1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
41 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
43 use chain::WatchedOutput;
44 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
45 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
48 use util::logger::Logger;
49 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
51 use util::events::Event;
53 use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
59 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
60 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
61 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
64 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
65 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
66 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
67 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
68 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
70 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
71 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
72 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
74 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
75 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
76 /// its docs for more details.
81 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
82 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
83 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
84 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
85 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
87 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = std::u64::MAX;
89 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
90 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
91 self.update_id.write(w)?;
92 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
93 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
94 update_step.write(w)?;
99 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
100 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
101 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
102 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
103 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
105 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
107 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
111 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
112 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
113 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
114 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
115 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
117 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
118 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
119 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
120 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
122 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
123 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
124 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
126 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
127 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
128 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
129 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
130 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
131 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
134 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
135 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
138 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
139 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
140 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
141 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
142 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
145 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
146 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
147 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
149 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
150 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
151 /// of this channel).
153 /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
154 /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
155 /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
156 /// update must be rejected.
158 /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
159 /// the channel monitor instance.
161 /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
162 /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
163 /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
165 /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
166 /// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
167 /// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
168 /// lagging behind on block processing.
172 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
173 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
174 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
176 /// Contains a developer-readable error message.
177 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
178 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
180 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
181 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
182 pub enum MonitorEvent {
183 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
184 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
186 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
187 CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
190 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
191 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
192 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
193 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
194 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
195 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
196 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
197 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
199 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
201 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
202 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
203 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
204 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
205 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
206 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
207 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
208 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
209 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
210 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
211 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
212 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
213 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
214 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
215 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
216 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
217 /// accurate block height.
218 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
219 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
220 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
221 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
222 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
223 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
224 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
225 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
226 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
227 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
228 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
229 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
230 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
232 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
233 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
234 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
236 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
237 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
238 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
239 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
241 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
242 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
244 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
245 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
246 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
248 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
249 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
250 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
252 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
253 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
254 struct HolderSignedTx {
255 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
257 revocation_key: PublicKey,
258 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
259 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
260 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
261 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
263 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
266 /// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
267 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
269 struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
270 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
271 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
272 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
273 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
276 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
277 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
278 self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
279 self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
280 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
281 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
282 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
283 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
284 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
285 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
292 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
293 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
294 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
295 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
296 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
297 let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
298 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
299 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
300 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
301 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
302 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
303 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
304 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
305 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
308 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
309 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
312 CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
313 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
314 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
315 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
319 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
323 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
324 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
325 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
326 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
327 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
329 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
330 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
331 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
332 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
333 input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
335 htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
336 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
339 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
340 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
341 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
342 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
343 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
346 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
350 funding_redeemscript: Script,
354 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
355 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
357 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
358 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
359 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
360 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
361 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
362 writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
363 input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
364 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
366 on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
368 &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
369 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
370 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
371 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
372 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
373 preimage.write(writer)?;
376 &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
377 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
378 preimage.write(writer)?;
379 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
381 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
382 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
383 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
390 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
391 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
392 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
394 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
395 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
396 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
397 let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
398 let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
399 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
400 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
401 let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
402 InputMaterial::Revoked {
403 per_commitment_point,
404 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
405 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
410 on_counterparty_tx_csv
414 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
415 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
416 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
417 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
418 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
419 InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
420 per_commitment_point,
421 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
422 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
428 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
429 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
430 InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
436 InputMaterial::Funding {
437 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
440 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
446 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
447 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
448 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
449 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
450 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
451 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
452 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
453 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
454 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
455 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
456 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
457 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
458 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
459 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
460 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
461 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
462 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
463 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
464 // and satisfy witness program.
465 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
468 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
469 /// transaction causing it.
