1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
36 use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
37 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, ChannelId};
38 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentKey, DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, HtlcKey, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
40 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,CommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys};
41 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
43 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
44 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
45 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
47 use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, OnchainTxHandler};
48 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use crate::chain::Filter;
50 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
51 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
52 use crate::util::byte_utils;
53 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler};
54 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
56 use crate::prelude::*;
58 use crate::io::{self, Error};
59 use core::convert::TryInto;
61 use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
63 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
64 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
66 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
67 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
68 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
69 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
70 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
72 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
73 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
74 /// Historically, [`ChannelMonitor`]s didn't know their counterparty node id. However,
75 /// `ChannelManager` really wants to know it so that it can easily look up the corresponding
76 /// channel. For now, this results in a temporary map in `ChannelManager` to look up channels
77 /// by only the funding outpoint.
79 /// To eventually remove that, we repeat the counterparty node id here so that we can upgrade
80 /// `ChannelMonitor`s to become aware of the counterparty node id if they were generated prior
81 /// to when it was stored directly in them.
82 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
83 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
84 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
85 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
87 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
88 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
89 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
91 /// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
92 /// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
93 /// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
94 /// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
95 /// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
97 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
101 /// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
103 /// (1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
104 /// (2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
105 /// allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
106 /// commitment transaction.
108 /// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
109 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
111 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
112 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
113 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
114 self.update_id.write(w)?;
115 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
116 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
117 update_step.write(w)?;
119 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
120 (1, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
125 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
126 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
127 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
128 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
129 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
130 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
132 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
136 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
137 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
138 (1, counterparty_node_id, option),
140 Ok(Self { update_id, counterparty_node_id, updates })
144 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
146 pub enum MonitorEvent {
147 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
148 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
150 /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
152 HolderForceClosed(OutPoint),
154 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
155 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
157 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
159 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
160 funding_txo: OutPoint,
161 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
162 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
164 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
165 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
166 monitor_update_id: u64,
169 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
170 // Note that Completed is currently never serialized to disk as it is generated only in
173 (0, funding_txo, required),
174 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
178 (4, HolderForceClosed),
179 // 6 was `UpdateFailed` until LDK 0.0.117
182 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
183 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
184 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
185 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
186 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
187 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
188 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
189 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
190 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
192 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
193 (0, payment_hash, required),
194 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
195 (2, source, required),
196 (4, payment_preimage, option),
199 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
200 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
201 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
202 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
203 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
204 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
205 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
206 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
207 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
208 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
209 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
210 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
211 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
212 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
213 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
214 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
215 /// accurate block height.
216 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
217 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
218 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
219 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
220 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
221 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
224 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
225 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
226 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
227 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
228 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
229 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
230 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
231 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
232 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
233 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
235 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
236 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
237 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
239 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
240 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
242 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
243 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
245 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
246 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
247 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
248 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
250 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
251 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
252 struct HolderSignedTx {
253 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
255 revocation_key: RevocationKey,
258 delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey,
259 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
260 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
261 to_self_value_sat: u64,
264 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
266 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
267 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
268 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
269 (2, revocation_key, required),
270 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
271 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
272 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
273 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
274 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
275 (14, htlc_outputs, required_vec)
278 impl HolderSignedTx {
279 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
280 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
281 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
291 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
292 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
293 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
294 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
295 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: DelayedPaymentBasepoint,
296 counterparty_htlc_base_key: HtlcBasepoint,
297 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
300 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
301 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
302 w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
303 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
304 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
305 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
306 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
311 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
312 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
313 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
314 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
315 // used. Read it for compatibility.
316 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
317 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
318 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
319 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
320 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
321 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
325 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
326 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
327 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
328 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
329 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
330 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
331 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
333 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
334 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
335 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
336 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
339 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
343 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
344 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
346 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
347 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
348 struct OnchainEventEntry {
351 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
353 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
356 impl OnchainEventEntry {
357 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
358 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
360 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
361 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
363 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
364 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
365 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
367 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
368 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
369 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
370 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
371 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
378 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
379 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
383 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
385 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
386 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
388 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
389 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
390 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
392 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
393 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
394 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
395 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
396 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
397 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
400 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
401 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
402 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
403 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
404 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
406 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
407 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
409 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
411 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
413 FundingSpendConfirmation {
414 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
415 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
416 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
417 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
418 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
420 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
421 /// counterparty output.
422 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
424 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
425 /// is constructed. This is used when
426 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
427 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
428 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
429 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
430 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
432 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
433 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
435 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
436 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
437 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
438 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
439 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
440 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
441 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
442 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
446 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
447 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
448 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
449 (0, self.txid, required),
450 (1, self.transaction, option),
451 (2, self.height, required),
452 (3, self.block_hash, option),
453 (4, self.event, required),
459 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
460 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
461 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
462 let mut transaction = None;
463 let mut block_hash = None;
465 let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
466 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
468 (1, transaction, option),
469 (2, height, required),
470 (3, block_hash, option),
471 (4, event, upgradable_required),
473 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
477 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
479 (0, source, required),
480 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
481 (2, payment_hash, required),
482 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
484 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
485 (0, descriptor, required),
487 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
488 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
489 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
491 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
492 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
493 (2, preimage, option),
494 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
499 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
500 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
501 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
502 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
503 /// Note that LDK after 0.0.115 supports this only containing dust HTLCs (implying the
504 /// `Signature` field is never filled in). At that point, non-dust HTLCs are implied by the
505 /// HTLC fields in `commitment_tx` and the sources passed via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
506 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
507 claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
508 nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>,
510 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
511 commitment_txid: Txid,
512 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
513 commitment_number: u64,
514 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
515 feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>,
516 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Option<u64>,
517 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Option<u64>,
520 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
526 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
527 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
529 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
530 /// think we've fallen behind!
531 should_broadcast: bool,
534 scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
538 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
539 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
541 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
542 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
543 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
544 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
545 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
546 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
551 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
552 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
553 (0, commitment_tx, required),
554 (1, claimed_htlcs, optional_vec),
555 (2, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
556 (4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
558 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
559 (0, commitment_txid, required),
560 (1, feerate_per_kw, option),
561 (2, commitment_number, required),
562 (3, to_broadcaster_value_sat, option),
563 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
564 (5, to_countersignatory_value_sat, option),
565 (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
567 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
568 (0, payment_preimage, required),
570 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
572 (2, secret, required),
574 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
575 (0, should_broadcast, required),
577 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
578 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
582 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
584 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
586 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
587 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
589 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
590 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
591 /// force-closed now.
592 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
593 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
594 /// required to do so.
595 amount_satoshis: u64,
597 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
598 /// we consider it spendable.
599 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
600 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
601 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
602 amount_satoshis: u64,
603 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
605 confirmation_height: u32,
607 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
608 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
609 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
611 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
612 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
613 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
614 ContentiousClaimable {
615 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
616 /// required to do so.
617 amount_satoshis: u64,
618 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
621 /// The payment hash that locks this HTLC.
622 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
623 /// The preimage that can be used to claim this HTLC.
