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Update pay_for_offer docs about unsupported chains
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / chain / channelmonitor.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
11 //! here.
12 //!
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
16 //!
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
22
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf};
26
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
30
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
35
36 use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
37 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, ChannelId};
38 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentKey, DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, HtlcKey, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
40 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,CommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys};
41 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
42 use crate::chain;
43 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
44 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
45 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
47 use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, FeerateStrategy, OnchainTxHandler};
48 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use crate::chain::Filter;
50 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
51 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
52 use crate::util::byte_utils;
53 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler};
54 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
55
56 use crate::prelude::*;
57 use core::{cmp, mem};
58 use crate::io::{self, Error};
59 use core::convert::TryInto;
60 use core::ops::Deref;
61 use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
62
63 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
64 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
65 ///
66 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
67 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
68 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
69 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
70 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
71 #[must_use]
72 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
73         pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
74         /// Historically, [`ChannelMonitor`]s didn't know their counterparty node id. However,
75         /// `ChannelManager` really wants to know it so that it can easily look up the corresponding
76         /// channel. For now, this results in a temporary map in `ChannelManager` to look up channels
77         /// by only the funding outpoint.
78         ///
79         /// To eventually remove that, we repeat the counterparty node id here so that we can upgrade
80         /// `ChannelMonitor`s to become aware of the counterparty node id if they were generated prior
81         /// to when it was stored directly in them.
82         pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
83         /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
84         /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
85         /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
86         ///
87         /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
88         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
89         /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
90         ///
91         /// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
92         /// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
93         /// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
94         /// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
95         /// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
96         ///
97         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
98         pub update_id: u64,
99         /// The channel ID associated with these updates.
100         ///
101         /// Will be `None` for `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.121 and
102         /// always `Some` otherwise.
103         pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
104 }
105
106 /// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
107 ///
108 ///     (1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
109 ///     (2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
110 ///             allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
111 ///             commitment transaction.
112 ///
113 /// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
114 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
115
116 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
117         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
118                 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
119                 self.update_id.write(w)?;
120                 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
121                 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
122                         update_step.write(w)?;
123                 }
124                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
125                         (1, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
126                         (3, self.channel_id, option),
127                 });
128                 Ok(())
129         }
130 }
131 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
132         fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
133                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
134                 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
135                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
136                 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
137                 for _ in 0..len {
138                         if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
139                                 updates.push(upd);
140                         }
141                 }
142                 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
143                 let mut channel_id = None;
144                 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
145                         (1, counterparty_node_id, option),
146                         (3, channel_id, option),
147                 });
148                 Ok(Self { update_id, counterparty_node_id, updates, channel_id })
149         }
150 }
151
152 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
153 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
154 pub enum MonitorEvent {
155         /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
156         HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
157
158         /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
159         /// channel.
160         HolderForceClosed(OutPoint),
161
162         /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
163         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
164         ///
165         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
166         Completed {
167                 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
168                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
169                 /// The channel ID of the channel associated with the [`ChannelMonitor`]
170                 channel_id: ChannelId,
171                 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
172                 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
173                 ///
174                 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
175                 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
176                 monitor_update_id: u64,
177         },
178 }
179 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
180         // Note that Completed is currently never serialized to disk as it is generated only in
181         // ChainMonitor.
182         (0, Completed) => {
183                 (0, funding_txo, required),
184                 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
185                 (4, channel_id, required),
186         },
187 ;
188         (2, HTLCEvent),
189         (4, HolderForceClosed),
190         // 6 was `UpdateFailed` until LDK 0.0.117
191 );
192
193 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
194 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
195 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
196 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
197 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
198         pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
199         pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
200         pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
201         pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
202 }
203 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
204         (0, payment_hash, required),
205         (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
206         (2, source, required),
207         (4, payment_preimage, option),
208 });
209
210 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
211 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
212 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
213 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
214 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
215 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
216 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
217 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
218 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
219 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
220 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
221 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
222 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
223 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
224 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
225 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
226 /// accurate block height.
227 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
228 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
229 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
230 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
231 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
232 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
233 /// losing money.
234 ///
235 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
236 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
237 /// by a  [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
238 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
239 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
240 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
241 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
242 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
243 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
244 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
245 ///
246 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
247 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
248 ///    waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
249 ///    fail this HTLC,
250 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
251 ///    condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
252 ///
253 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
254 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
255 ///
256 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
257 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
258 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
259 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
260
261 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
262 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
263 struct HolderSignedTx {
264         /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
265         txid: Txid,
266         revocation_key: RevocationKey,
267         a_htlc_key: HtlcKey,
268         b_htlc_key: HtlcKey,
269         delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey,
270         per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
271         htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
272         to_self_value_sat: u64,
273         feerate_per_kw: u32,
274 }
275 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
276         (0, txid, required),
277         // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
278         // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
279         (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
280         (2, revocation_key, required),
281         (4, a_htlc_key, required),
282         (6, b_htlc_key, required),
283         (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
284         (10, per_commitment_point, required),
285         (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
286         (14, htlc_outputs, required_vec)
287 });
288
289 impl HolderSignedTx {
290         fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
291                 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
292                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
293                                 Some(htlc.clone())
294                         } else {
295                                 None
296                         }
297                 })
298                 .collect()
299         }
300 }
301
302 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
303 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
304 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
305 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
306         counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: DelayedPaymentBasepoint,
307         counterparty_htlc_base_key: HtlcBasepoint,
308         on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
309 }
310
311 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
312         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
313                 w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
314                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
315                         (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
316                         (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
317                         (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
318                 });
319                 Ok(())
320         }
321 }
322 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
323         fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
324                 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
325                         // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
326                         // used. Read it for compatibility.
327                         let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
328                         for _  in 0..per_htlc_len {
329                                 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
330                                 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
331                                 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
332                                         let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
333                                 }
334                         }
335
336                         let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
337                         let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
338                         let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
339                         read_tlv_fields!(r, {
340                                 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
341                                 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
342                                 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
343                         });
344                         CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
345                                 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
346                                 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
347                                 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
348                         }
349                 };
350                 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
351         }
352 }
353
354 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
355 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
356 ///
357 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
358 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
359 struct OnchainEventEntry {
360         txid: Txid,
361         height: u32,
362         block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
363         event: OnchainEvent,
364         transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
365 }
366
367 impl OnchainEventEntry {
368         fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
369                 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
370                 match self.event {
371                         OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
372                                 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
373                         } => {
374                                 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
375                                 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
376                                 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
377                         },
378                         OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
379                         OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
380                                 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
381                                 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
382                                 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
383                         },
384                         _ => {},
385                 }
386                 conf_threshold
387         }
388
389         fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
390                 best_block.height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
391         }
392 }
393
394 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
395 ///
396 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
397 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
398
399 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
400 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
401 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
402 enum OnchainEvent {
403         /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
404         ///  * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
405         ///  * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
406         ///    on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
407         /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
408         /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
409         HTLCUpdate {
410                 source: HTLCSource,
411                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
412                 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
413                 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
414                 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
415                 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
416         },
417         /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
418         /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
419         MaturingOutput {
420                 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
421         },
422         /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
423         /// transaction.
424         FundingSpendConfirmation {
425                 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
426                 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
427                 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
428                 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
429                 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
430                 ///
431                 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
432                 /// counterparty output.
433                 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
434         },
435         /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
436         /// is constructed. This is used when
437         ///  * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
438         ///    immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
439         ///  * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
440         ///  * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
441         ///  * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
442         ///    signature.
443         ///  * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
444         ///    HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
445         ///    signature).
446         HTLCSpendConfirmation {
447                 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
448                 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
449                 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
450                 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
451                 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
452                 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
453                 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
454         },
455 }
456
457 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
458         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
459                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
460                         (0, self.txid, required),
461                         (1, self.transaction, option),
462                         (2, self.height, required),
463                         (3, self.block_hash, option),
464                         (4, self.event, required),
465                 });
466                 Ok(())
467         }
468 }
469
470 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
471         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
472                 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
473                 let mut transaction = None;
474                 let mut block_hash = None;
475                 let mut height = 0;
476                 let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
477                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
478                         (0, txid, required),
479                         (1, transaction, option),
480                         (2, height, required),
481                         (3, block_hash, option),
482                         (4, event, upgradable_required),
483                 });
484                 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
485         }
486 }
487
488 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
489         (0, HTLCUpdate) => {
490                 (0, source, required),
491                 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
492                 (2, payment_hash, required),
493                 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
494         },
495         (1, MaturingOutput) => {
496                 (0, descriptor, required),
497         },
498         (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
499                 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
500                 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
501         },
502         (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
503                 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
504                 (2, preimage, option),
505                 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
506         },
507
508 );
509
510 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
511 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
512         LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
513                 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
514                 /// Note that LDK after 0.0.115 supports this only containing dust HTLCs (implying the
515                 /// `Signature` field is never filled in). At that point, non-dust HTLCs are implied by the
516                 /// HTLC fields in `commitment_tx` and the sources passed via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
517                 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
518                 claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
519                 nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>,
520         },
521         LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
522                 commitment_txid: Txid,
523                 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
524                 commitment_number: u64,
525                 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
526                 feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>,
527                 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Option<u64>,
528                 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Option<u64>,
529         },
530         PaymentPreimage {
531                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
532         },
533         CommitmentSecret {
534                 idx: u64,
535                 secret: [u8; 32],
536         },
537         /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
538         /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
539         ChannelForceClosed {
540                 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
541                 /// think we've fallen behind!
542                 should_broadcast: bool,
543         },
544         ShutdownScript {
545                 scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
546         },
547 }
548
549 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
550         fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
551                 match self {
552                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
553                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
554                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
555                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
556                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
557                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
558                 }
559         }
560 }
561
562 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
563         (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
564                 (0, commitment_tx, required),
565                 (1, claimed_htlcs, optional_vec),
566                 (2, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
567                 (4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
568         },
569         (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
570                 (0, commitment_txid, required),
571                 (1, feerate_per_kw, option),
572                 (2, commitment_number, required),
573                 (3, to_broadcaster_value_sat, option),
574                 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
575                 (5, to_countersignatory_value_sat, option),
576                 (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
577         },
578         (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
579                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
580         },
581         (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
582                 (0, idx, required),
583                 (2, secret, required),
584         },
585         (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
586                 (0, should_broadcast, required),
587         },
588         (5, ShutdownScript) => {
589                 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
590         },
591 );
592
593 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
594 ///
595 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
596 /// be provided.
597 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
598 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
599 pub enum Balance {
600         /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
601         /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
602         /// force-closed now.
603         ClaimableOnChannelClose {
604                 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
605                 /// required to do so.
606                 amount_satoshis: u64,
607         },
608         /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
609         /// we consider it spendable.
610         ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
611                 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
612                 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
613                 amount_satoshis: u64,
614                 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
615                 /// amount.
616                 confirmation_height: u32,
617         },
618         /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
619         /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
620         /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
621         ///
622         /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
623         /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
624         /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
625         ContentiousClaimable {
626                 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
627                 /// required to do so.
628                 amount_satoshis: u64,
629                 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
630                 /// done so.
631                 timeout_height: u32,
632                 /// The payment hash that locks this HTLC.
633                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
634                 /// The preimage that can be used to claim this HTLC.
635                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
636         },
637         /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
638         /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
639         /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
640         MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
641                 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
642                 /// which will be required to do so.
643                 amount_satoshis: u64,
644                 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
645                 /// done so.
646                 claimable_height: u32,
647                 /// The payment hash whose preimage our counterparty needs to claim this HTLC.
648                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
649         },
650         /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
651         /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
652         /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
653         MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
654                 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
655                 /// which will be required to do so.
656                 amount_satoshis: u64,
657                 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
658                 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
659                 expiry_height: u32,
660                 /// The payment hash whose preimage we need to claim this HTLC.
661                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
662         },
663         /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
664         /// transaction.
665         ///
666         /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
667         /// following amount.
668         CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
669                 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
670                 ///
671                 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
672                 /// were already spent.
673                 amount_satoshis: u64,
674         },
675 }
676
677 impl Balance {
678         /// The amount claimable, in satoshis. This excludes balances that we are unsure if we are able
679         /// to claim, this is because we are waiting for a preimage or for a timeout to expire. For more
680         /// information on these balances see [`Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC`] and
681         /// [`Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC`].
682         ///
683         /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
684         pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
685                 match self {
686                         Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }|
687                         Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }|
688                         Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }|
689                         Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }
690                                 => *amount_satoshis,
691                         Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }|
692                         Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. }
693                                 => 0,
694                 }
695         }
696 }
697
698 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
699 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
700 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
701         commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
702         /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
703         /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
704         /// transaction.