471 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
473 struct OnchainEventEntry {
479 impl OnchainEventEntry {
480 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
481 self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
484 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
485 height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
489 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
490 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
493 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
494 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
495 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
497 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
500 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
504 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
505 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
507 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
509 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
510 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
511 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
512 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
514 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
515 commitment_txid: Txid,
516 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
517 commitment_number: u64,
518 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
521 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
527 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
528 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
530 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
531 /// think we've fallen behind!
532 should_broadcast: bool,
536 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
537 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
539 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
541 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
542 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
543 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
549 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
551 commitment_txid.write(w)?;
552 commitment_number.write(w)?;
553 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
554 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
555 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
557 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
560 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
562 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
564 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
569 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
571 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
577 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
578 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
579 match Readable::read(r)? {
581 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
582 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
584 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
585 let mut res = Vec::new();
587 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
594 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
595 commitment_txid: Readable::read(r)?,
596 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
597 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
599 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
600 let mut res = Vec::new();
602 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
609 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
610 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
614 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
615 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
616 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
620 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
621 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
624 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
629 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
630 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
632 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
633 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
635 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
636 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
637 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
638 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
640 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
641 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
642 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
643 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
644 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
645 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
647 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
649 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
652 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
653 latest_update_id: u64,
654 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
656 destination_script: Script,
657 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
658 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
659 shutdown_script: Script,
661 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
662 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
663 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
664 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
665 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
667 counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
668 funding_redeemscript: Script,
669 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
670 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
671 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
673 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
675 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
676 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
677 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
678 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
679 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
680 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
681 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
682 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
683 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
684 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
685 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
686 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
687 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
689 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
690 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
691 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
692 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
693 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
694 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
696 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
698 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
699 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
701 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
703 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
705 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
706 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
708 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
709 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
710 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
711 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
713 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
714 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
715 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
716 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
717 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
720 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
722 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
724 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
725 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
726 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
727 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
729 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
730 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
731 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
733 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
734 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
735 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
736 holder_tx_signed: bool,
738 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
739 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
740 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
741 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
742 // the full block_connected).
743 best_block: BestBlock,
745 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
748 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
749 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
750 /// underlying object
751 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
752 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
753 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
754 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
759 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
760 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
761 /// underlying object
762 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
763 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
764 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
765 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
766 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
767 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
768 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
769 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
770 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
771 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
772 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
773 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
774 self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
775 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
776 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
777 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
778 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
779 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
780 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
781 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
782 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
783 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
784 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
785 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
786 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
787 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
788 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
789 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
790 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
791 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
792 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
793 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
802 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
803 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
804 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
805 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
806 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
807 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
809 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
813 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
814 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
815 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
817 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
818 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
820 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
821 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
822 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
823 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
824 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
825 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
827 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
830 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
831 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
833 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
834 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
835 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
836 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
837 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
838 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
839 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
841 self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
842 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
843 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
845 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
846 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
847 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
848 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
849 match second_option {
850 Some(second_pubkey) => {
851 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
854 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
859 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
863 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
865 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
867 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
868 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
869 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
870 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
871 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
872 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
873 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
877 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
878 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
879 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
880 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
881 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
882 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
883 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
887 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
888 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
889 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
890 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
893 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
894 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
895 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
896 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
899 macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
900 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
901 $holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
902 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
903 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
904 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
905 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
906 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
908 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
909 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
910 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
911 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
912 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
914 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
918 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
923 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
924 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
925 serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
927 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
930 serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
932 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
933 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
935 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
936 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
937 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
940 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
941 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
943 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
947 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
951 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
952 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
953 event.write(writer)?;
956 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
957 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
959 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
960 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
961 entry.txid.write(writer)?;
962 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(entry.height))?;
964 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
966 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
967 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
969 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
971 descriptor.write(writer)?;
976 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
977 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
979 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
980 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
982 script.write(writer)?;
985 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
987 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
