1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
36 use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
37 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, ChannelId};
38 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentKey, DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, HtlcKey, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
40 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,CommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys};
41 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
43 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
44 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
45 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
47 use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, FeerateStrategy, OnchainTxHandler};
48 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use crate::chain::Filter;
50 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
51 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
52 use crate::util::byte_utils;
53 use crate::events::{ClosureReason, Event, EventHandler};
54 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
56 use crate::prelude::*;
58 use crate::io::{self, Error};
59 use core::convert::TryInto;
61 use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
63 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
64 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
66 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
67 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
68 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
69 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
70 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
72 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
73 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
74 /// Historically, [`ChannelMonitor`]s didn't know their counterparty node id. However,
75 /// `ChannelManager` really wants to know it so that it can easily look up the corresponding
76 /// channel. For now, this results in a temporary map in `ChannelManager` to look up channels
77 /// by only the funding outpoint.
79 /// To eventually remove that, we repeat the counterparty node id here so that we can upgrade
80 /// `ChannelMonitor`s to become aware of the counterparty node id if they were generated prior
81 /// to when it was stored directly in them.
82 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
83 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
84 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
85 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
87 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
88 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
89 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
91 /// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
92 /// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
93 /// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
94 /// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
95 /// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
97 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
99 /// The channel ID associated with these updates.
101 /// Will be `None` for `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.121 and
102 /// always `Some` otherwise.
103 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
106 /// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
108 /// (1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
109 /// (2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
110 /// allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
111 /// commitment transaction.
113 /// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
114 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
116 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
117 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
118 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
119 self.update_id.write(w)?;
120 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
121 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
122 update_step.write(w)?;
124 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
125 (1, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
126 (3, self.channel_id, option),
131 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
132 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
133 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
134 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
135 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
136 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
138 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
142 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
143 let mut channel_id = None;
144 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
145 (1, counterparty_node_id, option),
146 (3, channel_id, option),
148 Ok(Self { update_id, counterparty_node_id, updates, channel_id })
152 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
153 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
154 pub enum MonitorEvent {
155 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
156 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
158 /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
159 /// channel. Holds information about the channel and why it was closed.
160 HolderForceClosedWithInfo {
161 /// The reason the channel was closed.
162 reason: ClosureReason,
163 /// The funding outpoint of the channel.
165 /// The channel ID of the channel.
166 channel_id: ChannelId,
169 /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
171 HolderForceClosed(OutPoint),
173 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
174 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
176 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
178 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
179 funding_txo: OutPoint,
180 /// The channel ID of the channel associated with the [`ChannelMonitor`]
181 channel_id: ChannelId,
182 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
183 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
185 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
186 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
187 monitor_update_id: u64,
190 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
191 // Note that Completed is currently never serialized to disk as it is generated only in
194 (0, funding_txo, required),
195 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
196 (4, channel_id, required),
198 (5, HolderForceClosedWithInfo) => {
199 (0, reason, upgradable_required),
200 (2, outpoint, required),
201 (4, channel_id, required),
205 (4, HolderForceClosed),
206 // 6 was `UpdateFailed` until LDK 0.0.117
209 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
210 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
211 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
212 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
213 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
214 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
215 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
216 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
217 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
219 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
220 (0, payment_hash, required),
221 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
222 (2, source, required),
223 (4, payment_preimage, option),
226 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
227 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
228 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
229 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
230 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
231 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
232 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
233 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
234 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
235 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
236 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
237 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
238 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
239 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
240 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
241 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
242 /// accurate block height.
243 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
244 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
245 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
246 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
247 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
248 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
251 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
252 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
253 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
254 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
255 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
256 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
257 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
258 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
259 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
260 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
262 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
263 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
264 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
266 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
267 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
269 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
270 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
272 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
273 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
274 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
275 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
277 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
278 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
279 struct HolderSignedTx {
280 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
282 revocation_key: RevocationKey,
285 delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey,
286 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
287 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
288 to_self_value_sat: u64,
291 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
293 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
294 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
295 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
296 (2, revocation_key, required),
297 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
298 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
299 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
300 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
301 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
302 (14, htlc_outputs, required_vec)
305 impl HolderSignedTx {
306 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
307 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
308 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
318 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
319 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
320 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
321 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
322 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: DelayedPaymentBasepoint,
323 counterparty_htlc_base_key: HtlcBasepoint,
324 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
327 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
328 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
329 w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
330 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
331 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
332 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
333 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
338 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
339 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
340 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
341 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
342 // used. Read it for compatibility.
343 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
344 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
345 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
346 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
347 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
348 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
352 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
353 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
354 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
355 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
356 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
357 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
358 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
360 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
361 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
362 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
363 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
366 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
370 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
371 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
373 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
374 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
375 struct OnchainEventEntry {
378 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
380 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
383 impl OnchainEventEntry {
384 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
385 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
387 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
388 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
390 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
391 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
392 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
394 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
395 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
396 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
397 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
398 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
405 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
406 best_block.height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
410 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
412 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
413 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
415 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
416 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
417 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
419 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
420 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
421 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
422 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
423 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
424 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
427 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
428 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
429 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
430 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
431 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
433 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
434 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
436 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
438 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
440 FundingSpendConfirmation {
441 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
442 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
443 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
444 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
445 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
447 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
448 /// counterparty output.
449 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
451 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
452 /// is constructed. This is used when
453 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
454 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
455 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
456 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
457 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
459 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
460 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
462 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
463 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
464 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
465 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
466 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
467 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
468 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
469 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
473 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
474 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
475 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
476 (0, self.txid, required),
477 (1, self.transaction, option),
478 (2, self.height, required),
479 (3, self.block_hash, option),
480 (4, self.event, required),
486 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
487 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
488 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
489 let mut transaction = None;
490 let mut block_hash = None;
492 let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
493 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
495 (1, transaction, option),
496 (2, height, required),
497 (3, block_hash, option),
498 (4, event, upgradable_required),
500 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
504 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
506 (0, source, required),
507 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
508 (2, payment_hash, required),
509 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
511 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
512 (0, descriptor, required),
514 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
515 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
516 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
518 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
519 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
520 (2, preimage, option),
521 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
526 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
527 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
528 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
529 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
530 /// Note that LDK after 0.0.115 supports this only containing dust HTLCs (implying the
531 /// `Signature` field is never filled in). At that point, non-dust HTLCs are implied by the
532 /// HTLC fields in `commitment_tx` and the sources passed via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
533 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
534 claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
535 nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>,
537 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
538 commitment_txid: Txid,
539 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
540 commitment_number: u64,
541 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
542 feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>,
543 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Option<u64>,
544 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Option<u64>,
547 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
553 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
554 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
556 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
557 /// think we've fallen behind!
558 should_broadcast: bool,
561 scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
565 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
566 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
568 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
569 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
570 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
571 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
572 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
573 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
578 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
579 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
580 (0, commitment_tx, required),
581 (1, claimed_htlcs, optional_vec),
582 (2, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
583 (4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
585 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
586 (0, commitment_txid, required),
587 (1, feerate_per_kw, option),
588 (2, commitment_number, required),
589 (3, to_broadcaster_value_sat, option),
590 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
591 (5, to_countersignatory_value_sat, option),
592 (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
594 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
595 (0, payment_preimage, required),
597 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
599 (2, secret, required),
601 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
602 (0, should_broadcast, required),
604 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
605 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
609 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
611 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
613 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
614 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
616 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
617 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
618 /// force-closed now.
619 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
620 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
621 /// required to do so.
622 amount_satoshis: u64,
624 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
625 /// we consider it spendable.
626 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
627 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
628 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
629 amount_satoshis: u64,
630 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
632 confirmation_height: u32,
634 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
635 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
636 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
638 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
639 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
640 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
641 ContentiousClaimable {
642 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
643 /// required to do so.