705         resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
706         resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
707         /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
708         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
709 }
710
711 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
712 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
713 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
714 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
715 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
716         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
717                 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
718                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
719                         (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
720                         (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
721                         (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
722                         (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
723                 });
724                 Ok(())
725         }
726 }
727
728 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
729         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
730                 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
731                 let mut resolving_txid = None;
732                 let mut payment_preimage = None;
733                 let mut resolving_tx = None;
734                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
735                         (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
736                         (1, resolving_txid, option),
737                         (2, payment_preimage, option),
738                         (3, resolving_tx, option),
739                 });
740                 Ok(Self {
741                         commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
742                         resolving_txid,
743                         payment_preimage,
744                         resolving_tx,
745                 })
746         }
747 }
748
749 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
750 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
751 ///
752 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
753 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
754 ///
755 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
756 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
757 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
758 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
759 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
760 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
761         #[cfg(test)]
762         pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
763         #[cfg(not(test))]
764         pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
765 }
766
767 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: Clone {
768         fn clone(&self) -> Self {
769                 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone();
770                 ChannelMonitor::from_impl(inner)
771         }
772 }
773
774 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
775 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
776         latest_update_id: u64,
777         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
778
779         destination_script: ScriptBuf,
780         broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>,
781         counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf,
782         shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
783
784         channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
785         holder_revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint,
786         channel_id: ChannelId,
787         funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
788         current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
789         prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
790
791         counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
792         funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf,
793         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
794         // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
795         their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
796
797         on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
798
799         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
800         /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
801         /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
802         /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
803         counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
804         /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
805         /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
806         /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
807         /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
808         /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
809         counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
810         /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
811         /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
812         /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
813         /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
814         counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
815
816         counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,
817
818         // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
819         // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
820         // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
821         // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
822         prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
823         current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
824
825         // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
826         // deserialization
827         current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
828         // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
829         // deserialization
830         current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
831
832         /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
833         /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
834         /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
835         /// revoked.
836         payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
837
838         // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
839         // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
840         // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
841         // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
842         // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
843         // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
844         // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
845         // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
846         // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
847         pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
848
849         pub(super) pending_events: Vec<Event>,
850         pub(super) is_processing_pending_events: bool,
851
852         // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
853         // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
854         // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
855         onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
856
857         // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
858         // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
859         // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
860         // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
861         outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>>,
862
863         #[cfg(test)]
864         pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
865         #[cfg(not(test))]
866         onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
867
868         // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
869         // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
870         // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
871         lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
872
873         // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
874         // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
875         // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
876         //
877         // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
878         // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
879         // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
880         holder_tx_signed: bool,
881
882         // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
883         // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
884         // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
885         funding_spend_seen: bool,
886
887         /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
888         /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
889         funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
890
891         confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
892         /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
893         /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
894         /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
895         htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
896
897         /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
898         /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
899         /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
900         /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
901         /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
902         spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
903
904         // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
905         // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
906         // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
907         // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
908         // the full block_connected).
909         best_block: BestBlock,
910
911         /// The node_id of our counterparty
912         counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
913
914         /// Initial counterparty commmitment data needed to recreate the commitment tx
915         /// in the persistence pipeline for third-party watchtowers. This will only be present on
916         /// monitors created after 0.0.117.
917         ///
918         /// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats,
919         /// to_countersignatory_sats)
920         initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>,
921 }
922
923 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
924 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
925
926 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
927         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
928                 // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
929                 // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
930                 // lock is held).
931                 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
932                 let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
933                 let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
934                 a.eq(&b)
935         }
936 }
937
938 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
939         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
940                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
941         }
942 }
943
944 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
945 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
946 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
947
948 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
949         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
950                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
951
952                 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
953
954                 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
955                 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
956
957                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
958                 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
959                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
960                         broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
961                         broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
962                         broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
963                 } else {
964                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
965                 }
966
967                 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
968                 match &self.shutdown_script {
969                         Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
970                         None => ScriptBuf::new().write(writer)?,
971                 }
972
973                 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
974                 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
975                 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
976                 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
977                 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
978                 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
979                 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
980
981                 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
982                 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
983                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
984
985                 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
986                         Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
987                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
988                                 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
989                                 match second_option {
990                                         Some(second_pubkey) => {
991                                                 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
992                                         },
993                                         None => {
994                                                 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
995                                         },
996                                 }
997                         },
998                         None => {
999                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1000                         },
1001                 }
1002
1003                 writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
1004
1005                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
1006
1007                 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1008                         ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1009                                 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1010                                 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
1011                                 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
1012                                 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1013                                 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1014                         }
1015                 }
1016
1017                 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1018                 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1019                         writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1020                         writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1021                         for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1022                                 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
1023                                                 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
1024                                         "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
1025                                 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1026                                 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
1027                         }
1028                 }
1029
1030                 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1031                 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1032                         writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1033                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1034                 }
1035
1036                 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1037                 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1038                         writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1039                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1040                 }
1041
1042                 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1043                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1044                         prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1045                 } else {
1046                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1047                 }
1048
1049                 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1050
1051                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1052                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1053
1054                 writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1055                 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1056                         writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1057                 }
1058
1059                 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1060                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1061                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => true,
1062                         _ => false,
1063                 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1064                 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1065                         match event {
1066                                 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1067                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
1068                                         upd.write(writer)?;
1069                                 },
1070                                 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1071                                 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1072                         }
1073                 }
1074
1075                 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1076                 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1077                         event.write(writer)?;
1078                 }
1079
1080                 self.best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
1081                 writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height.to_be_bytes())?;
1082
1083                 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1084                 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1085                         entry.write(writer)?;
1086                 }
1087
1088                 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1089                 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1090                         txid.write(writer)?;
1091                         (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1092                         for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1093                                 idx.write(writer)?;
1094                                 script.write(writer)?;
1095                         }
1096                 }
1097                 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1098
1099                 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1100                 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1101
1102                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1103                         (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1104                         (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec),
1105                         (5, self.pending_monitor_events, required_vec),
1106                         (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1107                         (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1108                         (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1109                         (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
1110                         (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
1111                         (17, self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
1112                         (19, self.channel_id, required),
1113                 });
1114
1115                 Ok(())
1116         }
1117 }
1118
1119 macro_rules! _process_events_body {
1120         ($self_opt: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1121                 loop {
1122                         let (pending_events, repeated_events);
1123                         if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1124                                 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1125                                 if inner.is_processing_pending_events {
1126                                         break;
1127                                 }
1128                                 inner.is_processing_pending_events = true;
1129
1130                                 pending_events = inner.pending_events.clone();
1131                                 repeated_events = inner.get_repeated_events();
1132                         } else { break; }
1133                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
1134
1135                         for event in pending_events.into_iter().chain(repeated_events.into_iter()) {
1136                                 $event_to_handle = event;
1137                                 $handle_event;
1138                         }
1139
1140                         if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1141                                 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1142                                 inner.pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1143                                 inner.is_processing_pending_events = false;
1144                                 if !inner.pending_events.is_empty() {
1145                                         // If there's more events to process, go ahead and do so.
1146                                         continue;
1147                                 }
1148                         }
1149                         break;
1150                 }
1151         }
1152 }
1153 pub(super) use _process_events_body as process_events_body;
1154
1155 pub(crate) struct WithChannelMonitor<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
1156         logger: &'a L,
1157         peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
1158         channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1159 }
1160
1161 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1162         fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
1163                 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
1164                 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
1165                 self.logger.log(record)
1166         }
1167 }
1168
1169 impl<'a, L: Deref> WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1170         pub(crate) fn from<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor: &ChannelMonitor<S>) -> Self {
1171                 Self::from_impl(logger, &*monitor.inner.lock().unwrap())
1172         }
1173
1174         pub(crate) fn from_impl<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor_impl: &ChannelMonitorImpl<S>) -> Self {
1175                 let peer_id = monitor_impl.counterparty_node_id;
1176                 let channel_id = Some(monitor_impl.channel_id());
1177                 WithChannelMonitor {
1178                         logger, peer_id, channel_id,
1179                 }
1180         }
1181 }
1182
1183 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1184         /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1185         /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1186         /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1187         fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1188                 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1189         }
1190
1191         pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1192                           on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
1193                           channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1194                           funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1195                           commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1196                           initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1197                           best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId,
1198         ) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1199
1200                 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1201                 let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
1202                         &channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.pubkeys().payment_point
1203                 );
1204
1205                 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1206                 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1207                 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1208                 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1209
1210                 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1211                 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1212
1213                 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1214                 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1215                         let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1216                         let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1217
1218                         let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1219                         let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1220                                 txid,
1221                                 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1222                                 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1223                                 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1224                                 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1225                                 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1226                                 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1227                                 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1228                                 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1229                         };
1230                         (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1231                 };
1232
1233                 let onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(
1234                         channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id, destination_script.into(), keys,
1235                         channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx
1236                 );
1237
1238                 let mut outputs_to_watch = new_hash_map();
1239                 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1240
1241                 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1242                         latest_update_id: 0,
1243                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1244
1245                         destination_script: destination_script.into(),
1246                         broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1247                         counterparty_payment_script,
1248                         shutdown_script,
1249
1250                         channel_keys_id,
1251                         holder_revocation_basepoint,
1252                         channel_id,
1253                         funding_info,
1254                         current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1255                         prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1256
1257                         counterparty_commitment_params,
1258                         funding_redeemscript,
1259                         channel_value_satoshis,
1260                         their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1261
1262                         on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1263
1264                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1265                         counterparty_claimable_outpoints: new_hash_map(),
1266                         counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: new_hash_map(),
1267                         counterparty_hash_commitment_number: new_hash_map(),
1268                         counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: new_hash_map(),
1269
1270                         prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1271                         current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1272                         current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1273                         current_holder_commitment_number,
1274
1275                         payment_preimages: new_hash_map(),
1276                         pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1277                         pending_events: Vec::new(),
1278                         is_processing_pending_events: false,
1279
1280                         onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1281                         outputs_to_watch,
1282
1283                         onchain_tx_handler,
1284
1285                         lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1286                         holder_tx_signed: false,
1287                         funding_spend_seen: false,
1288                         funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1289                         confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1290                         htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1291                         spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
1292
1293                         best_block,
1294                         counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1295                         initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None,
1296                 })
1297         }
1298
1299         #[cfg(test)]
1300         fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1301                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1302         }
1303
1304         /// A variant of `Self::provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx` used to provide
1305         /// additional information to the monitor to store in order to recreate the initial
1306         /// counterparty commitment transaction during persistence (mainly for use in third-party
1307         /// watchtowers).
1308         ///
1309         /// This is used to provide the counterparty commitment information directly to the monitor
1310         /// before the initial persistence of a new channel.
1311         pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1312                 &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1313                 commitment_number: u64, their_cur_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
1314                 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, logger: &L,
1315         )
1316         where L::Target: Logger
1317         {
1318                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1319                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1320                 inner.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid,
1321                         htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_cur_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
1322                         to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, &logger);
1323         }
1324
1325         /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1326         /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1327         /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1328         /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1329         #[cfg(test)]
1330         fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1331                 &self,
1332                 txid: Txid,
1333                 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1334                 commitment_number: u64,
1335                 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1336                 logger: &L,
1337         ) where L::Target: Logger {
1338                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1339                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1340                 inner.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1341                         txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, &logger)
1342         }
1343
1344         #[cfg(test)]
1345         fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1346                 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1347                 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1348         ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1349                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new(), Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
1350         }
1351
1352         /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1353         /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1354         pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1355                 &self,
1356                 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1357                 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1358                 broadcaster: &B,
1359                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1360                 logger: &L,
1361         ) where
1362                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1363                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1364                 L::Target: Logger,
1365         {
1366                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1367                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1368                 inner.provide_payment_preimage(
1369                         payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1370         }
1371
1372         /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1373         /// itself.
1374         ///
1375         /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1376         pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1377                 &self,
1378                 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1379                 broadcaster: &B,
1380                 fee_estimator: &F,
1381                 logger: &L,
1382         ) -> Result<(), ()>
1383         where
1384                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1385                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1386                 L::Target: Logger,
1387         {
1388                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1389                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1390                 inner.update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1391         }
1392
1393         /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1394         /// ChannelMonitor.
1395         pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1396                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1397         }
1398
1399         /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1400         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
1401                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1402         }
1403
1404         /// Gets the channel_id of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1405         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1406                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id()
1407         }
1408
1409         /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1410         /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1411         pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>)> {
1412                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1413                         .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1414         }
1415
1416         /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1417         /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1418         /// have been registered.