988 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
994 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
995 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
996 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
997 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
998 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
999 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1000 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1001 best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1003 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1004 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1005 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1006 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1007 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1009 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1010 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1011 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1012 let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
1014 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1015 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1017 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1018 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1019 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1020 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1022 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1023 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1025 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1026 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1027 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1028 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1029 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1030 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1031 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1033 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1036 let onchain_tx_handler =
1037 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1038 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1040 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1041 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1044 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1045 latest_update_id: 0,
1046 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1048 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1049 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1050 counterparty_payment_script,
1054 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1056 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1057 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1059 counterparty_tx_cache,
1060 funding_redeemscript,
1061 channel_value_satoshis,
1062 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1064 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1066 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1067 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1068 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1069 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1071 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1072 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1073 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1074 current_holder_commitment_number,
1076 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1077 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1078 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1080 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1085 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1086 holder_tx_signed: false,
1096 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1097 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1100 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1101 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1102 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1103 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1104 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1107 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1108 commitment_number: u64,
1109 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
1111 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1112 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1113 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
1117 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1119 holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1120 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1121 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1122 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1123 holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)
1127 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1129 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1130 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1135 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1136 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1139 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1140 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1143 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1148 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1151 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1154 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1157 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1158 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1160 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1164 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1166 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1167 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1170 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1173 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1175 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1176 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1179 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1180 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1181 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1184 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1185 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1186 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1187 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1188 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1191 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1192 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1193 /// have been registered.
1194 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1195 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1196 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1197 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1198 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1199 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1200 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1202 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1203 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1209 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1210 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1211 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1212 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1215 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1218 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1219 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1220 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1221 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1222 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1225 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1226 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1229 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1230 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1233 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1234 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1237 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1238 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1239 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1240 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1241 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1242 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1243 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1244 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1245 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1246 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1247 where L::Target: Logger {
1248 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1251 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1252 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1253 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1254 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1255 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1256 where L::Target: Logger {
1257 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1260 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1261 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1262 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1263 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1264 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1265 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1267 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1268 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1270 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1271 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1273 header: &BlockHeader,
1274 txdata: &TransactionData,
1279 ) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
1281 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1282 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1285 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1286 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1289 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1291 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1293 header: &BlockHeader,
1299 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1300 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1303 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1304 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1307 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1308 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1310 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1311 /// blocks. May be called before or after [`update_best_block`] for transactions in the
1312 /// corresponding block. See [`update_best_block`] for further calling expectations.
1314 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1315 /// [`update_best_block`]: Self::update_best_block
1316 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1318 header: &BlockHeader,
1319 txdata: &TransactionData,
1324 ) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
1326 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1327 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1330 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1331 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1334 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1335 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1337 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1338 /// blocks. May be called before or after [`transactions_confirmed`] for the corresponding
1341 /// Must be called after new blocks become available for the most recent block. Intermediary
1342 /// blocks, however, may be safely skipped.
1344 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1345 /// [`transactions_confirmed`]: Self::transactions_confirmed
1346 pub fn update_best_block<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1348 header: &BlockHeader,
1353 ) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
1355 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1356 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1359 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_best_block(
1360 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1364 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1365 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1366 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1367 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1368 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1369 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1370 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1373 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1374 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1375 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1376 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1381 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1382 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1383 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1384 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1385 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1387 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1388 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1389 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1393 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1394 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1395 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1400 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1407 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1416 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1417 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1418 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1419 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1421 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1422 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1425 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1426 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1427 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1428 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1429 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1430 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1431 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1432 Some(old_points) => {
1433 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1434 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1435 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1436 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1437 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1439 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1442 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1446 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1449 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1450 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1451 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1455 self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs);
1458 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1459 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1460 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1461 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1462 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1463 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1464 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1465 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1466 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1467 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1468 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1469 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1472 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1473 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1474 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1475 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1476 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1477 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1481 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1482 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1483 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1484 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1485 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
1490 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1491 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1492 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
1493 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1494 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1497 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1499 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1500 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1501 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1502 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1503 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1504 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1507 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1508 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1509 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1513 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1514 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1515 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1520 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1521 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1522 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1523 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1524 // holder commitment transactions.
