1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 //! [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
30 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
32 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
33 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
34 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
37 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
38 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
40 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
42 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
43 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
44 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
45 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
46 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
47 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
48 use util::logger::Logger;
49 use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
51 use util::events::Event;
53 use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet, hash_map};
58 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
59 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
60 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
63 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
64 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
65 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
66 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
67 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
69 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
70 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
71 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
75 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
76 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
77 self.update_id.write(w)?;
78 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
79 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
80 update_step.write(w)?;
85 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
86 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
87 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
88 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
89 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
91 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
93 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
97 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
99 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
100 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
101 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
103 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
104 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
105 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
106 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
108 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
109 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
110 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
112 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
113 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
114 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
115 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
116 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
117 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
120 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
121 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
124 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
125 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
126 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
127 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
128 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
131 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
132 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
133 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
135 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
136 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
137 /// of this channel).
139 /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
140 /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
141 /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
142 /// update must be rejected.
144 /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
145 /// the channel monitor instance.
147 /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
148 /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
149 /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
151 /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
152 /// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
153 /// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
154 /// lagging behind on block processing.
158 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
159 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
160 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
162 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
164 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
166 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
168 pub enum MonitorEvent {
169 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
170 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
172 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
173 CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
176 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
177 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
178 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
180 /// [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
181 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
182 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
183 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
184 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
185 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
187 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
189 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
190 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
191 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
192 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
193 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
194 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
195 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
196 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
197 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
198 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
199 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
200 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
201 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
202 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
203 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
204 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
205 /// accurate block height.
206 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
207 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
208 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
209 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
210 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
211 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
212 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
213 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
214 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
215 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
216 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
217 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
218 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
220 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
221 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
222 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
224 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
225 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
226 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
227 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
229 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
230 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
232 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
233 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
234 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
236 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
237 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
238 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
240 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
241 struct HolderSignedTx {
242 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
244 revocation_key: PublicKey,
245 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
246 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
247 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
248 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
250 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
253 /// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
254 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
256 struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
257 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
258 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
259 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
260 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
263 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
264 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
265 self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
266 self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
267 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
268 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
269 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
270 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
271 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
272 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
279 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
280 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
282 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
283 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
284 let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
285 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
286 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
287 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
288 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
289 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
290 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
291 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
292 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
295 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
296 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
299 CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
300 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
301 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
302 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
306 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
310 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
311 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
312 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
313 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
314 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
316 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
317 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
318 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
319 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
320 input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
322 htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
323 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
326 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
327 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
328 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
329 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
330 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
333 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
337 funding_redeemscript: Script,
341 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
342 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
344 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
345 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
346 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
347 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
348 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
349 writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
350 input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
351 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
353 on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
355 &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
356 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
357 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
358 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
359 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
360 preimage.write(writer)?;
363 &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
364 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
365 preimage.write(writer)?;
366 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
368 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
369 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
370 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
377 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
378 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
379 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
381 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
382 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
383 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
384 let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
385 let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
386 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
387 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
388 let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
389 InputMaterial::Revoked {
390 per_commitment_point,
391 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
392 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
397 on_counterparty_tx_csv
401 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
402 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
403 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
404 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
405 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
406 InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
407 per_commitment_point,
408 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
409 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
415 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
416 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
417 InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
423 InputMaterial::Funding {
424 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
427 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
433 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
434 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
435 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
436 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
437 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
438 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
439 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
440 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
441 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
442 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
443 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
444 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
445 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
446 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
447 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
448 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
449 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
450 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
451 // and satisfy witness program.
452 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
455 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
456 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
457 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
459 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
460 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
461 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
463 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
466 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
470 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
471 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
473 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
475 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
476 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
477 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
478 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
480 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
481 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
482 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
483 commitment_number: u64,
484 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
487 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
493 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
494 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
496 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
497 /// think we've fallen behind!
