1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
36 use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
37 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, ChannelId};
38 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentKey, DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, HtlcKey, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
40 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,CommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys};
41 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
43 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
44 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
45 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
47 use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, OnchainTxHandler};
48 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use crate::chain::Filter;
50 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
51 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
52 use crate::util::byte_utils;
53 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler};
54 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
56 use crate::prelude::*;
58 use crate::io::{self, Error};
59 use core::convert::TryInto;
61 use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
63 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
64 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
66 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
67 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
68 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
69 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
70 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
72 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
73 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
74 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
75 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
76 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
78 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
79 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
80 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
82 /// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
83 /// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
84 /// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
85 /// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
86 /// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
88 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
92 /// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
94 /// (1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
95 /// (2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
96 /// allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
97 /// commitment transaction.
99 /// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
100 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
102 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
103 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
104 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
105 self.update_id.write(w)?;
106 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
107 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
108 update_step.write(w)?;
110 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
114 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
115 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
116 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
117 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
118 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
119 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
121 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
125 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
126 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
130 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
131 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
132 pub enum MonitorEvent {
133 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
134 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
136 /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
138 HolderForceClosed(OutPoint),
140 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
141 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
143 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
145 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
146 funding_txo: OutPoint,
147 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
148 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
150 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
151 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
152 monitor_update_id: u64,
155 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
156 // Note that Completed is currently never serialized to disk as it is generated only in
159 (0, funding_txo, required),
160 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
164 (4, HolderForceClosed),
165 // 6 was `UpdateFailed` until LDK 0.0.117
168 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
169 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
170 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
171 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
172 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
173 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
174 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
175 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
176 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
178 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
179 (0, payment_hash, required),
180 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
181 (2, source, required),
182 (4, payment_preimage, option),
185 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
186 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
187 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
188 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
189 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
190 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
191 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
192 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
193 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
194 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
195 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
196 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
197 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
198 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
199 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
200 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
201 /// accurate block height.
202 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
203 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
204 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
205 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
206 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
207 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
210 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
211 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
212 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
213 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
214 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
215 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
216 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
217 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
218 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
219 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
221 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
222 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
223 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
225 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
226 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
228 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
229 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
231 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
232 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
233 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
234 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
236 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
237 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
238 struct HolderSignedTx {
239 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
241 revocation_key: RevocationKey,
244 delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey,
245 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
246 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
247 to_self_value_sat: u64,
250 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
252 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
253 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
254 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
255 (2, revocation_key, required),
256 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
257 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
258 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
259 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
260 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
261 (14, htlc_outputs, required_vec)
264 impl HolderSignedTx {
265 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
266 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
267 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
277 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
278 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
279 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
280 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
281 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: DelayedPaymentBasepoint,
282 counterparty_htlc_base_key: HtlcBasepoint,
283 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
286 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
287 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
288 w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
289 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
290 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
291 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
292 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
297 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
298 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
299 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
300 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
301 // used. Read it for compatibility.
302 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
303 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
304 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
305 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
306 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
307 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
311 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
312 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
313 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
314 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
315 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
316 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
317 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
319 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
320 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
321 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
322 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
325 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
329 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
330 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
332 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
333 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
334 struct OnchainEventEntry {
337 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
339 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
342 impl OnchainEventEntry {
343 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
344 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
346 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
347 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
349 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
350 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
351 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
353 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
354 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
355 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
356 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
357 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
364 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
365 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
369 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
371 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
372 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
374 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
375 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
376 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
378 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
379 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
380 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
381 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
382 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
383 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
386 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
387 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
388 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
389 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
390 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
392 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
393 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
395 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
397 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
399 FundingSpendConfirmation {
400 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
401 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
402 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
403 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
404 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
406 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
407 /// counterparty output.
408 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
410 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
411 /// is constructed. This is used when
412 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
413 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
414 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
415 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
416 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
418 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
419 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
421 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
422 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
423 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
424 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
425 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
426 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
427 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
428 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
432 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
433 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
434 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
435 (0, self.txid, required),
436 (1, self.transaction, option),
437 (2, self.height, required),
438 (3, self.block_hash, option),
439 (4, self.event, required),
445 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
446 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
447 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
448 let mut transaction = None;
449 let mut block_hash = None;
451 let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
452 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
454 (1, transaction, option),
455 (2, height, required),
456 (3, block_hash, option),
457 (4, event, upgradable_required),
459 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
463 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
465 (0, source, required),
466 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
467 (2, payment_hash, required),
468 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
470 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
471 (0, descriptor, required),
473 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
474 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
475 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
477 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
478 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
479 (2, preimage, option),
480 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
485 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
486 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
487 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
488 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
489 /// Note that LDK after 0.0.115 supports this only containing dust HTLCs (implying the
490 /// `Signature` field is never filled in). At that point, non-dust HTLCs are implied by the
491 /// HTLC fields in `commitment_tx` and the sources passed via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
492 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
493 claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
494 nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>,
496 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
497 commitment_txid: Txid,
498 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
499 commitment_number: u64,
500 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
501 feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>,
502 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Option<u64>,
503 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Option<u64>,
506 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
512 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
513 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
515 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
516 /// think we've fallen behind!
517 should_broadcast: bool,
520 scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
524 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
525 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
527 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
528 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
529 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
530 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
531 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
532 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
537 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
538 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
539 (0, commitment_tx, required),
540 (1, claimed_htlcs, optional_vec),
541 (2, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
542 (4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
544 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
545 (0, commitment_txid, required),
546 (1, feerate_per_kw, option),
547 (2, commitment_number, required),
548 (3, to_broadcaster_value_sat, option),
549 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
550 (5, to_countersignatory_value_sat, option),
551 (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
553 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
554 (0, payment_preimage, required),
556 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
558 (2, secret, required),
560 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
561 (0, should_broadcast, required),
563 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
564 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
568 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
570 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
572 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
573 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
575 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
576 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
577 /// force-closed now.
578 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
579 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
580 /// required to do so.
581 amount_satoshis: u64,
583 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
584 /// we consider it spendable.
585 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
586 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
587 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
588 amount_satoshis: u64,
589 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
591 confirmation_height: u32,
593 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
594 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
595 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
597 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
598 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
599 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
600 ContentiousClaimable {
601 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
602 /// required to do so.
603 amount_satoshis: u64,
604 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
607 /// The payment hash that locks this HTLC.
608 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
609 /// The preimage that can be used to claim this HTLC.
610 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
612 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
613 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
614 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
615 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
616 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
617 /// which will be required to do so.
618 amount_satoshis: u64,
619 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
621 claimable_height: u32,
622 /// The payment hash whose preimage our counterparty needs to claim this HTLC.
623 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
625 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
626 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
627 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
628 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
629 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
630 /// which will be required to do so.
631 amount_satoshis: u64,
632 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
633 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
635 /// The payment hash whose preimage we need to claim this HTLC.
636 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
638 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
641 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
642 /// following amount.
643 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
644 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
646 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
647 /// were already spent.
648 amount_satoshis: u64,
653 /// The amount claimable, in satoshis. This excludes balances that we are unsure if we are able
654 /// to claim, this is because we are waiting for a preimage or for a timeout to expire. For more
655 /// information on these balances see [`Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC`] and
656 /// [`Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC`].
