1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
38 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
40 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
41 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
43 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
44 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
45 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
47 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
48 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
50 use util::logger::Logger;
51 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
53 use util::events::Event;
57 use io::{self, Error};
58 use core::convert::TryInto;
62 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
63 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
65 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
66 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
67 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
68 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
69 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
72 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
73 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
74 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
75 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
76 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
78 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
79 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
80 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
82 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
83 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
84 /// its docs for more details.
89 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
90 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
91 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
92 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
93 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
95 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
97 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
98 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
99 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
100 self.update_id.write(w)?;
101 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
102 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
103 update_step.write(w)?;
105 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
109 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
110 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
111 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
112 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
113 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
114 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
116 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
120 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
121 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
125 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
126 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
127 pub enum MonitorEvent {
128 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
129 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
131 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
132 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
134 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
135 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
137 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure
139 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
140 funding_txo: OutPoint,
141 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
142 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
144 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
145 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
146 monitor_update_id: u64,
149 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
150 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
152 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure
153 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
155 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
156 // Note that UpdateCompleted and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
157 // generated only in ChainMonitor
158 (0, UpdateCompleted) => {
159 (0, funding_txo, required),
160 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
164 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
168 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
169 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
170 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
171 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
172 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
173 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
174 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
175 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
176 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
178 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
179 (0, payment_hash, required),
180 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
181 (2, source, required),
182 (4, payment_preimage, option),
185 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
186 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
187 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
188 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
189 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
190 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
191 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
192 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
193 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
194 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
195 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
196 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
197 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
198 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
199 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
200 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
201 /// accurate block height.
202 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
203 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
204 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
205 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
206 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
207 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
210 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
211 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
212 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
213 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
214 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
215 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
216 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
217 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
218 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
219 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
221 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
222 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
223 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
225 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
226 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
228 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
229 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
231 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
232 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
233 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
234 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
236 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
237 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
238 struct HolderSignedTx {
239 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
241 revocation_key: PublicKey,
242 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
243 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
244 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
245 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
246 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
247 to_self_value_sat: u64,
250 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
252 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
253 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
254 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
255 (2, revocation_key, required),
256 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
257 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
258 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
259 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
260 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
261 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
264 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
265 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
267 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
268 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
269 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
270 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
273 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
275 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
276 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
277 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
278 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
279 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
284 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
285 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
286 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
287 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
288 // used. Read it for compatibility.
289 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
290 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
291 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
292 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
293 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
294 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
298 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
299 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
300 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
301 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
302 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
303 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
304 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
306 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
307 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
308 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
309 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
312 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
316 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
317 /// transaction causing it.
319 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
321 struct OnchainEventEntry {
325 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
328 impl OnchainEventEntry {
329 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
330 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
332 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
333 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
335 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
336 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
337 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
339 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
340 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
341 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
342 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
343 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
350 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
351 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
355 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
357 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
358 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
360 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
361 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
364 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
365 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
366 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
367 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
368 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
369 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
372 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
373 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
374 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
375 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
376 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
378 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
379 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
381 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
383 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
385 FundingSpendConfirmation {
386 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
387 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
388 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
389 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
390 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
392 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
393 /// counterparty output.
394 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
396 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
397 /// is constructed. This is used when
398 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
399 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
400 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
401 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
402 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
404 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
405 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
407 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
408 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
409 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
410 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
411 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
412 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
413 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
414 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
418 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
419 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
420 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
421 (0, self.txid, required),
422 (1, self.transaction, option),
423 (2, self.height, required),
424 (4, self.event, required),
430 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
431 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
432 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
433 let mut transaction = None;
435 let mut event = None;
436 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
438 (1, transaction, option),
439 (2, height, required),
440 (4, event, ignorable),
442 if let Some(ev) = event {
443 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, event: ev }))
450 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
452 (0, source, required),
453 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
454 (2, payment_hash, required),
455 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
457 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
458 (0, descriptor, required),
460 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
461 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
462 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
464 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
465 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
466 (2, preimage, option),
467 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
472 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
474 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
475 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
476 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
477 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
479 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
480 commitment_txid: Txid,
481 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
482 commitment_number: u64,
483 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
486 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
492 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
493 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
495 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
496 /// think we've fallen behind!