1419         pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, filter: &F, logger: &L)
1420         where
1421                 F::Target: chain::Filter, L::Target: Logger,
1422         {
1423                 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1424                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*lock);
1425                 log_trace!(&logger, "Registering funding outpoint {}", &lock.get_funding_txo().0);
1426                 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1427                 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1428                         for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1429                                 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1430                                 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 };
1431                                 log_trace!(logger, "Registering outpoint {} with the filter for monitoring spends", outpoint);
1432                                 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1433                                         block_hash: None,
1434                                         outpoint,
1435                                         script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1436                                 });
1437                         }
1438                 }
1439         }
1440
1441         /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1442         /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1443         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1444                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1445         }
1446
1447         /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
1448         ///
1449         /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
1450         /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
1451         /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
1452         /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
1453         /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
1454         ///
1455         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
1456         /// order to handle these events.
1457         ///
1458         /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
1459         /// [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
1460         pub fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: &H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
1461                 let mut ev;
1462                 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
1463         }
1464
1465         /// Processes any events asynchronously.
1466         ///
1467         /// See [`Self::process_pending_events`] for more information.
1468         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
1469                 &self, handler: &H
1470         ) {
1471                 let mut ev;
1472                 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, { handler(ev).await });
1473         }
1474
1475         #[cfg(test)]
1476         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1477                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1478                 let mut lck = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1479                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut lck.pending_events);
1480                 ret.append(&mut lck.get_repeated_events());
1481                 ret
1482         }
1483
1484         /// Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment
1485         /// transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of
1486         /// the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for
1487         /// watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions.
1488         ///
1489         /// This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except
1490         /// that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update.
1491         ///
1492         /// This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading
1493         /// to LDK 0.0.117+.
1494         ///
1495         /// [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel
1496         pub fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
1497                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().initial_counterparty_commitment_tx()
1498         }
1499
1500         /// Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This
1501         /// may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned
1502         /// commitment transactions are unsigned.
1503         ///
1504         /// This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build
1505         /// justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be
1506         /// used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided
1507         /// with a monitor and an update. Once revoked, signing a justice transaction can be done using
1508         /// [`Self::sign_to_local_justice_tx`].
1509         ///
1510         /// It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty
1511         /// commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which
1512         /// the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the
1513         /// monitor can sign the justice transaction.
1514         ///
1515         /// This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after
1516         /// upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which
1517         /// may have been created prior to upgrading.
1518         ///
1519         /// [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel
1520         pub fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
1521                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(update)
1522         }
1523
1524         /// Wrapper around [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`] to make
1525         /// signing the justice transaction easier for implementors of
1526         /// [`chain::chainmonitor::Persist`]. On success this method returns the provided transaction
1527         /// signing the input at `input_idx`. This method will only produce a valid signature for
1528         /// a transaction spending the `to_local` output of a commitment transaction, i.e. this cannot
1529         /// be used for revoked HTLC outputs.
1530         ///
1531         /// `Value` is the value of the output being spent by the input at `input_idx`, committed
1532         /// in the BIP 143 signature.
1533         ///
1534         /// This method will only succeed if this monitor has received the revocation secret for the
1535         /// provided `commitment_number`. If a commitment number is provided that does not correspond
1536         /// to the commitment transaction being revoked, this will return a signed transaction, but
1537         /// the signature will not be valid.
1538         ///
1539         /// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`]: crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output
1540         /// [`Persist`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist
1541         pub fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(&self, justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
1542                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().sign_to_local_justice_tx(justice_tx, input_idx, value, commitment_number)
1543         }
1544
1545         pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1546                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1547         }
1548
1549         pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1550                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1551         }
1552
1553         pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1554                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1555         }
1556
1557         /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1558         ///
1559         /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1560         /// otherwise.
1561         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1562                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1563         }
1564
1565         /// You may use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1566         /// a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our
1567         /// counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1568         ///
1569         /// Broadcasting these transactions in this manner is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1570         /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1571         /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1572         /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1573         /// to you.
1574         pub fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1575                 &self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L
1576         )
1577         where
1578                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1579                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1580                 L::Target: Logger
1581         {
1582                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1583                 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
1584                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1585                 inner.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
1586         }
1587
1588         /// Unsafe test-only version of `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` used by our test framework
1589         /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1590         /// revoked commitment transaction.
1591         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1592         pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1593         where L::Target: Logger {
1594                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1595                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1596                 inner.unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&logger)
1597         }
1598
1599         /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1600         /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1601         /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1602         /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1603         /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1604         /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1605         ///
1606         /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1607         /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1608         ///
1609         /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1610         pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1611                 &self,
1612                 header: &Header,
1613                 txdata: &TransactionData,
1614                 height: u32,
1615                 broadcaster: B,
1616                 fee_estimator: F,
1617                 logger: &L,
1618         ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1619         where
1620                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1621                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1622                 L::Target: Logger,
1623         {
1624                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1625                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1626                 inner.block_connected(
1627                         header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1628         }
1629
1630         /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1631         /// appropriately.
1632         pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1633                 &self,
1634                 header: &Header,
1635                 height: u32,
1636                 broadcaster: B,
1637                 fee_estimator: F,
1638                 logger: &L,
1639         ) where
1640                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1641                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1642                 L::Target: Logger,
1643         {
1644                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1645                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1646                 inner.block_disconnected(
1647                         header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1648         }
1649
1650         /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1651         /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1652         ///
1653         /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1654         /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1655         ///
1656         /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1657         pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1658                 &self,
1659                 header: &Header,
1660                 txdata: &TransactionData,
1661                 height: u32,
1662                 broadcaster: B,
1663                 fee_estimator: F,
1664                 logger: &L,
1665         ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1666         where
1667                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1668                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1669                 L::Target: Logger,
1670         {
1671                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1672                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1673                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1674                 inner.transactions_confirmed(
1675                         header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger)
1676         }
1677
1678         /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1679         ///
1680         /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1681         /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1682         ///
1683         /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1684         pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1685                 &self,
1686                 txid: &Txid,
1687                 broadcaster: B,
1688                 fee_estimator: F,
1689                 logger: &L,
1690         ) where
1691                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1692                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1693                 L::Target: Logger,
1694         {
1695                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1696                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1697                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1698                 inner.transaction_unconfirmed(
1699                         txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1700                 );
1701         }
1702
1703         /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1704         /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1705         ///
1706         /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1707         /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1708         ///
1709         /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1710         pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1711                 &self,
1712                 header: &Header,
1713                 height: u32,
1714                 broadcaster: B,
1715                 fee_estimator: F,
1716                 logger: &L,
1717         ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1718         where
1719                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1720                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1721                 L::Target: Logger,
1722         {
1723                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1724                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1725                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1726                 inner.best_block_updated(
1727                         header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1728                 )
1729         }
1730
1731         /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1732         pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1733                 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1734                 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1735                         .iter()
1736                         .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.height, entry.block_hash))
1737                         .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1738                         .collect();
1739                 txids.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0).then(b.1.cmp(&a.1)));
1740                 txids.dedup_by_key(|(txid, _, _)| *txid);
1741                 txids
1742         }
1743
1744         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1745         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1746         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1747                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1748         }
1749
1750         /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
1751         /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
1752         /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
1753         /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
1754         /// connections, like on mobile.
1755         pub fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1756                 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
1757         )
1758         where
1759                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1760                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1761                 L::Target: Logger,
1762         {
1763                 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1764                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1765                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1766                 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1767                 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1768                         current_height, FeerateStrategy::HighestOfPreviousOrNew, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1769                 );
1770         }
1771
1772         /// Triggers rebroadcasts of pending claims from a force-closed channel after a transaction
1773         /// signature generation failure.
1774         pub fn signer_unblocked<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1775                 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
1776         )
1777         where
1778                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1779                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1780                 L::Target: Logger,
1781         {
1782                 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1783                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1784                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1785                 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1786                 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1787                         current_height, FeerateStrategy::RetryPrevious, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1788                 );
1789         }
1790
1791         /// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the
1792         /// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]
1793         /// confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be
1794         /// returned, the transaction must have at least `max(ANTI_REORG_DELAY, to_self_delay)`
1795         /// confirmations.
1796         ///
1797         /// Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`]
1798         /// once they are no longer under reorg risk. This method serves as a way to retrieve these
1799         /// descriptors at a later time, either for historical purposes, or to replay any
1800         /// missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the
1801         /// channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns
1802         /// an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending
1803         /// transactions starting from the channel's funding transaction and going down three levels.
1804         ///
1805         /// `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any
1806         /// outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned.
1807         ///
1808         /// `confirmation_height` must be the height of the block in which `tx` was included in.
1809         pub fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction, confirmation_height: u32) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1810                 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1811                 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1812                 let mut spendable_outputs = inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx);
1813                 spendable_outputs.retain(|descriptor| {
1814                         let mut conf_threshold = current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1;
1815                         if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) = descriptor {
1816                                 conf_threshold = cmp::min(conf_threshold,
1817                                         current_height.saturating_sub(descriptor.to_self_delay as u32) + 1);
1818                         }
1819                         conf_threshold >= confirmation_height
1820                 });
1821                 spendable_outputs
1822         }
1823
1824         #[cfg(test)]
1825         pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1826                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script.clone()
1827         }
1828
1829         #[cfg(test)]
1830         pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: ScriptBuf) {
1831                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script;
1832         }
1833
1834         #[cfg(test)]
1835         pub fn do_signer_call<F: FnMut(&Signer) -> ()>(&self, mut f: F) {
1836                 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1837                 f(&inner.onchain_tx_handler.signer);
1838         }
1839 }
1840
1841 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1842         /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1843         /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1844         fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1845                 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1846         -> Option<Balance> {
1847                 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1848                         if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1849
1850                 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1851                 let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
1852                 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1853                 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1854                 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1855                 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1856                         match event.event {
1857                                 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1858                                 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1859                                         debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1860                                         htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1861                                         debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1862                                         htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1863                                         debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1864                                         debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1865                                         holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1866                                 },
1867                                 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1868                                 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1869                                         debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1870                                         htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1871                                         debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1872                                         htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1873                                         debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1874                                         htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1875                                 },
1876                                 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1877                                         descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1878                                 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1879                                         .any(|(input_idx, inp)|
1880                                                  Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1881                                                         inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx &&
1882                                                                 // A maturing output for an HTLC claim will always be at the same
1883                                                                 // index as the HTLC input. This is true pre-anchors, as there's
1884                                                                 // only 1 input and 1 output. This is also true post-anchors,
1885                                                                 // because we have a SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY signature from our
1886                                                                 // channel counterparty.
1887                                                                 descriptor.outpoint.index as usize == input_idx
1888                                         ))
1889                                         .unwrap_or(false)
1890                                 => {
1891                                         debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1892                                         holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1893                                 },
1894                                 _ => {},
1895                         }
1896                 }
1897                 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1898                         .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1899                                 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1900                                 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
1901                                 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1902                                 htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
1903                                 true
1904                         } else { false });
1905                 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1906
1907                 let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
1908                 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1909                         if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1910                                 // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
1911                                 // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
1912                                 // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
1913                                 // in the commitment.
1914                                 if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
1915                                         let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1916                                                 .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
1917                                                 .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
1918                                         debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
1919                                         BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
1920                                 } else {
1921                                         debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1922                                         BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
1923                                 }
1924                         } else {
1925                                 htlc_commitment_outpoint
1926                         };
1927                 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1928
1929                 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1930                         debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1931                         return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1932                                 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1933                                 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1934                         });
1935                 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1936                         // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1937                         // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1938                         // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1939                         // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1940                         // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1941                         debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1942                 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1943                         let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1944                                 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1945                                         descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1946                                 } = &event.event {
1947                                         if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1948                                                 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1949                                                         tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
1950                                                 } else {
1951                                                         Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1952                                                                 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1953                                                 }
1954                                         })).unwrap_or(false) {
1955                                                 Some(())
1956                                         } else { None }
1957                                 } else { None }
1958                         });
1959                         if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1960                                 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1961                                 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1962                                 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1963                                 // need to do so again here.
1964                         } else {
1965                                 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1966                                         "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1967                                 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1968                                         "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1969                                 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1970                                         amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1971                                 });
1972                         }
1973                 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1974                         // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1975                         // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1976                         // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1977                         if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1978                                 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1979                                         amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1980                                         confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1981                                 });
1982                         } else {
1983                                 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1984                                         amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1985                                         claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1986                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1987                                 });
1988                         }
1989                 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1990                         // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1991                         // we know the preimage.
