1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
42 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
44 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
46 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
47 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use util::logger::Logger;
50 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
52 use util::events::Event;
56 use io::{self, Error};
57 use core::convert::TryInto;
61 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
62 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
63 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
66 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
67 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
68 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
69 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
70 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
72 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
73 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
74 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
76 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
77 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
78 /// its docs for more details.
83 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
84 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
85 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
86 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
87 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
89 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
91 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
92 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
93 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
94 self.update_id.write(w)?;
95 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
96 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
97 update_step.write(w)?;
99 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
103 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
104 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
105 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
106 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
107 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
108 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
110 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
114 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
115 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
119 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
120 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
121 pub enum MonitorEvent {
122 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
123 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
125 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
126 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
128 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
129 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
131 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure
133 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
134 funding_txo: OutPoint,
135 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
136 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
138 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
139 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
140 monitor_update_id: u64,
143 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
144 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
146 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure
147 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
149 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
150 // Note that UpdateCompleted and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
151 // generated only in ChainMonitor
152 (0, UpdateCompleted) => {
153 (0, funding_txo, required),
154 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
158 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
162 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
163 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
164 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
165 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
166 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
167 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
168 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
169 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
170 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
172 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
173 (0, payment_hash, required),
174 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
175 (2, source, required),
176 (4, payment_preimage, option),
179 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
180 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
181 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
182 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
183 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
184 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
185 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
186 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
187 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
188 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
189 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
190 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
191 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
192 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
193 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
194 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
195 /// accurate block height.
196 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
197 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
198 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
199 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
200 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
201 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
204 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
205 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
206 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
207 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
208 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
209 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
210 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
211 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
212 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
213 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
215 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
216 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
217 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
219 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
220 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
222 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
223 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
225 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
226 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
227 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
228 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
230 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
231 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
232 struct HolderSignedTx {
233 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
235 revocation_key: PublicKey,
236 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
237 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
238 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
239 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
240 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
241 to_self_value_sat: u64,
244 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
246 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
247 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
248 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
249 (2, revocation_key, required),
250 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
251 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
252 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
253 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
254 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
255 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
258 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
259 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
261 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
262 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
263 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
264 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
267 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
268 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
269 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
270 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
271 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
272 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
273 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
278 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
279 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
280 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
281 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
282 // used. Read it for compatibility.
283 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
284 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
285 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
286 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
287 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
288 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
292 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
293 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
294 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
295 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
296 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
297 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
298 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
300 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
301 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
302 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
303 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
306 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
310 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
311 /// transaction causing it.
313 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
315 struct OnchainEventEntry {
319 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
322 impl OnchainEventEntry {
323 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
324 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
326 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
327 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
329 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
330 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
331 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
333 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
334 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
335 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
336 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
337 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
344 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
345 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
349 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
351 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
352 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
354 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
355 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
358 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
359 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
360 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
361 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
362 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
363 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
366 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
367 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
368 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
369 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
370 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
372 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
373 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
375 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
377 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
379 FundingSpendConfirmation {
380 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
381 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
382 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
383 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
384 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
385 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
387 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
388 /// is constructed. This is used when
389 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
390 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
391 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
392 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
393 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
395 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
396 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
398 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
399 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
400 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
401 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
402 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
403 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
404 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
405 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
409 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
410 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
412 (0, self.txid, required),
413 (1, self.transaction, option),
414 (2, self.height, required),
415 (4, self.event, required),
421 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
422 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
423 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
424 let mut transaction = None;
426 let mut event = None;
427 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
429 (1, transaction, option),
430 (2, height, required),
431 (4, event, ignorable),
433 if let Some(ev) = event {
434 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, event: ev }))
441 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
443 (0, source, required),
444 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
445 (2, payment_hash, required),
446 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
448 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
449 (0, descriptor, required),
451 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
452 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
453 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
455 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
456 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
457 (2, preimage, option),
458 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
463 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
465 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
466 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
467 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
468 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
470 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
471 commitment_txid: Txid,
472 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
473 commitment_number: u64,
474 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
477 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
483 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
484 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
486 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
487 /// think we've fallen behind!
