1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 //! [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
21 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
22 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
24 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
26 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
41 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
44 use util::{byte_utils, events};
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
51 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
52 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
53 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
56 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
57 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
58 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
59 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
60 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
62 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
63 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
64 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
68 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
69 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
70 self.update_id.write(w)?;
71 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
72 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
73 update_step.write(w)?;
78 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
79 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
80 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
81 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
82 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
84 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
86 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
90 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
92 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
93 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
94 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
96 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
97 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
98 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
99 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
101 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
102 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
103 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
105 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
106 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
107 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
108 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
109 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
110 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
113 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
114 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
117 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
118 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
119 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
120 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
121 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
124 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
125 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
126 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
128 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
129 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
130 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question (which will generate one
131 /// final ChannelMonitorUpdate which must be delivered to at least one ChannelMonitor copy).
133 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local persisted copy of the channel
138 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
139 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
140 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
142 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
144 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
146 /// Simple structure send back by `chain::Watch` in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
147 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
149 /// [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
150 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
151 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
152 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
153 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
154 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
156 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
158 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`].
160 /// May be used in conjunction with [`ChannelManager`] to monitor channels locally or used
161 /// independently to monitor channels remotely.
163 /// [`chain::Watch`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html
164 pub struct ChainMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
165 where C::Target: chain::Notify,
166 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
167 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
170 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
171 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
173 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
174 chain_source: Option<C>,
180 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
181 where C::Target: chain::Notify,
182 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
183 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
186 /// Delegates to [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`] for each watched channel. Any HTLCs that
187 /// were resolved on chain will be retuned by [`chain::Watch::release_pending_htlc_updates`].
189 /// Calls back to [`chain::Notify`] if any monitor indicated new outputs to watch, returning
192 /// [`ChannelMonitor::block_connected`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_connected
193 /// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_htlc_updates`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_htlc_updates
194 /// [`chain::Notify`]: ../../chain/trait.Notify.html
195 pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32) -> bool {
196 let mut new_outputs = false;
198 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
199 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
200 let mut txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
201 new_outputs |= !txn_outputs.is_empty();
203 if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
204 for (txid, outputs) in txn_outputs.drain(..) {
205 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
206 chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid, index: idx as u16 }, &output.script_pubkey);
215 /// Delegates to [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`] for each watched channel.
217 /// [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_disconnected
218 pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
219 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
220 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
221 monitor.block_disconnected(header, disconnected_height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
226 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
227 where C::Target: chain::Notify,
228 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
229 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
232 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
233 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
234 pub fn new(chain_source: Option<C>, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> Self {
236 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
240 fee_estimator: feeest,
244 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
246 /// Calls back to [`chain::Notify`] with the funding transaction and outputs to watch.
248 /// [`chain::Notify`]: ../../chain/trait.Notify.html
249 pub fn add_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
250 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
251 let entry = match monitors.entry(outpoint) {
252 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given outpoint is already present")),
253 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
256 let funding_txo = monitor.get_funding_txo();
257 log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
259 if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
260 chain_source.register_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1);
261 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
262 for (idx, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
263 chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: idx as u16 }, &script_pubkey);
268 entry.insert(monitor);
272 /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
273 pub fn update_monitor(&self, outpoint: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
274 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
275 match monitors.get_mut(&outpoint) {
276 Some(orig_monitor) => {
277 log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
278 orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger)
280 None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
285 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> chain::Watch for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
286 where C::Target: chain::Notify,
287 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
288 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
291 type Keys = ChanSigner;
293 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
294 match self.add_monitor(funding_txo, monitor) {
296 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
300 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
301 match self.update_monitor(funding_txo, update) {
303 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
307 fn release_pending_htlc_updates(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
308 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
309 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
310 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
312 pending_htlcs_updated
316 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChainMonitor<ChanSigner, C, T, F, L>
317 where C::Target: chain::Notify,
318 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
319 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
322 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
323 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
324 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
325 pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
331 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
332 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
333 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
334 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
335 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
336 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
337 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
338 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
339 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
340 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
341 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
342 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
343 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
344 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
345 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
346 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
347 /// accurate block height.
