1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
38 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
39 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
42 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
44 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use crate::sign::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
46 use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, OnchainTxHandler};
47 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
48 use crate::chain::Filter;
49 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
50 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
51 use crate::util::byte_utils;
52 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler};
53 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{ChannelDerivationParameters, AnchorDescriptor, HTLCDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
55 use crate::prelude::*;
57 use crate::io::{self, Error};
58 use core::convert::TryInto;
60 use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
62 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
63 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
65 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
66 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
67 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
68 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
69 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
71 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
72 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
73 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
74 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
75 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
77 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
78 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
79 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
81 /// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
82 /// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
83 /// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
84 /// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
85 /// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
87 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
91 /// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
93 /// (1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
94 /// (2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
95 /// allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
96 /// commitment transaction.
98 /// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
99 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
101 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
102 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
103 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
104 self.update_id.write(w)?;
105 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
106 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
107 update_step.write(w)?;
109 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
113 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
114 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
115 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
116 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
117 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
118 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
120 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
124 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
125 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
129 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
130 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
131 pub enum MonitorEvent {
132 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
133 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
135 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
136 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
138 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
139 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
141 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
143 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
144 funding_txo: OutPoint,
145 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
146 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
148 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
149 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
150 monitor_update_id: u64,
153 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
154 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
156 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
157 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
159 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
160 // Note that Completed and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
161 // generated only in ChainMonitor
163 (0, funding_txo, required),
164 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
168 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
172 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
173 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
174 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
175 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
176 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
177 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
178 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
179 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
180 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
182 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
183 (0, payment_hash, required),
184 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
185 (2, source, required),
186 (4, payment_preimage, option),
189 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
190 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
191 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
192 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
193 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
194 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
195 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
196 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
197 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
198 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
199 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
200 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
201 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
202 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
203 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
204 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
205 /// accurate block height.
206 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
207 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
208 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
209 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
210 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
211 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
214 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
215 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
216 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
217 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
218 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
219 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
220 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
221 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
222 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
223 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
225 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
226 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
227 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
229 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
230 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
232 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
233 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
235 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
236 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
237 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
238 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
240 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
241 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
242 struct HolderSignedTx {
243 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
245 revocation_key: PublicKey,
246 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
247 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
248 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
249 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
250 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
251 to_self_value_sat: u64,
254 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
256 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
257 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
258 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
259 (2, revocation_key, required),
260 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
261 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
262 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
263 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
264 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
265 (14, htlc_outputs, required_vec)
268 impl HolderSignedTx {
269 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
270 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
271 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
281 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
282 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
283 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
284 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
285 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
286 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
287 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
290 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
291 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
292 w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
293 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
294 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
295 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
296 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
301 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
302 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
303 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
304 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
305 // used. Read it for compatibility.
306 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
307 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
308 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
309 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
310 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
311 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
315 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
316 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
317 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
318 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
319 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
320 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
321 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
323 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
324 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
325 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
326 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
329 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
333 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
334 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
336 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
337 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
338 struct OnchainEventEntry {
341 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
343 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
346 impl OnchainEventEntry {
347 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
348 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
350 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
351 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
353 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
354 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
355 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
357 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
358 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
359 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
360 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
361 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
368 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
369 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
373 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
375 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
376 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
378 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
379 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
380 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
382 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
383 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
384 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
385 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
386 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
387 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
390 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
391 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
392 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
393 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
394 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
396 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
397 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
399 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
401 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
403 FundingSpendConfirmation {
404 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
405 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
406 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
407 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
408 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
410 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
411 /// counterparty output.
412 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
414 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
415 /// is constructed. This is used when
416 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
417 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
418 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
419 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
420 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
422 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
423 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
425 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
426 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
427 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
428 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
429 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
430 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
431 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
432 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
436 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
437 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
438 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
439 (0, self.txid, required),
440 (1, self.transaction, option),
441 (2, self.height, required),
442 (3, self.block_hash, option),
443 (4, self.event, required),
449 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
450 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
451 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
452 let mut transaction = None;
453 let mut block_hash = None;
455 let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
456 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
458 (1, transaction, option),
459 (2, height, required),
460 (3, block_hash, option),
461 (4, event, upgradable_required),
463 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
467 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
469 (0, source, required),
470 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
471 (2, payment_hash, required),
472 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
474 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
475 (0, descriptor, required),
477 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
478 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
479 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
481 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
482 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
483 (2, preimage, option),
484 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
489 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
490 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
491 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
492 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
493 /// Note that LDK after 0.0.115 supports this only containing dust HTLCs (implying the
494 /// `Signature` field is never filled in). At that point, non-dust HTLCs are implied by the
495 /// HTLC fields in `commitment_tx` and the sources passed via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
496 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
497 claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
498 nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>,
500 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
501 commitment_txid: Txid,
502 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
503 commitment_number: u64,
504 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
507 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
513 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
514 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
516 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
517 /// think we've fallen behind!
518 should_broadcast: bool,
521 scriptpubkey: Script,
525 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
526 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
528 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
529 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
530 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
531 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
532 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
533 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
538 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
539 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
540 (0, commitment_tx, required),
541 (1, claimed_htlcs, optional_vec),
542 (2, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
543 (4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
545 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
546 (0, commitment_txid, required),
547 (2, commitment_number, required),
548 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
549 (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
551 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
552 (0, payment_preimage, required),
554 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
556 (2, secret, required),
558 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
559 (0, should_broadcast, required),
561 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
562 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
566 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
568 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
570 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
571 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
573 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
574 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
575 /// force-closed now.