658 /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
659 pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
661 Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }|
662 Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }|
663 Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }|
664 Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }
666 Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }|
667 Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. }
673 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
674 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
675 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
676 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
677 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
678 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
680 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
681 resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
682 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
683 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
686 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
687 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
688 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
689 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
690 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
691 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
692 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
693 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
694 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
695 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
696 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
697 (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
703 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
704 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
705 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
706 let mut resolving_txid = None;
707 let mut payment_preimage = None;
708 let mut resolving_tx = None;
709 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
710 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
711 (1, resolving_txid, option),
712 (2, payment_preimage, option),
713 (3, resolving_tx, option),
716 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
724 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
725 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
727 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
728 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
730 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
731 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
732 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
733 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
734 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
735 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
737 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
739 pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
742 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: Clone {
743 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
744 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone();
745 ChannelMonitor::from_impl(inner)
749 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
750 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
751 latest_update_id: u64,
752 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
754 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
755 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>,
756 counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf,
757 shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
759 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
760 holder_revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint,
761 funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
762 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
763 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
765 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
766 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf,
767 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
768 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
769 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
771 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
773 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
774 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
775 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
776 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
777 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
778 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
779 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
780 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
781 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
782 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
783 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
784 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
785 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
786 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
787 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
788 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
790 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,
792 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
793 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
794 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
795 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
796 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
797 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
799 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
801 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
802 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
804 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
806 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
807 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
808 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
810 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
812 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
813 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
814 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
815 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
816 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
817 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
818 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
819 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
820 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
821 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
823 pub(super) pending_events: Vec<Event>,
824 pub(super) is_processing_pending_events: bool,
826 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
827 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
828 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
829 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
831 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
832 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
833 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
834 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
835 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>>,
838 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
840 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
842 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
843 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
844 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
845 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
847 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
848 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
849 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
851 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
852 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
853 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
854 holder_tx_signed: bool,
856 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
857 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
858 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
859 funding_spend_seen: bool,
861 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
862 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
863 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
865 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
866 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
867 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
868 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
869 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
871 /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
872 /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
873 /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
874 /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
875 /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
876 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
878 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
879 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
880 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
881 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
882 // the full block_connected).
883 best_block: BestBlock,
885 /// The node_id of our counterparty
886 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
888 /// Initial counterparty commmitment data needed to recreate the commitment tx
889 /// in the persistence pipeline for third-party watchtowers. This will only be present on
890 /// monitors created after 0.0.117.
892 /// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats,
893 /// to_countersignatory_sats)
894 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>,
897 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
898 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
900 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
901 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
902 // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
903 // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
905 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
906 let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
907 let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
912 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
913 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
914 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
918 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
919 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
920 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
922 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
923 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
924 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
926 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
928 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
929 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
931 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
932 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
933 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
934 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
935 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
936 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
938 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
941 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
942 match &self.shutdown_script {
943 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
944 None => ScriptBuf::new().write(writer)?,
947 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
948 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
949 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
950 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
951 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
952 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
953 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
955 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
956 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
957 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
959 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
960 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
961 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
962 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
963 match second_option {
964 Some(second_pubkey) => {
965 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
968 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
973 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
977 writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
979 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
981 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
982 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
983 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
984 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
985 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
986 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
987 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
991 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
992 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
993 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
994 writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
995 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
996 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
997 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
998 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
999 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1000 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
1004 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1005 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1006 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1007 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1010 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1011 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1012 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1013 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1016 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1017 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1018 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1020 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1023 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1025 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1026 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1028 writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1029 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1030 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1033 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1034 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1035 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => true,
1037 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1038 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1040 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1044 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1045 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1049 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1050 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1051 event.write(writer)?;
1054 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1055 writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height().to_be_bytes())?;
1057 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1058 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1059 entry.write(writer)?;
1062 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1063 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1064 txid.write(writer)?;
1065 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1066 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1068 script.write(writer)?;
1071 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1073 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1074 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1076 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1077 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1078 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec),
1079 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, required_vec),
1080 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1081 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1082 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1083 (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
1084 (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
1085 (17, self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
1092 macro_rules! _process_events_body {
1093 ($self_opt: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1095 let (pending_events, repeated_events);
1096 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1097 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1098 if inner.is_processing_pending_events {
1101 inner.is_processing_pending_events = true;
1103 pending_events = inner.pending_events.clone();
1104 repeated_events = inner.get_repeated_events();
1106 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1108 for event in pending_events.into_iter().chain(repeated_events.into_iter()) {
1109 $event_to_handle = event;
1113 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1114 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1115 inner.pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1116 inner.is_processing_pending_events = false;
1117 if !inner.pending_events.is_empty() {
1118 // If there's more events to process, go ahead and do so.
1126 pub(super) use _process_events_body as process_events_body;
1128 pub(crate) struct WithChannelMonitor<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
1130 peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
1131 channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1134 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1135 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
1136 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
1137 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
1138 self.logger.log(record)
1142 impl<'a, L: Deref> WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1143 pub(crate) fn from<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor: &ChannelMonitor<S>) -> Self {
1144 Self::from_impl(logger, &*monitor.inner.lock().unwrap())
1147 pub(crate) fn from_impl<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor_impl: &ChannelMonitorImpl<S>) -> Self {
1148 let peer_id = monitor_impl.counterparty_node_id;
1149 let channel_id = Some(monitor_impl.funding_info.0.to_channel_id());
1150 WithChannelMonitor {
1151 logger, peer_id, channel_id,
1156 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1157 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1158 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1159 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1160 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1161 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1164 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1165 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
1166 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1167 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1168 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1169 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1170 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1172 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1173 let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
1174 &channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.pubkeys().payment_point
1177 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1178 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1179 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1180 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1182 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1183 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1185 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1186 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1187 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1188 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1190 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1191 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1193 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1194 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1195 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1196 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1197 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1198 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1199 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1200 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1202 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1205 let onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(
1206 channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id, destination_script.into(), keys,
1207 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx
1210 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1211 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1213 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1214 latest_update_id: 0,
1215 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1217 destination_script: destination_script.into(),
1218 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1219 counterparty_payment_script,
1223 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1225 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1226 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1228 counterparty_commitment_params,
1229 funding_redeemscript,
1230 channel_value_satoshis,
1231 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1233 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1235 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1236 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1237 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1238 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1239 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1241 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1242 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1243 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1244 current_holder_commitment_number,
1246 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1247 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1248 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1249 is_processing_pending_events: false,
1251 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1256 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1257 holder_tx_signed: false,
1258 funding_spend_seen: false,
1259 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1260 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1261 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1262 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
1265 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1266 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None,
1271 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1272 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1275 /// A variant of `Self::provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx` used to provide
1276 /// additional information to the monitor to store in order to recreate the initial
1277 /// counterparty commitment transaction during persistence (mainly for use in third-party
1280 /// This is used to provide the counterparty commitment information directly to the monitor
1281 /// before the initial persistence of a new channel.