624 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
626 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
627 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
628 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
629 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
630 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
631 /// which will be required to do so.
632 amount_satoshis: u64,
633 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
635 claimable_height: u32,
636 /// The payment hash whose preimage our counterparty needs to claim this HTLC.
637 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
639 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
640 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
641 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
642 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
643 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
644 /// which will be required to do so.
645 amount_satoshis: u64,
646 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
647 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
649 /// The payment hash whose preimage we need to claim this HTLC.
650 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
652 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
655 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
656 /// following amount.
657 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
658 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
660 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
661 /// were already spent.
662 amount_satoshis: u64,
667 /// The amount claimable, in satoshis. This excludes balances that we are unsure if we are able
668 /// to claim, this is because we are waiting for a preimage or for a timeout to expire. For more
669 /// information on these balances see [`Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC`] and
670 /// [`Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC`].
672 /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
673 pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
675 Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }|
676 Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }|
677 Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }|
678 Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }
680 Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }|
681 Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. }
687 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
688 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
689 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
690 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
691 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
692 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
694 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
695 resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
696 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
697 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
700 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
701 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
702 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
703 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
704 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
705 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
706 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
707 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
708 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
709 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
710 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
711 (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
717 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
718 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
719 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
720 let mut resolving_txid = None;
721 let mut payment_preimage = None;
722 let mut resolving_tx = None;
723 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
724 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
725 (1, resolving_txid, option),
726 (2, payment_preimage, option),
727 (3, resolving_tx, option),
730 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
738 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
739 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
741 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
742 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
744 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
745 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
746 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
747 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
748 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
749 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
751 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
753 pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
756 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: Clone {
757 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
758 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone();
759 ChannelMonitor::from_impl(inner)
763 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
764 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
765 latest_update_id: u64,
766 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
768 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
769 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>,
770 counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf,
771 shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
773 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
774 holder_revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint,
775 funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
776 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
777 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
779 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
780 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf,
781 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
782 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
783 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
785 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
787 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
788 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
789 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
790 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
791 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
792 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
793 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
794 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
795 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
796 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
797 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
798 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
799 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
800 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
801 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
802 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
804 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,
806 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
807 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
808 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
809 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
810 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
811 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
813 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
815 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
816 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
818 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
820 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
821 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
822 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
824 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
826 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
827 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
828 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
829 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
830 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
831 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
832 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
833 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
834 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
835 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
837 pub(super) pending_events: Vec<Event>,
838 pub(super) is_processing_pending_events: bool,
840 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
841 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
842 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
843 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
845 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
846 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
847 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
848 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
849 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>>,
852 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
854 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
856 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
857 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
858 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
859 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
861 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
862 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
863 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
865 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
866 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
867 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
868 holder_tx_signed: bool,
870 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
871 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
872 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
873 funding_spend_seen: bool,
875 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
876 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
877 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
879 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
880 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
881 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
882 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
883 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
885 /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
886 /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
887 /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
888 /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
889 /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
890 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
892 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
893 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
894 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
895 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
896 // the full block_connected).
897 best_block: BestBlock,
899 /// The node_id of our counterparty
900 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
902 /// Initial counterparty commmitment data needed to recreate the commitment tx
903 /// in the persistence pipeline for third-party watchtowers. This will only be present on
904 /// monitors created after 0.0.117.
906 /// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats,
907 /// to_countersignatory_sats)
908 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>,
911 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
912 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
914 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
915 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
916 // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
917 // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
919 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
920 let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
921 let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
926 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
927 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
928 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
932 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
933 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
934 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
936 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
937 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
938 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
940 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
942 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
943 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
945 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
946 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
947 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
948 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
949 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
950 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
952 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
955 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
956 match &self.shutdown_script {
957 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
958 None => ScriptBuf::new().write(writer)?,
961 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
962 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
963 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
964 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
965 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
966 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
967 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
969 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
970 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
971 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
973 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
974 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
975 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
976 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
977 match second_option {
978 Some(second_pubkey) => {
979 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
982 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
987 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
991 writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
993 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
995 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
996 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
997 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
998 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
999 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
1000 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1001 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1005 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1006 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1007 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1008 writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1009 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1010 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
1011 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
1012 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
1013 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1014 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
1018 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1019 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1020 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1021 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1024 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1025 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1026 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1027 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1030 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1031 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1032 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1034 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1037 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1039 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1040 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1042 writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1043 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1044 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1047 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1048 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1049 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => true,
1051 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1052 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1054 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1058 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1059 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1063 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1064 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1065 event.write(writer)?;
1068 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1069 writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height().to_be_bytes())?;
1071 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1072 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1073 entry.write(writer)?;
1076 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1077 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1078 txid.write(writer)?;
1079 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1080 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1082 script.write(writer)?;
1085 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1087 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1088 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1090 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1091 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1092 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec),
1093 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, required_vec),
1094 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1095 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1096 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1097 (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
1098 (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
1099 (17, self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
1106 macro_rules! _process_events_body {
1107 ($self_opt: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1109 let (pending_events, repeated_events);
1110 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1111 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1112 if inner.is_processing_pending_events {
1115 inner.is_processing_pending_events = true;
1117 pending_events = inner.pending_events.clone();
1118 repeated_events = inner.get_repeated_events();
1120 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1122 for event in pending_events.into_iter().chain(repeated_events.into_iter()) {
1123 $event_to_handle = event;
1127 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1128 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1129 inner.pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1130 inner.is_processing_pending_events = false;
1131 if !inner.pending_events.is_empty() {
1132 // If there's more events to process, go ahead and do so.
1140 pub(super) use _process_events_body as process_events_body;
1142 pub(crate) struct WithChannelMonitor<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
1144 peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
1145 channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1148 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1149 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
1150 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
1151 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
1152 self.logger.log(record)
1156 impl<'a, L: Deref> WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1157 pub(crate) fn from<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor: &ChannelMonitor<S>) -> Self {
1158 Self::from_impl(logger, &*monitor.inner.lock().unwrap())
1161 pub(crate) fn from_impl<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor_impl: &ChannelMonitorImpl<S>) -> Self {
1162 let peer_id = monitor_impl.counterparty_node_id;
1163 let channel_id = Some(monitor_impl.funding_info.0.to_channel_id());
1164 WithChannelMonitor {
1165 logger, peer_id, channel_id,
1170 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1171 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1172 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1173 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1174 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1175 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1178 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1179 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
1180 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1181 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1182 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1183 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1184 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1186 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1187 let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
1188 &channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.pubkeys().payment_point
1191 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1192 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1193 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1194 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1196 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1197 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1199 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1200 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1201 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1202 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1204 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1205 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1207 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1208 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1209 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1210 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1211 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1212 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1213 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1214 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1216 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1219 let onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(
1220 channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id, destination_script.into(), keys,
1221 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx
1224 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1225 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1227 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1228 latest_update_id: 0,
1229 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1231 destination_script: destination_script.into(),
1232 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1233 counterparty_payment_script,
1237 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1239 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1240 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1242 counterparty_commitment_params,
1243 funding_redeemscript,
1244 channel_value_satoshis,
1245 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1247 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1249 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1250 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1251 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1252 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1253 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1255 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1256 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1257 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1258 current_holder_commitment_number,
1260 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1261 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1262 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1263 is_processing_pending_events: false,
1265 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1270 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1271 holder_tx_signed: false,
1272 funding_spend_seen: false,
1273 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1274 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1275 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1276 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
1279 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1280 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None,
1285 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1286 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1289 /// A variant of `Self::provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx` used to provide
1290 /// additional information to the monitor to store in order to recreate the initial
1291 /// counterparty commitment transaction during persistence (mainly for use in third-party
1294 /// This is used to provide the counterparty commitment information directly to the monitor
1295 /// before the initial persistence of a new channel.
