1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
42 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
44 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
46 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
47 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use util::logger::Logger;
50 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
52 use util::events::Event;
56 use io::{self, Error};
57 use core::convert::TryInto;
61 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
62 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
63 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
66 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
67 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
68 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
69 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
70 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
72 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
73 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
74 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
76 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
77 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
78 /// its docs for more details.
83 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
84 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
85 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
86 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
87 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
89 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
91 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
92 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
93 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
94 self.update_id.write(w)?;
95 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
96 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
97 update_step.write(w)?;
99 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
103 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
104 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
105 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
106 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
107 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
108 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
110 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
114 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
115 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
119 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
120 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
121 pub enum MonitorEvent {
122 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
123 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
125 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
126 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
128 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
129 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
131 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure
133 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
134 funding_txo: OutPoint,
135 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
136 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
138 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
139 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
140 monitor_update_id: u64,
143 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
144 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
146 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure
147 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
149 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
150 // Note that UpdateCompleted and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
151 // generated only in ChainMonitor
152 (0, UpdateCompleted) => {
153 (0, funding_txo, required),
154 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
158 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
162 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
163 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
164 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
165 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
166 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
167 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
168 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
169 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
170 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
172 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
173 (0, payment_hash, required),
174 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
175 (2, source, required),
176 (4, payment_preimage, option),
179 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
180 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
181 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
182 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
183 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
184 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
185 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
186 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
187 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
188 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
189 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
190 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
191 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
192 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
193 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
194 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
195 /// accurate block height.
196 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
197 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
198 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
199 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
200 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
201 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
204 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
205 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
206 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
207 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
208 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
209 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
210 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
211 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
212 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
213 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
215 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
216 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
217 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
219 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
220 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
222 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
223 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
225 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
226 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
227 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
228 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
230 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
231 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
232 struct HolderSignedTx {
233 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
235 revocation_key: PublicKey,
236 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
237 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
238 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
239 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
240 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
241 to_self_value_sat: u64,
244 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
246 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
247 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
248 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
249 (2, revocation_key, required),
250 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
251 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
252 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
253 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
254 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
255 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
258 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
259 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
261 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
262 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
263 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
264 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
267 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
268 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
269 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
270 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
271 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
272 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
273 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
278 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
279 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
280 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
281 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
282 // used. Read it for compatibility.
283 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
284 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
285 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
286 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
287 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
288 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
292 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
293 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
294 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
295 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
296 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
297 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
298 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
300 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
301 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
302 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
303 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
306 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
310 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
311 /// transaction causing it.
313 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
315 struct OnchainEventEntry {
319 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
322 impl OnchainEventEntry {
323 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
324 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
326 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
327 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
329 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
330 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
331 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
333 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
334 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
335 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
336 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
337 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
344 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
345 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
349 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
351 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
352 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
354 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
355 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
358 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
359 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
360 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
361 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
362 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
363 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
366 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
367 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
368 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
369 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
370 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
372 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
373 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
375 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
377 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
379 FundingSpendConfirmation {
380 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
381 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
382 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
383 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
384 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
385 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
387 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
388 /// is constructed. This is used when
389 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
390 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
391 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
392 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
393 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
395 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
396 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
398 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
399 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
400 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
401 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
402 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
403 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
404 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
405 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
409 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
410 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
412 (0, self.txid, required),
413 (1, self.transaction, option),
414 (2, self.height, required),
415 (4, self.event, required),
421 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
422 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
423 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
424 let mut transaction = None;
426 let mut event = None;
427 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
429 (1, transaction, option),
430 (2, height, required),
431 (4, event, ignorable),
433 if let Some(ev) = event {
434 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, event: ev }))
441 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
443 (0, source, required),
444 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
445 (2, payment_hash, required),
446 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
448 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
449 (0, descriptor, required),
451 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
452 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
453 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
455 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
456 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
457 (2, preimage, option),
458 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
463 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
465 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
466 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
467 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
468 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
470 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
471 commitment_txid: Txid,
472 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
473 commitment_number: u64,
474 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
477 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
483 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
484 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
486 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
487 /// think we've fallen behind!