644 amount_satoshis: u64,
645 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
648 /// The payment hash that locks this HTLC.
649 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
650 /// The preimage that can be used to claim this HTLC.
651 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
653 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
654 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
655 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
656 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
657 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
658 /// which will be required to do so.
659 amount_satoshis: u64,
660 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
662 claimable_height: u32,
663 /// The payment hash whose preimage our counterparty needs to claim this HTLC.
664 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
666 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
667 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
668 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
669 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
670 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
671 /// which will be required to do so.
672 amount_satoshis: u64,
673 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
674 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
676 /// The payment hash whose preimage we need to claim this HTLC.
677 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
679 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
682 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
683 /// following amount.
684 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
685 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
687 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
688 /// were already spent.
689 amount_satoshis: u64,
694 /// The amount claimable, in satoshis. This excludes balances that we are unsure if we are able
695 /// to claim, this is because we are waiting for a preimage or for a timeout to expire. For more
696 /// information on these balances see [`Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC`] and
697 /// [`Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC`].
699 /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
700 pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
702 Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }|
703 Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }|
704 Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }|
705 Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }
707 Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }|
708 Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. }
714 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
715 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
716 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
717 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
718 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
719 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
721 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
722 resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
723 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
724 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
727 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
728 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
729 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
730 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
731 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
732 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
733 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
734 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
735 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
736 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
737 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
738 (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
744 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
745 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
746 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
747 let mut resolving_txid = None;
748 let mut payment_preimage = None;
749 let mut resolving_tx = None;
750 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
751 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
752 (1, resolving_txid, option),
753 (2, payment_preimage, option),
754 (3, resolving_tx, option),
757 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
765 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
766 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
768 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
769 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
771 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
772 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
773 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
774 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
775 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
776 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
778 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
780 pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
783 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: Clone {
784 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
785 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone();
786 ChannelMonitor::from_impl(inner)
790 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
791 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
792 latest_update_id: u64,
793 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
795 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
796 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>,
797 counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf,
798 shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
800 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
801 holder_revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint,
802 channel_id: ChannelId,
803 funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
804 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
805 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
807 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
808 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf,
809 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
810 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
811 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
813 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
815 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
816 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
817 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
818 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
819 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
820 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
821 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
822 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
823 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
824 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
825 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
826 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
827 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
828 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
829 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
830 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
832 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,
834 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
835 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
836 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
837 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
838 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
839 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
841 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
843 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
844 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
846 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
848 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
849 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
850 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
852 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
854 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
855 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
856 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
857 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
858 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
859 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
860 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
861 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
862 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
863 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
865 pub(super) pending_events: Vec<Event>,
866 pub(super) is_processing_pending_events: bool,
868 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
869 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
870 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
871 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
873 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
874 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
875 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
876 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
877 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>>,
880 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
882 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
884 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
885 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
886 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
887 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
889 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
890 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
891 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
893 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
894 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
895 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
896 holder_tx_signed: bool,
898 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
899 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
900 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
901 funding_spend_seen: bool,
903 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
904 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
905 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
907 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
908 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
909 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
910 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
911 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
913 /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
914 /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
915 /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
916 /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
917 /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
918 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
920 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
921 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
922 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
923 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
924 // the full block_connected).
925 best_block: BestBlock,
927 /// The node_id of our counterparty
928 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
930 /// Initial counterparty commmitment data needed to recreate the commitment tx
931 /// in the persistence pipeline for third-party watchtowers. This will only be present on
932 /// monitors created after 0.0.117.
934 /// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats,
935 /// to_countersignatory_sats)
936 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>,
939 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
940 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
942 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
943 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
944 // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
945 // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
947 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
948 let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
949 let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
954 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
955 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
956 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
960 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
961 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
962 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
964 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
965 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
966 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
968 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
970 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
971 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
973 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
974 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
975 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
976 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
977 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
978 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
980 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
983 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
984 match &self.shutdown_script {
985 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
986 None => ScriptBuf::new().write(writer)?,
989 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
990 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
991 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
992 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
993 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
994 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
995 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
997 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
998 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
999 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
1001 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
1002 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1003 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1004 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1005 match second_option {
1006 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1007 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1010 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1015 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1019 writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
1021 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
1023 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1024 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1025 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1026 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
1027 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
1028 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1029 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1033 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1034 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1035 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1036 writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1037 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1038 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
1039 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
1040 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
1041 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1042 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
1046 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1047 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1048 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1049 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1052 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1053 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1054 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1055 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1058 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1059 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1060 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1062 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1065 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1067 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1068 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1070 writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1071 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1072 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1075 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1076 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1077 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => true,
1078 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => true,
1080 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1081 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1083 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1087 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1088 // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` replaced `HolderForceClosed` in v0.0.122. To keep
1089 // backwards compatibility, we write a `HolderForceClosed` event along with the
1090 // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` event. This is deduplicated in the reader.
1091 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1092 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1096 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1097 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1098 event.write(writer)?;
1101 self.best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
1102 writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height.to_be_bytes())?;
1104 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1105 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1106 entry.write(writer)?;
1109 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1110 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1111 txid.write(writer)?;
1112 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1113 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1115 script.write(writer)?;
1118 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1120 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1121 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1123 // If we have a `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` event, we need to write the `HolderForceClosed` for backwards compatibility.
1124 let pending_monitor_events = match self.pending_monitor_events.iter().find(|ev| match ev {
1125 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => true,
1128 Some(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { outpoint, .. }) => {
1129 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.pending_monitor_events.clone();
1130 pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(*outpoint));
1131 pending_monitor_events
1133 _ => self.pending_monitor_events.clone(),
1136 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1137 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1138 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec),
1139 (5, pending_monitor_events, required_vec),
1140 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1141 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1142 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1143 (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
1144 (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
1145 (17, self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
1146 (19, self.channel_id, required),
1153 macro_rules! _process_events_body {
1154 ($self_opt: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1156 let (pending_events, repeated_events);
1157 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1158 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1159 if inner.is_processing_pending_events {
1162 inner.is_processing_pending_events = true;
1164 pending_events = inner.pending_events.clone();
1165 repeated_events = inner.get_repeated_events();
1167 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1169 for event in pending_events.into_iter().chain(repeated_events.into_iter()) {
1170 $event_to_handle = event;
1174 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1175 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1176 inner.pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1177 inner.is_processing_pending_events = false;
1178 if !inner.pending_events.is_empty() {
1179 // If there's more events to process, go ahead and do so.
1187 pub(super) use _process_events_body as process_events_body;
1189 pub(crate) struct WithChannelMonitor<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
1191 peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
1192 channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1195 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1196 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
1197 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
1198 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
1199 self.logger.log(record)
1203 impl<'a, L: Deref> WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1204 pub(crate) fn from<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor: &ChannelMonitor<S>) -> Self {
1205 Self::from_impl(logger, &*monitor.inner.lock().unwrap())
1208 pub(crate) fn from_impl<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor_impl: &ChannelMonitorImpl<S>) -> Self {
1209 let peer_id = monitor_impl.counterparty_node_id;
1210 let channel_id = Some(monitor_impl.channel_id());
1211 WithChannelMonitor {
1212 logger, peer_id, channel_id,
1217 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1218 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1219 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1220 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1221 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1222 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1225 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1226 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
1227 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1228 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1229 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1230 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1231 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId,
1232 ) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1234 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1235 let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
1236 &channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.pubkeys().payment_point
1239 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1240 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1241 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1242 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1244 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1245 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1247 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1248 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1249 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1250 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1252 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1253 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1255 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1256 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1257 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1258 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1259 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1260 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1261 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1262 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1264 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1267 let onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(
1268 channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id, destination_script.into(), keys,
1269 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx
1272 let mut outputs_to_watch = new_hash_map();
1273 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1275 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1276 latest_update_id: 0,
1277 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1279 destination_script: destination_script.into(),
1280 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1281 counterparty_payment_script,
1285 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1288 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1289 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1291 counterparty_commitment_params,
1292 funding_redeemscript,
1293 channel_value_satoshis,
1294 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1296 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1298 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1299 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: new_hash_map(),
1300 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: new_hash_map(),
1301 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: new_hash_map(),
1302 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: new_hash_map(),
1304 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1305 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1306 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1307 current_holder_commitment_number,
1309 payment_preimages: new_hash_map(),
1310 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1311 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1312 is_processing_pending_events: false,
1314 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1319 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1320 holder_tx_signed: false,
1321 funding_spend_seen: false,
1322 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1323 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1324 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1325 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
1328 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1329 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None,
1334 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1335 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1338 /// A variant of `Self::provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx` used to provide
1339 /// additional information to the monitor to store in order to recreate the initial
1340 /// counterparty commitment transaction during persistence (mainly for use in third-party
1343 /// This is used to provide the counterparty commitment information directly to the monitor
1344 /// before the initial persistence of a new channel.