497 should_broadcast: bool,
500 scriptpubkey: Script,
504 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
505 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
507 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
508 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
509 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
510 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
511 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
512 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
517 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
518 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
519 (0, commitment_tx, required),
520 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
522 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
523 (0, commitment_txid, required),
524 (2, commitment_number, required),
525 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
526 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
528 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
529 (0, payment_preimage, required),
531 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
533 (2, secret, required),
535 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
536 (0, should_broadcast, required),
538 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
539 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
543 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
545 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
547 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
548 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
550 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
551 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
552 /// force-closed now.
553 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
554 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
555 /// required to do so.
556 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
558 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
559 /// we consider it spendable.
560 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
561 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
562 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
563 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
564 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
566 confirmation_height: u32,
568 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
569 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
570 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
572 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
573 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
574 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
575 ContentiousClaimable {
576 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
577 /// required to do so.
578 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
579 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
583 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
584 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
585 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
586 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
587 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
588 /// which will be required to do so.
589 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
590 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
592 claimable_height: u32,
594 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
595 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
596 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
597 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
598 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
599 /// which will be required to do so.
600 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
601 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
602 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
605 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
608 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
609 /// following amount.
610 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
611 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
613 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
614 /// were already spent.
615 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
619 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
621 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
622 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
623 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
624 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
626 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
627 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
628 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
631 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
632 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
633 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
634 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
635 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
636 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
637 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
638 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
639 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
640 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
641 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
647 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
648 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
649 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
650 let mut resolving_txid = None;
651 let mut payment_preimage = None;
652 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
653 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
654 (1, resolving_txid, option),
655 (2, payment_preimage, option),
658 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
665 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
666 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
668 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
669 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
671 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
672 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
673 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
674 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
676 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
677 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
678 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
679 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
680 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
681 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
683 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
685 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
688 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
689 latest_update_id: u64,
690 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
692 destination_script: Script,
693 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
694 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
695 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
697 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
698 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
699 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
700 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
701 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
703 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
704 funding_redeemscript: Script,
705 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
706 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
707 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
709 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
711 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
712 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
713 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
714 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
715 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
716 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
717 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
718 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
719 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
720 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
721 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
722 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
723 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
724 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
725 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
726 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
728 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
729 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
730 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
731 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
732 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
733 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
735 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
737 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
738 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
740 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
742 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
743 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
744 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
746 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
748 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
749 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
750 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
751 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
752 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
753 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
754 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
755 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
756 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
757 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
759 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
761 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
762 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
763 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
764 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
766 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
767 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
768 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
769 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
770 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
773 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
775 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
777 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
778 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
779 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
780 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
782 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
783 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
784 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
786 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
787 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
788 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
789 holder_tx_signed: bool,
791 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
792 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
793 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
794 funding_spend_seen: bool,
796 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
797 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
798 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
800 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
801 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
802 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
803 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
804 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
806 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
807 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
808 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
809 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
810 // the full block_connected).