1525 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1526 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1527 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1528 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1529 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx);
1530 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1535 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1536 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1539 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1540 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1542 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1545 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1546 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1547 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1550 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1551 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1552 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1553 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1554 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1555 match updates.updates[0] {
1556 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
1557 _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
1559 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1560 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1561 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1563 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
1565 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1566 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
1567 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1568 self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone())?
1570 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
1571 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
1572 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
1574 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
1575 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
1576 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1578 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
1579 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
1580 self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?
1582 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1583 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
1584 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1585 if *should_broadcast {
1586 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1587 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
1588 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1590 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted, the ChannelManager
1591 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
1592 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
1593 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
1598 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1602 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1603 self.latest_update_id
1606 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1610 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
1611 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
1612 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
1613 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
1614 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1615 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
1617 &self.outputs_to_watch
1620 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1621 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1622 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
1626 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
1627 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1628 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1632 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1633 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1634 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1637 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1638 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1641 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1642 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
1645 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1646 self.current_holder_commitment_number
1649 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1650 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1651 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1652 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1653 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1654 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
1655 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1656 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1657 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1658 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1659 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1661 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1662 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1664 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1665 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1668 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1673 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1674 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1675 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1676 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1677 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1678 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
1679 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
1681 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1682 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1684 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
1685 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1686 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1687 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1688 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1692 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1693 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1694 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1695 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1696 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1697 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1698 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1700 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1701 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1706 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1707 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1708 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
1709 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1710 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1711 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1713 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1715 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1716 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1717 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1718 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1719 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1720 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1721 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1723 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1724 htlc_update.0 != **source
1729 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1732 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1733 htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())
1736 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1737 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1743 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1744 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1746 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1747 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
1749 // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
1751 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1752 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1753 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1754 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1755 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1756 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1757 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1759 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1760 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1762 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1764 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1766 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1767 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1768 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1769 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1770 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1771 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1772 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1773 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1774 // payment_preimage.
1775 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1776 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1777 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1778 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1780 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1781 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1785 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1786 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1787 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1789 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1790 htlc_update.0 != **source
1795 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
1798 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1799 htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())
1807 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1808 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1810 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1811 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1814 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
1815 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
1816 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
1820 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1823 fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<ClaimRequest> {
1824 let mut claims = Vec::new();
1825 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
1826 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1827 let revocation_point_option =
1828 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
1829 // per-commitment point
1830 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1831 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1832 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
1833 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
1834 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
1835 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1837 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1838 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1839 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1840 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
1841 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
1842 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1843 return claims; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1848 if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1852 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1853 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1854 let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
1855 claims.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1865 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1866 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1867 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1868 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1869 return (Vec::new(), None)
1872 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1873 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1876 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1881 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1882 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1883 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1885 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1886 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1887 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1888 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
1889 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
1892 // Returns (1) `ClaimRequest`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
1893 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
1894 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
1895 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1896 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1898 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1899 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1901 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1902 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1903 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1904 witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
1905 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1906 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1907 Some(preimage.clone())
1909 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1913 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1918 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
1921 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
1922 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
1923 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1924 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1925 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1926 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
1932 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1933 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
1934 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1935 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1936 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1937 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1938 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1940 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1941 ($source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1942 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1943 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1945 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1946 htlc_update.0 != $source
1951 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1952 txid: commitment_txid,
1954 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash) },
1956 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1957 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1961 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1962 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
1963 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1964 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
1965 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
1969 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1970 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
1972 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1973 is_holder_tx = true;
1974 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1975 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1976 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
1977 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
1978 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1979 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1980 is_holder_tx = true;
1981 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1982 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx);
1983 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
1984 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
1988 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1989 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
1990 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
1991 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1992 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1993 wait_threshold_conf!(source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2001 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2002 if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2003 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
2007 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2010 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2011 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2012 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2013 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2014 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2015 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
2016 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2017 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2018 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2019 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2020 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2024 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2025 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2030 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2031 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2035 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2036 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2037 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2038 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2039 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2040 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