488 should_broadcast: bool,
491 scriptpubkey: Script,
495 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
496 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
498 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
499 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
500 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
501 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
502 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
503 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
508 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
509 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
510 (0, commitment_tx, required),
511 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
513 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
514 (0, commitment_txid, required),
515 (2, commitment_number, required),
516 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
517 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
519 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
520 (0, payment_preimage, required),
522 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
524 (2, secret, required),
526 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
527 (0, should_broadcast, required),
529 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
530 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
534 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
536 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
538 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
539 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
541 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
542 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
543 /// force-closed now.
544 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
545 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
546 /// required to do so.
547 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
549 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
550 /// we consider it spendable.
551 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
552 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
553 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
554 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
555 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
557 confirmation_height: u32,
559 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
560 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
561 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
563 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
564 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
565 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
566 ContentiousClaimable {
567 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
568 /// required to do so.
569 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
570 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
574 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
575 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
576 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
577 MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
578 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
579 /// required to do so.
580 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
581 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
583 claimable_height: u32,
587 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
589 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
590 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
591 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
592 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
595 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
596 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
597 (2, payment_preimage, option),
600 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
601 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
603 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
604 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
606 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
607 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
608 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
609 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
611 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
612 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
613 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
614 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
615 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
616 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
618 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
620 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
623 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
624 latest_update_id: u64,
625 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
627 destination_script: Script,
628 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
629 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
630 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
632 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
633 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
634 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
635 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
636 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
638 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
639 funding_redeemscript: Script,
640 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
641 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
642 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
644 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
646 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
647 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
648 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
649 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
650 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
651 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
652 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
653 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
654 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
655 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
656 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
657 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
658 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
659 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
660 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
661 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
663 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
664 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
665 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
666 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
667 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
668 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
670 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
672 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
673 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
675 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
677 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
678 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
679 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
681 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
683 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
684 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
685 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
686 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
687 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
688 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
689 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
690 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
691 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
692 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
694 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
696 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
697 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
698 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
699 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
701 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
702 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
703 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
704 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
705 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
708 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
710 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
712 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
713 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
714 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
715 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
717 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
718 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
719 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
721 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
722 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
723 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
724 holder_tx_signed: bool,
726 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
727 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
728 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
729 funding_spend_seen: bool,
731 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
732 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
733 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
734 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
735 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
736 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
738 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
739 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
740 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
741 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
742 // the full block_connected).
743 best_block: BestBlock,
745 /// The node_id of our counterparty
746 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
748 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
751 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
752 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
754 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
755 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
757 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
758 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
759 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
760 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
765 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
766 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
768 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
769 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
770 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
771 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
772 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
773 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
774 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
775 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
776 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
777 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
778 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
779 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
780 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
781 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
782 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
783 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
784 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
785 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
786 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
787 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
788 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
789 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
790 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
791 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
792 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
793 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
794 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
795 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
796 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
797 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
798 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
799 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
800 self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
801 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
802 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
803 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
812 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
813 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
814 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
818 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
819 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
820 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
822 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
823 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
824 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
826 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
828 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
829 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
831 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
832 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
833 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
834 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
835 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
836 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
838 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
841 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
842 match &self.shutdown_script {
843 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
844 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
847 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
848 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
849 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
850 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
851 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
852 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
853 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
855 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
856 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
857 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
859 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
860 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
861 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
862 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
863 match second_option {
864 Some(second_pubkey) => {
865 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
868 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
873 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
877 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
879 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
881 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
882 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
883 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
884 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
885 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
886 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
887 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
891 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
892 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
893 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
894 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
895 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
896 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
897 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
898 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
899 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
900 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
904 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
905 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
906 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
907 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
910 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
911 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
912 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
913 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
916 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
917 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
918 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
920 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
923 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
925 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
926 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
928 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
929 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
930 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
933 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
934 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
935 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
937 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
938 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
940 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
944 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
945 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
949 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
950 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
951 event.write(writer)?;
954 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
955 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
