1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
42 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
44 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
46 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
47 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use util::logger::Logger;
50 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
52 use util::events::Event;
56 use io::{self, Error};
60 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
61 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
62 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
65 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
67 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
68 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
69 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
71 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
72 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
73 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
75 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
76 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
77 /// its docs for more details.
82 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
83 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
84 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
85 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
86 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
88 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
90 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
91 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
92 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
93 self.update_id.write(w)?;
94 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
95 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
96 update_step.write(w)?;
98 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
102 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
103 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
104 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
105 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
106 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
107 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
109 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
111 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
112 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
116 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
117 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
118 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
119 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
120 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
122 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
123 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
124 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
125 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
127 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
128 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
129 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
131 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
132 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
133 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
134 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
135 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
136 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
139 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
140 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
143 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
144 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
145 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
146 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
147 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
150 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
151 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
152 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
154 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
155 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
156 /// of this channel).
158 /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
159 /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
160 /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
161 /// update must be rejected.
163 /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
164 /// the channel monitor instance.
166 /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
167 /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
168 /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
170 /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
171 /// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
172 /// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
173 /// lagging behind on block processing.
177 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
178 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
179 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
181 /// Contains a developer-readable error message.
182 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
183 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
185 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
186 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
187 pub enum MonitorEvent {
188 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
189 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
191 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
192 CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
195 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
196 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
197 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
198 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
199 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
200 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
201 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
202 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
203 pub(crate) onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
205 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
206 (0, payment_hash, required),
207 (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
208 (2, source, required),
209 (4, payment_preimage, option),
212 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
213 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
214 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
215 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
216 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
217 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
218 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
219 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
220 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
221 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
222 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
223 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
224 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
225 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
226 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
227 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
228 /// accurate block height.
229 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
230 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
231 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
232 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
233 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
234 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
235 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
236 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
237 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
238 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
239 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
240 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
241 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
243 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
244 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
245 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
247 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
248 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
249 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
250 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
252 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
253 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
255 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
256 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
257 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
259 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
260 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
261 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
263 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
264 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
265 struct HolderSignedTx {
266 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
268 revocation_key: PublicKey,
269 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
270 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
271 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
272 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
274 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
276 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
278 (2, revocation_key, required),
279 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
280 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
281 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
282 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
283 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
284 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
287 /// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
288 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
290 struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
291 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
292 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
293 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
294 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
297 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
298 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
299 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
300 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
301 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
302 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
303 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
307 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
308 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
309 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
310 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
315 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
316 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
317 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
318 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
319 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
320 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
321 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
322 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
323 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
324 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
325 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
328 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
329 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
332 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
333 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
334 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
335 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
336 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
337 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
338 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
340 CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
341 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
342 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
343 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
347 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
351 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
352 /// transaction causing it.
354 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
356 struct OnchainEventEntry {
362 impl OnchainEventEntry {
363 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
364 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
365 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
366 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
368 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
369 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
370 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
375 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
376 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
380 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
381 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
384 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
385 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
386 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
389 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
390 onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
393 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
397 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OnchainEventEntry, {
399 (2, height, required),
400 (4, event, required),
403 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(OnchainEvent,
405 (0, source, required),
406 (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
407 (2, payment_hash, required),
409 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
410 (0, descriptor, required),
414 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
416 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
417 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
418 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
419 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
421 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
422 commitment_txid: Txid,
423 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
424 commitment_number: u64,
425 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
428 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
434 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
435 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
437 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
438 /// think we've fallen behind!
439 should_broadcast: bool,
442 scriptpubkey: Script,
446 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
447 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
448 (0, commitment_tx, required),
449 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
451 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
452 (0, commitment_txid, required),
453 (2, commitment_number, required),
454 (4, their_revocation_point, required),
455 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
457 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
458 (0, payment_preimage, required),
460 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
462 (2, secret, required),
464 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
465 (0, should_broadcast, required),
467 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
468 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
472 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
473 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
475 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
476 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
478 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
479 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
480 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
481 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
483 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
484 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
485 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
486 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
487 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
488 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
490 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
492 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
495 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
496 latest_update_id: u64,
497 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
499 destination_script: Script,
500 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
501 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
502 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
504 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
505 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
506 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
507 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
508 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
510 counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
511 funding_redeemscript: Script,
512 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
513 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
514 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
516 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
518 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
519 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
520 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
521 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
522 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
523 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
524 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
525 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
526 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
527 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
528 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
529 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
530 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
531 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
532 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
533 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
535 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
536 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
537 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
538 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
539 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
540 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
542 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
544 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
545 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
547 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
549 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
551 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
552 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
554 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
555 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
556 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
557 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
559 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
560 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
561 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
562 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
563 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
566 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
568 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
570 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
571 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
572 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
573 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
575 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
576 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
577 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
579 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
580 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
581 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
582 holder_tx_signed: bool,
584 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
585 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
586 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
587 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
588 // the full block_connected).
