1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
38 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
40 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
41 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource};
42 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
44 use chain::WatchedOutput;
45 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
46 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
47 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
49 use util::logger::Logger;
50 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
52 use util::events::Event;
54 use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
60 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
61 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
62 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
65 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
67 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
68 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
69 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
71 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
72 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
73 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
75 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
76 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
77 /// its docs for more details.
82 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
83 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
84 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
85 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
86 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
88 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
90 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
91 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
92 self.update_id.write(w)?;
93 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
94 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
95 update_step.write(w)?;
100 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
101 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
102 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
103 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
104 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
106 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
108 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
112 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
113 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
114 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
115 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
116 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
118 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
119 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
120 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
121 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
123 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
124 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
125 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
127 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
128 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
129 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
130 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
131 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
132 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
135 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
136 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
139 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
140 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
141 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
142 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
143 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
146 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
147 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
148 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
150 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
151 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
152 /// of this channel).
154 /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
155 /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
156 /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
157 /// update must be rejected.
159 /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
160 /// the channel monitor instance.
162 /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
163 /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
164 /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
166 /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
167 /// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
168 /// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
169 /// lagging behind on block processing.
173 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
174 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
175 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
177 /// Contains a developer-readable error message.
178 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
179 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
181 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
182 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
183 pub enum MonitorEvent {
184 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
185 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
187 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
188 CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
191 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
192 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
193 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
194 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
195 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
196 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
197 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
198 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
200 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
202 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
203 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
204 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
205 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
206 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
207 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
208 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
209 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
210 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
211 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
212 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
213 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
214 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
215 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
216 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
217 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
218 /// accurate block height.
219 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
220 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
221 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
222 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
223 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
224 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
225 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
226 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
227 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
228 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
229 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
230 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
231 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
233 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
234 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
235 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
237 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
238 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
239 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
240 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
242 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
243 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
245 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
246 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
247 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
249 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
250 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
251 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
253 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
254 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
255 struct HolderSignedTx {
256 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
258 revocation_key: PublicKey,
259 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
260 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
261 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
262 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
264 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
267 /// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
268 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
270 struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
271 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
272 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
273 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
274 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
277 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
278 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
279 self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
280 self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
281 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
282 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
283 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
284 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
285 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
286 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
293 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
294 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
295 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
296 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
297 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
298 let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
299 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
300 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
301 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
302 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
303 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
304 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
305 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
306 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
309 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
310 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
313 CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
314 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
315 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
316 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
320 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
324 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
325 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
326 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
327 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
328 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
330 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
331 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
332 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
333 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
334 input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
336 htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
337 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
340 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
341 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
342 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
343 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
344 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
347 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
351 funding_redeemscript: Script,
355 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
356 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
358 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
359 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
360 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
361 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
362 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
363 writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
364 input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
365 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
367 on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
369 &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
370 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
371 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
372 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
373 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
374 preimage.write(writer)?;
377 &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
378 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
379 preimage.write(writer)?;
380 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
382 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
383 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
384 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
391 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
392 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
393 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
395 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
396 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
397 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
398 let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
399 let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
400 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
401 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
402 let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
403 InputMaterial::Revoked {
404 per_commitment_point,
405 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
406 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
411 on_counterparty_tx_csv
415 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
416 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
417 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
418 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
419 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
420 InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
421 per_commitment_point,
422 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
423 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
429 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
430 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
431 InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
437 InputMaterial::Funding {
438 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
441 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
447 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
448 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
449 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
450 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
451 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
452 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
453 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
454 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
455 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
456 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
457 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
458 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
459 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
460 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
461 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
462 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
463 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
464 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
465 // and satisfy witness program.
466 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
469 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
470 /// transaction causing it.
472 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
474 struct OnchainEventEntry {
480 impl OnchainEventEntry {
481 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
482 self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
485 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
486 height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
490 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
491 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
494 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
495 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
496 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
498 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
501 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
505 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
507 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
508 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
509 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
510 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
512 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
513 commitment_txid: Txid,
514 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
515 commitment_number: u64,
516 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
519 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
525 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
526 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
528 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
529 /// think we've fallen behind!
