1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Verification};
16 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
17 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
21 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
23 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
24 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
25 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, SocketAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, GossipTimestampFilter};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup, UtxoResolver};
31 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, MaybeReadable};
32 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Level};
33 use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
34 use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
35 use crate::util::indexed_map::{IndexedMap, Entry as IndexedMapEntry};
38 use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
39 use crate::prelude::*;
41 use core::convert::TryFrom;
42 use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, LockTestExt};
43 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use crate::sync::Mutex;
45 use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
46 use core::str::FromStr;
48 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
49 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
51 /// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
53 const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
55 /// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
56 const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
58 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
59 /// refuse to relay the message.
60 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
62 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
63 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
64 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
66 /// Represents the compressed public key of a node
67 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
68 pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
71 /// Create a new NodeId from a public key
72 pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
73 NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
76 /// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
77 pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
81 /// Get the public key as an array from this NodeId
82 pub fn as_array(&self) -> &[u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] {
86 /// Get the public key from this NodeId
87 pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
88 PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
92 impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
93 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
94 write!(f, "NodeId({})", crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0))
97 impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
98 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
99 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
103 impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
104 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
109 impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
110 fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
111 Some(self.cmp(other))
115 impl Ord for NodeId {
116 fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
117 self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
121 impl Writeable for NodeId {
122 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
123 writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
128 impl Readable for NodeId {
129 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
130 let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
131 reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
136 impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
137 fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
138 Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
142 impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
143 type Error = secp256k1::Error;
145 fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
150 impl FromStr for NodeId {
151 type Err = hex::parse::HexToArrayError;
153 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
154 let data: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = hex::FromHex::from_hex(s)?;
159 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
160 pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
161 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
162 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
163 chain_hash: ChainHash,
165 // Lock order: channels -> nodes
166 channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
167 nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
168 removed_node_counters: Mutex<Vec<u32>>,
169 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize,
170 // Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
172 // NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
173 // of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
174 // * We want it to be possible to do tracking in no-std environments where we can compare
175 // a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
176 // * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
177 // * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
178 // environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
181 /// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
182 /// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
183 /// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
184 removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
185 /// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
186 /// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
187 /// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
188 removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
189 /// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
190 pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
193 /// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
194 pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
195 channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
196 nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
197 max_node_counter: u32,
200 /// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
201 /// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
203 /// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
204 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
205 pub enum NetworkUpdate {
206 /// An error indicating a `channel_update` messages should be applied via
207 /// [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
208 ChannelUpdateMessage {
209 /// The update to apply via [`NetworkGraph::update_channel`].
212 /// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
213 /// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
215 /// The short channel id of the closed channel.
216 short_channel_id: u64,
217 /// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
218 /// `channel_update` message is received.
221 /// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
222 /// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
224 /// The node id of the failed node.
226 /// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
227 /// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
232 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(NetworkUpdate,
233 (0, ChannelUpdateMessage) => {
236 (2, ChannelFailure) => {
237 (0, short_channel_id, required),
238 (2, is_permanent, required),
240 (4, NodeFailure) => {
241 (0, node_id, required),
242 (2, is_permanent, required),
246 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
247 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
248 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
249 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
250 /// serving historical announcements.
251 pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
252 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
255 utxo_lookup: RwLock<Option<U>>,
256 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
257 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
258 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
262 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
263 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
265 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
266 /// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
267 /// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
268 /// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
269 pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
272 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
273 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
274 utxo_lookup: RwLock::new(utxo_lookup),
275 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
280 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
281 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
282 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
283 pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
284 *self.utxo_lookup.write().unwrap() = utxo_lookup;
287 /// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
288 /// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
290 /// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
291 pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
295 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
296 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
297 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
298 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
299 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
300 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
301 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
308 /// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
310 /// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
312 pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
314 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
315 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
316 if update_msg.as_ref()
317 .map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0) > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
322 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
323 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY { return; }
325 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
326 if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
327 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY ||
328 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
335 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
339 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
340 /// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
342 /// Note that this will skip applying any [`NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage`] to avoid
343 /// leaking possibly identifying information of the sender to the public network.
345 /// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
346 pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
347 match *network_update {
348 NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
349 let short_channel_id = msg.contents.short_channel_id;
350 let is_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
351 let status = if is_enabled { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
352 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipping application of a channel update from a payment failure. Channel {} is {}.", short_channel_id, status);
354 NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
356 log_debug!(self.logger, "Removing channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", short_channel_id);
357 self.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
360 NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
362 log_debug!(self.logger,
363 "Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.", log_pubkey!(node_id));
364 self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
370 /// Gets the chain hash for this network graph.
371 pub fn get_chain_hash(&self) -> ChainHash {
376 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
377 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
378 match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
381 return Err(LightningError {
382 err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
383 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
384 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
385 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
386 data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
388 log_level: Level::Trace,
396 macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
397 ( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
398 PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice())
399 .map_err(|_| LightningError {
400 err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
401 action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
402 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
403 channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
404 data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
406 log_level: Level::Trace
412 fn message_sha256d_hash<M: Writeable>(msg: &M) -> Sha256dHash {
413 let mut engine = Sha256dHash::engine();
414 msg.write(&mut engine).expect("In-memory structs should not fail to serialize");
415 Sha256dHash::from_engine(engine)
418 /// Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`].
420 /// Returns an error if it is invalid.
421 pub fn verify_node_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
422 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
423 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"), "node_announcement");
428 /// Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`].
430 /// Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid.
431 pub fn verify_channel_announcement<C: Verification>(msg: &ChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
432 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
433 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
434 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
435 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
436 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement"), "channel_announcement");
441 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
442 where U::Target: UtxoLookup, L::Target: Logger
444 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
445 self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
446 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
447 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
448 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
451 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
452 self.network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &*self.utxo_lookup.read().unwrap())?;
453 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
456 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
457 self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
458 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
461 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
462 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
463 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
464 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
465 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
466 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
467 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
468 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
469 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
471 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
472 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
474 return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
476 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
477 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
483 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
484 let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
485 let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
486 nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
490 for (_, ref node) in iter {
491 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
492 if let Some(msg) = node_info.announcement_message.clone() {
500 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
501 /// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
502 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
504 /// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
505 /// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
506 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
507 /// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
508 /// tracking this directly.