589 best_block: BestBlock,
591 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
594 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
595 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
597 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
598 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
599 /// underlying object
600 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
601 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
602 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
603 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
608 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
609 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
610 /// underlying object
611 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
612 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
613 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
614 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
615 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
616 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
617 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
618 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
619 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
620 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
621 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
622 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
623 self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
624 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
625 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
626 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
627 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
628 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
629 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
630 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
631 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
632 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
633 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
634 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
635 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
636 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
637 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
638 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
639 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
640 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
641 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
642 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
651 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
652 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
653 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
657 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
658 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
659 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
661 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
662 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
663 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
665 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
667 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
668 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
670 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
671 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
672 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
673 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
674 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
675 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
677 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
680 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
681 match &self.shutdown_script {
682 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
683 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
686 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
687 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
688 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
689 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
690 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
691 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
692 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
694 self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
695 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
696 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
698 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
699 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
700 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
701 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
702 match second_option {
703 Some(second_pubkey) => {
704 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
707 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
712 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
716 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
718 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
720 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
721 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
722 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
723 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
724 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
725 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
726 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
730 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
731 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
732 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
733 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
734 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
735 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
736 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
740 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
741 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
742 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
743 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
746 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
747 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
748 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
749 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
752 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
753 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
754 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
756 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
759 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
761 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
762 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
764 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
765 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
766 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
769 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
770 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
772 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
776 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
780 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
781 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
782 event.write(writer)?;
785 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
786 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
788 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
789 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
790 entry.write(writer)?;
793 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
794 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
796 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
797 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
799 script.write(writer)?;
802 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
804 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
805 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
807 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
813 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
814 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
815 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
816 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
817 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
818 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
819 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
820 best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
822 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
823 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
824 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
826 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
827 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
828 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
829 let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
831 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
832 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
834 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
835 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
836 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
837 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
839 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
840 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
842 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
843 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
844 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
845 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
846 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
847 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
848 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
850 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
853 let onchain_tx_handler =
854 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
855 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
857 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
858 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
861 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
863 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
865 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
866 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
867 counterparty_payment_script,
871 holder_revocation_basepoint,
873 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
874 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
876 counterparty_tx_cache,
877 funding_redeemscript,
878 channel_value_satoshis,
879 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
881 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
883 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
884 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
885 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
886 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
888 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
889 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
890 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
891 current_holder_commitment_number,
893 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
894 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
895 pending_events: Vec::new(),
897 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
902 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
903 holder_tx_signed: false,
913 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
914 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
917 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
918 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
919 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
920 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
921 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
924 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
925 commitment_number: u64,
926 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
928 ) where L::Target: Logger {
929 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
930 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
934 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
936 holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
937 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
938 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
939 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
940 holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)
944 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
946 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
947 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
952 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
953 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
956 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
957 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
960 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
965 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
968 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
971 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
974 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
975 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
977 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
981 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
983 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
984 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
987 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
990 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
992 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
993 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
996 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
997 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
998 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1001 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1002 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1003 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1004 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1005 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1008 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1009 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1010 /// have been registered.