957 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
958 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
959 entry.write(writer)?;
962 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
963 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
965 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
966 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
968 script.write(writer)?;
971 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
973 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
974 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
976 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
977 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
978 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
979 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
980 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
981 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
982 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
989 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
990 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
991 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
992 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
993 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
994 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
997 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
998 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
999 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1000 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1001 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1002 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1003 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1005 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1006 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1007 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1009 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1010 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1011 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1012 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1014 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1015 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1017 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1018 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1019 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1020 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1022 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1023 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1025 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1026 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1027 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1028 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1029 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1030 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1031 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1032 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1034 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1037 let onchain_tx_handler =
1038 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1039 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1041 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1042 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1044 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1045 latest_update_id: 0,
1046 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1048 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1049 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1050 counterparty_payment_script,
1054 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1056 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1057 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1059 counterparty_commitment_params,
1060 funding_redeemscript,
1061 channel_value_satoshis,
1062 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1064 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1066 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1067 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1068 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1069 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1071 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1072 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1073 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1074 current_holder_commitment_number,
1076 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1077 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1078 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1080 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1085 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1086 holder_tx_signed: false,
1087 funding_spend_seen: false,
1088 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1089 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1090 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1093 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1100 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1101 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1104 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1105 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1106 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1107 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1108 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1111 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1112 commitment_number: u64,
1113 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1115 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1116 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1117 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1121 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1122 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1123 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1124 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1125 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1128 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1129 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1130 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1132 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1133 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1135 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1138 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1139 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1142 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1143 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1146 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1151 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1154 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1157 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1160 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1161 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1163 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1169 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1170 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1173 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1176 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1178 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1179 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1182 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1183 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1184 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1187 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1188 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1189 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1190 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1191 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1194 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1195 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1196 /// have been registered.
1197 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1198 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1199 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1200 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1201 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1202 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1203 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1205 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1206 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1212 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1213 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1214 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1215 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1218 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1221 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1222 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1223 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1224 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1225 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1228 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1229 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1232 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1233 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1236 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1237 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1240 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1242 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1244 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1245 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1248 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1249 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1250 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1251 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1252 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1253 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1254 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1255 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1256 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1257 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1258 where L::Target: Logger {
1259 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1262 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1263 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1264 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1265 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1266 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1267 where L::Target: Logger {
1268 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1271 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1272 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1273 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1274 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1275 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1276 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1278 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1279 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1281 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1282 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1284 header: &BlockHeader,
1285 txdata: &TransactionData,
1290 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1292 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1293 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1296 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1297 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1300 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1302 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1304 header: &BlockHeader,
1310 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1311 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1314 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1315 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1318 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1319 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1321 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1322 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1324 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1325 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1327 header: &BlockHeader,
1328 txdata: &TransactionData,
1333 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1335 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1336 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1339 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1340 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1341 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1344 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1346 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1347 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1349 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1350 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1357 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1358 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1361 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1362 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1363 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1366 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1367 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1369 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1370 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1372 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1373 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1375 header: &BlockHeader,
1380 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1382 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1383 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1386 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1387 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1388 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1391 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1392 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1393 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1394 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1396 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1397 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1399 txids.sort_unstable();
1404 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1405 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1406 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1407 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1410 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1411 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1414 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1415 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1416 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1417 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1419 /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
1420 /// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
1423 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1424 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1425 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1426 let mut res = Vec::new();
1427 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1429 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1430 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1431 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1432 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1433 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1436 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1437 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1438 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1439 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1440 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1443 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1444 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1445 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1446 if let Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1447 if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1448 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
1449 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1452 debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
1453 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1454 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1455 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1457 } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1458 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1459 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1460 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1461 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1462 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1463 debug_assert!($holder_commitment || us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1464 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1465 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1466 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1467 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1468 let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1469 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1470 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
1471 Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1474 if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
1475 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1476 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1477 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1480 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1481 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1482 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1485 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1486 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1487 // we know the preimage.