1992                         // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1993                         // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1994                         // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1995                         debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1996                         if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1997                                 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1998                                         amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1999                                         confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2000                                 });
2001                         } else {
2002                                 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
2003                                         amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2004                                         timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2005                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2006                                         payment_preimage: *payment_preimage,
2007                                 });
2008                         }
2009                 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
2010                         return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
2011                                 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2012                                 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2013                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2014                         });
2015                 }
2016                 None
2017         }
2018 }
2019
2020 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
2021         /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
2022         /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
2023         /// confirmation).
2024         ///
2025         /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
2026         /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
2027         /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
2028         /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
2029         ///
2030         /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
2031         /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, not all or excess balances may be included.
2032         ///
2033         /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
2034         /// may be returned here and their meanings.
2035         pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
2036                 let mut res = Vec::new();
2037                 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2038
2039                 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
2040                 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
2041                 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
2042                 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2043                         if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
2044                                 event.event
2045                         {
2046                                 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
2047                                 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
2048                         } else { None }
2049                 });
2050                 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
2051                         debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
2052                                 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
2053                         confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
2054                         pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
2055                 }
2056
2057                 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2058                         ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2059                                 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
2060                                         if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2061
2062                                                 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
2063                                                         res.push(bal);
2064                                                 }
2065                                         }
2066                                 }
2067                         }
2068                 }
2069
2070                 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
2071                         let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
2072                         if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
2073                                 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
2074                                 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2075                                         if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2076                                                 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2077                                                         descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
2078                                                 } = &event.event {
2079                                                         Some(descriptor.output.value)
2080                                                 } else { None }
2081                                         }) {
2082                                                 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2083                                                         amount_satoshis: value,
2084                                                         confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2085                                                 });
2086                                         } else {
2087                                                 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
2088                                                 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
2089                                                 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
2090                                         }
2091                                 }
2092                                 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2093                                         walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2094                                 } else {
2095                                         walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2096                                         // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
2097                                         // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
2098                                         // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
2099                                         // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
2100                                         let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
2101                                         for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
2102                                                 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2103                                                         descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
2104                                                 } = &event.event {
2105                                                         res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2106                                                                 amount_satoshis: output.value,
2107                                                                 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
2108                                                         });
2109                                                         if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
2110                                                                 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
2111                                                                         tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
2112                                                                 ).unwrap_or(false) {
2113                                                                         spent_counterparty_output = true;
2114                                                                 }
2115                                                         }
2116                                                 }
2117                                         }
2118
2119                                         if spent_counterparty_output {
2120                                         } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
2121                                                 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
2122                                                         .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
2123                                                 if output_spendable {
2124                                                         res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
2125                                                                 amount_satoshis: amt,
2126                                                         });
2127                                                 }
2128                                         } else {
2129                                                 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
2130                                                 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
2131                                         }
2132                                 }
2133                                 found_commitment_tx = true;
2134                         } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2135                                 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2136                                 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2137                                         res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2138                                                 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2139                                                 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2140                                         });
2141                                 }
2142                                 found_commitment_tx = true;
2143                         } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2144                                 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2145                                         walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2146                                         if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2147                                                 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2148                                                         amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
2149                                                         confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2150                                                 });
2151                                         }
2152                                         found_commitment_tx = true;
2153                                 }
2154                         }
2155                         if !found_commitment_tx {
2156                                 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2157                                         // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
2158                                         // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
2159                                         // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
2160                                         res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2161                                                 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2162                                                 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2163                                         });
2164                                 }
2165                         }
2166                 } else {
2167                         let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
2168                         for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2169                                 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
2170                                 if htlc.offered {
2171                                         res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
2172                                                 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2173                                                 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2174                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2175                                         });
2176                                 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
2177                                         claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
2178                                 } else {
2179                                         // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
2180                                         // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
2181                                         res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
2182                                                 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2183                                                 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2184                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2185                                         });
2186                                 }
2187                         }
2188                         res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
2189                                 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
2190                         });
2191                 }
2192
2193                 res
2194         }
2195
2196         /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
2197         /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
2198         /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
2199         ///
2200         /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
2201         /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
2202         /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
2203         pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2204                 let mut res = new_hash_map();
2205                 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
2206                 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
2207                 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2208                 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
2209                         ($txid: expr) => {
2210                                 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2211                                         for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2212                                                 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2213                                                         res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
2214                                                                 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
2215                                                 }
2216                                         }
2217                                 }
2218                         }
2219                 }
2220                 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2221                         walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2222                 }
2223                 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2224                         walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2225                 }
2226                 res
2227         }
2228
2229         /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
2230         /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
2231         ///
2232         /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
2233         ///
2234         /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
2235         /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
2236         pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2237                 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2238                 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
2239                 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
2240                 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
2241                 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2242                         us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2243                                 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
2244                                         Some(event.txid)
2245                                 } else { None }
2246                         })
2247                 });
2248
2249                 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
2250                         // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
2251                         // closed), just get the full set.
2252                         mem::drop(us);
2253                         return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
2254                 }
2255
2256                 let mut res = new_hash_map();
2257                 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2258                         ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2259                                 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
2260                                         if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
2261                                                 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
2262                                                 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
2263                                                 // would fail.
2264                                                 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
2265                                                 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
2266                                         } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
2267                                                 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
2268                                                 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
2269                                                 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2270                                                 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
2271                                                         if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
2272                                                                 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
2273                                                                 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
2274                                                                 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
2275                                                                 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
2276                                                                         us.best_block.height >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
2277                                                         } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
2278                                                                 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
2279                                                                 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
2280                                                                 // the preimage.
2281                                                                 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
2282                                                         } else { false }
2283                                                 });
2284                                                 let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
2285                                                         us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
2286                                                 if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
2287                                                         res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
2288                                                 }
2289                                         }
2290                                 }
2291                         }
2292                 }
2293
2294                 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
2295                 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2296                         walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
2297                                 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
2298                                         Some((a, &**source))
2299                                 } else { None }
2300                         }));
2301                 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2302                         walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2303                                 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2304                         }));
2305                 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2306                         if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2307                                 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2308                                         if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2309                                 }));
2310                         }
2311                 }
2312
2313                 res
2314         }
2315
2316         pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
2317                 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
2318         }
2319 }
2320
2321 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
2322 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
2323 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
2324 ///
2325 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
2326 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
2327 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
2328 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
2329 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
2330 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
2331 ///
2332 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
2333 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
2334 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
2335 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
2336 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
2337         ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
2338          $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
2339                 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
2340
2341                 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
2342                         ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
2343                                 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2344                                         for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2345                                                 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2346                                                         // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
2347                                                         // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
2348                                                         // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
2349                                                         // payment_preimage.
2350                                                         // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
2351                                                         // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
2352                                                         // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
2353                                                         // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
2354                                                         // need to here.
2355                                                         let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
2356
2357                                                         let mut matched_htlc = false;
2358                                                         for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
2359                                                                 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
2360                                                                         (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
2361                                                                          (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
2362                                                                           broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
2363                                                                           broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
2364                                                                         matched_htlc = true;
2365                                                                         break;
2366                                                                 }
2367                                                         }
2368                                                         if matched_htlc { continue; }
2369                                                         if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
2370                                                                 continue;
2371                                                         }
2372                                                         $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2373                                                                 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
2374                                                                 match entry.event {
2375                                                                         OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
2376                                                                                 *update_source != **source
2377                                                                         },
2378                                                                         _ => true,
2379                                                                 }
2380                                                         });
2381                                                         let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2382                                                                 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
2383                                                                 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
2384                                                                 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
2385                                                                 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
2386                                                                 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2387                                                                         source: (**source).clone(),
2388                                                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
2389                                                                         htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
2390                                                                         commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
2391                                                                 },
2392                                                         };
2393                                                         log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
2394                                                                 &htlc.payment_hash, $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2395                                                                 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2396                                                         $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2397                                                 }
2398                                         }
2399                                 }
2400                         }
2401                 }
2402                 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2403                         check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2404                 }
2405                 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2406                         check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2407                 }
2408         } }
2409 }
2410
2411 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2412 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2413 // in-line tests later.
2414
2415 #[cfg(test)]
2416 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2417         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2418         let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2419         ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2420         ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2421         ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2422         ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2423         ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2424         Vec::from(&ret[..])
2425 }
2426
2427 #[cfg(test)]
2428 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2429         vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2430 }
2431
2432 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2433         /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2434         /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2435         /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2436         fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2437                 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2438                         return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2439                 }
2440
2441                 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2442                 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2443                 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2444                         if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
2445                                 let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2446                                         &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2447                                 for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2448                                         if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2449                                                 if !cur_claimables.iter()
2450                                                         .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
2451                                                 {
2452                                                         self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
2453                                                 }
2454                                         }
2455                                 }
2456                                 for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2457                                         *source_opt = None;
2458                                 }
2459                         } else {
2460                                 assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
2461                         }
2462                 }
2463
2464                 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2465                         let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2466                         let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2467                         let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2468                         let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2469
2470                         self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2471                                 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2472                                         if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2473                                                 return true
2474                                         }
2475                                 }
2476                                 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2477                                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2478                                                 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2479                                                         return true
2480                                                 }
2481                                         }
2482                                 }
2483                                 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2484                                         if *cn < min_idx {
2485                                                 return true
2486                                         }
2487                                         true
2488                                 } else { false };
2489                                 if contains {
2490                                         counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2491                                 }
2492                                 false
2493                         });
2494                 }
2495
2496                 Ok(())
2497         }
2498
2499         fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2500                 &mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2501                 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
2502                 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2503         ) where L::Target: Logger {
2504                 self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info = Some((their_per_commitment_point.clone(),
2505                         feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value));
2506
2507                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2508                         let rebuilt_commitment_tx = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_tx().unwrap();
2509                         debug_assert_eq!(rebuilt_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), txid);
2510                 }
2511
2512                 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number,
2513                                 their_per_commitment_point, logger);
2514         }
2515
2516         fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2517                 &mut self, txid: Txid,
2518                 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2519                 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2520         ) where L::Target: Logger {
2521                 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2522                 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2523                 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2524                 // timeouts)
2525                 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2526                         self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2527                 }
2528
2529                 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2530                 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2531                 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2532                 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2533                 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2534                 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2535                 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2536                         Some(old_points) => {
2537                                 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2538                                         self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2539                                 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2540                                         if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2541                                                 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2542                                         } else {
2543                                                 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2544                                         }
2545                                 } else {
2546                                         self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2547                                 }
2548                         },
2549                         None => {
2550                                 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2551                         }
2552                 }
2553                 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2554                 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2555                         if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2556                                 htlcs.push(htlc.0);
2557                         }
2558                 }
2559         }
2560
2561         /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2562         /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2563         /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2564         /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2565         /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2566         fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, mut htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)], nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2567                 if htlc_outputs.iter().any(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()) {
2568                         // If we have non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, ensure they match the HTLCs in the
2569                         // `holder_commitment_tx`. In the future, we'll no longer provide the redundant data
2570                         // and just pass in source data via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
2571                         debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len());
2572                         for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).map(|(h, _, _)| h).zip(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()) {
2573                                 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2574                         }
2575                         debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2576                         for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, s, _)| s.as_ref()).zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter()) {
2577                                 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2578                         }
2579                         debug_assert!(nondust_htlc_sources.is_empty());
2580                 } else {
2581                         // If we don't have any non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, assume they were all passed via
2582                         // `nondust_htlc_sources`, building up the final htlc_outputs by combining
2583                         // `nondust_htlc_sources` and the `holder_commitment_tx`
2584                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2585                                 let mut prev = -1;
2586                                 for htlc in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter() {
2587                                         assert!(htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32 > prev);
2588                                         prev = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32;
2589                                 }
2590                         }
2591                         debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(htlc, _, _)| htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()));
2592                         debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(_, sig_opt, _)| sig_opt.is_none()));
2593                         debug_assert_eq!(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2594
2595                         let mut sources_iter = nondust_htlc_sources.into_iter();
2596
2597                         for (htlc, counterparty_sig) in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()
2598                                 .zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter())
2599                         {
2600                                 if htlc.offered {
2601                                         let source = sources_iter.next().expect("Non-dust HTLC sources didn't match commitment tx");
2602                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2603                                                 assert!(source.possibly_matches_output(htlc));
2604                                         }
2605                                         htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), Some(source)));
2606                                 } else {
2607                                         htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), None));
2608                                 }
2609                         }
2610                         debug_assert!(sources_iter.next().is_none());
2611                 }
2612
2613                 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2614                 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2615                 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2616                 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2617                 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
2618                         txid,
2619                         revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2620                         a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2621                         b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2622                         delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2623                         per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2624                         htlc_outputs,
2625                         to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2626                         feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2627                 };
2628                 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2629                 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2630                 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2631                 for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
2632                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2633                                 let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2634                                                 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2635                                 assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
2636                                         if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2637                                                 SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
2638                                         } else { false }
2639                                 }));
2640                         }
2641                         self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
2642                 }
2643                 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2644                         return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2645                 }
2646                 Ok(())
2647         }
2648
2649         /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2650         /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2651         fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2652                 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2653                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>)
2654         where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2655                     F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2656                     L::Target: Logger,
2657         {
2658                 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2659
2660                 let confirmed_spend_txid = self.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2661                         self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| match event.event {
2662                                 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => Some(event.txid),
2663                                 _ => None,
2664                         })
2665                 });
2666                 let confirmed_spend_txid = if let Some(txid) = confirmed_spend_txid {
2667                         txid
2668                 } else {
2669                         return;
2670                 };
2671
2672                 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2673                 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2674                 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2675                         ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2676                                 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2677                                 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2678                         }
2679                 }
2680                 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2681                         if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2682                                 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2683                                         claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2684                                 } else {
2685                                         debug_assert!(false);
2686                                         log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2687                                 }
2688                                 return;
2689                         }
2690                 }
2691                 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2692                         if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2693                                 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2694                                         claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2695                                 } else {
2696                                         debug_assert!(false);
2697                                         log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2698                                 }
2699                                 return;
2700                         }
2701                 }
2702
2703                 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2704                 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2705                 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2706                 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2707                 // holder commitment transactions.