1011 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1012 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1013 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1014 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1015 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1016 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1017 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1019 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1020 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1026 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1027 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1028 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1029 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1032 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1035 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1036 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1037 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1038 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1039 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1042 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1043 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1046 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1047 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1050 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1051 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1054 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1055 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1056 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1057 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1058 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1059 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1060 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1061 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1062 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1063 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1064 where L::Target: Logger {
1065 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1068 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1069 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1070 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1071 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1072 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1073 where L::Target: Logger {
1074 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1077 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1078 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1079 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1080 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1081 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1082 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1084 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1085 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1087 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1088 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1090 header: &BlockHeader,
1091 txdata: &TransactionData,
1096 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1098 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1099 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1102 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1103 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1106 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1108 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1110 header: &BlockHeader,
1116 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1117 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1120 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1121 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1124 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1125 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1127 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1128 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1130 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1131 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1133 header: &BlockHeader,
1134 txdata: &TransactionData,
1139 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1141 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1142 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1145 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1146 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1149 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1151 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1152 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1154 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1155 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1162 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1163 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1166 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1167 txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1170 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1171 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1173 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1174 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1176 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1177 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1179 header: &BlockHeader,
1184 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1186 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1187 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1190 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1191 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1194 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1195 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1196 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1197 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1199 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1200 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1202 txids.sort_unstable();
1207 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1208 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1209 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1210 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1214 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1215 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1216 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1218 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1219 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1220 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1221 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1222 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1223 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1225 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1226 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1227 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1228 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1229 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1230 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1231 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1232 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1233 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1234 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1235 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1236 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1237 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1238 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1239 // payment_preimage.
1240 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1241 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1242 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1243 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1245 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1246 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1247 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1248 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source {
1249 matched_htlc = true;
1253 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1254 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1255 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1257 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1258 *update_source != **source
1263 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1265 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1266 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1267 source: (**source).clone(),
1268 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1269 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1272 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1273 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1274 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1280 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1281 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1283 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1284 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
1289 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1290 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1291 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1292 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1293 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1294 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1295 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1298 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1299 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1300 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1301 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1306 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1307 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1308 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1309 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1310 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1312 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1313 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1314 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1318 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1319 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1320 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1325 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1332 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1341 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1342 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1343 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1344 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1346 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1347 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1350 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1351 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1352 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1353 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1354 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1355 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1356 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1357 Some(old_points) => {
1358 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1359 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1360 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1361 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1362 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1364 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1367 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1371 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1374 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1375 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1376 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1380 self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs);
1383 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1384 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1385 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1386 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1387 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1388 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1389 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1390 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1391 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1392 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1393 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1394 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1397 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1398 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1399 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1400 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1401 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1402 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1406 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1407 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1408 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1409 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1410 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
1415 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1416 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1417 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
1418 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1419 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1422 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1424 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1425 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1426 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1427 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1428 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1429 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1432 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1433 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1434 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1438 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1439 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1440 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1445 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1446 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1447 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1448 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1449 // holder commitment transactions.
1450 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1451 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
1452 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
1454 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
1455 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1456 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1457 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
1458 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1463 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1464 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1467 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1468 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
1469 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1471 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1474 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1475 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1476 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1479 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1480 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1481 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1482 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1483 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1484 match updates.updates[0] {
1485 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
1486 _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
1488 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1489 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1490 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1492 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
1494 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1495 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
1496 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1497 self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone())?
1499 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
1500 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
1501 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
1503 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
1504 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
1505 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1507 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
1508 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
1509 self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?
1511 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1512 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
1513 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1514 if *should_broadcast {
1515 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1516 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
1517 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1519 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted, the ChannelManager
1520 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
1521 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
1522 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
1525 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
1526 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
1527 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
1528 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
1533 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1537 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1538 self.latest_update_id
1541 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1545 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
1546 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
1547 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
1548 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
1549 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1550 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
1552 &self.outputs_to_watch
1555 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1556 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1557 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
1561 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
1562 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1563 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1567 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1568 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1569 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1572 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1573 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1576 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1577 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
1580 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1581 self.current_holder_commitment_number
1584 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1585 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1586 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1587 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1588 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1589 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
1590 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
1591 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1592 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1593 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1594 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1596 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1597 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1599 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1600 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1603 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1608 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1609 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1610 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1611 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1612 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1613 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
1614 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
1616 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1617 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1619 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
1620 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1621 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1622 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
1623 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
1624 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
1628 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1629 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1630 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1631 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1632 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1633 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1634 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1636 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone());
1637 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
1638 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
1643 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1644 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1645 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
1646 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1647 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1648 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1650 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1652 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", height, [].iter().map(|a| *a), logger);
1654 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1655 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1656 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1657 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1658 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1659 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1660 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1662 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1663 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1665 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1667 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1668 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", height, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(a, b)| (a, b.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()))), logger);
1670 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
1671 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
1672 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
1676 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1679 fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
1680 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1681 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
1682 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1683 let revocation_point_option =
1684 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
1685 // per-commitment point
1686 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1687 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1688 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
1689 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
1690 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
1691 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1693 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1694 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1695 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1696 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
1697 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
1698 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1699 return claimable_outpoints; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1702 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1703 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1704 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
1705 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1706 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
1707 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
1717 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1718 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
1719 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1720 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1721 return (Vec::new(), None)
1724 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1725 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1728 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1733 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1734 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1735 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1737 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1738 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
1739 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
1740 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
1741 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
1742 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
1745 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
1746 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
1747 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
1748 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1749 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1751 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1752 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1754 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1755 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1756 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
1757 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
1759 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1762 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1765 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
1767 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
1768 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
1772 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
1775 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
1776 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
1777 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1778 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1779 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1780 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
1786 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1787 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
1788 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1789 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
1790 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1791 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1792 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1794 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1795 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
1796 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1797 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
1798 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
1802 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1803 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
1805 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1806 is_holder_tx = true;
1807 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
1808 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
1809 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
1810 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
1811 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", height, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
1812 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1813 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1814 is_holder_tx = true;
1815 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
1816 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
1817 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
1818 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
1819 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", height, holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
1826 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1829 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1830 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
1831 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
1832 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
1833 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1834 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
1835 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1836 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1837 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1838 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1839 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1842 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
1843 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
1844 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
1845 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
1846 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
1847 // confirmed in the next block.
