1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
38 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
39 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use crate::ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
42 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
44 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
47 use crate::chain::onchaintx::ClaimEvent;
48 use crate::chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
49 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
50 use crate::chain::Filter;
51 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
52 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
53 use crate::util::byte_utils;
54 use crate::util::events::Event;
56 use crate::util::events::{AnchorDescriptor, HTLCDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
58 use crate::prelude::*;
60 use crate::io::{self, Error};
61 use core::convert::TryInto;
63 use crate::sync::Mutex;
65 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
66 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
68 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
69 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
70 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
71 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
72 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
75 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
76 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
77 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
78 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
79 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
81 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
82 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
83 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
85 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
86 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
87 /// its docs for more details.
89 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
94 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
95 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
96 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
97 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
98 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
100 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
102 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
103 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
104 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
105 self.update_id.write(w)?;
106 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
107 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
108 update_step.write(w)?;
110 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
114 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
115 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
116 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
117 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
118 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
119 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
121 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
125 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
126 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
130 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
131 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
132 pub enum MonitorEvent {
133 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
134 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
136 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
137 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
139 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
140 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
142 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
144 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
145 funding_txo: OutPoint,
146 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
147 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
149 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
150 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
151 monitor_update_id: u64,
154 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
155 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
157 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
158 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
160 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
161 // Note that Completed and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
162 // generated only in ChainMonitor
164 (0, funding_txo, required),
165 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
169 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
173 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
174 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
175 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
176 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
178 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
179 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
180 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
181 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
183 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
184 (0, payment_hash, required),
185 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
186 (2, source, required),
187 (4, payment_preimage, option),
190 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
191 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
192 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
193 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
194 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
195 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
196 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
197 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
198 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
199 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
200 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
201 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
202 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
203 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
204 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
205 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
206 /// accurate block height.
207 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
208 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
209 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
210 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
211 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
212 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
215 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
216 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
217 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
218 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
219 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
220 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
221 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
222 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
223 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
224 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
226 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
227 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
228 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
230 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
231 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
233 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
234 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
236 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
237 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
238 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
239 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
241 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
242 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
243 struct HolderSignedTx {
244 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
246 revocation_key: PublicKey,
247 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
248 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
249 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
250 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
251 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
252 to_self_value_sat: u64,
255 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
257 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
258 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
259 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
260 (2, revocation_key, required),
261 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
262 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
263 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
264 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
265 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
266 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
270 impl HolderSignedTx {
271 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
272 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
273 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
283 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
284 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
285 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
286 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
287 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
288 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
289 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
292 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
293 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
294 w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
295 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
296 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
297 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
298 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
303 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
304 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
305 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
306 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
307 // used. Read it for compatibility.
308 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
309 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
310 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
311 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
312 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
313 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
317 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
318 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
319 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
320 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
321 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
322 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
323 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
325 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
326 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
327 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
328 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
331 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
335 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
336 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
338 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
339 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
340 struct OnchainEventEntry {
343 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
345 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
348 impl OnchainEventEntry {
349 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
350 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
352 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
353 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
355 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
356 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
357 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
359 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
360 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
361 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
362 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
363 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
370 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
371 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
375 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
377 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
378 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
380 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
381 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
382 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
384 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
385 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
386 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
387 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
388 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
389 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
392 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
393 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
394 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
395 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
396 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
398 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
399 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
401 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
403 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
405 FundingSpendConfirmation {
406 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
407 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
408 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
409 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
410 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
412 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
413 /// counterparty output.
414 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
416 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
417 /// is constructed. This is used when
418 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
419 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
420 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
421 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
422 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
424 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
425 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
427 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
428 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
429 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
430 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
431 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
432 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
433 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
434 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
438 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
439 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
440 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
441 (0, self.txid, required),
442 (1, self.transaction, option),
443 (2, self.height, required),
444 (3, self.block_hash, option),
445 (4, self.event, required),
451 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
452 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
453 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
454 let mut transaction = None;
455 let mut block_hash = None;
457 let mut event = None;
458 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
460 (1, transaction, option),
461 (2, height, required),
462 (3, block_hash, option),
463 (4, event, ignorable),
465 if let Some(ev) = event {
466 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: ev }))
473 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
475 (0, source, required),
476 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
477 (2, payment_hash, required),
478 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
480 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
481 (0, descriptor, required),
483 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
484 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
485 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
487 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
488 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
489 (2, preimage, option),
490 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
495 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
497 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
498 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
499 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
500 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
502 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
503 commitment_txid: Txid,
504 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
505 commitment_number: u64,
506 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
509 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
515 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
516 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
518 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
519 /// think we've fallen behind!
520 should_broadcast: bool,
523 scriptpubkey: Script,
527 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
528 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
530 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
531 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
532 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
533 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
534 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
535 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
540 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
541 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
542 (0, commitment_tx, required),
543 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
545 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
546 (0, commitment_txid, required),
547 (2, commitment_number, required),
548 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
549 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
551 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
552 (0, payment_preimage, required),
554 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
556 (2, secret, required),
558 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
559 (0, should_broadcast, required),
561 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
562 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
566 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
568 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
570 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
571 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
573 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
574 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
575 /// force-closed now.