530 should_broadcast: bool,
534 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
535 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
537 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
539 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
540 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
541 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
547 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
549 commitment_txid.write(w)?;
550 commitment_number.write(w)?;
551 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
552 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
553 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
555 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
558 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
560 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
562 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
567 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
569 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
575 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
576 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
577 match Readable::read(r)? {
579 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
580 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
582 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
583 let mut res = Vec::new();
585 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
592 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
593 commitment_txid: Readable::read(r)?,
594 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
595 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
597 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
598 let mut res = Vec::new();
600 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
607 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
608 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
612 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
613 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
614 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
618 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
619 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
622 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
627 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
628 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
630 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
631 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
633 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
634 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
635 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
636 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
638 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
639 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
640 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
641 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
642 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
643 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
645 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
647 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
650 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
651 latest_update_id: u64,
652 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
654 destination_script: Script,
655 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
656 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
657 shutdown_script: Script,
659 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
660 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
661 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
662 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
663 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
665 counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
666 funding_redeemscript: Script,
667 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
668 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
669 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
671 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
673 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
674 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
675 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
676 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
677 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
678 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
679 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
680 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
681 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
682 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
683 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
684 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
685 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
687 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
688 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
689 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
690 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
691 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
692 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
694 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
696 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
697 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
699 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
701 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
703 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
704 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
706 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
707 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
708 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
709 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
711 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
712 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
713 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
714 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
715 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
718 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
720 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
722 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
723 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
724 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
725 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
727 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
728 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
729 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
731 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
732 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
733 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
734 holder_tx_signed: bool,
736 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
737 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
738 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
739 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
740 // the full block_connected).
741 best_block: BestBlock,
743 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
746 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
747 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
749 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
750 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
751 /// underlying object
752 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
753 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
754 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
755 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
760 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
761 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
762 /// underlying object
763 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
764 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
765 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
766 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
767 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
768 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
769 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
770 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
771 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
772 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
773 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
774 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
775 self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
776 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
777 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
778 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
779 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
780 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
781 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
782 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
783 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
784 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
785 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
786 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
787 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
788 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
789 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
790 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
791 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
792 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
793 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
794 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
803 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
804 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
805 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
809 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
810 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
812 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
813 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
814 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
816 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
818 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
819 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
821 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
822 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
823 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
824 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
825 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
826 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
828 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
831 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
832 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
834 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
835 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
836 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
837 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
838 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
839 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
840 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
842 self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
843 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
844 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
846 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
847 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
848 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
849 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
850 match second_option {
851 Some(second_pubkey) => {
852 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
855 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
860 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
864 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
866 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
868 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
869 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
870 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
871 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
872 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
873 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
874 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
878 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
879 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
880 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
881 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
882 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
883 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
884 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
888 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
889 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
890 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
891 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
894 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
895 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
896 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
897 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
900 macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
901 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
902 $holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
903 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
904 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
905 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
906 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
907 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
909 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
910 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
911 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
912 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
913 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
915 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
919 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
924 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
925 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
926 serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
928 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
931 serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
933 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
934 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
936 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
937 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
938 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
941 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
942 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
944 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
948 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
952 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
953 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
954 event.write(writer)?;
957 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
958 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
960 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
961 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
962 entry.txid.write(writer)?;
963 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(entry.height))?;
965 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
967 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
968 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
970 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
972 descriptor.write(writer)?;
977 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
978 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
980 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
981 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
983 script.write(writer)?;
986 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
988 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
989 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
991 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {});
997 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
998 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
999 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1000 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1001 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1002 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1003 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1004 best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1006 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1007 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1008 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1009 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1010 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1012 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1013 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1014 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1015 let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
1017 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1018 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1020 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1021 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1022 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1023 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1025 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1026 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1028 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1029 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1030 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1031 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1032 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1033 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1034 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1036 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1039 let onchain_tx_handler =
1040 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1041 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1043 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1044 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1047 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1048 latest_update_id: 0,
1049 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1051 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1052 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1053 counterparty_payment_script,
1057 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1059 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1060 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1062 counterparty_tx_cache,
1063 funding_redeemscript,
1064 channel_value_satoshis,
1065 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1067 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1069 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1070 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1071 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1072 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1074 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1075 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1076 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1077 current_holder_commitment_number,
1079 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1080 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1081 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1083 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1088 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1089 holder_tx_signed: false,
1099 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1100 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1103 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1104 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1105 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1106 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1107 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1110 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1111 commitment_number: u64,
1112 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
1114 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1115 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1116 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
1120 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1122 holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1123 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1124 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1125 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1126 holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)
1130 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1132 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1133 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1138 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1139 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1142 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1143 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1146 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1151 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1154 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1157 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1160 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1161 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1163 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1167 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1169 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1170 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1173 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1176 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1178 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1179 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1182 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1183 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1184 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1187 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1188 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1189 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1190 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1191 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1194 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1195 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1196 /// have been registered.