2708                 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2709                         let holder_commitment_tx = if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2710                                 Some(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx)
2711                         } else if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2712                                 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2713                                         Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx)
2714                                 } else {
2715                                         None
2716                                 }
2717                         } else {
2718                                 None
2719                         };
2720                         if let Some(holder_commitment_tx) = holder_commitment_tx {
2721                                 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2722                                 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2723                                 // transactions.
2724                                 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height);
2725                                 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2726                         }
2727                 }
2728         }
2729
2730         fn generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(&mut self) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Vec<TransactionOutputs>) {
2731                 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2732                         self.funding_redeemscript.clone(),
2733                         self.channel_value_satoshis,
2734                         self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
2735                 );
2736                 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2737                         self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2738                         PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp),
2739                         self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height
2740                 );
2741                 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![commitment_package];
2742                 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
2743                 // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
2744                 // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
2745                 // new channel updates.
2746                 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2747                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2748                 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
2749                 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
2750                 // `transactions_confirmed`.
2751                 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2752                         // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2753                         // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2754                         // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2755                         let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(
2756                                 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height
2757                         );
2758                         let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
2759                         let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(
2760                                 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx
2761                         );
2762                         if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2763                                 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2764                         }
2765                         claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2766                 }
2767                 (claimable_outpoints, watch_outputs)
2768         }
2769
2770         pub(crate) fn queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2771                 &mut self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2772         )
2773         where
2774                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2775                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2776                 L::Target: Logger,
2777         {
2778                 let (claimable_outpoints, _) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs();
2779                 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2780                         claimable_outpoints, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster,
2781                         fee_estimator, logger
2782                 );
2783         }
2784
2785         fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2786                 &mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2787         ) -> Result<(), ()>
2788         where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2789                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2790                 L::Target: Logger,
2791         {
2792                 if self.latest_update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2793                         log_info!(logger, "Applying post-force-closed update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2794                                 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2795                 } else if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2796                         log_info!(logger, "Applying force close update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2797                                 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2798                 } else {
2799                         log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
2800                                 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2801                 }
2802
2803                 if updates.counterparty_node_id.is_some() {
2804                         if self.counterparty_node_id.is_none() {
2805                                 self.counterparty_node_id = updates.counterparty_node_id;
2806                         } else {
2807                                 debug_assert_eq!(self.counterparty_node_id, updates.counterparty_node_id);
2808                         }
2809                 }
2810
2811                 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
2812                 // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
2813                 // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
2814                 // sentinel value instead.
2815                 //
2816                 // The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
2817                 // thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
2818                 // them as well.
2819                 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2820                         assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2821                         match updates.updates[0] {
2822                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
2823                                 // We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
2824                                 // provide a preimage at this point.
2825                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
2826                                         debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
2827                                 _ => {
2828                                         log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2829                                         panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2830                                 },
2831                         }
2832                 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2833                         panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2834                 }
2835                 let mut ret = Ok(());
2836                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
2837                 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2838                         match update {
2839                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
2840                                         log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2841                                         if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2842                                         if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources.clone()) {
2843                                                 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2844                                                 log_error!(logger, "    {}", e);
2845                                                 ret = Err(());
2846                                         }
2847                                 }
2848                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2849                                         log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2850                                         self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2851                                 },
2852                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2853                                         log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2854                                         self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2855                                 },
2856                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2857                                         log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2858                                         if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2859                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Latest counterparty commitment secret was invalid");
2860                                                 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2861                                                 log_error!(logger, "    {}", e);
2862                                                 ret = Err(());
2863                                         }
2864                                 },
2865                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2866                                         log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2867                                         self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2868                                         if *should_broadcast {
2869                                                 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
2870                                                 // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
2871                                                 // duplicate/conflicting.
2872                                                 let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
2873                                                         self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
2874                                                                 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
2875                                                                 _ => false,
2876                                                         }).is_some();
2877                                                 if detected_funding_spend {
2878                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
2879                                                         continue;
2880                                                 }
2881                                                 self.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
2882                                         } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2883                                                 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2884                                                 log_error!(logger, "    in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.channel_id());
2885                                                 log_error!(logger, "    Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn to take manual action!");
2886                                         } else {
2887                                                 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager
2888                                                 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2889                                                 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2890                                                 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2891                                         }
2892                                 },
2893                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2894                                         log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2895                                         if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2896                                                 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2897                                         }
2898                                 },
2899                         }
2900                 }
2901
2902                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2903                         self.counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(updates);
2904                 }
2905
2906                 // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
2907                 // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
2908                 if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
2909                         return Ok(());
2910                 }
2911
2912                 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2913
2914                 // Refuse updates after we've detected a spend onchain, but only if we haven't processed a
2915                 // force closed monitor update yet.
2916                 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen && self.latest_update_id != CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2917                         log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2918                         Err(())
2919                 } else { ret }
2920         }
2921
2922         fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2923                 self.latest_update_id
2924         }
2925
2926         fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
2927                 &self.funding_info
2928         }
2929
2930         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2931                 self.channel_id
2932         }
2933
2934         fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>> {
2935                 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2936                 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2937                 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2938                 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2939                         self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2940                 }
2941                 &self.outputs_to_watch
2942         }
2943
2944         fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2945                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2946                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2947                 ret
2948         }
2949
2950         /// Gets the set of events that are repeated regularly (e.g. those which RBF bump
2951         /// transactions). We're okay if we lose these on restart as they'll be regenerated for us at
2952         /// some regular interval via [`ChannelMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims`].
2953         pub(super) fn get_repeated_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2954                 let pending_claim_events = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events();
2955                 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pending_claim_events.len());
2956                 for (claim_id, claim_event) in pending_claim_events {
2957                         match claim_event {
2958                                 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
2959                                         package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
2960                                 } => {
2961                                         let channel_id = self.channel_id;
2962                                         // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels,
2963                                         // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some`
2964                                         // since v0.0.110.
2965                                         let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap();
2966                                         let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2967                                         debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
2968                                         let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
2969                                         let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
2970                                                 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
2971                                         ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
2972                                                 channel_id,
2973                                                 counterparty_node_id,
2974                                                 claim_id,
2975                                                 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2976                                                 commitment_tx,
2977                                                 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
2978                                                 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
2979                                                         channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2980                                                                 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2981                                                                 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2982                                                                 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2983                                                         },
2984                                                         outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
2985                                                                 txid: commitment_txid,
2986                                                                 vout: anchor_output_idx,
2987                                                         },
2988                                                 },
2989                                                 pending_htlcs,
2990                                         }));
2991                                 },
2992                                 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
2993                                         target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs, tx_lock_time,
2994                                 } => {
2995                                         let channel_id = self.channel_id;
2996                                         // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels,
2997                                         // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some`
2998                                         // since v0.0.110.
2999                                         let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap();
3000                                         let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
3001                                         for htlc in htlcs {
3002                                                 htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
3003                                                         channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
3004                                                                 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3005                                                                 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3006                                                                 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
3007                                                         },
3008                                                         commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
3009                                                         per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
3010                                                         per_commitment_point: self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.get_per_commitment_point(
3011                                                                 htlc.per_commitment_number, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3012                                                         ),
3013                                                         feerate_per_kw: 0,
3014                                                         htlc: htlc.htlc,
3015                                                         preimage: htlc.preimage,
3016                                                         counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
3017                                                 });
3018                                         }
3019                                         ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
3020                                                 channel_id,
3021                                                 counterparty_node_id,
3022                                                 claim_id,
3023                                                 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
3024                                                 htlc_descriptors,
3025                                                 tx_lock_time,
3026                                         }));
3027                                 }
3028                         }
3029                 }
3030                 ret
3031         }
3032
3033         fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
3034                 let (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value,
3035                         to_countersignatory_value) = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info?;
3036                 let htlc_outputs = vec![];
3037
3038                 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
3039                         &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value,
3040                         feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs);
3041                 Some(commitment_tx)
3042         }
3043
3044         fn build_counterparty_commitment_tx(
3045                 &self, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
3046                 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3047                 mut nondust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>
3048         ) -> CommitmentTransaction {
3049                 let broadcaster_keys = &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters
3050                         .counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys;
3051                 let countersignatory_keys =
3052                         &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys;
3053
3054                 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey;
3055                 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey;
3056                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&their_per_commitment_point,
3057                         &broadcaster_keys, &countersignatory_keys, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx);
3058                 let channel_parameters =
3059                         &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable();
3060
3061                 CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
3062                         to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, broadcaster_funding_key,
3063                         countersignatory_funding_key, keys, feerate_per_kw, &mut nondust_htlcs,
3064                         channel_parameters)
3065         }
3066
3067         fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
3068                 update.updates.iter().filter_map(|update| {
3069                         match update {
3070                                 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid,
3071                                         ref htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point,
3072                                         feerate_per_kw: Some(feerate_per_kw),
3073                                         to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(to_broadcaster_value),
3074                                         to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(to_countersignatory_value) } => {
3075
3076                                         let nondust_htlcs = htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _)| {
3077                                                 htlc.transaction_output_index.map(|_| (htlc.clone(), None))
3078                                         }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3079
3080                                         let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_number,
3081                                                         &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value,
3082                                                         to_countersignatory_value, feerate_per_kw, nondust_htlcs);
3083
3084                                         debug_assert_eq!(commitment_tx.trust().txid(), commitment_txid);
3085
3086                                         Some(commitment_tx)
3087                                 },
3088                                 _ => None,
3089                         }
3090                 }).collect()
3091         }
3092
3093         fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(
3094                 &self, mut justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64
3095         ) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
3096                 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).ok_or(())?;
3097                 let per_commitment_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secret).map_err(|_| ())?;
3098                 let their_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(
3099                         &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3100
3101                 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3102                         &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &their_per_commitment_point);
3103                 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3104                         &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &their_per_commitment_point);
3105                 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3106                         self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3107
3108                 let sig = self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(
3109                         &justice_tx, input_idx, value, &per_commitment_key, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx)?;
3110                 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
3111                 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(&[1u8]);
3112                 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(revokeable_redeemscript.as_bytes());
3113                 Ok(justice_tx)
3114         }
3115
3116         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
3117         fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
3118                 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
3119         }
3120
3121         fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
3122                 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
3123         }
3124
3125         fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3126                 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
3127         }
3128
3129         fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3130                 self.current_holder_commitment_number
3131         }
3132
3133         /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
3134         /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
3135         /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
3136         /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
3137         ///
3138         /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
3139         /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
3140         /// transaction.
3141         fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
3142                 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
3143         where L::Target: Logger {
3144                 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
3145                 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
3146                 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3147                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3148                 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
3149
3150                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
3151                 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
3152
3153                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
3154                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
3155                                 match $thing {
3156                                         Ok(a) => a,
3157                                         Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3158                                 }
3159                         };
3160                 }
3161
3162                 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
3163                 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
3164                         let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
3165                         let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
3166                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3167                         let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,  &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,);
3168                         let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
3169
3170                         let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3171                         let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
3172
3173                         // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
3174                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3175                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3176                                         let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
3177                                         let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height);
3178                                         claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3179                                         to_counterparty_output_info =
3180                                                 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3181                                 }
3182                         }
3183
3184                         // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
3185                         if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3186                                 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
3187                                         if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3188                                                 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
3189                                                                 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3190                                                         // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3191                                                         return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
3192                                                                 to_counterparty_output_info);
3193                                                 }
3194                                                 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
3195                                                 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, height);
3196                                                 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3197                                         }
3198                                 }
3199                         }
3200
3201                         // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
3202                         if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
3203                                 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
3204                                 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
3205                                 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3206                                         watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3207                                 }
3208                                 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3209
3210                                 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3211                                         fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3212                                                 block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3213                                                         (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3214                                                 ), logger);
3215                                 } else {
3216                                         // Our fuzzers aren't constrained by pesky things like valid signatures, so can
3217                                         // spend our funding output with a transaction which doesn't match our past
3218                                         // commitment transactions. Thus, we can only debug-assert here when not
3219                                         // fuzzing.