811 best_block: BestBlock,
813 /// The node_id of our counterparty
814 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
816 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
819 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
820 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
822 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
823 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
825 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
826 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
827 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
828 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
833 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
834 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
836 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
837 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
838 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
839 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
840 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
841 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
842 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
843 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
844 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
845 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
846 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
847 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
848 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
849 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
850 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
851 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
852 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
853 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
854 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
855 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
856 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
857 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
858 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
859 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
860 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
861 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
862 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
863 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
864 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
865 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
866 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
867 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
868 self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
869 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
870 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
871 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
880 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
881 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
882 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
886 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
887 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
888 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
890 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
891 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
892 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
894 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
896 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
897 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
899 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
900 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
901 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
902 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
903 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
904 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
906 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
909 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
910 match &self.shutdown_script {
911 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
912 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
915 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
916 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
917 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
918 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
919 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
920 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
921 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
923 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
924 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
925 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
927 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
928 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
929 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
930 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
931 match second_option {
932 Some(second_pubkey) => {
933 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
936 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
941 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
945 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
947 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
949 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
950 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
951 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
952 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
953 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
954 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
955 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
959 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
960 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
961 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
962 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
963 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
964 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
965 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
966 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
967 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
968 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
972 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
973 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
974 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
975 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
978 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
979 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
980 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
981 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
984 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
985 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
986 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
988 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
991 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
993 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
994 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
996 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
997 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
998 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1001 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1002 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1003 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
1005 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1006 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1008 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1012 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1013 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1017 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1018 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1019 event.write(writer)?;
1022 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1023 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
1025 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1026 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1027 entry.write(writer)?;
1030 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1031 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1032 txid.write(writer)?;
1033 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1034 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1036 script.write(writer)?;
1039 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1041 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1042 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1044 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1045 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1046 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
1047 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
1048 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1049 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1050 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1057 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1058 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1059 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1060 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1061 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1062 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1065 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
1066 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1067 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1068 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1069 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1070 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1071 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1073 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1074 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1075 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1077 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1078 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1079 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1080 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1082 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1083 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1085 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1086 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1087 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1088 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1090 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1091 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1093 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1094 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1095 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1096 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1097 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1098 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1099 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1100 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1102 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1105 let onchain_tx_handler =
1106 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1107 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1109 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1110 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1112 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1113 latest_update_id: 0,
1114 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1116 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1117 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1118 counterparty_payment_script,
1122 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1124 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1125 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1127 counterparty_commitment_params,
1128 funding_redeemscript,
1129 channel_value_satoshis,
1130 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1132 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1134 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1135 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1136 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1137 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1139 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1140 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1141 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1142 current_holder_commitment_number,
1144 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1145 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1146 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1148 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1153 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1154 holder_tx_signed: false,
1155 funding_spend_seen: false,
1156 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1157 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1158 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1161 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1168 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1169 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1172 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1173 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1174 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1175 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1176 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1179 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1180 commitment_number: u64,
1181 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1183 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1184 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1185 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1189 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1190 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1191 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1192 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1193 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1196 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1197 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1198 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1200 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1201 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1203 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1206 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1207 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1210 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1211 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1214 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1219 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1222 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1225 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1228 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1229 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1231 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1237 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1238 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1241 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1244 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1246 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1247 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1250 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1251 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1252 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1255 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1256 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1257 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1258 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1259 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1262 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1263 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1264 /// have been registered.
1265 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1266 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1267 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1268 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1269 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1270 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1271 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1273 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1274 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1280 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1281 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1282 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1283 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1286 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1289 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1290 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1291 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1292 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1293 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1296 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1297 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1300 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1301 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1304 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1305 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1308 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1310 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1312 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1313 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1316 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1317 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1318 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1319 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1320 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1321 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1322 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1323 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1324 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1325 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1326 where L::Target: Logger {
1327 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1330 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1331 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1332 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1333 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1334 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1335 where L::Target: Logger {
1336 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1339 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1340 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1341 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1342 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1343 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1344 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1346 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1347 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1349 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1350 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1352 header: &BlockHeader,
1353 txdata: &TransactionData,
1358 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1360 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1361 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1364 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1365 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1368 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1370 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1372 header: &BlockHeader,
1378 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1379 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1382 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1383 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1386 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1387 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1389 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1390 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1392 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1393 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1395 header: &BlockHeader,
1396 txdata: &TransactionData,
1401 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1403 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1404 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1407 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1408 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1409 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1412 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1414 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1415 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1417 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1418 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1425 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1426 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1429 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1430 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1431 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1434 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1435 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1437 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1438 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1440 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1441 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1443 header: &BlockHeader,
1448 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1450 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1451 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1454 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1455 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1456 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1459 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1460 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1461 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1462 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1464 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1465 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1467 txids.sort_unstable();
1472 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1473 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1474 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1475 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1479 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1480 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1481 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1482 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1483 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1484 -> Option<Balance> {
1485 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1486 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1488 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1489 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1490 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1491 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1492 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1494 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1495 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1496 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1497 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1498 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1499 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1500 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1502 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1503 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1504 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1505 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1506 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1507 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1509 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1510 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1511 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1512 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1513 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1518 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1519 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1520 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1521 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid;
1524 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1526 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1527 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1529 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_none(),
1530 "This code needs updating for anchors");
1531 BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, 0)
1533 BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx)
1535 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1537 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1538 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1539 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1540 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1541 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1543 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1544 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1545 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1546 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1547 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1548 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1549 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1550 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1551 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1552 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1553 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1555 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1556 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1557 Some(tx.txid()) == htlc_spend_txid_opt ||
1558 inp.previous_output.txid == htlc_spend_txid
1560 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1561 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1563 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1568 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1569 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1570 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1571 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1572 // need to do so again here.