576 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
577 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
578 /// required to do so.
579 amount_satoshis: u64,
581 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
582 /// we consider it spendable.
583 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
584 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
585 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
586 amount_satoshis: u64,
587 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
589 confirmation_height: u32,
591 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
592 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
593 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
595 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
596 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
597 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
598 ContentiousClaimable {
599 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
600 /// required to do so.
601 amount_satoshis: u64,
602 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
605 /// The payment hash that locks this HTLC.
606 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
607 /// The preimage that can be used to claim this HTLC.
608 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
610 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
611 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
612 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
613 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
614 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
615 /// which will be required to do so.
616 amount_satoshis: u64,
617 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
619 claimable_height: u32,
620 /// The payment hash whose preimage our counterparty needs to claim this HTLC.
621 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
623 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
624 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
625 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
626 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
627 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
628 /// which will be required to do so.
629 amount_satoshis: u64,
630 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
631 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
633 /// The payment hash whose preimage we need to claim this HTLC.
634 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
636 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
639 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
640 /// following amount.
641 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
642 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
644 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
645 /// were already spent.
646 amount_satoshis: u64,
651 /// The amount claimable, in satoshis. This excludes balances that we are unsure if we are able
652 /// to claim, this is because we are waiting for a preimage or for a timeout to expire. For more
653 /// information on these balances see [`Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC`] and
654 /// [`Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC`].
656 /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
657 pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
659 Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }|
660 Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }|
661 Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }|
662 Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }
664 Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }|
665 Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. }
671 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
672 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
673 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
674 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
675 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
676 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
678 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
679 resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
680 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
681 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
684 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
685 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
686 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
687 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
688 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
689 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
690 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
691 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
692 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
693 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
694 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
695 (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
701 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
702 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
703 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
704 let mut resolving_txid = None;
705 let mut payment_preimage = None;
706 let mut resolving_tx = None;
707 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
708 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
709 (1, resolving_txid, option),
710 (2, payment_preimage, option),
711 (3, resolving_tx, option),
714 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
722 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
723 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
725 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
726 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
728 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
729 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
730 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
731 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
732 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
733 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
735 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
737 pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
740 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: Clone {
741 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
742 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone();
743 ChannelMonitor::from_impl(inner)
747 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
748 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
749 latest_update_id: u64,
750 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
752 destination_script: Script,
753 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
754 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
755 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
757 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
758 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
759 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
760 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
761 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
763 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
764 funding_redeemscript: Script,
765 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
766 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
767 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
769 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
771 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
772 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
773 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
774 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
775 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
776 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
777 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
778 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
779 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
780 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
781 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
782 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
783 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
784 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
785 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
786 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
788 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,
790 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
791 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
792 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
793 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
794 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
795 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
797 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
799 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
800 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
802 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
804 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
805 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
806 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
808 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
810 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
811 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
812 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
813 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
814 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
815 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
816 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
817 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
818 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
819 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
821 pub(super) pending_events: Vec<Event>,
822 pub(super) is_processing_pending_events: bool,
824 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
825 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
826 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
827 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
829 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
830 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
831 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
832 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
833 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
836 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
838 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
840 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
841 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
842 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
843 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
845 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
846 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
847 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
849 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
850 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
851 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
852 holder_tx_signed: bool,
854 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
855 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
856 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
857 funding_spend_seen: bool,
859 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
860 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
861 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
863 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
864 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
865 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
866 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
867 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
869 /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
870 /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
871 /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
872 /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
873 /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
874 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
876 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
877 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
878 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
879 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
880 // the full block_connected).
881 best_block: BestBlock,
883 /// The node_id of our counterparty
884 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
887 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
888 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
890 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
891 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
892 // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
893 // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
895 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
896 let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
897 let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
902 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
903 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
904 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
908 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
909 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
910 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
912 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
913 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
914 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
916 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
918 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
919 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
921 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
922 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
923 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
924 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
925 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
926 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
928 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
931 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
932 match &self.shutdown_script {
933 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
934 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
937 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
938 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
939 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
940 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
941 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
942 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
943 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
945 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
946 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
947 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
949 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
950 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
951 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
952 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
953 match second_option {
954 Some(second_pubkey) => {
955 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
958 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
963 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
967 writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
969 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
971 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
972 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
973 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
974 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
975 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
976 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
977 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
981 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
982 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
983 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
984 writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
985 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
986 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
987 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
988 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
989 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
990 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
994 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
995 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
996 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
997 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1000 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1001 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1002 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1003 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1006 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1007 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1008 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1010 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1013 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1015 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1016 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1018 writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1019 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1020 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1023 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1024 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1025 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
1027 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1028 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1030 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1034 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1035 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1039 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1040 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1041 event.write(writer)?;
1044 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1045 writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height().to_be_bytes())?;
1047 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1048 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1049 entry.write(writer)?;
1052 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1053 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1054 txid.write(writer)?;
1055 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1056 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1058 script.write(writer)?;
1061 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1063 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1064 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1066 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1067 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1068 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec),
1069 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, required_vec),
1070 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1071 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1072 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1073 (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
1074 (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
1081 macro_rules! _process_events_body {
1082 ($self_opt: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1084 let (pending_events, repeated_events);
1085 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1086 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1087 if inner.is_processing_pending_events {
1090 inner.is_processing_pending_events = true;
1092 pending_events = inner.pending_events.clone();
1093 repeated_events = inner.get_repeated_events();
1095 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1097 for event in pending_events.into_iter().chain(repeated_events.into_iter()) {
1098 $event_to_handle = event;
1102 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1103 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1104 inner.pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1105 inner.is_processing_pending_events = false;
1106 if !inner.pending_events.is_empty() {
1107 // If there's more events to process, go ahead and do so.