1488 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1489 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1490 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1491 let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1492 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
1493 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
1494 Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
1498 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1499 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1500 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1501 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1504 res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1505 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1506 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1515 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1516 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1517 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1518 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1519 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1520 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1521 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1522 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1524 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1527 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1528 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1529 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1532 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1533 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1534 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1537 found_commitment_tx = true;
1538 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1539 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1540 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1541 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1542 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1543 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1546 found_commitment_tx = true;
1547 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1548 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1549 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1550 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1551 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1552 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1553 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1556 found_commitment_tx = true;
1559 if !found_commitment_tx {
1560 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1561 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1562 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1563 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1564 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1565 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1566 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1570 // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
1573 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1574 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1575 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1577 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1578 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1579 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1581 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1582 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1585 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1586 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1593 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1594 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1595 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1596 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1597 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1599 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1600 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1601 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1602 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1603 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1604 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1606 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1607 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1608 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1609 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1610 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1611 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1612 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1613 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1614 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1615 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1616 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1617 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1618 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1619 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
1620 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1621 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1623 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1626 if !htlc_update_confd {
1627 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1634 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1635 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1636 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1637 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1638 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1639 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1644 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1645 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1646 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1647 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1648 Some((a, &**source))
1651 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1652 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1653 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1655 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1656 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1657 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1658 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1663 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1664 // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
1665 // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1666 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1668 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1669 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1670 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1671 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1677 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1678 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1680 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1681 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1688 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
1689 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
1693 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1694 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1695 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1697 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1698 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1699 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1700 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1701 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1702 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1704 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1705 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1706 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1707 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1708 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1709 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
1710 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1711 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
1713 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1714 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1715 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1716 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1717 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1718 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1719 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1720 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1721 // payment_preimage.
1722 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1723 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1724 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1725 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1727 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1729 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1730 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1731 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
1732 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
1733 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
1734 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
1735 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
1736 matched_htlc = true;
1740 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1741 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1742 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1744 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1745 *update_source != **source
1750 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1751 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
1752 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
1753 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1754 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1755 source: (**source).clone(),
1756 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1757 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1758 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
1761 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1762 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
1763 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1764 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1770 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1771 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1773 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1774 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
1779 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
1780 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
1781 // in-line tests later.
1784 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
1785 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
1786 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1787 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1788 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1789 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1790 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
1795 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
1796 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
1799 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1800 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1801 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1802 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1803 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1804 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1805 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
1808 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1809 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1810 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1811 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1816 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1817 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1818 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1819 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1820 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1822 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1823 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1824 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1828 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1829 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1830 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1835 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1842 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1851 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1852 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1853 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1854 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1856 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1857 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1860 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1861 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1862 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1863 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1864 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1865 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1866 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
1867 Some(old_points) => {
1868 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1869 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
1870 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1871 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1872 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
1874 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1877 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1881 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1884 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1885 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1886 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1892 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1893 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1894 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1895 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1896 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1897 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1898 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1899 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1900 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1901 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1902 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1903 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1906 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1907 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1908 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1909 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1910 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1912 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1913 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1916 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1917 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1918 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1919 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1920 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
1925 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1926 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1927 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1928 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
1929 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
1930 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1931 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1934 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1936 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1937 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1938 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1939 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1940 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1941 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1944 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1945 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1946 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1950 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1951 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1952 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1957 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1958 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1959 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1960 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1961 // holder commitment transactions.
