1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
42 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
44 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
46 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
47 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use util::logger::Logger;
50 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
52 use util::events::Event;
56 use io::{self, Error};
60 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
61 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
62 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
65 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
67 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
68 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
69 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
71 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
72 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
73 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
75 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
76 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
77 /// its docs for more details.
82 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
83 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
84 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
85 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
86 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
88 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
90 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
91 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
92 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
93 self.update_id.write(w)?;
94 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
95 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
96 update_step.write(w)?;
98 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
102 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
103 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
104 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
105 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
106 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
107 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
109 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
113 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
114 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
118 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
119 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
120 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
122 /// Contains a developer-readable error message.
123 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
124 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
126 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
127 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
128 pub enum MonitorEvent {
129 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
130 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
132 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
133 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
135 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent, ;
137 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
140 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
141 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
142 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
143 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
144 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
145 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
146 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
147 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
148 pub(crate) onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
150 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
151 (0, payment_hash, required),
152 (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
153 (2, source, required),
154 (4, payment_preimage, option),
157 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
158 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
159 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
160 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
161 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
162 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
163 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
164 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
165 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
166 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
167 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
168 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
169 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
170 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
171 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
172 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
173 /// accurate block height.
174 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
175 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
176 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
177 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
178 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
179 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
182 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
183 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
184 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
185 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
186 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
187 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
188 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
189 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
190 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
191 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
193 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
194 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
195 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
197 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
198 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
199 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
200 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
202 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
203 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
205 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
206 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
207 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
209 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
210 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
211 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
213 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
214 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
215 struct HolderSignedTx {
216 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
218 revocation_key: PublicKey,
219 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
220 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
221 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
222 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
223 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
224 to_self_value_sat: u64,
227 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
229 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
230 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
231 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
232 (2, revocation_key, required),
233 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
234 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
235 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
236 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
237 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
238 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
241 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
242 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
244 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
245 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
246 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
247 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
250 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
251 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
252 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
253 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
254 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
255 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
256 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
261 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
262 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
263 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
264 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
265 // used. Read it for compatibility.
266 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
267 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
268 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
269 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
270 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
271 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
275 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
276 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
277 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
278 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
279 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
280 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
281 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
283 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
284 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
285 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
286 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
289 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
293 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
294 /// transaction causing it.
296 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
298 struct OnchainEventEntry {
304 impl OnchainEventEntry {
305 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
306 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
308 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
309 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
311 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
312 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
313 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
315 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
316 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
317 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
318 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
319 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
326 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
327 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
331 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
332 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
335 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
336 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
337 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
338 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
339 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
340 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
343 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
344 onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
345 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
346 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
347 input_idx: Option<u32>,
350 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
352 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
354 FundingSpendConfirmation {
355 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
356 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
357 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
359 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
360 /// is constructed. This is used when
361 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
362 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
363 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
364 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
365 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
367 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
369 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
370 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
371 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
372 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
373 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
374 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
378 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
379 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
380 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
381 (0, self.txid, required),
382 (2, self.height, required),
383 (4, self.event, required),
389 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
390 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
391 let mut txid = Default::default();
393 let mut event = None;
394 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
396 (2, height, required),
397 (4, event, ignorable),
399 if let Some(ev) = event {
400 Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, event: ev }))
407 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
409 (0, source, required),
410 (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
411 (2, payment_hash, required),
412 (3, input_idx, option),
414 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
415 (0, descriptor, required),
417 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
418 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
420 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
421 (0, input_idx, required),
422 (2, preimage, option),
423 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
428 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
430 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
431 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
432 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
433 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
435 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
436 commitment_txid: Txid,
437 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
438 commitment_number: u64,
439 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
442 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
448 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
449 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
451 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
452 /// think we've fallen behind!