348 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
349 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
350 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
351 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
352 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
353 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
354 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
355 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
356 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
357 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
358 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
359 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
360 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
362 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
363 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
364 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
366 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
367 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
368 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
369 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
371 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
372 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
374 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
375 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
376 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
378 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
379 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
380 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
382 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
383 struct LocalSignedTx {
384 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
386 revocation_key: PublicKey,
387 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
388 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
389 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
390 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
392 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
395 /// We use this to track remote commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
396 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
398 struct RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
399 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
400 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
401 on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
402 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
405 impl Writeable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
407 self.remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
408 self.remote_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
409 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_remote_tx_csv))?;
410 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
411 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
412 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
413 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
414 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
421 impl Readable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
422 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
423 let remote_commitment_transaction = {
424 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
425 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
426 let on_remote_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
427 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
428 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
429 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
430 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
431 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
432 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
433 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
434 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
437 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
438 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
441 RemoteCommitmentTransaction {
442 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
443 remote_htlc_base_key,
448 Ok(remote_commitment_transaction)
452 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
453 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
454 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
455 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
456 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
458 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
459 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
460 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
461 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
462 input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
464 htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
465 on_remote_tx_csv: u16,
468 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
469 remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
470 remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
471 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
472 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
475 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
479 funding_redeemscript: Script,
483 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
484 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
486 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_remote_tx_csv} => {
487 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
488 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
489 remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
490 remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
491 writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
492 input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
493 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
495 on_remote_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
497 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
498 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
499 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
500 remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
501 remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
502 preimage.write(writer)?;
505 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
506 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
507 preimage.write(writer)?;
508 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
510 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
511 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
512 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
519 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
520 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
521 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
523 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
524 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
525 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
526 let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
527 let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
528 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
529 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
530 let on_remote_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
531 InputMaterial::Revoked {
532 per_commitment_point,
533 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
534 remote_htlc_base_key,
543 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
544 let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
545 let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
546 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
547 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
548 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
549 per_commitment_point,
550 remote_delayed_payment_base_key,
551 remote_htlc_base_key,
557 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
558 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
559 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
565 InputMaterial::Funding {
566 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
569 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
575 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
576 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
577 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
578 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
579 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
580 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
581 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
582 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
583 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
584 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
585 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
586 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
587 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
588 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
589 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
590 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
591 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
592 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
593 // and satisfy witness program.
594 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
597 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
598 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
599 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
601 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
602 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
603 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
605 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
608 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
612 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
613 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
615 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
617 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
618 LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
619 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
620 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
622 LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
623 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
624 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
625 commitment_number: u64,
626 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
629 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
635 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest local
636 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
638 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest local commitment transaction as we
639 /// think we've fallen behind!
640 should_broadcast: bool,
644 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
645 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
647 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
649 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
650 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
651 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
657 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
659 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
660 commitment_number.write(w)?;
661 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
662 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
663 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
665 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
668 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
670 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
672 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
677 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
679 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
685 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
686 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
687 match Readable::read(r)? {
689 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
690 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
692 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
693 let mut res = Vec::new();
695 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
702 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
703 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
704 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
705 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
707 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
708 let mut res = Vec::new();
710 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
717 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
718 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
722 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
723 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
724 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
728 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
729 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
732 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
737 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
738 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
740 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
741 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
743 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
744 /// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
745 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
746 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
747 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
748 latest_update_id: u64,
749 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
751 destination_script: Script,
752 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
753 remote_payment_script: Script,
754 shutdown_script: Script,
757 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
758 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
759 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
761 remote_tx_cache: RemoteCommitmentTransaction,
762 funding_redeemscript: Script,
763 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
764 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
765 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
767 on_local_tx_csv: u16,
769 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
770 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
771 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
772 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
773 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
774 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
775 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
776 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
777 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
778 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
779 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
780 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
781 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
783 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
784 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
785 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
786 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
787 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
788 current_local_commitment_tx: LocalSignedTx,
790 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
792 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
793 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
795 current_local_commitment_number: u64,
797 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
799 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
800 pending_events: Vec<events::Event>,
802 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
803 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
804 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
805 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
807 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
808 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
809 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
810 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
811 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
814 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
816 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
818 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
819 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further local commitment transaction
820 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
821 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
823 // Set once we've signed a local commitment transaction and handed it over to our
824 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our local commitment transactions
825 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
826 local_tx_signed: bool,
828 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
829 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
830 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
831 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
832 // the full block_connected).