1296 pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1297 &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1298 commitment_number: u64, their_cur_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
1299 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, logger: &L,
1301 where L::Target: Logger
1303 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1304 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1305 inner.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid,
1306 htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_cur_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
1307 to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, &logger);
1310 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1311 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1312 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1313 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1315 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1318 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1319 commitment_number: u64,
1320 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1322 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1323 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1324 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1325 inner.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1326 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, &logger)
1330 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1331 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1332 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1333 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1334 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new(), Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
1337 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1338 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1339 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1341 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1342 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1344 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1347 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1348 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1351 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1352 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1353 inner.provide_payment_preimage(
1354 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1357 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1360 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1361 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1363 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1369 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1370 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1373 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1374 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1375 inner.update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1378 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1380 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1381 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1384 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1385 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
1386 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1389 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1390 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1391 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>)> {
1392 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1393 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1396 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1397 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1398 /// have been registered.
1399 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, filter: &F, logger: &L)
1401 F::Target: chain::Filter, L::Target: Logger,
1403 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1404 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*lock);
1405 log_trace!(&logger, "Registering funding outpoint {}", &lock.get_funding_txo().0);
1406 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1407 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1408 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1409 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1410 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 };
1411 log_trace!(logger, "Registering outpoint {} with the filter for monitoring spends", outpoint);
1412 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1415 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1421 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1422 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1423 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1424 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1427 /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
1429 /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
1430 /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
1431 /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
1432 /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
1433 /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
1435 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
1436 /// order to handle these events.
1438 /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
1439 /// [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
1440 pub fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: &H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
1442 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
1445 /// Processes any events asynchronously.
1447 /// See [`Self::process_pending_events`] for more information.
1448 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
1452 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, { handler(ev).await });
1456 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1457 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1458 let mut lck = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1459 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut lck.pending_events);
1460 ret.append(&mut lck.get_repeated_events());
1464 /// Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment
1465 /// transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of
1466 /// the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for
1467 /// watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions.
1469 /// This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except
1470 /// that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update.
1472 /// This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading
1473 /// to LDK 0.0.117+.
1475 /// [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel
1476 pub fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
1477 self.inner.lock().unwrap().initial_counterparty_commitment_tx()
1480 /// Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This
1481 /// may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned
1482 /// commitment transactions are unsigned.
1484 /// This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build
1485 /// justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be
1486 /// used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided
1487 /// with a monitor and an update. Once revoked, signing a justice transaction can be done using
1488 /// [`Self::sign_to_local_justice_tx`].
1490 /// It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty
1491 /// commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which
1492 /// the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the
1493 /// monitor can sign the justice transaction.
1495 /// This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after
1496 /// upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which
1497 /// may have been created prior to upgrading.
1499 /// [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel
1500 pub fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
1501 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(update)
1504 /// Wrapper around [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`] to make
1505 /// signing the justice transaction easier for implementors of
1506 /// [`chain::chainmonitor::Persist`]. On success this method returns the provided transaction
1507 /// signing the input at `input_idx`. This method will only produce a valid signature for
1508 /// a transaction spending the `to_local` output of a commitment transaction, i.e. this cannot
1509 /// be used for revoked HTLC outputs.
1511 /// `Value` is the value of the output being spent by the input at `input_idx`, committed
1512 /// in the BIP 143 signature.
1514 /// This method will only succeed if this monitor has received the revocation secret for the
1515 /// provided `commitment_number`. If a commitment number is provided that does not correspond
1516 /// to the commitment transaction being revoked, this will return a signed transaction, but
1517 /// the signature will not be valid.
1519 /// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`]: crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output
1520 /// [`Persist`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist
1521 pub fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(&self, justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
1522 self.inner.lock().unwrap().sign_to_local_justice_tx(justice_tx, input_idx, value, commitment_number)
1525 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1526 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1529 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1530 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1533 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1534 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1537 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1539 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1541 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1542 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1545 /// Used by [`ChannelManager`] deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy
1546 /// of the channel state was out-of-date.
1548 /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1549 /// a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our
1550 /// counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1552 /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1553 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1554 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1555 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1558 /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
1559 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1560 where L::Target: Logger {
1561 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1562 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1563 inner.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&logger)
1566 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1567 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1568 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1569 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1570 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1571 where L::Target: Logger {
1572 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1573 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1574 inner.unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&logger)
1577 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1578 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1579 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1580 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1581 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1582 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1584 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1585 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1587 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1588 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1591 txdata: &TransactionData,
1596 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1598 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1599 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1602 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1603 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1604 inner.block_connected(
1605 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1608 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1610 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1618 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1619 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1622 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1623 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1624 inner.block_disconnected(
1625 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1628 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1629 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1631 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1632 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1634 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1635 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1638 txdata: &TransactionData,
1643 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1645 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1646 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1649 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1650 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1651 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1652 inner.transactions_confirmed(
1653 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger)
1656 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1658 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1659 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1661 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1662 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1669 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1670 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1673 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1674 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1675 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1676 inner.transaction_unconfirmed(
1677 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1681 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1682 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1684 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1685 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1687 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1688 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1695 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1697 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1698 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1701 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1702 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1703 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1704 inner.best_block_updated(
1705 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1709 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1710 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1711 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1712 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1714 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.height, entry.block_hash))
1715 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1717 txids.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0).then(b.1.cmp(&a.1)));
1718 txids.dedup_by_key(|(txid, _, _)| *txid);
1722 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1723 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1724 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1725 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1728 /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
1729 /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
1730 /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
1731 /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
1732 /// connections, like on mobile.
1733 pub fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1734 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
1737 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1738 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1741 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1742 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1743 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1744 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1745 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1746 current_height, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1750 /// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the
1751 /// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]
1752 /// confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be
1753 /// returned, the transaction must have at least `max(ANTI_REORG_DELAY, to_self_delay)`
1756 /// Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`]
1757 /// once they are no longer under reorg risk. This method serves as a way to retrieve these
1758 /// descriptors at a later time, either for historical purposes, or to replay any
1759 /// missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the
1760 /// channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns
1761 /// an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending
1762 /// transactions starting from the channel's funding transaction and going down three levels.
1764 /// `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any
1765 /// outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned.
1767 /// `confirmation_height` must be the height of the block in which `tx` was included in.