1574 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1575 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1576 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1577 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1578 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1579 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1582 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1583 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1584 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1585 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1586 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1587 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1588 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1589 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1592 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1593 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1594 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1597 } else if self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1598 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1599 // we know the preimage.
1600 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1601 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1602 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1603 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1604 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1605 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1606 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1607 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1610 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1611 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1612 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1615 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1616 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1617 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1618 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1625 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1626 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1627 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1630 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1631 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1632 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1633 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1635 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1636 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
1637 /// a revoked state.
1639 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1640 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1641 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1642 let mut res = Vec::new();
1643 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1645 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1646 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1647 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1648 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1649 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1652 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
1653 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1656 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1657 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1658 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1659 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1660 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1663 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1664 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1665 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1666 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1668 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
1676 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1677 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1678 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1679 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
1680 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1681 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1682 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1683 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1685 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1688 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1689 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1690 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1693 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1694 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1695 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1698 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1699 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1701 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1702 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
1703 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
1704 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
1705 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
1706 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
1707 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1708 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1709 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
1711 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1712 claimable_amount_satoshis: output.value,
1713 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
1715 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
1716 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
1717 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
1718 ).unwrap_or(false) {
1719 spent_counterparty_output = true;
1725 if spent_counterparty_output {
1726 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
1727 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
1728 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
1729 if output_spendable {
1730 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1731 claimable_amount_satoshis: amt,
1735 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
1736 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
1739 found_commitment_tx = true;
1740 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1741 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1742 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1743 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1744 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1745 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1748 found_commitment_tx = true;
1749 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1750 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1751 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1752 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1753 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1754 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1755 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1758 found_commitment_tx = true;
1761 if !found_commitment_tx {
1762 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1763 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1764 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1765 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1766 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1767 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1768 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1773 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1774 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1775 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1777 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1778 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1779 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1781 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1782 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1784 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
1785 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
1786 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1787 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1788 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1792 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1793 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1800 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1801 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1802 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1803 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1804 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1806 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1807 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1808 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1809 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1810 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1811 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1813 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1814 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1815 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1816 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1817 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1818 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1819 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1820 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1821 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1822 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1823 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1824 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1825 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1826 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
1827 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1828 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1830 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1833 if !htlc_update_confd {
1834 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1841 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1842 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1843 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1844 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1845 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1846 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1851 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1852 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1853 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1854 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1855 Some((a, &**source))
1858 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1859 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1860 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1862 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1863 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1864 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1865 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1870 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1871 // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
1872 // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1873 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1875 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1876 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1877 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1878 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1884 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1885 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1887 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1888 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1895 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
1896 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
1900 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1901 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1902 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1904 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1905 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1906 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1907 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1908 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1909 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1911 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1912 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1913 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1914 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1915 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1916 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
1917 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1918 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
1920 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1921 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1922 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1923 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1924 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1925 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1926 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1927 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1928 // payment_preimage.
1929 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1930 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1931 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1932 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1934 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1936 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1937 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1938 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
1939 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
1940 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
1941 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
1942 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
1943 matched_htlc = true;
1947 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1948 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1949 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1951 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1952 *update_source != **source
1957 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1958 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
1959 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
1960 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1961 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1962 source: (**source).clone(),
1963 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1964 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1965 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
1968 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1969 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
1970 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1971 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1977 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1978 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1980 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1981 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
1986 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
1987 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
1988 // in-line tests later.