453 should_broadcast: bool,
456 scriptpubkey: Script,
460 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
461 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
462 (0, commitment_tx, required),
463 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
465 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
466 (0, commitment_txid, required),
467 (2, commitment_number, required),
468 (4, their_revocation_point, required),
469 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
471 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
472 (0, payment_preimage, required),
474 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
476 (2, secret, required),
478 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
479 (0, should_broadcast, required),
481 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
482 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
486 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
488 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
490 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
491 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
493 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
494 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
495 /// force-closed now.
496 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
497 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
498 /// required to do so.
499 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
501 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
502 /// we consider it spendable.
503 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
504 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
505 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
506 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
507 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
509 confirmation_height: u32,
511 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
512 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
513 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
515 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
516 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
517 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
518 ContentiousClaimable {
519 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
520 /// required to do so.
521 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
522 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
526 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
527 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
528 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
529 MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
530 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
531 /// required to do so.
532 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
533 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
535 claimable_height: u32,
539 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
541 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
543 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
544 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
547 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
548 (0, input_idx, required),
549 (2, payment_preimage, option),
552 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
553 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
555 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
556 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
558 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
559 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
560 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
561 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
563 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
564 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
565 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
566 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
567 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
568 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
570 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
572 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
575 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
576 latest_update_id: u64,
577 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
579 destination_script: Script,
580 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
581 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
582 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
584 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
585 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
586 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
587 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
588 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
590 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
591 funding_redeemscript: Script,
592 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
593 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
594 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
596 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
598 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
599 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
600 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
601 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
602 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
603 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
604 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
605 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
606 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
607 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
608 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
609 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
610 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
611 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
612 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
613 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
615 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
616 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
617 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
618 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
619 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
620 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
622 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
624 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
625 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
627 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
629 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
631 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
632 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
634 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
635 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
636 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
637 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
639 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
640 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
641 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
642 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
643 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
646 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
648 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
650 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
651 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
652 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
653 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
655 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
656 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
657 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
659 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
660 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
661 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
662 holder_tx_signed: bool,
664 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
665 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
666 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
667 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
668 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
670 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
671 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
672 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
673 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
674 // the full block_connected).
675 best_block: BestBlock,
677 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
680 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
681 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
683 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
684 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
685 /// underlying object
686 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
687 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
688 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
689 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
694 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
695 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
696 /// underlying object
697 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
698 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
699 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
700 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
701 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
702 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
703 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
704 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
705 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
706 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
707 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
708 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
709 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
710 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
711 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
712 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
713 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
714 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
715 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
716 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
717 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
718 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
719 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
720 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
721 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
722 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
723 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
724 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
725 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
726 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
727 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
728 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
729 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
730 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
739 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
740 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
741 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
745 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
746 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
747 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
749 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
750 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
751 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
753 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
755 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
756 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
758 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
759 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
760 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
761 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
762 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
763 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
765 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
768 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
769 match &self.shutdown_script {
770 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
771 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
774 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
775 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
776 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
777 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
778 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
779 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
780 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
782 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
783 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
784 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
786 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
787 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
788 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
789 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
790 match second_option {
791 Some(second_pubkey) => {
792 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
795 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
800 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
804 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
806 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
808 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
809 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
810 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
811 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
812 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
813 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
814 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
818 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
819 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
820 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
821 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
822 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
823 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
824 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
828 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
829 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
830 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
831 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
834 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
835 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
836 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
837 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
840 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
841 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
842 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
844 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
847 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
849 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
850 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
852 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
853 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
854 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
857 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
858 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
860 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
864 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
868 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
869 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
870 event.write(writer)?;
873 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
874 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
876 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
877 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
878 entry.write(writer)?;
881 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
882 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
884 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
885 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
887 script.write(writer)?;
890 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
892 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
893 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
895 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
896 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
897 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
898 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
905 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
906 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
907 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
908 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
909 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
910 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
911 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
912 best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
914 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
915 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
916 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
918 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
919 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
920 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
921 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
923 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
924 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
926 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
927 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
928 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
929 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
931 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
932 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
934 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
935 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
936 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
937 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
938 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
939 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
940 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
