1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
42 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
44 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
46 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
47 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use util::logger::Logger;
50 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
52 use util::events::Event;
56 use io::{self, Error};
60 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
61 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
63 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
64 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
65 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
66 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
67 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
70 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
71 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
72 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
73 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
74 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
76 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
77 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
78 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
80 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
81 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
82 /// its docs for more details.
87 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
88 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
89 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
90 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
91 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
93 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
95 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
96 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
97 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
98 self.update_id.write(w)?;
99 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
100 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
101 update_step.write(w)?;
103 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
107 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
108 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
109 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
110 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
111 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
112 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
114 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
118 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
119 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
123 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
124 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
125 pub enum MonitorEvent {
126 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
127 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
129 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
130 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
132 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
133 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
135 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure
137 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
138 funding_txo: OutPoint,
139 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
140 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
142 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
143 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
144 monitor_update_id: u64,
147 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
148 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
150 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure
151 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
153 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
154 // Note that UpdateCompleted and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
155 // generated only in ChainMonitor
156 (0, UpdateCompleted) => {
157 (0, funding_txo, required),
158 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
162 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
166 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
167 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
168 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
169 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
170 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
171 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
172 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
173 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
174 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
176 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
177 (0, payment_hash, required),
178 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
179 (2, source, required),
180 (4, payment_preimage, option),
183 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
184 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
185 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
186 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
187 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
188 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
189 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
190 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
191 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
192 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
193 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
194 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
195 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
196 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
197 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
198 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
199 /// accurate block height.
200 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
201 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
202 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
203 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
204 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
205 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
208 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
209 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
210 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
211 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
212 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
213 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
214 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
215 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
216 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
217 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
219 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
220 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
221 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
223 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
224 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
226 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
227 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
229 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
230 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
231 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
232 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
234 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
235 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
236 struct HolderSignedTx {
237 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
239 revocation_key: PublicKey,
240 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
241 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
242 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
243 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
244 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
245 to_self_value_sat: u64,
248 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
250 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
251 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
252 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
253 (2, revocation_key, required),
254 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
255 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
256 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
257 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
258 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
259 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
262 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
263 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
265 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
266 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
267 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
268 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
271 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
272 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
273 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
274 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
275 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
276 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
277 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
282 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
283 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
284 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
285 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
286 // used. Read it for compatibility.
287 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
288 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
289 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
290 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
291 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
292 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
296 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
297 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
298 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
299 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
300 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
301 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
302 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
304 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
305 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
306 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
307 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
310 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
314 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
315 /// transaction causing it.
317 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
319 struct OnchainEventEntry {
325 impl OnchainEventEntry {
326 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
327 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
329 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
330 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
332 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
333 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
334 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
336 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
337 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
338 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
339 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
340 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
347 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
348 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
352 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
353 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
356 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
357 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
358 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
359 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
360 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
361 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
364 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
365 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
366 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
367 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
368 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
371 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
373 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
375 FundingSpendConfirmation {
376 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
377 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
378 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
380 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
381 /// is constructed. This is used when
382 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
383 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
384 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
385 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
386 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
388 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
389 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
390 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
391 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
392 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
393 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
394 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
395 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
399 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
400 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
401 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
402 (0, self.txid, required),
403 (2, self.height, required),
404 (4, self.event, required),
410 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
411 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
412 let mut txid = Default::default();
414 let mut event = None;
415 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
417 (2, height, required),
418 (4, event, ignorable),
420 if let Some(ev) = event {
421 Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, event: ev }))
428 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
430 (0, source, required),
431 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
432 (2, payment_hash, required),
433 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
435 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
436 (0, descriptor, required),
438 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
439 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
441 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
442 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
443 (2, preimage, option),
444 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
449 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
451 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
452 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
453 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
454 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
456 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
457 commitment_txid: Txid,
458 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
459 commitment_number: u64,
460 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
463 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
469 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
470 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
472 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
473 /// think we've fallen behind!
474 should_broadcast: bool,
477 scriptpubkey: Script,
481 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
482 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
484 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
485 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
486 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
487 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
488 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
489 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
494 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
495 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
496 (0, commitment_tx, required),
497 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
499 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
500 (0, commitment_txid, required),
501 (2, commitment_number, required),
502 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
503 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
505 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
506 (0, payment_preimage, required),
508 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
510 (2, secret, required),
512 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
513 (0, should_broadcast, required),
515 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
516 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
520 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
522 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
524 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
525 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
527 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
528 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
529 /// force-closed now.