1282 pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1283 &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1284 commitment_number: u64, their_cur_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
1285 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, logger: &L,
1287 where L::Target: Logger
1289 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1290 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1291 inner.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid,
1292 htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_cur_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
1293 to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, &logger);
1296 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1297 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1298 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1299 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1301 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1304 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1305 commitment_number: u64,
1306 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1308 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1309 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1310 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1311 inner.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1312 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, &logger)
1316 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1317 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1318 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1319 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1320 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new(), Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
1323 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1324 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1325 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1327 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1328 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1330 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1333 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1334 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1337 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1338 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1339 inner.provide_payment_preimage(
1340 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1343 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1346 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1347 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1349 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1355 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1356 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1359 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1360 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1361 inner.update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1364 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1366 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1367 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1370 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1371 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
1372 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1375 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1376 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1377 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>)> {
1378 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1379 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1382 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1383 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1384 /// have been registered.
1385 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, filter: &F, logger: &L)
1387 F::Target: chain::Filter, L::Target: Logger,
1389 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1390 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*lock);
1391 log_trace!(&logger, "Registering funding outpoint {}", &lock.get_funding_txo().0);
1392 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1393 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1394 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1395 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1396 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 };
1397 log_trace!(logger, "Registering outpoint {} with the filter for monitoring spends", outpoint);
1398 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1401 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1407 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1408 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1409 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1410 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1413 /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
1415 /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
1416 /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
1417 /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
1418 /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
1419 /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
1421 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
1422 /// order to handle these events.
1424 /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
1425 /// [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
1426 pub fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: &H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
1428 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
1431 /// Processes any events asynchronously.
1433 /// See [`Self::process_pending_events`] for more information.
1434 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
1438 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, { handler(ev).await });
1442 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1443 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1444 let mut lck = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1445 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut lck.pending_events);
1446 ret.append(&mut lck.get_repeated_events());
1450 /// Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment
1451 /// transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of
1452 /// the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for
1453 /// watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions.
1455 /// This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except
1456 /// that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update.
1458 /// This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading
1459 /// to LDK 0.0.117+.
1461 /// [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel
1462 pub fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
1463 self.inner.lock().unwrap().initial_counterparty_commitment_tx()
1466 /// Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This
1467 /// may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned
1468 /// commitment transactions are unsigned.
1470 /// This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build
1471 /// justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be
1472 /// used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided
1473 /// with a monitor and an update. Once revoked, signing a justice transaction can be done using
1474 /// [`Self::sign_to_local_justice_tx`].
1476 /// It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty
1477 /// commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which
1478 /// the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the
1479 /// monitor can sign the justice transaction.
1481 /// This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after
1482 /// upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which
1483 /// may have been created prior to upgrading.
1485 /// [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel
1486 pub fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
1487 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(update)
1490 /// Wrapper around [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`] to make
1491 /// signing the justice transaction easier for implementors of
1492 /// [`chain::chainmonitor::Persist`]. On success this method returns the provided transaction
1493 /// signing the input at `input_idx`. This method will only produce a valid signature for
1494 /// a transaction spending the `to_local` output of a commitment transaction, i.e. this cannot
1495 /// be used for revoked HTLC outputs.
1497 /// `Value` is the value of the output being spent by the input at `input_idx`, committed
1498 /// in the BIP 143 signature.
1500 /// This method will only succeed if this monitor has received the revocation secret for the
1501 /// provided `commitment_number`. If a commitment number is provided that does not correspond
1502 /// to the commitment transaction being revoked, this will return a signed transaction, but
1503 /// the signature will not be valid.
1505 /// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`]: crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output
1506 /// [`Persist`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist
1507 pub fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(&self, justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
1508 self.inner.lock().unwrap().sign_to_local_justice_tx(justice_tx, input_idx, value, commitment_number)
1511 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1512 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1515 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1516 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1519 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1520 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1523 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1525 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1527 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1528 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1531 /// Used by [`ChannelManager`] deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy
1532 /// of the channel state was out-of-date.
1534 /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1535 /// a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our
1536 /// counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1538 /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1539 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1540 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1541 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1544 /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
1545 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1546 where L::Target: Logger {
1547 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1548 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1549 inner.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&logger)
1552 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1553 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1554 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1555 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1556 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1557 where L::Target: Logger {
1558 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1559 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1560 inner.unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&logger)
1563 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1564 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1565 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1566 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1567 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1568 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1570 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1571 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1573 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1574 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1577 txdata: &TransactionData,
1582 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1584 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1585 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1588 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1589 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1590 inner.block_connected(
1591 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1594 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1596 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1604 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1605 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1608 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1609 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1610 inner.block_disconnected(
1611 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1614 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1615 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1617 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1618 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1620 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1621 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1624 txdata: &TransactionData,
1629 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1631 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1632 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1635 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1636 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1637 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1638 inner.transactions_confirmed(
1639 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger)
1642 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1644 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1645 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1647 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1648 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1655 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1656 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1659 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1660 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1661 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1662 inner.transaction_unconfirmed(
1663 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1667 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1668 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1670 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1671 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1673 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1674 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1681 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1683 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1684 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1687 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1688 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1689 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1690 inner.best_block_updated(
1691 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1695 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1696 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1697 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1698 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1700 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.height, entry.block_hash))
1701 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1703 txids.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0).then(b.1.cmp(&a.1)));
1704 txids.dedup_by_key(|(txid, _, _)| *txid);
1708 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1709 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1710 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1711 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1714 /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
1715 /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
1716 /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
1717 /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
1718 /// connections, like on mobile.
1719 pub fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1720 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
1723 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1724 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1727 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1728 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1729 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1730 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1731 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1732 current_height, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1736 /// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the
1737 /// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]
1738 /// confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be
1739 /// returned, the transaction must have at least `max(ANTI_REORG_DELAY, to_self_delay)`
1742 /// Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`]
1743 /// once they are no longer under reorg risk. This method serves as a way to retrieve these
1744 /// descriptors at a later time, either for historical purposes, or to replay any
1745 /// missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the
1746 /// channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns
1747 /// an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending
1748 /// transactions starting from the channel's funding transaction and going down three levels.
1750 /// `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any
1751 /// outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned.
1753 /// `confirmation_height` must be the height of the block in which `tx` was included in.
1754 pub fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction, confirmation_height: u32) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1755 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1756 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1757 let mut spendable_outputs = inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx);
1758 spendable_outputs.retain(|descriptor| {
1759 let mut conf_threshold = current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1;
1760 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) = descriptor {
1761 conf_threshold = cmp::min(conf_threshold,
1762 current_height.saturating_sub(descriptor.to_self_delay as u32) + 1);
1764 conf_threshold >= confirmation_height
1770 pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1771 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script.clone()
1775 pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: ScriptBuf) {
1776 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script;
1780 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1781 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1782 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1783 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1784 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1785 -> Option<Balance> {
1786 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1787 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1789 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1790 let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
1791 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1792 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1793 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1794 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1796 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1797 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1798 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1799 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1800 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1801 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1802 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1803 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1804 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1806 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1807 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1808 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1809 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1810 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1811 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1812 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1813 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1815 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1816 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1817 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1818 .any(|(input_idx, inp)|
1819 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1820 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx &&
1821 // A maturing output for an HTLC claim will always be at the same
1822 // index as the HTLC input. This is true pre-anchors, as there's
1823 // only 1 input and 1 output. This is also true post-anchors,
1824 // because we have a SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY signature from our
1825 // channel counterparty.