510 /// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
511 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
512 /// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
513 /// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
514 /// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
515 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
516 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
517 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
518 // Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
519 // channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
523 // The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
525 // Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
526 // to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
527 // updates from all our peers normally.
529 // Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
530 // wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
531 // dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
534 // In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
535 // to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
536 // channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
537 // `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
538 // very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
540 // Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
541 // make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
542 // relying on it useless.
544 // After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
545 // connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
546 // without using the "gossip queries" messages.
548 // Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
549 // peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
550 // message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
551 // timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
552 // timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
555 // Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
556 // your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
557 // tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
558 // routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
559 // will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
560 // ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
561 // ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
563 // Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
564 // propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
565 // several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
566 // propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
568 // In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
569 // our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
570 // `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
572 // For no-std builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
573 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
574 let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
575 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
577 gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
578 if self.should_request_full_sync(&their_node_id) {
579 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
581 gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
585 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
586 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
587 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
588 msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
589 chain_hash: self.network_graph.chain_hash,
590 first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
591 timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
597 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
598 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
599 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
600 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
604 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
605 // We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
606 // reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
607 // this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
611 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
612 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
613 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
614 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
615 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
616 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
617 /// memory constrained systems.
618 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
619 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
621 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
623 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
624 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
625 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
627 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
628 if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.chain_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
629 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
630 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
631 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
632 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
633 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
634 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
635 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
637 short_channel_ids: vec![],
640 return Err(LightningError {
641 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
642 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
646 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
647 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
648 // exists even if its not yet routable.
649 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
650 let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
651 for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
652 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
653 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
654 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
655 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
658 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
659 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
664 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
665 let batch_count = batches.len();
666 let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
667 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
668 // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
669 // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
671 // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
672 // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
673 // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
674 // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
675 // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
676 // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
677 let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
679 // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
680 // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
681 // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
683 // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
684 // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
685 // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
687 // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
688 // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
689 let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
690 (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
692 // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
693 // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
695 (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
698 prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
700 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
701 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
702 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
703 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
707 short_channel_ids: batch,
715 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
718 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
719 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
723 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
724 let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
725 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
729 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
730 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
731 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
735 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
736 self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
740 impl<G: Deref<Target=NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
742 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
745 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
746 let mut ret = Vec::new();
747 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
748 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
753 // Fetching values from this struct is very performance sensitive during routefinding. Thus, we
754 // want to ensure that all of the fields we care about (all of them except `last_update_message`)
755 // sit on the same cache line.
757 // We do this by using `repr(C)`, which forces the struct to be laid out in memory the way we write
758 // it (ensuring `last_update_message` hangs off the end and no fields are reordered after it), and
759 // `align(32)`, ensuring the struct starts either at the start, or in the middle, of a 64b x86-64
760 // cache line. This ensures the beginning fields (which are 31 bytes) all sit in the same cache
762 #[repr(C, align(32))]
763 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
764 /// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
765 pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
766 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
767 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
768 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
769 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
770 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
771 pub fees: RoutingFees,
772 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
773 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
774 pub last_update: u32,
775 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
776 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
777 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
779 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
780 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
781 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
782 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
783 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
786 impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
787 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
788 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
793 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
794 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
795 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
796 (0, self.last_update, required),
797 (2, self.enabled, required),
798 (4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
799 (6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
800 // Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
801 // compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
802 (8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
803 (10, self.fees, required),
804 (12, self.last_update_message, required),
810 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
811 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
812 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
813 _init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
814 _init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
815 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
816 _init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
817 _init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
818 _init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
820 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
821 (0, last_update, required),
822 (2, enabled, required),
823 (4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
824 (6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
825 (8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
826 (10, fees, required),
827 (12, last_update_message, required)
830 if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
831 Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
832 last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
833 enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
834 cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
835 htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
837 fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
838 last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
841 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
846 // Fetching values from this struct is very performance sensitive during routefinding. Thus, we
847 // want to ensure that all of the fields we care about (all of them except `last_update_message`
848 // and `announcement_received_time`) sit on the same cache line.
850 // Sadly, this is not possible, however we can still do okay - all of the fields before
851 // `one_to_two` and `two_to_one` are just under 128 bytes long, so we can ensure they sit on
852 // adjacent cache lines (which are generally fetched together in x86_64 processors).
854 // This leaves only the two directional channel info structs on separate cache lines.
856 // We accomplish this using `repr(C)`, which forces the struct to be laid out in memory the way we
857 // write it (ensuring the fields we care about are at the start of the struct) and `align(128)`,
858 // ensuring the struct starts at the beginning of two adjacent 64b x86-64 cache lines.
859 #[repr(align(128), C)]
860 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq)]
861 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
862 /// Received within a channel announcement.
863 pub struct ChannelInfo {
864 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
865 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
867 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
868 pub node_one: NodeId,
870 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
871 pub node_two: NodeId,
874 pub(crate) node_one_counter: u32,
876 pub(crate) node_two_counter: u32,
878 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
879 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
881 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
882 pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
883 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
884 pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
886 /// An initial announcement of the channel
887 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
888 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
889 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
890 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
891 /// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
892 /// (which we can probably assume we are - no-std environments probably won't have a full
893 /// network graph in memory!).
894 announcement_received_time: u64,
897 impl PartialEq for ChannelInfo {
898 fn eq(&self, o: &ChannelInfo) -> bool {
899 self.features == o.features &&
900 self.node_one == o.node_one &&
901 self.one_to_two == o.one_to_two &&
902 self.node_two == o.node_two &&
903 self.two_to_one == o.two_to_one &&
904 self.capacity_sats == o.capacity_sats &&
905 self.announcement_message == o.announcement_message &&
906 self.announcement_received_time == o.announcement_received_time
911 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
912 /// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
913 pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
914 let (direction, source, outbound) = {
915 if target == &self.node_one {
916 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two, false)
917 } else if target == &self.node_two {
918 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one, true)
923 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), source))
926 /// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
927 /// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
928 pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo, &NodeId)> {
929 let (direction, target, outbound) = {
930 if source == &self.node_one {
931 (self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two, true)
932 } else if source == &self.node_two {
933 (self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one, false)
938 direction.map(|dir| (DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), target))
941 /// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
942 pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
943 let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
945 self.one_to_two.as_ref()
947 self.two_to_one.as_ref()
952 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
953 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
954 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
955 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), &self.node_one, self.one_to_two, &self.node_two, self.two_to_one)?;
960 impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
961 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
962 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
963 (0, self.features, required),
964 (1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
965 (2, self.node_one, required),
966 (4, self.one_to_two, required),
967 (6, self.node_two, required),
968 (8, self.two_to_one, required),
969 (10, self.capacity_sats, required),
970 (12, self.announcement_message, required),
976 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
977 // necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
978 // that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
979 // the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
980 // channel updates via the gossip network.