3220                                         debug_assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
3221                                         fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3222                                                 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
3223                                 }
3224                         }
3225                 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3226                         // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
3227                         // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
3228                         // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
3229                         // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
3230                         // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
3231                         // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
3232                         // insert it here.
3233                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3234                                 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3235                         }
3236                         self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3237
3238                         log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
3239                         fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3240                                 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3241                                         (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3242                                 ), logger);
3243
3244                         let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
3245                                 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
3246                         to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
3247                         for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
3248                                 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
3249                         }
3250
3251                 }
3252                 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3253         }
3254
3255         /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
3256         fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
3257         -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
3258                 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3259                 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
3260
3261                 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
3262                         Some(outputs) => outputs,
3263                         None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3264                 };
3265                 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
3266                         Some(points) => points,
3267                         None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3268                 };
3269
3270                 let per_commitment_point =
3271                         // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
3272                         // per-commitment point
3273                         if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
3274                         else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
3275                                 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
3276                                 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
3277                                 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
3278                                 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
3279                                         point
3280                                 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
3281                         } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
3282
3283                 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3284                         let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
3285                                 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,  &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point);
3286
3287                         let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &per_commitment_point);
3288
3289                         let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3290                                 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3291                                 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
3292                         for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
3293                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3294                                         to_counterparty_output_info =
3295                                                 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3296                                 }
3297                         }
3298                 }
3299
3300                 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
3301                         if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3302                                 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3303                                         if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
3304                                                 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3305                                                         // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3306                                                         return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
3307                                                 }
3308                                 }
3309                                 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
3310                                 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
3311                                         let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
3312                                                 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
3313                                                         CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3314                                                                 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3315                                                                 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3316                                                                 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3317                                         } else {
3318                                                 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
3319                                                         CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3320                                                                 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3321                                                                 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3322                                                                 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3323                                         };
3324                                         let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry, 0);
3325                                         claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
3326                                 }
3327                         }
3328                 }
3329
3330                 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
3331         }
3332
3333         /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
3334         fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
3335                 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
3336         ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
3337                 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
3338                 let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
3339                         Ok(key) => key,
3340                         Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
3341                 };
3342                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3343
3344                 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
3345                 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
3346                 let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
3347                 // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
3348                 // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
3349                 // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
3350                 // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
3351                 // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
3352                 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
3353                 //
3354                 // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
3355                 // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
3356                 // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
3357                 for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
3358                         if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
3359                                 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
3360                                 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
3361                                         per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3362                                         self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
3363                                         tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3364                                         false
3365                                 );
3366                                 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3367                                         htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
3368                                         height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height
3369                                 );
3370                                 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3371                                 if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
3372                                         outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
3373                                 }
3374                                 outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
3375                         }
3376                 }
3377                 (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
3378         }
3379
3380         // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
3381         // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
3382         // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
3383         fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>) {
3384                 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3385
3386                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
3387                 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
3388
3389                 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3390                         if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3391                                 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
3392                                         let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
3393                                                 htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3394                                         );
3395                                         htlc_output
3396                                 } else {
3397                                         let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
3398                                                 preimage.clone()
3399                                         } else {
3400                                                 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3401                                                 continue;
3402                                         };
3403                                         let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
3404                                                 payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3405                                         );
3406                                         htlc_output
3407                                 };
3408                                 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3409                                         holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
3410                                         PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
3411                                         htlc.cltv_expiry, conf_height
3412                                 );
3413                                 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
3414                         }
3415                 }
3416
3417                 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
3418         }
3419
3420         // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
3421         fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
3422                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3423                 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3424                         if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3425                                 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
3426                         }
3427                 }
3428                 watch_outputs
3429         }
3430
3431         /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
3432         /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
3433         /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
3434         /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
3435         fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
3436                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
3437                 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
3438                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3439
3440                 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
3441                         ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
3442                                 claim_requests = $updates.0;
3443                                 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
3444                                 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
3445                         }
3446                 }
3447
3448                 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
3449                 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
3450
3451                 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3452                         is_holder_tx = true;
3453                         log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3454                         let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
3455                         let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
3456                         append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3457                         fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3458                                 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
3459                                 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
3460                 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3461                         if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3462                                 is_holder_tx = true;
3463                                 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3464                                 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
3465                                 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
3466                                 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3467                                 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3468                                         holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
3469                                         logger);
3470                         }
3471                 }
3472
3473                 if is_holder_tx {
3474                         Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
3475                 } else {
3476                         None
3477                 }
3478         }
3479
3480         /// Cancels any existing pending claims for a commitment that previously confirmed and has now
3481         /// been replaced by another.
3482         pub fn cancel_prev_commitment_claims<L: Deref>(
3483                 &mut self, logger: &L, confirmed_commitment_txid: &Txid
3484         ) where L::Target: Logger {
3485                 for (counterparty_commitment_txid, _) in &self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain {
3486                         // Cancel any pending claims for counterparty commitments we've seen confirm.
3487                         if counterparty_commitment_txid == confirmed_commitment_txid {
3488                                 continue;
3489                         }
3490                         for (htlc, _) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(counterparty_commitment_txid).unwrap_or(&vec![]) {
3491                                 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously confirmed counterparty commitment {}",
3492                                         counterparty_commitment_txid);
3493                                 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: *counterparty_commitment_txid, vout: 0 };
3494                                 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3495                                         outpoint.vout = vout;
3496                                         self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3497                                 }
3498                         }
3499                 }
3500                 if self.holder_tx_signed {
3501                         // If we've signed, we may have broadcast either commitment (prev or current), and
3502                         // attempted to claim from it immediately without waiting for a confirmation.
3503                         if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3504                                 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3505                                         self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3506                                 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3507                                 for (htlc, _, _) in &self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3508                                         if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3509                                                 outpoint.vout = vout;
3510                                                 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3511                                         }
3512                                 }
3513                         }
3514                         if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3515                                 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3516                                         log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3517                                                 prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3518                                         let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3519                                         for (htlc, _, _) in &prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3520                                                 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3521                                                         outpoint.vout = vout;
3522                                                         self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3523                                                 }
3524                                         }
3525                                 }
3526                         }
3527                 } else {
3528                         // No previous claim.
3529                 }
3530         }
3531
3532         #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
3533         /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
3534         fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3535                 &mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3536         ) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3537                 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
3538                 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3539                 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3540                 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3541                 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
3542                 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
3543                 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3544                         return holder_transactions;
3545                 }
3546                 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3547                         if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3548                                 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3549                                         if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3550                                                 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3551                                                 continue;
3552                                         }
3553                                 } else { None };
3554                                 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_maybe_signed_htlc_tx(
3555                                         &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage
3556                                 ) {
3557                                         if htlc_tx.is_fully_signed() {
3558                                                 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx.0);
3559                                         }
3560                                 }
3561                         }
3562                 }
3563                 holder_transactions
3564         }
3565
3566         fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3567                 &mut self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B,
3568                 fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3569         ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3570                 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3571                         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3572                         L::Target: Logger,
3573         {
3574                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3575                 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3576
3577                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3578                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
3579         }
3580
3581         fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3582                 &mut self,
3583                 header: &Header,
3584                 height: u32,
3585                 broadcaster: B,
3586                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3587                 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3588         ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3589         where
3590                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3591                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3592                 L::Target: Logger,
3593         {
3594                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3595
3596                 if height > self.best_block.height {
3597                         self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3598                         log_trace!(logger, "Connecting new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3599                         self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3600                 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash {
3601                         self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3602                         log_trace!(logger, "Best block re-orged, replaced with new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3603                         self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
3604                         self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3605                         Vec::new()
3606                 } else { Vec::new() }
3607         }
3608
3609         fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3610                 &mut self,
3611                 header: &Header,
3612                 txdata: &TransactionData,
3613                 height: u32,
3614                 broadcaster: B,
3615                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3616                 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3617         ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3618         where
3619                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3620                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3621                 L::Target: Logger,
3622         {
3623                 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
3624                 for tx in &txn_matched {
3625                         let mut output_val = 0;
3626                         for out in tx.output.iter() {
3627                                 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3628                                 output_val += out.value;
3629                                 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3630                         }
3631                 }
3632
3633                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3634
3635                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3636                 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3637                 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
3638                         let txid = tx.txid();
3639                         log_trace!(logger, "Transaction {} confirmed in block {}", txid , block_hash);
3640                         // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
3641                         if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
3642                                 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3643                                 continue 'tx_iter;
3644                         }
3645                         for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3646                                 if ev.txid == txid {
3647                                         if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
3648                                                 assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
3649                                                         "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
3650                                                         This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
3651                                         }
3652                                         log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3653                                         continue 'tx_iter;
3654                                 }
3655                         }
3656                         for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
3657                                 if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
3658                                         log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3659                                         continue 'tx_iter;
3660                                 }
3661                         }
3662                         for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
3663                                 if txid == *spendable_txid {
3664                                         log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3665                                         continue 'tx_iter;
3666                                 }
3667                         }
3668
3669                         if tx.input.len() == 1 {
3670                                 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
3671                                 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
3672                                 // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
3673                                 // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
3674                                 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
3675                                 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
3676                                         let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
3677                                         log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
3678                                                 &self.channel_id(), txid);
3679                                         self.funding_spend_seen = true;
3680                                         let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
3681                                         if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
3682                                                 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
3683                                                         self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3684                                                 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
3685                                                 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3686                                                         watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3687                                                 }
3688                                                 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3689                                                 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
3690                                                         if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
3691                                                                 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3692                                                                 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
3693                                                                         "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
3694                                                                 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3695                                                                         watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3696                                                                 }
3697                                                                 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3698                                                                 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
3699                                                         }
3700                                                 }
3701                                         }
3702                                         self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3703                                                 txid,
3704                                                 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
3705                                                 height,
3706                                                 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
3707                                                 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
3708                                                         on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
3709                                                         commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
3710                                                 },
3711                                         });
3712                                         // Now that we've detected a confirmed commitment transaction, attempt to cancel
3713                                         // pending claims for any commitments that were previously confirmed such that
3714                                         // we don't continue claiming inputs that no longer exist.
3715                                         self.cancel_prev_commitment_claims(&logger, &txid);
3716                                 }
3717                         }
3718                         if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
3719                                 // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
3720                                 // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
3721                                 // other ways which can have more than one output.
3722                                 for tx_input in &tx.input {
3723                                         let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
3724                                         if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
3725                                                 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
3726                                                         &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
3727                                                 );
3728                                                 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3729                                                 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
3730                                                         watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3731                                                 }
3732                                                 // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
3733                                                 // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
3734                                                 // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
3735                                                 // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
3736                                                 break;
3737                                         }
3738                                 }
3739                                 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3740
3741                                 self.check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3742                         }
3743                 }
3744
3745                 if height > self.best_block.height {
3746                         self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3747                 }
3748
3749                 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3750         }
3751
3752         /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
3753         /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
3754         /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
3755         /// complexity especially in
3756         /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
3757         ///
3758         /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
3759         /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
3760         fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3761                 &mut self,
3762                 conf_height: u32,
3763                 conf_hash: BlockHash,
3764                 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
3765                 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
3766                 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
3767                 broadcaster: &B,
3768                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3769                 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3770         ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3771         where
3772                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3773                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3774                 L::Target: Logger,
3775         {
3776                 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
3777                 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height >= conf_height);
3778
3779                 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
3780                 if should_broadcast {
3781                         let (mut new_outpoints, mut new_outputs) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs();
3782                         claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3783                         watch_outputs.append(&mut new_outputs);
3784                 }
3785
3786                 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3787                 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3788                         self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3789                 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3790                 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3791                         if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3792                                 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3793                         } else {
3794                                 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3795                         }
3796                 }
3797
3798                 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3799                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3800                 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3801                         .iter()
3802                         .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3803                                 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3804                                 _ => None,
3805                         })
3806                         .collect();
3807                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3808                 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3809
3810                 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3811                 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3812                         match entry.event {
3813                                 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3814                                         // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3815                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3816                                         {
3817                                                 debug_assert!(
3818                                                         unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3819                                                         "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3820                                                          call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3821                                                          or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3822                                                 debug_assert!(
3823                                                         matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3824                                                         "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3825                                                          call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3826                                                          or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3827                                                 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3828                                         }
3829
3830                                         log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3831                                                 &payment_hash, entry.txid);
3832                                         self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3833                                                 payment_hash,
3834                                                 payment_preimage: None,
3835                                                 source: source.clone(),
3836                                                 htlc_value_satoshis,
3837                                         }));
3838                                         self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3839                                                 commitment_tx_output_idx,
3840                                                 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3841                                                 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3842                                                 payment_preimage: None,
3843                                         });
3844                                 },
3845                                 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3846                                         log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3847                                         self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3848                                                 outputs: vec![descriptor],
3849                                                 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3850                                         });
3851                                         self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
3852                                 },
3853                                 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3854                                         self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3855                                                 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
3856                                                 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3857                                                 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3858                                                 payment_preimage: preimage,
3859                                         });
3860                                 },
3861                                 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3862                                         self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3863                                         self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3864                                 },
3865                         }
3866                 }
3867
3868                 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3869                 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3870
3871                 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3872                 // updating the latter in the process.