1962 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1963 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
1964 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
1966 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
1967 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1968 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1969 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
1970 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1975 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1976 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1979 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1980 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
1981 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1983 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
1986 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
1987 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1988 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1991 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
1992 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
1993 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1994 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1995 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1996 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1997 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1998 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1999 match updates.updates[0] {
2000 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
2002 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2003 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2006 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2007 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2009 let mut ret = Ok(());
2010 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2012 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
2013 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2014 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2015 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
2016 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2017 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2021 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2022 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2023 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2025 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2026 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2027 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2028 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2030 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2031 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2032 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2033 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2034 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2038 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2039 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2040 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2041 if *should_broadcast {
2042 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2043 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2044 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
2046 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2047 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2048 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2049 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2052 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2053 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2054 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2055 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2060 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2062 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
2063 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2068 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2069 self.latest_update_id
2072 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2076 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2077 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2078 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2079 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2080 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2081 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2083 &self.outputs_to_watch
2086 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2087 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2088 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2092 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2093 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2094 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
2098 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2099 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2100 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2103 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2104 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2107 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2108 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2111 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2112 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2115 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2116 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2117 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2118 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2120 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
2121 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
2123 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L)
2124 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
2125 where L::Target: Logger {
2126 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2127 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2128 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2129 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2130 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
2132 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2133 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2135 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2136 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2139 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2144 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2145 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2146 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2147 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2148 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2149 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
2150 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
2152 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2153 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2155 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2156 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2157 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2158 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2159 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2160 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2161 to_counterparty_output_info =
2162 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2166 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2167 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2168 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2169 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2170 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2171 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2172 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2173 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
2174 to_counterparty_output_info);
2176 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2177 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2178 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2183 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2184 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2185 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2186 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2187 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2188 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2190 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2192 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2193 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2194 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2195 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2198 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2199 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2200 [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2203 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2204 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2205 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2206 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2207 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2208 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2209 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2211 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2212 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2214 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2216 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2217 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2218 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2219 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2222 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
2223 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2224 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
2225 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2226 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2230 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2233 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
2234 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
2235 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
2236 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2237 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
2239 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2240 Some(outputs) => outputs,
2241 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2243 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2244 Some(points) => points,
2245 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2248 let per_commitment_point =
2249 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2250 // per-commitment point
2251 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
2252 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2253 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2254 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2255 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2256 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2258 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
2259 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
2261 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2262 let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
2263 if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
2264 &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
2266 if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
2267 &per_commitment_point,
2268 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
2270 Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
2271 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2272 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
2274 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
2278 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
2281 if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
2282 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
2283 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2284 to_counterparty_output_info =
2285 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2291 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2292 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2293 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2294 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2295 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2296 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2297 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
2300 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2301 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2302 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2303 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2304 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2305 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2306 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2307 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
2309 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2310 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2311 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2312 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2315 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2316 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2317 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2322 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
2325 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2326 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2327 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2328 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
2329 return (Vec::new(), None)
2332 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2333 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2336 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2341 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2342 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2343 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2345 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2346 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2347 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2348 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2349 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2350 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2353 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2354 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2355 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2356 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2357 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2359 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2360 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2362 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2363 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2364 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2365 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2367 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2370 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2373 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2375 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2376 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2380 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2383 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2384 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2385 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2386 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2387 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2388 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2394 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2395 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2396 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2397 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2398 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2399 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2400 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2401 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2403 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2404 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2405 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2406 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2407 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2411 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2412 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2414 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2415 is_holder_tx = true;
2416 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2417 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2418 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2419 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2420 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2421 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2422 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2423 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2424 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2425 is_holder_tx = true;
2426 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2427 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2428 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2429 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2430 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2431 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
2437 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2443 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2444 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2445 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2446 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2447 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2448 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2449 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2450 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2451 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2452 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2453 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2456 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2457 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2458 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2459 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2460 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2461 // confirmed in the next block.