1345 pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1346 &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1347 commitment_number: u64, their_cur_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
1348 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, logger: &L,
1350 where L::Target: Logger
1352 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1353 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1354 inner.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid,
1355 htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_cur_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
1356 to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, &logger);
1359 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1360 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1361 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1362 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1364 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1367 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1368 commitment_number: u64,
1369 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1371 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1372 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1373 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1374 inner.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1375 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, &logger)
1379 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1380 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1381 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1382 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1383 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new(), Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
1386 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1387 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1388 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1390 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1391 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1393 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1396 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1397 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1400 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1401 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1402 inner.provide_payment_preimage(
1403 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1406 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1409 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1410 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1412 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1418 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1419 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1422 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1423 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1424 inner.update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1427 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1429 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1430 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1433 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1434 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
1435 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1438 /// Gets the channel_id of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1439 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1440 self.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id()
1443 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1444 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1445 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>)> {
1446 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1447 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1450 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1451 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1452 /// have been registered.
1453 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, filter: &F, logger: &L)
1455 F::Target: chain::Filter, L::Target: Logger,
1457 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1458 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*lock);
1459 log_trace!(&logger, "Registering funding outpoint {}", &lock.get_funding_txo().0);
1460 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1461 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1462 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1463 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1464 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 };
1465 log_trace!(logger, "Registering outpoint {} with the filter for monitoring spends", outpoint);
1466 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1469 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1475 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1476 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1477 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1478 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1481 /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
1483 /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
1484 /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
1485 /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
1486 /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
1487 /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
1489 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
1490 /// order to handle these events.
1492 /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
1493 /// [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
1494 pub fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: &H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
1496 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
1499 /// Processes any events asynchronously.
1501 /// See [`Self::process_pending_events`] for more information.
1502 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
1506 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, { handler(ev).await });
1510 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1511 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1512 let mut lck = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1513 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut lck.pending_events);
1514 ret.append(&mut lck.get_repeated_events());
1518 /// Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment
1519 /// transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of
1520 /// the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for
1521 /// watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions.
1523 /// This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except
1524 /// that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update.
1526 /// This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading
1527 /// to LDK 0.0.117+.
1529 /// [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel
1530 pub fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
1531 self.inner.lock().unwrap().initial_counterparty_commitment_tx()
1534 /// Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This
1535 /// may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned
1536 /// commitment transactions are unsigned.
1538 /// This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build
1539 /// justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be
1540 /// used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided
1541 /// with a monitor and an update. Once revoked, signing a justice transaction can be done using
1542 /// [`Self::sign_to_local_justice_tx`].
1544 /// It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty
1545 /// commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which
1546 /// the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the
1547 /// monitor can sign the justice transaction.
1549 /// This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after
1550 /// upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which
1551 /// may have been created prior to upgrading.
1553 /// [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel
1554 pub fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
1555 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(update)
1558 /// Wrapper around [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`] to make
1559 /// signing the justice transaction easier for implementors of
1560 /// [`chain::chainmonitor::Persist`]. On success this method returns the provided transaction
1561 /// signing the input at `input_idx`. This method will only produce a valid signature for
1562 /// a transaction spending the `to_local` output of a commitment transaction, i.e. this cannot
1563 /// be used for revoked HTLC outputs.
1565 /// `Value` is the value of the output being spent by the input at `input_idx`, committed
1566 /// in the BIP 143 signature.
1568 /// This method will only succeed if this monitor has received the revocation secret for the
1569 /// provided `commitment_number`. If a commitment number is provided that does not correspond
1570 /// to the commitment transaction being revoked, this will return a signed transaction, but
1571 /// the signature will not be valid.
1573 /// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`]: crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output
1574 /// [`Persist`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist
1575 pub fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(&self, justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
1576 self.inner.lock().unwrap().sign_to_local_justice_tx(justice_tx, input_idx, value, commitment_number)
1579 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1580 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1583 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1584 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1587 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1588 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1591 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1593 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1595 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1596 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1599 /// You may use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1600 /// a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our
1601 /// counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1603 /// Broadcasting these transactions in this manner is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1604 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1605 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1606 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1608 pub fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1609 &self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L
1612 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1613 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1616 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1617 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
1618 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1619 inner.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
1622 /// Unsafe test-only version of `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` used by our test framework
1623 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1624 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1625 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1626 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1627 where L::Target: Logger {
1628 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1629 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1630 inner.unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&logger)
1633 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1634 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1635 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1636 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1637 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1638 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1640 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1641 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1643 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1644 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1647 txdata: &TransactionData,
1652 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1654 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1655 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1658 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1659 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1660 inner.block_connected(
1661 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1664 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1666 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1674 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1675 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1678 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1679 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1680 inner.block_disconnected(
1681 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1684 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1685 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1687 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1688 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1690 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1691 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1694 txdata: &TransactionData,
1699 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1701 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1702 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1705 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1706 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1707 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1708 inner.transactions_confirmed(
1709 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger)
1712 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1714 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1715 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1717 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1718 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1725 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1726 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1729 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1730 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1731 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1732 inner.transaction_unconfirmed(
1733 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1737 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1738 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1740 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1741 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1743 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1744 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1751 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1753 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1754 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1757 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1758 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1759 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1760 inner.best_block_updated(
1761 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1765 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1766 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1767 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1768 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1770 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.height, entry.block_hash))
1771 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1773 txids.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0).then(b.1.cmp(&a.1)));
1774 txids.dedup_by_key(|(txid, _, _)| *txid);
1778 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1779 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1780 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1781 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1784 /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
1785 /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
1786 /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
1787 /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
1788 /// connections, like on mobile.
1789 pub fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1790 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
1793 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1794 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1797 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1798 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1799 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1800 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1801 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1802 current_height, FeerateStrategy::HighestOfPreviousOrNew, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1806 /// Triggers rebroadcasts of pending claims from a force-closed channel after a transaction
1807 /// signature generation failure.
1808 pub fn signer_unblocked<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1809 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
1812 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1813 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1816 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1817 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1818 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1819 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1820 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1821 current_height, FeerateStrategy::RetryPrevious, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1825 /// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the
1826 /// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]
1827 /// confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be
1828 /// returned, the transaction must have at least `max(ANTI_REORG_DELAY, to_self_delay)`
1831 /// Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`]
1832 /// once they are no longer under reorg risk. This method serves as a way to retrieve these
1833 /// descriptors at a later time, either for historical purposes, or to replay any
1834 /// missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the
1835 /// channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns
1836 /// an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending
1837 /// transactions starting from the channel's funding transaction and going down three levels.