1991 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
1992 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
1993 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1994 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1995 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1996 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
1997 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2002 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2003 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2006 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2007 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2008 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2009 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2010 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2011 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2012 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2015 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2016 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2017 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2018 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2023 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2024 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2025 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2026 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2027 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2029 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2030 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2031 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2035 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2036 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2037 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2042 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2049 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2058 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2059 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2060 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2061 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2063 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2064 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2067 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2068 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2069 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2070 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2071 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2072 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2073 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2074 Some(old_points) => {
2075 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2076 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2077 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2078 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2079 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2081 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2084 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2088 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2091 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2092 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2093 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2099 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2100 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2101 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2102 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2103 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2104 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2105 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
2106 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
2107 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2108 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2109 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2110 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2113 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2114 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2115 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2116 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2117 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2119 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2120 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2123 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2124 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2125 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2126 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2127 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2132 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2133 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2134 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2135 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2136 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
2137 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2138 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2141 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2143 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2144 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2145 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2146 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2147 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2148 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2151 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2152 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2153 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2157 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2158 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2159 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2164 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2165 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2166 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2167 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2168 // holder commitment transactions.
2169 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2170 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2171 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2173 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2174 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2175 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2176 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
2177 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2182 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
2183 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2186 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
2187 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
2188 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2190 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2193 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
2194 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2195 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2198 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
2199 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2200 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
2201 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
2202 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
2203 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
2204 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2205 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2206 match updates.updates[0] {
2207 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
2209 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2210 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2213 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2214 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2216 let mut ret = Ok(());
2217 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2219 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
2220 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2221 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2222 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
2223 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2224 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2228 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2229 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2230 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2232 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2233 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2234 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2235 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2237 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2238 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2239 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2240 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2241 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2245 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2246 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2247 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2248 if *should_broadcast {
2249 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2250 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2251 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
2253 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2254 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2255 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2256 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2259 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2260 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2261 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2262 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2267 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2269 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
2270 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2275 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2276 self.latest_update_id
2279 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2283 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2284 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2285 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2286 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2287 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2288 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2290 &self.outputs_to_watch
2293 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2294 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2295 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2299 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2300 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2301 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
2305 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2306 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2307 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2310 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2311 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2314 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2315 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2318 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2319 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2322 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2323 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2324 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2325 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2327 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
2328 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
2330 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L)
2331 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
2332 where L::Target: Logger {
2333 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2334 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2335 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2336 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2337 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
2339 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2340 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2342 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2343 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2346 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2351 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2352 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2353 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2354 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2355 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2356 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
2357 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
2359 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2360 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2362 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2363 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2364 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2365 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2366 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2367 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2368 to_counterparty_output_info =
2369 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2373 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2374 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2375 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2376 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2377 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2378 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2379 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2380 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
2381 to_counterparty_output_info);
2383 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2384 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2385 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2390 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2391 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2392 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2393 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2394 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2395 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2397 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2399 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2400 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2401 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2402 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2405 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2406 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2407 [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2410 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2411 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2412 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2413 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2414 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2415 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2416 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2418 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2419 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2421 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2423 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2424 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2425 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2426 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2429 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
2430 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2431 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
2432 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2433 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2437 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2440 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
2441 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
2442 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
2443 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2444 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
2446 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2447 Some(outputs) => outputs,
2448 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2450 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2451 Some(points) => points,
2452 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2455 let per_commitment_point =
2456 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2457 // per-commitment point
2458 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
2459 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2460 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2461 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2462 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2463 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2465 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
2466 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
2468 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2469 let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
2470 if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
2471 &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
2473 if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
2474 &per_commitment_point,
2475 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
2477 Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
2478 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2479 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
2481 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
2485 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
2488 if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
2489 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
2490 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2491 to_counterparty_output_info =
2492 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2498 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2499 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2500 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2501 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2502 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2503 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2504 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
2507 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2508 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2509 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2510 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2511 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2512 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2513 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2514 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
2516 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2517 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2518 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2519 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2522 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2523 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2524 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2529 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
2532 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2533 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2534 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2535 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
2536 return (Vec::new(), None)
2539 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2540 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2543 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2548 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2549 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2550 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2552 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2553 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2554 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2555 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2556 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2557 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2560 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2561 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2562 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2563 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2564 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2566 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2567 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2569 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2570 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2571 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2572 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2574 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2577 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2580 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2582 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2583 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2587 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2590 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2591 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2592 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2593 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2594 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2595 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2601 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2602 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2603 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2604 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2605 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2606 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2607 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2608 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2610 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2611 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2612 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2613 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2614 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2618 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2619 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2621 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2622 is_holder_tx = true;
2623 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2624 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2625 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2626 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2627 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2628 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2629 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2630 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2631 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2632 is_holder_tx = true;
2633 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2634 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2635 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2636 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2637 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2638 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
2644 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2650 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2651 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2652 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2653 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2654 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2655 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2656 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
2657 // transaction confirms.