1115 pub(super) use _process_events_body as process_events_body;
1117 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1118 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1119 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1120 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1121 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1122 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1125 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
1126 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1127 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1128 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1129 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1130 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1131 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1133 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1134 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1135 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1137 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1138 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1139 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1140 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1142 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1143 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1145 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1146 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1147 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1148 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1150 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1151 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1153 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1154 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1155 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1156 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1157 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1158 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1159 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1160 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1162 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1165 let onchain_tx_handler =
1166 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1167 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
1169 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1170 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1172 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1173 latest_update_id: 0,
1174 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1176 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1177 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1178 counterparty_payment_script,
1182 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1184 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1185 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1187 counterparty_commitment_params,
1188 funding_redeemscript,
1189 channel_value_satoshis,
1190 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1192 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1194 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1195 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1196 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1197 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1198 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1200 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1201 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1202 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1203 current_holder_commitment_number,
1205 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1206 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1207 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1208 is_processing_pending_events: false,
1210 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1215 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1216 holder_tx_signed: false,
1217 funding_spend_seen: false,
1218 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1219 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1220 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1221 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
1224 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1229 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1230 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1233 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1234 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1235 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1236 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1237 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1240 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1241 commitment_number: u64,
1242 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1244 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1245 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1246 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1250 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1251 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1252 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1253 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1254 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new(), Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
1257 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1258 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1259 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1261 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1262 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1264 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1267 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1268 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1271 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1272 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1275 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1278 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1279 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1281 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1287 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1288 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1291 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1294 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1296 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1297 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1300 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1301 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1302 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1305 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1306 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1307 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1308 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1309 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1312 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1313 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1314 /// have been registered.
1315 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1316 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1317 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1318 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1319 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1320 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1321 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1323 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1324 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1330 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1331 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1332 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1333 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1336 /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
1338 /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
1339 /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
1340 /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
1341 /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
1342 /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
1344 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
1345 /// order to handle these events.
1347 /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
1348 /// [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
1349 pub fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: &H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
1351 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
1354 /// Processes any events asynchronously.
1356 /// See [`Self::process_pending_events`] for more information.
1357 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
1361 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, { handler(ev).await });
1365 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1366 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1367 let mut lck = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1368 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut lck.pending_events);
1369 ret.append(&mut lck.get_repeated_events());
1373 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1374 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1377 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1378 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1381 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1382 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1385 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1387 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1389 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1390 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1393 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1394 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1396 /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1397 /// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've
1398 /// fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation
1399 /// secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1401 /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1402 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1403 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1404 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1405 /// to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you.
1407 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
1408 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1409 where L::Target: Logger {
1410 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1413 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1414 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1415 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1416 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1417 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1418 where L::Target: Logger {
1419 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1422 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1423 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1424 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1425 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1426 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1427 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1429 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1430 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1432 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1433 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1435 header: &BlockHeader,
1436 txdata: &TransactionData,
1441 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1443 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1444 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1447 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1448 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1451 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1453 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1455 header: &BlockHeader,
1461 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1462 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1465 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1466 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1469 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1470 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1472 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1473 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1475 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1476 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1478 header: &BlockHeader,
1479 txdata: &TransactionData,
1484 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1486 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1487 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1490 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1491 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1492 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1495 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1497 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1498 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1500 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1501 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1508 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1509 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1512 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1513 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1514 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1517 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1518 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1520 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1521 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1523 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1524 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1526 header: &BlockHeader,
1531 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1533 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1534 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1537 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1538 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1539 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1542 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1543 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1544 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1545 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1547 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.block_hash))
1548 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1550 txids.sort_unstable();
1555 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1556 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1557 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1558 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1561 /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
1562 /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
1563 /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
1564 /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
1565 /// connections, like on mobile.
1566 pub fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1567 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L,
1570 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1571 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1574 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1575 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1576 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1577 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1578 current_height, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1583 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1584 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1585 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1586 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1587 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1588 -> Option<Balance> {
1589 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1590 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1592 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1593 let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
1594 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1595 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1596 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1597 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1599 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1600 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1601 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1602 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1603 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1604 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1605 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1606 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1607 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1609 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1610 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1611 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1612 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1613 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1614 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1615 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1616 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1618 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1619 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1620 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1621 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1622 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1627 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1628 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1629 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1630 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
1631 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1632 htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
1635 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1637 let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
1638 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1639 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1640 // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
1641 // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
1642 // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
1643 // in the commitment.
1644 if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
1645 let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1646 .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
1647 .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
1648 debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
1649 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
1651 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1652 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
1655 htlc_commitment_outpoint
1657 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1659 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1660 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1661 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1662 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1663 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1665 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1666 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1667 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1668 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1669 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1670 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1671 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1672 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1673 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1674 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1675 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1677 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1678 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1679 tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
1681 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1682 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1684 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1689 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1690 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1691 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1692 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1693 // need to do so again here.
