1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
42 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
44 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
46 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
47 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use util::logger::Logger;
50 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
52 use util::events::Event;
56 use io::{self, Error};
60 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
61 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
62 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
65 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
67 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
68 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
69 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
71 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
72 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
73 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
75 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
76 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
77 /// its docs for more details.
82 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
83 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
84 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
85 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
86 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
88 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
90 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
91 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
92 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
93 self.update_id.write(w)?;
94 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
95 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
96 update_step.write(w)?;
98 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
102 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
103 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
104 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
105 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
106 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
107 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
109 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
113 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
114 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
118 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
119 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
120 pub enum MonitorEvent {
121 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
122 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
124 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
125 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
127 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
128 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
130 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure
132 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
133 funding_txo: OutPoint,
134 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
135 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
137 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
138 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
139 monitor_update_id: u64,
142 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
143 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
145 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure
146 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
148 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
149 // Note that UpdateCompleted and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
150 // generated only in ChainMonitor
151 (0, UpdateCompleted) => {
152 (0, funding_txo, required),
153 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
157 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
161 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
162 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
163 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
164 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
165 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
166 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
167 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
168 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
169 pub(crate) onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
171 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
172 (0, payment_hash, required),
173 (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
174 (2, source, required),
175 (4, payment_preimage, option),
178 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
179 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
180 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
181 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
182 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
183 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
184 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
185 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
186 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
187 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
188 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
189 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
190 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
191 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
192 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
193 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
194 /// accurate block height.
195 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
196 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
197 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
198 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
199 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
200 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
203 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
204 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
205 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
206 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
207 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
208 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
209 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
210 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
211 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
212 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
214 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
215 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
216 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
218 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
219 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
221 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
222 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
224 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
225 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
226 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
227 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
229 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
230 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
231 struct HolderSignedTx {
232 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
234 revocation_key: PublicKey,
235 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
236 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
237 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
238 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
239 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
240 to_self_value_sat: u64,
243 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
245 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
246 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
247 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
248 (2, revocation_key, required),
249 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
250 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
251 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
252 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
253 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
254 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
257 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
258 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
260 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
261 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
262 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
263 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
266 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
267 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
268 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
269 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
270 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
271 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
272 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
277 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
278 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
279 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
280 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
281 // used. Read it for compatibility.
282 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
283 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
284 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
285 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
286 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
287 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
291 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
292 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
293 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
294 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
295 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
296 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
297 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
299 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
300 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
301 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
302 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
305 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
309 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
310 /// transaction causing it.
312 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
314 struct OnchainEventEntry {
320 impl OnchainEventEntry {
321 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
322 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
324 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
325 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
327 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
328 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
329 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
331 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
332 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
333 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
334 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
335 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
342 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
343 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
347 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
348 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
351 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
352 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
353 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
354 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
355 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
356 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
359 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
360 onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
361 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
362 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
363 input_idx: Option<u32>,
366 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
368 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
370 FundingSpendConfirmation {
371 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
372 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
373 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
375 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
376 /// is constructed. This is used when
377 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
378 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
379 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
380 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
381 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
383 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
385 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
386 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
387 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
388 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
389 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
390 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
394 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
395 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
396 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
397 (0, self.txid, required),
398 (2, self.height, required),
399 (4, self.event, required),
405 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
406 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
407 let mut txid = Default::default();
409 let mut event = None;
410 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
412 (2, height, required),
413 (4, event, ignorable),
415 if let Some(ev) = event {
416 Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, event: ev }))
423 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
425 (0, source, required),
426 (1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
427 (2, payment_hash, required),
428 (3, input_idx, option),
430 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
431 (0, descriptor, required),
433 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
434 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
436 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
437 (0, input_idx, required),
438 (2, preimage, option),
439 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
444 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
446 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
447 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
448 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
449 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
451 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
452 commitment_txid: Txid,
453 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
454 commitment_number: u64,
455 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
458 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
464 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
465 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
467 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
468 /// think we've fallen behind!