1826 descriptor.outpoint.index as usize == input_idx
1830 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1831 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1836 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1837 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1838 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1839 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
1840 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1841 htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
1844 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1846 let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
1847 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1848 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1849 // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
1850 // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
1851 // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
1852 // in the commitment.
1853 if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
1854 let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1855 .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
1856 .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
1857 debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
1858 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
1860 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1861 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
1864 htlc_commitment_outpoint
1866 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1868 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1869 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1870 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1871 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1872 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1874 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1875 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1876 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1877 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1878 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1879 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1880 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1881 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1882 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1883 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1884 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1886 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1887 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1888 tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
1890 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1891 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1893 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1898 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1899 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1900 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1901 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1902 // need to do so again here.
1904 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1905 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1906 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1907 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1908 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1909 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1912 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1913 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1914 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1915 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1916 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1917 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1918 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1919 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1922 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1923 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1924 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1925 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1928 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1929 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1930 // we know the preimage.
1931 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1932 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1933 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1934 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1935 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1936 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1937 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1938 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1941 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1942 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1943 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1944 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1945 payment_preimage: *payment_preimage,
1948 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1949 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1950 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1951 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1952 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1959 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1960 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1961 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1964 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1965 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1966 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1967 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1969 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1970 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, not all or excess balances may be included.
1972 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1973 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1974 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1975 let mut res = Vec::new();
1976 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1978 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1979 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1980 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1981 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1982 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1985 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
1986 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1989 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1990 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1991 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1992 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1993 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1996 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1997 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1998 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1999 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2001 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
2009 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
2010 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
2011 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
2012 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
2013 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2014 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2015 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2016 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
2018 Some(descriptor.output.value)
2021 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2022 amount_satoshis: value,
2023 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2026 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
2027 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
2028 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
2031 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2032 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2034 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2035 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
2036 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
2037 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
2038 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
2039 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
2040 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
2041 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2042 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
2044 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2045 amount_satoshis: output.value,
2046 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
2048 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
2049 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
2050 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
2051 ).unwrap_or(false) {
2052 spent_counterparty_output = true;
2058 if spent_counterparty_output {
2059 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
2060 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
2061 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
2062 if output_spendable {
2063 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
2064 amount_satoshis: amt,
2068 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
2069 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
2072 found_commitment_tx = true;
2073 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2074 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2075 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2076 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2077 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2078 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2081 found_commitment_tx = true;
2082 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2083 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2084 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2085 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2086 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2087 amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
2088 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2091 found_commitment_tx = true;
2094 if !found_commitment_tx {
2095 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2096 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
2097 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
2098 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
2099 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2100 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2101 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2106 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
2107 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2108 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
2110 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
2111 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2112 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2113 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2115 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
2116 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
2118 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
2119 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
2120 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
2121 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2122 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2123 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2127 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
2128 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
2135 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
2136 /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
2137 /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
2139 /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
2140 /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
2141 /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
2142 pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2143 let mut res = HashMap::new();
2144 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
2145 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
2146 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2147 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
2149 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2150 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2151 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2152 res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
2153 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
2159 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2160 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2162 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2163 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2168 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
2169 /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
2171 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
2173 /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
2174 /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
2175 pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2176 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2177 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
2178 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
2179 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
2180 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2181 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2182 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
2188 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
2189 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
2190 // closed), just get the full set.
2192 return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
2195 let mut res = HashMap::new();
2196 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2197 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2198 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
2199 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
2200 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
2201 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
2203 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
2204 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
2205 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
2206 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
2207 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
2208 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2209 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
2210 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
2211 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
2212 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
2213 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
2214 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
2215 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
2216 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
2217 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
2218 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
2220 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
2223 let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
2224 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
2225 if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
2226 res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
2233 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
2234 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2235 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
2236 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
2237 Some((a, &**source))
2240 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2241 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2242 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2244 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2245 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2246 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2247 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2255 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
2256 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
2260 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
2261 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
2262 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
2264 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
2265 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
2266 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
2267 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
2268 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
2269 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
2271 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
2272 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
2273 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
2274 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
2275 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
2276 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
2277 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
2278 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
2280 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
2281 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
2282 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2283 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2284 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2285 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
2286 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
2287 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
2288 // payment_preimage.
2289 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
2290 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
2291 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
2292 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
2294 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
2296 let mut matched_htlc = false;
2297 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
2298 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
2299 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
2300 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
2301 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
2302 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
2303 matched_htlc = true;
2307 if matched_htlc { continue; }
2308 if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
2311 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2312 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
2314 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
2315 *update_source != **source
2320 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2321 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
2322 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
2323 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
2324 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
2325 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2326 source: (**source).clone(),
2327 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
2328 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
2329 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
2332 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
2333 &htlc.payment_hash, $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2334 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2335 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2341 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2342 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2344 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2345 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2350 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2351 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2352 // in-line tests later.
2355 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2356 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2357 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2358 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2359 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2360 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2361 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2362 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2367 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2368 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2371 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2372 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2373 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2374 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2375 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2376 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2377 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2380 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2381 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2382 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2383 if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
2384 let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2385 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2386 for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2387 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2388 if !cur_claimables.iter()
2389 .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
2391 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
2395 for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2399 assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
2403 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2404 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2405 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2406 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2407 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2409 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2410 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2411 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2415 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2416 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2417 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2422 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2429 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2438 fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2439 &mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2440 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
2441 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2442 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2443 self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info = Some((their_per_commitment_point.clone(),
2444 feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value));
2446 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2447 let rebuilt_commitment_tx = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_tx().unwrap();
2448 debug_assert_eq!(rebuilt_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), txid);
2451 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number,
2452 their_per_commitment_point, logger);
2455 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2456 &mut self, txid: Txid,
2457 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2458 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2459 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2460 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2461 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2462 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2464 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2465 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2468 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2469 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2470 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2471 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2472 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2473 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2474 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2475 Some(old_points) => {
2476 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2477 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2478 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2479 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2480 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2482 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2485 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2489 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2492 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2493 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2494 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2500 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2501 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2502 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2503 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2504 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2505 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, mut htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)], nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2506 if htlc_outputs.iter().any(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()) {
2507 // If we have non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, ensure they match the HTLCs in the
2508 // `holder_commitment_tx`. In the future, we'll no longer provide the redundant data
2509 // and just pass in source data via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
2510 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len());
2511 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).map(|(h, _, _)| h).zip(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()) {
2512 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2514 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2515 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, s, _)| s.as_ref()).zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter()) {
2516 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2518 debug_assert!(nondust_htlc_sources.is_empty());
2520 // If we don't have any non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, assume they were all passed via
2521 // `nondust_htlc_sources`, building up the final htlc_outputs by combining
2522 // `nondust_htlc_sources` and the `holder_commitment_tx`
2523 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2525 for htlc in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter() {
2526 assert!(htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32 > prev);
2527 prev = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32;
2530 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(htlc, _, _)| htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()));
2531 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(_, sig_opt, _)| sig_opt.is_none()));
2532 debug_assert_eq!(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2534 let mut sources_iter = nondust_htlc_sources.into_iter();
2536 for (htlc, counterparty_sig) in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()
2537 .zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter())
2540 let source = sources_iter.next().expect("Non-dust HTLC sources didn't match commitment tx");
2541 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2542 assert!(source.possibly_matches_output(htlc));
2544 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), Some(source)));
2546 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), None));
2549 debug_assert!(sources_iter.next().is_none());
2552 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2553 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2554 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2555 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2556 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
2558 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2559 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2560 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2561 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2562 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2564 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2565 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2567 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2568 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2569 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2570 for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
2571 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2572 let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2573 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2574 assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
2575 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2576 SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
2580 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
2582 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2583 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2588 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2589 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2590 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2591 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2592 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>)
2593 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2594 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2597 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2599 let confirmed_spend_txid = self.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2600 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| match event.event {
2601 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => Some(event.txid),
2605 let confirmed_spend_txid = if let Some(txid) = confirmed_spend_txid {
2611 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2612 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2613 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2614 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2615 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2616 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2619 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2620 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2621 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2622 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2624 debug_assert!(false);
2625 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2630 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2631 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2632 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2633 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2635 debug_assert!(false);
2636 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2642 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2643 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2644 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2645 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2646 // holder commitment transactions.