488 should_broadcast: bool,
491 scriptpubkey: Script,
495 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
496 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
498 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
499 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
500 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
501 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
502 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
503 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
508 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
509 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
510 (0, commitment_tx, required),
511 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
513 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
514 (0, commitment_txid, required),
515 (2, commitment_number, required),
516 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
517 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
519 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
520 (0, payment_preimage, required),
522 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
524 (2, secret, required),
526 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
527 (0, should_broadcast, required),
529 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
530 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
534 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
536 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
538 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
539 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
541 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
542 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
543 /// force-closed now.
544 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
545 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
546 /// required to do so.
547 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
549 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
550 /// we consider it spendable.
551 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
552 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
553 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
554 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
555 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
557 confirmation_height: u32,
559 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
560 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
561 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
563 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
564 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
565 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
566 ContentiousClaimable {
567 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
568 /// required to do so.
569 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
570 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
574 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
575 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
576 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
577 MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
578 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
579 /// required to do so.
580 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
581 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
583 claimable_height: u32,
587 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
589 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
590 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
591 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
592 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
594 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
595 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
596 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
599 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
600 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
601 (1, resolving_txid, option),
602 (2, payment_preimage, option),
605 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
606 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
608 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
609 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
611 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
612 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
613 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
614 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
616 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
617 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
618 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
619 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
620 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
621 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
623 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
625 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
628 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
629 latest_update_id: u64,
630 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
632 destination_script: Script,
633 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
634 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
635 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
637 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
638 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
639 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
640 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
641 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
643 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
644 funding_redeemscript: Script,
645 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
646 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
647 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
649 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
651 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
652 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
653 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
654 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
655 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
656 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
657 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
658 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
659 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
660 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
661 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
662 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
663 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
664 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
665 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
666 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
668 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
669 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
670 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
671 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
672 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
673 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
675 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
677 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
678 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
680 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
682 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
683 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
684 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
686 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
688 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
689 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
690 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
691 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
692 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
693 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
694 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
695 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
696 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
697 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
699 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
701 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
702 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
703 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
704 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
706 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
707 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
708 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
709 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
710 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
713 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
715 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
717 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
718 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
719 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
720 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
722 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
723 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
724 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
726 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
727 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
728 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
729 holder_tx_signed: bool,
731 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
732 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
733 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
734 funding_spend_seen: bool,
736 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
737 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
738 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
739 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
740 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
741 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
743 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
744 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
745 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
746 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
747 // the full block_connected).
748 best_block: BestBlock,
750 /// The node_id of our counterparty
751 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
753 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
756 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
757 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
759 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
760 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
762 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
763 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
764 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
765 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
770 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
771 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
773 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
774 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
775 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
776 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
777 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
778 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
779 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
780 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
781 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
782 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
783 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
784 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
785 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
786 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
787 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
788 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
789 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
790 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
791 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
792 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
793 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
794 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
795 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
796 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
797 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
798 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
799 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
800 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
801 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
802 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
803 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
804 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
805 self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
806 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
807 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
808 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
817 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
818 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
819 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
823 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
824 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
825 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
827 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
828 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
829 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
831 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
833 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
834 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
836 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
837 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
838 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
839 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
840 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
841 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
843 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
846 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
847 match &self.shutdown_script {
848 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
849 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
852 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
853 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
854 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
855 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
856 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
857 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
858 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
860 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
861 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
862 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
864 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
865 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
866 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
867 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
868 match second_option {
869 Some(second_pubkey) => {
870 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
873 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
878 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
882 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
884 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
886 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
887 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
888 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
889 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
890 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
891 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
892 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
896 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
897 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
898 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
899 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
900 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
901 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
902 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
903 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
904 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
905 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
909 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
910 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
911 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
912 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
915 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
916 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
917 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
918 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
921 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
922 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
923 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
925 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
928 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
930 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
931 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
933 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
934 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
935 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
938 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
939 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
940 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
942 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
943 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
945 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
949 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
950 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
954 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
955 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