2041 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2042 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2043 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2044 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2045 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2049 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2050 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2058 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
2059 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2060 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2063 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2064 log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
2065 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2067 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2070 fn update_best_block<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2072 header: &BlockHeader,
2077 ) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
2079 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2080 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2083 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2084 log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
2086 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2087 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2088 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2090 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2091 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2092 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2097 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2099 header: &BlockHeader,
2100 txdata: &TransactionData,
2105 ) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
2107 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2108 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2111 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2112 for tx in &txn_matched {
2113 let mut output_val = 0;
2114 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2115 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2116 output_val += out.value;
2117 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2121 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2122 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2124 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2125 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2126 for tx in &txn_matched {
2127 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2128 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2129 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2130 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2132 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2133 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2134 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2135 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2136 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2137 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2139 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2140 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2141 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2142 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2144 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2146 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2149 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2150 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2151 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2152 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2153 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2158 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2159 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2160 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2161 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2163 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2166 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2169 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2172 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2173 mut watch_outputs: Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>,
2174 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<ClaimRequest>,
2178 ) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
2180 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2181 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2184 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
2185 if should_broadcast {
2186 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
2187 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
2188 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2189 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2190 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2191 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2192 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2193 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2195 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2198 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2199 let onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf =
2200 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2201 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2202 for entry in onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf {
2203 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(height) {
2204 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2206 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2210 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2211 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2212 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
2214 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2215 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => Some(htlc_update.0.clone()),
2216 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { .. } => None,
2219 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2220 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2222 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2223 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2225 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2226 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2227 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2230 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &htlc_update.0).is_none(),
2231 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2232 call block_disconnected for a block containing the conflicting \
2235 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &htlc_update.0).is_none(),
2236 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2237 call block_disconnected for a block containing the conflicting \
2239 matured_htlcs.push(htlc_update.0.clone());
2242 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2243 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2244 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
2245 payment_preimage: None,
2246 source: htlc_update.0,
2249 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2250 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2251 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2252 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2258 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, Some(height), &&*broadcaster, &&*fee_estimator, &&*logger);
2260 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2261 // updating the latter in the process.
2262 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2263 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2264 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2268 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2269 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2270 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2271 for tx in &txn_matched {
2272 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2273 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2274 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2275 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2283 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2284 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2285 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2288 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2291 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2292 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2293 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2295 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2297 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2300 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2301 /// transactions thereof.
2302 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2303 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2304 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2305 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2306 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2307 if matches { break; }
2308 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2313 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2316 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2319 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2320 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2321 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2322 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2323 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2324 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2327 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2328 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2329 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2330 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2331 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2332 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2333 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2334 } else { panic!(); }
2345 fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2346 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2347 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2348 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2349 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2350 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2351 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2352 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2353 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2354 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2355 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2356 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2357 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2358 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2359 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2360 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2361 // time out the HTLC first.
2362 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2363 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2364 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2365 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2366 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2367 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2368 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2369 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2370 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2371 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2372 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2373 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2374 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2375 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2376 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2377 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2378 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2379 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2380 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2381 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2382 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2383 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2384 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2385 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2392 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2394 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2395 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2396 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2399 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2400 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2401 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2408 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2409 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2410 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2411 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2412 let mut payment_data = None;
2413 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2414 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2415 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2416 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2418 macro_rules! log_claim {
2419 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2420 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2421 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
2422 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2423 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2424 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2425 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2426 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2427 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2428 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2429 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2430 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2432 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2433 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2434 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2435 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2440 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2441 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2442 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2443 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2444 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2445 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2446 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2447 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2456 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2457 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2458 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2459 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2460 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2461 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2462 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2463 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2464 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2465 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2466 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2467 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2468 } else if !$holder_tx {
2469 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2470 if payment_data.is_none() {
2471 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2474 if payment_data.is_none() {
2475 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2476 continue 'outer_loop;
2483 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2484 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2485 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2487 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2488 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2489 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2490 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2493 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2494 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2495 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2498 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2499 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2500 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2501 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2502 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2503 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2504 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2505 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2506 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2508 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2512 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2513 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2514 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
2515 upd.source == source
2517 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2518 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2520 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2525 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2526 if entry.height != height { return true; }
2528 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2529 htlc_update.0 != source
2534 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2537 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash) },
2539 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2540 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2546 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2547 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2548 let mut spendable_output = None;
2549 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2550 if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize {
2551 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2552 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2553 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2554 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2555 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2556 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2557 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2558 // non-standard due to their size.