2647 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2648 let holder_commitment_tx = if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2649 Some(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx)
2650 } else if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2651 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2652 Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx)
2659 if let Some(holder_commitment_tx) = holder_commitment_tx {
2660 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2661 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2663 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2664 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2669 fn generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(&mut self) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Vec<TransactionOutputs>) {
2670 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2671 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(),
2672 self.channel_value_satoshis,
2673 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
2675 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2676 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2677 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp),
2678 self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height()
2680 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![commitment_package];
2681 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
2682 // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
2683 // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
2684 // new channel updates.
2685 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2686 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2687 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
2688 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
2689 // `transactions_confirmed`.
2690 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2691 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2692 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2693 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2694 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(
2695 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height()
2697 let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
2698 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(
2699 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx
2701 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2702 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2704 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2706 (claimable_outpoints, watch_outputs)
2709 pub(crate) fn queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2710 &mut self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2713 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2714 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2717 let (claimable_outpoints, _) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs();
2718 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2719 claimable_outpoints, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster,
2720 fee_estimator, logger
2724 fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2725 &mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2727 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2728 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2731 if self.latest_update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2732 log_info!(logger, "Applying post-force-closed update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2733 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2734 } else if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2735 log_info!(logger, "Applying force close update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2736 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2738 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
2739 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2741 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
2742 // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
2743 // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
2744 // sentinel value instead.
2746 // The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
2747 // thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
2749 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2750 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2751 match updates.updates[0] {
2752 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
2753 // We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
2754 // provide a preimage at this point.
2755 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
2756 debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
2758 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2759 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2762 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2763 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2765 let mut ret = Ok(());
2766 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
2767 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2769 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
2770 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2771 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2772 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources.clone()) {
2773 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2774 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2778 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2779 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2780 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2782 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2783 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2784 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2786 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2787 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2788 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2789 debug_assert!(false, "Latest counterparty commitment secret was invalid");
2790 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2791 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2795 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2796 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2797 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2798 if *should_broadcast {
2799 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
2800 // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
2801 // duplicate/conflicting.
2802 let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
2803 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
2804 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
2807 if detected_funding_spend {
2808 log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
2811 self.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
2812 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2813 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2814 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id());
2815 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
2817 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager
2818 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2819 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2820 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2823 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2824 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2825 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2826 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2832 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2833 self.counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(updates);
2836 // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
2837 // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
2838 if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
2842 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2844 // Refuse updates after we've detected a spend onchain, but only if we haven't processed a
2845 // force closed monitor update yet.
2846 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen && self.latest_update_id != CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2847 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2852 fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2853 self.latest_update_id
2856 fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
2860 fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>> {
2861 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2862 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2863 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2864 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2865 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2867 &self.outputs_to_watch
2870 fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2871 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2872 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2876 /// Gets the set of events that are repeated regularly (e.g. those which RBF bump
2877 /// transactions). We're okay if we lose these on restart as they'll be regenerated for us at
2878 /// some regular interval via [`ChannelMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims`].
2879 pub(super) fn get_repeated_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2880 let pending_claim_events = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events();
2881 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pending_claim_events.len());
2882 for (claim_id, claim_event) in pending_claim_events {
2884 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
2885 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
2887 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2888 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
2889 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
2890 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
2891 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
2892 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
2894 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2896 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
2897 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
2898 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2899 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2900 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2901 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2903 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
2904 txid: commitment_txid,
2905 vout: anchor_output_idx,
2911 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
2912 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs, tx_lock_time,
2914 let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
2916 htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
2917 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2918 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2919 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2920 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2922 commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
2923 per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
2924 per_commitment_point: self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.get_per_commitment_point(
2925 htlc.per_commitment_number, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
2929 preimage: htlc.preimage,
2930 counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
2933 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
2935 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2945 fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
2946 let (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value,
2947 to_countersignatory_value) = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info?;
2948 let htlc_outputs = vec![];
2950 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2951 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value,
2952 feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs);
2956 fn build_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2957 &self, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
2958 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, feerate_per_kw: u32,
2959 mut nondust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>
2960 ) -> CommitmentTransaction {
2961 let broadcaster_keys = &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters
2962 .counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys;
2963 let countersignatory_keys =
2964 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys;
2966 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey;
2967 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey;
2968 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&their_per_commitment_point,
2969 &broadcaster_keys, &countersignatory_keys, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx);
2970 let channel_parameters =
2971 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable();
2973 CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2974 to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, broadcaster_funding_key,
2975 countersignatory_funding_key, keys, feerate_per_kw, &mut nondust_htlcs,
2979 fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
2980 update.updates.iter().filter_map(|update| {
2982 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid,
2983 ref htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point,
2984 feerate_per_kw: Some(feerate_per_kw),
2985 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(to_broadcaster_value),
2986 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(to_countersignatory_value) } => {
2988 let nondust_htlcs = htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _)| {
2989 htlc.transaction_output_index.map(|_| (htlc.clone(), None))
2990 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2992 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_number,
2993 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value,
2994 to_countersignatory_value, feerate_per_kw, nondust_htlcs);
2996 debug_assert_eq!(commitment_tx.trust().txid(), commitment_txid);
3005 fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(
3006 &self, mut justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64
3007 ) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
3008 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).ok_or(())?;
3009 let per_commitment_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secret).map_err(|_| ())?;
3010 let their_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(
3011 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3013 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3014 &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &their_per_commitment_point);
3015 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3016 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &their_per_commitment_point);
3017 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3018 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3020 let sig = self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(
3021 &justice_tx, input_idx, value, &per_commitment_key, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx)?;
3022 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
3023 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(&[1u8]);
3024 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(revokeable_redeemscript.as_bytes());
3028 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
3029 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
3030 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
3033 fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
3034 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
3037 fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3038 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
3041 fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3042 self.current_holder_commitment_number
3045 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
3046 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
3047 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
3048 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
3050 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
3051 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
3053 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
3054 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
3055 where L::Target: Logger {
3056 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
3057 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
3058 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3059 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3060 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
3062 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
3063 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
3065 macro_rules! ignore_error {
3066 ( $thing : expr ) => {
3069 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3074 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
3075 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
3076 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
3077 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
3078 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3079 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,);
3080 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
3082 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3083 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
3085 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
3086 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3087 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3088 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
3089 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height);
3090 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3091 to_counterparty_output_info =
3092 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3096 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
3097 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3098 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
3099 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3100 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
3101 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3102 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3103 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
3104 to_counterparty_output_info);
3106 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
3107 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, height);
3108 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3113 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
3114 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
3115 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
3116 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
3117 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3118 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3120 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3122 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3123 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3124 block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3125 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3128 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
3129 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3130 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
3133 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3134 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
3135 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
3136 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
3137 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
3138 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
3139 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
3141 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3142 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3144 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3146 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