469 should_broadcast: bool,
472 scriptpubkey: Script,
476 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
477 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
478 (0, commitment_tx, required),
479 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
481 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
482 (0, commitment_txid, required),
483 (2, commitment_number, required),
484 (4, their_revocation_point, required),
485 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
487 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
488 (0, payment_preimage, required),
490 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
492 (2, secret, required),
494 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
495 (0, should_broadcast, required),
497 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
498 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
502 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
504 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
506 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
507 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
509 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
510 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
511 /// force-closed now.
512 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
513 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
514 /// required to do so.
515 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
517 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
518 /// we consider it spendable.
519 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
520 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
521 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
522 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
523 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
525 confirmation_height: u32,
527 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
528 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
529 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
531 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
532 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
533 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
534 ContentiousClaimable {
535 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
536 /// required to do so.
537 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
538 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
542 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
543 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
544 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
545 MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
546 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
547 /// required to do so.
548 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
549 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
551 claimable_height: u32,
555 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
557 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
559 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
560 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
563 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
564 (0, input_idx, required),
565 (2, payment_preimage, option),
568 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
569 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
571 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
572 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
574 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
575 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
576 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
577 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
579 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
580 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
581 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
582 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
583 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
584 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
586 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
588 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
591 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
592 latest_update_id: u64,
593 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
595 destination_script: Script,
596 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
597 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
598 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
600 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
601 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
602 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
603 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
604 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
606 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
607 funding_redeemscript: Script,
608 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
609 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
610 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
612 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
614 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
615 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
616 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
617 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
618 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
619 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
620 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
621 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
622 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
623 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
624 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
625 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
626 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
627 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
628 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
629 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
631 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
632 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
633 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
634 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
635 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
636 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
638 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
640 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
641 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
643 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
645 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
647 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
648 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
649 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
650 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
651 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
652 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
653 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
654 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
655 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
656 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
658 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
660 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
661 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
662 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
663 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
665 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
666 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
667 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
668 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
669 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
672 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
674 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
676 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
677 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
678 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
679 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
681 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
682 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
683 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
685 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
686 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
687 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
688 holder_tx_signed: bool,
690 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
691 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
692 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
693 funding_spend_seen: bool,
695 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
696 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
697 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
698 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
699 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
701 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
702 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
703 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
704 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
705 // the full block_connected).
706 best_block: BestBlock,
708 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
711 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
712 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
714 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
715 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
717 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
718 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
719 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
720 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
725 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
726 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
728 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
729 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
730 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
731 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
732 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
733 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
734 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
735 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
736 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
737 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
738 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
739 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
740 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
741 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
742 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
743 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
744 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
745 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
746 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
747 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
748 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
749 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
750 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
751 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
752 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
753 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
754 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
755 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
756 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
757 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
758 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
759 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
760 self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
761 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
762 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
771 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
772 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
773 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
777 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
778 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
779 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
781 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
782 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
783 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
785 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
787 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
788 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
790 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
791 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
792 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
793 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
794 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
795 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
797 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
800 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
801 match &self.shutdown_script {
802 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
803 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
806 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
807 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
808 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
809 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
810 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
811 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
812 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
814 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
815 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
816 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
818 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
819 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
820 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
821 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
822 match second_option {
823 Some(second_pubkey) => {
824 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
827 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
832 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
836 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
838 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
840 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
841 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
842 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
843 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
844 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
845 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
846 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
850 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
851 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
852 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
853 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
854 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
855 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
856 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
860 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
861 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
862 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
863 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
866 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
867 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
868 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
869 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
872 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
873 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
874 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
876 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
879 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
881 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
882 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
884 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
885 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
886 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
889 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
890 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
891 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
893 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
894 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
896 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
900 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
901 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
905 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
906 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
907 event.write(writer)?;
910 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
911 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
913 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
914 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
915 entry.write(writer)?;
918 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
919 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
921 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
922 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
924 script.write(writer)?;
927 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
929 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
930 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
932 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
933 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
934 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
935 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
936 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
943 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
944 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
945 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
946 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
947 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
948 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
949 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
950 best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
952 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
953 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
954 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
956 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
957 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
958 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
959 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
961 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
962 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
964 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
965 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
966 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
967 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
969 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
970 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
972 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
973 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
974 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
975 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
976 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
977 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
978 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
979 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
981 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
984 let onchain_tx_handler =
985 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
986 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
988 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
989 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
992 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
994 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
996 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
997 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
998 counterparty_payment_script,
1002 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1004 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1005 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1007 counterparty_commitment_params,
1008 funding_redeemscript,
1009 channel_value_satoshis,
1010 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1012 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1014 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1015 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1016 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1017 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1019 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1020 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1021 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1022 current_holder_commitment_number,
1024 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1025 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1026 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1028 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1033 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1034 holder_tx_signed: false,
1035 funding_spend_seen: false,
1036 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1037 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1047 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1048 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1051 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1052 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1053 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1054 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1055 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1058 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1059 commitment_number: u64,
1060 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
1062 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1063 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1064 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
1068 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1069 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1070 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1071 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1072 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1076 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1078 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1079 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1084 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1088 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1089 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1092 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1097 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1100 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1103 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1106 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1107 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1109 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1115 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1116 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1119 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1122 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1124 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1125 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1128 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1129 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1130 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1133 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1134 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1135 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1136 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1137 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1140 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1141 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1142 /// have been registered.