498 should_broadcast: bool,
502 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
503 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
505 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
507 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
508 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
509 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
515 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
517 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
518 commitment_number.write(w)?;
519 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
520 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
521 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
523 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
526 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
528 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
530 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
535 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
537 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
543 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
544 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
545 match Readable::read(r)? {
547 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
548 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
550 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
551 let mut res = Vec::new();
553 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
560 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
561 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
562 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
563 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
565 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
566 let mut res = Vec::new();
568 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
575 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
576 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
580 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
581 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
582 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
586 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
587 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
590 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
595 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
596 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
598 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
599 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
601 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
602 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
603 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
604 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
605 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
606 latest_update_id: u64,
607 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
609 destination_script: Script,
610 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
611 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
612 shutdown_script: Script,
615 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
616 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
617 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
619 counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
620 funding_redeemscript: Script,
621 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
622 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
623 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
625 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
627 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
628 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
629 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
630 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
631 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
632 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
633 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
634 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
635 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
636 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
637 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
638 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
639 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
641 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
642 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
643 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
644 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
645 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
646 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
648 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
650 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
651 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
653 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
655 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
657 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
658 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
660 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
661 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
662 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
663 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
665 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
666 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
667 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
668 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
669 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
672 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
674 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
676 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
677 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
678 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
679 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
681 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
682 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
683 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
685 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
686 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
687 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
688 holder_tx_signed: bool,
690 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
691 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
692 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
693 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
694 // the full block_connected).
695 last_block_hash: BlockHash,
696 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
699 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
700 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
701 /// underlying object
702 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
703 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
704 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
705 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
706 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
707 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
708 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
709 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
710 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
711 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
712 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
713 self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
714 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
715 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
716 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
717 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
718 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
719 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
720 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
721 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
722 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
723 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
724 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
725 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
726 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
727 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
728 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
729 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
730 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
731 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
732 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
741 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
742 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
744 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
745 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
746 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
747 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
748 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
749 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
750 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
751 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
752 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
753 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
755 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
757 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
758 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
760 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
761 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
762 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
763 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
764 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
765 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
767 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
770 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
771 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
773 self.keys.write(writer)?;
774 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
775 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
776 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
777 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
778 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
780 self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
781 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
782 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
784 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
785 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
786 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
787 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
788 match second_option {
789 Some(second_pubkey) => {
790 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
793 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
798 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
802 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
804 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
806 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
807 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
808 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
809 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
810 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
811 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
812 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
816 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
817 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
818 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
819 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
820 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
821 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
822 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
826 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
827 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
828 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
829 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
832 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
833 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
834 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
835 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
838 macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
839 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
840 $holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
841 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
842 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
843 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
844 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
845 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
847 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
848 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
849 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
850 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
851 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
853 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
857 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
862 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
863 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
864 serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
866 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
869 serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
871 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
872 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
874 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
875 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
876 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
879 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
880 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
882 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
886 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
890 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
891 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
892 event.write(writer)?;
895 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
897 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
898 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
899 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
900 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
901 for ev in events.iter() {
903 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
905 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
906 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
908 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
910 descriptor.write(writer)?;
916 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
917 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
919 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
920 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
921 script.write(writer)?;
924 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
926 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
927 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
933 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
934 pub(crate) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
935 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
936 counterparty_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
937 on_holder_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
938 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
939 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
941 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
942 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
943 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
944 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
945 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
947 let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: *counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: *counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
949 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_holder_tx_csv);
951 let holder_tx_sequence = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
952 let holder_tx_locktime = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
953 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
954 txid: initial_holder_commitment_tx.txid(),
955 revocation_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
956 a_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
957 b_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
958 delayed_payment_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
959 per_commitment_point: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
960 feerate_per_kw: initial_holder_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
961 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
963 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);
965 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
966 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![funding_info.1.clone()]);
970 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
972 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
973 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
974 counterparty_payment_script,
979 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
980 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
982 counterparty_tx_cache,
983 funding_redeemscript,
984 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
985 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
989 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
990 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
991 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
992 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
994 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
995 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
996 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
997 current_holder_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((holder_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (holder_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