3873                 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3874                         let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3875                         self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3876                 });
3877                 #[cfg(test)]
3878                 {
3879                         // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3880                         // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3881                         // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3882                         for tx in &txn_matched {
3883                                 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3884                                         for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3885                                                 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3886                                                 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3887                                         }
3888                                 }
3889                         }
3890                 }
3891                 watch_outputs
3892         }
3893
3894         fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3895                 &mut self, header: &Header, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3896         ) where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3897                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3898                 L::Target: Logger,
3899         {
3900                 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3901
3902                 //We may discard:
3903                 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3904                 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3905                 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3906
3907                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3908                 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3909
3910                 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3911         }
3912
3913         fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3914                 &mut self,
3915                 txid: &Txid,
3916                 broadcaster: B,
3917                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3918                 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3919         ) where
3920                 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3921                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3922                 L::Target: Logger,
3923         {
3924                 let mut removed_height = None;
3925                 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3926                         if entry.txid == *txid {
3927                                 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
3928                                 break;
3929                         }
3930                 }
3931
3932                 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
3933                         log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
3934                         self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
3935                                 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
3936                                 false
3937                         } else { true });
3938                 }
3939
3940                 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
3941
3942                 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3943         }
3944
3945         /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3946         /// transactions thereof.
3947         fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3948                 let mut matched_txn = new_hash_set();
3949                 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3950                         let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3951                         for input in tx.input.iter() {
3952                                 if matches { break; }
3953                                 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3954                                         matches = true;
3955                                 }
3956                         }
3957                         if matches {
3958                                 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3959                         }
3960                         matches
3961                 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3962         }
3963
3964         /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3965         fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3966                 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3967                         if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3968                                 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3969                                         if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3970                                                 #[cfg(test)]
3971                                                 {
3972                                                         // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3973                                                         // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3974                                                         // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3975                                                         if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3976                                                                 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3977                                                                         // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3978                                                                         // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3979                                                                         // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3980                                                                         return true;
3981                                                                 }
3982
3983                                                                 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&ScriptBuf::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3984                                                         } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3985                                                                 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3986                                                         } else { panic!(); }
3987                                                 }
3988                                                 return true;
3989                                         }
3990                                 }
3991                         }
3992                 }
3993
3994                 false
3995         }
3996
3997         fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3998                 &self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3999         ) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
4000                 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
4001                 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
4002                 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
4003                         self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
4004                                 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
4005                                 _ => false,
4006                         }).is_some()
4007                 {
4008                         return false;
4009                 }
4010                 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
4011                 //  * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
4012                 //    transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
4013                 //  * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
4014                 //    broadcast if we go on-chain.
4015                 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
4016                 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
4017                 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
4018                 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
4019                 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
4020                 let height = self.best_block.height;
4021                 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
4022                         ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
4023                                 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
4024                                         // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
4025                                         // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
4026                                         // time out the HTLC first.
4027                                         // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
4028                                         // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
4029                                         // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
4030                                         // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
4031                                         // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
4032                                         // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
4033                                         // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
4034                                         // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
4035                                         // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
4036                                         // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
4037                                         // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
4038                                         // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
4039                                         //  aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4040                                         //      inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4041                                         //      outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4042                                         //      LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
4043                                         //      CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
4044                                         //      LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
4045                                         //  The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
4046                                         //  with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
4047                                         let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
4048                                         if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
4049                                            (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
4050                                                 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4051                                                 return true;
4052                                         }
4053                                 }
4054                         }
4055                 }
4056
4057                 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
4058
4059                 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4060                         if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4061                                 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4062                         }
4063                 }
4064                 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4065                         if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4066                                 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4067                         }
4068                 }
4069
4070                 false
4071         }
4072
4073         /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
4074         /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
4075         fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(
4076                 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4077         ) where L::Target: Logger {
4078                 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
4079                         let mut payment_data = None;
4080                         let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
4081                         let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
4082                         let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
4083                         #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4084                         let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
4085                         let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
4086                         #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4087                         let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
4088
4089                         let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4090                         if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
4091                                 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
4092                         }
4093
4094                         macro_rules! log_claim {
4095                                 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
4096                                         let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
4097                                         // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
4098                                         // revocation path:
4099                                         #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4100                                         debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4101                                         #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4102                                         debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4103                                         // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
4104                                         // matched by any HTLC spend:
4105                                         #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4106                                         debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
4107                                                          offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
4108                                                          revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
4109                                         if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
4110                                                         (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
4111                                                 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
4112                                                         $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4113                                                         if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4114                                                         if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
4115                                         } else {
4116                                                 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
4117                                                         $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4118                                                         if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4119                                                         if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
4120                                         }
4121                                 }
4122                         }
4123
4124                         macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
4125                                 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
4126                                         if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
4127                                                 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
4128                                                         if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
4129                                                                 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
4130                                                                         log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
4131                                                                         payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
4132                                                                         break;
4133                                                                 }
4134                                                         }
4135                                                 }
4136                                         }
4137                                 }
4138                         }
4139
4140                         macro_rules! scan_commitment {
4141                                 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
4142                                         for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
4143                                                 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
4144                                                         if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
4145                                                                 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
4146                                                                 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
4147                                                                 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
4148                                                                 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
4149                                                                 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
4150                                                                 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
4151                                                                 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
4152                                                         } else if !$holder_tx {
4153                                                                 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4154                                                                 if payment_data.is_none() {
4155                                                                         check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4156                                                                 }
4157                                                         }
4158                                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
4159                                                                 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
4160                                                                 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
4161                                                                 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4162                                                                         txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4163                                                                         event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4164                                                                                 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4165                                                                                 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
4166                                                                                         Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
4167                                                                                 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
4168                                                                                 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
4169                                                                                 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
4170                                                                                 // accepted_preimage_claim).
4171                                                                                 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
4172                                                                                         Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
4173                                                                         },
4174                                                                 });
4175                                                                 continue 'outer_loop;
4176                                                         }
4177                                                 }
4178                                         }
4179                                 }
4180                         }
4181
4182                         if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
4183                                 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4184                                         "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
4185                         }
4186                         if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
4187                                 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
4188                                         scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4189                                                 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
4190                                 }
4191                         }
4192                         if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
4193                                 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
4194                                         "counterparty commitment tx", false);
4195                         }
4196
4197                         // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
4198                         // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
4199                         if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
4200                                 if accepted_preimage_claim {
4201                                         if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4202                                                 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
4203                                                 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4204                                                         txid: tx.txid(),
4205                                                         height,
4206                                                         block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4207                                                         transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4208                                                         event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4209                                                                 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4210                                                                 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4211                                                                 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4212                                                         },
4213                                                 });
4214                                                 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4215                                                         source,
4216                                                         payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4217                                                         payment_hash,
4218                                                         htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4219                                                 }));
4220                                         }
4221                                 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
4222                                         if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4223                                                 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
4224                                                         upd.source == source
4225                                                 } else { false }) {
4226                                                 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4227                                                         txid: tx.txid(),
4228                                                         transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4229                                                         height,
4230                                                         block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4231                                                         event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4232                                                                 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4233                                                                 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4234                                                                 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4235                                                         },
4236                                                 });
4237                                                 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4238                                                         source,
4239                                                         payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4240                                                         payment_hash,
4241                                                         htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4242                                                 }));
4243                                         }
4244                                 } else {
4245                                         self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
4246                                                 if entry.height != height { return true; }
4247                                                 match entry.event {
4248                                                         OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
4249                                                                 *htlc_source != source
4250                                                         },
4251                                                         _ => true,
4252                                                 }
4253                                         });
4254                                         let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4255                                                 txid: tx.txid(),
4256                                                 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4257                                                 height,
4258                                                 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4259                                                 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
4260                                                         source, payment_hash,
4261                                                         htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4262                                                         commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
4263                                                 },
4264                                         };
4265                                         log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", &payment_hash, entry.confirmation_threshold());
4266                                         self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4267                                 }
4268                         }
4269                 }
4270         }
4271
4272         fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
4273                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
4274                 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4275                         if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
4276                                 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4277                                         outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4278                                         output: outp.clone(),
4279                                         channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4280                                 });
4281                         }
4282                         if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
4283                                 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
4284                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4285                                                 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4286                                                 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
4287                                                 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
4288                                                 output: outp.clone(),
4289                                                 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2,
4290                                                 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4291                                                 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4292                                         }));
4293                                 }
4294                         }
4295                         if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
4296                                 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4297                                         outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4298                                         output: outp.clone(),
4299                                         channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4300                                         channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4301                                         channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()),
4302                                 }));
4303                         }
4304                         if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
4305                                 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4306                                         outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4307                                         output: outp.clone(),
4308                                         channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4309                                 });
4310                         }
4311                 }
4312                 spendable_outputs
4313         }
4314
4315         /// Checks if the confirmed transaction is paying funds back to some address we can assume to
4316         /// own.
4317         fn check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs<L: Deref>(
4318                 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4319         ) where L::Target: Logger {
4320                 for spendable_output in self.get_spendable_outputs(tx) {
4321                         let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4322                                 txid: tx.txid(),
4323                                 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4324                                 height,
4325                                 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4326                                 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
4327                         };
4328                         log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
4329                         self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4330                 }
4331         }
4332 }
4333
4334 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
4335 where
4336         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4337         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4338         L::Target: Logger,
4339 {
4340         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4341                 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4342         }
4343
4344         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4345                 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4346         }
4347 }
4348
4349 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, M, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (M, T, F, L)
4350 where
4351         M: Deref<Target = ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4352         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4353         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4354         L::Target: Logger,
4355 {
4356         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4357                 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4358         }
4359
4360         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4361                 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4362         }
4363
4364         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4365                 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4366         }
4367
4368         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
4369                 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
4370         }
4371 }
4372
4373 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4374
4375 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
4376                 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::EcdsaSigner>) {
4377         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4378                 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
4379                         ($key: expr) => {
4380                                 match $key {
4381                                         Ok(res) => res,
4382                                         Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4383                                 }
4384                         }
4385                 }
4386
4387                 let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
4388
4389                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4390
4391                 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4392                 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4393
4394                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4395                 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4396                         0 => {
4397                                 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
4398                                 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4399                                 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4400                                 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
4401                         },
4402                         1 => { None },
4403                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4404                 };
4405                 let mut counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf = Readable::read(reader)?;
4406                 let shutdown_script = {
4407                         let script = <ScriptBuf as Readable>::read(reader)?;
4408                         if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
4409                 };
4410
4411                 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4412                 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
4413                 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
4414                 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
4415                 let outpoint = OutPoint {
4416                         txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
4417                         index: Readable::read(reader)?,
4418                 };
4419                 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
4420                 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4421                 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4422
4423                 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
4424                 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
4425                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4426
4427                 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
4428                         let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4429                         if first_idx == 0 {
4430                                 None
4431                         } else {
4432                                 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4433                                 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
4434                                 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
4435                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
4436                                 } else {
4437                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
4438                                 }
4439                         }
4440                 };
4441
4442                 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4443
4444                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4445
4446                 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
4447                         () => {
4448                                 {
4449                                         let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
4450                                         let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4451                                         let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4452                                         let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4453                                         let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
4454
4455                                         HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4456                                                 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
4457                                         }
4458                                 }
4459                         }
4460                 }
4461
4462                 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4463                 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
4464                 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
4465                         let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4466                         let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4467                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4468                         for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
4469                                 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
4470                         }
4471                         if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
4472                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4473                         }
4474                 }
4475
4476                 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4477                 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4478                 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
4479                         let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4480                         let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4481                         if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
4482                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4483                         }
4484                 }
4485
4486                 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4487                 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4488                 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
4489                         let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4490                         let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4491                         if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
4492                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4493                         }
4494                 }
4495
4496                 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
4497                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4498                                 0 => None,
4499                                 1 => {
4500                                         Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
4501                                 },
4502                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4503                         };
4504                 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
4505
4506                 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4507                 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4508
4509                 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4510                 let mut payment_preimages = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4511                 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
4512                         let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
4513                         let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4514                         if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
4515                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4516                         }
4517                 }
4518
4519                 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4520                 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
4521                         Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
4522                 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
4523                         let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4524                                 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
4525                                 1 => MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_info.0),
4526                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4527                         };
4528                         pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
4529                 }
4530
4531                 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4532                 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
4533                 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
4534                         if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4535                                 pending_events.push(event);
4536                         }
4537                 }
4538
4539                 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
4540
4541                 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4542                 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
4543                 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
4544                         if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4545                                 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
4546                         }
4547                 }
4548
4549                 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4550                 let mut outputs_to_watch = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<ScriptBuf>>())));
4551                 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
4552                         let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4553                         let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4554                         let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<ScriptBuf>())));
4555                         for _ in 0..outputs_len {
4556                                 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4557                         }
4558                         if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
4559                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4560                         }
4561                 }
4562                 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::EcdsaSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(
4563                         reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
4564                 )?;
4565
4566                 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
4567                 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4568
4569                 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
4570                         let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4571                         if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
4572                         if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4573                                 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
4574                         } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
4575                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4576                         }
4577                 }
4578
4579                 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4580                 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4581                         current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
4582                 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
4583                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4584                 }
4585
4586                 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
4587                 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
4588                 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
4589                 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
4590                 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
4591                 let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
4592                 let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(new_hash_map());
4593                 let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None;
4594                 let mut channel_id = None;
4595                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4596                         (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
4597                         (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
4598                         (5, pending_monitor_events, optional_vec),
4599                         (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
4600                         (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
4601                         (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
4602                         (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
4603                         (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
4604                         (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
4605                         (19, channel_id, option),
4606                 });
4607
4608                 // Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the
4609                 // wrong `counterparty_payment_script` was being tracked. Fix it now on deserialization to
4610                 // give them a chance to recognize the spendable output.