576 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
577 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
578 /// required to do so.
579 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
581 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
582 /// we consider it spendable.
583 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
584 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
585 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
586 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
587 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
589 confirmation_height: u32,
591 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
592 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
593 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
595 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
596 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
597 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
598 ContentiousClaimable {
599 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
600 /// required to do so.
601 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
602 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
606 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
607 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
608 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
609 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
610 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
611 /// which will be required to do so.
612 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
613 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
615 claimable_height: u32,
617 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
618 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
619 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
620 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
621 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
622 /// which will be required to do so.
623 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
624 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
625 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
628 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
631 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
632 /// following amount.
633 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
634 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
636 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
637 /// were already spent.
638 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
642 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
643 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
644 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
645 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
646 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
647 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
649 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
650 resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
651 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
652 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
655 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
656 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
657 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
658 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
659 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
660 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
661 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
662 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
663 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
664 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
665 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
666 (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
672 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
673 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
674 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
675 let mut resolving_txid = None;
676 let mut payment_preimage = None;
677 let mut resolving_tx = None;
678 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
679 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
680 (1, resolving_txid, option),
681 (2, payment_preimage, option),
682 (3, resolving_tx, option),
685 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
693 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
694 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
696 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
697 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
699 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
700 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
701 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
702 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
704 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
705 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
706 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
707 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
708 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
709 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
711 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
713 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
717 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
718 latest_update_id: u64,
719 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
721 destination_script: Script,
722 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
723 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
724 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
726 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
727 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
728 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
729 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
730 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
732 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
733 funding_redeemscript: Script,
734 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
735 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
736 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
738 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
740 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
741 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
742 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
743 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
744 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
745 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
746 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
747 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
748 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
749 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
750 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
751 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
752 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
753 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
754 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
755 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
757 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
758 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
759 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
760 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
761 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
762 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
764 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
766 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
767 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
769 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
771 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
772 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
773 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
775 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
777 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
778 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
779 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
780 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
781 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
782 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
783 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
784 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
785 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
786 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
788 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
790 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
791 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
792 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
793 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
795 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
796 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
797 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
798 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
799 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
802 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
804 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
806 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
807 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
808 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
809 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
811 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
812 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
813 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
815 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
816 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
817 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
818 holder_tx_signed: bool,
820 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
821 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
822 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
823 funding_spend_seen: bool,
825 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
826 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
827 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
829 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
830 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
831 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
832 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
833 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
835 /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
836 /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
837 /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
838 /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
839 /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
840 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
842 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
843 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
844 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
845 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
846 // the full block_connected).
847 best_block: BestBlock,
849 /// The node_id of our counterparty
850 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
852 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
855 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
856 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
858 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
859 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
860 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
861 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
866 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
867 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
868 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
872 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
873 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
874 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
876 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
877 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
878 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
880 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
882 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
883 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
885 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
886 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
887 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
888 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
889 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
890 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
892 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
895 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
896 match &self.shutdown_script {
897 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
898 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
901 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
902 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
903 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
904 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
905 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
906 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
907 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
909 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
910 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
911 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
913 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
914 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
915 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
916 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
917 match second_option {
918 Some(second_pubkey) => {
919 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
922 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
927 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
931 writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
933 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
935 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
936 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
937 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
938 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
939 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
940 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
941 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
945 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
946 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
947 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
948 writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
949 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
950 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
951 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
952 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
953 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
954 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
958 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
959 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
960 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
961 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
964 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
965 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
966 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
967 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
970 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
971 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
972 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
974 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
977 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
979 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
980 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
982 writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
983 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
984 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
987 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
988 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
989 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
991 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
992 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
994 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
998 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
999 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1003 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1004 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1005 event.write(writer)?;
1008 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1009 writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height().to_be_bytes())?;
1011 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1012 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1013 entry.write(writer)?;
1016 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1017 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1018 txid.write(writer)?;
1019 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1020 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1022 script.write(writer)?;
1025 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1027 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1028 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1030 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1031 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1032 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
1033 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
1034 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1035 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1036 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1037 (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, vec_type),
1044 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1045 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1046 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1047 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1048 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1049 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1052 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
1053 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1054 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1055 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1056 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1057 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1058 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1060 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1061 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1062 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1064 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1065 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1066 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1067 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1069 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1070 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1072 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1073 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1074 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1075 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1077 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1078 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1080 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1081 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1082 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1083 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1084 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1085 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1086 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1087 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1089 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1092 let onchain_tx_handler =
1093 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1094 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1096 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1097 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1099 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1100 latest_update_id: 0,
1101 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1103 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1104 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1105 counterparty_payment_script,
1109 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1111 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1112 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1114 counterparty_commitment_params,
1115 funding_redeemscript,
1116 channel_value_satoshis,
1117 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1119 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1121 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1122 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1123 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1124 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1126 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1127 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1128 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1129 current_holder_commitment_number,
1131 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1132 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1133 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1135 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1140 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1141 holder_tx_signed: false,
1142 funding_spend_seen: false,
1143 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1144 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1145 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1146 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
1149 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1156 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1157 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1160 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1161 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1162 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1163 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1164 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1167 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1168 commitment_number: u64,
1169 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1171 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1172 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1173 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1177 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1178 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1179 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1180 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1181 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1184 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1185 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1186 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1188 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1189 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1191 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1194 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1195 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1198 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1199 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1202 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1207 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1210 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1213 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1216 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1217 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1219 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1225 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1226 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1229 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1232 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1234 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1235 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1238 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1239 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1240 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1243 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1244 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1245 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1246 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1247 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1250 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1251 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1252 /// have been registered.