941 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
943 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
946 let onchain_tx_handler =
947 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
948 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
950 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
951 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
954 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
956 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
958 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
959 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
960 counterparty_payment_script,
964 holder_revocation_basepoint,
966 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
967 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
969 counterparty_commitment_params,
970 funding_redeemscript,
971 channel_value_satoshis,
972 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
974 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
976 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
977 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
978 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
979 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
981 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
982 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
983 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
984 current_holder_commitment_number,
986 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
987 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
988 pending_events: Vec::new(),
990 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
995 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
996 holder_tx_signed: false,
997 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
998 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1008 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1009 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1012 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1013 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1014 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1015 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1016 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1019 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1020 commitment_number: u64,
1021 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
1023 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1024 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1025 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
1029 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1031 holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1032 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1033 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1034 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1035 holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)
1039 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1041 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1042 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1047 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1048 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1051 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1052 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1055 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1060 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1063 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1066 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1069 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1070 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1072 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1076 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1078 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1079 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1082 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1085 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1087 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1088 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1091 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1092 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1093 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1096 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1097 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1098 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1099 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1100 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1103 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1104 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1105 /// have been registered.
1106 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1107 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1108 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1109 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1110 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1111 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1112 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1114 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1115 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1121 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1122 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1123 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1124 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1127 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1130 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1131 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1132 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1133 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1134 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1137 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1138 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1141 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1142 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1145 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1146 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1149 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1150 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1151 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1152 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1153 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1154 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1155 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1156 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1157 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1158 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1159 where L::Target: Logger {
1160 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1163 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1164 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1165 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1166 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1167 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1168 where L::Target: Logger {
1169 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1172 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1173 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1174 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1175 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1176 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1177 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1179 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1180 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1182 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1183 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1185 header: &BlockHeader,
1186 txdata: &TransactionData,
1191 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1193 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1194 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1197 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1198 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1201 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1203 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1205 header: &BlockHeader,
1211 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1212 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1215 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1216 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1219 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1220 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1222 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1223 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1225 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1226 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1228 header: &BlockHeader,
1229 txdata: &TransactionData,
1234 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1236 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1237 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1240 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1241 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1244 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1246 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1247 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1249 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1250 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1257 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1258 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1261 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1262 txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1265 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1266 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1268 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1269 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1271 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1272 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1274 header: &BlockHeader,
1279 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1281 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1282 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1285 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1286 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1289 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1290 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1291 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1292 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1294 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1295 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1297 txids.sort_unstable();
1302 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1303 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1304 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1305 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1308 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1309 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1312 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1313 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1314 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1315 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1317 /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
1318 /// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
1321 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1322 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1323 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1324 let mut res = Vec::new();
1325 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1327 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1328 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1329 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1330 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1331 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1334 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1335 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1336 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1337 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1338 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1341 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1342 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1343 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1344 if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1345 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
1346 assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1347 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1348 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1349 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1350 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1351 let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1352 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
1353 if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1356 if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
1357 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1358 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1359 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1362 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1363 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1364 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1367 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1368 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1369 // we know the preimage.
1370 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1371 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1372 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1373 let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1374 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
1375 if input_idx == htlc_input_idx {
1376 Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
1380 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1381 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1382 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1383 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1386 res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1387 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1388 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1397 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1398 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1399 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1400 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1401 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1402 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1403 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1404 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1406 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1409 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1410 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1411 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1414 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1415 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1416 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1419 found_commitment_tx = true;
1420 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1421 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1422 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1423 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1424 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1425 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1428 found_commitment_tx = true;
1429 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1430 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1431 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1432 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1433 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1434 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1435 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1438 found_commitment_tx = true;
1441 if !found_commitment_tx {
1442 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1443 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1444 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1445 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1446 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1447 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1448 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1452 // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
1455 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1456 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1457 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1459 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1460 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1461 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1463 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1464 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1467 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1468 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1476 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1477 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1478 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1480 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1481 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1482 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1483 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1484 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1485 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1487 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1488 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1489 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1490 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1491 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1492 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1493 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1494 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1495 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1496 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1497 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1498 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1499 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1500 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1501 // payment_preimage.