1695 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1696 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1697 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1698 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1699 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1700 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1703 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1704 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1705 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1706 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1707 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1708 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1709 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1710 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1713 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1714 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1715 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1716 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1719 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1720 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1721 // we know the preimage.
1722 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1723 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1724 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1725 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1726 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1727 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1728 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1729 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1732 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1733 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1734 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1735 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1736 payment_preimage: *payment_preimage,
1739 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1740 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1741 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1742 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1743 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1750 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1751 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1752 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1755 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1756 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1757 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1758 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1760 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1761 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
1762 /// a revoked state.
1764 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1765 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1766 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1767 let mut res = Vec::new();
1768 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1770 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1771 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1772 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1773 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1774 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1777 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
1778 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1781 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1782 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1783 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1784 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1785 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1788 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1789 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1790 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1791 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1793 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
1801 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1802 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1803 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1804 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
1805 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1806 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1807 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1808 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1810 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1813 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1814 amount_satoshis: value,
1815 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1818 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1819 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1820 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1823 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1824 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1826 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1827 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
1828 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
1829 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
1830 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
1831 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
1832 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1833 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1834 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
1836 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1837 amount_satoshis: output.value,
1838 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
1840 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
1841 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
1842 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
1843 ).unwrap_or(false) {
1844 spent_counterparty_output = true;
1850 if spent_counterparty_output {
1851 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
1852 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
1853 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
1854 if output_spendable {
1855 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1856 amount_satoshis: amt,
1860 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
1861 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
1864 found_commitment_tx = true;
1865 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1866 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1867 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1868 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1869 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1870 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1873 found_commitment_tx = true;
1874 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1875 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1876 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1877 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1878 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1879 amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1880 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1883 found_commitment_tx = true;
1886 if !found_commitment_tx {
1887 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1888 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1889 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1890 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1891 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1892 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1893 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1898 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1899 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1900 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1902 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1903 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1904 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1905 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1907 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1908 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1910 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
1911 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
1912 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1913 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1914 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1915 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1919 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1920 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1927 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
1928 /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
1929 /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
1931 /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
1932 /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
1933 /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
1934 pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
1935 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1936 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
1937 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1938 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1939 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1941 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1942 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1943 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1944 res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
1945 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
1951 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1952 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1954 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1955 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1960 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
1961 /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
1963 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1965 /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
1966 /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
1967 pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
1968 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1969 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1970 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1971 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1972 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1973 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1974 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1980 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
1981 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1982 // closed), just get the full set.
1984 return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
1987 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1988 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1989 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1990 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1991 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1992 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1993 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1995 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1996 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1997 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1998 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1999 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
2000 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2001 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
2002 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
2003 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
2004 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
2005 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
2006 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
2007 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
2008 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
2009 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
2010 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
2012 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
2015 let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
2016 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
2017 if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
2018 res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
2025 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
2026 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2027 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
2028 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
2029 Some((a, &**source))
2032 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2033 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2034 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2036 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2037 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2038 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2039 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2047 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
2048 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
2052 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
2053 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
2054 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
2056 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
2057 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
2058 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
2059 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
2060 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
2061 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
2063 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
2064 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
2065 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
2066 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
2067 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
2068 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
2069 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
2070 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
2072 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
2073 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
2074 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2075 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2076 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2077 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
2078 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
2079 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
2080 // payment_preimage.
2081 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
2082 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
2083 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
2084 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
2086 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
2088 let mut matched_htlc = false;
2089 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
2090 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
2091 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
2092 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
2093 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
2094 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
2095 matched_htlc = true;
2099 if matched_htlc { continue; }
2100 if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
2103 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2104 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
2106 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
2107 *update_source != **source
2112 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2113 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
2114 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
2115 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
2116 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
2117 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2118 source: (**source).clone(),
2119 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
2120 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
2121 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
2124 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
2125 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2126 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2127 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2133 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2134 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2136 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2137 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2142 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2143 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2144 // in-line tests later.
2147 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2148 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2149 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2150 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2151 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2152 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2153 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2158 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2159 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2162 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2163 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2164 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2165 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2166 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2167 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2168 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2171 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2172 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2173 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2174 if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
2175 let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2176 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2177 for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2178 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2179 if !cur_claimables.iter()
2180 .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
2182 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
2186 for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2190 assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
2194 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2195 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2196 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2197 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2198 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2200 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2201 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2202 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2206 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2207 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2208 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2213 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2220 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2229 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2230 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2231 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2232 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2234 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2235 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2238 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2239 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2240 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2241 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2242 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2243 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2244 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2245 Some(old_points) => {
2246 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2247 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2248 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2249 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2250 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2252 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2255 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2259 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2262 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2263 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2264 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2270 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2271 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2272 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2273 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2274 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2275 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, mut htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)], nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2276 if htlc_outputs.iter().any(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()) {
2277 // If we have non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, ensure they match the HTLCs in the
2278 // `holder_commitment_tx`. In the future, we'll no longer provide the redundant data
2279 // and just pass in source data via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
2280 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len());
2281 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).map(|(h, _, _)| h).zip(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()) {
2282 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2284 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2285 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, s, _)| s.as_ref()).zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter()) {
2286 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2288 debug_assert!(nondust_htlc_sources.is_empty());
2290 // If we don't have any non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, assume they were all passed via
2291 // `nondust_htlc_sources`, building up the final htlc_outputs by combining
2292 // `nondust_htlc_sources` and the `holder_commitment_tx`
2293 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2295 for htlc in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter() {
2296 assert!(htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32 > prev);
2297 prev = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32;
2300 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(htlc, _, _)| htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()));
2301 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(_, sig_opt, _)| sig_opt.is_none()));
2302 debug_assert_eq!(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2304 let mut sources_iter = nondust_htlc_sources.into_iter();
2306 for (htlc, counterparty_sig) in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()
2307 .zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter())
2310 let source = sources_iter.next().expect("Non-dust HTLC sources didn't match commitment tx");
2311 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2312 assert!(source.possibly_matches_output(htlc));
2314 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), Some(source)));
2316 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), None));
2319 debug_assert!(sources_iter.next().is_none());
2322 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2323 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2324 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2325 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2326 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
2328 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2329 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2330 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2331 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2332 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2334 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2335 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2337 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2338 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2339 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2340 for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
2341 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2342 let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2343 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2344 assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
2345 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2346 SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
2350 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
2352 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2353 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2358 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2359 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2360 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2361 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2362 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
2363 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2364 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2367 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2369 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2370 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2371 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2372 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2373 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2374 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2377 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2378 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2379 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2383 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2384 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2385 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2390 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2391 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2392 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2393 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2394 // holder commitment transactions.