1768 pub fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction, confirmation_height: u32) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1769 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1770 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1771 let mut spendable_outputs = inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx);
1772 spendable_outputs.retain(|descriptor| {
1773 let mut conf_threshold = current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1;
1774 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) = descriptor {
1775 conf_threshold = cmp::min(conf_threshold,
1776 current_height.saturating_sub(descriptor.to_self_delay as u32) + 1);
1778 conf_threshold >= confirmation_height
1784 pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1785 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script.clone()
1789 pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: ScriptBuf) {
1790 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script;
1794 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1795 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1796 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1797 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1798 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1799 -> Option<Balance> {
1800 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1801 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1803 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1804 let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
1805 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1806 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1807 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1808 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1810 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1811 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1812 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1813 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1814 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1815 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1816 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1817 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1818 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1820 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1821 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1822 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1823 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1824 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1825 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1826 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1827 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1829 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1830 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1831 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1832 .any(|(input_idx, inp)|
1833 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1834 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx &&
1835 // A maturing output for an HTLC claim will always be at the same
1836 // index as the HTLC input. This is true pre-anchors, as there's
1837 // only 1 input and 1 output. This is also true post-anchors,
1838 // because we have a SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY signature from our
1839 // channel counterparty.
1840 descriptor.outpoint.index as usize == input_idx
1844 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1845 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1850 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1851 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1852 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1853 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
1854 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1855 htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
1858 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1860 let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
1861 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1862 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1863 // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
1864 // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
1865 // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
1866 // in the commitment.
1867 if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
1868 let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1869 .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
1870 .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
1871 debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
1872 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
1874 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1875 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
1878 htlc_commitment_outpoint
1880 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1882 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1883 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1884 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1885 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1886 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1888 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1889 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1890 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1891 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1892 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1893 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1894 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1895 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1896 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1897 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1898 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1900 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1901 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1902 tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
1904 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1905 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1907 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1912 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1913 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1914 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1915 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1916 // need to do so again here.
1918 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1919 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1920 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1921 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1922 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1923 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1926 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1927 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1928 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1929 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1930 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1931 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1932 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1933 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1936 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1937 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1938 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1939 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1942 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1943 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1944 // we know the preimage.
1945 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1946 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1947 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1948 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1949 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1950 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1951 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1952 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1955 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1956 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1957 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1958 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1959 payment_preimage: *payment_preimage,
1962 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1963 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1964 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1965 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1966 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1973 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1974 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1975 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1978 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1979 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1980 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1981 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1983 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1984 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, not all or excess balances may be included.
1986 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1987 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1988 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1989 let mut res = Vec::new();
1990 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1992 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1993 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1994 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1995 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1996 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1999 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
2000 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
2003 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
2004 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
2005 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
2006 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
2007 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
2010 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2011 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2012 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
2013 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2015 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
2023 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
2024 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
2025 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
2026 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
2027 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2028 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2029 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2030 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
2032 Some(descriptor.output.value)
2035 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2036 amount_satoshis: value,
2037 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2040 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
2041 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
2042 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
2045 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2046 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2048 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2049 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
2050 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
2051 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
2052 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
2053 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
2054 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
2055 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2056 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
2058 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2059 amount_satoshis: output.value,
2060 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
2062 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
2063 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
2064 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
2065 ).unwrap_or(false) {
2066 spent_counterparty_output = true;
2072 if spent_counterparty_output {
2073 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
2074 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
2075 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
2076 if output_spendable {
2077 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
2078 amount_satoshis: amt,
2082 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
2083 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
2086 found_commitment_tx = true;
2087 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2088 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2089 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2090 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2091 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2092 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2095 found_commitment_tx = true;
2096 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2097 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2098 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2099 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2100 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2101 amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
2102 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2105 found_commitment_tx = true;
2108 if !found_commitment_tx {
2109 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2110 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
2111 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
2112 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
2113 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2114 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2115 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2120 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
2121 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2122 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
2124 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
2125 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2126 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2127 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2129 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
2130 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
2132 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
2133 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
2134 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
2135 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2136 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2137 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2141 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
2142 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
2149 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
2150 /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
2151 /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
2153 /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
2154 /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
2155 /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
2156 pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2157 let mut res = HashMap::new();
2158 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
2159 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
2160 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2161 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
2163 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2164 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2165 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2166 res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
2167 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
2173 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2174 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2176 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2177 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2182 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
2183 /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
2185 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
2187 /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
2188 /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
2189 pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2190 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2191 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
2192 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
2193 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
2194 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2195 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2196 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
2202 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
2203 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
2204 // closed), just get the full set.
2206 return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
2209 let mut res = HashMap::new();
2210 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2211 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2212 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
2213 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
2214 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
2215 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
2217 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
2218 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
2219 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
2220 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
2221 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
2222 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2223 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
2224 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
2225 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
2226 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
2227 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
2228 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
2229 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
2230 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
2231 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
2232 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
2234 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
2237 let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
2238 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
2239 if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
2240 res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
2247 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
2248 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2249 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
2250 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
2251 Some((a, &**source))
2254 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2255 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2256 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2258 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2259 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2260 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2261 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2269 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
2270 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
2274 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
2275 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
2276 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
2278 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
2279 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
2280 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
2281 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
2282 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
2283 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
2285 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
2286 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
2287 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
2288 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
2289 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
2290 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
2291 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
2292 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
2294 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
2295 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
2296 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2297 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2298 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2299 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
2300 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
2301 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
2302 // payment_preimage.
2303 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
2304 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
2305 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
2306 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
2308 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
2310 let mut matched_htlc = false;
2311 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
2312 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
2313 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
2314 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
2315 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
2316 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
2317 matched_htlc = true;
2321 if matched_htlc { continue; }
2322 if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
2325 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2326 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
2328 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
2329 *update_source != **source
2334 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2335 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
2336 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
2337 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
2338 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
2339 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2340 source: (**source).clone(),
2341 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
2342 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
2343 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
2346 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
2347 &htlc.payment_hash, $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2348 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2349 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2355 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2356 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2358 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2359 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2364 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2365 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2366 // in-line tests later.