981 struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
983 impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
984 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
985 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
986 Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
987 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
988 Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
989 Err(err) => Err(err),
994 impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
995 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
996 _init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
997 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
998 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
999 let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1000 _init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
1001 let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
1002 _init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
1003 _init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
1004 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1005 (0, features, required),
1006 (1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
1007 (2, node_one, required),
1008 (4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
1009 (6, node_two, required),
1010 (8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
1011 (10, capacity_sats, required),
1012 (12, announcement_message, required),
1016 features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
1017 node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
1018 one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
1019 node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
1020 two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
1021 capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
1022 announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
1023 announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
1024 node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
1025 node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
1030 /// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
1031 /// source node to a target node.
1033 pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1034 channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
1035 direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
1036 source_counter: u32,
1037 target_counter: u32,
1038 /// The direction this channel is in - if set, it indicates that we're traversing the channel
1039 /// from [`ChannelInfo::node_one`] to [`ChannelInfo::node_two`].
1040 from_node_one: bool,
1043 impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1045 fn new(channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo, from_node_one: bool) -> Self {
1046 let (source_counter, target_counter) = if from_node_one {
1047 (channel.node_one_counter, channel.node_two_counter)
1049 (channel.node_two_counter, channel.node_one_counter)
1051 Self { channel, direction, from_node_one, source_counter, target_counter }
1054 /// Returns information for the channel.
1056 pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo { self.channel }
1058 /// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
1060 /// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
1061 /// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
1064 pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
1065 let mut htlc_maximum_msat = self.direction().htlc_maximum_msat;
1066 let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
1068 match capacity_msat {
1069 Some(capacity_msat) => {
1070 htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
1071 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat }
1073 None => EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
1077 /// Returns information for the direction.
1079 pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo { self.direction }
1081 /// Returns the `node_id` of the source hop.
1083 /// Refers to the `node_id` forwarding the payment to the next hop.
1085 pub(super) fn source(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_one } else { &self.channel.node_two } }
1087 /// Returns the `node_id` of the target hop.
1089 /// Refers to the `node_id` receiving the payment from the previous hop.
1091 pub(super) fn target(&self) -> &'a NodeId { if self.from_node_one { &self.channel.node_two } else { &self.channel.node_one } }
1093 /// Returns the source node's counter
1095 pub(super) fn source_counter(&self) -> u32 { self.source_counter }
1097 /// Returns the target node's counter
1099 pub(super) fn target_counter(&self) -> u32 { self.target_counter }
1102 impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
1103 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1104 f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo")
1105 .field("channel", &self.channel)
1110 /// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
1112 /// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
1113 /// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
1114 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
1115 pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
1116 /// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
1119 /// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
1121 liquidity_msat: u64,
1123 /// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
1125 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1128 /// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
1130 /// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1132 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1133 htlc_maximum_msat: u64
1135 /// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
1138 /// The maximum HTLC amount as provided by an invoice route hint.
1140 /// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
1143 /// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
1144 /// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
1148 /// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
1149 /// use when making routing decisions.
1150 pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
1152 impl EffectiveCapacity {
1153 /// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
1154 pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1156 EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
1157 EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1158 EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
1159 EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
1160 EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
1161 EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
1166 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
1167 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug, Hash, Ord, PartialOrd)]
1168 pub struct RoutingFees {
1169 /// Flat routing fee in millisatoshis.
1171 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
1172 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
1173 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
1176 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
1177 (0, base_msat, required),
1178 (2, proportional_millionths, required)
1181 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1182 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
1183 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1184 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
1185 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1186 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
1187 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
1188 pub last_update: u32,
1189 /// Color assigned to the node
1191 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
1192 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
1193 /// should not be exposed to the user.
1194 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1195 /// An initial announcement of the node
1196 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
1197 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
1198 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
1199 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
1202 impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1203 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
1204 pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddress] {
1205 self.announcement_message.as_ref()
1206 .map(|msg| msg.contents.addresses.as_slice())
1207 .unwrap_or_default()
1211 impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1212 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1213 let empty_addresses = Vec::<SocketAddress>::new();
1214 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1215 (0, self.features, required),
1216 (2, self.last_update, required),
1217 (4, self.rgb, required),
1218 (6, self.alias, required),
1219 (8, self.announcement_message, option),
1220 (10, empty_addresses, required_vec), // Versions prior to 0.0.115 require this field
1226 impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1227 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1228 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1229 (0, features, required),
1230 (2, last_update, required),
1232 (6, alias, required),
1233 (8, announcement_message, option),
1234 (10, _addresses, optional_vec), // deprecated, not used anymore
1236 let _: Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> = _addresses;
1237 Ok(Self { features: features.0.unwrap(), last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(), rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
1238 alias: alias.0.unwrap(), announcement_message })
1242 /// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
1244 /// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
1245 /// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
1246 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1247 pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
1249 impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
1250 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1251 let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
1252 let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
1253 match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
1254 Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
1256 use core::fmt::Write;
1257 for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
1258 // Display printable ASCII characters
1259 let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
1260 let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
1269 impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
1270 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1275 impl Readable for NodeAlias {
1276 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1277 Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
1281 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq)]
1282 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
1283 pub struct NodeInfo {
1284 /// All valid channels a node has announced
1285 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
1286 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
1287 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
1288 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
1289 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>,
1291 pub(crate) node_counter: u32,
1294 impl PartialEq for NodeInfo {
1295 fn eq(&self, o: &NodeInfo) -> bool {
1296 self.channels == o.channels && self.announcement_info == o.announcement_info
1300 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
1301 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1302 write!(f, " channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
1303 &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
1308 impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
1309 fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1310 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1311 // Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
1312 (2, self.announcement_info, option),
1313 (4, self.channels, required_vec),
1319 // A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
1320 // necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `SocketAddress` that have an
1321 // invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
1322 // `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
1323 struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
1325 impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
1326 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
1327 match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
1328 Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
1330 copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
1337 impl Readable for NodeInfo {
1338 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1339 // Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
1340 // A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
1341 // with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
1342 // requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
1343 // performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
1344 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1345 (0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
1346 (2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
1347 (4, channels, required_vec),
1349 let _: Option<RoutingFees> = _lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1350 let announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> = announcement_info_wrap;
1353 announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
1355 node_counter: u32::max_value(),
1360 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1361 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
1363 impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1364 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1365 self.test_node_counter_consistency();
1367 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1369 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
1370 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1371 (channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1372 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1373 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
1374 chan_info.write(writer)?;
1376 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1377 (nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1378 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1379 node_id.write(writer)?;
1380 node_info.write(writer)?;
1383 let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
1384 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1385 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1391 impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1392 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
1393 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
1395 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1396 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1397 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 15,000 nodes; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1398 let mut channels = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count as usize, 22500));
1399 for _ in 0..channels_count {
1400 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1401 let chan_info: ChannelInfo = Readable::read(reader)?;
1402 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
1404 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1405 if nodes_count > u32::max_value() as u64 / 2 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1406 // In Nov, 2023 there were about 69K channels; we cap allocations to 1.5x that.