2395 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2396 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2397 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2399 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2400 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2401 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2402 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
2403 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2408 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
2409 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2412 let commit_txs = self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2413 let mut txs = vec![];
2414 for tx in commit_txs.iter() {
2415 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
2418 broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&txs);
2419 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2422 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
2423 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2424 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2427 if self.latest_update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2428 log_info!(logger, "Applying post-force-closed update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2429 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2430 } else if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2431 log_info!(logger, "Applying force close update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2432 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2434 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
2435 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2437 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
2438 // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
2439 // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
2440 // sentinel value instead.
2442 // The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
2443 // thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
2445 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2446 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2447 match updates.updates[0] {
2448 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
2449 // We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
2450 // provide a preimage at this point.
2451 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
2452 debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
2454 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2455 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2458 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2459 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2461 let mut ret = Ok(());
2462 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2463 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2465 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
2466 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2467 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2468 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources.clone()) {
2469 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2470 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2474 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2475 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2476 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2478 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2479 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2480 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2482 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2483 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2484 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2485 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2486 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2490 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2491 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2492 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2493 if *should_broadcast {
2494 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
2495 // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
2496 // duplicate/conflicting.
2497 let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
2498 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
2499 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
2502 if detected_funding_spend {
2503 log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
2506 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2507 // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
2508 // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
2509 // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm.
2510 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2511 let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2512 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2513 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(),
2515 let best_block_height = self.best_block.height();
2516 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2517 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2518 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output),
2519 best_block_height, best_block_height
2521 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2522 vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height,
2523 broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger,
2526 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2527 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2528 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()));
2529 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
2531 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2532 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2533 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2534 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2537 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2538 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2539 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2540 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2546 // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
2547 // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
2548 if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
2552 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2554 // Refuse updates after we've detected a spend onchain, but only if we haven't processed a
2555 // force closed monitor update yet.
2556 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen && self.latest_update_id != CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2557 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2562 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2563 self.latest_update_id
2566 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2570 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2571 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2572 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2573 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2574 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2575 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2577 &self.outputs_to_watch
2580 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2581 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2582 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2586 /// Gets the set of events that are repeated regularly (e.g. those which RBF bump
2587 /// transactions). We're okay if we lose these on restart as they'll be regenerated for us at
2588 /// some regular interval via [`ChannelMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims`].
2589 pub(super) fn get_repeated_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2590 let pending_claim_events = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events();
2591 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pending_claim_events.len());
2592 for (claim_id, claim_event) in pending_claim_events {
2594 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
2595 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
2597 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2598 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
2599 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
2600 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
2601 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
2602 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
2604 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2606 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
2607 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
2608 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2609 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2610 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2611 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2613 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
2614 txid: commitment_txid,
2615 vout: anchor_output_idx,
2621 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
2622 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs, tx_lock_time,
2624 let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
2626 htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
2627 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2628 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2629 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2630 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2632 commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
2633 per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
2634 per_commitment_point: self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.get_per_commitment_point(
2635 htlc.per_commitment_number, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
2638 preimage: htlc.preimage,
2639 counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
2642 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
2644 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2654 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2655 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2656 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2659 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2660 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2663 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2664 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2667 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2668 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2671 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2672 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2673 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2674 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2676 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
2677 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
2679 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
2680 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
2681 where L::Target: Logger {
2682 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2683 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2684 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2685 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2686 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
2688 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2689 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2691 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2692 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2695 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2700 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2701 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2702 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2703 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2704 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2705 let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
2706 let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
2708 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2709 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2711 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2712 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2713 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2714 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
2715 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height);
2716 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2717 to_counterparty_output_info =
2718 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2722 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2723 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2724 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2725 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2726 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2727 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2728 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2729 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
2730 to_counterparty_output_info);
2732 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2733 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, height);
2734 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2739 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2740 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2741 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2742 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2743 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2744 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2746 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2748 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2749 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2750 block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2751 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2754 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2755 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2756 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2759 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2760 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2761 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2762 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2763 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2764 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2765 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2767 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2768 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2770 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2772 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2773 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
2774 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2775 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2778 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
2779 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2780 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
2781 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2782 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2786 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2789 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
2790 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
2791 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
2792 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2793 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
2795 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2796 Some(outputs) => outputs,
2797 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2799 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2800 Some(points) => points,
2801 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2804 let per_commitment_point =
2805 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2806 // per-commitment point
2807 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
2808 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2809 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2810 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2811 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2812 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2814 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
2815 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
2817 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2818 let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
2819 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
2820 let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
2821 &per_commitment_point,
2822 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
2823 let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
2824 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2825 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
2826 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
2827 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2828 to_counterparty_output_info =
2829 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2834 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2835 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2836 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2837 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2838 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2839 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2840 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
2843 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2844 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2845 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2846 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2847 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2848 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2849 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2850 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
2852 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2853 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2854 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2855 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2856 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
2858 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry, 0);
2859 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2864 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
2867 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2868 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
2869 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
2870 ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2871 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2872 let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
2874 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2876 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2878 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2879 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