1197 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1198 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1199 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1200 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1201 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1202 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1203 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1205 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1206 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1212 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1213 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1214 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1215 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1218 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1221 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1222 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1223 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1224 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1225 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1228 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1229 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1232 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1233 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1236 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1237 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1240 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1241 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1242 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1243 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1244 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1245 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1246 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1247 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1248 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1249 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1250 where L::Target: Logger {
1251 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1254 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1255 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1256 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1257 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1258 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1259 where L::Target: Logger {
1260 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1263 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1264 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1265 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1266 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1267 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1268 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1270 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1271 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1273 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1274 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1276 header: &BlockHeader,
1277 txdata: &TransactionData,
1282 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1284 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1285 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1288 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1289 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1292 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1294 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1296 header: &BlockHeader,
1302 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1303 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1306 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1307 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1310 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1311 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1313 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1314 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1316 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1317 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1319 header: &BlockHeader,
1320 txdata: &TransactionData,
1325 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1327 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1328 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1331 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1332 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1335 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1337 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1338 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1340 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1341 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1348 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1349 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1352 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1353 txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1356 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1357 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1359 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1360 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1362 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1363 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1365 header: &BlockHeader,
1370 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1372 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1373 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1376 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1377 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1380 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1381 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1382 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1383 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1385 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1386 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1388 txids.sort_unstable();
1394 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1395 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1396 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1397 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1398 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1399 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1400 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1403 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1404 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1405 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1406 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1411 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1412 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1413 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1414 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1415 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1417 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1418 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1419 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1423 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1424 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1425 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1430 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1437 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1446 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1447 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1448 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1449 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1451 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1452 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1455 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1456 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1457 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1458 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1459 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1460 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1461 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1462 Some(old_points) => {
1463 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1464 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1465 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1466 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1467 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1469 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1472 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1476 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1479 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1480 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1481 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1485 self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs);
1488 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1489 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1490 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1491 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1492 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1493 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1494 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1495 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1496 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1497 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1498 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1499 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1502 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1503 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1504 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1505 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1506 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1507 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1511 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1512 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1513 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1514 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1515 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
1520 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1521 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1522 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
1523 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1524 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1527 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1529 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1530 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1531 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1532 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1533 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1534 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1537 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1538 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1539 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1543 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1544 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1545 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1550 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1551 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1552 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1553 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1554 // holder commitment transactions.
1555 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1556 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1557 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1558 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1559 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx);
1560 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1565 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1566 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1569 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1570 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
1571 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1573 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1576 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1577 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1578 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1581 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1582 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1583 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1584 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1585 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1586 match updates.updates[0] {
1587 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
1588 _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
1590 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1591 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1592 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1594 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
1596 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1597 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
1598 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1599 self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone())?
1601 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
1602 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
1603 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
1605 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
1606 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
1607 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1609 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
1610 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
1611 self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?
1613 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1614 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
1615 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1616 if *should_broadcast {
1617 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1618 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
1619 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1621 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted, the ChannelManager
1622 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
1623 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
1624 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
1629 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1633 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1634 self.latest_update_id
1637 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1641 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
1642 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
1643 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
1644 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
1645 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1646 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
1648 &self.outputs_to_watch
1651 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1652 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1653 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
1657 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
1658 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1659 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1663 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1664 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1665 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1668 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1669 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1672 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1673 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
1676 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1677 self.current_holder_commitment_number
1680 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1681 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1682 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1683 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1684 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1685 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
1686 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
1687 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1688 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1689 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1690 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1692 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1693 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1695 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1696 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1699 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1704 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1705 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1706 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1707 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1708 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1709 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
1710 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
1712 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1713 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1715 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
1716 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1717 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1718 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1719 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1723 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1724 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1725 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1726 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1727 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1728 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1729 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1731 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1732 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1737 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1738 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1739 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
1740 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1741 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1742 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1744 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1746 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1747 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1748 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1749 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1750 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1751 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1752 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1754 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1755 htlc_update.0 != **source
1760 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1763 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1764 htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())
1767 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1768 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1774 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1775 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1777 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1778 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
1780 // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
1782 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1783 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1784 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1785 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1786 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1787 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1788 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1790 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1791 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1793 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1795 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1797 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1798 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1799 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1800 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1801 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1802 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1803 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1804 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1805 // payment_preimage.