530 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
531 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
532 /// required to do so.
533 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
535 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
536 /// we consider it spendable.
537 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
538 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
539 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
540 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
541 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
543 confirmation_height: u32,
545 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
546 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
547 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
549 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
550 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
551 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
552 ContentiousClaimable {
553 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
554 /// required to do so.
555 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
556 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
560 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
561 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
562 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
563 MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
564 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
565 /// required to do so.
566 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
567 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
569 claimable_height: u32,
573 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
575 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
576 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
577 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
578 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
581 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
582 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
583 (2, payment_preimage, option),
586 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
587 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
589 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
590 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
592 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
593 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
594 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
595 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
597 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
598 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
599 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
600 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
601 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
602 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
604 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
606 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
609 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
610 latest_update_id: u64,
611 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
613 destination_script: Script,
614 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
615 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
616 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
618 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
619 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
620 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
621 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
622 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
624 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
625 funding_redeemscript: Script,
626 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
627 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
628 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
630 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
632 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
633 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
634 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
635 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
636 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
637 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
638 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
639 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
640 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
641 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
642 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
643 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
644 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
645 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
646 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
647 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
649 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
650 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
651 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
652 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
653 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
654 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
656 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
658 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
659 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
661 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
663 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
664 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
665 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
667 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
669 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
670 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
671 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
672 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
673 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
674 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
675 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
676 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
677 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
678 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
680 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
682 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
683 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
684 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
685 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
687 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
688 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
689 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
690 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
691 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
694 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
696 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
698 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
699 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
700 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
701 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
703 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
704 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
705 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
707 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
708 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
709 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
710 holder_tx_signed: bool,
712 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
713 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
714 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
715 funding_spend_seen: bool,
717 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
718 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
719 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
720 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
721 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
723 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
724 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
725 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
726 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
727 // the full block_connected).
728 best_block: BestBlock,
730 /// The node_id of our counterparty
731 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
733 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
736 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
737 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
739 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
740 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
742 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
743 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
744 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
745 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
750 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
751 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
753 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
754 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
755 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
756 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
757 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
758 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
759 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
760 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
761 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
762 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
763 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
764 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
765 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
766 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
767 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
768 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
769 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
770 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
771 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
772 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
773 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
774 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
775 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
776 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
777 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
778 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
779 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
780 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
781 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
782 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
783 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
784 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
785 self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
786 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
787 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
796 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
797 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
798 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
802 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
803 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
804 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
806 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
807 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
808 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
810 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
812 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
813 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
815 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
816 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
817 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
818 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
819 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
820 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
822 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
825 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
826 match &self.shutdown_script {
827 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
828 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
831 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
832 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
833 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
834 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
835 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
836 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
837 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
839 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
840 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
841 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
843 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
844 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
845 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
846 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
847 match second_option {
848 Some(second_pubkey) => {
849 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
852 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
857 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
861 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
863 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
865 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
866 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
867 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
868 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
869 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
870 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
871 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
875 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
876 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
877 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
878 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
879 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
880 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
881 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
882 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
883 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
884 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
888 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
889 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
890 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
891 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
894 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
895 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
896 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
897 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
900 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
901 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
902 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
904 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
907 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
909 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
910 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
912 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
913 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
914 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
917 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
918 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
919 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
921 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
922 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
924 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
928 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
929 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
933 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
934 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
935 event.write(writer)?;
938 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
939 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
941 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
942 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
943 entry.write(writer)?;
946 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
947 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
949 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
950 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
952 script.write(writer)?;
955 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
957 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
958 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
960 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
961 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
962 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
963 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
964 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
965 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
972 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
973 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
974 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
975 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
976 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
977 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
980 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
981 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
982 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
983 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
984 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
985 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
986 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
988 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
989 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
990 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
992 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
993 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
994 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
995 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
997 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
998 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1000 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1001 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1002 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1003 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1005 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1006 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1008 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1009 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1010 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1011 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1012 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1013 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1014 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1015 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1017 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1020 let onchain_tx_handler =
1021 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1022 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1024 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1025 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1027 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1028 latest_update_id: 0,
1029 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1031 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1032 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1033 counterparty_payment_script,
1037 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1039 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1040 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1042 counterparty_commitment_params,
1043 funding_redeemscript,
1044 channel_value_satoshis,
1045 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1047 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1049 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1050 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1051 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1052 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1054 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1055 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1056 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1057 current_holder_commitment_number,
1059 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1060 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1061 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1063 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1068 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1069 holder_tx_signed: false,
1070 funding_spend_seen: false,
1071 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1072 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1075 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1082 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1083 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1086 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1087 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1088 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1089 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1090 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1093 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1094 commitment_number: u64,
1095 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1097 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1098 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1099 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1103 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1104 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1105 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1106 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1107 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1110 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1111 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1112 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1114 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1115 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1117 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1120 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1121 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1124 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1125 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1128 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1133 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1136 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1139 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1142 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1143 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1145 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1151 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1152 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1155 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1158 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1160 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1161 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1164 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1165 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1166 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1169 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1170 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1171 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1172 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1173 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1176 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1177 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1178 /// have been registered.