1850 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1851 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1852 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
1856 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1857 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1861 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1862 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
1863 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1864 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
1865 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
1866 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1867 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
1868 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1869 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1870 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1871 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1872 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1876 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1877 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1878 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
1885 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1886 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1887 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1890 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
1891 log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
1892 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
1894 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1897 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1899 header: &BlockHeader,
1904 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1906 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1907 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1910 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
1911 log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
1913 if height > self.best_block.height() {
1914 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
1915 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
1916 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
1917 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
1918 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
1919 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1921 } else { Vec::new() }
1924 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1926 header: &BlockHeader,
1927 txdata: &TransactionData,
1932 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1934 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1935 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1938 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
1939 for tx in &txn_matched {
1940 let mut output_val = 0;
1941 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1942 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1943 output_val += out.value;
1944 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1948 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
1949 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1951 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1952 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1953 for tx in &txn_matched {
1954 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1955 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1956 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1957 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1959 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1960 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1961 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1962 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1963 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1964 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1966 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1967 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1968 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1969 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1971 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1973 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1976 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1977 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
1978 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1979 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1980 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1985 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1986 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1987 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1988 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1990 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1993 if height > self.best_block.height() {
1994 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
1997 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2000 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2001 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2002 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2003 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2005 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2006 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2007 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2010 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2011 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2012 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2016 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2018 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2019 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2022 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2024 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2025 if should_broadcast {
2026 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2027 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2028 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2029 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
2030 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2031 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2032 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2033 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2034 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2035 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2036 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2037 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2038 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2040 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2043 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2044 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2045 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2046 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2047 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2048 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2049 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2051 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2055 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2056 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2057 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2059 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2060 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2061 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { .. } => None,
2064 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2065 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2067 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2068 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2070 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis } => {
2071 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2072 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2075 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
2076 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2077 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2078 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2080 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
2081 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2082 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2083 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2084 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
2087 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2088 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2090 payment_preimage: None,
2091 source: source.clone(),
2092 onchain_value_satoshis,
2095 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2096 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2097 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2098 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2104 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2106 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2107 // updating the latter in the process.
2108 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2109 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2110 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2114 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2115 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2116 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2117 for tx in &txn_matched {
2118 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2119 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2120 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2121 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2129 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2130 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2131 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2134 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2137 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2138 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2139 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2141 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2143 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2146 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2153 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2154 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2157 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.txid != *txid);
2158 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2161 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2162 /// transactions thereof.
2163 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2164 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2165 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2166 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2167 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2168 if matches { break; }
2169 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2174 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2177 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2180 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2181 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2182 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2183 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2184 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2185 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2188 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2189 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2190 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2191 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2192 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2193 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2194 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2195 } else { panic!(); }
2206 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2207 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2208 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2209 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2210 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2211 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2212 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2213 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2214 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2215 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2216 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2217 let height = self.best_block.height();
2218 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2219 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2220 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2221 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2222 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2223 // time out the HTLC first.