2658 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2659 return holder_transactions;
2661 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2662 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2663 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2664 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2665 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2668 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2669 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2670 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2671 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2672 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2673 // confirmed in the next block.
2676 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2677 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2678 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2682 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2683 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2687 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2688 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2689 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2690 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2691 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2692 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2693 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2694 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
2695 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
2696 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2697 return holder_transactions;
2699 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2700 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2701 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2702 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2703 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2707 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2708 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2709 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2716 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2717 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2721 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2722 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2724 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2725 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2728 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2730 header: &BlockHeader,
2733 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2735 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2737 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2738 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2741 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2743 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2744 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2745 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2746 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2747 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2748 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2749 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2751 } else { Vec::new() }
2754 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2756 header: &BlockHeader,
2757 txdata: &TransactionData,
2760 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2762 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2764 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2765 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2768 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2769 for tx in &txn_matched {
2770 let mut output_val = 0;
2771 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2772 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2773 output_val += out.value;
2774 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2778 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2780 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2781 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2782 for tx in &txn_matched {
2783 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2784 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2785 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2786 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2788 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2789 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2790 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2791 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2792 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
2793 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2794 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
2795 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2796 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
2797 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2798 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
2799 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2800 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2802 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2803 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2804 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
2805 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
2806 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
2807 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2808 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2810 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2811 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2815 let txid = tx.txid();
2816 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2818 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
2820 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2821 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2822 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
2826 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2827 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2828 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2829 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2830 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2835 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2836 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2837 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2838 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2840 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2843 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2844 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2847 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2850 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2851 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2852 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2853 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2855 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2856 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2857 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2860 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2861 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2862 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2864 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2866 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2868 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2869 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2872 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2873 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2875 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2876 if should_broadcast {
2877 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2878 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2879 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2880 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2881 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2882 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2883 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2884 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2885 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2886 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2887 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2888 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2889 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2891 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2894 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2895 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2896 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2897 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2898 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2899 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2900 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2902 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2906 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2907 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2908 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2910 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2911 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2915 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2916 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2918 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2919 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2921 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
2922 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2923 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2926 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
2927 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2928 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2929 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2931 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
2932 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2933 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2934 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2935 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
2938 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
2939 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
2940 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2942 payment_preimage: None,
2943 source: source.clone(),
2944 htlc_value_satoshis,
2946 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
2947 commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
2948 payment_preimage: None,
2951 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2952 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2953 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2954 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2957 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
2958 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
2959 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
2960 payment_preimage: preimage,
2963 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
2964 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
2965 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
2970 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2972 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2973 // updating the latter in the process.
2974 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2975 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2976 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2980 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2981 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2982 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2983 for tx in &txn_matched {
2984 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2985 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2986 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2987 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2995 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2996 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2997 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3000 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3003 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3004 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3005 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3007 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3008 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3010 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3013 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3017 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3020 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3021 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3024 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
3025 log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
3028 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3031 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3032 /// transactions thereof.
3033 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3034 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
3035 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3036 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3037 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3038 if matches { break; }
3039 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3044 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3047 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3050 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3051 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3052 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3053 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3054 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3055 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3058 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3059 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3060 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3061 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3062 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3063 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3064 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3065 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3069 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3070 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3071 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3072 } else { panic!(); }
3083 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3084 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
3085 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
3086 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
3087 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
3088 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
3094 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3095 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3096 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3097 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3098 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3099 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3100 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3101 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3102 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3103 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3104 let height = self.best_block.height();
3105 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3106 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3107 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3108 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3109 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3110 // time out the HTLC first.