956 event.write(writer)?;
959 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
960 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
962 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
963 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
964 entry.write(writer)?;
967 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
968 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
970 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
971 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
973 script.write(writer)?;
976 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
978 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
979 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
981 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
982 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
983 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
984 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
985 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
986 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
987 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
994 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
995 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
996 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
997 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
998 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
999 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1002 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
1003 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1004 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1005 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1006 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1007 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1008 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1010 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1011 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1012 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1014 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1015 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1016 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1017 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1019 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1020 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1022 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1023 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1024 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1025 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1027 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1028 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1030 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1031 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1032 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1033 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1034 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1035 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1036 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1037 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1039 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1042 let onchain_tx_handler =
1043 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1044 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1046 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1047 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1049 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1050 latest_update_id: 0,
1051 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1053 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1054 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1055 counterparty_payment_script,
1059 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1061 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1062 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1064 counterparty_commitment_params,
1065 funding_redeemscript,
1066 channel_value_satoshis,
1067 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1069 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1071 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1072 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1073 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1074 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1076 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1077 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1078 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1079 current_holder_commitment_number,
1081 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1082 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1083 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1085 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1090 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1091 holder_tx_signed: false,
1092 funding_spend_seen: false,
1093 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1094 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1095 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1098 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1105 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1106 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1109 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1110 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1111 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1112 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1113 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1116 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1117 commitment_number: u64,
1118 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1120 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1121 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1122 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1126 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1127 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1128 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1129 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1130 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1133 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1134 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1135 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1137 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1138 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1140 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1143 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1144 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1147 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1148 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1151 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1156 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1159 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1162 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1165 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1166 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1168 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1174 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1175 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1178 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1181 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1183 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1184 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1187 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1188 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1189 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1192 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1193 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1194 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1195 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1196 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1199 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1200 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1201 /// have been registered.
1202 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1203 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1204 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1205 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1206 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1207 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1208 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1210 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1211 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1217 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1218 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1219 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1220 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1223 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1226 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1227 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1228 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1229 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1230 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1233 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1234 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1237 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1238 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1241 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1242 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1245 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1247 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1249 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1250 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1253 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1254 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1255 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1256 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1257 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1258 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1259 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1260 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1261 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1262 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1263 where L::Target: Logger {
1264 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1267 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1268 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1269 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1270 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1271 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1272 where L::Target: Logger {
1273 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1276 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1277 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1278 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1279 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1280 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1281 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1283 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1284 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1286 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1287 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1289 header: &BlockHeader,
1290 txdata: &TransactionData,
1295 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1297 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1298 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1301 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1302 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1305 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1307 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1309 header: &BlockHeader,
1315 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1316 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1319 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1320 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1323 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1324 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1326 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1327 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1329 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1330 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1332 header: &BlockHeader,
1333 txdata: &TransactionData,
1338 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1340 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1341 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1344 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1345 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1346 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1349 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1351 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1352 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1354 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1355 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1362 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1363 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1366 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1367 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1368 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1371 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1372 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1374 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1375 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1377 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1378 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1380 header: &BlockHeader,
1385 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1387 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1388 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1391 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1392 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1393 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1396 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1397 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1398 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1399 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1401 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1402 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1404 txids.sort_unstable();
1409 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1410 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1411 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1412 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1415 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1416 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1419 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1420 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1421 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1422 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1424 /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
1425 /// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
1428 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1429 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1430 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1431 let mut res = Vec::new();
1432 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1434 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1435 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1436 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1437 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1438 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1441 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1442 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1443 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1444 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1445 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1448 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1449 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1450 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1451 if let Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1452 if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1453 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
1454 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1457 debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
1458 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1459 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1460 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1462 } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1463 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1464 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1465 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1466 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1467 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1468 debug_assert!($holder_commitment || us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1469 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1470 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1471 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1472 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1473 let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1474 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1475 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
1476 Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1479 if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
1480 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1481 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1482 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1485 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1486 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1487 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1490 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1491 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1492 // we know the preimage.