2224 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2225 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2226 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2227 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2228 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2229 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2230 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2231 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2232 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2233 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2234 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2235 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2236 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2237 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2238 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2239 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2240 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2241 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2242 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2243 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2244 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2245 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2246 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2247 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2254 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2256 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2257 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2258 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2261 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2262 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2263 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2270 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2271 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2272 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2273 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2274 let mut payment_data = None;
2275 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2276 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2277 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2278 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2280 macro_rules! log_claim {
2281 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2282 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2283 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
2284 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2285 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2286 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2287 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2288 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2289 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2290 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2291 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2292 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2294 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2295 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2296 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2297 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2302 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2303 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2304 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2305 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2306 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2307 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2308 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2309 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
2318 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2319 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2320 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2321 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2322 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2323 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2324 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2325 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2326 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2327 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2328 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2329 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
2330 } else if !$holder_tx {
2331 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2332 if payment_data.is_none() {
2333 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2336 if payment_data.is_none() {
2337 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2338 continue 'outer_loop;
2345 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2346 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2347 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2349 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2350 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2351 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2352 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2355 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2356 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2357 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2360 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2361 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2362 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
2363 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2364 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2365 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2366 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2367 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2368 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2370 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2372 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2375 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2376 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2377 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
2378 upd.source == source
2380 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2381 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2383 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2385 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2389 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2390 if entry.height != height { return true; }
2392 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
2393 *htlc_source != source
2398 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2401 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2402 source, payment_hash,
2403 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2406 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2407 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2413 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2414 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2415 let mut spendable_output = None;
2416 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2417 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
2418 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2419 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2420 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2421 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2422 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2423 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2424 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2425 // non-standard due to their size.
2426 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2427 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2428 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2431 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2432 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2433 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2434 output: outp.clone(),
2438 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
2439 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2440 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2441 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2442 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
2443 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
2444 output: outp.clone(),
2445 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2446 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2447 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2452 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2453 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2454 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2455 output: outp.clone(),
2456 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2457 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2461 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
2462 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2463 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2464 output: outp.clone(),
2469 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2470 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2473 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
2475 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2476 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2481 /// `Persist` defines behavior for persisting channel monitors: this could mean
2482 /// writing once to disk, and/or uploading to one or more backup services.
2484 /// Note that for every new monitor, you **must** persist the new `ChannelMonitor`
2485 /// to disk/backups. And, on every update, you **must** persist either the
2486 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself. Otherwise, there is risk
2487 /// of situations such as revoking a transaction, then crashing before this
2488 /// revocation can be persisted, then unintentionally broadcasting a revoked
2489 /// transaction and losing money. This is a risk because previous channel states
2490 /// are toxic, so it's important that whatever channel state is persisted is
2491 /// kept up-to-date.
2492 pub trait Persist<ChannelSigner: Sign> {
2493 /// Persist a new channel's data. The data can be stored any way you want, but
2494 /// the identifier provided by Rust-Lightning is the channel's outpoint (and
2495 /// it is up to you to maintain a correct mapping between the outpoint and the
2496 /// stored channel data). Note that you **must** persist every new monitor to
2497 /// disk. See the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2499 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2500 /// and [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2501 fn persist_new_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2503 /// Update one channel's data. The provided `ChannelMonitor` has already
2504 /// applied the given update.
2506 /// Note that on every update, you **must** persist either the
2507 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself to disk/backups. See
2508 /// the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2510 /// If an implementer chooses to persist the updates only, they need to make
2511 /// sure that all the updates are applied to the `ChannelMonitors` *before*
2512 /// the set of channel monitors is given to the `ChannelManager`
2513 /// deserialization routine. See [`ChannelMonitor::update_monitor`] for
2514 /// applying a monitor update to a monitor. If full `ChannelMonitors` are
2515 /// persisted, then there is no need to persist individual updates.
2517 /// Note that there could be a performance tradeoff between persisting complete
2518 /// channel monitors on every update vs. persisting only updates and applying
2519 /// them in batches. The size of each monitor grows `O(number of state updates)`
2520 /// whereas updates are small and `O(1)`.
