1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
38 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
39 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
42 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
44 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use crate::sign::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
46 use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, OnchainTxHandler};
47 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
48 use crate::chain::Filter;
49 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
50 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
51 use crate::util::byte_utils;
52 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler};
53 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{ChannelDerivationParameters, AnchorDescriptor, HTLCDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
55 use crate::prelude::*;
57 use crate::io::{self, Error};
58 use core::convert::TryInto;
60 use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
62 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
63 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
65 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
66 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
67 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
68 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
69 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
71 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
72 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
73 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
74 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
75 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
77 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
78 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
79 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
81 /// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
82 /// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
83 /// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
84 /// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
85 /// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
87 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
91 /// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
93 /// (1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
94 /// (2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
95 /// allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
96 /// commitment transaction.
98 /// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
99 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
101 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
102 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
103 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
104 self.update_id.write(w)?;
105 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
106 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
107 update_step.write(w)?;
109 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
113 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
114 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
115 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
116 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
117 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
118 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
120 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
124 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
125 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
129 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
130 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
131 pub enum MonitorEvent {
132 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
133 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
135 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
136 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
138 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
139 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
141 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
143 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
144 funding_txo: OutPoint,
145 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
146 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
148 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
149 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
150 monitor_update_id: u64,
153 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
154 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
156 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
157 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
159 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
160 // Note that Completed and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
161 // generated only in ChainMonitor
163 (0, funding_txo, required),
164 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
168 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
172 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
173 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
174 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
175 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
176 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
177 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
178 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
179 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
180 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
182 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
183 (0, payment_hash, required),
184 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
185 (2, source, required),
186 (4, payment_preimage, option),
189 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
190 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
191 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
192 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
193 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
194 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
195 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
196 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
197 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
198 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
199 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
200 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
201 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
202 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
203 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
204 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
205 /// accurate block height.
206 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
207 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
208 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
209 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
210 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
211 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
214 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
215 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
216 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
217 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
218 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
219 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
220 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
221 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
222 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
223 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
225 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
226 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
227 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
229 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
230 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
232 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
233 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
235 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
236 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
237 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
238 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
240 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
241 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
242 struct HolderSignedTx {
243 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
245 revocation_key: PublicKey,
246 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
247 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
248 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
249 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
250 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
251 to_self_value_sat: u64,
254 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
256 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
257 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
258 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
259 (2, revocation_key, required),
260 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
261 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
262 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
263 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
264 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
265 (14, htlc_outputs, required_vec)
268 impl HolderSignedTx {
269 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
270 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
271 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
281 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
282 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
283 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
284 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
285 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
286 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
287 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
290 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
291 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
292 w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
293 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
294 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
295 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
296 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
301 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
302 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
303 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
304 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
305 // used. Read it for compatibility.
306 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
307 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
308 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
309 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
310 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
311 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
315 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
316 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
317 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
318 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
319 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
320 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
321 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
323 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
324 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
325 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
326 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
329 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
333 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
334 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
336 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
337 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
338 struct OnchainEventEntry {
341 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
343 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
346 impl OnchainEventEntry {
347 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
348 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
350 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
351 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
353 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
354 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
355 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
357 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
358 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
359 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
360 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
361 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
368 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
369 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
373 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
375 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
376 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
378 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
379 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
380 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
382 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
383 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
384 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
385 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
386 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
387 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
390 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
391 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
392 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
393 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
394 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
396 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
397 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
399 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
401 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
403 FundingSpendConfirmation {
404 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
405 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
406 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
407 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
408 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
410 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
411 /// counterparty output.
412 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
414 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
415 /// is constructed. This is used when
416 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
417 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
418 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
419 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
420 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
422 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
423 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
425 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
426 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
427 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
428 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
429 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
430 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
431 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
432 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
436 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
437 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
438 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
439 (0, self.txid, required),
440 (1, self.transaction, option),
441 (2, self.height, required),
442 (3, self.block_hash, option),
443 (4, self.event, required),
449 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
450 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
451 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
452 let mut transaction = None;
453 let mut block_hash = None;
455 let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
456 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
458 (1, transaction, option),
459 (2, height, required),
460 (3, block_hash, option),
461 (4, event, upgradable_required),
463 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
467 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
469 (0, source, required),
470 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
471 (2, payment_hash, required),
472 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
474 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
475 (0, descriptor, required),
477 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
478 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
479 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
481 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
482 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
483 (2, preimage, option),
484 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
489 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
490 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
491 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
492 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
493 /// Note that LDK after 0.0.115 supports this only containing dust HTLCs (implying the
494 /// `Signature` field is never filled in). At that point, non-dust HTLCs are implied by the
495 /// HTLC fields in `commitment_tx` and the sources passed via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
496 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
497 claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
498 nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>,
500 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
501 commitment_txid: Txid,
502 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
503 commitment_number: u64,
504 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
507 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
513 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
514 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
516 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
517 /// think we've fallen behind!
518 should_broadcast: bool,
521 scriptpubkey: Script,
525 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
526 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
528 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
529 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
530 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
531 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
532 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
533 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
538 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
539 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
540 (0, commitment_tx, required),
541 (1, claimed_htlcs, optional_vec),
542 (2, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
543 (4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
545 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
546 (0, commitment_txid, required),
547 (2, commitment_number, required),
548 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
549 (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
551 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
552 (0, payment_preimage, required),
554 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
556 (2, secret, required),
558 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
559 (0, should_broadcast, required),
561 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
562 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
566 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
568 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
570 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
571 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
573 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
574 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
575 /// force-closed now.