1179 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1180 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1181 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1182 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1183 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1184 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1185 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1187 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1188 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1194 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1195 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1196 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1197 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1200 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1203 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1204 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1205 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1206 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1207 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1210 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1211 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1214 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1215 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1218 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1219 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1222 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1224 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1226 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1227 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1230 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1231 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1232 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1233 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1234 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1235 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1236 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1237 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1238 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1239 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1240 where L::Target: Logger {
1241 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1244 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1245 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1246 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1247 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1248 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1249 where L::Target: Logger {
1250 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1253 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1254 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1255 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1256 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1257 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1258 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1260 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1261 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1263 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1264 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1266 header: &BlockHeader,
1267 txdata: &TransactionData,
1272 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1274 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1275 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1278 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1279 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1282 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1284 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1286 header: &BlockHeader,
1292 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1293 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1296 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1297 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1300 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1301 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1303 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1304 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1306 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1307 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1309 header: &BlockHeader,
1310 txdata: &TransactionData,
1315 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1317 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1318 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1321 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1322 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1323 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1326 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1328 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1329 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1331 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1332 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1339 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1340 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1343 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1344 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1345 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1348 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1349 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1351 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1352 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1354 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1355 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1357 header: &BlockHeader,
1362 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1364 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1365 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1368 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1369 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1370 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1373 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1374 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1375 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1376 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1378 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1379 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1381 txids.sort_unstable();
1386 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1387 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1388 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1389 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1392 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1393 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1396 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1397 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1398 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1399 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1401 /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
1402 /// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
1405 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1406 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1407 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1408 let mut res = Vec::new();
1409 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1411 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1412 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1413 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1414 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1415 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1418 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1419 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1420 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1421 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1422 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1425 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1426 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1427 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1428 if let Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1429 if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1430 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
1431 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1434 debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
1435 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1436 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1437 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1439 } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1440 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1441 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1442 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1443 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1444 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1445 debug_assert!($holder_commitment || us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1446 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1447 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1448 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1449 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1450 let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1451 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1452 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
1453 Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1456 if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
1457 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1458 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1459 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1462 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1463 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1464 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1467 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1468 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1469 // we know the preimage.
1470 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1471 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1472 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1473 let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1474 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
1475 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
1476 Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
1480 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1481 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1482 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1483 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1486 res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1487 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1488 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1497 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1498 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1499 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1500 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1501 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1502 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1503 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1504 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1506 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1509 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1510 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1511 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1514 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1515 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1516 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1519 found_commitment_tx = true;
1520 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1521 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1522 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1523 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1524 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1525 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1528 found_commitment_tx = true;
1529 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1530 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1531 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1532 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1533 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1534 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1535 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1538 found_commitment_tx = true;
1541 if !found_commitment_tx {
1542 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1543 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1544 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1545 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1546 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1547 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1548 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1552 // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
1555 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1556 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1557 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1559 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1560 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1561 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1563 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1564 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1567 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1568 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1575 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1576 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1577 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1578 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1579 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1581 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1582 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1583 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1584 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1585 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1586 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1588 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1589 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1590 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1591 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1592 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1593 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1594 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1595 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1596 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1597 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1598 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1599 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1600 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1601 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
1602 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1603 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1605 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1608 if !htlc_update_confd {
1609 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1616 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1617 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1618 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1619 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1620 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1621 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1626 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1627 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1628 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1629 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1630 Some((a, &**source))
1633 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1634 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1635 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1637 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1638 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1639 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1640 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1645 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1646 // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
1647 // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1648 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1650 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1651 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1652 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1653 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1659 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1660 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1662 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1663 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1670 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
1671 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
1675 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1676 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1677 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1679 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1680 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1681 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1682 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1683 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1684 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1686 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1687 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1688 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1689 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1690 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1691 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr,
1692 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1693 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1694 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1695 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1696 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1697 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1698 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1699 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1700 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1701 // payment_preimage.