833 pub(crate) last_block_hash: BlockHash,
834 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
837 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
838 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
839 /// underlying object
840 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
841 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
842 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
843 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
844 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
845 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_local_revokable_script ||
846 self.remote_payment_script != other.remote_payment_script ||
847 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
848 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
849 self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid ||
850 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid ||
851 self.remote_tx_cache != other.remote_tx_cache ||
852 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
853 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
854 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
855 self.on_local_tx_csv != other.on_local_tx_csv ||
856 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
857 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
858 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
859 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
860 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
861 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
862 self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number ||
863 self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx ||
864 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
865 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
866 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
867 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
868 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
869 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
870 self.local_tx_signed != other.local_tx_signed
879 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
880 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
882 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
883 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
884 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
885 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
886 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
887 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
888 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
889 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
890 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
891 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
893 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
895 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
896 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
898 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
899 if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
900 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
901 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
902 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
903 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
905 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
908 self.remote_payment_script.write(writer)?;
909 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
911 self.keys.write(writer)?;
912 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
913 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
914 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
915 self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
916 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
918 self.remote_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
919 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
920 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
922 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
923 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
924 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
925 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
926 match second_option {
927 Some(second_pubkey) => {
928 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
931 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
936 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
940 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_local_tx_csv))?;
942 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
944 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
945 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
946 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
947 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
948 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
949 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
950 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
954 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
955 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
956 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
957 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
958 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
959 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
960 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
964 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
965 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
966 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
967 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
968 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
969 for script in txouts.iter() {
970 script.write(writer)?;
974 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
975 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
976 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
977 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
980 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
981 ($local_tx: expr) => {
982 $local_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
983 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
984 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
985 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
986 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
987 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
989 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
990 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
991 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
992 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
993 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
995 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
999 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
1004 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1005 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1006 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1008 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1011 serialize_local_tx!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1013 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1014 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_local_commitment_number))?;
1016 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1017 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1018 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1021 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
1022 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
1023 data.write(writer)?;
1026 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1027 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1028 event.write(writer)?;
1031 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1033 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1034 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1035 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1036 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1037 for ev in events.iter() {
1039 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1041 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1042 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1044 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
1046 descriptor.write(writer)?;
1052 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1053 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1054 txid.write(writer)?;
1055 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1056 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1057 script.write(writer)?;
1060 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1062 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1063 self.local_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1069 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1070 pub(crate) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
1071 on_remote_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1072 remote_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
1073 on_local_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1074 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1075 initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1077 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1078 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1079 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1080 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1081 let remote_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1083 let remote_tx_cache = RemoteCommitmentTransaction { remote_delayed_payment_base_key: *remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: *remote_htlc_base_key, on_remote_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
1085 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_local_tx_csv);
1087 let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1088 let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1089 let local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1090 txid: initial_local_commitment_tx.txid(),
1091 revocation_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1092 a_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1093 b_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1094 delayed_payment_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1095 per_commitment_point: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1096 feerate_per_kw: initial_local_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1097 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1099 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1100 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1101 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1102 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1103 // now but we should consider it later.
1104 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(initial_local_commitment_tx).unwrap();
1107 latest_update_id: 0,
1108 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1110 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1111 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: None,
1112 remote_payment_script,
1117 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1118 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1121 funding_redeemscript,
1122 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
1123 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1127 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1128 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1129 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1130 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1132 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1133 current_local_commitment_tx: local_commitment_tx,
1134 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1135 current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
1137 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1138 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1139 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1141 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1142 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1146 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1147 local_tx_signed: false,
1149 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1150 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1154 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1155 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1156 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1157 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1158 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1159 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1162 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1163 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1164 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1165 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1170 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1171 let cur_local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_commitment_tx;
1172 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1173 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1174 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1176 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1177 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1178 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1182 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1183 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1184 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1189 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1196 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1205 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1206 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1207 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1208 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1209 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1210 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1211 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1212 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1214 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1215 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1218 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1219 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1220 log_trace!(logger, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1221 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1222 self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1223 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1224 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1225 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1226 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1227 Some(old_points) => {
1228 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1229 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1230 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1231 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1232 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1234 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1237 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1241 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1244 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1245 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1246 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1250 self.remote_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
1253 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1254 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1255 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1256 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1257 /// Panics if set_on_local_tx_csv has never been called.
