1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
41 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
43 use chain::WatchedOutput;
44 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
45 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
48 use util::logger::Logger;
49 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
51 use util::events::Event;
53 use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
59 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
60 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
61 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
64 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
65 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
66 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
67 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
68 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
70 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
71 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
72 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
74 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
75 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
76 /// its docs for more details.
81 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
82 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
83 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
84 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
85 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
87 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = std::u64::MAX;
89 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
90 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
91 self.update_id.write(w)?;
92 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
93 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
94 update_step.write(w)?;
99 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
100 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
101 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
102 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
103 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
105 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
107 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
111 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
112 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
113 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
114 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
115 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
117 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
118 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
119 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
120 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
122 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
123 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
124 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
126 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
127 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
128 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
129 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
130 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
131 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
134 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
135 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
138 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
139 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
140 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
141 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
142 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
145 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
146 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
147 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
149 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
150 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
151 /// of this channel).
153 /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
154 /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
155 /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
156 /// update must be rejected.
158 /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
159 /// the channel monitor instance.
161 /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
162 /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
163 /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
165 /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
166 /// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
167 /// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
168 /// lagging behind on block processing.
172 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
173 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
174 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
176 /// Contains a developer-readable error message.
177 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
178 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
180 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
181 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
182 pub enum MonitorEvent {
183 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
184 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
186 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
187 CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
190 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
191 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
192 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
193 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
194 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
195 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
196 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
197 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
199 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
201 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
202 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
203 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
204 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
205 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
206 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
207 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
208 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
209 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
210 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
211 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
212 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
213 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
214 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
215 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
216 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
217 /// accurate block height.
218 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
219 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
220 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
221 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
222 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
223 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
224 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
225 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
226 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
227 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
228 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
229 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
230 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
232 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
233 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
234 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
236 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
237 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
238 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
239 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
241 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
242 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
244 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
245 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
246 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
248 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
249 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
250 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
252 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
253 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
254 struct HolderSignedTx {
255 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
257 revocation_key: PublicKey,
258 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
259 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
260 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
261 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
263 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
266 /// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
267 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
269 struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
270 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
271 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
272 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
273 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
276 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
277 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
278 self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
279 self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
280 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
281 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
282 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
283 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
284 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
285 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
292 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
293 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
294 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
295 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
296 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
297 let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
298 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
299 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
300 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
301 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
302 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
303 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
304 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
305 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
308 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
309 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
312 CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
313 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
314 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
315 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
319 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
323 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
324 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
325 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
326 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
327 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
329 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
330 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
331 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
332 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
333 input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
335 htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
336 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
339 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
340 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
341 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
342 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
343 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
346 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
350 funding_redeemscript: Script,
354 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
355 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
357 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
358 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
359 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
360 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
361 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
362 writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
363 input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
364 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
366 on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
368 &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
369 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
370 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
371 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
372 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
373 preimage.write(writer)?;
376 &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
377 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
378 preimage.write(writer)?;
379 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
381 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
382 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
383 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
390 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
391 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
392 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
394 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
395 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
396 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
397 let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
398 let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
399 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
400 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
401 let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
402 InputMaterial::Revoked {
403 per_commitment_point,
404 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
405 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
410 on_counterparty_tx_csv
414 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
415 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
416 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
417 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
418 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
419 InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
420 per_commitment_point,
421 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
422 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
428 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
429 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
430 InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
436 InputMaterial::Funding {
437 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
440 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
446 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
447 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
448 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
449 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
450 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
451 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
452 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
453 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
454 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
455 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
456 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
457 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
458 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
459 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
460 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
461 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
462 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
463 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
464 // and satisfy witness program.
465 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
468 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
469 /// transaction causing it.
471 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
473 struct OnchainEventEntry {
479 impl OnchainEventEntry {
480 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
481 self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
484 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
485 height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
489 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
490 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
493 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
494 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
495 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
497 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
500 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
504 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
505 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
507 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
509 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
510 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
511 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
512 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
514 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
515 commitment_txid: Txid,
516 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
517 commitment_number: u64,
518 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
521 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
527 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
528 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
530 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
531 /// think we've fallen behind!