2559 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2560 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2561 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2564 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2565 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2566 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2567 output: outp.clone(),
2570 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
2571 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2572 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2573 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2574 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
2575 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
2576 output: outp.clone(),
2577 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2578 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2579 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2583 } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2584 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2585 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2586 output: outp.clone(),
2587 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2588 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2591 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2592 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2593 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2594 output: outp.clone(),
2598 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2599 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2602 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
2604 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2605 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2610 /// `Persist` defines behavior for persisting channel monitors: this could mean
2611 /// writing once to disk, and/or uploading to one or more backup services.
2613 /// Note that for every new monitor, you **must** persist the new `ChannelMonitor`
2614 /// to disk/backups. And, on every update, you **must** persist either the
2615 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself. Otherwise, there is risk
2616 /// of situations such as revoking a transaction, then crashing before this
2617 /// revocation can be persisted, then unintentionally broadcasting a revoked
2618 /// transaction and losing money. This is a risk because previous channel states
2619 /// are toxic, so it's important that whatever channel state is persisted is
2620 /// kept up-to-date.
2621 pub trait Persist<ChannelSigner: Sign>: Send + Sync {
2622 /// Persist a new channel's data. The data can be stored any way you want, but
2623 /// the identifier provided by Rust-Lightning is the channel's outpoint (and
2624 /// it is up to you to maintain a correct mapping between the outpoint and the
2625 /// stored channel data). Note that you **must** persist every new monitor to
2626 /// disk. See the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2628 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2629 /// and [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2630 fn persist_new_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2632 /// Update one channel's data. The provided `ChannelMonitor` has already
2633 /// applied the given update.
2635 /// Note that on every update, you **must** persist either the
2636 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself to disk/backups. See
2637 /// the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2639 /// If an implementer chooses to persist the updates only, they need to make
2640 /// sure that all the updates are applied to the `ChannelMonitors` *before*
2641 /// the set of channel monitors is given to the `ChannelManager`
2642 /// deserialization routine. See [`ChannelMonitor::update_monitor`] for
2643 /// applying a monitor update to a monitor. If full `ChannelMonitors` are
2644 /// persisted, then there is no need to persist individual updates.
2646 /// Note that there could be a performance tradeoff between persisting complete
2647 /// channel monitors on every update vs. persisting only updates and applying
2648 /// them in batches. The size of each monitor grows `O(number of state updates)`
2649 /// whereas updates are small and `O(1)`.