576 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
577 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
578 /// required to do so.
579 amount_satoshis: u64,
581 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
582 /// we consider it spendable.
583 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
584 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
585 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
586 amount_satoshis: u64,
587 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
589 confirmation_height: u32,
591 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
592 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
593 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
595 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
596 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
597 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
598 ContentiousClaimable {
599 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
600 /// required to do so.
601 amount_satoshis: u64,
602 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
605 /// The payment hash that locks this HTLC.
606 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
607 /// The preimage that can be used to claim this HTLC.
608 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
610 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
611 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
612 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
613 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
614 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
615 /// which will be required to do so.
616 amount_satoshis: u64,
617 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
619 claimable_height: u32,
620 /// The payment hash whose preimage our counterparty needs to claim this HTLC.
621 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
623 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
624 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
625 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
626 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
627 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
628 /// which will be required to do so.
629 amount_satoshis: u64,
630 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
631 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
633 /// The payment hash whose preimage we need to claim this HTLC.
634 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
636 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
639 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
640 /// following amount.
641 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
642 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
644 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
645 /// were already spent.
646 amount_satoshis: u64,
651 /// The amount claimable, in satoshis. This excludes balances that we are unsure if we are able
652 /// to claim, this is because we are waiting for a preimage or for a timeout to expire. For more
653 /// information on these balances see [`Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC`] and
654 /// [`Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC`].
656 /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
657 pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
659 Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }|
660 Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }|
661 Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }|
662 Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }
664 Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }|
665 Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. }
671 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
672 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
673 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
674 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
675 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
676 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
678 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
679 resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
680 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
681 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
684 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
685 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
686 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
687 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
688 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
689 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
690 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
691 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
692 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
693 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
694 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
695 (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
701 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
702 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
703 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
704 let mut resolving_txid = None;
705 let mut payment_preimage = None;
706 let mut resolving_tx = None;
707 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
708 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
709 (1, resolving_txid, option),
710 (2, payment_preimage, option),
711 (3, resolving_tx, option),
714 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
722 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
723 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
725 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
726 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
728 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
729 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
730 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
731 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
732 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
733 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
735 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
737 pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
740 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
741 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
742 Self { inner: Mutex::new(self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone()) }
746 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
747 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
748 latest_update_id: u64,
749 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
751 destination_script: Script,
752 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
753 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
754 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
756 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
757 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
758 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
759 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
760 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
762 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
763 funding_redeemscript: Script,
764 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
765 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
766 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
768 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
770 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
771 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
772 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
773 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
774 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
775 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
776 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
777 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
778 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
779 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
780 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
781 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
782 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
783 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
784 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
785 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
787 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,
789 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
790 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
791 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
792 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
793 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
794 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
796 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
798 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
799 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
801 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
803 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
804 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
805 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
807 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
809 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
810 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
811 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
812 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
813 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
814 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
815 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
816 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
817 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
818 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
820 pub(super) pending_events: Vec<Event>,
821 pub(super) is_processing_pending_events: bool,
823 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
824 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
825 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
826 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
828 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
829 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
830 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
831 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
832 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
835 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
837 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
839 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
840 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
841 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
842 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
844 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
845 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
846 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
848 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
849 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
850 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
851 holder_tx_signed: bool,
853 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
854 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
855 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
856 funding_spend_seen: bool,
858 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
859 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
860 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
862 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
863 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
864 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
865 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
866 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
868 /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
869 /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
870 /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
871 /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
872 /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
873 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
875 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
876 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
877 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
878 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
879 // the full block_connected).
880 best_block: BestBlock,
882 /// The node_id of our counterparty
883 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
886 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
887 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
889 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
890 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
891 // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
892 // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
894 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
895 let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
896 let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
901 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
902 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
903 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
907 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
908 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
909 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
911 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
912 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
913 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
915 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
917 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
918 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
920 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
921 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
922 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
923 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
924 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
925 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
927 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
930 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
931 match &self.shutdown_script {
932 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
933 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
936 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
937 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
938 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
939 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
940 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
941 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
942 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
944 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
945 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
946 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
948 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
949 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
950 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
951 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
952 match second_option {
953 Some(second_pubkey) => {
954 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
957 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
962 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
966 writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
968 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
970 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
971 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
972 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
973 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
974 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
975 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
976 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
980 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
981 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
982 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
983 writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
984 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
985 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
986 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
987 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
988 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
989 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
993 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
994 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
995 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
996 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
999 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1000 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1001 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1002 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1005 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1006 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1007 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1009 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1012 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1014 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1015 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1017 writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1018 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1019 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1022 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1023 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1024 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
1026 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1027 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1029 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1033 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1034 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1038 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1039 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1040 event.write(writer)?;
1043 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1044 writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height().to_be_bytes())?;
1046 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1047 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1048 entry.write(writer)?;
1051 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1052 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1053 txid.write(writer)?;
1054 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1055 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1057 script.write(writer)?;
1060 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1062 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1063 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1065 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1066 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1067 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec),
1068 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, required_vec),
1069 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1070 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1071 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1072 (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
1073 (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
1080 macro_rules! _process_events_body {
1081 ($self_opt: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1083 let (pending_events, repeated_events);
1084 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1085 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1086 if inner.is_processing_pending_events {
1089 inner.is_processing_pending_events = true;
1091 pending_events = inner.pending_events.clone();
1092 repeated_events = inner.get_repeated_events();
1094 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1096 for event in pending_events.into_iter().chain(repeated_events.into_iter()) {
1097 $event_to_handle = event;
1101 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1102 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1103 inner.pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1104 inner.is_processing_pending_events = false;
1105 if !inner.pending_events.is_empty() {
1106 // If there's more events to process, go ahead and do so.