1143 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1144 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1145 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1146 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1147 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1148 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1149 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1151 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1152 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1158 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1159 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1160 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1161 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1164 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1167 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1168 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1169 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1170 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1171 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1174 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1175 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1178 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1179 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1182 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1183 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1186 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1187 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1188 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1189 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1190 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1191 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1192 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1193 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1194 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1195 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1196 where L::Target: Logger {
1197 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1200 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1201 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1202 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1203 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1204 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1205 where L::Target: Logger {
1206 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1209 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1210 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1211 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1212 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1213 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1214 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1216 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1217 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1219 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1220 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1222 header: &BlockHeader,
1223 txdata: &TransactionData,
1228 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1230 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1231 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1234 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1235 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1238 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1240 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1242 header: &BlockHeader,
1248 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1249 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1252 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1253 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1256 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1257 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1259 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1260 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1262 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1263 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1265 header: &BlockHeader,
1266 txdata: &TransactionData,
1271 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1273 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1274 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1277 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1278 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1281 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1283 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1284 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1286 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1287 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1294 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1295 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1298 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1299 txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1302 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1303 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1305 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1306 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1308 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1309 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1311 header: &BlockHeader,
1316 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1318 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1319 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1322 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1323 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1326 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1327 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1328 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1329 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1331 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1332 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1334 txids.sort_unstable();
1339 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1340 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1341 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1342 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1345 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1346 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1349 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1350 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1351 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1352 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1354 /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
1355 /// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
1358 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1359 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1360 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1361 let mut res = Vec::new();
1362 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1364 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1365 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1366 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1367 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1368 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1371 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1372 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1373 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1374 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1375 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1378 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1379 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1380 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1381 if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1382 if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1383 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
1384 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1387 debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
1388 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1389 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1390 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1392 } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
1393 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1394 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1395 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1396 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1397 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1398 debug_assert!($holder_commitment || us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1399 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1400 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1401 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1402 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1403 let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1404 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
1405 if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1408 if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
1409 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1410 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1411 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1414 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1415 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1416 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1419 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1420 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1421 // we know the preimage.
1422 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1423 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1424 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1425 let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1426 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
1427 if input_idx == htlc_input_idx {
1428 Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
1432 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1433 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1434 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1435 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1438 res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1439 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1440 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1449 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1450 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1451 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1452 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1453 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1454 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1455 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1456 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1458 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1461 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1462 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1463 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1466 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1467 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1468 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1471 found_commitment_tx = true;
1472 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1473 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1474 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1475 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1476 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1477 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1480 found_commitment_tx = true;
1481 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1482 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1483 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1484 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1485 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1486 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1487 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1490 found_commitment_tx = true;
1493 if !found_commitment_tx {
1494 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1495 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1496 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1497 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1498 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1499 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1500 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1504 // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
1507 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1508 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1509 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1511 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1512 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1513 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1515 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1516 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1519 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1520 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1527 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1528 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1529 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1530 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1531 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1533 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1534 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1535 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1536 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1537 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1538 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1540 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1541 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1542 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1543 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1544 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1545 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1546 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1547 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
1548 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1549 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1550 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1551 Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1552 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1553 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, .. } = event.event {
1554 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1555 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1557 Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1560 if !htlc_update_confd {
1561 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1568 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1569 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1570 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1571 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1572 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1573 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1578 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1579 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1580 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1581 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1582 Some((a, &**source))
1585 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1586 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1587 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1589 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1590 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1591 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1592 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1597 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1598 // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
1599 // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1600 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1602 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1603 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1604 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1605 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1611 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1612 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1614 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1615 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1623 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1624 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1625 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1627 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1628 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1629 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1630 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1631 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1632 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1634 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1635 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1636 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1637 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1638 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1639 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1640 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1641 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1642 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1643 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1644 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1645 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1646 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1647 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1648 // payment_preimage.