2880 let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
2881 // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
2882 // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
2883 // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
2884 // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
2885 // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
2886 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
2888 // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
2889 // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
2890 // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
2891 for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
2892 if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
2893 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
2894 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
2895 per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2896 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
2897 tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2900 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2901 htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
2902 height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height
2904 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2905 if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
2906 outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
2908 outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
2911 (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
2914 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2915 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2916 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2917 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2918 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2920 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2921 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2923 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2924 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2925 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2926 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
2927 htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
2931 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2934 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2937 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
2938 payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
2942 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2943 holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
2944 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
2945 htlc.cltv_expiry, conf_height
2947 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2951 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2954 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2955 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2956 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2957 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2958 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2959 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2965 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2966 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2967 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2968 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2969 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2970 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2971 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2972 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2974 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2975 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2976 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2977 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2978 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2982 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2983 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2985 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2986 is_holder_tx = true;
2987 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2988 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2989 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2990 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2991 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2992 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2993 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2994 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2995 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2996 is_holder_tx = true;
2997 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2998 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2999 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
3000 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3001 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3002 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
3008 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
3014 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3015 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
3016 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
3017 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3018 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3019 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3020 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
3021 // transaction confirms.
3022 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3023 return holder_transactions;
3025 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3026 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3027 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3028 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3029 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3032 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
3033 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
3034 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
3035 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
3036 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
3037 // confirmed in the next block.
3040 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
3041 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
3042 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
3046 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
3047 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
3051 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
3052 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
3053 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3054 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
3055 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3056 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3057 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3058 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
3059 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
3060 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3061 return holder_transactions;
3063 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3064 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3065 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3066 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3067 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3071 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
3072 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
3073 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
3080 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3081 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3082 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3085 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3086 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3088 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3089 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
3092 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3094 header: &BlockHeader,
3097 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3099 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3101 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3102 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3105 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3107 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3108 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3109 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
3110 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
3111 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3112 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
3113 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3115 } else { Vec::new() }
3118 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3120 header: &BlockHeader,
3121 txdata: &TransactionData,
3124 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3126 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3128 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3129 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3132 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
3133 for tx in &txn_matched {
3134 let mut output_val = 0;
3135 for out in tx.output.iter() {
3136 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3137 output_val += out.value;
3138 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3142 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3144 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3145 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3146 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
3147 let txid = tx.txid();
3148 // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
3149 if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
3150 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3153 for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3154 if ev.txid == txid {
3155 if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
3156 assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
3157 "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
3158 This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
3160 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3164 for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
3165 if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
3166 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3170 for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
3171 if txid == *spendable_txid {
3172 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3177 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
3178 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
3179 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
3180 // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
3181 // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
3182 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
3183 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
3184 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
3185 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
3186 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), txid);
3187 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
3188 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
3189 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
3190 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
3191 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3192 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
3193 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3194 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3196 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3197 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
3198 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
3199 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
3200 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
3201 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3202 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3204 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3205 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
3209 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3211 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
3213 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
3214 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
3215 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
3216 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
3221 if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
3222 // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
3223 // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
3224 // other ways which can have more than one output.
3225 for tx_input in &tx.input {
3226 let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
3227 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
3228 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
3229 &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
3231 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3232 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
3233 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3235 // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
3236 // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
3237 // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
3238 // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
3242 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3244 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3248 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3249 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3252 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
3255 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
3256 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
3257 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
3258 /// complexity especially in
3259 /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
3261 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
3262 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
3263 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3266 conf_hash: BlockHash,
3267 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
3268 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
3269 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
3271 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3273 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3275 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3276 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3279 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
3280 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
3282 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
3283 if should_broadcast {
3284 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone());
3285 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height());
3286 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
3287 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
3288 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3289 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
3290 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
3291 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
3292 // `transactions_confirmed`.
3293 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3294 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
3295 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
3296 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
3297 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
3298 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
3299 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
3300 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
3302 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3306 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3307 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3308 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3309 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3310 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3311 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3312 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3314 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3318 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3319 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3320 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3322 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3323 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3327 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3328 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3330 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3331 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3333 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3334 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3335 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3338 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3339 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3340 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3341 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3343 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3344 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3345 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3346 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3347 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3350 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3351 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
3352 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3354 payment_preimage: None,
3355 source: source.clone(),
3356 htlc_value_satoshis,
3358 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3359 commitment_tx_output_idx,
3360 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3361 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3362 payment_preimage: None,
3365 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3366 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3367 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3368 outputs: vec![descriptor]
3370 self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
3372 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3373 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3374 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
3375 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3376 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3377 payment_preimage: preimage,
3380 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3381 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3382 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3387 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3388 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3390 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3391 // updating the latter in the process.