1806 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1807 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1808 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1809 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1811 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1812 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1816 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1817 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1818 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1820 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1821 htlc_update.0 != **source
1826 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
1829 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1830 htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())
1838 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1839 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1841 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1842 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1845 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
1846 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
1847 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
1851 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1854 fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<ClaimRequest> {
1855 let mut claims = Vec::new();
1856 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
1857 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1858 let revocation_point_option =
1859 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
1860 // per-commitment point
1861 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1862 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1863 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
1864 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
1865 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
1866 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1868 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1869 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1870 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1871 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
1872 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
1873 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1874 return claims; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1879 if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1883 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1884 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1885 let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
1886 claims.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1896 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1897 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
1898 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1899 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1900 return (Vec::new(), None)
1903 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1904 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1907 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1912 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1913 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1914 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1916 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1917 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1918 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1919 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
1920 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
1923 // Returns (1) `ClaimRequest`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
1924 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
1925 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
1926 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1927 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1929 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1930 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1932 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1933 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1934 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::core::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1935 witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
1936 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1937 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1938 Some(preimage.clone())
1940 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1944 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1949 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
1952 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
1953 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
1954 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1955 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1956 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1957 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
1963 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1964 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
1965 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1966 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
1967 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1968 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1969 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1971 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1972 ($source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1973 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1974 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1976 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1977 htlc_update.0 != $source
1982 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1983 txid: commitment_txid,
1985 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash) },
1987 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1988 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1992 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1993 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
1994 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1995 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
1996 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2000 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2001 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2003 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2004 is_holder_tx = true;
2005 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2006 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2007 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2008 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2009 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2010 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2011 is_holder_tx = true;
2012 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2013 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx);
2014 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2015 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2019 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2020 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
2021 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
2022 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2023 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2024 wait_threshold_conf!(source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2032 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2033 if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2034 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
2038 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2041 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2042 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2043 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2044 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2045 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2046 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
2047 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2048 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2049 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2050 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2051 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2055 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2056 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2061 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2062 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2066 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2067 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2068 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2069 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2070 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2071 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
2072 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2073 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2074 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2075 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2076 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2080 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2081 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2089 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2090 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2091 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2094 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2095 log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
2096 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2098 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2101 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2103 header: &BlockHeader,
2108 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2110 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2111 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2114 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2115 log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
2117 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2118 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2119 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2121 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2122 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2123 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2128 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2130 header: &BlockHeader,
2131 txdata: &TransactionData,
2136 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2138 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2139 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2142 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2143 for tx in &txn_matched {
2144 let mut output_val = 0;
2145 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2146 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2147 output_val += out.value;
2148 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2152 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2153 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2155 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2156 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2157 for tx in &txn_matched {
2158 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2159 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2160 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2161 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2163 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2164 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2165 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2166 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2167 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2168 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2170 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2171 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2172 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2173 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2175 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2177 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2180 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2181 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2182 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2183 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2184 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2189 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2190 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2191 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2192 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2194 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2197 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2200 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2203 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2204 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2205 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<ClaimRequest>,
2209 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2211 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2212 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2215 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
2216 if should_broadcast {
2217 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
2218 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
2219 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2220 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2221 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2222 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2223 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2224 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2226 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2229 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2230 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2231 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2232 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2233 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2234 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(height) {
2235 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2237 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2241 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2242 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2243 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2245 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2246 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => Some(htlc_update.0.clone()),
2247 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { .. } => None,
2250 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2251 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2253 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2254 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2256 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2257 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2258 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2261 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &htlc_update.0).is_none(),
2262 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2263 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2264 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2266 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &htlc_update.0).is_none(),
2267 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2268 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2269 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2270 matured_htlcs.push(htlc_update.0.clone());
2273 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2274 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2275 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
2276 payment_preimage: None,
2277 source: htlc_update.0,
2280 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2281 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2282 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2283 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2289 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, Some(height), &&*broadcaster, &&*fee_estimator, &&*logger);
2291 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2292 // updating the latter in the process.
2293 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2294 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2295 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2299 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2300 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2301 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2302 for tx in &txn_matched {
2303 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2304 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2305 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2306 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2314 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2315 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2316 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2319 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2322 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2323 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2324 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2326 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2328 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2331 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2338 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2339 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2342 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.txid != *txid);
2343 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2346 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2347 /// transactions thereof.