1114 pub(super) use _process_events_body as process_events_body;
1116 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1117 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1118 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1119 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1120 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1121 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1124 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
1125 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1126 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1127 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1128 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1129 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1130 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1132 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1133 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1134 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1136 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1137 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1138 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1139 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1141 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1142 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1144 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1145 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1146 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1147 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1149 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1150 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1152 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1153 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1154 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1155 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1156 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1157 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1158 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1159 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1161 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1164 let onchain_tx_handler =
1165 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1166 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
1168 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1169 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1171 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1172 latest_update_id: 0,
1173 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1175 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1176 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1177 counterparty_payment_script,
1181 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1183 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1184 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1186 counterparty_commitment_params,
1187 funding_redeemscript,
1188 channel_value_satoshis,
1189 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1191 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1193 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1194 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1195 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1196 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1197 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1199 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1200 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1201 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1202 current_holder_commitment_number,
1204 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1205 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1206 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1207 is_processing_pending_events: false,
1209 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1214 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1215 holder_tx_signed: false,
1216 funding_spend_seen: false,
1217 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1218 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1219 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1220 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
1223 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1228 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1229 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1232 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1233 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1234 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1235 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1236 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1239 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1240 commitment_number: u64,
1241 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1243 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1244 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1245 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1249 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1250 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1251 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1252 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1253 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new(), Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
1256 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1257 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1258 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1260 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1261 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1263 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1266 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1267 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1270 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1271 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1274 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1277 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1278 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1280 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1286 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1287 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1290 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1293 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1295 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1296 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1299 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1300 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1301 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1304 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1305 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1306 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1307 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1308 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1311 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1312 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1313 /// have been registered.
1314 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1315 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1316 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1317 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1318 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1319 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1320 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1322 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1323 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1329 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1330 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1331 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1332 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1335 /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
1337 /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
1338 /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
1339 /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
1340 /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
1341 /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
1343 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
1344 /// order to handle these events.
1346 /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
1347 /// [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
1348 pub fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: &H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
1350 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
1353 /// Processes any events asynchronously.
1355 /// See [`Self::process_pending_events`] for more information.
1356 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
1360 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, { handler(ev).await });
1364 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1365 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1366 let mut lck = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1367 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut lck.pending_events);
1368 ret.append(&mut lck.get_repeated_events());
1372 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1373 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1376 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1377 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1380 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1381 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1384 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1386 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1388 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1389 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1392 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1393 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1395 /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1396 /// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've
1397 /// fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation
1398 /// secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1400 /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1401 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1402 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1403 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1404 /// to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you.
1406 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
1407 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1408 where L::Target: Logger {
1409 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1412 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1413 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1414 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1415 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1416 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1417 where L::Target: Logger {
1418 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1421 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1422 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1423 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1424 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1425 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1426 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1428 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1429 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1431 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1432 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1434 header: &BlockHeader,
1435 txdata: &TransactionData,
1440 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1442 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1443 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1446 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1447 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1450 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1452 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1454 header: &BlockHeader,
1460 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1461 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1464 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1465 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1468 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1469 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1471 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1472 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1474 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1475 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1477 header: &BlockHeader,
1478 txdata: &TransactionData,
1483 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1485 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1486 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1489 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1490 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1491 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1494 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1496 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1497 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1499 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1500 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1507 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1508 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1511 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1512 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1513 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1516 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1517 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1519 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1520 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1522 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1523 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1525 header: &BlockHeader,
1530 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1532 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1533 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1536 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1537 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1538 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1541 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1542 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1543 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1544 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1546 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.block_hash))
1547 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1549 txids.sort_unstable();
1554 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1555 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1556 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1557 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1560 /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
1561 /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
1562 /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
1563 /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
1564 /// connections, like on mobile.
1565 pub fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1566 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L,
1569 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1570 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1573 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1574 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1575 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1576 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1577 current_height, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1582 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1583 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1584 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1585 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1586 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1587 -> Option<Balance> {
1588 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1589 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1591 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1592 let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
1593 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1594 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1595 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1596 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1598 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1599 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1600 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1601 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1602 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1603 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1604 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1605 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1606 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1608 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1609 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1610 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1611 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1612 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1613 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1614 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1615 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1617 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1618 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1619 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1620 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1621 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1626 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1627 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1628 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1629 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
1630 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1631 htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
1634 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1636 let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
1637 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1638 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1639 // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
1640 // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
1641 // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
1642 // in the commitment.
1643 if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
1644 let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1645 .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
1646 .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
1647 debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
1648 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
1650 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1651 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
1654 htlc_commitment_outpoint
1656 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1658 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1659 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1660 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1661 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1662 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1664 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1665 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1666 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1667 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1668 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1669 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1670 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1671 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1672 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1673 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1674 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1676 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1677 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1678 tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
1680 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1681 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1683 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1688 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1689 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1690 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1691 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1692 // need to do so again here.