999 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1000 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1001 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1003 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1008 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1009 holder_tx_signed: false,
1011 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1012 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1016 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1017 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1018 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1019 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1020 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1021 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1024 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1025 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1026 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1027 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1032 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1033 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1034 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1035 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1036 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1038 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1039 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1040 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1044 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1045 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1046 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1051 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1058 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1067 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1068 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1069 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1070 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1071 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1072 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1073 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1074 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1076 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1077 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1080 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1081 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1082 log_trace!(logger, "New potential counterparty commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1083 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1084 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1085 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1086 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1087 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1088 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1089 Some(old_points) => {
1090 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1091 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1092 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1093 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1094 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1096 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1099 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1103 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1106 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1107 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1108 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1112 self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
1115 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1116 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1117 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1118 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1119 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1120 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1121 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1122 let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1123 let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1124 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1126 revocation_key: commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
1127 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1128 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1129 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1130 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
1131 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1132 htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
1134 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(commitment_tx);
1135 self.current_holder_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1136 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1137 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1138 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1139 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
1144 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1145 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1146 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1147 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1150 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1151 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1154 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1155 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1157 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1160 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1163 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1164 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1165 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1168 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1169 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1171 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1173 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1174 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1175 self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1177 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1178 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1179 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1180 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1181 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1182 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1183 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1184 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1185 if should_broadcast {
1186 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1188 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1193 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1197 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1199 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1200 self.latest_update_id
1203 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1204 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1208 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1209 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1211 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
1212 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
1213 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
1214 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
1215 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
1216 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1217 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
1219 &self.outputs_to_watch
1222 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1223 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1225 /// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
1226 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1227 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1228 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
1232 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1235 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1236 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1237 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1238 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
1239 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1240 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1244 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1245 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1246 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1249 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1250 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1253 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1254 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
1257 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1258 self.current_holder_commitment_number
1261 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1262 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1263 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1264 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1265 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1266 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
1267 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1268 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1269 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1270 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1271 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1273 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1274 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1276 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1277 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1280 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1285 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1286 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1287 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1288 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1289 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1290 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1291 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
1293 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1294 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1296 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
1297 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1298 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1299 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1300 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1304 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1305 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1306 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1307 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1308 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1309 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1310 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1312 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1313 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1318 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1319 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1320 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
1321 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1322 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1323 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1325 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1326 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1327 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1328 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1329 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1330 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1331 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1333 let e = entry.get_mut();
1334 e.retain(|ref event| {
1336 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1337 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1342 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1344 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1345 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1353 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1354 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1356 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1357 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
1359 // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
1361 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1362 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1363 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1364 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1365 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1366 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1367 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1369 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1370 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1372 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1374 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1375 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1376 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1377 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1378 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1379 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1380 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1381 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1382 // payment_preimage.
1383 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1384 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1385 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1386 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1388 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1389 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1393 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1394 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1395 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1396 let e = entry.get_mut();
1397 e.retain(|ref event| {
1399 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1400 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1405 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1407 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1408 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1416 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1417 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1419 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1420 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1423 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1424 let revocation_point_option =
1425 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1426 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1427 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1429 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1430 self.counterparty_payment_script = {
1431 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1432 // script_pubkey version
1433 let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1434 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
1437 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1438 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1439 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1440 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1441 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1442 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1444 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1445 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1446 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1447 let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
1448 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1455 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1458 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1459 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1460 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1461 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1462 return (Vec::new(), None)
1465 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1466 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1469 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1474 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1475 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1476 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1478 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1479 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1480 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1481 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
1484 fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1485 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1486 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1488 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1489 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1491 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1492 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1493 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1494 witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
1495 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1496 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1497 Some(preimage.clone())
1499 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1503 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1505 watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1509 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
1512 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1513 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
1514 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1515 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1516 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1517 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1518 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1520 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1521 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1522 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1523 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1524 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1525 let e = entry.get_mut();
1526 e.retain(|ref event| {