2464 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2465 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2466 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2470 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2471 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2475 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2476 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2477 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2478 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2479 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2480 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2481 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2482 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2483 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2484 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2485 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2486 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2490 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2491 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2492 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2499 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2500 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2501 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2504 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2505 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2507 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2508 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2511 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2513 header: &BlockHeader,
2516 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2518 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2520 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2521 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2524 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2526 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2527 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2528 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2529 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2530 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2531 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2532 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2534 } else { Vec::new() }
2537 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2539 header: &BlockHeader,
2540 txdata: &TransactionData,
2543 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2545 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2547 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2548 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2551 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2552 for tx in &txn_matched {
2553 let mut output_val = 0;
2554 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2555 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2556 output_val += out.value;
2557 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2561 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2563 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2564 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2565 for tx in &txn_matched {
2566 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2567 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2568 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2569 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2571 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2572 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2573 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2574 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2575 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
2576 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2577 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
2578 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2579 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
2580 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2581 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
2582 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2583 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2585 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2586 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2587 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
2588 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
2589 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
2590 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2591 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2593 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2594 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2598 let txid = tx.txid();
2599 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2601 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
2603 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2604 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2605 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
2609 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2610 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2611 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2612 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2613 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2618 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2619 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2620 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2621 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2623 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2626 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2627 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2630 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2633 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2634 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2635 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2636 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2638 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2639 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2640 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2643 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2644 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2645 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2647 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2649 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2651 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2652 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2655 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2656 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2658 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2659 if should_broadcast {
2660 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2661 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2662 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2663 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2664 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2665 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2666 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2667 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2668 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2669 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2670 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2671 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2672 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2674 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2677 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2678 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2679 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2680 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2681 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2682 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2683 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2685 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2689 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2691 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2693 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2694 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2698 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2699 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2701 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2702 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2704 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
2705 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2706 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2709 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
2710 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2711 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2712 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2714 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
2715 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2716 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2717 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2718 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
2721 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
2722 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
2723 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2725 payment_preimage: None,
2726 source: source.clone(),
2727 htlc_value_satoshis,
2729 if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
2730 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
2733 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2734 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2735 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2736 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2739 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
2740 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
2742 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
2743 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
2744 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
2749 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2751 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2752 // updating the latter in the process.
2753 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2754 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2755 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2759 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2760 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2761 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2762 for tx in &txn_matched {
2763 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2764 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2765 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2766 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2774 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2775 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2776 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2779 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2782 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2783 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2784 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2786 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2787 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
2789 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2792 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2796 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2799 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2800 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2803 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
2804 log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
2807 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2810 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2811 /// transactions thereof.
2812 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2813 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2814 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2815 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2816 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2817 if matches { break; }
2818 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2823 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2826 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2829 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2830 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2831 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2832 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2833 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2834 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2837 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2838 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2839 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2840 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2841 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
2842 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
2843 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
2844 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
2848 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2849 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2850 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2851 } else { panic!(); }
2862 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2863 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2864 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2865 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2866 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2867 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2868 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2869 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2870 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2871 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2872 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2873 let height = self.best_block.height();
2874 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2875 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2876 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2877 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2878 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2879 // time out the HTLC first.
2880 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2881 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2882 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2883 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2884 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2885 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2886 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2887 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2888 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2889 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2890 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2891 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2892 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2893 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2894 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2895 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2896 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2897 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2898 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2899 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2900 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2901 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2902 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2903 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2910 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2912 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2913 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2914 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2917 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2918 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2919 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2926 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2927 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2928 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2929 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2930 let mut payment_data = None;
2931 let witness_items = input.witness.len();
2932 let htlctype = input.witness.last().map(|w| w.len()).and_then(HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype);
2933 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
2934 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
2935 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
2936 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
2937 && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
2938 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2939 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
2940 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
2941 !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
2943 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2944 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2946 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2947 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2948 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
2949 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2950 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
2953 macro_rules! log_claim {
2954 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2955 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2956 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
2958 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2959 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2960 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2961 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2962 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
2963 // matched by any HTLC spend:
2964 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2965 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
2966 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
2967 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
2968 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2969 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2970 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2971 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2972 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2973 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
2975 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2976 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2977 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2978 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2983 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2984 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2985 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2986 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2987 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2988 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2989 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2990 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
2999 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3000 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3001 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3002 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3003 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3004 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
3005 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3006 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
3007 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3008 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3009 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3010 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
3011 } else if !$holder_tx {
3012 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3013 if payment_data.is_none() {
3014 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3017 if payment_data.is_none() {
3018 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
3019 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
3020 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3021 txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3022 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3023 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3024 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
3025 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
3026 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
3027 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
3028 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
3029 // accepted_preimage_claim).