1407 let mut nodes = IndexedMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(nodes_count as usize, 103500));
1408 for i in 0..nodes_count {
1409 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
1410 let mut node_info: NodeInfo = Readable::read(reader)?;
1411 node_info.node_counter = i as u32;
1412 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
1415 for (_, chan) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1416 chan.node_one_counter =
1417 nodes.get(&chan.node_one).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.node_counter;
1418 chan.node_two_counter =
1419 nodes.get(&chan.node_two).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.node_counter;
1422 let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
1423 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1424 (1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
1428 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1431 channels: RwLock::new(channels),
1432 nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
1433 removed_node_counters: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1434 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize::new(nodes_count as usize),
1435 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
1436 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1437 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1438 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1443 impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1444 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
1445 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
1446 for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1447 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
1449 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
1450 for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
1451 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", &node_id, val)?;
1457 impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
1458 impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1459 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
1460 // For a total lockorder, sort by position in memory and take the inner locks in that order.
1461 // (Assumes that we can't move within memory while a lock is held).
1462 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
1463 let a = if ord { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) } else { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) };
1464 let b = if ord { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) } else { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) };
1465 let (channels_a, channels_b) = (a.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1466 let (nodes_a, nodes_b) = (a.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(), b.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
1467 self.chain_hash.eq(&other.chain_hash) && channels_a.eq(&channels_b) && nodes_a.eq(&nodes_b)
1471 impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {
1472 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
1473 pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
1475 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
1476 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network),
1478 channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1479 nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::new()),
1480 next_node_counter: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1481 removed_node_counters: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1482 last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
1483 removed_channels: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1484 removed_nodes: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1485 pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
1489 fn test_node_counter_consistency(&self) {
1490 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1491 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1492 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1493 let removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1494 let next_counter = self.next_node_counter.load(Ordering::Acquire);
1495 assert!(next_counter < (u32::max_value() as usize) / 2);
1496 let mut used_node_counters = vec![0u8; next_counter / 8 + 1];
1498 for counter in removed_node_counters.iter() {
1499 let pos = (*counter as usize) / 8;
1500 let bit = 1 << (counter % 8);
1501 assert_eq!(used_node_counters[pos] & bit, 0);
1502 used_node_counters[pos] |= bit;
1504 for (_, node) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
1505 assert!((node.node_counter as usize) < next_counter);
1506 let pos = (node.node_counter as usize) / 8;
1507 let bit = 1 << (node.node_counter % 8);
1508 assert_eq!(used_node_counters[pos] & bit, 0);
1509 used_node_counters[pos] |= bit;
1512 for (_, chan) in channels.unordered_iter() {
1513 assert_eq!(chan.node_one_counter, nodes.get(&chan.node_one).unwrap().node_counter);
1514 assert_eq!(chan.node_two_counter, nodes.get(&chan.node_two).unwrap().node_counter);
1519 /// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
1520 pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
1521 self.test_node_counter_consistency();
1522 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1523 let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
1524 ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
1527 max_node_counter: (self.next_node_counter.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).saturating_sub(1),
1531 /// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1532 /// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1533 pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1534 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
1537 /// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
1538 /// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
1539 pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
1540 self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
1543 /// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
1546 pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
1547 for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
1548 node.1.announcement_info = None;
1552 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1553 /// given node announcement.
1555 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
1556 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1557 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1558 pub fn update_node_from_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1559 verify_node_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1560 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
1563 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
1564 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
1565 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
1567 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1568 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
1571 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1572 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1573 match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
1575 core::mem::drop(nodes);
1576 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
1577 Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
1580 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
1581 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
1582 // updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
1583 // that it be at least the current time.
1584 if node_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
1585 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1586 } else if node_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
1587 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1592 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1593 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
1594 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
1595 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
1596 features: msg.features.clone(),
1597 last_update: msg.timestamp,
1600 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1608 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1610 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1611 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1612 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1614 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1615 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1616 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
1617 &self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
1618 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1620 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1622 verify_channel_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
1623 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
1626 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
1628 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1629 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
1630 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
1632 /// This will skip verification of if the channel is actually on-chain.