1528 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1529 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1534 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1536 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1537 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1543 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1544 ($updates: expr) => {
1545 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1546 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1547 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1551 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1552 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
1554 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1555 is_holder_tx = true;
1556 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1557 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1558 append_onchain_update!(res);
1559 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1560 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1561 is_holder_tx = true;
1562 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1563 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, holder_tx);
1564 append_onchain_update!(res);
1568 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1569 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
1570 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
1571 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1572 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1573 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1581 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1582 if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1583 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
1587 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1590 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1591 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1592 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1593 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1594 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1595 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1596 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1597 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1598 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1599 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1600 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
1601 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
1602 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1603 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1604 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1605 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1606 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1607 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1608 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1609 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1613 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1614 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1619 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1620 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1626 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1627 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1628 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1629 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1630 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1631 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
1632 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1633 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1634 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1635 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1636 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1637 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1638 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1639 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1643 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1644 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1654 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1655 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1656 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1657 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1658 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1659 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1661 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1662 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1664 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1665 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
1666 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1667 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1670 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
1671 for tx in &txn_matched {
1672 let mut output_val = 0;
1673 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1674 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1675 output_val += out.value;
1676 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1680 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
1681 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1683 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1684 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1685 for tx in &txn_matched {
1686 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1687 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1688 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1689 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1691 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1692 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1693 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1694 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1695 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1696 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1698 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1699 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1700 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1701 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1703 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1705 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1708 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1709 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
1710 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1711 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1712 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1717 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1718 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1719 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1720 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1722 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1724 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
1725 if should_broadcast {
1726 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
1728 if should_broadcast {
1729 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1730 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1731 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
1732 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1733 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1734 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1736 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1739 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1742 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1743 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1744 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
1745 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1746 payment_preimage: None,
1747 source: htlc_update.0,
1750 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1751 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1752 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
1753 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1760 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
1761 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1763 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
1764 // updating the latter in the process.
1765 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
1766 let output_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect();
1767 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts).is_none()
1772 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1774 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
1775 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1776 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1779 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
1780 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
1782 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1784 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1785 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
1788 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1790 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1793 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
1794 /// transactions thereof.
1795 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
1796 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
1797 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
1798 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
1799 for input in tx.input.iter() {
1800 if matches { break; }
1801 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1806 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
1809 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
1812 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
1813 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
1814 for input in tx.input.iter() {
1815 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1816 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1817 if idx == input.previous_output.vout as usize {
1827 fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
1828 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1829 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1830 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1831 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1832 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1833 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1834 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1835 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1836 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1837 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1838 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1839 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
1840 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1841 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1842 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1843 // time out the HTLC first.
1844 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1845 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1846 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1847 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1848 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1849 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1850 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1851 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1852 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1853 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1854 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1855 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1856 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1857 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1858 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1859 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1860 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
1861 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1862 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
1863 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
1864 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
1865 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1866 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1867 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1874 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
1876 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1877 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1878 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1881 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1882 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1883 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1890 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
1891 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1892 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1893 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
1894 let mut payment_data = None;
1895 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
1896 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
1897 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
1898 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
1900 macro_rules! log_claim {
1901 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
1902 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
1903 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
1904 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
1905 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
1906 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
1907 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
1908 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
1909 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
1910 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1911 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1912 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
1914 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
1915 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1916 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1917 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
1922 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
1923 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
1924 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
1925 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
1926 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
1927 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
1928 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
1929 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
1938 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1939 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
1940 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
1941 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
1942 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
1943 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
1944 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
1945 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
1946 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
1947 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
1948 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
1949 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
1950 } else if !$holder_tx {
1951 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
1952 if payment_data.is_none() {
1953 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
1956 if payment_data.is_none() {
1957 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
1958 continue 'outer_loop;
1965 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1966 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
1967 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
1969 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1970 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1971 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
1972 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
1975 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1976 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
1977 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
1980 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
1981 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
1982 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
1983 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
1984 if accepted_preimage_claim {
1985 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
1986 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
1987 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
1988 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
1990 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
1994 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
1995 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
1996 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
1997 upd.source == source
1999 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2000 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2002 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2007 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2008 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2009 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2010 let e = entry.get_mut();
2011 e.retain(|ref event| {
2013 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2014 return htlc_update.0 != source
2019 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2022 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2030 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2031 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2032 let mut spendable_output = None;
2033 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2034 if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize {
2035 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2036 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2037 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2038 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2039 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2040 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2041 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2042 // non-standard due to their size.