2369 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2370 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2371 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2372 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2373 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2374 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2375 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2376 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2381 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2382 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2385 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2386 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2387 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2388 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2389 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2390 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2391 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2394 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2395 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2396 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2397 if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
2398 let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2399 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2400 for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2401 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2402 if !cur_claimables.iter()
2403 .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
2405 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
2409 for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2413 assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
2417 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2418 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2419 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2420 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2421 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2423 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2424 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2425 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2429 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2430 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2431 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2436 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2443 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2452 fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2453 &mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2454 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
2455 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2456 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2457 self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info = Some((their_per_commitment_point.clone(),
2458 feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value));
2460 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2461 let rebuilt_commitment_tx = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_tx().unwrap();
2462 debug_assert_eq!(rebuilt_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), txid);
2465 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number,
2466 their_per_commitment_point, logger);
2469 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2470 &mut self, txid: Txid,
2471 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2472 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2473 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2474 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2475 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2476 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2478 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2479 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2482 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2483 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2484 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2485 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2486 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2487 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2488 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2489 Some(old_points) => {
2490 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2491 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2492 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2493 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2494 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2496 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2499 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2503 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2506 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2507 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2508 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2514 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2515 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2516 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2517 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2518 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2519 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, mut htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)], nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2520 if htlc_outputs.iter().any(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()) {
2521 // If we have non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, ensure they match the HTLCs in the
2522 // `holder_commitment_tx`. In the future, we'll no longer provide the redundant data
2523 // and just pass in source data via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
2524 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len());
2525 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).map(|(h, _, _)| h).zip(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()) {
2526 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2528 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2529 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, s, _)| s.as_ref()).zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter()) {
2530 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2532 debug_assert!(nondust_htlc_sources.is_empty());
2534 // If we don't have any non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, assume they were all passed via
2535 // `nondust_htlc_sources`, building up the final htlc_outputs by combining
2536 // `nondust_htlc_sources` and the `holder_commitment_tx`
2537 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2539 for htlc in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter() {
2540 assert!(htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32 > prev);
2541 prev = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32;
2544 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(htlc, _, _)| htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()));
2545 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(_, sig_opt, _)| sig_opt.is_none()));
2546 debug_assert_eq!(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2548 let mut sources_iter = nondust_htlc_sources.into_iter();
2550 for (htlc, counterparty_sig) in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()
2551 .zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter())
2554 let source = sources_iter.next().expect("Non-dust HTLC sources didn't match commitment tx");
2555 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2556 assert!(source.possibly_matches_output(htlc));
2558 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), Some(source)));
2560 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), None));
2563 debug_assert!(sources_iter.next().is_none());
2566 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2567 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2568 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2569 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2570 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
2572 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2573 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2574 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2575 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2576 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2578 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2579 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2581 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2582 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2583 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2584 for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
2585 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2586 let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2587 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2588 assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
2589 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2590 SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
2594 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
2596 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2597 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2602 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2603 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2604 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2605 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2606 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>)
2607 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2608 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2611 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2613 let confirmed_spend_txid = self.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2614 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| match event.event {
2615 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => Some(event.txid),
2619 let confirmed_spend_txid = if let Some(txid) = confirmed_spend_txid {
2625 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2626 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2627 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2628 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2629 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2630 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2633 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2634 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2635 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2636 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2638 debug_assert!(false);
2639 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2644 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2645 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2646 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2647 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2649 debug_assert!(false);
2650 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2656 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2657 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2658 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2659 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2660 // holder commitment transactions.
2661 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2662 let holder_commitment_tx = if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2663 Some(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx)
2664 } else if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2665 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2666 Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx)
2673 if let Some(holder_commitment_tx) = holder_commitment_tx {
2674 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2675 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2677 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2678 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2683 fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>)
2684 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2687 let commit_txs = self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2688 let mut txs = vec![];
2689 for tx in commit_txs.iter() {
2690 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
2693 broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&txs);
2694 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
2697 fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2698 &mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2700 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2701 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2704 if self.latest_update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2705 log_info!(logger, "Applying post-force-closed update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2706 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2707 } else if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2708 log_info!(logger, "Applying force close update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2709 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2711 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
2712 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2715 if updates.counterparty_node_id.is_some() {
2716 if self.counterparty_node_id.is_none() {
2717 self.counterparty_node_id = updates.counterparty_node_id;
2719 debug_assert_eq!(self.counterparty_node_id, updates.counterparty_node_id);
2723 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
2724 // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
2725 // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
2726 // sentinel value instead.
2728 // The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
2729 // thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
2731 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2732 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2733 match updates.updates[0] {
2734 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
2735 // We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
2736 // provide a preimage at this point.
2737 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
2738 debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
2740 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2741 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2744 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2745 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2747 let mut ret = Ok(());
2748 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
2749 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2751 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
2752 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2753 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2754 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources.clone()) {
2755 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2756 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2760 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2761 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2762 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2764 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2765 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2766 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2768 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2769 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2770 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2771 debug_assert!(false, "Latest counterparty commitment secret was invalid");
2772 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2773 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2777 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2778 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2779 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2780 if *should_broadcast {
2781 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
2782 // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
2783 // duplicate/conflicting.
2784 let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
2785 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
2786 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
2789 if detected_funding_spend {
2790 log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
2793 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2794 // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
2795 // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
2796 // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm.
2797 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2798 let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2799 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2800 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(),
2802 let best_block_height = self.best_block.height();
2803 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2804 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2805 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output),
2806 best_block_height, best_block_height
2808 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2809 vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height,
2810 broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger,
2813 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2814 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2815 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id());
2816 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
2818 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager
2819 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2820 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2821 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2824 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2825 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2826 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2827 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2833 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2834 self.counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(updates);
2837 // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
2838 // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
2839 if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
2843 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2845 // Refuse updates after we've detected a spend onchain, but only if we haven't processed a
2846 // force closed monitor update yet.
2847 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen && self.latest_update_id != CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2848 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2853 fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2854 self.latest_update_id
2857 fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
2861 fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>> {
2862 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2863 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2864 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2865 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2866 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2868 &self.outputs_to_watch
2871 fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2872 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2873 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2877 /// Gets the set of events that are repeated regularly (e.g. those which RBF bump
2878 /// transactions). We're okay if we lose these on restart as they'll be regenerated for us at
2879 /// some regular interval via [`ChannelMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims`].