2651 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2652 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::write`] for writing out an update, and
2653 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2654 fn update_persisted_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2657 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2659 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2660 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2663 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
2664 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
2665 self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2668 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2669 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2673 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2675 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
2676 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
2677 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2678 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2682 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2687 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2688 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2689 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2690 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2693 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2694 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2696 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2697 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2699 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2700 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2701 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2702 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2705 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2707 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2708 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2710 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2711 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2712 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2713 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2714 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2715 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2716 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2718 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2719 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2720 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2722 let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2723 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2724 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2726 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2727 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2731 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2732 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2733 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2734 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2736 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2741 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2743 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2745 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2748 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2749 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2750 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2751 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2752 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2754 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2755 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2761 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2762 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2763 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
2764 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2765 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2766 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2767 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2768 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2770 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2771 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2775 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2776 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2777 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2778 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2779 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2780 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
2781 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2785 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2786 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2787 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
2788 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2789 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2790 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2791 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2795 macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
2798 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2799 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2800 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2801 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2802 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2803 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2804 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2806 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2807 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2808 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2809 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2810 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2812 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2813 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2815 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2820 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2827 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2830 Some(read_holder_tx!())
2832 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2834 let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
2836 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2837 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2839 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2840 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2841 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2842 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2843 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2844 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2845 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2849 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2850 let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2851 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
2852 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2853 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
2854 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
2855 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2857 pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
2860 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2861 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
2862 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2863 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2864 pending_events.push(event);
2868 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
2870 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2871 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2872 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2873 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2874 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
2875 let event = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2877 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2878 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2879 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2880 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2884 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2885 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2889 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2891 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry { txid, height, event });
2894 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2895 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2896 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2897 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2898 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2899 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
2900 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2901 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
2903 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2904 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2907 let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
2909 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2910 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2912 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2913 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2915 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
2916 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
2918 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2921 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
2922 counterparty_payment_script,
2926 holder_revocation_basepoint,
2928 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2929 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2931 counterparty_tx_cache,
2932 funding_redeemscript,
2933 channel_value_satoshis,
2934 their_cur_revocation_points,
2939 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
2940 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2941 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
2943 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
2944 current_holder_commitment_tx,
2945 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
2946 current_holder_commitment_number,
2949 pending_monitor_events,
2952 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2957 lockdown_from_offchain,
2970 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2971 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2972 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2973 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2974 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2975 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2976 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2977 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2978 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2979 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2981 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2982 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2983 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2984 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2986 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
2987 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
2988 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2989 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2990 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2991 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
2994 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2995 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2996 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2997 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2998 let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3000 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3001 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3003 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3006 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3007 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3008 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3012 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3013 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3015 let mut res = Vec::new();
3016 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3017 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3021 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3022 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3029 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3030 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3032 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3033 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3039 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3040 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3041 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3042 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3047 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3049 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3050 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3051 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3052 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3053 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3059 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3060 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3061 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3062 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3063 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3064 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3066 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
3067 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3068 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3069 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3070 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3071 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3072 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3073 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3075 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3077 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3079 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3080 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3081 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
3082 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3083 &channel_parameters,
3084 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3085 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
3087 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3088 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3089 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3090 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3091 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3092 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3093 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3094 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
3097 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3098 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3099 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3100 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3101 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3102 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3103 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3105 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3106 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3107 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3108 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3109 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3110 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3112 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3113 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3114 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3115 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3116 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3117 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3118 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3119 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3121 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3122 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3123 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3124 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3125 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3126 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3130 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3131 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3132 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3134 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3135 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3136 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3137 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3139 macro_rules! sign_input {
3140 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3141 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3142 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3144 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3145 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3146 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3148 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3149 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3150 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3151 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3152 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3153 sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
3154 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3155 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
3156 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3157 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3158 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3159 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
3161 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3163 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3164 println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
3165 println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
3166 println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
3170 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3171 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3173 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3174 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3176 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3177 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3181 script_sig: Script::new(),
3182 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3183 witness: Vec::new(),
3186 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3187 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3190 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3191 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3193 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3194 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
3195 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3198 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3200 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3201 claim_tx.input.clear();
3202 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3204 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3205 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3209 script_sig: Script::new(),
3210 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3211 witness: Vec::new(),
3214 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3215 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3217 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3218 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
3219 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3222 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3224 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3225 claim_tx.input.clear();
3226 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3227 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3228 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3232 script_sig: Script::new(),
3233 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3234 witness: Vec::new(),
3236 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3237 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3239 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3240 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
3241 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3244 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3247 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.