1702 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1703 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1704 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1705 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1707 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1709 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1710 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1711 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
1712 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
1713 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
1714 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
1715 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
1716 matched_htlc = true;
1720 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1721 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1722 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1724 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1725 *update_source != **source
1730 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1731 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
1732 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1733 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1734 source: (**source).clone(),
1735 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1736 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1737 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
1740 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1741 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
1742 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1743 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1749 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1750 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1752 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1753 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
1758 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
1759 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
1760 // in-line tests later.
1763 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
1764 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
1765 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
1766 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
1767 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
1768 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
1769 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
1774 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
1775 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
1778 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1779 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1780 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1781 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1782 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1783 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1784 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
1787 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1788 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1789 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1790 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1795 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1796 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1797 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1798 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1799 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1801 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1802 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1803 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1807 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1808 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1809 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1814 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1821 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1830 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1831 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1832 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1833 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1835 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1836 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1839 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1840 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1841 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1842 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1843 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1844 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1845 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
1846 Some(old_points) => {
1847 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1848 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
1849 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1850 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1851 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
1853 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1856 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1860 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1863 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1864 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1865 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1871 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1872 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1873 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1874 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1875 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1876 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1877 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1878 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1879 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1880 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1881 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1882 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1885 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1886 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1887 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1888 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1889 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1891 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1892 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1895 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1896 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1897 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1898 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1899 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
1904 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1905 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1906 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1907 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
1908 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
1909 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1910 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1913 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1915 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1916 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1917 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1918 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1919 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1920 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1923 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1924 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1925 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1929 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1930 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1931 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1936 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1937 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1938 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1939 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1940 // holder commitment transactions.
1941 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1942 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
1943 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
1945 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
1946 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1947 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1948 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
1949 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1954 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1955 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1958 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1959 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
1960 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1962 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
1965 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
1966 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1967 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1970 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
1971 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
1972 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1973 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1974 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1975 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1976 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1977 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1978 match updates.updates[0] {
1979 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
1981 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
1982 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
1985 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1986 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1988 let mut ret = Ok(());
1989 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
1991 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1992 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
1993 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1994 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
1995 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
1996 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2000 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2001 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2002 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2004 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2005 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2006 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2007 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2009 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2010 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2011 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2012 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2013 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2017 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2018 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2019 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2020 if *should_broadcast {
2021 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2022 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2023 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
2025 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2026 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2027 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2028 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2031 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2032 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2033 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2034 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2039 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2041 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
2042 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2047 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2048 self.latest_update_id
2051 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2055 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2056 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2057 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2058 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2059 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2060 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2062 &self.outputs_to_watch
2065 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2066 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2067 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2071 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2072 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2073 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
2077 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2078 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2079 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2082 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2083 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2086 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2087 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2090 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2091 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2094 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2095 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2096 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2097 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2098 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
2099 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
2100 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
2101 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2102 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2103 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2104 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2106 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2107 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2109 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2110 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2113 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2118 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2119 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2120 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2121 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2122 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2123 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
2124 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
2126 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2127 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2129 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2130 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2131 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2132 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2133 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2134 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2138 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2139 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2140 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2141 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2142 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2143 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2144 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
2146 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2147 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2148 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2153 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2154 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2155 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2156 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2157 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2158 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2160 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2162 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2163 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
2164 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2165 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2168 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2169 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
2170 [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2173 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2174 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2175 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2176 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2177 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2178 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2179 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2181 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2182 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2184 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2186 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2187 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
2188 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2189 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2192 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2193 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2194 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2198 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2201 fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
2202 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2203 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2204 if let Some(per_commitment_points) = self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2205 let per_commitment_point_option =
2206 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2207 // per-commitment point
2208 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&per_commitment_points.1) }
2209 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2210 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2211 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2212 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2213 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
2215 if let Some(per_commitment_point) = per_commitment_point_option {
2216 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2217 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2218 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2219 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2220 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2221 return claimable_outpoints; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
2224 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2225 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2226 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2227 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2228 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2229 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2230 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2231 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
2233 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2234 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2235 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2236 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2239 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2240 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2241 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2251 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2252 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2253 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2254 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
2255 return (Vec::new(), None)
2258 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2259 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2262 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2267 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2268 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2269 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2271 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2272 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2273 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2274 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2275 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2276 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2279 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2280 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2281 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2282 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2283 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2285 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2286 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2288 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2289 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2290 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2291 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2293 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2296 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2299 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2301 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2302 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2306 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2309 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2310 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2311 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2312 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2313 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2314 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2320 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2321 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2322 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2323 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2324 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2325 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2326 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2327 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2329 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2330 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2331 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2332 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2333 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2337 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2338 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2340 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2341 is_holder_tx = true;
2342 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2343 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2344 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2345 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2346 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, height,
2347 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2348 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2349 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2350 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2351 is_holder_tx = true;
2352 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2353 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2354 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2355 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2356 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, height,
2357 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
2363 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2369 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2370 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2371 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2372 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2373 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2374 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2375 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2376 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2377 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2378 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2379 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2382 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2383 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2384 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2385 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2386 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2387 // confirmed in the next block.