2043 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2044 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2045 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2048 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2049 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2050 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2051 output: outp.clone(),
2054 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
2055 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2056 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2057 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2058 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
2059 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
2060 output: outp.clone(),
2061 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2062 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2066 } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2067 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
2068 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2069 output: outp.clone(),
2070 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2073 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2074 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2075 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2076 output: outp.clone(),
2080 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2081 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2082 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2083 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2084 let e = entry.get_mut();
2085 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2088 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2095 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2097 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2098 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2099 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2103 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2108 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2109 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2110 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2111 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2114 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2115 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2117 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2118 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2120 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2121 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2122 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2123 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2126 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2128 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2129 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2131 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2132 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2133 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2134 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2135 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2136 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2138 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2139 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2140 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2142 let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2143 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2144 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2146 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2147 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2151 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2152 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2153 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2154 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2156 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2161 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2163 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2165 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2168 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2169 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2170 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2171 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2172 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2174 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2175 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2181 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2182 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2183 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
2184 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2185 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2186 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2187 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2188 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2190 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2191 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2195 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2196 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2197 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2198 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2199 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2200 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
2201 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2205 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2206 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2207 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
2208 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2209 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2210 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2211 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2215 macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
2218 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2219 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2220 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2221 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2222 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2223 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2224 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2226 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2227 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2228 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2229 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2230 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2232 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2233 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2235 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2240 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2247 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2250 Some(read_holder_tx!())
2252 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2254 let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
2256 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2257 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2259 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2260 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2261 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2262 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2263 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2264 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2265 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2269 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2270 let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2271 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
2272 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2273 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
2274 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
2275 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2277 pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
2280 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2281 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
2282 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2283 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2284 pending_events.push(event);
2288 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2290 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2291 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2292 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2293 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2294 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2295 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2296 for _ in 0..events_len {
2297 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2299 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2300 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2301 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2302 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2306 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2307 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2311 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2315 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2318 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2319 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2320 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2321 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2322 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2323 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
2324 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2325 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2327 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2328 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2331 let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
2333 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2334 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2336 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2338 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2341 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
2342 counterparty_payment_script,
2347 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2348 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2350 counterparty_tx_cache,
2351 funding_redeemscript,
2352 channel_value_satoshis,
2353 their_cur_revocation_points,
2358 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
2359 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2360 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
2362 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
2363 current_holder_commitment_tx,
2364 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
2365 current_holder_commitment_number,
2368 pending_monitor_events,
2371 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2376 lockdown_from_offchain,
2380 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2387 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2388 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2389 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2390 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2391 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2392 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2393 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2394 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2395 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2397 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2398 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2399 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2400 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2402 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
2403 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2404 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2405 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2407 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2410 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2411 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2412 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2414 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2415 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2417 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2420 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
2421 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2422 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2426 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2427 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2429 let mut res = Vec::new();
2430 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2431 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2435 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2436 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2443 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
2444 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2446 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2447 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2453 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2454 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2455 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2456 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2461 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2463 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2464 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2465 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2466 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2467 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2473 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2475 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2476 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2477 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2478 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2479 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2480 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
2482 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2483 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
2484 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
2485 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
2486 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
2487 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2488 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2491 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2492 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2493 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2494 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2495 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2496 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2497 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2499 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2500 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2501 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2502 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2503 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2504 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2506 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2507 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2508 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2509 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2510 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2511 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2512 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2513 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2515 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2516 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2517 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2518 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2519 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2520 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2524 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2525 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2526 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2528 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2529 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2530 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2531 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2533 macro_rules! sign_input {
2534 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2535 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2536 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2538 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2539 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2540 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
2542 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2543 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2544 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2545 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2546 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2547 sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
2548 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2549 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
2550 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2551 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2552 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2553 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
2555 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2557 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2558 println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
2559 println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
2560 println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
2564 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2565 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2567 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2568 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2570 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2571 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2575 script_sig: Script::new(),
2576 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2577 witness: Vec::new(),
2580 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2581 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2584 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2585 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2587 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
2588 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
2589 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
2592 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2594 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2595 claim_tx.input.clear();
2596 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2598 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2599 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2603 script_sig: Script::new(),
2604 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2605 witness: Vec::new(),
2608 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2609 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2611 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
2612 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
2613 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
2616 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2618 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2619 claim_tx.input.clear();
2620 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2621 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2622 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2626 script_sig: Script::new(),
2627 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2628 witness: Vec::new(),
2630 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2631 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2633 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
2634 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
2635 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
2638 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2641 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.