532 should_broadcast: bool,
536 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
537 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
539 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
541 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
542 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
543 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
549 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
551 commitment_txid.write(w)?;
552 commitment_number.write(w)?;
553 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
554 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
555 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
557 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
560 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
562 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
564 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
569 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
571 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
577 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
578 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
579 match Readable::read(r)? {
581 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
582 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
584 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
585 let mut res = Vec::new();
587 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
594 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
595 commitment_txid: Readable::read(r)?,
596 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
597 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
599 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
600 let mut res = Vec::new();
602 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
609 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
610 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
614 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
615 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
616 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
620 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
621 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
624 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
629 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
630 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
632 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
633 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
635 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
636 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
637 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
638 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
640 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
641 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
642 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
643 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
644 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
645 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
647 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
649 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
652 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
653 latest_update_id: u64,
654 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
656 destination_script: Script,
657 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
658 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
659 shutdown_script: Script,
661 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
662 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
663 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
664 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
665 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
667 counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
668 funding_redeemscript: Script,
669 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
670 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
671 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
673 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
675 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
676 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
677 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
678 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
679 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
680 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
681 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
682 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
683 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
684 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
685 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
686 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
687 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
689 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
690 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
691 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
692 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
693 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
694 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
696 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
698 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
699 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
701 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
703 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
705 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
706 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
708 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
709 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
710 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
711 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
713 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
714 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
715 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
716 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
717 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
720 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
722 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
724 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
725 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
726 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
727 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
729 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
730 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
731 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
733 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
734 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
735 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
736 holder_tx_signed: bool,
738 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
739 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
740 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
741 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
742 // the full block_connected).
743 best_block: BestBlock,
745 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
748 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
749 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
750 /// underlying object
751 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
752 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
753 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
754 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
759 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
760 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
761 /// underlying object
762 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
763 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
764 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
765 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
766 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
767 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
768 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
769 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
770 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
771 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
772 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
773 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
774 self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
775 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
776 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
777 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
778 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
779 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
780 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
781 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
782 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
783 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
784 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
785 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
786 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
787 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
788 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
789 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
790 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
791 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
792 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
793 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
802 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
803 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
804 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
805 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
806 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
807 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
809 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
813 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
814 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
815 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
817 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
818 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
820 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
821 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
822 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
823 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
824 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
825 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
827 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
830 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
831 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
833 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
834 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
835 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
836 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
837 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
838 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
839 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
841 self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
842 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
843 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
845 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
846 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
847 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
848 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
849 match second_option {
850 Some(second_pubkey) => {
851 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
854 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
859 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
863 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
865 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
867 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
868 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
869 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
870 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
871 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
872 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
873 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
877 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
878 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
879 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
880 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
881 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
882 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
883 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
887 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
888 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
889 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
890 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
893 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
894 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
895 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
896 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
899 macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
900 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
901 $holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
902 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
903 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
904 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
905 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
906 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
908 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
909 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
910 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
911 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
912 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
914 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
918 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
923 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
924 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
925 serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
927 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
930 serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
932 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
933 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
935 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
936 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
937 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
940 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
941 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
943 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
947 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
951 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
952 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
953 event.write(writer)?;
956 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
957 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
959 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
960 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
961 entry.txid.write(writer)?;
962 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(entry.height))?;
964 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
966 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
967 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
969 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
971 descriptor.write(writer)?;
976 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
977 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
979 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
980 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
982 script.write(writer)?;
985 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
987 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
988 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
994 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
995 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
996 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
997 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
998 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
999 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1000 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1001 best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1003 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1004 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1005 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1006 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1007 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1009 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1010 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1011 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1012 let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
1014 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1015 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1017 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1018 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1019 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1020 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1022 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1023 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1025 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1026 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1027 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1028 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1029 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1030 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1031 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1033 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1036 let onchain_tx_handler =
1037 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1038 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1040 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1041 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1044 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1045 latest_update_id: 0,
1046 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1048 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1049 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1050 counterparty_payment_script,
1054 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1056 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1057 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1059 counterparty_tx_cache,
1060 funding_redeemscript,
1061 channel_value_satoshis,
1062 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1064 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1066 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1067 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1068 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1069 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1071 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1072 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1073 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1074 current_holder_commitment_number,
1076 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1077 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1078 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1080 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1085 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1086 holder_tx_signed: false,
1096 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1097 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1100 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1101 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1102 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1103 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1104 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1107 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1108 commitment_number: u64,
1109 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
1111 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1112 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1113 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
1117 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1119 holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1120 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1121 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1122 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1123 holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)
1127 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1129 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1130 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1135 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1136 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1139 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1140 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1143 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1148 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1151 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1154 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1157 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1158 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1160 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1164 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1166 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1167 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1170 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1173 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1175 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1176 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1179 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1180 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1181 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1184 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1185 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1186 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1187 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1188 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1191 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1192 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1193 /// have been registered.