1649 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1650 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1651 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1652 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1654 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1655 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1656 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1657 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source {
1658 matched_htlc = true;
1662 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1663 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1664 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1666 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1667 *update_source != **source
1672 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1674 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1675 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1676 source: (**source).clone(),
1677 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1678 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1682 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1683 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1684 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1690 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1691 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1693 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1694 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
1699 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1700 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1701 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1702 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1703 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1704 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1705 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
1708 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1709 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1710 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1711 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1716 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1717 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1718 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1719 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1720 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1722 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1723 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1724 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1728 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1729 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1730 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1735 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1742 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1751 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1752 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1753 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1754 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1756 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1757 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1760 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1761 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1762 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1763 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1764 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1765 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1766 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1767 Some(old_points) => {
1768 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1769 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1770 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1771 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1772 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1774 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1777 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1781 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1784 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1785 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1786 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1792 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1793 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1794 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1795 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1796 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1797 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1798 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1799 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1800 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1801 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1802 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1803 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1806 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1807 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1808 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1809 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1810 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1812 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1813 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1816 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1817 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1818 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1819 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1820 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
1825 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1826 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1827 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
1828 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1829 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1832 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1834 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1835 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1836 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1837 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1838 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1839 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1842 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1843 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1844 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1848 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1849 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1850 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1855 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1856 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1857 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1858 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1859 // holder commitment transactions.
1860 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1861 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
1862 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
1864 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
1865 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1866 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1867 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
1868 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1873 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1874 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1877 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1878 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
1879 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1881 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
1884 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
1885 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1886 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1889 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1890 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1891 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1892 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1893 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1894 match updates.updates[0] {
1895 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
1896 _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
1898 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1899 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1900 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1902 let mut ret = Ok(());
1903 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
1905 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1906 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
1907 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1908 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
1909 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
1910 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
1914 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
1915 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
1916 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
1918 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
1919 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
1920 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1922 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
1923 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
1924 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
1925 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
1926 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
1930 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1931 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
1932 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1933 if *should_broadcast {
1934 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1935 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
1936 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1938 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
1939 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
1940 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
1941 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
1944 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
1945 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
1946 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
1947 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
1952 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1954 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
1955 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
1960 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1961 self.latest_update_id
1964 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1968 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
1969 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
1970 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
1971 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
1972 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1973 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
1975 &self.outputs_to_watch
1978 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1979 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1980 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
1984 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
1985 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1986 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1990 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1991 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1992 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1995 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1996 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1999 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2000 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2003 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2004 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2007 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2008 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2009 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2010 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2011 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
2012 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
2013 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
2014 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2015 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2016 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2017 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2019 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2020 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2022 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2023 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2026 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2031 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2032 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2033 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2034 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2035 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2036 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
2037 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
2039 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2040 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2042 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2043 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2044 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2045 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2046 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2047 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2051 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2052 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2053 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2054 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2055 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2056 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2057 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
2059 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2060 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2061 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2066 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2067 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2068 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2069 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2070 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2071 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2073 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2075 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", height, [].iter().map(|a| *a), logger);
2077 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2078 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2079 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2080 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2081 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2082 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2083 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2085 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2086 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2088 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2090 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2091 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", height, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(a, b)| (a, b.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()))), logger);
2093 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2094 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2095 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2099 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2102 fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
2103 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2104 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2105 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
2106 let revocation_point_option =
2107 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2108 // per-commitment point
2109 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
2110 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
2111 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2112 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2113 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2114 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
2116 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
2117 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2118 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2119 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2120 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2121 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2122 return claimable_outpoints; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
2125 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2126 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2127 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
2128 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2129 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2130 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2140 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2141 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2142 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2143 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
2144 return (Vec::new(), None)
2147 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2148 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2151 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2156 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2157 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2158 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2160 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2161 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2162 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2163 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2164 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2165 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2168 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2169 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2170 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2171 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2172 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2174 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2175 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2177 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2178 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2179 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2180 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2182 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2185 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2188 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2190 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2191 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2195 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2198 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2199 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2200 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2201 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2202 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2203 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2209 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2210 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2211 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2212 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2213 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2214 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2215 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2216 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2218 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2219 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2220 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2221 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2222 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2226 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2227 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2229 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2230 is_holder_tx = true;
2231 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2232 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2233 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2234 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2235 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", height, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
2236 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2237 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2238 is_holder_tx = true;
2239 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2240 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2241 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2242 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2243 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", height, holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
2248 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2254 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2255 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2256 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2257 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2258 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2259 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2260 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2261 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2262 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2263 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2264 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2267 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2268 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2269 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2270 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2271 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2272 // confirmed in the next block.