1493 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1494 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1495 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1496 let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1497 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
1498 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
1499 Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
1503 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1504 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1505 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1506 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1509 res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1510 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1511 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1520 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1521 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1522 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1523 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1524 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1525 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1526 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1527 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1529 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1532 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1533 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1534 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1537 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1538 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1539 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1542 found_commitment_tx = true;
1543 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1544 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1545 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1546 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1547 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1548 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1551 found_commitment_tx = true;
1552 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1553 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1554 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1555 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1556 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1557 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1558 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1561 found_commitment_tx = true;
1564 if !found_commitment_tx {
1565 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1566 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1567 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1568 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1569 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1570 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1571 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1575 // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
1578 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1579 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1580 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1582 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1583 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1584 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1586 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1587 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1590 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1591 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1598 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1599 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1600 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1601 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1602 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1604 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1605 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1606 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1607 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1608 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1609 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1611 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1612 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1613 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1614 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1615 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1616 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1617 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1618 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1619 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1620 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1621 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1622 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1623 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1624 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
1625 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1626 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1628 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1631 if !htlc_update_confd {
1632 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1639 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1640 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1641 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1642 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1643 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1644 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1649 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1650 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1651 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1652 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1653 Some((a, &**source))
1656 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1657 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1658 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1660 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1661 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1662 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1663 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1668 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1669 // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
1670 // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1671 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1673 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1674 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1675 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1676 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1682 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1683 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1685 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1686 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1693 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
1694 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
1698 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1699 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1700 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1702 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1703 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1704 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1705 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1706 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1707 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1709 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1710 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1711 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1712 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1713 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1714 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
1715 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1716 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
1718 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1719 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1720 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1721 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1722 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1723 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1724 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1725 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1726 // payment_preimage.
1727 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1728 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1729 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1730 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1732 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1734 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1735 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1736 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
1737 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
1738 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
1739 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
1740 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
1741 matched_htlc = true;
1745 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1746 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1747 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1749 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1750 *update_source != **source
1755 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1756 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
1757 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
1758 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1759 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1760 source: (**source).clone(),
1761 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1762 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1763 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
1766 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1767 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
1768 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1769 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1775 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1776 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1778 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1779 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
1784 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
1785 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
1786 // in-line tests later.
1789 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
1790 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
1791 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1792 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1793 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1794 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1795 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
1800 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
1801 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
1804 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1805 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1806 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1807 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1808 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1809 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1810 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
1813 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1814 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1815 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1816 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1821 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1822 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1823 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1824 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1825 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1827 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1828 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1829 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1833 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1834 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1835 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1840 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1847 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1856 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1857 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1858 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1859 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1861 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1862 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1865 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1866 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1867 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1868 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1869 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1870 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1871 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
1872 Some(old_points) => {
1873 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1874 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
1875 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1876 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1877 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
1879 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1882 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1886 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1889 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1890 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1891 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1897 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1898 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1899 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1900 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1901 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1902 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1903 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1904 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1905 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1906 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1907 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1908 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1911 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1912 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1913 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1914 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1915 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1917 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1918 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1921 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1922 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1923 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1924 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1925 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
1930 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1931 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1932 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1933 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
1934 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
1935 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1936 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1939 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1941 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1942 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1943 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1944 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1945 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1946 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1949 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1950 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1951 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1955 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1956 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1957 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1962 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1963 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1964 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1965 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1966 // holder commitment transactions.