1633 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement_no_lookup(
1634 &self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement
1635 ) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1636 self.update_channel_from_announcement::<&UtxoResolver>(msg, &None)
1639 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
1640 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
1641 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
1643 /// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
1644 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
1645 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
1646 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1647 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1649 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1651 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
1654 /// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
1656 /// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
1657 /// rapid gossip sync server)
1659 /// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
1660 pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(&self, short_channel_id: u64, timestamp: u64, features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: PublicKey, node_id_2: PublicKey) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1661 if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
1662 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1665 let node_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1);
1666 let node_2 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2);
1667 let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
1669 node_one: node_1.clone(),
1671 node_two: node_2.clone(),
1673 capacity_sats: None,
1674 announcement_message: None,
1675 announcement_received_time: timestamp,
1676 node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
1677 node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
1680 self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
1683 fn add_channel_between_nodes(&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<u64>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
1684 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1685 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1687 let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
1688 let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
1690 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Adding channel {} between nodes {} and {}", short_channel_id, node_id_a, node_id_b);
1692 let channel_entry = channels.entry(short_channel_id);
1693 let channel_info = match channel_entry {
1694 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1695 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
1696 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
1698 if utxo_value.is_some() {
1699 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
1700 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
1701 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
1703 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
1704 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
1706 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
1707 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
1708 *entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
1711 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
1714 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
1715 entry.insert(channel_info)
1719 let mut node_counter_id = [
1720 (&mut channel_info.node_one_counter, node_id_a),
1721 (&mut channel_info.node_two_counter, node_id_b)
1723 for (node_counter, current_node_id) in node_counter_id.iter_mut() {
1724 match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
1725 IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
1726 let node = node_entry.into_mut();
1727 node.channels.push(short_channel_id);
1728 **node_counter = node.node_counter;
1730 IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
1731 let mut removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1732 **node_counter = removed_node_counters.pop()
1733 .unwrap_or(self.next_node_counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u32);
1734 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
1735 channels: vec!(short_channel_id),
1736 announcement_info: None,
1737 node_counter: **node_counter,
1746 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
1747 &self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>
1748 ) -> Result<(), LightningError>
1750 U::Target: UtxoLookup,
1752 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
1753 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
1756 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
1757 return Err(LightningError {
1758 err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
1759 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
1764 let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
1766 if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
1767 if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
1768 // If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
1769 // against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
1771 // Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
1772 // the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
1773 // to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
1774 // randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
1776 // We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
1777 // as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
1778 // if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
1779 if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
1780 return Err(LightningError {
1781 err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1782 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1785 } else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
1786 // Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
1787 // duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
1788 return Err(LightningError {
1789 err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
1790 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip
1797 let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1798 let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1799 if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id) ||
1800 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1) ||
1801 removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2) {
1802 return Err(LightningError{
1803 err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
1804 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
1808 let utxo_value = self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(
1809 utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
1811 #[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
1812 let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
1813 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1815 announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1818 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
1819 features: msg.features.clone(),
1820 node_one: msg.node_id_1,
1822 node_two: msg.node_id_2,
1824 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
1825 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
1826 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
1827 announcement_received_time,
1828 node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
1829 node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
1832 self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
1834 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.short_channel_id, if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
1838 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1840 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1841 pub fn channel_failed_permanent(&self, short_channel_id: u64) {
1842 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1843 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1844 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1845 let current_time_unix = None;
1847 self.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, current_time_unix)
1850 /// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
1852 /// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
1853 fn channel_failed_permanent_with_time(&self, short_channel_id: u64, current_time_unix: Option<u64>) {
1854 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1855 if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
1856 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1857 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
1858 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
1862 /// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
1863 /// from local storage.
1864 pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
1865 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1866 let current_time_unix = Some(SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs());
1867 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
1868 let current_time_unix = None;
1870 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
1871 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1872 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1873 let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
1874 let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
1876 if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
1877 let mut removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
1878 for scid in node.channels.iter() {
1879 if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
1880 let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one { chan_info.node_two } else { chan_info.node_one };
1881 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) = nodes.entry(other_node_id) {
1882 other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1885 if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1886 removed_node_counters.push(other_node_entry.get().node_counter);
1887 other_node_entry.remove_entry();
1890 removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
1893 removed_node_counters.push(node.node_counter);
1894 removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
1898 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1899 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1900 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1903 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1904 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1905 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1907 /// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
1908 /// automatically called regularly for you.
1910 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1911 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1913 /// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
1914 /// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for `no-std` use.
1915 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
1916 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
1917 self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
1920 /// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
1921 /// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
1924 /// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
1925 /// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
1926 /// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
1928 /// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
1929 /// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
1931 /// This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature
1932 /// enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable.
1933 pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
1934 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
1935 // Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
1936 if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 { return; } // Remove by 2106
1937 if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS { return; }
1938 let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
1939 // Sadly BTreeMap::retain was only stabilized in 1.53 so we can't switch to it for some
1941 let mut scids_to_remove = Vec::new();
1942 for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
1943 if info.one_to_two.is_some() && info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1944 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update one_to_two (0) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1945 scid, info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1946 info.one_to_two = None;
1948 if info.two_to_one.is_some() && info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix {
1949 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update two_to_one (1) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
1950 scid, info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
1951 info.two_to_one = None;
1953 if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
1954 // We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
1955 // announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
1956 // channel_update for.
1957 let announcement_received_timestamp = info.announcement_received_time;
1958 if announcement_received_timestamp < min_time_unix as u64 {
1959 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing channel {} because both directional updates are missing and its announcement timestamp {} being below {}",
1960 scid, announcement_received_timestamp, min_time_unix);
1961 scids_to_remove.push(*scid);
1965 if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
1966 let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
1967 for scid in scids_to_remove {
1968 let info = channels.remove(&scid).expect("We just accessed this scid, it should be present");
1969 self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &info, scid);
1970 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
1974 let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
1975 if let Some(time) = time {
1976 current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
1978 // NOTE: In the case of no-std, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
1979 // so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
1980 // of this function.
1981 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
1983 let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
1984 core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
1987 #[allow(unreachable_code)]
1991 self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1992 self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
1995 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
1998 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
1999 /// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
2000 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
2002 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
2003 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
2004 pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2005 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), false)
2008 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
2009 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
2010 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
2012 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
2013 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
2014 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2015 self.update_channel_internal(msg, None, None, false)
2018 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, verify the given [`ChannelUpdate`].
2020 /// This checks whether the update currently is applicable by [`Self::update_channel`].
2022 /// If built with `no-std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
2023 /// materially in the future will be rejected.