1694 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1695 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1696 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1697 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1698 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1699 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1702 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1703 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1704 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1705 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1706 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1707 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1708 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1709 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1712 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1713 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1714 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1715 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1718 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1719 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1720 // we know the preimage.
1721 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1722 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1723 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1724 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1725 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1726 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1727 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1728 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1731 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1732 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1733 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1734 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1735 payment_preimage: *payment_preimage,
1738 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1739 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1740 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1741 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1742 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1749 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1750 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1751 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1754 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1755 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1756 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1757 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1759 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1760 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
1761 /// a revoked state.
1763 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1764 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1765 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1766 let mut res = Vec::new();
1767 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1769 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1770 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1771 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1772 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1773 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1776 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
1777 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1780 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1781 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1782 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1783 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1784 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1787 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1788 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1789 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1790 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1792 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
1800 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1801 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1802 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1803 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
1804 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1805 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1806 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1807 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1809 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1812 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1813 amount_satoshis: value,
1814 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1817 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1818 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1819 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1822 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1823 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1825 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1826 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
1827 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
1828 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
1829 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
1830 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
1831 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1832 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1833 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
1835 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1836 amount_satoshis: output.value,
1837 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
1839 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
1840 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
1841 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
1842 ).unwrap_or(false) {
1843 spent_counterparty_output = true;
1849 if spent_counterparty_output {
1850 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
1851 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
1852 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
1853 if output_spendable {
1854 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1855 amount_satoshis: amt,
1859 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
1860 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
1863 found_commitment_tx = true;
1864 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1865 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1866 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1867 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1868 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1869 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1872 found_commitment_tx = true;
1873 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1874 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1875 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1876 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1877 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1878 amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1879 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1882 found_commitment_tx = true;
1885 if !found_commitment_tx {
1886 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1887 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1888 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1889 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1890 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1891 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1892 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1897 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1898 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1899 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1901 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1902 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1903 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1904 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1906 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1907 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1909 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
1910 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
1911 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1912 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1913 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1914 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1918 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1919 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1926 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
1927 /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
1928 /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
1930 /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
1931 /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
1932 /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
1933 pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
1934 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1935 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
1936 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1937 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1938 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1940 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1941 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1942 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1943 res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
1944 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
1950 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1951 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1953 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1954 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1959 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
1960 /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
1962 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1964 /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
1965 /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
1966 pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
1967 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1968 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1969 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1970 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1971 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1972 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1973 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1979 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
1980 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1981 // closed), just get the full set.
1983 return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
1986 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1987 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1988 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1989 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1990 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1991 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1992 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1994 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1995 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1996 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1997 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1998 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1999 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2000 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
2001 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
2002 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
2003 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
2004 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
2005 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
2006 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
2007 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
2008 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
2009 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
2011 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
2014 let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
2015 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
2016 if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
2017 res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
2024 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
2025 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2026 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
2027 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
2028 Some((a, &**source))
2031 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2032 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2033 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2035 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2036 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2037 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2038 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2046 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
2047 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
2051 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
2052 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
2053 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
2055 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
2056 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
2057 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
2058 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
2059 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
2060 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
2062 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
2063 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
2064 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
2065 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
2066 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
2067 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
2068 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
2069 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
2071 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
2072 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
2073 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2074 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2075 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2076 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
2077 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
2078 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
2079 // payment_preimage.
2080 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
2081 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
2082 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
2083 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
2085 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
2087 let mut matched_htlc = false;
2088 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
2089 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
2090 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
2091 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
2092 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
2093 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
2094 matched_htlc = true;
2098 if matched_htlc { continue; }
2099 if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
2102 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2103 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
2105 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
2106 *update_source != **source
2111 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2112 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
2113 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
2114 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
2115 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
2116 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2117 source: (**source).clone(),
2118 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
2119 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
2120 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
2123 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
2124 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2125 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2126 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2132 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2133 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2135 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2136 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2141 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2142 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2143 // in-line tests later.
2146 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2147 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2148 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2149 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2150 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2151 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2152 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2157 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2158 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2161 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2162 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2163 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2164 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2165 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2166 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2167 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2170 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2171 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2172 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2173 if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
2174 let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2175 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2176 for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2177 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2178 if !cur_claimables.iter()
2179 .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
2181 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
2185 for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2189 assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
2193 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2194 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2195 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2196 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2197 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2199 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2200 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2201 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2205 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2206 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2207 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2212 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2219 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2228 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2229 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2230 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2231 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2233 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2234 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2237 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2238 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2239 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2240 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2241 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2242 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2243 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2244 Some(old_points) => {
2245 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2246 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2247 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2248 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2249 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2251 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2254 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2258 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2261 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2262 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2263 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2269 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2270 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2271 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2272 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2273 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2274 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, mut htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)], nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2275 if htlc_outputs.iter().any(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()) {
2276 // If we have non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, ensure they match the HTLCs in the
2277 // `holder_commitment_tx`. In the future, we'll no longer provide the redundant data
2278 // and just pass in source data via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
2279 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len());
2280 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).map(|(h, _, _)| h).zip(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()) {
2281 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2283 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2284 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, s, _)| s.as_ref()).zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter()) {
2285 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2287 debug_assert!(nondust_htlc_sources.is_empty());
2289 // If we don't have any non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, assume they were all passed via
2290 // `nondust_htlc_sources`, building up the final htlc_outputs by combining
2291 // `nondust_htlc_sources` and the `holder_commitment_tx`
2292 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2294 for htlc in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter() {
2295 assert!(htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32 > prev);
2296 prev = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32;
2299 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(htlc, _, _)| htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()));
2300 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(_, sig_opt, _)| sig_opt.is_none()));
2301 debug_assert_eq!(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2303 let mut sources_iter = nondust_htlc_sources.into_iter();
2305 for (htlc, counterparty_sig) in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()
2306 .zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter())
2309 let source = sources_iter.next().expect("Non-dust HTLC sources didn't match commitment tx");
2310 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2311 assert!(source.possibly_matches_output(htlc));
2313 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), Some(source)));
2315 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), None));
2318 debug_assert!(sources_iter.next().is_none());
2321 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2322 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2323 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2324 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2325 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
2327 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2328 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2329 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2330 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2331 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2333 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2334 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2336 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2337 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2338 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2339 for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
2340 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2341 let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2342 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2343 assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
2344 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2345 SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
2349 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
2351 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2352 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2357 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2358 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2359 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2360 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2361 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
2362 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2363 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2366 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2368 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2369 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2370 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2371 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2372 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2373 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2376 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2377 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2378 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2382 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2383 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2384 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2389 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2390 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2391 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2392 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2393 // holder commitment transactions.