2348 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2349 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2350 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2351 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2352 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2353 if matches { break; }
2354 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2359 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2362 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2365 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2366 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2367 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2368 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2369 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2370 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2373 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2374 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2375 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2376 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2377 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2378 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2379 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2380 } else { panic!(); }
2391 fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2392 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2393 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2394 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2395 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2396 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2397 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2398 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2399 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2400 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2401 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2402 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2403 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2404 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2405 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2406 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2407 // time out the HTLC first.
2408 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2409 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2410 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2411 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2412 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2413 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2414 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2415 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2416 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2417 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2418 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2419 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2420 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2421 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2422 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2423 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2424 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2425 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2426 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2427 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2428 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2429 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2430 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2431 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2438 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2440 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2441 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2442 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2445 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2446 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2447 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2454 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2455 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2456 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2457 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2458 let mut payment_data = None;
2459 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2460 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2461 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2462 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2464 macro_rules! log_claim {
2465 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2466 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2467 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
2468 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2469 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2470 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2471 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2472 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2473 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2474 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2475 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2476 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2478 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2479 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2480 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2481 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2486 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2487 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2488 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2489 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2490 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2491 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2492 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2493 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2502 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2503 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2504 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2505 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2506 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2507 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2508 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2509 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2510 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2511 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2512 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2513 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2514 } else if !$holder_tx {
2515 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2516 if payment_data.is_none() {
2517 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2520 if payment_data.is_none() {
2521 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2522 continue 'outer_loop;
2529 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2530 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2531 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2533 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2534 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2535 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2536 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2539 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2540 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2541 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2544 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2545 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2546 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2547 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2548 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2549 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2550 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2551 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2552 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2554 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2558 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2559 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2560 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
2561 upd.source == source
2563 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2564 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2566 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2571 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2572 if entry.height != height { return true; }
2574 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2575 htlc_update.0 != source
2580 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2583 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash) },
2585 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2586 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2592 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2593 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2594 let mut spendable_output = None;
2595 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2596 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
2597 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2598 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2599 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2600 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2601 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2602 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2603 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2604 // non-standard due to their size.
2605 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2606 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2607 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2610 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2611 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2612 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2613 output: outp.clone(),
2616 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
2617 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2618 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2619 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2620 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
2621 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
2622 output: outp.clone(),
2623 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2624 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2625 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2629 } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2630 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2631 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2632 output: outp.clone(),
2633 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2634 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2637 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2638 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2639 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2640 output: outp.clone(),
2644 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2645 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2648 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
2650 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2651 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2656 /// `Persist` defines behavior for persisting channel monitors: this could mean
2657 /// writing once to disk, and/or uploading to one or more backup services.
2659 /// Note that for every new monitor, you **must** persist the new `ChannelMonitor`
2660 /// to disk/backups. And, on every update, you **must** persist either the
2661 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself. Otherwise, there is risk
2662 /// of situations such as revoking a transaction, then crashing before this
2663 /// revocation can be persisted, then unintentionally broadcasting a revoked
2664 /// transaction and losing money. This is a risk because previous channel states
2665 /// are toxic, so it's important that whatever channel state is persisted is
2666 /// kept up-to-date.
2667 pub trait Persist<ChannelSigner: Sign> {
2668 /// Persist a new channel's data. The data can be stored any way you want, but
2669 /// the identifier provided by Rust-Lightning is the channel's outpoint (and
2670 /// it is up to you to maintain a correct mapping between the outpoint and the
2671 /// stored channel data). Note that you **must** persist every new monitor to
2672 /// disk. See the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2674 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2675 /// and [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2676 fn persist_new_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2678 /// Update one channel's data. The provided `ChannelMonitor` has already
2679 /// applied the given update.
2681 /// Note that on every update, you **must** persist either the
2682 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself to disk/backups. See
2683 /// the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2685 /// If an implementer chooses to persist the updates only, they need to make
2686 /// sure that all the updates are applied to the `ChannelMonitors` *before*
2687 /// the set of channel monitors is given to the `ChannelManager`
2688 /// deserialization routine. See [`ChannelMonitor::update_monitor`] for
2689 /// applying a monitor update to a monitor. If full `ChannelMonitors` are
2690 /// persisted, then there is no need to persist individual updates.
2692 /// Note that there could be a performance tradeoff between persisting complete
2693 /// channel monitors on every update vs. persisting only updates and applying
2694 /// them in batches. The size of each monitor grows `O(number of state updates)`
2695 /// whereas updates are small and `O(1)`.