1258 fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1259 if self.local_tx_signed {
1260 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("A local commitment tx has already been signed, no new local commitment txn can be sent to our counterparty"));
1262 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1263 let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1264 let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1265 let mut new_local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1267 revocation_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1268 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1269 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1270 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1271 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1272 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1273 htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
1275 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1276 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1277 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1278 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1279 // now but we should consider it later.
1280 if let Err(_) = self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(commitment_tx) {
1281 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Local commitment signed has already been signed, no further update of LOCAL commitment transaction is allowed"));
1283 self.current_local_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1284 mem::swap(&mut new_local_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1285 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_local_commitment_tx);
1289 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1290 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1291 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1292 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1295 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1296 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1299 for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1300 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1304 /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
1305 pub(crate) fn update_monitor_ooo<L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> where L::Target: Logger {
1306 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1308 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1309 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1310 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1312 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1313 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1314 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1315 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1316 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1317 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1318 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
1321 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1325 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1328 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1329 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1330 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1333 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1334 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1336 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1338 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1339 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1340 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1342 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1343 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1344 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1345 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1346 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1347 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1348 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1349 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1350 if should_broadcast {
1351 self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1353 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1358 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1362 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1364 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1365 self.latest_update_id
1368 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1369 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1373 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1374 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1375 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
1376 &self.outputs_to_watch
1379 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1380 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1381 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1382 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1383 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
1384 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1385 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1386 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1387 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1393 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1394 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_htlc_updates`].
1396 /// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_htlc_updates`]: ../../chain/trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_htlc_updates
1397 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1398 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1399 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1403 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1406 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1407 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1408 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1409 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1410 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1411 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1415 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1416 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1417 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1420 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1421 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1424 pub(crate) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1425 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1428 pub(crate) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1429 self.current_local_commitment_number
1432 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1433 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1434 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1435 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1436 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1437 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1438 fn check_spend_remote_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1439 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1440 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1441 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1442 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1444 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1445 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1447 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1448 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1451 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1456 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1457 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1458 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1459 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1460 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1461 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1462 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key));
1464 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1465 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1467 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote)
1468 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1469 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1470 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
1471 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1475 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1476 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1477 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1478 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1479 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1480 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1481 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1483 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv};
1484 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1489 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1490 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1491 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1492 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1493 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1494 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1496 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1497 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1498 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1499 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1500 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1501 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1502 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1503 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1504 let e = entry.get_mut();
1505 e.retain(|ref event| {
1507 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1508 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1513 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1516 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1524 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1525 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1527 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1528 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1530 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1532 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1533 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1534 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1535 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1536 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1537 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1538 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1540 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1541 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1543 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1545 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1546 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1547 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1548 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1549 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1550 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1551 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1552 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1553 // payment_preimage.
1554 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1555 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1556 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1557 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1559 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1560 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1564 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1565 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1567 let e = entry.get_mut();
1568 e.retain(|ref event| {
1570 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1571 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1576 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1579 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1587 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1588 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1590 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1591 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1594 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1595 let revocation_point_option =
1596 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1597 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1598 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1600 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1601 self.remote_payment_script = {
1602 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1603 // script_pubkey version
1604 let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1605 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
1608 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1609 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1610 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1611 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1612 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1613 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1615 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1616 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1617 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1618 let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
1619 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1626 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1629 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1630 fn check_spend_remote_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1631 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1632 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1633 return (Vec::new(), None)
1636 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1637 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1640 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1645 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1646 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1647 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1649 log_trace!(logger, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1650 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv };
1651 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1652 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
1655 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1656 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1657 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1659 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.on_local_tx_csv, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1660 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), local_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1662 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1663 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1664 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1665 witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
1666 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1667 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1668 Some(preimage.clone())
1670 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1674 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1676 watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1680 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_local_revokable_script)
1683 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1684 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1685 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1686 fn check_spend_local_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1687 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1688 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1689 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1691 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1692 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1693 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1694 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1695 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1696 let e = entry.get_mut();
1697 e.retain(|ref event| {
1699 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1700 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1705 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1707 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1708 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1714 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1715 ($updates: expr) => {
1716 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1717 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1718 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1722 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1723 let mut is_local_tx = false;
1725 if self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1727 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1728 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1729 append_onchain_update!(res);
1730 } else if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1731 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1733 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1734 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, local_tx);
1735 append_onchain_update!(res);
1739 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1740 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1741 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
1742 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1743 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1744 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1752 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1753 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1754 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
1758 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1761 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
1762 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
1763 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
1764 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1765 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1766 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1767 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1768 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1769 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1770 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1771 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
1772 self.local_tx_signed = true;
1773 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1774 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1775 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1776 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1777 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1778 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1779 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1780 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1784 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1785 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1790 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1791 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1797 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_local_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1798 /// to bypass LocalCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1799 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1801 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1802 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!");
1803 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1804 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1805 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1806 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1807 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1808 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1809 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1810 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1814 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1815 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1825 /// Determines if any HTLCs have been resolved on chain in the connected block.