1194 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1195 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1196 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1197 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1198 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1199 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1200 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1202 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1203 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1209 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1210 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1211 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1212 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1215 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1218 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1219 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1220 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1221 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1222 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1225 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1226 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1229 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1230 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1233 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1234 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1237 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1238 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1239 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1240 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1241 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1242 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1243 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1244 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1245 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1246 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1247 where L::Target: Logger {
1248 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1251 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1252 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1253 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1254 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1255 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1256 where L::Target: Logger {
1257 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1260 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1261 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1262 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1263 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1264 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1265 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1267 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1268 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1270 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1271 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1273 header: &BlockHeader,
1274 txdata: &TransactionData,
1279 ) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
1281 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1282 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1285 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1286 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1289 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1291 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1293 header: &BlockHeader,
1299 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1300 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1303 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1304 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1307 /// Processes transactions from a block with the given header and height, returning new outputs
1308 /// to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1310 /// TODO: Expand docs.
1312 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1313 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1315 header: &BlockHeader,
1316 txdata: &TransactionData,
1321 ) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
1323 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1324 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1327 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1328 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1332 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1333 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1334 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1335 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1336 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1337 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1338 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1341 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1342 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1343 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1344 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1349 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1350 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1351 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1352 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1353 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1355 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1356 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1357 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1361 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1362 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1363 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1368 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1375 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1384 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1385 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1386 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1387 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1389 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1390 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1393 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1394 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1395 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1396 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1397 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1398 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1399 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1400 Some(old_points) => {
1401 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1402 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1403 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1404 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1405 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1407 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1410 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1414 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1417 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1418 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1419 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1423 self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs);
1426 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1427 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1428 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1429 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1430 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1431 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1432 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1433 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1434 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1435 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1436 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1437 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1440 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1441 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1442 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1443 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1444 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1445 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1449 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1450 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1451 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1452 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1453 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
1458 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1459 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1460 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
1461 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1462 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1465 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1467 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1468 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1469 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1470 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1471 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1472 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1475 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1476 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1477 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1481 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1482 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1483 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1488 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1489 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1490 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1491 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1492 // holder commitment transactions.
1493 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1494 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1495 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1496 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1497 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx);
1498 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1503 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1504 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1507 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1508 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1510 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1513 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1514 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1515 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1518 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1519 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1520 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1521 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1522 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1523 match updates.updates[0] {
1524 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
1525 _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
1527 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1528 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1529 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1531 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
1533 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1534 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
1535 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1536 self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone())?
1538 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
1539 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
1540 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
1542 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
1543 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
1544 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1546 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
1547 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
1548 self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?
1550 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1551 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
1552 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1553 if *should_broadcast {
1554 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1555 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
1556 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1558 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted, the ChannelManager
1559 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
1560 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
1561 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
1566 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1570 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1571 self.latest_update_id
1574 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1578 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
1579 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
1580 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
1581 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
1582 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1583 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
1585 &self.outputs_to_watch
1588 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1589 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1590 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
1594 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
1595 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1596 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1600 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1601 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1602 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1605 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1606 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1609 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1610 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
1613 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1614 self.current_holder_commitment_number
1617 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1618 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1619 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1620 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1621 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1622 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
1623 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1624 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1625 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1626 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1627 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1629 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1630 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1632 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1633 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1636 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1641 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1642 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1643 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1644 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1645 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1646 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
1647 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
1649 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1650 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1652 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
1653 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1654 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1655 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1656 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1660 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1661 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1662 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1663 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1664 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1665 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1666 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1668 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1669 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1674 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1675 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1676 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
1677 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1678 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1679 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1681 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1683 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1684 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1685 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1686 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1687 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1688 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1689 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1691 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1692 htlc_update.0 != **source
1697 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1700 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1701 htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())
1704 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1705 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1711 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1712 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1714 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1715 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
1717 // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
1719 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1720 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1721 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1722 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1723 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1724 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1725 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1727 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1728 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1730 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1732 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1734 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1735 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1736 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1737 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1738 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1739 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1740 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1741 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1742 // payment_preimage.