3030 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
3031 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
3034 continue 'outer_loop;
3041 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
3042 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3043 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
3045 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3046 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3047 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3048 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
3051 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3052 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3053 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
3056 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3057 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3058 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
3059 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3060 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3061 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
3062 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3065 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3066 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3067 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3068 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3069 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3072 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3074 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3076 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3079 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3080 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3081 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3082 upd.source == source
3084 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3086 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3088 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3089 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3090 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3091 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3094 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3096 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3098 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3102 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3103 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3105 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3106 *htlc_source != source
3111 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3113 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3115 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3116 source, payment_hash,
3117 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3118 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3121 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3122 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3128 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3129 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3130 let mut spendable_output = None;
3131 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3132 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3133 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3134 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3135 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3136 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3137 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3138 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3139 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3140 // non-standard due to their size.
3141 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3142 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3143 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3146 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3147 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3148 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3149 output: outp.clone(),
3153 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3154 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3155 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3156 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3157 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3158 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3159 output: outp.clone(),
3160 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3161 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3162 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3167 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3168 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3169 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3170 output: outp.clone(),
3171 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3172 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3176 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3177 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3178 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3179 output: outp.clone(),
3184 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3185 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3187 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3189 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3191 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3192 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3197 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3199 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3200 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3203 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3204 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3207 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3208 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3212 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3214 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3215 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3218 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3219 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3222 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3223 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3226 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3227 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3230 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3231 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3235 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3237 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
3238 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
3239 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3240 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3244 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3249 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3251 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3252 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3254 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3255 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3257 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3258 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3259 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3260 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3263 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3265 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3266 let shutdown_script = {
3267 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3268 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3271 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3272 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3273 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3274 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3275 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3276 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3277 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3279 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3280 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3281 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3283 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3284 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3285 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3287 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3288 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3292 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3293 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3294 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3295 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3297 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3302 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3304 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3306 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3309 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3310 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3311 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3312 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3313 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3315 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3316 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3322 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3323 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3324 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3325 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3326 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3327 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3328 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3329 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3331 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3332 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3336 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3337 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3338 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3339 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3340 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3341 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3342 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3346 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3347 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3348 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3349 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3350 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3351 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3352 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3356 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3357 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3360 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3362 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3364 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3366 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3367 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3369 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3370 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3371 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3372 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3373 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3374 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3375 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3379 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3380 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3381 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3382 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3383 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3384 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3385 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3386 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3388 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3391 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3392 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3393 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3394 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3395 pending_events.push(event);
3399 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3401 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3402 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3403 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3404 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3405 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3409 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3410 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3411 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3412 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3413 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3414 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3415 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3416 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3418 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3419 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3422 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3424 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3425 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3427 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3428 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3429 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3430 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3431 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3432 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3433 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3437 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3438 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3439 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3440 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3441 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3444 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3445 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3446 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3447 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
3448 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
3449 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3450 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3451 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3452 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3453 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3454 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
3455 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
3458 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3459 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3461 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3463 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3466 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3467 counterparty_payment_script,
3471 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3473 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3474 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3476 counterparty_commitment_params,
3477 funding_redeemscript,
3478 channel_value_satoshis,
3479 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
3484 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3485 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3486 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3488 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3489 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3490 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3491 current_holder_commitment_number,
3494 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3497 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3502 lockdown_from_offchain,
3504 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3505 funding_spend_confirmed,
3506 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
3507 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3510 counterparty_node_id,
3519 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3520 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3521 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3522 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