2880 pub(super) fn get_repeated_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2881 let pending_claim_events = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events();
2882 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pending_claim_events.len());
2883 for (claim_id, claim_event) in pending_claim_events {
2885 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
2886 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
2888 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2889 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
2890 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
2891 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
2892 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
2893 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
2895 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2897 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
2898 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
2899 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2900 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2901 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2902 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2904 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
2905 txid: commitment_txid,
2906 vout: anchor_output_idx,
2912 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
2913 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs, tx_lock_time,
2915 let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
2917 htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
2918 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2919 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2920 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2921 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2923 commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
2924 per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
2925 per_commitment_point: self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.get_per_commitment_point(
2926 htlc.per_commitment_number, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
2930 preimage: htlc.preimage,
2931 counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
2934 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
2936 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2946 fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
2947 let (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value,
2948 to_countersignatory_value) = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info?;
2949 let htlc_outputs = vec![];
2951 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2952 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value,
2953 feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs);
2957 fn build_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2958 &self, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
2959 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, feerate_per_kw: u32,
2960 mut nondust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>
2961 ) -> CommitmentTransaction {
2962 let broadcaster_keys = &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters
2963 .counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys;
2964 let countersignatory_keys =
2965 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys;
2967 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey;
2968 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey;
2969 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&their_per_commitment_point,
2970 &broadcaster_keys, &countersignatory_keys, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx);
2971 let channel_parameters =
2972 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable();
2974 CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2975 to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, broadcaster_funding_key,
2976 countersignatory_funding_key, keys, feerate_per_kw, &mut nondust_htlcs,
2980 fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
2981 update.updates.iter().filter_map(|update| {
2983 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid,
2984 ref htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point,
2985 feerate_per_kw: Some(feerate_per_kw),
2986 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(to_broadcaster_value),
2987 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(to_countersignatory_value) } => {
2989 let nondust_htlcs = htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _)| {
2990 htlc.transaction_output_index.map(|_| (htlc.clone(), None))
2991 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2993 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_number,
2994 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value,
2995 to_countersignatory_value, feerate_per_kw, nondust_htlcs);
2997 debug_assert_eq!(commitment_tx.trust().txid(), commitment_txid);
3006 fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(
3007 &self, mut justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64
3008 ) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
3009 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).ok_or(())?;
3010 let per_commitment_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secret).map_err(|_| ())?;
3011 let their_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(
3012 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3014 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3015 &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &their_per_commitment_point);
3016 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3017 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &their_per_commitment_point);
3018 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3019 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3021 let sig = self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(
3022 &justice_tx, input_idx, value, &per_commitment_key, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx)?;
3023 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
3024 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(&[1u8]);
3025 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(revokeable_redeemscript.as_bytes());
3029 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
3030 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
3031 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
3034 fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
3035 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
3038 fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3039 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
3042 fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3043 self.current_holder_commitment_number
3046 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
3047 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
3048 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
3049 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
3051 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
3052 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
3054 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
3055 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
3056 where L::Target: Logger {
3057 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
3058 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
3059 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3060 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3061 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
3063 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
3064 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
3066 macro_rules! ignore_error {
3067 ( $thing : expr ) => {
3070 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3075 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
3076 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
3077 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
3078 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
3079 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3080 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,);
3081 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
3083 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3084 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
3086 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
3087 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3088 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3089 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
3090 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height);
3091 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3092 to_counterparty_output_info =
3093 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3097 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
3098 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3099 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
3100 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3101 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
3102 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3103 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3104 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
3105 to_counterparty_output_info);
3107 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
3108 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, height);
3109 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3114 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
3115 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
3116 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
3117 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
3118 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3119 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3121 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3123 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3124 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3125 block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3126 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3129 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
3130 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3131 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
3134 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3135 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
3136 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
3137 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
3138 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
3139 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
3140 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
3142 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3143 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3145 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3147 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
3148 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3149 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3150 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3153 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
3154 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
3155 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
3156 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
3157 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
3161 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3164 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
3165 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
3166 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
3167 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3168 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
3170 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
3171 Some(outputs) => outputs,
3172 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3174 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
3175 Some(points) => points,
3176 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3179 let per_commitment_point =
3180 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
3181 // per-commitment point
3182 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
3183 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
3184 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
3185 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
3186 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
3187 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
3189 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
3190 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
3192 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3193 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
3194 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point);
3196 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &per_commitment_point);
3198 let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3199 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3200 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
3201 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
3202 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3203 to_counterparty_output_info =
3204 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3209 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
3210 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3211 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3212 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
3213 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3214 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3215 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
3218 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
3219 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
3220 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
3221 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
3222 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3223 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3224 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3225 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3227 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
3228 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3229 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3230 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3231 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3233 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry, 0);
3234 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
3239 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
3242 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
3243 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
3244 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
3245 ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
3246 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
3247 let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
3249 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
3251 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3253 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
3254 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
3255 let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
3256 // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
3257 // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
3258 // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
3259 // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
3260 // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
3261 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
3263 // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
3264 // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
3265 // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
3266 for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
3267 if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
3268 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
3269 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
3270 per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3271 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
3272 tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3275 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3276 htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
3277 height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height
3279 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3280 if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
3281 outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
3283 outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
3286 (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
3289 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
3290 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
3291 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
3292 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>) {
3293 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3295 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
3296 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
3298 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3299 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3300 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
3301 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
3302 htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3306 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
3309 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3312 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
3313 payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3317 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3318 holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
3319 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
3320 htlc.cltv_expiry, conf_height
3322 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
3326 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
3329 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
3330 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
3331 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3332 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3333 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3334 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
3340 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
3341 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
3342 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
3343 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
3344 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
3345 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
3346 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
3347 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3349 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
3350 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
3351 claim_requests = $updates.0;
3352 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
3353 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
3357 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
3358 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
3360 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3361 is_holder_tx = true;
3362 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3363 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
3364 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
3365 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3366 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3367 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
3368 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
3369 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3370 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3371 is_holder_tx = true;
3372 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3373 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
3374 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
3375 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3376 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3377 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
3383 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
3389 fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3390 &mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3391 ) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3392 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
3393 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
3394 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3395 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3396 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3397 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
3398 // transaction confirms.
3399 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3400 return holder_transactions;
3402 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3403 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3404 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3405 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3406 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3409 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
3410 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
3411 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
3412 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
3413 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
3414 // confirmed in the next block.
3417 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
3418 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
3419 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
3423 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
3424 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
3428 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
3429 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
3430 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3431 &mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3432 ) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3433 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
3434 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3435 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3436 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3437 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
3438 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
3439 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3440 return holder_transactions;
3442 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3443 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3444 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3445 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3446 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3450 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
3451 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
3452 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
3459 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3460 &mut self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B,
3461 fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3462 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3463 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3464 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3467 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3468 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3470 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3471 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
3474 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3479 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3480 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3481 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3483 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3484 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3487 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3489 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3490 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3491 log_trace!(logger, "Connecting new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3492 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3493 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
3494 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3495 log_trace!(logger, "Best block re-orged, replaced with new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3496 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
3497 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3499 } else { Vec::new() }
3502 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3505 txdata: &TransactionData,
3508 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3509 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3510 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3512 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3513 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3516 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
3517 for tx in &txn_matched {
3518 let mut output_val = 0;
3519 for out in tx.output.iter() {
3520 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3521 output_val += out.value;
3522 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3526 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3528 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3529 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3530 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
3531 let txid = tx.txid();
3532 log_trace!(logger, "Transaction {} confirmed in block {}", txid , block_hash);
3533 // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
3534 if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
3535 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3538 for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3539 if ev.txid == txid {
3540 if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
3541 assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
3542 "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
3543 This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
3545 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3549 for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
3550 if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
3551 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3555 for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
3556 if txid == *spendable_txid {
3557 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3562 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
3563 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
3564 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
3565 // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
3566 // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
3567 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
3568 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
3569 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
3570 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
3571 &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id(), txid);
3572 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
3573 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
3574 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
3575 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
3576 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3577 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
3578 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3579 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3581 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3582 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
3583 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
3584 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
3585 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
3586 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3587 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3589 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3590 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
3594 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3596 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
3598 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
3599 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
3600 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
3601 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
3606 if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
3607 // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
3608 // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
3609 // other ways which can have more than one output.
3610 for tx_input in &tx.input {
3611 let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
3612 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
3613 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
3614 &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
3616 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3617 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
3618 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3620 // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
3621 // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
3622 // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
3623 // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
3627 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3629 self.check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3633 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3634 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3637 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3640 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
3641 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
3642 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
3643 /// complexity especially in
3644 /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
3646 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
3647 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
3648 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3651 conf_hash: BlockHash,
3652 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
3653 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
3654 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
3656 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3657 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3658 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3660 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3661 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3664 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
3665 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
3667 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
3668 if should_broadcast {
3669 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone());
3670 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height());
3671 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
3672 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
3673 // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
3674 // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
3675 // new channel updates.