4611                 if onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() &&
4612                         counterparty_payment_script.is_v0_p2wpkh()
4613                 {
4614                         let payment_point = onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.payment_point;
4615                         counterparty_payment_script =
4616                                 chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh();
4617                 }
4618
4619                 Ok((best_block.block_hash, ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
4620                         latest_update_id,
4621                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
4622
4623                         destination_script,
4624                         broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
4625                         counterparty_payment_script,
4626                         shutdown_script,
4627
4628                         channel_keys_id,
4629                         holder_revocation_basepoint,
4630                         channel_id: channel_id.unwrap_or(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint)),
4631                         funding_info,
4632                         current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4633                         prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4634
4635                         counterparty_commitment_params,
4636                         funding_redeemscript,
4637                         channel_value_satoshis,
4638                         their_cur_per_commitment_points,
4639
4640                         on_holder_tx_csv,
4641
4642                         commitment_secrets,
4643                         counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
4644                         counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
4645                         counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
4646                         counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),
4647
4648                         prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
4649                         current_holder_commitment_tx,
4650                         current_counterparty_commitment_number,
4651                         current_holder_commitment_number,
4652
4653                         payment_preimages,
4654                         pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
4655                         pending_events,
4656                         is_processing_pending_events: false,
4657
4658                         onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
4659                         outputs_to_watch,
4660
4661                         onchain_tx_handler,
4662
4663                         lockdown_from_offchain,
4664                         holder_tx_signed,
4665                         funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
4666                         funding_spend_confirmed,
4667                         confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
4668                         htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
4669                         spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
4670
4671                         best_block,
4672                         counterparty_node_id,
4673                         initial_counterparty_commitment_info,
4674                 })))
4675         }
4676 }
4677
4678 #[cfg(test)]
4679 mod tests {
4680         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
4681         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
4682         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4683         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut};
4684         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4685         use bitcoin::sighash;
4686         use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
4687         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4688         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4689         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4690         use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
4691         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4692         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4693         use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
4694         use bitcoin::{Sequence, Witness};
4695
4696         use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
4697
4698         use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
4699         use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
4700         use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
4701         use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, WithChannelMonitor};
4702         use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
4703         use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4704         use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
4705         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, ChannelId};
4706         use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint, RevocationKey};
4707         use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
4708         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
4709         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4710         use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
4711         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
4712         use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
4713         use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
4714         use crate::util::logger::Logger;
4715         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4716         use crate::io;
4717         use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
4718         use crate::prelude::*;
4719
4720         use std::str::FromStr;
4721
4722         fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
4723                 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
4724                 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
4725                 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
4726                 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
4727                 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
4728                 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
4729                 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
4730                 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
4731                 //
4732                 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
4733                 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
4734                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4735                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4736                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4737                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4738                 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4739                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4740
4741                 // Rebalance somewhat
4742                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
4743
4744                 // First route two payments for testing at the end
4745                 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4746                 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4747
4748                 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
4749                 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4750                 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
4751                 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
4752                 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
4753                 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
4754                 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
4755
4756                 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
4757                 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
4758                 let new_header = create_dummy_header(nodes[0].best_block_info().0, 0);
4759                 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4760                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
4761                         &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
4762
4763                 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
4764                                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
4765                                                 (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
4766
4767                 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
4768                 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
4769                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
4770                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
4771                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
4772                         ), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress, {});
4773                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4774
4775                 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
4776                 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
4777                 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
4778                 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
4779                 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().next().unwrap().clone();
4780                 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
4781                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
4782                 } else { panic!(); }
4783                 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
4784                 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
4785
4786                 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
4787                 assert!(
4788                         pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
4789                         .is_err());
4790                 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
4791                 // transaction
4792                 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4793                 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
4794                 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
4795                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
4796                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
4797                 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
4798                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4799                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
4800                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
4801         }
4802         #[test]
4803         fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
4804                 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
4805                 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4806         }
4807
4808         #[test]
4809         fn test_prune_preimages() {
4810                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4811                 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4812                 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster::new(Network::Testnet));
4813                 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4814
4815                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4816
4817                 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4818                 {
4819                         for i in 0..20 {
4820                                 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4821                                 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4822                                 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4823                         }
4824                 }
4825
4826                 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlcs {
4827                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4828                                 {
4829                                         let mut res = Vec::new();
4830                                         for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4831                                                 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4832                                                         offered: true,
4833                                                         amount_msat: 0,
4834                                                         cltv_expiry: 0,
4835                                                         payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4836                                                         transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4837                                                 }, ()));
4838                                         }
4839                                         res
4840                                 }
4841                         }
4842                 }
4843                 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4844                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4845                                 preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
4846                         }
4847                 }
4848                 let dummy_sig = crate::crypto::utils::sign(&secp_ctx,
4849                         &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
4850                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4851
4852                 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4853                         ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4854                                 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4855                                         assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4856                                 }
4857                         }
4858                 }
4859
4860                 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4861                         &secp_ctx,
4862                         SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4863                         SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4864                         SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4865                         SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4866                         SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4867                         [41; 32],
4868                         0,
4869                         [0; 32],
4870                         [0; 32],
4871                 );
4872
4873                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4874                         funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4875                         revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
4876                         payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4877                         delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
4878                         htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap()))
4879                 };
4880                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4881                 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
4882                 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4883                         holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4884                         holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4885                         is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4886                         counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4887                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4888                                 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4889                         }),
4890                         funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4891                         channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
4892                 };
4893                 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4894                 // old state.
4895                 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4896                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
4897                 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4898                         Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
4899                         (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
4900                         &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
4901                         best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);
4902
4903                 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
4904                 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4905
4906                 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4907                         htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4908                 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"1").to_byte_array()),
4909                         preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4910                 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"2").to_byte_array()),
4911                         preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4912                 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4913                         let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4914                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4915                 }
4916
4917                 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4918                 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4919                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4920                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4921                 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4922                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4923                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4924
4925                 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"3").to_byte_array()),
4926                         preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4927
4928                 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4929                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4930                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4931                 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4932                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4933                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4934
4935                 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"4").to_byte_array()),
4936                         preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4937
4938                 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4939                 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4940                 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]);
4941                 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4942                 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4943                         htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4944                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4945                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4946                 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4947                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4948                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4949
4950                 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4951                 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]);
4952                 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4953                 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
4954                         htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4955                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4956                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4957                 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4958                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4959         }
4960
4961         #[test]
4962         fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4963                 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4964                 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4965
4966                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4967                 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4968                 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4969
4970                 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint};
4971                 macro_rules! sign_input {
4972                         ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4973                                 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4974                                         offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4975                                         amount_msat: 0,
4976                                         cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4977                                         payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4978                                         transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4979                                 };
4980                                 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), 256, &DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) };
4981                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4982                                 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4983                                 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4984                                 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4985                                 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len() as u64;
4986                                 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4987                                 witness.push(ser_sig);
4988                                 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4989                                         witness.push(vec!(1));
4990                                 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4991                                         witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4992                                 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4993                                         witness.push(vec![0]);
4994                                 } else {
4995                                         witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4996                                 }
4997                                 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4998                                 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4999                                 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
5000                                 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
5001                                 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
5002                         }
5003                 }
5004
5005                 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
5006                 let txid = Txid::from_str("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
5007
5008                 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
5009                 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5010                         let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5011                         let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5012                         for i in 0..4 {
5013                                 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5014                                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5015                                                 txid,
5016                                                 vout: i,
5017                                         },
5018                                         script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5019                                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5020                                         witness: Witness::new(),
5021                                 });
5022                         }
5023                         claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5024                                 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5025                                 value: 0,
5026                         });
5027                         let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5028                         let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
5029                         let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5030                         {
5031                                 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5032                                 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5033                                         sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5034                                         inputs_total_weight += inp;
5035                                 }
5036                         }
5037                         assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5038                 }
5039
5040                 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
5041                 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5042                         let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5043                         let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5044                         for i in 0..4 {
5045                                 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5046                                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5047                                                 txid,
5048                                                 vout: i,
5049                                         },
5050                                         script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5051                                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5052                                         witness: Witness::new(),
5053                                 });
5054                         }
5055                         claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5056                                 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5057                                 value: 0,
5058                         });
5059                         let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5060                         let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
5061                         let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5062                         {
5063                                 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5064                                 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5065                                         sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5066                                         inputs_total_weight += inp;
5067                                 }
5068                         }
5069                         assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5070                 }
5071
5072                 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
5073                 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5074                         let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5075                         let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5076                         claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5077                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5078                                         txid,
5079                                         vout: 0,
5080                                 },
5081                                 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5082                                 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5083                                 witness: Witness::new(),
5084                         });
5085                         claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5086                                 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5087                                 value: 0,
5088                         });
5089                         let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5090                         let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
5091                         let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5092                         {
5093                                 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5094                                 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5095                                         sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5096                                         inputs_total_weight += inp;
5097                                 }
5098                         }
5099                         assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5100                 }
5101         }
5102
5103         #[test]
5104         fn test_with_channel_monitor_impl_logger() {
5105                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5106                 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
5107
5108                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5109
5110                 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
5111                         &secp_ctx,
5112                         SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5113                         SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5114                         SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5115                         SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5116                         SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5117                         [41; 32],
5118                         0,
5119                         [0; 32],
5120                         [0; 32],
5121                 );
5122
5123                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5124                         funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
5125                         revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
5126                         payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
5127                         delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
5128                         htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())),
5129                 };
5130                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
5131                 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
5132                 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
5133                         holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
5134                         holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
5135                         is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5136                         counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5137                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5138                                 selected_contest_delay: 67,
5139                         }),
5140                         funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
5141                         channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
5142                 };
5143                 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5144                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
5145                 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
5146                         Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
5147                         (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
5148                         &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
5149                         best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);
5150
5151                 let chan_id = monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id();
5152                 let context_logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&logger, &monitor);
5153                 log_error!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5154                 log_warn!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5155                 log_debug!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5156                 log_trace!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5157                 log_gossip!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5158                 log_info!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5159                 logger.assert_log_context_contains("lightning::chain::channelmonitor::tests", Some(dummy_key), Some(chan_id), 6);
5160         }
5161         // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
5162 }