3523 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3524 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
3525 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3526 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3527 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3528 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3529 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3530 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3531 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3535 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
3537 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3538 use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3539 use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3540 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3541 use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3542 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3543 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3544 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3546 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3547 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
3548 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
3549 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3550 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3551 use util::errors::APIError;
3552 use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3553 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3554 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3555 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3557 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
3560 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3561 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3562 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3563 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3564 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3565 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3566 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3567 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3568 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3570 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3571 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3572 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3573 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3574 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3575 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3576 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3577 &nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3578 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3579 &nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3581 // Rebalance somewhat
3582 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
3584 // First route two payments for testing at the end
3585 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3586 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3588 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
3589 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
3590 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
3591 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
3592 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
3593 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
3594 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
3596 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
3597 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
3598 let new_header = BlockHeader {
3599 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
3600 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
3601 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
3602 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3603 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
3604 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
3606 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
3607 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
3608 &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
3610 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
3611 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
3612 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
3613 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)),
3614 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
3615 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
3616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
3617 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3618 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
3620 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
3621 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
3622 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
3623 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
3624 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
3625 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
3626 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
3627 } else { panic!(); }
3628 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
3629 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
3631 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
3633 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
3635 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
3637 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3638 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
3639 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
3640 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
3641 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
3642 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3643 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
3644 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
3645 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
3648 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
3649 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
3650 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
3654 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3655 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3656 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3657 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
3658 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
3660 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3661 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3663 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3666 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3667 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3668 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3672 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3673 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3675 let mut res = Vec::new();
3676 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3677 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3681 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3682 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3689 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3690 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3692 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3693 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3699 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3700 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3701 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3702 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3707 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3709 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3710 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3711 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3712 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3713 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3714 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3720 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3721 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3722 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3723 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3724 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3725 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3727 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
3728 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3729 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3730 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3731 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3732 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3733 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3734 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3736 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3739 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3741 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3742 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3743 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3744 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
3745 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3746 &channel_parameters,
3747 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3748 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
3750 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3751 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3752 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3753 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3754 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3755 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3756 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3757 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
3758 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
3761 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3762 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3763 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3764 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3765 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3766 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3767 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3769 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3770 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3771 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3772 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3773 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3774 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3776 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3777 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3778 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3779 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3780 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3781 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3782 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3783 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3785 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3786 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3787 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3788 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3789 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3790 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3794 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3795 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3796 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3798 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3799 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3800 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3802 macro_rules! sign_input {
3803 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
3804 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3805 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
3807 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3808 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3809 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3811 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3812 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
3813 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
3814 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
3815 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
3816 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
3817 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
3818 witness.push(ser_sig);
3819 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
3820 witness.push(vec!(1));
3821 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
3822 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3823 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
3824 witness.push(vec![0]);
3826 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3828 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3829 let witness = witness.to_vec();
3830 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
3831 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
3832 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
3836 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3837 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3839 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3840 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3841 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3842 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3844 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3845 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3849 script_sig: Script::new(),
3850 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
3851 witness: Witness::new(),
3854 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3855 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3858 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3859 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
3860 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3862 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3863 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3864 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3865 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3868 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3871 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3872 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3873 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3874 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3876 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3877 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3881 script_sig: Script::new(),
3882 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
3883 witness: Witness::new(),
3886 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3887 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3890 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3891 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
3892 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3894 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3895 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3896 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3897 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3900 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3903 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3904 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3905 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3906 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3907 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3908 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3912 script_sig: Script::new(),
3913 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
3914 witness: Witness::new(),
3916 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3917 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3920 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3921 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
3922 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3924 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3925 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3926 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3927 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3930 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3934 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.