2390 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2391 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2392 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2396 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2397 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2401 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2402 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2403 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2404 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2405 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2406 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2407 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2408 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2409 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2410 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2411 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2412 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2416 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2417 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2418 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2425 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2426 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2427 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2430 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2431 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2433 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2434 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2437 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2439 header: &BlockHeader,
2442 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2444 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2446 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2447 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2450 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2452 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2453 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2454 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2455 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2456 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2457 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2458 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2460 } else { Vec::new() }
2463 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2465 header: &BlockHeader,
2466 txdata: &TransactionData,
2469 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2471 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2473 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2474 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2477 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2478 for tx in &txn_matched {
2479 let mut output_val = 0;
2480 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2481 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2482 output_val += out.value;
2483 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2487 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2489 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2490 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2491 for tx in &txn_matched {
2492 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2493 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2494 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2495 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2497 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2498 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2499 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2500 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2501 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
2502 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2503 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2504 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2505 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2506 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2508 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2509 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2510 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
2511 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2512 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2514 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2515 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2519 let txid = tx.txid();
2520 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2523 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2524 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2528 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2529 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2530 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2531 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2532 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2537 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2538 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2539 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2540 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2542 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2545 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2546 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2549 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2552 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2553 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2554 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2555 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2557 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2558 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2559 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2562 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2563 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2564 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2566 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2568 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2570 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2571 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2574 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2575 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2577 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2578 if should_broadcast {
2579 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2580 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2581 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2582 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2583 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2584 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2585 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2586 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2587 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2588 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2589 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2590 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2591 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2593 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2596 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2597 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2598 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2599 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2600 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2601 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2602 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2604 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2608 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2609 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2610 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2612 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2613 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2617 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2618 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2620 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2621 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2623 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
2624 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2625 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2628 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
2629 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2630 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2631 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2633 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
2634 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2635 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2636 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2637 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
2640 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
2641 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
2642 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2644 payment_preimage: None,
2645 source: source.clone(),
2646 htlc_value_satoshis,
2648 if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
2649 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
2652 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2653 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2654 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2655 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2658 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
2659 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
2661 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
2662 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
2667 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2669 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2670 // updating the latter in the process.
2671 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2672 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2673 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2677 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2678 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2679 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2680 for tx in &txn_matched {
2681 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2682 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2683 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2684 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2692 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2693 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2694 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2697 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2700 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2701 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2702 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2704 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2705 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
2707 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2710 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2714 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2717 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2721 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
2722 log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
2725 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2728 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2729 /// transactions thereof.
2730 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2731 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2732 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2733 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2734 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2735 if matches { break; }
2736 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2741 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2744 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2747 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2748 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2749 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2750 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2751 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2752 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2755 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2756 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2757 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2758 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2759 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
2760 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
2761 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
2762 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
2766 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2767 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2768 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2769 } else { panic!(); }
2780 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2781 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2782 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2783 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2784 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2785 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2786 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2787 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2788 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2789 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2790 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2791 let height = self.best_block.height();
2792 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2793 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2794 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2795 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2796 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2797 // time out the HTLC first.