3147 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3148 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3149 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3152 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
3153 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
3154 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
3155 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
3156 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
3160 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3163 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
3164 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
3165 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
3166 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3167 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
3169 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
3170 Some(outputs) => outputs,
3171 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3173 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
3174 Some(points) => points,
3175 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3178 let per_commitment_point =
3179 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
3180 // per-commitment point
3181 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
3182 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
3183 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
3184 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
3185 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
3186 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
3188 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
3189 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
3191 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3192 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
3193 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point);
3195 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &per_commitment_point);
3197 let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3198 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3199 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
3200 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
3201 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3202 to_counterparty_output_info =
3203 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3208 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
3209 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3210 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3211 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
3212 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3213 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3214 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
3217 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
3218 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
3219 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
3220 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
3221 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3222 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3223 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3224 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3226 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
3227 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3228 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3229 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3230 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3232 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry, 0);
3233 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
3238 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
3241 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
3242 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
3243 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
3244 ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
3245 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
3246 let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
3248 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
3250 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3252 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
3253 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
3254 let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
3255 // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
3256 // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
3257 // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
3258 // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
3259 // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
3260 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
3262 // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
3263 // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
3264 // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
3265 for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
3266 if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
3267 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
3268 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
3269 per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3270 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
3271 tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3274 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3275 htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
3276 height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height
3278 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3279 if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
3280 outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
3282 outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
3285 (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
3288 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
3289 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
3290 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
3291 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>) {
3292 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3294 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
3295 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
3297 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3298 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3299 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
3300 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
3301 htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3305 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
3308 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3311 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
3312 payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3316 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3317 holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
3318 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
3319 htlc.cltv_expiry, conf_height
3321 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
3325 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
3328 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
3329 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
3330 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3331 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3332 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3333 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
3339 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
3340 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
3341 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
3342 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
3343 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
3344 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
3345 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
3346 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3348 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
3349 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
3350 claim_requests = $updates.0;
3351 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
3352 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
3356 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
3357 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
3359 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3360 is_holder_tx = true;
3361 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3362 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
3363 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
3364 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3365 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3366 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
3367 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
3368 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3369 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3370 is_holder_tx = true;
3371 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3372 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
3373 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
3374 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3375 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3376 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
3382 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
3388 /// Cancels any existing pending claims for a commitment that previously confirmed and has now
3389 /// been replaced by another.
3390 pub fn cancel_prev_commitment_claims<L: Deref>(
3391 &mut self, logger: &L, confirmed_commitment_txid: &Txid
3392 ) where L::Target: Logger {
3393 for (counterparty_commitment_txid, _) in &self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain {
3394 // Cancel any pending claims for counterparty commitments we've seen confirm.
3395 if counterparty_commitment_txid == confirmed_commitment_txid {
3398 for (htlc, _) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(counterparty_commitment_txid).unwrap_or(&vec![]) {
3399 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously confirmed counterparty commitment {}",
3400 counterparty_commitment_txid);
3401 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: *counterparty_commitment_txid, vout: 0 };
3402 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3403 outpoint.vout = vout;
3404 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3408 if self.holder_tx_signed {
3409 // If we've signed, we may have broadcast either commitment (prev or current), and
3410 // attempted to claim from it immediately without waiting for a confirmation.
3411 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3412 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3413 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3414 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3415 for (htlc, _, _) in &self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3416 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3417 outpoint.vout = vout;
3418 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3422 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3423 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3424 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3425 prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3426 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3427 for (htlc, _, _) in &prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3428 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3429 outpoint.vout = vout;
3430 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3436 // No previous claim.
3440 fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3441 &mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3442 ) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3443 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
3444 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
3445 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3446 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3447 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3448 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
3449 // transaction confirms.
3450 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3451 return holder_transactions;
3453 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3454 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3455 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3456 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3457 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3460 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
3461 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
3462 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
3463 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
3464 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
3465 // confirmed in the next block.
3468 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
3469 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
3470 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
3474 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
3475 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
3479 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
3480 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
3481 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3482 &mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3483 ) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3484 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
3485 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3486 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3487 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3488 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
3489 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
3490 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3491 return holder_transactions;
3493 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3494 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3495 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3496 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3497 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3501 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
3502 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
3503 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
3510 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3511 &mut self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B,
3512 fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3513 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3514 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3515 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3518 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3519 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3521 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3522 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
3525 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3530 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3531 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3532 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3534 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3535 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3538 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3540 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3541 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3542 log_trace!(logger, "Connecting new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3543 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3544 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
3545 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3546 log_trace!(logger, "Best block re-orged, replaced with new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3547 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
3548 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3550 } else { Vec::new() }
3553 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3556 txdata: &TransactionData,
3559 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3560 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3561 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3563 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3564 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3567 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
3568 for tx in &txn_matched {
3569 let mut output_val = 0;
3570 for out in tx.output.iter() {
3571 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3572 output_val += out.value;
3573 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3577 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3579 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3580 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3581 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
3582 let txid = tx.txid();
3583 log_trace!(logger, "Transaction {} confirmed in block {}", txid , block_hash);
3584 // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
3585 if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
3586 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3589 for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3590 if ev.txid == txid {
3591 if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
3592 assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
3593 "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
3594 This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
3596 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3600 for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
3601 if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
3602 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3606 for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
3607 if txid == *spendable_txid {
3608 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3613 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
3614 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
3615 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
3616 // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
3617 // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
3618 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
3619 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
3620 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
3621 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
3622 &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id(), txid);
3623 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
3624 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
3625 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
3626 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
3627 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3628 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
3629 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3630 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3632 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3633 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
3634 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
3635 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
3636 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
3637 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3638 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3640 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3641 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
3645 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3647 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
3649 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
3650 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
3651 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
3652 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
3655 // Now that we've detected a confirmed commitment transaction, attempt to cancel
3656 // pending claims for any commitments that were previously confirmed such that
3657 // we don't continue claiming inputs that no longer exist.
3658 self.cancel_prev_commitment_claims(&logger, &txid);
3661 if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
3662 // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
3663 // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
3664 // other ways which can have more than one output.