1502 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1503 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1504 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1505 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1507 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1508 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1509 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1510 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source {
1511 matched_htlc = true;
1515 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1516 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1517 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1519 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1520 *update_source != **source
1525 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1527 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1528 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1529 source: (**source).clone(),
1530 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1531 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1535 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1536 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1537 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1543 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1544 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1546 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1547 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
1552 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1553 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1554 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1555 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1556 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1557 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1558 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1561 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1562 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1563 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1564 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1569 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1570 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1571 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1572 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1573 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1575 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1576 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1577 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1581 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1582 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1583 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1588 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1595 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1604 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1605 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1606 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1607 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1609 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1610 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1613 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1614 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1615 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1616 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1617 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1618 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1619 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1620 Some(old_points) => {
1621 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1622 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1623 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1624 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1625 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1627 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1630 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1634 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1637 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1638 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1639 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1645 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1646 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1647 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1648 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1649 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1650 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1651 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1652 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1653 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1654 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1655 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1656 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1659 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1660 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1661 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1662 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1663 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1665 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1666 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1669 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1670 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1671 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1672 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1673 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
1678 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1679 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1680 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
1681 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1682 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1685 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1687 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1688 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1689 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1690 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1691 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1692 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1695 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1696 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1697 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1701 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1702 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1703 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1708 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1709 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1710 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1711 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1712 // holder commitment transactions.
1713 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1714 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
1715 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
1717 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
1718 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1719 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1720 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
1721 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1726 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1727 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1730 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1731 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
1732 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1734 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
1737 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1738 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1739 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1742 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1743 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1744 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1745 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1746 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1747 match updates.updates[0] {
1748 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
1749 _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
1751 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1752 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1753 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1755 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
1757 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1758 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
1759 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1760 self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone())?
1762 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
1763 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
1764 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
1766 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
1767 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
1768 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1770 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
1771 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
1772 self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?
1774 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1775 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
1776 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1777 if *should_broadcast {
1778 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1779 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
1780 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1782 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
1783 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
1784 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
1785 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
1788 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
1789 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
1790 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
1791 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
1796 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1800 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1801 self.latest_update_id
1804 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1808 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
1809 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
1810 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
1811 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
1812 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1813 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
1815 &self.outputs_to_watch
1818 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1819 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1820 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
1824 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
1825 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1826 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1830 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1831 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1832 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1835 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1836 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1839 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1840 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
1843 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1844 self.current_holder_commitment_number
1847 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1848 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1849 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1850 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1851 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1852 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
1853 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
1854 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1855 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1856 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1857 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1859 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1860 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1862 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1863 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1866 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1871 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1872 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1873 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1874 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1875 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1876 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
1877 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
1879 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1880 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1882 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
1883 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1884 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1885 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
1886 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
1887 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
1891 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1892 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1893 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1894 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1895 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1896 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1897 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1899 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone());
1900 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
1901 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
1906 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1907 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1908 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
1909 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1910 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1911 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1913 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1915 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", height, [].iter().map(|a| *a), logger);
1917 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1918 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1919 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1920 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1921 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1922 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1923 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1925 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1926 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1928 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1930 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1931 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", height, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(a, b)| (a, b.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()))), logger);
1933 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
1934 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
1935 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
1939 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1942 fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
1943 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1944 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
1945 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1946 let revocation_point_option =
1947 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
1948 // per-commitment point
1949 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1950 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1951 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
1952 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
1953 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
1954 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1956 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1957 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1958 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1959 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
1960 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
1961 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1962 return claimable_outpoints; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1965 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1966 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1967 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
1968 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1969 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
1970 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
1980 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1981 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
1982 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1983 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1984 return (Vec::new(), None)
1987 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1988 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1991 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1996 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1997 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1998 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2000 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2001 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2002 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2003 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2004 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2005 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2008 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2009 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2010 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2011 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2012 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2014 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2015 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2017 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2018 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2019 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2020 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2022 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2025 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2028 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2030 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2031 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2035 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2038 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2039 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2040 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2041 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2042 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2043 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2049 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2050 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2051 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2052 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2053 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2054 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2055 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2056 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2058 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2059 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2060 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2061 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2062 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2066 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2067 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2069 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2070 is_holder_tx = true;
2071 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2072 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2073 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2074 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2075 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", height, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
2076 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2077 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2078 is_holder_tx = true;
2079 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2080 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2081 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2082 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2083 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", height, holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
2088 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2094 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2095 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2096 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2097 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2098 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2099 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2100 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2101 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2102 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2103 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2104 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2107 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2108 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2109 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2110 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2111 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2112 // confirmed in the next block.