3111 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3112 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3113 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3114 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3115 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3116 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3117 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
3118 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
3119 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
3120 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
3121 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
3122 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
3123 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3124 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3125 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3126 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
3127 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
3128 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
3129 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
3130 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
3131 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
3132 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
3133 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
3134 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3141 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
3143 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3144 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3145 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3148 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3149 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3150 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3157 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
3158 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
3159 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3160 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
3161 let mut payment_data = None;
3162 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
3163 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
3164 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
3165 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3166 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
3167 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
3168 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3169 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
3171 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3172 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
3173 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
3176 macro_rules! log_claim {
3177 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
3178 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
3179 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
3181 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3182 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3183 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3184 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3185 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
3186 // matched by any HTLC spend:
3187 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3188 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
3189 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
3190 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
3191 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
3192 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
3193 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
3194 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3195 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3196 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
3198 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
3199 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3200 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3201 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
3206 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
3207 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
3208 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
3209 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
3210 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
3211 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
3212 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
3213 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
3222 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3223 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3224 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3225 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3226 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3227 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
3228 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3229 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
3230 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3231 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3232 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3233 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
3234 } else if !$holder_tx {
3235 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3236 if payment_data.is_none() {
3237 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3240 if payment_data.is_none() {
3241 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
3242 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
3243 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3244 txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3245 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3246 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3247 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
3248 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
3249 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
3250 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
3251 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
3252 // accepted_preimage_claim).
3253 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
3254 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
3257 continue 'outer_loop;
3264 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
3265 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3266 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
3268 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3269 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3270 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3271 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
3274 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3275 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3276 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
3279 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3280 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3281 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
3282 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3283 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3284 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
3285 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3288 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3289 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3290 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3291 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3292 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3295 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3297 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3299 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3302 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3303 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3304 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3305 upd.source == source
3307 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3309 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3311 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3312 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3313 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3314 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3317 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3319 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3321 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3325 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3326 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3328 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3329 *htlc_source != source
3334 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3336 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3338 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3339 source, payment_hash,
3340 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3341 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3344 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3345 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3351 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3352 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3353 let mut spendable_output = None;
3354 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3355 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3356 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3357 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3358 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3359 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3360 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3361 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3362 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3363 // non-standard due to their size.
3364 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3365 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3366 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3369 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3370 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3371 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3372 output: outp.clone(),
3376 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3377 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3378 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3379 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3380 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3381 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3382 output: outp.clone(),
3383 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3384 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3385 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3390 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3391 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3392 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3393 output: outp.clone(),
3394 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3395 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3399 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3400 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3401 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3402 output: outp.clone(),
3407 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3408 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3410 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3412 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3414 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3415 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3420 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3422 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3423 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3426 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3427 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3430 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3431 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3435 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3437 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3438 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3441 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3442 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3445 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3446 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3449 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3450 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3453 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3454 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3458 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3460 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
3461 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
3462 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3463 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3467 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3472 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3474 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3475 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3477 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3478 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3480 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3481 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3482 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3483 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3486 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3488 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3489 let shutdown_script = {
3490 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3491 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3494 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3495 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3496 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3497 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3498 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3499 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3500 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3502 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3503 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3504 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3506 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3507 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3508 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3510 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3511 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3515 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3516 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3517 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3518 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3520 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3525 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3527 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3529 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3532 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3533 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3534 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3535 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3536 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3538 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3539 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3545 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3546 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3547 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3548 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3549 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3550 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3551 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3552 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3554 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3555 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3559 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3560 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3561 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3562 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3563 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3564 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3565 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3569 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3570 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3571 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3572 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3573 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3574 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3575 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3579 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3580 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3583 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3585 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3587 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3589 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3590 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3592 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3593 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3594 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3595 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3596 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3597 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3598 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3602 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3603 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3604 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3605 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3606 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3607 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3608 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3609 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3611 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3614 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3615 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3616 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3617 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3618 pending_events.push(event);
3622 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3624 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3625 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3626 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3627 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3628 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3632 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3633 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3634 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3635 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3636 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3637 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3638 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3639 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3641 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3642 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3645 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3647 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3648 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3650 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3651 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3652 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3653 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3654 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3655 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3656 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3660 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3661 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3662 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3663 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3664 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3667 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3668 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3669 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3670 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