1827 /// TODO: Include how `broadcaster` and `fee_estimator` are used.
1829 /// Returns any transaction outputs from `txn_matched` that spends of should be watched for.
1830 /// After called these are also available via [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1832 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1833 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txn_matched: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
1834 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1835 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1838 for &(_, tx) in txn_matched {
1839 let mut output_val = 0;
1840 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1841 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1842 output_val += out.value;
1843 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1847 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
1848 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1850 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1851 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1852 for &(_, tx) in txn_matched {
1853 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1854 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1855 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1856 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1858 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1859 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1860 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1861 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1862 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1863 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1865 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1866 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1867 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1868 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1870 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1872 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1875 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1876 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
1877 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1878 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1879 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1884 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1885 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1886 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1887 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1889 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1891 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
1892 if should_broadcast {
1893 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
1895 if should_broadcast {
1896 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1897 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1898 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1899 watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1901 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1904 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1907 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1908 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1909 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
1910 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1911 payment_preimage: None,
1912 source: htlc_update.0,
1915 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1916 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1917 self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
1918 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1924 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
1925 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1927 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
1928 let output_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect();
1929 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts).is_none()
1934 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1937 /// TODO: Include how `broadcaster` and `fee_estimator` are used.
1938 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
1939 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1940 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1943 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
1944 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
1946 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1948 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1949 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
1952 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1954 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1957 pub(crate) fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
1958 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1959 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1960 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1961 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1962 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1963 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1964 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1965 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1966 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1967 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1968 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1969 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
1970 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1971 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1972 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1973 // time out the HTLC first.
1974 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1975 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1976 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1977 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1978 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1979 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1980 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1981 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1982 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1983 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1984 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1985 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1986 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1987 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1988 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1989 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1990 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
1991 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1992 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
1993 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
1994 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
1995 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1996 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1997 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2004 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2006 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
2007 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2008 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2011 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2012 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2013 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2020 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2021 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2022 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2023 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2024 let mut payment_data = None;
2025 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2026 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2027 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2028 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2030 macro_rules! log_claim {
2031 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2032 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2033 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2034 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2035 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2036 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2037 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2038 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2039 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2040 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2041 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2042 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2044 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2045 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2046 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2047 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2052 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2053 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2054 if let Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2055 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2056 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2057 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2058 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2059 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2068 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2069 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2070 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2071 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2072 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2073 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2074 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2075 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2076 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2077 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2078 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2079 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2080 } else if !$local_tx {
2081 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2082 if payment_data.is_none() {
2083 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2086 if payment_data.is_none() {
2087 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2088 continue 'outer_loop;
2095 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid {
2096 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2097 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2099 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2100 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2101 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2102 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2105 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2106 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2107 "remote commitment tx", false);
2110 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2111 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2112 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2113 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2114 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2115 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2116 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2117 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2119 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2123 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2124 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2125 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2126 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2128 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2133 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2134 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2135 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2136 let e = entry.get_mut();
2137 e.retain(|ref event| {
2139 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2140 return htlc_update.0 != source
2145 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2147 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2148 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2156 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2157 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2158 let mut spendable_output = None;
2159 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2160 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2161 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2162 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2163 output: outp.clone(),
2166 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
2167 if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2168 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2169 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2170 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1,
2171 to_self_delay: self.on_local_tx_csv,
2172 output: outp.clone(),
2173 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2174 remote_revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2178 } else if self.remote_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2179 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment {
2180 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2181 output: outp.clone(),
2182 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2185 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2186 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2187 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2188 output: outp.clone(),
2192 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2193 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2194 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2195 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2196 let e = entry.get_mut();
2197 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2199 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2200 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2207 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2209 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2210 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2211 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2215 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2220 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2221 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2222 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2223 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2226 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2227 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2229 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2230 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2232 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2233 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2234 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2235 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2238 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2240 let remote_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2241 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2243 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2244 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2245 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2246 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2247 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2248 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2250 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2251 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2252 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2254 let remote_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2255 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2256 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2258 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2259 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2263 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2264 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2265 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2266 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2268 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2273 let