3392 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3393 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3394 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3398 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3399 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3400 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3401 for tx in &txn_matched {
3402 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3403 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3404 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3405 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3413 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
3414 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3415 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3418 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3421 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3422 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3423 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3425 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3426 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3428 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3431 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3435 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3438 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3439 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3442 let mut removed_height = None;
3443 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3444 if entry.txid == *txid {
3445 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
3450 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
3451 log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
3452 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
3453 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
3458 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
3460 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3463 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3464 /// transactions thereof.
3465 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3466 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
3467 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3468 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3469 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3470 if matches { break; }
3471 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3476 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3479 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3482 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3483 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3484 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3485 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3486 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3487 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3490 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3491 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3492 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3493 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3494 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3495 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3496 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3497 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3501 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3502 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3503 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3504 } else { panic!(); }
3515 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3516 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
3517 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
3518 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
3519 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
3520 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
3526 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3527 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3528 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3529 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3530 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3531 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3532 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3533 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3534 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3535 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3536 let height = self.best_block.height();
3537 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3538 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3539 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3540 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3541 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3542 // time out the HTLC first.
3543 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3544 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3545 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3546 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3547 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3548 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3549 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
3550 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
3551 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
3552 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
3553 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
3554 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
3555 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3556 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3557 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3558 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
3559 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
3560 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
3561 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
3562 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
3563 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
3564 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
3565 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
3566 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3573 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
3575 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3576 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3577 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3580 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3581 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3582 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3589 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
3590 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
3591 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3592 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
3593 let mut payment_data = None;
3594 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
3595 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
3596 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
3597 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3598 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
3599 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
3600 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3601 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
3603 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3604 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
3605 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
3608 macro_rules! log_claim {
3609 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
3610 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
3611 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
3613 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3614 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3615 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3616 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3617 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
3618 // matched by any HTLC spend:
3619 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3620 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
3621 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
3622 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
3623 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
3624 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
3625 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
3626 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3627 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3628 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
3630 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
3631 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3632 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3633 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
3638 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
3639 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
3640 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
3641 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
3642 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
3643 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
3644 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
3645 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
3654 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3655 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3656 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3657 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3658 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3659 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
3660 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3661 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
3662 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3663 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3664 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3665 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
3666 } else if !$holder_tx {
3667 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3668 if payment_data.is_none() {
3669 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3672 if payment_data.is_none() {
3673 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
3674 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
3675 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3676 txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3677 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3678 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3679 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
3680 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
3681 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
3682 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
3683 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
3684 // accepted_preimage_claim).
3685 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
3686 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
3689 continue 'outer_loop;
3696 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
3697 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3698 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
3700 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3701 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3702 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3703 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
3706 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3707 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3708 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
3711 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3712 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3713 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
3714 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3715 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3716 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
3717 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3720 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3721 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3722 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3723 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3724 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3725 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3728 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3730 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3732 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3735 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3736 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3737 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3738 upd.source == source
3740 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3742 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3744 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3745 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3746 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3747 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3748 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3751 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3753 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3755 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3759 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3760 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3762 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3763 *htlc_source != source
3768 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3770 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3772 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3773 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3774 source, payment_hash,
3775 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3776 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3779 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3780 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3786 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3787 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3788 let mut spendable_output = None;
3789 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3790 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3791 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3792 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3793 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3794 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3795 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3796 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3797 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3798 // non-standard due to their size.
3799 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3800 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3801 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3804 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3805 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3806 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3807 output: outp.clone(),
3811 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3812 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3813 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3814 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3815 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3816 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3817 output: outp.clone(),
3818 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3819 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3820 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3825 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3826 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3827 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3828 output: outp.clone(),
3829 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3830 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3834 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3835 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3836 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3837 output: outp.clone(),
3842 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3843 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3845 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3847 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3848 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3850 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3851 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3856 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3858 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3859 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3862 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3863 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3866 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3867 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3871 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, M, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (M, T, F, L)
3873 M: Deref<Target = ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
3874 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3875 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3878 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3879 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3882 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3883 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3886 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3887 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3890 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
3891 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3895 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3897 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
3898 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::Signer>) {
3899 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3900 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3904 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3909 let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
3911 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3913 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3914 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3916 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3917 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3919 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3920 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3921 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3922 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3925 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3927 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3928 let shutdown_script = {
3929 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3930 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3933 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3934 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3935 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3936 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3937 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3938 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3939 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3941 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3942 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3943 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3945 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3946 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3947 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3949 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3950 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3954 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3955 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3956 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3957 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3959 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3964 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3966 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3968 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3971 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3972 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3973 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3974 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3975 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3977 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3978 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3984 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3985 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3986 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3987 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3988 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3989 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3990 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3991 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3993 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3994 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3998 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3999 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4000 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
4001 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4002 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4003 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
4004 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4008 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4009 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4010 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
4011 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4012 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4013 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
4014 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4018 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
4019 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4022 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
4024 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4026 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
4028 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4029 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4031 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4032 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4033 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