3665 for tx_input in &tx.input {
3666 let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
3667 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
3668 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
3669 &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
3671 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3672 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
3673 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3675 // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
3676 // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
3677 // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
3678 // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
3682 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3684 self.check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3688 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3689 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3692 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3695 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
3696 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
3697 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
3698 /// complexity especially in
3699 /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
3701 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
3702 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
3703 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3706 conf_hash: BlockHash,
3707 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
3708 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
3709 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
3711 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3712 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3713 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3715 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3716 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3719 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
3720 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
3722 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
3723 if should_broadcast {
3724 let (mut new_outpoints, mut new_outputs) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs();
3725 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3726 watch_outputs.append(&mut new_outputs);
3729 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3730 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3731 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3732 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3733 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3734 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3735 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3737 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3741 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3742 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3743 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3745 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3746 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3750 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3751 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3753 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3754 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3756 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3757 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3758 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3761 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3762 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3763 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3764 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3766 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3767 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3768 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3769 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3770 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3773 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3774 &payment_hash, entry.txid);
3775 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3777 payment_preimage: None,
3778 source: source.clone(),
3779 htlc_value_satoshis,
3781 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3782 commitment_tx_output_idx,
3783 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3784 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3785 payment_preimage: None,
3788 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3789 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3790 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3791 outputs: vec![descriptor],
3792 channel_id: Some(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()),
3794 self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
3796 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3797 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3798 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
3799 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3800 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3801 payment_preimage: preimage,
3804 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3805 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3806 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3811 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3812 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3814 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3815 // updating the latter in the process.
3816 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3817 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3818 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3822 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3823 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3824 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3825 for tx in &txn_matched {
3826 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3827 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3828 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3829 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3837 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3838 &mut self, header: &Header, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3839 ) where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3840 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3843 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3846 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3847 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3848 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3850 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3851 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3853 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3856 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3860 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3861 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3863 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3864 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3867 let mut removed_height = None;
3868 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3869 if entry.txid == *txid {
3870 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
3875 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
3876 log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
3877 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
3878 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
3883 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
3885 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3888 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3889 /// transactions thereof.
3890 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3891 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
3892 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3893 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3894 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3895 if matches { break; }
3896 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3901 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3904 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3907 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3908 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3909 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3910 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3911 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3912 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3915 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3916 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3917 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3918 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3919 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3920 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3921 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3922 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3926 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&ScriptBuf::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3927 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3928 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3929 } else { panic!(); }
3940 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3941 &self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3942 ) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3943 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
3944 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
3945 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
3946 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
3947 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
3953 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3954 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3955 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3956 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3957 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3958 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3959 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3960 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3961 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3962 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3963 let height = self.best_block.height();
3964 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3965 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3966 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3967 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3968 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3969 // time out the HTLC first.
3970 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3971 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3972 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3973 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3974 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3975 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3976 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
3977 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
3978 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
3979 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
3980 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
3981 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
3982 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3983 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3984 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3985 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
3986 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
3987 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
3988 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
3989 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
3990 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
3991 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
3992 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
3993 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4000 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
4002 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4003 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4004 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4007 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4008 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4009 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4016 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
4017 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
4018 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(
4019 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4020 ) where L::Target: Logger {
4021 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
4022 let mut payment_data = None;
4023 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
4024 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
4025 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
4026 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4027 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
4028 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
4029 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4030 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
4032 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4033 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
4034 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
4037 macro_rules! log_claim {
4038 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
4039 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
4040 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
4042 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4043 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4044 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4045 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4046 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
4047 // matched by any HTLC spend:
4048 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4049 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
4050 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
4051 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
4052 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
4053 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
4054 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
4055 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4056 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4057 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
4059 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
4060 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4061 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4062 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
4067 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
4068 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
4069 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
4070 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
4071 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
4072 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
4073 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
4074 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
4083 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
4084 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
4085 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
4086 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
4087 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
4088 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
4089 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
4090 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
4091 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
4092 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
4093 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
4094 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
4095 } else if !$holder_tx {
4096 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4097 if payment_data.is_none() {
4098 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4101 if payment_data.is_none() {
4102 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
4103 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
4104 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4105 txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4106 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4107 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4108 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
4109 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
4110 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
4111 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
4112 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
4113 // accepted_preimage_claim).
4114 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
4115 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
4118 continue 'outer_loop;
4125 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
4126 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4127 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
4129 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
4130 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
4131 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4132 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
4135 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
4136 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
4137 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
4140 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
4141 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
4142 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
4143 if accepted_preimage_claim {
4144 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4145 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
4146 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4149 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4150 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4151 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4152 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4153 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4154 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4157 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4159 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4161 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4164 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
4165 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4166 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
4167 upd.source == source
4169 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4171 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4173 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4174 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4175 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4176 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4177 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4180 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4182 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4184 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4188 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
4189 if entry.height != height { return true; }
4191 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
4192 *htlc_source != source
4197 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4199 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4201 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4202 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
4203 source, payment_hash,
4204 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4205 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
4208 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", &payment_hash, entry.confirmation_threshold());
4209 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4215 fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
4216 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
4217 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4218 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
4219 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4220 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4221 output: outp.clone(),
4222 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4225 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
4226 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
4227 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4228 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4229 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
4230 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
4231 output: outp.clone(),
4232 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2,
4233 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4234 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4238 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
4239 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4240 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4241 output: outp.clone(),
4242 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4243 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4244 channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()),
4247 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
4248 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4249 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4250 output: outp.clone(),
4251 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4258 /// Checks if the confirmed transaction is paying funds back to some address we can assume to
4260 fn check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs<L: Deref>(
4261 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4262 ) where L::Target: Logger {
4263 for spendable_output in self.get_spendable_outputs(tx) {
4264 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4266 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4268 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4269 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
4271 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
4272 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4277 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
4279 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4280 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4283 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4284 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4287 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4288 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4292 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, M, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (M, T, F, L)
4294 M: Deref<Target = ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4295 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4296 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4299 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4300 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4303 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4304 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4307 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4308 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4311 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
4312 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
4316 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4318 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
4319 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::EcdsaSigner>) {
4320 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4321 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
4325 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4330 let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
4332 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4334 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4335 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4337 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4338 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4340 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
4341 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4342 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4343 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
4346 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4348 let mut counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf = Readable::read(reader)?;
4349 let shutdown_script = {
4350 let script = <ScriptBuf as Readable>::read(reader)?;
4351 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
4354 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4355 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
4356 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
4357 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
4358 let outpoint = OutPoint {
4359 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
4360 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
4362 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
4363 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4364 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4366 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
4367 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
4368 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4370 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
4371 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4375 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4376 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
4377 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
4378 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
4380 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
4385 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4387 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4389 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
4392 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
4393 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4394 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4395 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4396 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
4398 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4399 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
4405 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4406 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
4407 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
4408 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4409 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4410 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4411 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
4412 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
4414 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
4415 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4419 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4420 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4421 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
4422 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4423 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4424 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
4425 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4429 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4430 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4431 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
4432 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4433 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4434 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
4435 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4439 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
4440 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4443 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
4445 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4447 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
4449 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4450 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4452 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4453 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4454 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
4455 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
4456 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4457 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
4458 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4462 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4463 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
4464 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
4465 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
4466 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4467 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
4468 1 => MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_info.0),
4469 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4471 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
4474 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4475 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
4476 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
4477 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4478 pending_events.push(event);
4482 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
4484 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4485 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
4486 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
4487 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4488 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
4492 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4493 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<ScriptBuf>>())));
4494 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
4495 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4496 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4497 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<ScriptBuf>())));
4498 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
4499 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4501 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
4502 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4505 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::EcdsaSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(
4506 reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
4509 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
4510 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4512 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
4513 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4514 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
4515 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4516 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
4517 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
4518 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4522 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4523 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4524 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
4525 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
4526 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4529 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
4530 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
4531 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
4532 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
4533 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
4534 let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
4535 let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new());
4536 let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None;
4537 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4538 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
4539 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
4540 (5, pending_monitor_events, optional_vec),
4541 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
4542 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
4543 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
4544 (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
4545 (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
4546 (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
4549 // Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the
4550 // wrong `counterparty_payment_script` was being tracked. Fix it now on deserialization to
4551 // give them a chance to recognize the spendable output.