3676 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
3677 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
3678 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
3679 // `transactions_confirmed`.
3680 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3681 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
3682 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
3683 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
3684 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
3685 let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
3686 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx);
3687 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
3688 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
3690 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3694 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3695 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3696 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3697 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3698 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3699 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3700 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3702 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3706 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3707 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3708 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3710 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3711 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3715 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3716 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3718 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3719 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3721 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3722 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3723 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3726 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3727 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3728 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3729 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3731 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3732 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3733 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3734 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3735 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3738 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3739 &payment_hash, entry.txid);
3740 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3742 payment_preimage: None,
3743 source: source.clone(),
3744 htlc_value_satoshis,
3746 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3747 commitment_tx_output_idx,
3748 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3749 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3750 payment_preimage: None,
3753 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3754 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3755 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3756 outputs: vec![descriptor],
3757 channel_id: Some(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()),
3759 self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
3761 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3762 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3763 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
3764 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3765 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3766 payment_preimage: preimage,
3769 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3770 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3771 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3776 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3777 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3779 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3780 // updating the latter in the process.
3781 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3782 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3783 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3787 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3788 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3789 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3790 for tx in &txn_matched {
3791 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3792 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3793 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3794 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3802 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3803 &mut self, header: &Header, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3804 ) where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3805 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3808 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3811 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3812 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3813 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3815 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3816 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3818 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3821 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3825 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3826 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3828 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3829 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3832 let mut removed_height = None;
3833 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3834 if entry.txid == *txid {
3835 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
3840 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
3841 log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
3842 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
3843 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
3848 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
3850 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3853 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3854 /// transactions thereof.
3855 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3856 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
3857 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3858 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3859 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3860 if matches { break; }
3861 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3866 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3869 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3872 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3873 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3874 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3875 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3876 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3877 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3880 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3881 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3882 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3883 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3884 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3885 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3886 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3887 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3891 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&ScriptBuf::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3892 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3893 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3894 } else { panic!(); }
3905 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3906 &self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3907 ) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3908 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
3909 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
3910 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
3911 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
3912 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
3918 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3919 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3920 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3921 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3922 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3923 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3924 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3925 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3926 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3927 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3928 let height = self.best_block.height();
3929 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3930 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3931 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3932 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3933 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3934 // time out the HTLC first.
3935 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3936 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3937 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3938 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3939 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3940 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3941 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
3942 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
3943 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
3944 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
3945 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
3946 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
3947 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3948 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3949 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3950 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
3951 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
3952 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
3953 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
3954 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
3955 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
3956 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
3957 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
3958 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3965 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
3967 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3968 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3969 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3972 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3973 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3974 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3981 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
3982 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
3983 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(
3984 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3985 ) where L::Target: Logger {
3986 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
3987 let mut payment_data = None;
3988 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
3989 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
3990 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
3991 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3992 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
3993 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
3994 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3995 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
3997 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3998 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
3999 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
4002 macro_rules! log_claim {
4003 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
4004 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
4005 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
4007 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4008 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4009 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4010 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4011 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
4012 // matched by any HTLC spend:
4013 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4014 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
4015 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
4016 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
4017 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
4018 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
4019 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
4020 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4021 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4022 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
4024 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
4025 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4026 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4027 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
4032 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
4033 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
4034 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
4035 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
4036 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
4037 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
4038 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
4039 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
4048 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
4049 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
4050 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
4051 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
4052 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
4053 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
4054 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
4055 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
4056 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
4057 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
4058 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
4059 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
4060 } else if !$holder_tx {
4061 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4062 if payment_data.is_none() {
4063 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4066 if payment_data.is_none() {
4067 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
4068 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
4069 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4070 txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4071 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4072 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4073 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
4074 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
4075 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
4076 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
4077 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
4078 // accepted_preimage_claim).
4079 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
4080 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
4083 continue 'outer_loop;
4090 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
4091 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4092 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
4094 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
4095 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
4096 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4097 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
4100 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
4101 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
4102 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
4105 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
4106 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
4107 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
4108 if accepted_preimage_claim {
4109 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4110 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
4111 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4114 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4115 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4116 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4117 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4118 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4119 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4122 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4124 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4126 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4129 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
4130 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4131 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
4132 upd.source == source
4134 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4136 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4138 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4139 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4140 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4141 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4142 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4145 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4147 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4149 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4153 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
4154 if entry.height != height { return true; }
4156 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
4157 *htlc_source != source
4162 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4164 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4166 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4167 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
4168 source, payment_hash,
4169 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4170 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
4173 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", &payment_hash, entry.confirmation_threshold());
4174 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4180 fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
4181 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
4182 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4183 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
4184 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4185 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4186 output: outp.clone(),
4187 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4190 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
4191 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
4192 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4193 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4194 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
4195 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
4196 output: outp.clone(),
4197 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2,
4198 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4199 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4203 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
4204 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4205 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4206 output: outp.clone(),
4207 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4208 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4209 channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()),
4212 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
4213 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4214 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4215 output: outp.clone(),
4216 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4223 /// Checks if the confirmed transaction is paying funds back to some address we can assume to
4225 fn check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs<L: Deref>(
4226 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4227 ) where L::Target: Logger {
4228 for spendable_output in self.get_spendable_outputs(tx) {
4229 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4231 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4233 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4234 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
4236 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
4237 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4242 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
4244 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4245 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4248 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4249 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4252 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4253 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4257 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, M, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (M, T, F, L)
4259 M: Deref<Target = ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4260 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4261 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4264 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4265 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4268 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4269 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4272 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4273 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4276 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
4277 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
4281 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4283 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
4284 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::EcdsaSigner>) {
4285 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4286 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
4290 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4295 let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
4297 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4299 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4300 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4302 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4303 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4305 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
4306 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4307 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4308 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
4311 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4313 let mut counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf = Readable::read(reader)?;
4314 let shutdown_script = {
4315 let script = <ScriptBuf as Readable>::read(reader)?;
4316 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
4319 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4320 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
4321 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
4322 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
4323 let outpoint = OutPoint {
4324 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
4325 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
4327 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
4328 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4329 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4331 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
4332 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
4333 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4335 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
4336 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4340 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4341 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
4342 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
4343 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
4345 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
4350 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4352 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4354 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
4357 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
4358 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4359 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4360 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4361 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
4363 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4364 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
4370 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4371 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
4372 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
4373 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4374 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4375 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4376 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
4377 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
4379 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
4380 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4384 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4385 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4386 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
4387 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4388 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4389 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
4390 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4394 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4395 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4396 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
4397 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4398 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4399 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
4400 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4404 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
4405 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4408 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
4410 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4412 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
4414 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4415 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4417 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4418 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4419 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
4420 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
4421 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4422 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
4423 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4427 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4428 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
4429 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
4430 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
4431 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4432 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
4433 1 => MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_info.0),
4434 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4436 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
4439 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4440 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
4441 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
4442 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4443 pending_events.push(event);
4447 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
4449 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4450 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
4451 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
4452 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4453 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
4457 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4458 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<ScriptBuf>>())));
4459 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
4460 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4461 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4462 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<ScriptBuf>())));
4463 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
4464 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4466 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
4467 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4470 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::EcdsaSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(
4471 reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
4474 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
4475 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4477 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
4478 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4479 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
4480 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4481 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
4482 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
4483 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4487 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4488 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4489 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
4490 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
4491 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4494 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
4495 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
4496 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
4497 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
4498 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
4499 let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
4500 let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new());
4501 let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None;
4502 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4503 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
4504 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
4505 (5, pending_monitor_events, optional_vec),
4506 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
4507 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
4508 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
4509 (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
4510 (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
4511 (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
4514 // Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the
4515 // wrong `counterparty_payment_script` was being tracked. Fix it now on deserialization to
4516 // give them a chance to recognize the spendable output.