2275 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2276 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2277 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2281 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2282 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2286 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2287 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2288 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2289 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2290 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2291 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2292 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2293 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2294 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2295 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2296 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2297 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2301 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2302 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2303 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2310 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2311 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2312 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2315 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2316 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2318 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2321 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2323 header: &BlockHeader,
2328 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2330 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2331 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2334 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2336 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2337 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2338 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2339 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2340 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2341 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2342 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2344 } else { Vec::new() }
2347 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2349 header: &BlockHeader,
2350 txdata: &TransactionData,
2355 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2357 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2358 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2361 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2362 for tx in &txn_matched {
2363 let mut output_val = 0;
2364 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2365 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2366 output_val += out.value;
2367 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2371 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2373 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2374 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2375 for tx in &txn_matched {
2376 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2377 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2378 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2379 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2381 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2382 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2383 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2384 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2385 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
2386 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2387 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2388 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2389 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2390 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2392 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2393 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2394 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
2395 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2396 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2398 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2399 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2403 let txid = tx.txid();
2404 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2407 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2408 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2412 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2413 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2414 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2415 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2416 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2421 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2422 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2423 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2424 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2426 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2429 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2430 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2433 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2436 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2437 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2438 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2439 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2441 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2442 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2443 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2446 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2447 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2448 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2452 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2454 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2455 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2458 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2459 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2461 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2462 if should_broadcast {
2463 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2464 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2465 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2466 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2467 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2468 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2469 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2470 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2471 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2472 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2473 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2474 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2475 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2477 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2480 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2481 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2482 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2483 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2484 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2485 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2486 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2488 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2492 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2493 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2494 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2496 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2497 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2501 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2502 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2504 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2505 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2507 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis, input_idx } => {
2508 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2509 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2512 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
2513 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2514 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2515 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2517 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
2518 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2519 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2520 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2521 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
2524 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2525 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2527 payment_preimage: None,
2528 source: source.clone(),
2529 onchain_value_satoshis,
2531 if let Some(idx) = input_idx {
2532 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
2535 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2536 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2537 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2538 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2541 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } => {
2542 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
2544 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
2545 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
2550 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2552 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2553 // updating the latter in the process.
2554 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2555 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2556 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2560 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2561 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2562 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2563 for tx in &txn_matched {
2564 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2565 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2566 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2567 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2575 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2576 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2577 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2580 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2583 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2584 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2585 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2587 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2589 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2592 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2599 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2600 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2603 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.txid != *txid);
2604 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2607 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2608 /// transactions thereof.
2609 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2610 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2611 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2612 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2613 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2614 if matches { break; }
2615 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2620 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2623 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2626 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2627 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2628 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2629 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2630 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2631 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2634 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2635 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2636 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2637 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2638 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2639 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2640 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2641 } else { panic!(); }
2652 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2653 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2654 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2655 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2656 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2657 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2658 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2659 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2660 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2661 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2662 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2663 let height = self.best_block.height();
2664 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2665 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2666 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2667 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2668 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2669 // time out the HTLC first.