2522 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2523 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::write`] for writing out an update, and
2524 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2525 fn update_persisted_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2528 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2530 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2531 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2534 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
2535 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
2536 self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2539 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2540 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2544 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2546 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2547 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2550 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
2551 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2554 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
2555 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2558 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2559 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2562 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
2563 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
2567 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2569 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
2570 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
2571 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2572 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2576 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2581 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
2583 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2584 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2586 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2587 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2589 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2590 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2591 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2592 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2595 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2597 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2598 let shutdown_script = {
2599 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2600 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
2603 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2604 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2605 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2606 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2607 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2608 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2609 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2611 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2612 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2613 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2615 let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2616 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2617 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2619 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2620 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2624 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2625 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2626 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2627 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2629 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2634 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2636 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2638 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2641 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2642 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2643 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2644 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2645 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2647 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2648 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2654 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2655 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2656 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
2657 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2658 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2659 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2660 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2661 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2663 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2664 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2668 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2669 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2670 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2671 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2672 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2673 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
2674 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2678 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2679 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2680 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
2681 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2682 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2683 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2684 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2688 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2691 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
2693 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2695 let current_holder_commitment_tx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2697 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2698 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2700 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2701 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2702 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2703 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2704 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2705 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2706 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2710 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2711 let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2712 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
2713 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2714 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
2715 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
2716 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2718 pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
2721 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2722 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
2723 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2724 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2725 pending_events.push(event);
2729 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
2731 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2732 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2733 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2734 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2737 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2738 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2739 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2740 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2741 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2742 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
2743 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2744 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
2746 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2747 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2750 let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
2752 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2753 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2755 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
2757 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2758 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2760 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
2761 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
2763 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2766 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
2767 counterparty_payment_script,
2771 holder_revocation_basepoint,
2773 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2774 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2776 counterparty_tx_cache,
2777 funding_redeemscript,
2778 channel_value_satoshis,
2779 their_cur_revocation_points,
2784 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
2785 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2786 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
2788 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
2789 current_holder_commitment_tx,
2790 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
2791 current_holder_commitment_number,
2794 pending_monitor_events,
2797 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
2802 lockdown_from_offchain,
2815 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2816 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2817 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2818 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2819 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2820 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2821 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2822 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2823 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2824 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2826 use chain::BestBlock;
2827 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2828 use chain::package::{WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
2829 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2830 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2832 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
2833 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
2834 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
2835 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2836 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2837 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2838 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
2842 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2843 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2844 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2845 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
2846 let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) });
2848 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2849 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2851 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2854 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
2855 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2856 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2860 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2861 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2863 let mut res = Vec::new();
2864 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2865 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2869 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2870 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2877 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
2878 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2880 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2881 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2887 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2888 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2889 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2890 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2895 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
2897 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2898 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2899 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2900 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2901 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2907 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2908 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2909 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2910 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
2911 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
2912 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
2914 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
2915 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
2916 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
2917 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
2918 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
2919 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2920 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2921 selected_contest_delay: 67,
2923 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
2925 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2927 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2928 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
2929 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
2930 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
2931 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2932 &channel_parameters,
2933 Script::new(), 46, 0,
2934 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
2936 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2937 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
2938 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
2939 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
2940 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
2941 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
2942 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2943 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
2946 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2947 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2948 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2949 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2950 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2951 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2952 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2954 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2955 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2956 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2957 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2958 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2959 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2961 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2962 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2963 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2964 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2965 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2966 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2967 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2968 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2970 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2971 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2972 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2973 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2974 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2975 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2979 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2980 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2981 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2983 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2984 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2985 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2986 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2988 macro_rules! sign_input {
2989 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2990 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2991 offered: if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC { true } else { false },
2993 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2994 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2995 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
2997 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2998 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2999 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3000 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3001 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3002 sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
3003 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
3004 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
3005 } else if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC {
3006 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3007 } else if *$weight == WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC {
3008 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
3010 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3012 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3013 println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
3014 println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
3015 println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
3019 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3020 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3022 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3023 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3025 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3026 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3030 script_sig: Script::new(),
3031 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3032 witness: Vec::new(),
3035 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3036 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3039 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3040 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC];
3041 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3043 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3044 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3045 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3046 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3049 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3051 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3052 claim_tx.input.clear();
3053 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3055 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3056 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3060 script_sig: Script::new(),
3061 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3062 witness: Vec::new(),
3065 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3066 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC];
3067 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3069 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3070 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3071 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3072 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3075 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3077 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3078 claim_tx.input.clear();
3079 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3080 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3081 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3085 script_sig: Script::new(),
3086 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3087 witness: Vec::new(),
3089 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3090 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
3091 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3093 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3094 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3095 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3096 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3099 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3102 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.