2798 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2799 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2800 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2801 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2802 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2803 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2804 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2805 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2806 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2807 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2808 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2809 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2810 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2811 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2812 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2813 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2814 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2815 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2816 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2817 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2818 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2819 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2820 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2821 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2828 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2830 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2831 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2832 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2835 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2836 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2837 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2844 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2845 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2846 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2847 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2848 let mut payment_data = None;
2849 let witness_items = input.witness.len();
2850 let htlctype = input.witness.last().map(|w| w.len()).and_then(HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype);
2851 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
2852 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
2853 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
2854 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
2855 && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
2856 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2857 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
2858 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
2859 !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
2861 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2862 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2864 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2865 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2866 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
2867 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2868 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
2871 macro_rules! log_claim {
2872 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2873 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2874 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
2876 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2877 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2878 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2879 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2880 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
2881 // matched by any HTLC spend:
2882 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2883 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
2884 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
2885 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
2886 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2887 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2888 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2889 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2890 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2891 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2893 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2894 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2895 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2896 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2901 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2902 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2903 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2904 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2905 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2906 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2907 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2908 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
2917 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2918 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2919 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2920 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2921 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2922 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2923 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2924 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2925 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2926 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2927 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2928 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
2929 } else if !$holder_tx {
2930 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2931 if payment_data.is_none() {
2932 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2935 if payment_data.is_none() {
2936 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2937 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
2938 if !outbound_htlc || revocation_sig_claim {
2939 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2940 txid: tx.txid(), height,
2941 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2942 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2943 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
2944 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
2945 // If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
2946 // wait for the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from
2947 // claimable balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success
2949 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim {
2950 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
2954 // Outbound claims should always have payment_data, unless
2955 // we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
2956 // which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
2957 // spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
2958 // as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
2959 // TODO: Track the above as claimable!
2961 continue 'outer_loop;
2968 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2969 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2970 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2972 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2973 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2974 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2975 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2978 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2979 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2980 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2983 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2984 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2985 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
2986 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2987 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2988 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2989 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2992 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2993 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2994 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2995 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
2998 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3000 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3002 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3005 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3006 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3007 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3008 upd.source == source
3010 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3013 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3014 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3015 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3016 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3019 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3021 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3023 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3027 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3028 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3030 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3031 *htlc_source != source
3036 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3039 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3040 source, payment_hash,
3041 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3042 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3045 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3046 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3052 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3053 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3054 let mut spendable_output = None;
3055 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3056 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3057 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3058 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3059 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3060 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3061 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3062 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3063 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3064 // non-standard due to their size.
3065 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3066 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3067 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3070 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3071 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3072 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3073 output: outp.clone(),
3077 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3078 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3079 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3080 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3081 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3082 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3083 output: outp.clone(),
3084 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3085 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3086 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3091 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3092 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3093 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3094 output: outp.clone(),
3095 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3096 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3100 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3101 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3102 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3103 output: outp.clone(),
3108 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3109 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3112 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3114 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3115 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3120 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3122 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3123 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3126 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3127 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3130 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3131 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3135 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3137 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3138 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3141 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3142 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3145 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3146 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3149 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3150 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3153 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3154 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3158 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3160 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
3161 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
3162 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3163 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3167 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3172 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3174 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3175 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3177 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3178 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3180 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3181 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3182 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3183 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3186 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3188 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3189 let shutdown_script = {
3190 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3191 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3194 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3195 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3196 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3197 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3198 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3199 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3200 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3202 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3203 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3204 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3206 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3207 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3208 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3210 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3211 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3215 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3216 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3217 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3218 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3220 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3225 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3227 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3229 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3232 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3233 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3234 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3235 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3236 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3238 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3239 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3245 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3246 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3247 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3248 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3249 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3250 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3251 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3252 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3254 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3255 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3259 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3260 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3261 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3262 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3263 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3264 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3265 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3269 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3270 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3271 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3272 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3273 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3274 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3275 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3279 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3280 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3283 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3285 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3287 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3289 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3290 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3292 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3293 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3294 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3295 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3296 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3297 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3298 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3302 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3303 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3304 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3305 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3306 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3307 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3308 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3309 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3311 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3314 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3315 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3316 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3317 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3318 pending_events.push(event);