4552 if onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() &&
4553 counterparty_payment_script.is_v0_p2wpkh()
4555 let payment_point = onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.payment_point;
4556 counterparty_payment_script =
4557 chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh();
4560 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
4562 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
4565 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
4566 counterparty_payment_script,
4570 holder_revocation_basepoint,
4572 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4573 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4575 counterparty_commitment_params,
4576 funding_redeemscript,
4577 channel_value_satoshis,
4578 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
4583 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
4584 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
4585 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
4586 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),
4588 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
4589 current_holder_commitment_tx,
4590 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
4591 current_holder_commitment_number,
4594 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
4596 is_processing_pending_events: false,
4598 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
4603 lockdown_from_offchain,
4605 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
4606 funding_spend_confirmed,
4607 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
4608 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
4609 spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
4612 counterparty_node_id,
4613 initial_counterparty_commitment_info,
4620 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
4621 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
4622 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4623 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut};
4624 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4625 use bitcoin::sighash;
4626 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
4627 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4628 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4629 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4630 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
4631 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4632 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4633 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
4634 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Witness};
4636 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
4638 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
4639 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
4640 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
4641 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, WithChannelMonitor};
4642 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
4643 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4644 use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
4645 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4646 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint, RevocationKey};
4647 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
4648 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
4649 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4650 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
4651 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
4652 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
4653 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
4654 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
4655 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4657 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
4658 use crate::prelude::*;
4660 use std::str::FromStr;
4662 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
4663 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
4664 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
4665 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
4666 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
4667 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
4668 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
4669 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
4670 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
4672 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
4673 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
4674 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4675 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4676 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4677 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4678 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4679 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4681 // Rebalance somewhat
4682 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
4684 // First route two payments for testing at the end
4685 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4686 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4688 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
4689 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4690 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
4691 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
4692 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
4693 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
4694 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
4696 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
4697 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
4698 let new_header = create_dummy_header(nodes[0].best_block_info().0, 0);
4699 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4700 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
4701 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
4703 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
4704 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
4705 (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
4707 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
4708 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
4709 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
4710 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
4711 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
4712 ), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress, {});
4713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4715 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
4716 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
4717 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
4718 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
4719 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().next().unwrap().clone();
4720 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
4721 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
4722 } else { panic!(); }
4723 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
4724 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
4726 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
4728 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
4730 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
4732 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4733 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
4734 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
4735 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
4736 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
4737 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
4738 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4739 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
4740 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
4743 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
4744 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
4745 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4749 fn test_prune_preimages() {
4750 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4751 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4752 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster::new(Network::Testnet));
4753 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4755 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4757 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4760 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4761 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4762 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4766 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlcs {
4767 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4769 let mut res = Vec::new();
4770 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4771 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4775 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4776 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4783 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4784 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4785 preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
4788 let dummy_sig = crate::util::crypto::sign(&secp_ctx,
4789 &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
4790 &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4792 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4793 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4794 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4795 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4800 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4802 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4803 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4804 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4805 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4806 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4813 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4814 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4815 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
4816 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4817 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
4818 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap()))
4820 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4821 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4822 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4823 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4824 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4825 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4826 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4827 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4829 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4830 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
4832 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4834 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4835 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
4836 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4837 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
4838 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
4839 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
4840 best_block, dummy_key);
4842 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
4843 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4845 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4846 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4847 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"1").to_byte_array()),
4848 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4849 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"2").to_byte_array()),
4850 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4851 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4852 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4853 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4856 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4857 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4858 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4859 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4860 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4861 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4862 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4864 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"3").to_byte_array()),
4865 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4867 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4868 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4869 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4870 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4871 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4872 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4874 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"4").to_byte_array()),
4875 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4877 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4878 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4879 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]);
4880 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4881 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4882 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4883 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4884 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4885 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4886 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4887 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4889 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4890 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]);
4891 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4892 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
4893 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4894 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4895 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4896 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4897 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4901 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4902 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4903 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4905 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4906 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4907 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4909 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint};
4910 macro_rules! sign_input {
4911 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4912 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4913 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4915 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4916 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4917 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4919 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), 256, &DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) };
4920 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4921 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4922 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4923 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4924 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len() as u64;
4925 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4926 witness.push(ser_sig);
4927 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4928 witness.push(vec!(1));
4929 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4930 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4931 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4932 witness.push(vec![0]);
4934 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4936 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4937 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4938 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4939 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4940 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4944 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4945 let txid = Txid::from_str("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4947 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4948 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4949 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4950 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4952 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4953 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4957 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
4958 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4959 witness: Witness::new(),
4962 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4963 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4966 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
4967 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
4968 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4970 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4971 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4972 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
4973 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4976 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
4979 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
4980 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4981 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4982 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4984 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4985 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4989 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
4990 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4991 witness: Witness::new(),
4994 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4995 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4998 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
4999 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
5000 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5002 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5003 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5004 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5005 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5008 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5011 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
5012 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5013 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5014 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5015 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5016 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5020 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5021 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5022 witness: Witness::new(),
5024 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5025 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5028 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5029 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
5030 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5032 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5033 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5034 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5035 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5038 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5043 fn test_with_channel_monitor_impl_logger() {
5044 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5045 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
5047 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5049 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
5051 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5052 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5053 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5054 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5055 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5062 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5063 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
5064 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
5065 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
5066 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
5067 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())),
5069 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
5070 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
5071 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
5072 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
5073 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5074 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5075 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5076 selected_contest_delay: 67,
5078 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
5079 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
5081 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5082 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
5083 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
5084 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
5085 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
5086 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
5087 best_block, dummy_key);
5089 let chan_id = monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().funding_info.0.to_channel_id().clone();
5090 let context_logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&logger, &monitor);
5091 log_error!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5092 log_warn!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5093 log_debug!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5094 log_trace!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5095 log_gossip!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5096 log_info!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5097 logger.assert_log_context_contains("lightning::chain::channelmonitor::tests", Some(dummy_key), Some(chan_id), 6);
5099 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.