1839 /// `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any
1840 /// outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned.
1842 /// `confirmation_height` must be the height of the block in which `tx` was included in.
1843 pub fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction, confirmation_height: u32) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1844 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1845 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1846 let mut spendable_outputs = inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx);
1847 spendable_outputs.retain(|descriptor| {
1848 let mut conf_threshold = current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1;
1849 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) = descriptor {
1850 conf_threshold = cmp::min(conf_threshold,
1851 current_height.saturating_sub(descriptor.to_self_delay as u32) + 1);
1853 conf_threshold >= confirmation_height
1859 pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1860 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script.clone()
1864 pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: ScriptBuf) {
1865 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script;
1869 pub fn do_signer_call<F: FnMut(&Signer) -> ()>(&self, mut f: F) {
1870 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1871 f(&inner.onchain_tx_handler.signer);
1875 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1876 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1877 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1878 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1879 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1880 -> Option<Balance> {
1881 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1882 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1884 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1885 let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
1886 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1887 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1888 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1889 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1891 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1892 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1893 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1894 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1895 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1896 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1897 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1898 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1899 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1901 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1902 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1903 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1904 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1905 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1906 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1907 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1908 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1910 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1911 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1912 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1913 .any(|(input_idx, inp)|
1914 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1915 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx &&
1916 // A maturing output for an HTLC claim will always be at the same
1917 // index as the HTLC input. This is true pre-anchors, as there's
1918 // only 1 input and 1 output. This is also true post-anchors,
1919 // because we have a SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY signature from our
1920 // channel counterparty.
1921 descriptor.outpoint.index as usize == input_idx
1925 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1926 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1931 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1932 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1933 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1934 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
1935 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1936 htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
1939 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1941 let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
1942 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1943 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1944 // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
1945 // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
1946 // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
1947 // in the commitment.
1948 if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
1949 let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1950 .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
1951 .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
1952 debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
1953 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
1955 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1956 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
1959 htlc_commitment_outpoint
1961 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1963 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1964 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1965 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1966 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1967 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1969 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1970 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1971 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1972 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1973 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1974 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1975 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1976 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1977 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1978 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1979 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1981 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1982 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1983 tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
1985 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1986 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1988 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1993 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1994 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1995 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1996 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1997 // need to do so again here.
1999 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
2000 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
2001 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
2002 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
2003 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
2004 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2007 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
2008 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
2009 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
2010 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2011 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
2012 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2013 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2014 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2017 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
2018 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2019 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2020 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2023 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2024 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
2025 // we know the preimage.
2026 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
2027 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
2028 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2029 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
2030 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
2031 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2032 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2033 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2036 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
2037 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2038 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2039 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2040 payment_preimage: *payment_preimage,
2043 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
2044 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
2045 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2046 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2047 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2054 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
2055 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
2056 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
2059 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
2060 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
2061 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
2062 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
2064 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
2065 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, not all or excess balances may be included.
2067 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
2068 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
2069 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
2070 let mut res = Vec::new();
2071 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2073 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
2074 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
2075 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
2076 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2077 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
2080 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
2081 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
2084 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
2085 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
2086 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
2087 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
2088 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
2091 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2092 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2093 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
2094 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2096 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
2104 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
2105 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
2106 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
2107 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
2108 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2109 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2110 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2111 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
2113 Some(descriptor.output.value)
2116 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2117 amount_satoshis: value,
2118 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2121 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
2122 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
2123 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
2126 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2127 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2129 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2130 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
2131 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
2132 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
2133 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
2134 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
2135 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
2136 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2137 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
2139 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2140 amount_satoshis: output.value,
2141 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
2143 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
2144 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
2145 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
2146 ).unwrap_or(false) {
2147 spent_counterparty_output = true;
2153 if spent_counterparty_output {
2154 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
2155 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
2156 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
2157 if output_spendable {
2158 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
2159 amount_satoshis: amt,
2163 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
2164 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
2167 found_commitment_tx = true;
2168 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2169 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2170 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2171 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2172 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2173 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2176 found_commitment_tx = true;
2177 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2178 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2179 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2180 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2181 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2182 amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
2183 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2186 found_commitment_tx = true;
2189 if !found_commitment_tx {
2190 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2191 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
2192 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
2193 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
2194 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2195 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2196 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2201 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
2202 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2203 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
2205 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
2206 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2207 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2208 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2210 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
2211 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
2213 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
2214 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
2215 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
2216 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2217 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2218 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2222 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
2223 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
2230 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
2231 /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
2232 /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
2234 /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
2235 /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
2236 /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
2237 pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2238 let mut res = new_hash_map();
2239 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
2240 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
2241 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2242 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
2244 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2245 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2246 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2247 res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
2248 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
2254 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2255 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2257 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2258 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2263 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
2264 /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
2266 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
2268 /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
2269 /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
2270 pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2271 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2272 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
2273 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
2274 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
2275 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2276 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2277 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
2283 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
2284 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
2285 // closed), just get the full set.
2287 return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
2290 let mut res = new_hash_map();
2291 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2292 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2293 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
2294 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
2295 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
2296 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
2298 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
2299 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
2300 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
2301 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
2302 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
2303 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2304 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
2305 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
2306 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
2307 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
2308 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
2309 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
2310 us.best_block.height >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
2311 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
2312 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
2313 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
2315 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
2318 let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
2319 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
2320 if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
2321 res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
2328 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
2329 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2330 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
2331 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
2332 Some((a, &**source))
2335 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2336 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2337 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2339 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2340 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2341 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2342 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2350 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
2351 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
2355 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
2356 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
2357 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
2359 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
2360 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
2361 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
2362 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
2363 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
2364 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
2366 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
2367 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
2368 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
2369 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
2370 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
2371 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
2372 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
2373 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
2375 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
2376 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
2377 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2378 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2379 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2380 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
2381 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
2382 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
2383 // payment_preimage.
2384 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
2385 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
2386 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
2387 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
2389 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
2391 let mut matched_htlc = false;
2392 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
2393 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
2394 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
2395 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
2396 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
2397 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
2398 matched_htlc = true;
2402 if matched_htlc { continue; }
2403 if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
2406 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2407 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
2409 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
2410 *update_source != **source
2415 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2416 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
2417 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
2418 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
2419 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
2420 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2421 source: (**source).clone(),
2422 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
2423 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
2424 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
2427 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
2428 &htlc.payment_hash, $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2429 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2430 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2436 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2437 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2439 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2440 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2445 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2446 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2447 // in-line tests later.