2394 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2395 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2396 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2398 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2399 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2400 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2401 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
2402 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2407 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
2408 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2411 let commit_txs = self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2412 let mut txs = vec![];
2413 for tx in commit_txs.iter() {
2414 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
2417 broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&txs);
2418 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2421 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
2422 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2423 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2426 if self.latest_update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2427 log_info!(logger, "Applying post-force-closed update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2428 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2429 } else if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2430 log_info!(logger, "Applying force close update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2431 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2433 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
2434 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2436 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
2437 // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
2438 // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
2439 // sentinel value instead.
2441 // The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
2442 // thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
2444 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2445 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2446 match updates.updates[0] {
2447 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
2448 // We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
2449 // provide a preimage at this point.
2450 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
2451 debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
2453 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2454 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2457 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2458 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2460 let mut ret = Ok(());
2461 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2462 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2464 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
2465 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2466 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2467 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources.clone()) {
2468 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2469 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2473 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2474 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2475 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2477 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2478 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2479 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2481 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2482 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2483 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2484 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2485 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2489 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2490 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2491 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2492 if *should_broadcast {
2493 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
2494 // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
2495 // duplicate/conflicting.
2496 let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
2497 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
2498 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
2501 if detected_funding_spend {
2502 log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
2505 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2506 // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
2507 // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
2508 // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm.
2509 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2510 let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2511 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2512 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(),
2514 let best_block_height = self.best_block.height();
2515 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2516 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2517 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output),
2518 best_block_height, best_block_height
2520 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2521 vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height,
2522 broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger,
2525 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2526 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2527 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()));
2528 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
2530 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2531 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2532 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2533 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2536 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2537 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2538 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2539 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2545 // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
2546 // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
2547 if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
2551 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2553 // Refuse updates after we've detected a spend onchain, but only if we haven't processed a
2554 // force closed monitor update yet.
2555 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen && self.latest_update_id != CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2556 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2561 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2562 self.latest_update_id
2565 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2569 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2570 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2571 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2572 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2573 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2574 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2576 &self.outputs_to_watch
2579 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2580 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2581 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2585 /// Gets the set of events that are repeated regularly (e.g. those which RBF bump
2586 /// transactions). We're okay if we lose these on restart as they'll be regenerated for us at
2587 /// some regular interval via [`ChannelMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims`].
2588 pub(super) fn get_repeated_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2589 let pending_claim_events = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events();
2590 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pending_claim_events.len());
2591 for (claim_id, claim_event) in pending_claim_events {
2593 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
2594 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
2596 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2597 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
2598 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
2599 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
2600 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
2601 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
2603 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2605 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
2606 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
2607 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2608 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2609 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2610 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2612 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
2613 txid: commitment_txid,
2614 vout: anchor_output_idx,
2620 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
2621 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs, tx_lock_time,
2623 let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
2625 htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
2626 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2627 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2628 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2629 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2631 commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
2632 per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
2633 per_commitment_point: self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.get_per_commitment_point(
2634 htlc.per_commitment_number, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
2637 preimage: htlc.preimage,
2638 counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
2641 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
2643 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2653 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2654 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2655 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2658 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2659 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2662 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2663 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2666 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2667 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2670 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2671 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2672 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2673 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2675 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
2676 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
2678 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
2679 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
2680 where L::Target: Logger {
2681 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2682 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2683 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2684 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2685 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
2687 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2688 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2690 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2691 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2694 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2699 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2700 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2701 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2702 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2703 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2704 let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
2705 let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
2707 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2708 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2710 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2711 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2712 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2713 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
2714 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height);
2715 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2716 to_counterparty_output_info =
2717 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2721 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2722 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2723 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2724 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2725 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2726 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2727 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2728 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
2729 to_counterparty_output_info);
2731 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2732 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, height);
2733 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2738 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2739 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2740 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2741 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2742 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2743 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2745 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2747 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2748 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2749 block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2750 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2753 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2754 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2755 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2758 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2759 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2760 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2761 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2762 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2763 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2764 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2766 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2767 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2769 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2771 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2772 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
2773 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2774 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2777 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
2778 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2779 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
2780 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2781 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2785 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2788 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
2789 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
2790 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
2791 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2792 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
2794 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2795 Some(outputs) => outputs,
2796 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2798 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2799 Some(points) => points,
2800 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2803 let per_commitment_point =
2804 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2805 // per-commitment point
2806 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
2807 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2808 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2809 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2810 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2811 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2813 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
2814 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
2816 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2817 let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
2818 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
2819 let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
2820 &per_commitment_point,
2821 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
2822 let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
2823 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2824 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
2825 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
2826 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2827 to_counterparty_output_info =
2828 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2833 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2834 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2835 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2836 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2837 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2838 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2839 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
2842 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2843 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2844 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2845 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2846 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2847 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2848 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2849 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
2851 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2852 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2853 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2854 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2855 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
2857 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry, 0);
2858 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2863 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
2866 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2867 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
2868 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
2869 ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2870 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2871 let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
2873 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2875 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2877 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2878 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