2024 pub fn verify_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2025 self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), true)
2028 fn update_channel_internal(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate,
2029 full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>,
2030 only_verify: bool) -> Result<(), LightningError>
2032 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
2034 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
2035 return Err(LightningError {
2036 err: "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
2037 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
2041 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
2043 // Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
2044 // disable this check during tests!
2045 let time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2046 if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
2047 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
2049 if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
2050 return Err(LightningError{err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
2054 log_gossip!(self.logger, "Updating channel {} in direction {} with timestamp {}", msg.short_channel_id, msg.flags & 1, msg.timestamp);
2056 let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
2057 match channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
2059 core::mem::drop(channels);
2060 self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
2061 return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2064 if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
2065 return Err(LightningError{err:
2066 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
2067 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2070 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
2071 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
2072 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
2073 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
2074 return Err(LightningError{err:
2075 "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
2076 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2079 macro_rules! check_update_latest {
2080 ($target: expr) => {
2081 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
2082 // The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
2083 // order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
2084 // suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
2085 // channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
2086 // pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
2087 // but only in the non-normative section.
2088 if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
2089 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
2090 } else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
2091 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip});
2097 macro_rules! get_new_channel_info {
2099 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
2100 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
2102 let updated_channel_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
2103 enabled: chan_enabled,
2104 last_update: msg.timestamp,
2105 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
2106 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
2107 htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
2109 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
2110 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
2114 Some(updated_channel_update_info)
2118 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg)[..]);
2119 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
2120 check_update_latest!(channel.two_to_one);
2121 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2122 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_two.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2123 err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
2124 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2125 })?, "channel_update");
2128 channel.two_to_one = get_new_channel_info!();
2131 check_update_latest!(channel.one_to_two);
2132 if let Some(sig) = sig {
2133 secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &PublicKey::from_slice(channel.node_one.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError{
2134 err: "Couldn't parse destination node pubkey".to_owned(),
2135 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug)
2136 })?, "channel_update");
2139 channel.one_to_two = get_new_channel_info!();
2148 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(&self, nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
2149 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
2150 ($node_id: expr) => {
2151 if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
2152 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
2153 short_channel_id != *chan_id
2155 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
2156 self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap().push(entry.get().node_counter);
2157 entry.remove_entry();
2160 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
2165 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
2166 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
2170 impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
2171 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
2173 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2174 pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
2178 /// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
2179 pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
2180 self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
2183 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
2184 /// Returns the list of channels in the graph
2185 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
2186 self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
2189 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
2191 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
2192 pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
2196 /// Returns information on a node with the given id.
2197 pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
2198 self.nodes.get(node_id)
2201 #[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
2202 /// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
2203 pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
2204 self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
2207 /// Get network addresses by node id.
2208 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
2209 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
2210 pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> {
2211 self.nodes.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
2212 .and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
2215 /// Gets the maximum possible node_counter for a node in this graph
2216 pub(crate) fn max_node_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2217 self.max_node_counter
2222 pub(crate) mod tests {
2223 use crate::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
2224 use crate::ln::channelmanager;
2225 use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
2226 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2227 use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
2228 use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY, NodeId, RoutingFees, ChannelUpdateInfo, ChannelInfo, NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeInfo};
2229 use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
2230 use crate::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
2231 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate,
2232 ReplyChannelRange, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
2233 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
2234 use crate::util::test_utils;
2235 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable};
2236 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
2238 use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2239 use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
2241 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2242 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2243 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2244 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2245 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
2246 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::ScriptBuf;
2247 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
2248 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
2249 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
2252 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
2253 use crate::prelude::*;
2254 use crate::sync::Arc;
2256 fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
2257 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2258 NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
2261 fn create_gossip_sync(network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) -> (
2262 Secp256k1<All>, P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2263 Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>
2265 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2266 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
2267 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
2268 (secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
2272 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2273 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
2274 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2275 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2276 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
2278 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2279 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2280 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2281 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2282 assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2283 assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
2286 pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> NodeAnnouncement {
2287 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
2288 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2289 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2293 alias: NodeAlias([0; 32]),
2294 addresses: Vec::new(),
2295 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2296 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2298 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2299 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2301 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2302 contents: unsigned_announcement
2306 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
2307 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
2308 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
2309 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2310 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2312 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2313 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
2314 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2315 short_channel_id: 0,
2316 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
2317 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
2318 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey)),
2319 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey)),
2320 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2322 f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
2323 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2324 ChannelAnnouncement {
2325 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
2326 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
2327 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2328 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2329 contents: unsigned_announcement,
2333 pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ScriptBuf {
2334 let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2335 let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2336 make_funding_redeemscript(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
2337 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey)).to_v0_p2wsh()
2340 pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelUpdate {
2341 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2342 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
2343 short_channel_id: 0,
2346 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2347 htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
2348 htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
2349 fee_base_msat: 10_000,
2350 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2351 excess_data: Vec::new()
2353 f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
2354 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
2356 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
2357 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2362 fn handling_node_announcements() {
2363 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2364 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2366 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2367 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2368 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2370 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2371 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2373 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
2377 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
2378 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2379 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2380 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2385 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2386 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2390 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2391 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
2393 signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
2394 contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone()
2397 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message")
2400 let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2401 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
2402 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2403 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2404 // Return false because contains excess data.
2405 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
2406 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2410 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2411 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
2412 let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2413 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
2414 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2415 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
2417 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
2422 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
2423 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2424 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2426 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2427 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2429 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2430 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2432 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
2433 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2434 let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
2435 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2436 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2441 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2447 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
2448 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
2449 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2451 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel")
2454 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
2455 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2456 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
2457 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2458 gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2460 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2461 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
2462 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2463 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2465 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
2468 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
2469 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2470 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2471 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2472 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
2473 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2474 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2475 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2480 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id) {
2486 // If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
2487 // chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
2488 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2489 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script }));
2490 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2492 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel")
2495 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2497 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2499 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2500 // Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
2501 gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2503 // Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
2504 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2505 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
2506 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2507 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2509 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
2512 gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2514 // The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
2515 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2516 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2521 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
2522 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2523 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
2524 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2525 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2526 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2527 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2531 let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_announcement.clone();
2532 invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
2533 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
2535 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message")
2538 let channel_to_itself_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2539 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
2541 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
2544 // Test that channel announcements with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet,
2545 // announcement is mainnet).