2670 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2671 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2672 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2673 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2674 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2675 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2676 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2677 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2678 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2679 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2680 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2681 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2682 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2683 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2684 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2685 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2686 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2687 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2688 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2689 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2690 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2691 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2692 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2693 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2700 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2702 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2703 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2704 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2707 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2708 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2709 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2716 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2717 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2718 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2719 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2720 let mut payment_data = None;
2721 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2722 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2723 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2724 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2725 let accepted_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
2726 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
2727 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2728 let offered_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2730 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2731 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2732 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2733 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2734 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2737 macro_rules! log_claim {
2738 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2739 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2740 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
2742 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2743 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2744 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2745 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2746 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
2747 // matched by any HTLC spend:
2748 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2749 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
2750 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
2751 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
2752 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2753 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2754 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2755 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2756 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2757 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2759 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2760 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2761 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2762 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2767 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2768 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2769 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2770 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2771 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2772 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2773 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2774 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
2783 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2784 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2785 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2786 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2787 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2788 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2789 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2790 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2791 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2792 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2793 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2794 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
2795 } else if !$holder_tx {
2796 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2797 if payment_data.is_none() {
2798 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2801 if payment_data.is_none() {
2802 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2803 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
2804 if !outbound_htlc || revocation_sig_claim {
2805 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2806 txid: tx.txid(), height,
2807 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2808 input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2809 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
2810 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
2811 // If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
2812 // wait for the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from
2813 // claimable balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success
2815 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim {
2816 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
2820 // Outbound claims should always have payment_data, unless
2821 // we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
2822 // which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
2823 // spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
2824 // as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
2825 // TODO: Track the above as claimable!
2827 continue 'outer_loop;
2834 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2835 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2836 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2838 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2839 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2840 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2841 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2844 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2845 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2846 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2849 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2850 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2851 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
2852 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2853 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2854 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2855 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2858 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2859 input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2860 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2861 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
2864 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2866 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2868 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2871 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2872 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2873 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
2874 upd.source == source
2876 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2879 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2880 input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2881 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2882 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
2885 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2887 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2889 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2893 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2894 if entry.height != height { return true; }
2896 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
2897 *htlc_source != source
2902 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2905 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2906 source, payment_hash,
2907 onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2908 input_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
2911 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2912 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2918 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2919 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2920 let mut spendable_output = None;
2921 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2922 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
2923 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2924 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2925 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2926 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2927 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2928 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2929 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2930 // non-standard due to their size.
2931 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2932 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2933 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2936 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2937 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2938 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2939 output: outp.clone(),
2943 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
2944 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2945 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2946 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2947 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
2948 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
2949 output: outp.clone(),
2950 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2951 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2952 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2957 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2958 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2959 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2960 output: outp.clone(),
2961 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2962 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2966 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
2967 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2968 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2969 output: outp.clone(),
2974 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2975 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2978 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
2980 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2981 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2986 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2988 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2989 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2992 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
2993 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
2994 self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2997 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2998 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3002 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3004 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3005 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3008 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3009 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3012 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3013 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3016 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3017 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3020 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3021 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3025 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3027 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
3028 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
3029 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3030 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3034 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3039 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3041 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3042 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3044 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3045 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3047 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3048 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3049 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3050 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3053 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3055 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3056 let shutdown_script = {
3057 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3058 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3061 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3062 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3063 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3064 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3065 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3066 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3067 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3069 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3070 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3071 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3073 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3074 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3075 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3077 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
3078 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3082 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3083 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3084 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3085 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3087 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3092 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3094 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3096 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3099 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3100 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3101 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3102 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3103 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3105 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3106 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3112 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3113 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3114 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3115 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3116 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3117 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3118 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3119 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3121 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3122 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3126 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3127 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3128 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3129 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3130 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3131 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3132 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3136 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3137 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3138 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3139 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3140 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3141 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3142 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3146 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3147 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3150 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3152 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3154 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3156 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3157 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3159 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3160 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3161 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3162 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3163 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3164 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3165 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3169 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3170 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3171 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3172 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3173 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3174 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3175 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3176 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3178 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3181 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3182 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3183 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3184 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3185 pending_events.push(event);