on_local_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2275 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2277 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2280 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2281 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2282 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2283 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2284 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2286 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2287 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2293 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2294 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2295 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2296 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2297 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2298 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2299 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2300 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2302 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2303 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2307 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2308 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2309 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2310 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2311 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2312 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2313 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2314 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2315 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2317 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2318 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2322 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2323 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2324 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2325 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2326 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2327 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2328 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2332 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2335 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2336 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2337 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2338 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2339 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2340 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2341 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2343 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2344 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2345 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2346 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2347 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2349 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2350 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2352 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2357 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2364 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2367 Some(read_local_tx!())
2369 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2371 let current_local_commitment_tx = read_local_tx!();
2373 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2374 let current_local_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2376 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2377 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2378 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2379 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2380 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2381 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2382 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2386 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2387 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2388 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
2389 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2392 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2393 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
2394 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2395 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2396 pending_events.push(event);
2400 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2402 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2403 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2404 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2405 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2406 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2407 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2408 for _ in 0..events_len {
2409 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2411 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2412 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2413 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2414 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2418 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2419 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2423 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2427 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2430 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2431 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2432 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2433 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2434 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2435 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
2436 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2437 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2439 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2440 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2443 let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
2445 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2446 let local_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2448 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2450 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2453 broadcasted_local_revokable_script,
2454 remote_payment_script,
2459 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2460 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2463 funding_redeemscript,
2464 channel_value_satoshis,
2465 their_cur_revocation_points,
2470 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2471 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2472 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2474 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2475 current_local_commitment_tx,
2476 current_remote_commitment_number,
2477 current_local_commitment_number,
2480 pending_htlcs_updated,
2483 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2488 lockdown_from_offchain,
2492 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2499 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2500 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2501 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2502 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2503 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2504 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2505 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2506 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2507 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2509 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2510 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2511 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2512 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2514 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
2515 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2516 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2517 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2519 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2522 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2523 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2524 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2526 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2527 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2529 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2532 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
2533 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2534 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2538 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2539 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2541 let mut res = Vec::new();
2542 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2543 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2547 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2548 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2555 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2556 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2558 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2559 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2565 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2566 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2567 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2568 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2573 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2575 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2576 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2577 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2578 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2579 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2585 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2587 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2588 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2589 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2590 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2591 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2592 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
2594 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2595 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
2596 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
2597 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
2598 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
2599 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2600 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2603 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2604 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2605 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2606 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2607 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2608 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2609 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2611 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2612 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2613 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2614 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2615 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2616 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2618 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2619 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2620 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2621 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2622 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2623 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2624 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2625 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2627 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2628 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2629 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2630 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2631 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2632 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2636 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2637 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2638 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2640 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2641 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2642 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2643 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2645 macro_rules! sign_input {
2646 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2647 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2648 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2650 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2651 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2652 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
2654 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2655 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
2656 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2657 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2658 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2659 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
2660 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2661 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
2662 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2663 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2664 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2665 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
2667 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2669 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2670 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
2671 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
2672 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
2676 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2677 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2679 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2680 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2682 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2683 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2687 script_sig: Script::new(),
2688 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2689 witness: Vec::new(),
2692 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2693 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2696 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2697 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2698 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2699 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2700 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2702 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2704 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2705 claim_tx.input.clear();
2706 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2708 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2709 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2713 script_sig: Script::new(),
2714 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2715 witness: Vec::new(),
2718 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2719 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2720 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2721 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2722 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2724 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2726 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2727 claim_tx.input.clear();
2728 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2729 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2730 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2734 script_sig: Script::new(),
2735 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2736 witness: Vec::new(),
2738 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2739 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2740 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2741 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2742 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2744 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2747 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.