2546 let incorrect_chain_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
2547 unsigned_announcement.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2548 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2549 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&incorrect_chain_announcement) {
2551 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2556 fn handling_channel_update() {
2557 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2558 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2559 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2560 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2561 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2563 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2564 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2566 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
2567 let short_channel_id;
2570 // Announce a channel we will update
2571 let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
2572 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
2573 UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
2575 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2576 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2577 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2584 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2585 network_graph.verify_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2586 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2587 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
2592 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2594 Some(channel_info) => {
2595 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
2596 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
2601 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2602 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2603 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
2604 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2605 // Return false because contains excess data
2606 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2607 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
2611 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2612 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2613 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
2614 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2615 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2617 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
2620 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2621 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
2622 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2623 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2624 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2626 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
2629 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2630 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats * 1000 + 1;
2631 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
2632 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2633 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2635 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
2638 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
2639 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
2640 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2641 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
2642 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2643 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2645 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update")
2648 let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2649 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
2650 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2651 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
2652 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
2653 invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
2654 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
2656 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message")
2659 // Test that channel updates with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet, channel
2660 // update is mainet).
2661 let incorrect_chain_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2662 unsigned_channel_update.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
2663 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2665 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&incorrect_chain_update) {
2667 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash")
2672 fn handling_network_update() {
2673 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2674 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2675 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2677 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2678 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2679 let node_2_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2682 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
2683 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2686 let short_channel_id;
2688 // Check we won't apply an update via `handle_network_update` for privacy reasons, but
2689 // can continue fine if we manually apply it.
2690 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2691 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2692 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2693 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2694 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2696 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2697 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2699 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage {
2700 msg: valid_channel_update.clone(),
2703 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2704 network_graph.update_channel(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
2707 // Non-permanent failure doesn't touch the channel at all
2709 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2711 Some(channel_info) => {
2712 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2716 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2718 is_permanent: false,
2721 match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
2723 Some(channel_info) => {
2724 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
2729 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
2730 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
2735 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2736 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
2737 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2740 // Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
2741 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2743 // Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
2744 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2745 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2746 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2747 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2748 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2750 // Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
2751 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2753 is_permanent: false,
2756 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2757 assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_id)).is_some());
2759 // Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
2760 network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
2765 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2766 // Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
2767 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2772 fn test_channel_timeouts() {
2773 // Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
2774 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
2775 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
2776 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
2777 let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
2778 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2780 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2781 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2783 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2784 let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2785 let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
2786 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2787 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
2789 // Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
2790 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2791 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2792 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2794 let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(|update| {update.flags |=1;}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2795 gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
2796 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
2798 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2799 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2800 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2802 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2803 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] {
2804 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2805 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2807 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2808 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2810 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2812 // In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
2813 // the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
2814 // fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
2815 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
2816 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
2818 // Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
2819 // We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
2820 // so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
2821 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
2822 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2823 let announcement_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2824 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2825 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = (announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
2826 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2827 assert!(gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).is_ok());
2828 assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
2829 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2830 // Make sure removed channels are tracked.
2831 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2832 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2833 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS +
2834 REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2837 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
2838 assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
2839 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2841 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2843 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
2845 let tracking_time = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
2847 // Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
2848 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2849 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2851 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2852 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2853 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2854 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2856 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2857 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2858 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, Some(tracking_time));
2860 // Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
2861 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2862 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1);
2863 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1, "Removed channel count ≠1 with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2865 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2866 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2867 tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2868 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2869 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}", tracking_time);
2872 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
2874 // When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
2875 // be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
2876 // only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
2878 let removal_time = 1664619654;
2880 // Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
2881 network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
2882 network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
2884 // Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
2885 // now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
2886 assert!(network_graph.update_channel_from_announcement(
2887 &valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source).is_ok());
2889 // Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
2890 // and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
2891 network_graph.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
2893 // The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
2894 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
2895 assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
2897 // Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
2898 network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
2899 removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS);
2900 assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2901 assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
2906 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
2907 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2908 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2909 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2910 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2912 // Channels were not announced yet.
2913 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
2914 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2916 let short_channel_id;
2918 // Announce a channel we will update
2919 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2920 short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
2921 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
2927 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
2928 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2929 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2930 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2931 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2932 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2938 // Valid channel update
2939 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2940 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
2941 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2942 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2948 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
2949 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2950 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2951 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2952 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
2953 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2959 // Channel update with excess data.
2960 let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|unsigned_channel_update| {
2961 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
2962 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
2963 }, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
2964 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
2970 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
2971 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
2972 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
2973 let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
2974 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
2975 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
2980 // Further starting point have no channels after it
2981 let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
2982 assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
2986 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
2987 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
2988 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
2989 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2990 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2991 let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
2994 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
2995 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
2998 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
2999 let valid_channel_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3000 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
3006 // Nodes were never announced
3007 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
3008 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
3011 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3012 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3017 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3018 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3024 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
3025 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
3027 // Skip the first node.