1967 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1968 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
1969 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
1971 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
1972 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1973 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1974 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
1975 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1980 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1981 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1984 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1985 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
1986 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1988 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
1991 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
1992 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1993 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1996 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
1997 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
1998 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1999 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
2000 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
2001 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
2002 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2003 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2004 match updates.updates[0] {
2005 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
2007 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2008 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2011 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2012 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2014 let mut ret = Ok(());
2015 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2017 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
2018 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2019 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2020 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
2021 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2022 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2026 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2027 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2028 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2030 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2031 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2032 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2033 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2035 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2036 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2037 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2038 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2039 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2043 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2044 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2045 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2046 if *should_broadcast {
2047 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2048 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2049 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
2051 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2052 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2053 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2054 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2057 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2058 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2059 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2060 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2065 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2067 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
2068 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2073 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2074 self.latest_update_id
2077 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2081 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2082 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2083 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2084 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2085 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2086 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2088 &self.outputs_to_watch
2091 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2092 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2093 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2097 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2098 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2099 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
2103 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2104 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2105 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2108 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2109 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2112 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2113 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2116 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2117 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2120 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2121 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2122 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2123 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2125 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
2126 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
2128 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L)
2129 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
2130 where L::Target: Logger {
2131 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2132 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2133 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2134 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2135 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
2137 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2138 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2140 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2141 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2144 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2149 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2150 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2151 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2152 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2153 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2154 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
2155 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
2157 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2158 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2160 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2161 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2162 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2163 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2164 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2165 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2166 to_counterparty_output_info =
2167 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2171 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2172 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2173 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2174 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2175 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2176 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2177 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2178 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
2179 to_counterparty_output_info);
2181 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2182 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2183 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2188 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2189 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2190 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2191 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2192 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2193 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2195 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2197 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2198 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2199 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2200 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2203 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2204 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2205 [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2208 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2209 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2210 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2211 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2212 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2213 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2214 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2216 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2217 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2219 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2221 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2222 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2223 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2224 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2227 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
2228 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2229 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
2230 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2231 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2235 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2238 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
2239 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
2240 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
2241 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2242 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
2244 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2245 Some(outputs) => outputs,
2246 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2248 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2249 Some(points) => points,
2250 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2253 let per_commitment_point =
2254 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2255 // per-commitment point
2256 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
2257 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2258 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2259 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2260 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2261 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2263 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
2264 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
2266 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2267 let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
2268 if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
2269 &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
2271 if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
2272 &per_commitment_point,
2273 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
2275 Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
2276 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2277 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
2279 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
2283 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
2286 if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
2287 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
2288 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2289 to_counterparty_output_info =
2290 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2296 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2297 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2298 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2299 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2300 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2301 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2302 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
2305 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2306 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2307 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2308 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2309 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2310 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2311 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2312 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
2314 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2315 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2316 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2317 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2320 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2321 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2322 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2327 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
2330 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2331 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2332 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2333 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
2334 return (Vec::new(), None)
2337 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2338 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2341 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2346 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2347 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2348 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2350 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2351 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2352 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2353 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2354 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2355 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2358 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2359 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2360 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2361 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2362 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2364 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2365 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2367 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2368 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2369 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2370 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2372 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2375 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2378 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2380 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2381 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2385 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2388 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2389 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2390 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2391 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2392 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2393 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2399 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2400 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2401 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2402 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2403 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2404 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2405 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2406 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2408 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2409 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2410 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2411 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2412 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2416 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2417 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2419 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2420 is_holder_tx = true;
2421 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2422 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2423 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2424 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2425 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2426 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2427 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2428 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2429 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2430 is_holder_tx = true;
2431 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2432 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2433 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2434 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2435 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2436 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
2442 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2448 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2449 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2450 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2451 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2452 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2453 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2454 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2455 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2456 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2457 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2458 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2461 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2462 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2463 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2464 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2465 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2466 // confirmed in the next block.