2879 let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
2880 // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
2881 // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
2882 // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
2883 // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
2884 // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
2885 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
2887 // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
2888 // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
2889 // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
2890 for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
2891 if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
2892 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
2893 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
2894 per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2895 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
2896 tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2899 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2900 htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
2901 height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height
2903 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2904 if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
2905 outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
2907 outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
2910 (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
2913 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2914 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2915 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2916 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2917 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2919 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2920 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2922 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2923 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2924 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2925 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
2926 htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
2930 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2933 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2936 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
2937 payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
2941 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2942 holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
2943 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
2944 htlc.cltv_expiry, conf_height
2946 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2950 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2953 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2954 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2955 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2956 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2957 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2958 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2964 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2965 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2966 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2967 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2968 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2969 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2970 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2971 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2973 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2974 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2975 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2976 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2977 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2981 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2982 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2984 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2985 is_holder_tx = true;
2986 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2987 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2988 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2989 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2990 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2991 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2992 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2993 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2994 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2995 is_holder_tx = true;
2996 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2997 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2998 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2999 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3000 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3001 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
3007 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
3013 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3014 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
3015 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
3016 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3017 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3018 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3019 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
3020 // transaction confirms.
3021 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3022 return holder_transactions;
3024 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3025 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3026 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3027 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3028 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3031 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
3032 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
3033 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
3034 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
3035 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
3036 // confirmed in the next block.
3039 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
3040 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
3041 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
3045 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
3046 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
3050 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
3051 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
3052 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3053 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
3054 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3055 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3056 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3057 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
3058 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
3059 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3060 return holder_transactions;
3062 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3063 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3064 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3065 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3066 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3070 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
3071 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
3072 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
3079 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3080 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3081 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3084 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3085 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3087 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3088 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
3091 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3093 header: &BlockHeader,
3096 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3098 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3100 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3101 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3104 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3106 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3107 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3108 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
3109 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
3110 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3111 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
3112 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3114 } else { Vec::new() }
3117 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3119 header: &BlockHeader,
3120 txdata: &TransactionData,
3123 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3125 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3127 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3128 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3131 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
3132 for tx in &txn_matched {
3133 let mut output_val = 0;
3134 for out in tx.output.iter() {
3135 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3136 output_val += out.value;
3137 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3141 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3143 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3144 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3145 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
3146 let txid = tx.txid();
3147 // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
3148 if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
3149 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3152 for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3153 if ev.txid == txid {
3154 if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
3155 assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
3156 "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
3157 This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
3159 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3163 for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
3164 if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
3165 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3169 for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
3170 if txid == *spendable_txid {
3171 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3176 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
3177 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
3178 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
3179 // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
3180 // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
3181 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
3182 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
3183 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
3184 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
3185 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), txid);
3186 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
3187 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
3188 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
3189 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
3190 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3191 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
3192 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3193 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3195 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3196 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
3197 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
3198 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
3199 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
3200 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3201 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3203 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3204 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
3208 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3210 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
3212 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
3213 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
3214 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
3215 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
3220 if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
3221 // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
3222 // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
3223 // other ways which can have more than one output.
3224 for tx_input in &tx.input {
3225 let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
3226 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
3227 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
3228 &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
3230 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3231 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
3232 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3234 // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
3235 // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
3236 // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
3237 // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
3241 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3243 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3247 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3248 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3251 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
3254 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
3255 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
3256 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
3257 /// complexity especially in
3258 /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
3260 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
3261 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
3262 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3265 conf_hash: BlockHash,
3266 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
3267 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
3268 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
3270 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3272 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3274 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3275 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3278 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
3279 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
3281 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
3282 if should_broadcast {
3283 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone());
3284 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height());
3285 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
3286 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
3287 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3288 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
3289 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
3290 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
3291 // `transactions_confirmed`.
3292 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3293 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
3294 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
3295 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
3296 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
3297 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
3298 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
3299 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
3301 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3305 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3306 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3307 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3308 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3309 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3310 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3311 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3313 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3317 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3318 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3319 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3321 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3322 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3326 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3327 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3329 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3330 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3332 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3333 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3334 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3337 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3338 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3339 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3340 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3342 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3343 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3344 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3345 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3346 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3349 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3350 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
3351 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3353 payment_preimage: None,
3354 source: source.clone(),
3355 htlc_value_satoshis,
3357 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3358 commitment_tx_output_idx,
3359 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3360 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3361 payment_preimage: None,
3364 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3365 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3366 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3367 outputs: vec![descriptor]
3369 self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
3371 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3372 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3373 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
3374 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3375 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3376 payment_preimage: preimage,
3379 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3380 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3381 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3386 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3387 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3389 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3390 // updating the latter in the process.