2450 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2451 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2452 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2453 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2454 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2455 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2456 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2457 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2462 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2463 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2466 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2467 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2468 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2469 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2470 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2471 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2472 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2475 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2476 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2477 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2478 if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
2479 let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2480 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2481 for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2482 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2483 if !cur_claimables.iter()
2484 .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
2486 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
2490 for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2494 assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
2498 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2499 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2500 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2501 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2502 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2504 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2505 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2506 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2510 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2511 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2512 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2517 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2524 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2533 fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2534 &mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2535 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
2536 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2537 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2538 self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info = Some((their_per_commitment_point.clone(),
2539 feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value));
2541 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2542 let rebuilt_commitment_tx = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_tx().unwrap();
2543 debug_assert_eq!(rebuilt_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), txid);
2546 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number,
2547 their_per_commitment_point, logger);
2550 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2551 &mut self, txid: Txid,
2552 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2553 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2554 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2555 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2556 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2557 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2559 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2560 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2563 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2564 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2565 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2566 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2567 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2568 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2569 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2570 Some(old_points) => {
2571 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2572 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2573 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2574 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2575 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2577 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2580 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2584 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2587 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2588 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2589 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2595 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2596 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2597 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2598 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2599 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2600 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, mut htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)], nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2601 if htlc_outputs.iter().any(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()) {
2602 // If we have non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, ensure they match the HTLCs in the
2603 // `holder_commitment_tx`. In the future, we'll no longer provide the redundant data
2604 // and just pass in source data via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
2605 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len());
2606 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).map(|(h, _, _)| h).zip(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()) {
2607 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2609 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2610 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, s, _)| s.as_ref()).zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter()) {
2611 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2613 debug_assert!(nondust_htlc_sources.is_empty());
2615 // If we don't have any non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, assume they were all passed via
2616 // `nondust_htlc_sources`, building up the final htlc_outputs by combining
2617 // `nondust_htlc_sources` and the `holder_commitment_tx`
2618 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2620 for htlc in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter() {
2621 assert!(htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32 > prev);
2622 prev = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32;
2625 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(htlc, _, _)| htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()));
2626 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(_, sig_opt, _)| sig_opt.is_none()));
2627 debug_assert_eq!(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2629 let mut sources_iter = nondust_htlc_sources.into_iter();
2631 for (htlc, counterparty_sig) in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()
2632 .zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter())
2635 let source = sources_iter.next().expect("Non-dust HTLC sources didn't match commitment tx");
2636 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2637 assert!(source.possibly_matches_output(htlc));
2639 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), Some(source)));
2641 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), None));
2644 debug_assert!(sources_iter.next().is_none());
2647 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2648 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2649 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2650 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2651 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
2653 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2654 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2655 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2656 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2657 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2659 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2660 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2662 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2663 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2664 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2665 for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
2666 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2667 let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2668 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2669 assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
2670 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2671 SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
2675 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
2677 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2678 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2683 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2684 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2685 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2686 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2687 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>)
2688 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2689 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2692 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2694 let confirmed_spend_txid = self.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2695 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| match event.event {
2696 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => Some(event.txid),
2700 let confirmed_spend_txid = if let Some(txid) = confirmed_spend_txid {
2706 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2707 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2708 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2709 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2710 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2711 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2714 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2715 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2716 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2717 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2719 debug_assert!(false);
2720 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2725 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2726 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2727 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2728 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2730 debug_assert!(false);
2731 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2737 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2738 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2739 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2740 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2741 // holder commitment transactions.
2742 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2743 let holder_commitment_tx = if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2744 Some(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx)
2745 } else if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2746 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2747 Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx)
2754 if let Some(holder_commitment_tx) = holder_commitment_tx {
2755 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2756 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2758 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height);
2759 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2764 fn generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(&mut self, reason: ClosureReason) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Vec<TransactionOutputs>) {
2765 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2766 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(),
2767 self.channel_value_satoshis,
2768 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
2770 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2771 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2772 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp),
2773 self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height
2775 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![commitment_package];
2776 let event = MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo {
2778 outpoint: self.funding_info.0,
2779 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2781 self.pending_monitor_events.push(event);
2783 // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
2784 // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
2785 // new channel updates.
2786 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2787 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2788 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
2789 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
2790 // `transactions_confirmed`.
2791 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2792 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2793 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2794 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2795 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(
2796 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height
2798 let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
2799 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(
2800 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx
2802 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2803 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2805 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2807 (claimable_outpoints, watch_outputs)
2810 pub(crate) fn queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2811 &mut self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2814 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2815 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2818 let (claimable_outpoints, _) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2819 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2820 claimable_outpoints, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster,
2821 fee_estimator, logger
2825 fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2826 &mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2828 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2829 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2832 if self.latest_update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2833 log_info!(logger, "Applying post-force-closed update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2834 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2835 } else if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2836 log_info!(logger, "Applying force close update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2837 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2839 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
2840 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2843 if updates.counterparty_node_id.is_some() {
2844 if self.counterparty_node_id.is_none() {
2845 self.counterparty_node_id = updates.counterparty_node_id;
2847 debug_assert_eq!(self.counterparty_node_id, updates.counterparty_node_id);
2851 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
2852 // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
2853 // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
2854 // sentinel value instead.
2856 // The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
2857 // thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
2859 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2860 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2861 match updates.updates[0] {
2862 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
2863 // We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
2864 // provide a preimage at this point.
2865 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
2866 debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
2868 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2869 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2872 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2873 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2875 let mut ret = Ok(());
2876 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
2877 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2879 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
2880 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2881 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2882 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources.clone()) {
2883 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2884 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2888 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2889 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2890 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2892 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2893 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2894 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2896 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2897 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2898 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2899 debug_assert!(false, "Latest counterparty commitment secret was invalid");
2900 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2901 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2905 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2906 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2907 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2908 if *should_broadcast {
2909 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
2910 // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
2911 // duplicate/conflicting.
2912 let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
2913 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
2914 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
2917 if detected_funding_spend {
2918 log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
2921 self.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
2922 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2923 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2924 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.channel_id());
2925 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn to take manual action!");
2927 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager
2928 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2929 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2930 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2933 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2934 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2935 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2936 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2942 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2943 self.counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(updates);
2946 // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
2947 // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
2948 if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
2952 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2954 // Refuse updates after we've detected a spend onchain, but only if we haven't processed a
2955 // force closed monitor update yet.
2956 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen && self.latest_update_id != CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2957 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2962 fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2963 self.latest_update_id
2966 fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
2970 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2974 fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>> {
2975 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2976 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2977 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2978 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2979 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2981 &self.outputs_to_watch
2984 fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2985 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2986 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2990 /// Gets the set of events that are repeated regularly (e.g. those which RBF bump
2991 /// transactions). We're okay if we lose these on restart as they'll be regenerated for us at
2992 /// some regular interval via [`ChannelMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims`].