2469 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2470 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2471 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2475 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2476 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2480 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2481 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2482 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2483 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2484 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2485 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2486 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2487 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2488 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2489 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2490 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2491 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2495 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2496 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2497 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2504 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2505 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2506 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2509 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2510 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2512 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2513 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2516 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2518 header: &BlockHeader,
2521 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2523 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2525 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2526 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2529 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2531 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2532 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2533 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2534 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2535 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2536 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2537 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2539 } else { Vec::new() }
2542 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2544 header: &BlockHeader,
2545 txdata: &TransactionData,
2548 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2550 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2552 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2553 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2556 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2557 for tx in &txn_matched {
2558 let mut output_val = 0;
2559 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2560 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2561 output_val += out.value;
2562 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2566 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2568 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2569 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2570 for tx in &txn_matched {
2571 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2572 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2573 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2574 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2576 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2577 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2578 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2579 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2580 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
2581 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2582 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
2583 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2584 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
2585 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2586 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
2587 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2588 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2590 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2591 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2592 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
2593 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
2594 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
2595 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2596 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2598 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2599 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2603 let txid = tx.txid();
2604 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2606 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
2608 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2609 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2610 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
2614 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2615 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2616 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2617 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2618 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2623 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2624 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2625 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2626 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2628 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2631 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2632 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2635 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2638 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2639 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2640 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2641 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2643 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2644 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2645 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2648 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2649 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2650 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2652 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2654 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2656 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2657 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2660 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2661 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2663 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2664 if should_broadcast {
2665 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2666 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2667 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2668 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2669 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2670 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2671 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2672 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2673 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2674 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2675 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2676 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2677 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2679 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2682 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2683 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2684 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2685 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2686 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2687 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2688 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2690 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2694 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2695 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2696 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2698 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2699 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2703 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2704 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2706 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2707 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2709 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
2710 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2711 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2714 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
2715 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2716 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2717 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2719 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
2720 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2721 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2722 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2723 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
2726 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
2727 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
2728 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2730 payment_preimage: None,
2731 source: source.clone(),
2732 htlc_value_satoshis,
2734 if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
2735 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
2736 commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
2737 payment_preimage: None,
2741 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2742 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2743 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2744 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2747 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
2748 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
2749 commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
2750 payment_preimage: preimage,
2753 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
2754 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
2755 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
2760 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2762 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2763 // updating the latter in the process.
2764 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2765 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2766 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2770 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2771 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2772 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2773 for tx in &txn_matched {
2774 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2775 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2776 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2777 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2785 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2786 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2787 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2790 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2793 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2794 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2795 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2797 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2798 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
2800 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2803 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2807 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2810 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2811 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2814 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
2815 log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
2818 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2821 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2822 /// transactions thereof.
2823 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2824 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2825 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2826 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2827 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2828 if matches { break; }
2829 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2834 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2837 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2840 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2841 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2842 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2843 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2844 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2845 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2848 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2849 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2850 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2851 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2852 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
2853 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
2854 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
2855 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
2859 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2860 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2861 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2862 } else { panic!(); }
2873 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2874 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2875 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2876 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2877 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2878 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2879 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2880 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2881 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2882 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2883 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2884 let height = self.best_block.height();
2885 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2886 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2887 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2888 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2889 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2890 // time out the HTLC first.
2891 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2892 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2893 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2894 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2895 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2896 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2897 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2898 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2899 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2900 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2901 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2902 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2903 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2904 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2905 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2906 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2907 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2908 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2909 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2910 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2911 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2912 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2913 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2914 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2921 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2923 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2924 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2925 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2928 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2929 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2930 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2937 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2938 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2939 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2940 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2941 let mut payment_data = None;
2942 let witness_items = input.witness.len();
2943 let htlctype = input.witness.last().map(|w| w.len()).and_then(HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype);
2944 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
2945 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
2946 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
2947 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
2948 && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
2949 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2950 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
2951 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
2952 !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
2954 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2955 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2957 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2958 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2959 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
2960 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2961 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
2964 macro_rules! log_claim {
2965 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2966 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2967 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
2969 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2970 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2971 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2972 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2973 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
2974 // matched by any HTLC spend:
2975 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2976 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
2977 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
2978 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
2979 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2980 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2981 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2982 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2983 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2984 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
2986 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2987 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2988 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2989 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2994 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2995 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2996 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2997 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2998 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2999 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
3000 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
3001 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
3010 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3011 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3012 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3013 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3014 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3015 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
3016 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3017 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
3018 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3019 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3020 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3021 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
3022 } else if !$holder_tx {
3023 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3024 if payment_data.is_none() {
3025 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3028 if payment_data.is_none() {
3029 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
3030 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
3031 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3032 txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3033 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3034 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3035 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
3036 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
3037 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
3038 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
3039 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
3040 // accepted_preimage_claim).