3671 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
3672 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3673 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3674 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3675 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3676 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3677 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
3678 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
3681 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3682 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3684 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3686 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3689 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3690 counterparty_payment_script,
3694 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3696 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3697 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3699 counterparty_commitment_params,
3700 funding_redeemscript,
3701 channel_value_satoshis,
3702 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
3707 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3708 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3709 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3711 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3712 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3713 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3714 current_holder_commitment_number,
3717 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3720 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3725 lockdown_from_offchain,
3727 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3728 funding_spend_confirmed,
3729 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
3730 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3733 counterparty_node_id,
3742 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3743 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3744 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3745 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
3746 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3747 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
3748 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3749 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3750 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3751 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3752 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3753 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3754 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3758 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
3760 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3761 use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3762 use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3763 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3764 use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3765 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3766 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3767 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3769 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3770 use ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentSendFailure};
3771 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3772 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3773 use util::errors::APIError;
3774 use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3775 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3776 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3777 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3779 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
3782 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3783 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3784 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3785 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3786 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3787 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3788 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3789 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3790 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3792 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3793 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3794 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3797 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3798 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3799 &nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3800 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3801 &nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3803 // Rebalance somewhat
3804 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
3806 // First route two payments for testing at the end
3807 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3808 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3810 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
3811 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
3812 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
3813 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
3814 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
3815 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
3816 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
3818 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
3819 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
3820 let new_header = BlockHeader {
3821 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
3822 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
3823 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
3824 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3825 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
3826 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
3828 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
3829 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
3830 &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
3832 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
3833 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
3834 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
3835 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)),
3836 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
3837 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
3838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
3839 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3840 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
3842 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
3843 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
3844 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
3845 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
3846 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
3847 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
3848 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
3849 } else { panic!(); }
3850 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
3851 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
3853 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
3855 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
3857 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
3859 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3860 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
3861 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
3862 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
3863 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
3864 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3865 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
3866 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
3867 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
3870 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
3871 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
3872 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
3876 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3877 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3878 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3879 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
3880 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
3882 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3883 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3885 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3888 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3889 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3890 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3894 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3895 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3897 let mut res = Vec::new();
3898 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3899 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3903 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3904 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3911 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3912 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3914 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3915 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3921 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3922 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3923 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3924 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3929 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3931 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3932 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3933 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3934 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3935 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3936 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3942 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3943 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3944 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3945 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3946 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3947 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3949 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
3950 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3951 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3952 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3953 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3954 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3955 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3956 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3958 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3961 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3963 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3964 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3965 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3966 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
3967 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3968 &channel_parameters,
3969 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3970 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
3972 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3973 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3974 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3975 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3976 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3977 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3978 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3979 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
3980 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
3983 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3984 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3985 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3986 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3987 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3988 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3989 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3991 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3992 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3993 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3994 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3995 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3996 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3998 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3999 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4000 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
4001 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4002 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4003 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4004 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4005 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4007 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4008 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
4009 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4010 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4011 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4012 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4016 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4017 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4018 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4020 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4021 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4022 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4024 macro_rules! sign_input {
4025 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4026 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4027 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4029 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4030 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4031 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4033 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
4034 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4035 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4036 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4037 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4038 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
4039 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4040 witness.push(ser_sig);
4041 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4042 witness.push(vec!(1));
4043 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4044 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4045 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4046 witness.push(vec![0]);
4048 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4050 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4051 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4052 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4053 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4054 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4058 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4059 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4061 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4062 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4063 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4064 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4066 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4067 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4071 script_sig: Script::new(),
4072 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4073 witness: Witness::new(),
4076 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4077 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4080 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4081 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4082 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4084 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4085 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4086 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4087 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4090 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4093 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
4094 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4095 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4096 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4098 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4099 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4103 script_sig: Script::new(),
4104 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4105 witness: Witness::new(),
4108 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4109 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4112 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4113 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4114 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4116 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4117 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4118 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4119 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4122 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4125 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
4126 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4127 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4128 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4129 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4130 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4134 script_sig: Script::new(),
4135 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4136 witness: Witness::new(),
4138 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4139 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4142 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4143 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
4144 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4146 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4147 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4148 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4149 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4152 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4156 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.