1743 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1744 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1745 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1746 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1748 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1749 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1753 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1754 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1755 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1757 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1758 htlc_update.0 != **source
1763 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
1766 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1767 htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())
1775 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1776 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1778 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1779 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1782 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
1783 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
1784 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
1788 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1791 fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<ClaimRequest> {
1792 let mut claims = Vec::new();
1793 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
1794 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1795 let revocation_point_option =
1796 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
1797 // per-commitment point
1798 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1799 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1800 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
1801 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
1802 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
1803 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1805 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1806 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1807 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1808 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
1809 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
1810 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1811 return claims; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1816 if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1820 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1821 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1822 let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
1823 claims.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1833 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1834 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1835 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1836 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1837 return (Vec::new(), None)
1840 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1841 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1844 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1849 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1850 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1851 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1853 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1854 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1855 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1856 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
1857 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
1860 // Returns (1) `ClaimRequest`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
1861 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
1862 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
1863 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1864 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1866 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1867 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1869 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1870 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1871 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1872 witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
1873 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1874 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1875 Some(preimage.clone())
1877 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1881 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1886 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
1889 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
1890 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
1891 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1892 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1893 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1894 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
1900 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1901 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
1902 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1903 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1904 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1905 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1906 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1908 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1909 ($source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1910 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1911 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1913 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1914 htlc_update.0 != $source
1919 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1920 txid: commitment_txid,
1922 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash) },
1924 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1925 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1929 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1930 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
1931 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1932 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
1933 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
1937 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1938 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
1940 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1941 is_holder_tx = true;
1942 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1943 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1944 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
1945 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
1946 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1947 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1948 is_holder_tx = true;
1949 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1950 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx);
1951 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
1952 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
1956 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1957 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
1958 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
1959 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1960 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1961 wait_threshold_conf!(source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1969 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1970 if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1971 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
1975 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1978 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1979 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
1980 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
1981 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
1982 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1983 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1984 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1985 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1986 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1987 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1988 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1992 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1993 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1998 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1999 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2003 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2004 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2005 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2006 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2007 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2008 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
2009 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2010 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2011 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2012 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2013 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2017 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2018 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2026 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
2027 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2028 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2031 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.block_hash(), height);
2032 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2035 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2037 header: &BlockHeader,
2038 txdata: &TransactionData,
2043 ) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
2045 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2046 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2049 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2050 for tx in &txn_matched {
2051 let mut output_val = 0;
2052 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2053 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2054 output_val += out.value;
2055 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2059 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2060 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2062 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2063 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2064 for tx in &txn_matched {
2065 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2066 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2067 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2068 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2070 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2071 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2072 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2073 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2074 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2075 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2077 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2078 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2079 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2080 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2082 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2084 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2087 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2088 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2089 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2090 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2091 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2096 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2097 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2098 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2099 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2101 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2103 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
2104 if should_broadcast {
2105 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
2107 if should_broadcast {
2108 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
2109 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2110 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2111 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2112 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2113 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2114 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2116 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2119 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2120 let onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf =
2121 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2122 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2123 for entry in onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf {
2124 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(height) {
2125 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2127 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2131 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2132 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2133 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
2135 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2136 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => Some(htlc_update.0.clone()),
2137 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { .. } => None,
2140 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2141 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2143 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2144 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2146 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2147 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2148 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2151 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &htlc_update.0).is_none(),
2152 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2153 call block_disconnected for a block containing the conflicting \
2156 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &htlc_update.0).is_none(),
2157 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2158 call block_disconnected for a block containing the conflicting \
2160 matured_htlcs.push(htlc_update.0.clone());
2163 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2164 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2165 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
2166 payment_preimage: None,
2167 source: htlc_update.0,
2170 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2171 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2172 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2173 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2179 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, Some(height), &&*broadcaster, &&*fee_estimator, &&*logger);
2181 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2182 // updating the latter in the process.
2183 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2184 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2185 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2189 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2190 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2191 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2192 for tx in &txn_matched {
2193 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2194 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2195 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2196 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2204 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2205 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2206 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2209 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2212 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2213 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2214 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height != height);
2216 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2218 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2221 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2222 /// transactions thereof.
2223 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2224 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2225 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2226 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2227 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2228 if matches { break; }
2229 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2234 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2237 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2240 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2241 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2242 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2243 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2244 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2245 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2248 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2249 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2250 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2251 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2252 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2253 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2254 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2255 } else { panic!(); }
2266 fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2267 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2268 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2269 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2270 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2271 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2272 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2273 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2274 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2275 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2276 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2277 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2278 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2279 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2280 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2281 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2282 // time out the HTLC first.