4034 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
4035 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4036 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
4037 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4041 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4042 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
4043 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
4044 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
4045 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4046 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
4047 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
4048 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4050 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
4053 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4054 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
4055 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
4056 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4057 pending_events.push(event);
4061 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
4063 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4064 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
4065 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
4066 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4067 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
4071 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4072 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
4073 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
4074 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4075 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4076 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
4077 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
4078 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4080 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
4081 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4084 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(
4085 reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
4088 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
4089 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4091 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
4092 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4093 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
4094 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4095 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
4096 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
4097 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4101 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4102 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4103 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
4104 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
4105 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4108 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
4109 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
4110 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
4111 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
4112 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
4113 let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
4114 let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new());
4115 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4116 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
4117 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
4118 (5, pending_monitor_events, optional_vec),
4119 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
4120 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
4121 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
4122 (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
4123 (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
4126 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
4128 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
4131 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
4132 counterparty_payment_script,
4136 holder_revocation_basepoint,
4138 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4139 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4141 counterparty_commitment_params,
4142 funding_redeemscript,
4143 channel_value_satoshis,
4144 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
4149 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
4150 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
4151 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
4152 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),
4154 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
4155 current_holder_commitment_tx,
4156 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
4157 current_holder_commitment_number,
4160 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
4162 is_processing_pending_events: false,
4164 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
4169 lockdown_from_offchain,
4171 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
4172 funding_spend_confirmed,
4173 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
4174 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
4175 spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
4178 counterparty_node_id,
4185 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4186 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4187 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
4188 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4189 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
4190 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4191 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4192 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4193 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
4194 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4195 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4196 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
4200 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
4202 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
4203 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
4204 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
4205 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
4206 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
4207 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4208 use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
4209 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
4210 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4211 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
4212 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
4213 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
4214 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4215 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
4216 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
4217 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
4218 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
4219 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4221 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
4222 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
4223 use crate::prelude::*;
4225 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
4226 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
4227 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
4228 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
4229 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
4230 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
4231 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
4232 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
4233 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
4235 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
4236 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
4237 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4238 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4239 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4240 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4241 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4242 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4244 // Rebalance somewhat
4245 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
4247 // First route two payments for testing at the end
4248 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4249 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4251 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
4252 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4253 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
4254 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
4255 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
4256 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
4257 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
4259 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
4260 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
4261 let new_header = create_dummy_header(nodes[0].best_block_info().0, 0);
4262 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4263 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
4264 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
4266 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
4267 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
4268 (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
4270 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
4271 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
4272 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
4273 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
4274 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
4275 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
4276 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
4277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
4278 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4279 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() },
4280 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4282 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
4283 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
4284 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
4285 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
4286 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
4287 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
4288 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
4289 } else { panic!(); }
4290 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
4291 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
4293 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
4295 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
4297 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
4299 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4300 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
4301 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
4302 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
4303 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
4304 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
4305 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4306 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
4307 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
4310 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
4311 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
4312 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4316 fn test_prune_preimages() {
4317 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4318 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4319 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster::new(Network::Testnet));
4320 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4322 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4324 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4327 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4328 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4329 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4333 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlcs {
4334 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4336 let mut res = Vec::new();
4337 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4338 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4342 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4343 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4350 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4351 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4352 preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
4355 let dummy_sig = crate::util::crypto::sign(&secp_ctx,
4356 &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
4357 &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4359 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4360 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4361 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4362 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4367 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4369 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4370 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4371 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4372 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4373 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4380 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4381 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4382 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
4383 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4384 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
4385 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
4387 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4388 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4389 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4390 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4391 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4392 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4393 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4394 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4396 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4397 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
4399 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4401 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4402 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
4403 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4404 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
4405 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
4406 &channel_parameters, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
4407 best_block, dummy_key);
4409 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
4410 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4411 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4412 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4413 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"1").into_inner()),
4414 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4415 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"2").into_inner()),
4416 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4417 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4418 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4419 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4422 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4423 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4424 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4425 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4426 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4427 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4428 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4430 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"3").into_inner()),
4431 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4433 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4434 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4435 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4436 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4437 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4438 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4440 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"4").into_inner()),
4441 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4443 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4444 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4445 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]);
4446 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4447 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4448 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4449 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4450 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4451 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4452 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4453 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4455 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4456 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]);
4457 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4458 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
4459 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4460 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4461 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4462 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4463 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4467 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4468 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4469 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4471 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4472 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4473 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4475 macro_rules! sign_input {
4476 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4477 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4478 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4480 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4481 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4482 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4484 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
4485 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4486 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4487 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4488 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4489 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
4490 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4491 witness.push(ser_sig);
4492 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4493 witness.push(vec!(1));
4494 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4495 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4496 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4497 witness.push(vec![0]);
4499 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4501 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4502 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4503 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4504 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4505 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4509 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4510 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4512 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4513 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4514 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4515 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4517 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4518 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4522 script_sig: Script::new(),
4523 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4524 witness: Witness::new(),
4527 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4528 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4531 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4532 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
4533 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4535 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4536 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4537 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
4538 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4541 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4544 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
4545 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4546 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4547 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4549 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4550 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4554 script_sig: Script::new(),
4555 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4556 witness: Witness::new(),
4559 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4560 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4563 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4564 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
4565 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4567 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4568 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4569 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
4570 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4573 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4576 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
4577 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4578 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4579 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4580 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4581 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4585 script_sig: Script::new(),
4586 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4587 witness: Witness::new(),
4589 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4590 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4593 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4594 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
4595 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4597 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4598 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4599 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
4600 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4603 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4607 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.