2993 pub(super) fn get_repeated_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2994 let pending_claim_events = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events();
2995 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pending_claim_events.len());
2996 for (claim_id, claim_event) in pending_claim_events {
2998 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
2999 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
3001 let channel_id = self.channel_id;
3002 // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels,
3003 // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some`
3005 let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap();
3006 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3007 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
3008 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
3009 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
3010 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
3011 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
3013 counterparty_node_id,
3015 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
3017 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
3018 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
3019 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
3020 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3021 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3022 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
3024 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
3025 txid: commitment_txid,
3026 vout: anchor_output_idx,
3032 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
3033 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs, tx_lock_time,
3035 let channel_id = self.channel_id;
3036 // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels,
3037 // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some`
3039 let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap();
3040 let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
3042 htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
3043 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
3044 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3045 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3046 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
3048 commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
3049 per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
3050 per_commitment_point: self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.get_per_commitment_point(
3051 htlc.per_commitment_number, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3055 preimage: htlc.preimage,
3056 counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
3059 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
3061 counterparty_node_id,
3063 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
3073 fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
3074 let (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value,
3075 to_countersignatory_value) = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info?;
3076 let htlc_outputs = vec![];
3078 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
3079 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value,
3080 feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs);
3084 fn build_counterparty_commitment_tx(
3085 &self, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
3086 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3087 mut nondust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>
3088 ) -> CommitmentTransaction {
3089 let broadcaster_keys = &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters
3090 .counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys;
3091 let countersignatory_keys =
3092 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys;
3094 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey;
3095 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey;
3096 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&their_per_commitment_point,
3097 &broadcaster_keys, &countersignatory_keys, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx);
3098 let channel_parameters =
3099 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable();
3101 CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
3102 to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, broadcaster_funding_key,
3103 countersignatory_funding_key, keys, feerate_per_kw, &mut nondust_htlcs,
3107 fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
3108 update.updates.iter().filter_map(|update| {
3110 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid,
3111 ref htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point,
3112 feerate_per_kw: Some(feerate_per_kw),
3113 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(to_broadcaster_value),
3114 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(to_countersignatory_value) } => {
3116 let nondust_htlcs = htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _)| {
3117 htlc.transaction_output_index.map(|_| (htlc.clone(), None))
3118 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3120 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_number,
3121 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value,
3122 to_countersignatory_value, feerate_per_kw, nondust_htlcs);
3124 debug_assert_eq!(commitment_tx.trust().txid(), commitment_txid);
3133 fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(
3134 &self, mut justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64
3135 ) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
3136 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).ok_or(())?;
3137 let per_commitment_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secret).map_err(|_| ())?;
3138 let their_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(
3139 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3141 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3142 &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &their_per_commitment_point);
3143 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3144 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &their_per_commitment_point);
3145 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3146 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3148 let sig = self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(
3149 &justice_tx, input_idx, value, &per_commitment_key, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx)?;
3150 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
3151 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(&[1u8]);
3152 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(revokeable_redeemscript.as_bytes());
3156 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
3157 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
3158 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
3161 fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
3162 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
3165 fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3166 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
3169 fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3170 self.current_holder_commitment_number
3173 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
3174 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
3175 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
3176 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
3178 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
3179 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
3181 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
3182 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
3183 where L::Target: Logger {
3184 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
3185 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
3186 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3187 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3188 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
3190 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
3191 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
3193 macro_rules! ignore_error {
3194 ( $thing : expr ) => {
3197 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3202 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
3203 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
3204 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
3205 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
3206 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3207 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,);
3208 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
3210 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3211 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
3213 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
3214 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3215 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3216 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
3217 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height);
3218 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3219 to_counterparty_output_info =
3220 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3224 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
3225 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3226 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
3227 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3228 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
3229 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3230 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3231 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
3232 to_counterparty_output_info);
3234 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
3235 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, height);
3236 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3241 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
3242 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
3243 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
3244 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
3245 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3246 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3248 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3250 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3251 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3252 block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3253 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3256 // Our fuzzers aren't constrained by pesky things like valid signatures, so can
3257 // spend our funding output with a transaction which doesn't match our past
3258 // commitment transactions. Thus, we can only debug-assert here when not
3260 debug_assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
3261 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3262 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
3265 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3266 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
3267 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
3268 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
3269 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
3270 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
3271 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
3273 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3274 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3276 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3278 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
3279 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3280 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3281 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3284 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
3285 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
3286 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
3287 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
3288 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
3292 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3295 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
3296 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
3297 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
3298 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3299 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
3301 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
3302 Some(outputs) => outputs,
3303 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3305 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
3306 Some(points) => points,
3307 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3310 let per_commitment_point =
3311 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
3312 // per-commitment point
3313 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
3314 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
3315 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
3316 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
3317 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
3318 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
3320 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
3321 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
3323 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3324 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
3325 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point);
3327 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &per_commitment_point);
3329 let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3330 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3331 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
3332 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
3333 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3334 to_counterparty_output_info =
3335 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3340 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
3341 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3342 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3343 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
3344 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3345 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3346 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
3349 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
3350 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
3351 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
3352 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
3353 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3354 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3355 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3356 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3358 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
3359 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3360 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3361 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3362 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3364 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry, 0);
3365 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
3370 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
3373 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
3374 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
3375 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
3376 ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
3377 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
3378 let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
3380 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
3382 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3384 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
3385 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
3386 let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
3387 // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
3388 // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
3389 // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
3390 // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
3391 // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
3392 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
3394 // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
3395 // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
3396 // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
3397 for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
3398 if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
3399 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
3400 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
3401 per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3402 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
3403 tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3406 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3407 htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
3408 height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height
3410 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3411 if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
3412 outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
3414 outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
3417 (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
3420 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
3421 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
3422 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
3423 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>) {
3424 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3426 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
3427 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
3429 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3430 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3431 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
3432 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
3433 htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3437 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
3440 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3443 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
3444 payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3448 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3449 holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
3450 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
3451 htlc.cltv_expiry, conf_height
3453 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
3457 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
3460 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
3461 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
3462 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3463 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3464 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3465 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
3471 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
3472 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
3473 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
3474 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
3475 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
3476 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
3477 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
3478 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3480 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
3481 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
3482 claim_requests = $updates.0;
3483 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
3484 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
3488 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
3489 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
3491 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3492 is_holder_tx = true;
3493 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3494 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
3495 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
3496 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3497 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3498 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
3499 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
3500 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3501 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3502 is_holder_tx = true;
3503 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3504 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
3505 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
3506 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3507 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3508 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
3514 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
3520 /// Cancels any existing pending claims for a commitment that previously confirmed and has now
3521 /// been replaced by another.
3522 pub fn cancel_prev_commitment_claims<L: Deref>(
3523 &mut self, logger: &L, confirmed_commitment_txid: &Txid
3524 ) where L::Target: Logger {
3525 for (counterparty_commitment_txid, _) in &self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain {
3526 // Cancel any pending claims for counterparty commitments we've seen confirm.
3527 if counterparty_commitment_txid == confirmed_commitment_txid {
3530 for (htlc, _) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(counterparty_commitment_txid).unwrap_or(&vec![]) {
3531 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously confirmed counterparty commitment {}",
3532 counterparty_commitment_txid);
3533 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: *counterparty_commitment_txid, vout: 0 };
3534 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3535 outpoint.vout = vout;
3536 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3540 if self.holder_tx_signed {
3541 // If we've signed, we may have broadcast either commitment (prev or current), and
3542 // attempted to claim from it immediately without waiting for a confirmation.
3543 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3544 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3545 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3546 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3547 for (htlc, _, _) in &self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3548 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3549 outpoint.vout = vout;
3550 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3554 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3555 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3556 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3557 prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3558 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3559 for (htlc, _, _) in &prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3560 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3561 outpoint.vout = vout;
3562 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3568 // No previous claim.
3572 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
3573 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
3574 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3575 &mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3576 ) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3577 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
3578 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3579 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3580 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3581 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
3582 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
3583 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3584 return holder_transactions;
3586 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3587 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3588 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3589 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3590 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3594 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_maybe_signed_htlc_tx(
3595 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage
3597 if htlc_tx.is_fully_signed() {
3598 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx.0);
3606 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3607 &mut self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B,
3608 fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3609 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3610 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3611 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3614 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3615 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3617 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3618 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
3621 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3626 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3627 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3628 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3630 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3631 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3634 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3636 if height > self.best_block.height {
3637 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3638 log_trace!(logger, "Connecting new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3639 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3640 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash {
3641 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3642 log_trace!(logger, "Best block re-orged, replaced with new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3643 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
3644 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3646 } else { Vec::new() }
3649 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3652 txdata: &TransactionData,
3655 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3656 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3657 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3659 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3660 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3663 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
3664 for tx in &txn_matched {
3665 let mut output_val = 0;
3666 for out in tx.output.iter() {
3667 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3668 output_val += out.value;
3669 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3673 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3675 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3676 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3677 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
3678 let txid = tx.txid();
3679 log_trace!(logger, "Transaction {} confirmed in block {}", txid , block_hash);
3680 // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
3681 if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
3682 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3685 for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3686 if ev.txid == txid {
3687 if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
3688 assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
3689 "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
3690 This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
3692 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3696 for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
3697 if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
3698 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3702 for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
3703 if txid == *spendable_txid {
3704 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3709 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
3710 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
3711 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
3712 // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
3713 // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
3714 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
3715 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
3716 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
3717 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
3718 &self.channel_id(), txid);
3719 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
3720 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
3721 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
3722 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
3723 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3724 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
3725 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3726 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3728 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3729 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
3730 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
3731 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3732 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
3733 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
3734 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3735 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3737 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3738 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
3742 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3744 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
3746 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
3747 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
3748 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
3749 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
3752 // Now that we've detected a confirmed commitment transaction, attempt to cancel
3753 // pending claims for any commitments that were previously confirmed such that
3754 // we don't continue claiming inputs that no longer exist.