2283 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2284 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2285 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2286 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2287 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2288 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2289 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2290 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2291 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2292 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2293 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2294 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2295 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2296 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2297 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2298 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2299 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2300 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2301 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2302 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2303 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2304 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2305 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2306 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2313 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2315 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2316 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2317 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2320 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2321 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2322 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2329 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2330 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2331 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2332 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2333 let mut payment_data = None;
2334 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2335 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2336 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2337 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2339 macro_rules! log_claim {
2340 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2341 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2342 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
2343 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2344 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2345 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2346 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2347 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2348 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2349 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2350 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2351 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2353 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2354 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2355 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2356 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2361 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2362 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2363 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2364 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2365 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2366 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2367 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2368 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2377 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2378 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2379 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2380 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2381 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2382 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2383 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2384 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2385 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2386 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2387 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2388 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2389 } else if !$holder_tx {
2390 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2391 if payment_data.is_none() {
2392 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2395 if payment_data.is_none() {
2396 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2397 continue 'outer_loop;
2404 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2405 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2406 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2408 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2409 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2410 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2411 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2414 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2415 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2416 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2419 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2420 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2421 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2422 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2423 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2424 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2425 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2426 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2427 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2429 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2433 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2434 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2435 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
2436 upd.source == source
2438 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2439 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2441 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2446 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2447 if entry.height != height { return true; }
2449 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2450 htlc_update.0 != source
2455 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2458 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash) },
2460 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2461 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2467 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2468 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2469 let mut spendable_output = None;
2470 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2471 if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize {
2472 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2473 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2474 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2475 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2476 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2477 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2478 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2479 // non-standard due to their size.
2480 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2481 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2482 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2485 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2486 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2487 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2488 output: outp.clone(),
2491 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
2492 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2493 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2494 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2495 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
2496 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
2497 output: outp.clone(),
2498 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2499 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2500 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2504 } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2505 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2506 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2507 output: outp.clone(),
2508 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2509 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2512 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2513 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2514 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2515 output: outp.clone(),
2519 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2520 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2523 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
2525 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2526 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2531 /// `Persist` defines behavior for persisting channel monitors: this could mean
2532 /// writing once to disk, and/or uploading to one or more backup services.
2534 /// Note that for every new monitor, you **must** persist the new `ChannelMonitor`
2535 /// to disk/backups. And, on every update, you **must** persist either the
2536 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself. Otherwise, there is risk
2537 /// of situations such as revoking a transaction, then crashing before this
2538 /// revocation can be persisted, then unintentionally broadcasting a revoked
2539 /// transaction and losing money. This is a risk because previous channel states
2540 /// are toxic, so it's important that whatever channel state is persisted is
2541 /// kept up-to-date.
2542 pub trait Persist<ChannelSigner: Sign>: Send + Sync {
2543 /// Persist a new channel's data. The data can be stored any way you want, but
2544 /// the identifier provided by Rust-Lightning is the channel's outpoint (and
2545 /// it is up to you to maintain a correct mapping between the outpoint and the
2546 /// stored channel data). Note that you **must** persist every new monitor to
2547 /// disk. See the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2549 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2550 /// and [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2551 fn persist_new_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2553 /// Update one channel's data. The provided `ChannelMonitor` has already
2554 /// applied the given update.
2556 /// Note that on every update, you **must** persist either the
2557 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself to disk/backups. See
2558 /// the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2560 /// If an implementer chooses to persist the updates only, they need to make
2561 /// sure that all the updates are applied to the `ChannelMonitors` *before*
2562 /// the set of channel monitors is given to the `ChannelManager`
2563 /// deserialization routine. See [`ChannelMonitor::update_monitor`] for
2564 /// applying a monitor update to a monitor. If full `ChannelMonitors` are
2565 /// persisted, then there is no need to persist individual updates.
2567 /// Note that there could be a performance tradeoff between persisting complete
2568 /// channel monitors on every update vs. persisting only updates and applying
2569 /// them in batches. The size of each monitor grows `O(number of state updates)`
2570 /// whereas updates are small and `O(1)`.