3041 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
3042 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
3045 continue 'outer_loop;
3052 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
3053 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3054 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
3056 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3057 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3058 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3059 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
3062 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3063 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3064 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
3067 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3068 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3069 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
3070 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3071 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3072 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
3073 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3076 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3077 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3078 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3079 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3080 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3083 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3085 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3087 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3090 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3091 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3092 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3093 upd.source == source
3095 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3097 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3099 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3100 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3101 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3102 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3105 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3107 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3109 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3113 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3114 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3116 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3117 *htlc_source != source
3122 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3124 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3126 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3127 source, payment_hash,
3128 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3129 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3132 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3133 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3139 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3140 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3141 let mut spendable_output = None;
3142 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3143 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3144 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3145 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3146 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3147 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3148 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3149 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3150 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3151 // non-standard due to their size.
3152 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3153 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3154 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3157 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3158 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3159 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3160 output: outp.clone(),
3164 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3165 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3166 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3167 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3168 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3169 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3170 output: outp.clone(),
3171 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3172 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3173 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3178 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3179 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3180 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3181 output: outp.clone(),
3182 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3183 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3187 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3188 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3189 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3190 output: outp.clone(),
3195 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3196 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3198 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3200 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3202 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3203 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3208 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3210 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3211 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3214 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3215 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3218 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3219 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3223 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3225 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3226 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3229 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3230 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3233 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3234 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3237 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3238 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3241 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3242 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3246 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3248 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
3249 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
3250 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3251 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3255 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3260 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3262 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3263 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3265 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3266 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3268 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3269 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3270 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3271 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3274 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3276 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3277 let shutdown_script = {
3278 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3279 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3282 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3283 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3284 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3285 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3286 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3287 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3288 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3290 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3291 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3292 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3294 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3295 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3296 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3298 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3299 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3303 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3304 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3305 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3306 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3308 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3313 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3315 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3317 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3320 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3321 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3322 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3323 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3324 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3326 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3327 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3333 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3334 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3335 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3336 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3337 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3338 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3339 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3340 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3342 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3343 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3347 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3348 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3349 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3350 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3351 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3352 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3353 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3357 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3358 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3359 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3360 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3361 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3362 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3363 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3367 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3368 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3371 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3373 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3375 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3377 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3378 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3380 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3381 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3382 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3383 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3384 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3385 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3386 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3390 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3391 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3392 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3393 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3394 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3395 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3396 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3397 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3399 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3402 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3403 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3404 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3405 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3406 pending_events.push(event);
3410 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3412 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3413 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3414 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3415 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3416 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3420 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3421 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3422 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3423 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3424 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3425 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3426 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3427 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3429 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3430 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3433 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3435 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3436 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3438 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3439 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3440 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3441 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3442 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3443 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3444 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3448 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3449 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3450 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3451 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3452 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3455 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3456 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3457 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3458 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
3459 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
3460 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3461 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3462 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3463 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3464 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3465 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
3466 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
3469 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3470 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3472 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3474 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3477 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3478 counterparty_payment_script,
3482 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3484 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3485 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3487 counterparty_commitment_params,
3488 funding_redeemscript,
3489 channel_value_satoshis,
3490 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
3495 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3496 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3497 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3499 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3500 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3501 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3502 current_holder_commitment_number,
3505 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3508 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3513 lockdown_from_offchain,
3515 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3516 funding_spend_confirmed,
3517 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
3518 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3521 counterparty_node_id,
3530 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3531 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3532 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3533 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