2115 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2116 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2117 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2121 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2122 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2126 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2127 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2128 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2129 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2130 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2131 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2132 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2133 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2134 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2135 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2136 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2137 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2141 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2142 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2143 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2150 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2151 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2152 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2155 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2156 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2158 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2161 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2163 header: &BlockHeader,
2168 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2170 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2171 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2174 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2176 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2177 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2178 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2179 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2180 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2181 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2182 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2184 } else { Vec::new() }
2187 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2189 header: &BlockHeader,
2190 txdata: &TransactionData,
2195 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2197 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2198 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2201 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2202 for tx in &txn_matched {
2203 let mut output_val = 0;
2204 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2205 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2206 output_val += out.value;
2207 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2211 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2213 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2214 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2215 for tx in &txn_matched {
2216 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2217 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2218 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2219 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2221 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2222 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2223 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2224 log_info!(logger, "Channel closed by funding output spend in txid {}.", log_bytes!(tx.txid()));
2225 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2226 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2227 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2228 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2230 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2231 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2232 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
2233 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2234 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2236 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2237 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2241 let txid = tx.txid();
2242 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2245 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2246 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2250 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2251 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2252 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2253 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2254 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2259 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2260 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2261 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2262 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2264 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2267 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2268 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2271 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2274 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2275 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2276 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2277 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2279 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2280 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2281 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2284 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2285 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2286 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2290 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2292 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2293 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2296 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2297 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2299 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2300 if should_broadcast {
2301 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2302 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2303 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2304 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2305 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2306 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2307 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2308 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2309 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2310 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2311 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2312 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2313 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2315 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2318 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2319 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2320 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2321 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2322 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2323 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2324 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2326 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2330 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2331 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2332 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2334 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2335 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2339 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2340 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2342 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2343 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2345 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis, input_idx } => {
2346 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2347 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2350 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
2351 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2352 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2353 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2355 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
2356 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2357 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2358 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2359 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
2362 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2363 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2365 payment_preimage: None,
2366 source: source.clone(),
2367 onchain_value_satoshis,
2369 if let Some(idx) = input_idx {
2370 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
2373 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2374 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2375 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2376 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2379 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } => {
2380 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
2382 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
2383 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
2388 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2390 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2391 // updating the latter in the process.
2392 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2393 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2394 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2398 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2399 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2400 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2401 for tx in &txn_matched {
2402 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2403 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2404 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2405 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2413 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2414 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2415 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2418 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2421 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2422 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2423 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2425 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2427 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2430 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2437 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2438 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2441 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.txid != *txid);
2442 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2445 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2446 /// transactions thereof.