3189 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3191 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3192 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3193 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3194 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3195 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3199 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3200 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3201 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3202 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3203 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3204 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3205 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3206 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3208 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3209 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3212 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3214 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3215 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3217 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3218 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3219 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3220 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3221 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3222 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3223 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3227 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3228 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3229 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3230 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3231 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3234 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3235 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3236 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3237 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3238 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3239 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3240 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3241 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3244 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3245 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3247 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
3248 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3250 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3253 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3254 counterparty_payment_script,
3258 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3260 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3261 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3263 counterparty_commitment_params,
3264 funding_redeemscript,
3265 channel_value_satoshis,
3266 their_cur_revocation_points,
3271 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3272 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3273 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3275 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3276 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3277 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3278 current_holder_commitment_number,
3281 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3284 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3289 lockdown_from_offchain,
3291 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3292 funding_spend_confirmed,
3293 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3305 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3306 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3307 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3308 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3309 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3310 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3311 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3312 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3313 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3314 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3315 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3316 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3317 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3321 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3322 use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3323 use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3324 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3325 use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3326 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3327 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3328 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3330 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3331 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
3332 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
3333 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3334 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3335 use util::errors::APIError;
3336 use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3337 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3338 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3339 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3343 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3344 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3345 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3346 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3347 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3348 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3349 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3350 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3351 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3353 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3354 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3355 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3356 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3357 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3358 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3359 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3360 &nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3361 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3362 &nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3364 // Rebalance somewhat
3365 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
3367 // First route two payments for testing at the end
3368 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3369 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3371 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
3372 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
3373 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
3374 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
3375 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
3376 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
3377 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
3379 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
3380 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
3381 let new_header = BlockHeader {
3382 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
3383 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
3384 merkle_root: Default::default() };
3385 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3386 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
3387 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
3389 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
3390 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
3391 &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
3393 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
3394 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
3395 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
3396 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)),
3397 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
3398 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
3399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
3400 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3401 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
3403 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
3404 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
3405 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
3406 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
3407 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
3408 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
3409 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
3410 } else { panic!(); }
3411 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
3412 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
3414 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
3416 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
3418 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
3420 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3421 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
3422 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
3423 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
3424 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
3425 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3426 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
3427 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
3428 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
3431 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
3432 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
3433 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
3437 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3438 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3439 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3440 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
3441 let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) });
3443 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3444 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3446 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3449 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3450 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3451 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3455 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3456 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3458 let mut res = Vec::new();
3459 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3460 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3464 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3465 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3472 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3473 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3475 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3476 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3482 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3483 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3484 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3485 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3490 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3492 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3493 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3494 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3495 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3496 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3497 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3503 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3504 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3505 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3506 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3507 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3508 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3510 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
3511 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3512 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3513 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3514 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3515 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3516 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3517 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3519 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3522 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3524 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3525 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3526 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3527 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
3528 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3529 &channel_parameters,
3530 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3531 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
3533 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3534 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3535 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3536 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3537 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3538 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3539 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3540 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
3543 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3544 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3545 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3546 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3547 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3548 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3549 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3551 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3552 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3553 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3554 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3555 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3556 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3558 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3559 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3560 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3561 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3562 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3563 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3564 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3565 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3567 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3568 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3569 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3570 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3571 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3572 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3576 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3577 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3578 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3580 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3581 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3582 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3584 macro_rules! sign_input {
3585 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
3586 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3587 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
3589 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3590 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3591 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3593 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3594 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3595 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3596 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3597 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3598 $sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
3599 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
3600 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
3601 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
3602 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3603 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
3604 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
3606 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3608 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3609 println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
3610 println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
3611 println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
3615 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3616 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3618 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3619 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3620 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3621 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3623 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3624 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3628 script_sig: Script::new(),
3629 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3630 witness: Vec::new(),
3633 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3634 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3637 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3638 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
3639 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3641 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3642 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3643 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3644 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3647 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3650 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3651 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3652 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3653 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3655 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3656 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3660 script_sig: Script::new(),
3661 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3662 witness: Vec::new(),
3665 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3666 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3669 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3670 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
3671 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3673 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3674 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3675 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3676 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3679 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3682 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3683 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3684 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3685 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3686 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3687 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3691 script_sig: Script::new(),
3692 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3693 witness: Vec::new(),
3695 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3696 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3699 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3700 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
3701 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3703 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3704 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3705 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3706 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3709 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3713 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.