3028 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
3029 assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
3032 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
3033 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3034 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
3035 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
3036 }, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3037 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3038 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
3043 let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
3044 assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
3048 fn network_graph_serialization() {
3049 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3050 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3052 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3053 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3055 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
3056 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3057 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3058 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
3062 let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3063 match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3068 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3069 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
3070 assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
3071 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
3073 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3074 assert!(<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph);
3078 fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
3079 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3080 network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
3082 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3083 network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
3085 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
3086 let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> = ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
3087 assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
3088 assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
3092 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
3093 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
3094 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
3095 use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
3097 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3098 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3099 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3100 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
3102 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3104 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
3106 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
3107 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
3108 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3109 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
3112 // It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
3114 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
3115 features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
3116 let init_msg = Init { features, networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
3117 gossip_sync.peer_connected(&node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
3118 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3121 MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter{ node_id, msg } => {
3122 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
3123 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
3124 let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
3125 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2);
3126 assert!((msg.first_timestamp as u64) < expected_timestamp - 60*60*24*7*2 + 10);
3127 assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
3129 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
3135 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
3136 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3137 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3139 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3140 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3141 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3142 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
3144 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
3145 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
3146 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
3149 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
3150 for block in 100000..=108001 {
3151 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
3154 // used for testing resumption on same block
3155 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
3158 let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(|unsigned_announcement| {
3159 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
3160 }, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
3161 match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
3167 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
3168 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3172 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3174 number_of_blocks: 0,
3177 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3178 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3180 number_of_blocks: 0,
3181 sync_complete: true,
3182 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3186 // Error when wrong chain
3187 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3191 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3193 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3196 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3197 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3199 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3200 sync_complete: true,
3201 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3205 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
3206 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3210 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3211 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3212 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3215 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
3216 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3217 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
3218 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
3219 sync_complete: true,
3220 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3224 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
3225 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3229 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3230 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3231 number_of_blocks: 1,
3236 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3237 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
3238 number_of_blocks: 1,
3239 sync_complete: true,
3240 short_channel_ids: vec![]
3245 // No results in valid query range
3246 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3250 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3251 first_blocknum: 1000,
3252 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3257 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3258 first_blocknum: 1000,
3259 number_of_blocks: 1000,
3260 sync_complete: true,
3261 short_channel_ids: vec![],
3266 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
3267 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3271 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3272 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3273 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
3278 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3279 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
3280 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
3281 sync_complete: true,
3282 short_channel_ids: vec![
3283 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
3289 // Single block exactly full
3290 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3294 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3295 first_blocknum: 100000,
3296 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3301 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3302 first_blocknum: 100000,
3303 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3304 sync_complete: true,
3305 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3306 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3312 // Multiple split on new block
3313 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3317 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3318 first_blocknum: 100000,
3319 number_of_blocks: 8001,
3324 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3325 first_blocknum: 100000,
3326 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3327 sync_complete: false,
3328 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
3329 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3333 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3334 first_blocknum: 107999,
3335 number_of_blocks: 2,
3336 sync_complete: true,
3337 short_channel_ids: vec![
3338 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
3344 // Multiple split on same block
3345 do_handling_query_channel_range(
3349 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3350 first_blocknum: 100002,
3351 number_of_blocks: 8000,
3356 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3357 first_blocknum: 100002,
3358 number_of_blocks: 7999,
3359 sync_complete: false,
3360 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
3361 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
3365 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
3366 first_blocknum: 108001,
3367 number_of_blocks: 1,
3368 sync_complete: true,
3369 short_channel_ids: vec![
3370 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
3377 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
3378 gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
3379 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
3380 msg: QueryChannelRange,
3382 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
3384 let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
3385 let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
3386 let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
3387 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
3390 assert!(result.is_ok());
3392 assert!(result.is_err());
3395 let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3396 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
3398 for i in 0..events.len() {
3399 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
3401 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
3402 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
3403 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
3404 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
3405 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
3406 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
3407 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
3409 // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
3410 assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
3411 assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
3412 max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
3413 c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
3415 // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
3416 if i == events.len() - 1 {
3417 assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
3420 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
3426 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
3427 let network_graph = create_network_graph();
3428 let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
3429 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
3430 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
3432 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
3434 let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
3436 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
3438 assert!(result.is_err());
3442 fn displays_node_alias() {
3443 let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
3444 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3445 bytes[..alias.as_bytes().len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
3446 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3449 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
3450 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
3451 assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
3453 let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
3454 let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
3455 bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
3456 format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
3459 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
3460 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
3461 assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
3465 fn channel_info_is_readable() {
3466 let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3467 let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3468 let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
3469 let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3470 let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
3472 // 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
3473 let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
3476 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
3477 htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
3478 htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
3479 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
3480 last_update_message: None,
3483 let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3484 assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
3486 // First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
3487 let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3488 assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
3490 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3491 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3492 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
3494 // Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
3495 // or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
3496 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
3497 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice());
3498 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3500 let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
3501 let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
3502 assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
3504 // 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
3505 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3506 let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
3507 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3508 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3510 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3512 capacity_sats: None,
3513 announcement_message: None,
3514 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3515 node_one_counter: 0,
3516 node_two_counter: 1,
3519 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3520 assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3522 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3523 assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
3525 // Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
3526 let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
3527 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
3528 node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
3529 one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3530 node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
3531 two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
3532 capacity_sats: None,
3533 announcement_message: None,
3534 announcement_received_time: 87654,
3535 node_one_counter: 0,
3536 node_two_counter: 1,
3539 let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
3540 assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
3542 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3543 assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
3545 // Check the serialization hasn't changed.
3546 let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3547 assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
3549 // Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
3550 // `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
3551 let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3552 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice()).unwrap();
3553 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3554 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3555 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3557 let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
3558 let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
3559 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
3560 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
3561 assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
3565 fn node_info_is_readable() {
3566 // 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
3567 let announcement_message = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
3568 let announcement_message = NodeAnnouncement::read(&mut announcement_message.as_slice()).unwrap();
3569 let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo {
3570 features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
3573 alias: NodeAlias([0u8; 32]),
3574 announcement_message: Some(announcement_message)
3577 let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
3578 assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
3579 let read_valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3580 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
3581 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
3583 let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
3584 let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
3585 assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
3587 // 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
3588 let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
3589 channels: Vec::new(),
3590 announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
3594 let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
3595 assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
3596 let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
3597 assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
3599 let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
3600 let read_invalid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
3601 assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
3605 fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
3606 let old_ann_info_with_addresses = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
3607 let ann_info_with_addresses = NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
3608 .expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
3609 // This serialized info has an address field but no announcement_message, therefore the addresses returned by our function will still be empty
3610 assert!(ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
3614 fn test_node_id_display() {
3615 let node_id = NodeId([42; 33]);
3616 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &node_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
3624 use criterion::{black_box, Criterion};
3626 pub fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3627 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3628 let (mut d, _) = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_graph_scorer_file().unwrap();
3629 let mut v = Vec::new();
3630 d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
3631 bench.bench_function("read_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3632 NetworkGraph::read(&mut std::io::Cursor::new(black_box(&v)), &logger).unwrap()
3636 pub fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
3637 let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
3638 let (mut d, _) = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_graph_scorer_file().unwrap();
3639 let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut d, &logger).unwrap();
3640 bench.bench_function("write_network_graph", |b| b.iter(||
3641 black_box(&net_graph).encode()