2447 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2448 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2449 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2450 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2451 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2452 if matches { break; }
2453 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2458 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2461 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2464 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2465 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2466 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2467 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2468 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2469 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2472 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2473 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2474 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2475 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2476 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2477 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2478 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2479 } else { panic!(); }
2490 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2491 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2492 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2493 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2494 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2495 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2496 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2497 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2498 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2499 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2500 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2501 let height = self.best_block.height();
2502 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2503 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2504 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2505 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2506 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2507 // time out the HTLC first.
2508 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2509 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2510 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2511 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2512 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2513 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2514 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2515 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2516 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2517 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2518 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2519 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2520 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2521 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2522 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2523 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2524 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2525 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2526 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2527 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2528 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2529 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2530 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2531 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2538 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2540 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2541 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2542 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2545 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2546 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2547 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2554 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2555 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2556 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2557 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2558 let mut payment_data = None;
2559 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2560 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2561 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2562 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2563 let accepted_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
2564 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
2565 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2566 let offered_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2568 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2569 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2570 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2571 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2572 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2575 macro_rules! log_claim {
2576 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2577 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2578 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
2580 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2581 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2582 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2583 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2584 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
2585 // matched by any HTLC spend:
2586 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2587 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
2588 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
2589 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
2590 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2591 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2592 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2593 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2594 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2595 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2597 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2598 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2599 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2600 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2605 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2606 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2607 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2608 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2609 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2610 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2611 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2612 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
2621 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2622 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2623 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2624 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2625 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2626 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2627 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2628 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2629 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2630 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2631 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2632 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
2633 } else if !$holder_tx {
2634 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2635 if payment_data.is_none() {
2636 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2639 if payment_data.is_none() {
2640 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2641 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
2642 if !outbound_htlc || revocation_sig_claim {
2643 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2644 txid: tx.txid(), height,
2645 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2646 input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2647 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
2648 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
2649 // If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
2650 // wait for the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from
2651 // claimable balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success
2653 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim {
2654 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
2658 // Outbound claims should always have payment_data, unless
2659 // we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
2660 // which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
2661 // spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
2662 // as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
2663 // TODO: Track the above as claimable!
2665 continue 'outer_loop;
2672 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2673 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2674 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2676 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2677 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2678 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2679 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2682 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2683 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2684 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2687 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2688 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2689 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
2690 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2691 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2692 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2693 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2696 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2697 input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2698 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2699 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
2702 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2704 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2706 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2709 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2710 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2711 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
2712 upd.source == source
2714 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2717 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2718 input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2719 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2720 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
2723 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2725 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2727 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2731 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2732 if entry.height != height { return true; }
2734 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
2735 *htlc_source != source
2740 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2743 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2744 source, payment_hash,
2745 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2746 input_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
2749 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2750 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2756 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2757 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2758 let mut spendable_output = None;
2759 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2760 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
2761 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2762 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2763 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2764 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2765 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2766 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2767 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2768 // non-standard due to their size.