3391 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3392 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3393 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3397 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3398 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3399 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3400 for tx in &txn_matched {
3401 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3402 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3403 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3404 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3412 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
3413 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3414 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3417 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3420 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3421 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3422 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3424 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3425 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3427 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3430 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3434 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3437 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3438 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3441 let mut removed_height = None;
3442 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3443 if entry.txid == *txid {
3444 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
3449 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
3450 log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
3451 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
3452 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
3457 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
3459 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3462 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3463 /// transactions thereof.
3464 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3465 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
3466 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3467 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3468 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3469 if matches { break; }
3470 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3475 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3478 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3481 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3482 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3483 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3484 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3485 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3486 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3489 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3490 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3491 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3492 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3493 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3494 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3495 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3496 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3500 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3501 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3502 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3503 } else { panic!(); }
3514 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3515 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
3516 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
3517 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
3518 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
3519 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
3525 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3526 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3527 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3528 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3529 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3530 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3531 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3532 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3533 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3534 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3535 let height = self.best_block.height();
3536 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3537 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3538 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3539 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3540 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3541 // time out the HTLC first.
3542 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3543 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3544 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3545 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3546 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3547 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3548 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
3549 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
3550 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
3551 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
3552 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
3553 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
3554 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3555 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3556 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3557 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
3558 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
3559 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
3560 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
3561 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
3562 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
3563 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
3564 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
3565 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3572 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
3574 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3575 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3576 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3579 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3580 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3581 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3588 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
3589 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
3590 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3591 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
3592 let mut payment_data = None;
3593 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
3594 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
3595 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
3596 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3597 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
3598 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
3599 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3600 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
3602 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3603 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
3604 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
3607 macro_rules! log_claim {
3608 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
3609 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
3610 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
3612 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3613 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3614 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3615 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3616 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
3617 // matched by any HTLC spend:
3618 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3619 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
3620 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
3621 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
3622 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
3623 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
3624 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
3625 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3626 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3627 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
3629 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
3630 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3631 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3632 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
3637 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
3638 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
3639 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
3640 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
3641 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
3642 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
3643 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
3644 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
3653 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3654 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3655 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3656 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3657 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3658 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
3659 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3660 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
3661 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3662 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3663 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3664 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
3665 } else if !$holder_tx {
3666 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3667 if payment_data.is_none() {
3668 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3671 if payment_data.is_none() {
3672 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
3673 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
3674 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3675 txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3676 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3677 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3678 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
3679 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
3680 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
3681 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
3682 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
3683 // accepted_preimage_claim).
3684 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
3685 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
3688 continue 'outer_loop;
3695 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
3696 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3697 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
3699 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3700 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3701 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3702 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
3705 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3706 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3707 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
3710 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3711 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3712 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
3713 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3714 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3715 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
3716 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3719 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3720 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3721 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3722 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3723 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3724 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3727 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3729 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3731 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3734 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3735 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3736 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3737 upd.source == source
3739 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3741 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3743 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3744 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3745 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3746 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3747 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3750 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3752 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3754 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3758 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3759 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3761 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3762 *htlc_source != source
3767 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3769 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3771 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3772 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3773 source, payment_hash,
3774 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3775 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3778 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3779 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3785 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3786 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3787 let mut spendable_output = None;
3788 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3789 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3790 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3791 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3792 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3793 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3794 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3795 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3796 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3797 // non-standard due to their size.
3798 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3799 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3800 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3803 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3804 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3805 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3806 output: outp.clone(),
3810 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3811 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3812 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3813 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3814 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3815 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3816 output: outp.clone(),
3817 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3818 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3819 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3824 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3825 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3826 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3827 output: outp.clone(),
3828 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3829 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3833 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3834 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3835 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3836 output: outp.clone(),
3841 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3842 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3844 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3846 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3847 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3849 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3850 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3855 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3857 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3858 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3861 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3862 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3865 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3866 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3870 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, M, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (M, T, F, L)
3872 M: Deref<Target = ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
3873 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3874 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3877 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3878 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3881 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3882 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3885 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3886 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3889 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
3890 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3894 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3896 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider<Signer=Signer>, Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
3897 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
3898 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3899 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3903 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3908 let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
3910 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3912 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3913 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3915 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3916 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3918 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3919 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3920 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3921 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3924 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3926 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3927 let shutdown_script = {
3928 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3929 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3932 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3933 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3934 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3935 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3936 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3937 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3938 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3940 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3941 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3942 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3944 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3945 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3946 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3948 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3949 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3953 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3954 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3955 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3956 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3958 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3963 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3965 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3967 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3970 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3971 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3972 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3973 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3974 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3976 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3977 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3983 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3984 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3985 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3986 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3987 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3988 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3989 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3990 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3992 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3993 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3997 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3998 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3999 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
4000 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4001 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4002 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
4003 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4007 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4008 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4009 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
4010 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4011 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4012 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
4013 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4017 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
4018 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4021 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
4023 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4025 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
4027 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4028 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4030 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4031 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4032 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