3755 self.cancel_prev_commitment_claims(&logger, &txid);
3758 if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
3759 // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
3760 // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
3761 // other ways which can have more than one output.
3762 for tx_input in &tx.input {
3763 let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
3764 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
3765 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
3766 &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
3768 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3769 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
3770 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3772 // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
3773 // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
3774 // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
3775 // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
3779 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3781 self.check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3785 if height > self.best_block.height {
3786 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3789 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3792 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
3793 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
3794 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
3795 /// complexity especially in
3796 /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
3798 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
3799 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
3800 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3803 conf_hash: BlockHash,
3804 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
3805 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
3806 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
3808 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3809 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3810 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3812 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3813 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3816 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
3817 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height >= conf_height);
3819 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
3820 if should_broadcast {
3821 let (mut new_outpoints, mut new_outputs) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut);
3822 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3823 watch_outputs.append(&mut new_outputs);
3826 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3827 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3828 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3829 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3830 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3831 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3832 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3834 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3838 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3839 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3840 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3842 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3843 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3847 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3848 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3850 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3851 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3853 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3854 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3855 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3858 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3859 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3860 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3861 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3863 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3864 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3865 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3866 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3867 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3870 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3871 &payment_hash, entry.txid);
3872 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3874 payment_preimage: None,
3875 source: source.clone(),
3876 htlc_value_satoshis,
3878 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3879 commitment_tx_output_idx,
3880 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3881 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3882 payment_preimage: None,
3885 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3886 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3887 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3888 outputs: vec![descriptor],
3889 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3891 self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
3893 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3894 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3895 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
3896 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3897 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3898 payment_preimage: preimage,
3901 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3902 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3903 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3908 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3909 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3911 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3912 // updating the latter in the process.
3913 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3914 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3915 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3919 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3920 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3921 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3922 for tx in &txn_matched {
3923 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3924 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3925 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3926 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3934 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3935 &mut self, header: &Header, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3936 ) where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3937 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3940 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3943 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3944 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3945 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3947 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3948 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3950 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3953 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3957 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3958 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3960 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3961 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3964 let mut removed_height = None;
3965 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3966 if entry.txid == *txid {
3967 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
3972 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
3973 log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
3974 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
3975 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
3980 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
3982 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3985 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3986 /// transactions thereof.
3987 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3988 let mut matched_txn = new_hash_set();
3989 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3990 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3991 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3992 if matches { break; }
3993 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3998 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
4001 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
4004 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
4005 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
4006 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4007 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
4008 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
4009 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
4012 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
4013 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
4014 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
4015 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
4016 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
4017 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
4018 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
4019 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
4023 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&ScriptBuf::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
4024 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
4025 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
4026 } else { panic!(); }
4037 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
4038 &self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
4039 ) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
4040 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
4041 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
4042 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
4043 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
4044 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
4050 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
4051 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
4052 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
4053 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
4054 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
4055 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
4056 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
4057 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
4058 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
4059 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
4060 let height = self.best_block.height;
4061 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
4062 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
4063 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
4064 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
4065 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
4066 // time out the HTLC first.
4067 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
4068 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
4069 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
4070 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
4071 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
4072 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
4073 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
4074 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
4075 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
4076 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
4077 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
4078 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
4079 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4080 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4081 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4082 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
4083 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
4084 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
4085 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
4086 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
4087 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
4088 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
4089 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
4090 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4097 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
4099 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4100 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4101 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4104 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4105 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4106 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4113 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
4114 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
4115 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(
4116 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4117 ) where L::Target: Logger {
4118 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
4119 let mut payment_data = None;
4120 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
4121 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
4122 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
4123 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4124 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
4125 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
4126 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4127 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
4129 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4130 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
4131 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
4134 macro_rules! log_claim {
4135 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
4136 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
4137 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
4139 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4140 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4141 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4142 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4143 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
4144 // matched by any HTLC spend:
4145 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4146 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
4147 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
4148 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
4149 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
4150 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
4151 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
4152 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4153 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4154 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
4156 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
4157 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4158 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4159 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
4164 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
4165 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
4166 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
4167 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
4168 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
4169 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
4170 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
4171 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
4180 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
4181 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
4182 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
4183 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
4184 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
4185 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
4186 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
4187 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
4188 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
4189 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
4190 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
4191 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
4192 } else if !$holder_tx {
4193 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4194 if payment_data.is_none() {
4195 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4198 if payment_data.is_none() {
4199 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
4200 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
4201 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4202 txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4203 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4204 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4205 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
4206 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
4207 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
4208 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
4209 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
4210 // accepted_preimage_claim).
4211 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
4212 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
4215 continue 'outer_loop;
4222 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
4223 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4224 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
4226 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
4227 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
4228 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4229 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
4232 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
4233 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
4234 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
4237 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
4238 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
4239 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
4240 if accepted_preimage_claim {
4241 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4242 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
4243 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4246 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4247 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4248 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4249 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4250 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4251 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4254 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4256 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4258 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4261 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
4262 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4263 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
4264 upd.source == source
4266 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4268 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4270 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4271 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4272 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4273 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4274 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4277 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4279 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4281 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4285 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
4286 if entry.height != height { return true; }
4288 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
4289 *htlc_source != source
4294 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4296 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4298 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4299 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
4300 source, payment_hash,
4301 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4302 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
4305 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", &payment_hash, entry.confirmation_threshold());
4306 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4312 fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
4313 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
4314 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4315 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
4316 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4317 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4318 output: outp.clone(),
4319 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4322 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
4323 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
4324 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4325 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4326 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
4327 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
4328 output: outp.clone(),
4329 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2,
4330 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4331 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4335 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
4336 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4337 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4338 output: outp.clone(),
4339 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4340 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4341 channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()),
4344 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
4345 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4346 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4347 output: outp.clone(),
4348 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4355 /// Checks if the confirmed transaction is paying funds back to some address we can assume to
4357 fn check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs<L: Deref>(
4358 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4359 ) where L::Target: Logger {
4360 for spendable_output in self.get_spendable_outputs(tx) {
4361 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4363 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4365 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4366 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
4368 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
4369 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4374 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
4376 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4377 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4380 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4381 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4384 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4385 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4389 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, M, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (M, T, F, L)
4391 M: Deref<Target = ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4392 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4393 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4396 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4397 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4400 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4401 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4404 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4405 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4408 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
4409 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
4413 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4415 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
4416 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::EcdsaSigner>) {
4417 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4418 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
4422 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4427 let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
4429 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4431 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4432 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4434 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4435 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4437 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
4438 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4439 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4440 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
4443 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4445 let mut counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf = Readable::read(reader)?;
4446 let shutdown_script = {
4447 let script = <ScriptBuf as Readable>::read(reader)?;
4448 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
4451 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4452 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
4453 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
4454 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
4455 let outpoint = OutPoint {
4456 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
4457 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
4459 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
4460 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4461 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4463 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
4464 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
4465 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4467 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
4468 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4472 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4473 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
4474 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
4475 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
4477 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
4482 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4484 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4486 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
4489 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
4490 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4491 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4492 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4493 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
4495 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4496 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
4502 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4503 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
4504 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
4505 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4506 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4507 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4508 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
4509 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
4511 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
4512 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4516 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4517 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4518 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
4519 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4520 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4521 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
4522 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4526 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4527 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4528 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
4529 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4530 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4531 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
4532 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4536 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
4537 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4540 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
4542 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4544 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
4546 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4547 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4549 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4550 let mut payment_preimages = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4551 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
4552 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
4553 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4554 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
4555 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4559 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4560 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
4561 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
4562 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
4563 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4564 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
4565 1 => MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_info.0),
4566 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4568 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
4571 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4572 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
4573 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
4574 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4575 pending_events.push(event);
4579 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
4581 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4582 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
4583 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
4584 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4585 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
4589 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4590 let mut outputs_to_watch = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<ScriptBuf>>())));
4591 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
4592 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4593 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4594 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<ScriptBuf>())));
4595 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
4596 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4598 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
4599 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4602 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::EcdsaSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(
4603 reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
4606 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
4607 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4609 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
4610 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4611 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
4612 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4613 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
4614 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
4615 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4619 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4620 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4621 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
4622 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
4623 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4626 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
4627 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
4628 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
4629 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
4630 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
4631 let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
4632 let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(new_hash_map());
4633 let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None;
4634 let mut channel_id = None;
4635 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4636 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
4637 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
4638 (5, pending_monitor_events, optional_vec),
4639 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
4640 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
4641 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
4642 (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
4643 (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
4644 (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
4645 (19, channel_id, option),
4648 // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` replaced `HolderForceClosed` in v0.0.122. If we have both
4649 // events, we can remove the `HolderForceClosed` event and just keep the `HolderForceClosedWithInfo`.