2769 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2770 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2771 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2774 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2775 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2776 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2777 output: outp.clone(),
2781 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
2782 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2783 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2784 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2785 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
2786 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
2787 output: outp.clone(),
2788 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2789 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2790 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2795 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2796 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2797 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2798 output: outp.clone(),
2799 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2800 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2804 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
2805 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2806 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2807 output: outp.clone(),
2812 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2813 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2816 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
2818 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2819 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2824 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2826 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2827 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2830 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
2831 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
2832 self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2835 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2836 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2840 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2842 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2843 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2846 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
2847 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2850 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
2851 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2854 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2855 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2858 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
2859 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
2863 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2865 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
2866 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
2867 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2868 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2872 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2877 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
2879 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2880 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2882 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2883 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2885 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2886 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2887 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2888 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2891 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2893 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2894 let shutdown_script = {
2895 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2896 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
2899 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2900 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2901 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2902 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2903 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2904 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2905 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2907 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2908 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2909 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2911 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
2912 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2913 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2915 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2916 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2920 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2921 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2922 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2923 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2925 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2930 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2932 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2934 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2937 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2938 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2939 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2940 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2941 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2943 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2944 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2950 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2951 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2952 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
2953 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2954 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2955 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2956 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2957 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2959 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2960 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2964 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2965 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2966 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2967 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2968 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2969 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
2970 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2974 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2975 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2976 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
2977 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2978 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2979 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2980 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2984 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
2985 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2988 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
2990 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2992 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2994 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2995 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2997 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2998 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2999 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3000 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3001 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3002 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3003 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3007 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3008 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3009 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3010 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3011 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3012 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3013 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3014 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3016 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3019 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3020 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3021 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3022 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3023 pending_events.push(event);
3027 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3029 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3030 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3031 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3032 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3033 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3037 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3038 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3039 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3040 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3041 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3042 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3043 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3044 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3046 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3047 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3050 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3052 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3053 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3055 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3056 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3057 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3058 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3059 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3060 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3061 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3065 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3066 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3067 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3068 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3069 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3072 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3073 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3074 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3075 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3076 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3077 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3080 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3081 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3083 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
3084 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3086 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3089 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3090 counterparty_payment_script,
3094 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3096 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3097 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3099 counterparty_commitment_params,
3100 funding_redeemscript,
3101 channel_value_satoshis,
3102 their_cur_revocation_points,
3107 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3108 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3109 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3111 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3112 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3113 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3114 current_holder_commitment_number,
3117 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3120 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3125 lockdown_from_offchain,
3127 funding_spend_confirmed,
3128 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3140 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3141 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3142 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3143 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3144 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3145 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3146 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3147 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3148 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
3149 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3151 use chain::BestBlock;
3152 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3153 use chain::package::{WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3154 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3155 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3157 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3158 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3159 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3160 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3161 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3162 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3163 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3167 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3168 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3169 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3170 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
3171 let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) });
3173 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3174 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3176 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3179 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3180 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3181 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3185 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3186 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3188 let mut res = Vec::new();
3189 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3190 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3194 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3195 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3202 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3203 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3205 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3206 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3212 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3213 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3214 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3215 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3220 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3222 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3223 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3224 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3225 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3226 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3232 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3233 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3234 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3235 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3236 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3237 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3239 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
3240 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3241 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3242 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3243 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3244 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3245 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3246 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3248 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3250 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3252 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3253 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3254 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3255 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
3256 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3257 &channel_parameters,
3258 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3259 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
3261 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3262 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3263 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3264 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3265 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3266 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3267 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3268 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
3271 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3272 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3273 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3274 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3275 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3276 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3277 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3279 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3280 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3281 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3282 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3283 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3284 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3286 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3287 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3288 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3289 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3290 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3291 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3292 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3293 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3295 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3296 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3297 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3298 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3299 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3300 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3304 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3305 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3306 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3308 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3309 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3310 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3311 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3313 macro_rules! sign_input {
3314 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3315 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3316 offered: if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC { true } else { false },
3318 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3319 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3320 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3322 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3323 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3324 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3325 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3326 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3327 sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
3328 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
3329 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
3330 } else if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC {
3331 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3332 } else if *$weight == WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC {
3333 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
3335 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3337 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3338 println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
3339 println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
3340 println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
3344 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3345 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3347 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3348 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3350 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3351 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3355 script_sig: Script::new(),
3356 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3357 witness: Vec::new(),
3360 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3361 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3364 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3365 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC];
3366 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3368 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3369 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3370 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3371 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3374 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3376 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3377 claim_tx.input.clear();
3378 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3380 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3381 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3385 script_sig: Script::new(),
3386 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3387 witness: Vec::new(),
3390 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3391 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC];
3392 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3394 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3395 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3396 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3397 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3400 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3402 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3403 claim_tx.input.clear();
3404 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3405 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3406 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3410 script_sig: Script::new(),
3411 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3412 witness: Vec::new(),
3414 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3415 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
3416 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3418 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3419 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3420 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3421 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3424 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3427 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.