4033 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
4034 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4035 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
4036 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4040 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4041 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
4042 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
4043 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
4044 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4045 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
4046 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
4047 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4049 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
4052 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4053 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
4054 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
4055 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4056 pending_events.push(event);
4060 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
4062 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4063 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
4064 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
4065 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4066 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
4070 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4071 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
4072 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
4073 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4074 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4075 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
4076 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
4077 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4079 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
4080 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4083 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(
4084 reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
4087 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
4088 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4090 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
4091 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4092 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
4093 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4094 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
4095 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
4096 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4100 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4101 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4102 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
4103 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
4104 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4107 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
4108 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
4109 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
4110 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
4111 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
4112 let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
4113 let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new());
4114 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4115 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
4116 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
4117 (5, pending_monitor_events, optional_vec),
4118 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
4119 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
4120 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
4121 (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
4122 (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
4125 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
4127 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
4130 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
4131 counterparty_payment_script,
4135 holder_revocation_basepoint,
4137 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4138 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4140 counterparty_commitment_params,
4141 funding_redeemscript,
4142 channel_value_satoshis,
4143 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
4148 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
4149 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
4150 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
4151 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),
4153 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
4154 current_holder_commitment_tx,
4155 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
4156 current_holder_commitment_number,
4159 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
4161 is_processing_pending_events: false,
4163 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
4168 lockdown_from_offchain,
4170 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
4171 funding_spend_confirmed,
4172 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
4173 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
4174 spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
4177 counterparty_node_id,
4184 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4185 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4186 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
4187 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4188 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
4189 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4190 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4191 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4192 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
4193 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4194 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4195 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
4199 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
4201 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
4202 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
4203 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
4204 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
4205 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
4206 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4207 use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
4208 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
4209 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4210 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
4211 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
4212 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
4213 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4214 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
4215 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
4216 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
4217 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
4218 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4220 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
4221 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
4222 use crate::prelude::*;
4224 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
4225 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
4226 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
4227 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
4228 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
4229 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
4230 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
4231 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
4232 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
4234 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
4235 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
4236 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4237 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4238 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4239 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4240 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4241 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4243 // Rebalance somewhat
4244 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
4246 // First route two payments for testing at the end
4247 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4248 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4250 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
4251 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4252 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
4253 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
4254 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
4255 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
4256 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
4258 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
4259 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
4260 let new_header = create_dummy_header(nodes[0].best_block_info().0, 0);
4261 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4262 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
4263 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
4265 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
4266 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
4267 (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
4269 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
4270 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
4271 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
4272 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
4273 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
4274 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
4275 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
4276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
4277 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4278 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
4280 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
4281 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
4282 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
4283 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
4284 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
4285 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
4286 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
4287 } else { panic!(); }
4288 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
4289 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
4291 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
4293 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
4295 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
4297 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4298 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
4299 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
4300 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
4301 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
4302 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
4303 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4304 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
4305 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
4308 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
4309 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
4310 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4314 fn test_prune_preimages() {
4315 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4316 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4317 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster::new(Network::Testnet));
4318 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4320 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4322 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4325 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4326 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4327 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4331 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlcs {
4332 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4334 let mut res = Vec::new();
4335 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4336 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4340 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4341 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4348 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4349 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4350 preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
4353 let dummy_sig = crate::util::crypto::sign(&secp_ctx,
4354 &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
4355 &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4357 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4358 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4359 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4360 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4365 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4367 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4368 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4369 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4370 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4371 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4378 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4379 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4380 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
4381 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4382 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
4383 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
4385 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4386 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4387 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4388 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4389 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4390 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4391 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4392 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4394 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4395 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
4397 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4399 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4400 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
4401 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4402 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
4403 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
4404 &channel_parameters, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
4405 best_block, dummy_key);
4407 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
4408 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4409 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4410 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4411 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"1").into_inner()),
4412 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4413 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"2").into_inner()),
4414 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4415 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4416 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4417 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4420 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4421 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4422 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4423 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4424 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4425 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4426 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4428 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"3").into_inner()),
4429 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4431 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4432 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4433 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4434 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4435 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4436 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4438 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"4").into_inner()),
4439 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4441 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4442 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4443 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]);
4444 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4445 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4446 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4447 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4448 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4449 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4450 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4451 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4453 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4454 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]);
4455 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4456 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
4457 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4458 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4459 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4460 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4461 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4465 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4466 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4467 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4469 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4470 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4471 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4473 macro_rules! sign_input {
4474 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4475 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4476 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4478 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4479 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4480 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4482 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
4483 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4484 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4485 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4486 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4487 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
4488 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4489 witness.push(ser_sig);
4490 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4491 witness.push(vec!(1));
4492 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4493 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4494 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4495 witness.push(vec![0]);
4497 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4499 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4500 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4501 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4502 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4503 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4507 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4508 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4510 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4511 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4512 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4513 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4515 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4516 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4520 script_sig: Script::new(),
4521 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4522 witness: Witness::new(),
4525 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4526 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4529 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4530 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
4531 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4533 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4534 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4535 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
4536 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4539 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4542 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
4543 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4544 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4545 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4547 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4548 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4552 script_sig: Script::new(),
4553 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4554 witness: Witness::new(),
4557 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4558 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4561 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4562 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
4563 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4565 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4566 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4567 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
4568 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4571 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4574 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
4575 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4576 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4577 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4578 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4579 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4583 script_sig: Script::new(),
4584 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4585 witness: Witness::new(),
4587 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4588 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4591 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4592 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
4593 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4595 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4596 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4597 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
4598 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4601 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4605 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.