3534 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3535 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
3536 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3537 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3538 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3539 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3540 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3541 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3542 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3546 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
3548 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3549 use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3550 use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3551 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3552 use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3553 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3554 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3555 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3557 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3558 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
3559 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
3560 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3561 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3562 use util::errors::APIError;
3563 use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3564 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3565 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3566 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3568 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
3571 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3572 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3573 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3574 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3575 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3576 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3577 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3578 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3579 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3581 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3582 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3586 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3587 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3588 &nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3589 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3590 &nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3592 // Rebalance somewhat
3593 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
3595 // First route two payments for testing at the end
3596 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3597 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3599 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
3600 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
3601 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
3602 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
3603 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
3604 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
3605 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
3607 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
3608 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
3609 let new_header = BlockHeader {
3610 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
3611 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
3612 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
3613 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3614 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
3615 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
3617 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
3618 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
3619 &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
3621 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
3622 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
3623 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
3624 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)),
3625 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
3626 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
3627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
3628 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3629 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
3631 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
3632 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
3633 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
3634 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
3635 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
3636 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
3637 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
3638 } else { panic!(); }
3639 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
3640 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
3642 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
3644 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
3646 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
3648 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3649 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
3650 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
3651 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
3652 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
3653 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3654 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
3655 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
3656 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
3659 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
3660 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
3661 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
3665 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3666 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3667 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3668 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
3669 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
3671 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3672 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3674 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3677 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3678 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3679 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3683 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3684 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3686 let mut res = Vec::new();
3687 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3688 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3692 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3693 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3700 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3701 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3703 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3704 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3710 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3711 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3712 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3713 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3718 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3720 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3721 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3722 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3723 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3724 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3725 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3731 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3732 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3733 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3734 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3735 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3736 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3738 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
3739 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3740 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3741 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3742 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3743 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3744 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3745 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3747 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3750 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3752 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3753 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3754 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3755 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
3756 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3757 &channel_parameters,
3758 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3759 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
3761 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3762 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3763 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3764 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3765 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3766 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3767 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3768 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
3769 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
3772 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3773 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3774 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3775 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3776 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3777 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3778 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3780 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3781 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3782 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3783 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3784 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3785 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3787 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3788 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3789 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3790 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3791 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3792 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3793 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3794 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3796 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3797 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3798 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3799 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3800 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3801 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3805 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3806 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3807 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3809 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3810 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3811 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3813 macro_rules! sign_input {
3814 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
3815 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3816 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
3818 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3819 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3820 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3822 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3823 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
3824 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
3825 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
3826 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
3827 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
3828 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
3829 witness.push(ser_sig);
3830 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
3831 witness.push(vec!(1));
3832 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
3833 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3834 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
3835 witness.push(vec![0]);
3837 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3839 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3840 let witness = witness.to_vec();
3841 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
3842 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
3843 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
3847 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3848 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3850 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3851 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3852 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3853 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3855 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3856 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3860 script_sig: Script::new(),
3861 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
3862 witness: Witness::new(),
3865 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3866 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3869 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3870 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
3871 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3873 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3874 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3875 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3876 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3879 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3882 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3883 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3884 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3885 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3887 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3888 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3892 script_sig: Script::new(),
3893 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
3894 witness: Witness::new(),
3897 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3898 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3901 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3902 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
3903 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3905 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3906 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3907 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3908 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3911 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3914 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3915 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3916 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3917 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3918 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3919 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3923 script_sig: Script::new(),
3924 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
3925 witness: Witness::new(),
3927 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3928 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3931 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3932 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
3933 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3935 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3936 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3937 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3938 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3941 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3945 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.