4650 if let Some(ref mut pending_monitor_events) = pending_monitor_events {
4651 if pending_monitor_events.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_))) &&
4652 pending_monitor_events.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. }))
4654 pending_monitor_events.retain(|e| !matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_)));
4658 // Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the
4659 // wrong `counterparty_payment_script` was being tracked. Fix it now on deserialization to
4660 // give them a chance to recognize the spendable output.
4661 if onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() &&
4662 counterparty_payment_script.is_v0_p2wpkh()
4664 let payment_point = onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.payment_point;
4665 counterparty_payment_script =
4666 chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh();
4669 Ok((best_block.block_hash, ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
4671 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
4674 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
4675 counterparty_payment_script,
4679 holder_revocation_basepoint,
4680 channel_id: channel_id.unwrap_or(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint)),
4682 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4683 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4685 counterparty_commitment_params,
4686 funding_redeemscript,
4687 channel_value_satoshis,
4688 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
4693 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
4694 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
4695 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
4696 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),
4698 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
4699 current_holder_commitment_tx,
4700 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
4701 current_holder_commitment_number,
4704 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
4706 is_processing_pending_events: false,
4708 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
4713 lockdown_from_offchain,
4715 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
4716 funding_spend_confirmed,
4717 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
4718 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
4719 spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
4722 counterparty_node_id,
4723 initial_counterparty_commitment_info,
4730 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
4731 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
4732 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4733 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut};
4734 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4735 use bitcoin::sighash;
4736 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
4737 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4738 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4739 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4740 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
4741 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4742 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4743 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
4744 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Witness};
4746 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
4748 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
4749 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
4750 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
4751 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, WithChannelMonitor};
4752 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
4753 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4754 use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
4755 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, ChannelId};
4756 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint, RevocationKey};
4757 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
4758 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
4759 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4760 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
4761 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
4762 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
4763 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
4764 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
4765 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4767 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
4768 use crate::prelude::*;
4770 use std::str::FromStr;
4772 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
4773 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
4774 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
4775 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
4776 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
4777 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
4778 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
4779 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
4780 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
4782 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
4783 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
4784 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4785 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4786 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4787 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4788 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4789 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4791 // Rebalance somewhat
4792 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
4794 // First route two payments for testing at the end
4795 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4796 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4798 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
4799 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4800 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
4801 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
4802 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
4803 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
4804 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
4806 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
4807 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
4808 let new_header = create_dummy_header(nodes[0].best_block_info().0, 0);
4809 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4810 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
4811 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
4813 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
4814 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
4815 (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
4817 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
4818 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
4819 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
4820 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
4821 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
4822 ), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress, {});
4823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4825 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
4826 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
4827 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
4828 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
4829 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().next().unwrap().clone();
4830 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
4831 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
4832 } else { panic!(); }
4833 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
4834 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
4836 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
4838 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
4840 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
4842 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4843 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
4844 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
4845 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
4846 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
4847 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
4848 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4849 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
4850 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
4853 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
4854 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
4855 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4859 fn test_prune_preimages() {
4860 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4861 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4862 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster::new(Network::Testnet));
4863 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4865 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4867 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4870 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4871 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4872 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4876 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlcs {
4877 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4879 let mut res = Vec::new();
4880 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4881 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4885 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4886 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4893 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4894 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4895 preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
4898 let dummy_sig = crate::crypto::utils::sign(&secp_ctx,
4899 &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
4900 &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4902 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4903 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4904 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4905 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4910 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4912 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4913 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4914 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4915 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4916 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4923 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4924 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4925 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
4926 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4927 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
4928 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap()))
4930 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4931 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
4932 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4933 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4934 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4935 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4936 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4937 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4938 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4940 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4941 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
4943 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4945 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4946 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
4947 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4948 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
4949 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
4950 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
4951 best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);
4953 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
4954 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4956 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4957 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4958 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"1").to_byte_array()),
4959 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4960 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"2").to_byte_array()),
4961 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4962 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4963 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4964 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4967 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4968 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4969 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4970 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4971 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4972 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4973 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4975 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"3").to_byte_array()),
4976 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4978 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4979 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4980 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4981 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4982 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4983 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4985 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"4").to_byte_array()),
4986 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4988 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4989 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4990 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]);
4991 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4992 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4993 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4994 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4995 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4996 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4997 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4998 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
5000 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
5001 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]);
5002 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
5003 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
5004 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
5005 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
5006 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
5007 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
5008 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
5012 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
5013 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
5014 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
5016 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5017 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5018 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
5020 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint};
5021 macro_rules! sign_input {
5022 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
5023 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
5024 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
5026 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
5027 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
5028 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
5030 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), 256, &DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) };
5031 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
5032 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
5033 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5034 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5035 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len() as u64;
5036 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
5037 witness.push(ser_sig);
5038 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
5039 witness.push(vec!(1));
5040 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
5041 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
5042 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
5043 witness.push(vec![0]);
5045 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
5047 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
5048 let witness = witness.to_vec();
5049 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
5050 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
5051 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
5055 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
5056 let txid = Txid::from_str("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
5058 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
5059 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5060 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5061 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5063 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5064 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5068 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5069 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5070 witness: Witness::new(),
5073 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5074 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5077 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5078 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
5079 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5081 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5082 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5083 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5084 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5087 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5090 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
5091 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5092 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5093 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5095 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5096 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5100 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5101 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5102 witness: Witness::new(),
5105 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5106 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5109 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5110 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
5111 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5113 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5114 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5115 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5116 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5119 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5122 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
5123 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5124 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5125 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5126 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5127 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5131 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5132 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5133 witness: Witness::new(),
5135 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5136 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5139 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5140 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
5141 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5143 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5144 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5145 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5146 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5149 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5154 fn test_with_channel_monitor_impl_logger() {
5155 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5156 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
5158 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5160 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
5162 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5163 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5164 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5165 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5166 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5173 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5174 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
5175 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
5176 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
5177 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
5178 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())),
5180 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
5181 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
5182 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
5183 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
5184 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
5185 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5186 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5187 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5188 selected_contest_delay: 67,
5190 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
5191 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
5193 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5194 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
5195 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
5196 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
5197 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
5198 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
5199 best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);
5201 let chan_id = monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id();
5202 let context_logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&logger, &monitor);
5203 log_error!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5204 log_warn!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5205 log_debug!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5206 log_trace!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5207 log_gossip!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5208 log_info!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5209 logger.assert_log_context_contains("lightning::chain::channelmonitor::tests", Some(dummy_key), Some(chan_id), 6);
5211 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.