2697 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2698 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::write`] for writing out an update, and
2699 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2700 fn update_persisted_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2703 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2705 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2706 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2709 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
2710 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
2711 self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2714 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2715 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2719 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2721 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2722 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2725 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
2726 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2729 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
2730 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2733 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2734 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2737 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
2738 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
2742 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2744 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
2745 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
2746 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2747 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2751 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2756 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
2758 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2759 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2761 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2762 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2764 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2765 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2766 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2767 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2770 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2772 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2773 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2775 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2776 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2777 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2778 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2779 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2780 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2781 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2783 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2784 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2785 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2787 let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2788 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2789 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2791 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2792 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2796 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2797 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2798 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2799 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2801 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2806 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2808 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2810 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2813 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2814 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2815 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2816 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2817 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2819 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2820 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2826 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2827 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2828 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
2829 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2830 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2831 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2832 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2833 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2835 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2836 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2840 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2841 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2842 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2843 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2844 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2845 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
2846 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2850 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2851 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2852 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
2853 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2854 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2855 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2856 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2860 macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
2863 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2864 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2865 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2866 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2867 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2868 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2869 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2871 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2872 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2873 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2874 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2875 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2877 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2878 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2880 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2885 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2892 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2895 Some(read_holder_tx!())
2897 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2899 let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
2901 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2902 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2904 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2905 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2906 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2907 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2908 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2909 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2910 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2914 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2915 let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2916 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
2917 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2918 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
2919 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
2920 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2922 pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
2925 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2926 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
2927 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2928 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2929 pending_events.push(event);
2933 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
2935 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2936 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2937 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2938 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2939 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
2940 let event = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2942 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2943 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2944 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2945 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2949 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2950 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2954 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2956 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry { txid, height, event });
2959 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2960 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2961 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2962 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2963 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2964 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
2965 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2966 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
2968 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2969 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2972 let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
2974 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2975 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2977 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
2979 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2980 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2982 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
2983 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
2985 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2988 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
2989 counterparty_payment_script,
2993 holder_revocation_basepoint,
2995 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2996 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2998 counterparty_tx_cache,
2999 funding_redeemscript,
3000 channel_value_satoshis,
3001 their_cur_revocation_points,
3006 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3007 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3008 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3010 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3011 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3012 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3013 current_holder_commitment_number,
3016 pending_monitor_events,
3019 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3024 lockdown_from_offchain,
3037 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3038 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3039 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3040 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3041 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3042 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3043 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3044 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3045 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
3046 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3048 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3049 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3050 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3051 use ln::channelmanager::BestBlock;
3052 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
3054 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3055 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3056 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3057 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3058 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3059 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3062 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3063 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3064 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3065 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3066 let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3068 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3069 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3071 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3074 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3075 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3076 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3080 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3081 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3083 let mut res = Vec::new();
3084 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3085 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3089 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3090 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3097 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3098 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3100 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3101 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3107 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3108 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3109 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3110 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3115 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3117 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3118 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3119 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3120 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3121 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3127 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3128 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3129 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3130 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3131 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3132 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3134 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
3135 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3136 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3137 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3138 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3139 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3140 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3141 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3143 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3145 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3147 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3148 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3149 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
3150 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3151 &channel_parameters,
3152 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3153 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
3155 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3156 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3157 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3158 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3159 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3160 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3161 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3162 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
3165 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3166 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3167 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3168 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3169 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3170 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3171 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3173 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3174 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3175 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3176 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3177 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3178 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3180 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3181 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3182 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3183 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3184 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3185 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3186 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3187 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3189 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3190 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3191 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3192 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3193 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3194 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3198 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3199 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3200 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3202 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3203 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3204 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3205 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3207 macro_rules! sign_input {
3208 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3209 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3210 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3212 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3213 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3214 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3216 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3217 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3218 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3219 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3220 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3221 sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
3222 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3223 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
3224 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3225 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3226 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3227 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
3229 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3231 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3232 println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
3233 println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
3234 println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
3238 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3239 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3241 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3242 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3244 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3245 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3249 script_sig: Script::new(),
3250 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3251 witness: Vec::new(),
3254 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3255 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3258 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3259 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3261 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3262 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
3263 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3266 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3268 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3269 claim_tx.input.clear();
3270 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3272 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3273 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3277 script_sig: Script::new(),
3278 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3279 witness: Vec::new(),
3282 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3283 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3285 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3286 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
3287 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3290 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3292 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3293 claim_tx.input.clear();
3294 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3295 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3296 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3300 script_sig: Script::new(),
3301 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3302 witness: Vec::new(),
3304 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3305 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3307 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3308 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
3309 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3312 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3315 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.