3322 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3324 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3325 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3326 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3327 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3328 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3332 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3333 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3334 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3335 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3336 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3337 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3338 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3339 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3341 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3342 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3345 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3347 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3348 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3350 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3351 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3352 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3353 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3354 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3355 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3356 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3360 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3361 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3362 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3363 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3364 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3367 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3368 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3369 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3370 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
3371 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3372 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3373 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3374 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3375 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3376 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
3379 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3380 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3382 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3384 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3387 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3388 counterparty_payment_script,
3392 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3394 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3395 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3397 counterparty_commitment_params,
3398 funding_redeemscript,
3399 channel_value_satoshis,
3400 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
3405 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3406 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3407 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3409 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3410 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3411 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3412 current_holder_commitment_number,
3415 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3418 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3423 lockdown_from_offchain,
3425 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3426 funding_spend_confirmed,
3427 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3430 counterparty_node_id,
3439 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3440 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3441 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3442 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
3443 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3444 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
3445 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3446 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3447 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3448 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3449 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3450 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3451 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3455 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
3457 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3458 use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3459 use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3460 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3461 use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3462 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3463 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3464 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3466 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3467 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
3468 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
3469 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3470 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3471 use util::errors::APIError;
3472 use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3473 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3474 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3475 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3477 use bitcoin::Witness;
3480 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3481 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3482 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3483 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3484 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3485 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3486 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3487 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3488 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3490 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3491 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3492 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3493 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3494 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3495 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3496 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3497 &nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3498 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3499 &nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3501 // Rebalance somewhat
3502 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
3504 // First route two payments for testing at the end
3505 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3506 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3508 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
3509 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
3510 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
3511 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
3512 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
3513 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
3514 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
3516 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
3517 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
3518 let new_header = BlockHeader {
3519 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
3520 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
3521 merkle_root: Default::default() };
3522 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3523 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
3524 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
3526 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
3527 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
3528 &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
3530 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
3531 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
3532 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
3533 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)),
3534 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
3535 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
3536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
3537 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3538 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
3540 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
3541 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
3542 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
3543 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
3544 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
3545 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
3546 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
3547 } else { panic!(); }
3548 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
3549 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
3551 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
3553 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
3555 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
3557 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3558 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
3559 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
3560 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
3561 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
3562 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3563 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
3564 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
3565 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
3568 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
3569 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
3570 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
3574 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3575 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3576 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3577 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
3578 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
3580 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3581 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3583 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3586 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3587 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3588 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3592 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3593 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3595 let mut res = Vec::new();
3596 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3597 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3601 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3602 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3609 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3610 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3612 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3613 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3619 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3620 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3621 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3622 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3627 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3629 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3630 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3631 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3632 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3633 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3634 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3640 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3641 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3642 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3643 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3644 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3645 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3647 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
3648 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3649 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3650 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3651 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3652 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3653 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3654 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3656 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3659 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3661 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3662 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3663 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3664 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
3665 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3666 &channel_parameters,
3667 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3668 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
3670 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3671 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3672 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3673 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3674 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3675 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3676 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3677 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
3678 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
3681 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3682 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3683 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3684 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3685 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3686 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3687 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3689 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3690 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3691 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3692 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3693 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3694 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3696 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3697 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3698 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3699 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3700 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3701 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3702 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3703 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3705 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3706 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3707 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3708 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3709 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3710 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3714 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3715 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3716 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3718 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3719 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3720 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3722 macro_rules! sign_input {
3723 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
3724 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3725 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
3727 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3728 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3729 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3731 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3732 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
3733 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
3734 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
3735 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
3736 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
3737 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
3738 witness.push(ser_sig);
3739 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
3740 witness.push(vec!(1));
3741 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
3742 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3743 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
3744 witness.push(vec![0]);
3746 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3748 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3749 let witness = witness.to_vec();
3750 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
3751 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
3752 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
3756 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3757 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3759 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3760 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3761 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3762 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3764 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3765 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3769 script_sig: Script::new(),
3770 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3771 witness: Witness::new(),
3774 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3775 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3778 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3779 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
3780 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3782 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3783 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3784 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3785 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3788 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3791 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3792 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3793 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3794 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3796 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3797 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3801 script_sig: Script::new(),
3802 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3803 witness: Witness::new(),
3806 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3807 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3810 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3811 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
3812 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3814 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3815 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3816 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3817 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3820 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3823 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3824 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3825 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3826 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3827 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3828 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3832 script_sig: Script::new(),
3833 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3834 witness: Witness::new(),
3836 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3837 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3840 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3841 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
3842 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3844 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3845 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3846 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3847 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3850 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3854 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.