2572 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2573 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::write`] for writing out an update, and
2574 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2575 fn update_persisted_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2578 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2580 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2581 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2584 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
2585 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
2586 self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2589 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2590 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2594 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2596 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
2597 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
2598 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2599 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2603 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2608 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2609 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2610 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2611 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2614 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2615 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2617 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2618 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2620 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2621 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2622 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2623 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2626 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2628 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2629 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2631 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2632 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2633 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2634 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2635 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2636 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2637 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2639 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2640 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2641 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2643 let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2644 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2645 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2647 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2648 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2652 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2653 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2654 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2655 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2657 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2662 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2664 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2666 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2669 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2670 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2671 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2672 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2673 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2675 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2676 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2682 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2683 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2684 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
2685 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2686 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2687 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2688 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2689 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2691 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2692 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2696 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2697 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2698 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2699 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2700 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2701 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
2702 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2706 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2707 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2708 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
2709 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2710 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2711 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2712 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2716 macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
2719 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2720 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2721 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2722 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2723 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2724 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2725 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2727 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2728 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2729 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2730 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2731 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2733 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2734 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2736 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2741 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2748 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2751 Some(read_holder_tx!())
2753 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2755 let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
2757 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2758 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2760 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2761 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2762 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2763 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2764 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2765 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2766 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2770 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2771 let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2772 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
2773 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2774 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
2775 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
2776 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2778 pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
2781 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2782 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
2783 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2784 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2785 pending_events.push(event);
2789 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
2791 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2792 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2793 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2794 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2795 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
2796 let event = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2798 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2799 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2800 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2801 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2805 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2806 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2810 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2812 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry { txid, height, event });
2815 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2816 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2817 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2818 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2819 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2820 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
2821 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2822 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
2824 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2825 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2828 let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
2830 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2831 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2833 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2834 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2836 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
2837 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
2839 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2842 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
2843 counterparty_payment_script,
2847 holder_revocation_basepoint,
2849 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2850 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2852 counterparty_tx_cache,
2853 funding_redeemscript,
2854 channel_value_satoshis,
2855 their_cur_revocation_points,
2860 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
2861 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2862 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
2864 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
2865 current_holder_commitment_tx,
2866 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
2867 current_holder_commitment_number,
2870 pending_monitor_events,
2873 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2878 lockdown_from_offchain,
2891 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2892 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2893 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2894 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2895 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2896 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2897 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2898 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2899 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2900 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2902 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2903 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2904 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2905 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2907 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
2908 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
2909 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2910 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2911 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2912 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
2915 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2916 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2917 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2918 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2919 let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
2921 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2922 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2924 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2927 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
2928 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2929 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2933 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2934 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2936 let mut res = Vec::new();
2937 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2938 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2942 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2943 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2950 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
2951 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2953 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2954 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2960 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2961 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2962 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2963 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2968 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
2970 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2971 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2972 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2973 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2974 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2980 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2981 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2982 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2983 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
2984 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
2985 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
2987 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
2988 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
2989 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
2990 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
2991 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
2992 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2993 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2994 selected_contest_delay: 67,
2996 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
2998 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3000 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3001 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3002 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
3003 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3004 &channel_parameters,
3005 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3006 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
3008 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3009 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3010 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3011 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3012 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3013 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3014 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3015 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
3018 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3019 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3020 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3021 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3022 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3023 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3024 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3026 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3027 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3028 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3029 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3030 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3031 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3033 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3034 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3035 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3036 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3037 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3038 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3039 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3040 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3042 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3043 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3044 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3045 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3046 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3047 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3051 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3052 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3053 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3055 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3056 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3057 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3058 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3060 macro_rules! sign_input {
3061 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3062 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3063 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3065 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3066 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3067 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3069 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3070 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3071 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3072 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3073 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3074 sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
3075 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3076 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
3077 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3078 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3079 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3080 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
3082 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3084 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3085 println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
3086 println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
3087 println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
3091 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3092 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3094 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3095 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3097 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3098 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3102 script_sig: Script::new(),
3103 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3104 witness: Vec::new(),
3107 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3108 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3111 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3112 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3114 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3115 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
3116 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3119 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3121 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3122 claim_tx.input.clear();
3123 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3125 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3126 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3130 script_sig: Script::new(),
3131 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3132 witness: Vec::new(),
3135 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3136 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3138 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3139 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
3140 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3143 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3145 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3146 claim_tx.input.clear();
3147 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3148 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3149 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3153 script_sig: Script::new(),
3154 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3155 witness: Vec::new(),
3157 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3158 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3160 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3161 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
3162 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3165 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3168 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.