4517 if onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() &&
4518 counterparty_payment_script.is_v0_p2wpkh()
4520 let payment_point = onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.payment_point;
4521 counterparty_payment_script =
4522 chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh();
4525 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
4527 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
4530 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
4531 counterparty_payment_script,
4535 holder_revocation_basepoint,
4537 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4538 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4540 counterparty_commitment_params,
4541 funding_redeemscript,
4542 channel_value_satoshis,
4543 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
4548 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
4549 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
4550 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
4551 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),
4553 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
4554 current_holder_commitment_tx,
4555 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
4556 current_holder_commitment_number,
4559 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
4561 is_processing_pending_events: false,
4563 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
4568 lockdown_from_offchain,
4570 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
4571 funding_spend_confirmed,
4572 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
4573 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
4574 spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
4577 counterparty_node_id,
4578 initial_counterparty_commitment_info,
4585 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
4586 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
4587 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4588 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut};
4589 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4590 use bitcoin::sighash;
4591 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
4592 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4593 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4594 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4595 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
4596 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4597 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4598 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
4599 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Witness};
4601 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
4603 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
4604 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
4605 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
4606 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, WithChannelMonitor};
4607 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
4608 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4609 use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
4610 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4611 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint, RevocationKey};
4612 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
4613 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
4614 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4615 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
4616 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
4617 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
4618 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
4619 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
4620 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4622 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
4623 use crate::prelude::*;
4625 use std::str::FromStr;
4627 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
4628 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
4629 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
4630 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
4631 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
4632 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
4633 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
4634 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
4635 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
4637 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
4638 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
4639 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4640 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4642 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4643 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4644 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4646 // Rebalance somewhat
4647 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
4649 // First route two payments for testing at the end
4650 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4651 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4653 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
4654 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4655 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
4656 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
4657 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
4658 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
4659 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
4661 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
4662 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
4663 let new_header = create_dummy_header(nodes[0].best_block_info().0, 0);
4664 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4665 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
4666 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
4668 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
4669 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
4670 (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
4672 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
4673 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
4674 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
4675 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
4676 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
4677 ), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress, {});
4678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4680 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
4681 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
4682 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
4683 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
4684 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().next().unwrap().clone();
4685 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
4686 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
4687 } else { panic!(); }
4688 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
4689 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
4691 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
4693 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
4695 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
4697 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4698 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
4699 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
4700 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
4701 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
4702 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
4703 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4704 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
4705 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
4708 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
4709 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
4710 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4714 fn test_prune_preimages() {
4715 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4716 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4717 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster::new(Network::Testnet));
4718 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4720 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4722 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4725 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4726 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4727 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4731 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlcs {
4732 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4734 let mut res = Vec::new();
4735 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4736 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4740 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4741 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4748 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4749 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4750 preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
4753 let dummy_sig = crate::util::crypto::sign(&secp_ctx,
4754 &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
4755 &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4757 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4758 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4759 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4760 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4765 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4767 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4768 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4769 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4770 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4771 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4778 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4779 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4780 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
4781 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4782 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
4783 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap()))
4785 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4786 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4787 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4788 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4789 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4790 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4791 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4792 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4794 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4795 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
4797 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4799 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4800 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
4801 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4802 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
4803 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
4804 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
4805 best_block, dummy_key);
4807 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
4808 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4810 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4811 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4812 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"1").to_byte_array()),
4813 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4814 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"2").to_byte_array()),
4815 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4816 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4817 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4818 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4821 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4822 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4823 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4824 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4825 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4826 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4827 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4829 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"3").to_byte_array()),
4830 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4832 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4833 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4834 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4835 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4836 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4837 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4839 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"4").to_byte_array()),
4840 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4842 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4843 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4844 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]);
4845 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4846 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4847 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4848 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4849 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4850 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4851 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4852 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4854 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4855 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]);
4856 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4857 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
4858 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4859 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4860 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4861 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4862 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4866 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4867 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4868 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4870 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4871 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4872 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4874 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint};
4875 macro_rules! sign_input {
4876 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4877 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4878 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4880 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4881 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4882 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4884 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), 256, &DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) };
4885 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4886 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4887 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4888 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4889 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len() as u64;
4890 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4891 witness.push(ser_sig);
4892 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4893 witness.push(vec!(1));
4894 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4895 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4896 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4897 witness.push(vec![0]);
4899 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4901 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4902 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4903 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4904 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4905 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4909 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4910 let txid = Txid::from_str("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4912 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4913 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4914 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4915 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4917 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4918 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4922 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
4923 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4924 witness: Witness::new(),
4927 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4928 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4931 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
4932 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
4933 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4935 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4936 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4937 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
4938 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4941 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
4944 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
4945 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4946 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4947 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4949 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4950 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4954 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
4955 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4956 witness: Witness::new(),
4959 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4960 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4963 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
4964 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
4965 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4967 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4968 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4969 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
4970 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4973 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
4976 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
4977 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4978 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4979 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4980 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4981 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4985 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
4986 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4987 witness: Witness::new(),
4989 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4990 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4993 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
4994 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
4995 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4997 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4998 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4999 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5000 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5003 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5008 fn test_with_channel_monitor_impl_logger() {
5009 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5010 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
5012 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5014 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
5016 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5017 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5018 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5019 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5020 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5027 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5028 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
5029 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
5030 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
5031 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
5032 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())),
5034 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
5035 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
5036 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
5037 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
5038 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5039 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5040 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5041 selected_contest_delay: 67,
5043 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
5044 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
5046 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5047 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
5048 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
5049 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
5050 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
5051 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
5052 best_block, dummy_key);
5054 let chan_id = monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().funding_info.0.to_channel_id().clone();
5055 let context_logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&logger, &monitor);
5056 log_error!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5057 log_warn!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5058 log_debug!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5059 log_trace!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5060 log_gossip!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5061 log_info!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5062 logger.assert_log_context_contains("lightning::chain::channelmonitor::tests", Some(dummy_key), Some(chan_id), 6);
5064 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.