1253 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1254 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1255 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1256 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1257 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1258 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1259 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1261 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1262 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1268 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1269 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1270 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1271 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1274 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1277 /// This is called by the [`EventsProvider::process_pending_events`] implementation for
1278 /// [`ChainMonitor`].
1280 /// [`EventsProvider::process_pending_events`]: crate::util::events::EventsProvider::process_pending_events
1281 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1282 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1283 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1286 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1287 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1290 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1291 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1294 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1295 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1298 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1300 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1302 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1303 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1306 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1307 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1309 /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1310 /// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've
1311 /// fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation
1312 /// secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1314 /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1315 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1316 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1317 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1318 /// to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you.
1320 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
1321 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1322 where L::Target: Logger {
1323 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1326 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1327 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1328 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1329 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1330 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1331 where L::Target: Logger {
1332 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1335 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1336 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1337 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1338 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1339 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1340 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1342 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1343 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1345 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1346 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1348 header: &BlockHeader,
1349 txdata: &TransactionData,
1354 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1356 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1357 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1360 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1361 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1364 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1366 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1368 header: &BlockHeader,
1374 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1375 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1378 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1379 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1382 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1383 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1385 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1386 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1388 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1389 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1391 header: &BlockHeader,
1392 txdata: &TransactionData,
1397 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1399 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1400 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1403 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1404 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1405 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1408 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1410 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1411 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1413 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1414 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1421 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1422 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1425 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1426 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1427 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1430 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1431 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1433 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1434 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1436 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1437 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1439 header: &BlockHeader,
1444 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1446 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1447 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1450 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1451 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1452 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1455 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1456 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1457 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1458 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1460 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.block_hash))
1461 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1463 txids.sort_unstable();
1468 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1469 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1470 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1471 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1475 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1476 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1477 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1478 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1479 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1480 -> Option<Balance> {
1481 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1482 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1484 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1485 let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
1486 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1487 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1488 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1489 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1491 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1492 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1493 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1494 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1495 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1496 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1497 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1498 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1499 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1501 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1502 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1503 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1504 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1505 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1506 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1507 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1508 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1510 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1511 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1512 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1513 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1514 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1519 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1520 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1521 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1522 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
1523 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1524 htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
1527 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1529 let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
1530 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1531 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1532 // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
1533 // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
1534 // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
1535 // in the commitment.
1536 if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
1537 let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1538 .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
1539 .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
1540 debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
1541 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
1543 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors());
1544 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
1547 htlc_commitment_outpoint
1549 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1551 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1552 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1553 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1554 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1555 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1557 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1558 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1559 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1560 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1561 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1562 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1563 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1564 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1565 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1566 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1567 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1569 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1570 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1571 tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
1573 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1574 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1576 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1581 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1582 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1583 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1584 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1585 // need to do so again here.
1587 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1588 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1589 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1590 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1591 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1592 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1595 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1596 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1597 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1598 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1599 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1600 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1601 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1602 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1605 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1606 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1607 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1610 } else if self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1611 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1612 // we know the preimage.
1613 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1614 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1615 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1616 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1617 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1618 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1619 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1620 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1623 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1624 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1625 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1628 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1629 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1630 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1631 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1638 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1639 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1640 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1643 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1644 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1645 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1646 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1648 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1649 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
1650 /// a revoked state.
1652 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1653 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1654 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1655 let mut res = Vec::new();
1656 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1658 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1659 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1660 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1661 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1662 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1665 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
1666 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1669 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1670 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1671 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1672 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1673 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1676 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1677 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1678 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1679 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1681 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
1689 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1690 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1691 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1692 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
1693 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1694 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1695 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1696 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1698 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1701 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1702 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1703 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1706 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1707 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1708 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1711 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1712 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1714 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1715 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
1716 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
1717 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
1718 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
1719 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
1720 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1721 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1722 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
1724 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1725 claimable_amount_satoshis: output.value,
1726 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
1728 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
1729 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
1730 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
1731 ).unwrap_or(false) {
1732 spent_counterparty_output = true;
1738 if spent_counterparty_output {
1739 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
1740 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
1741 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
1742 if output_spendable {
1743 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1744 claimable_amount_satoshis: amt,
1748 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
1749 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
1752 found_commitment_tx = true;
1753 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1754 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1755 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1756 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1757 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1758 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1761 found_commitment_tx = true;
1762 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1763 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1764 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1765 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1766 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1767 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1768 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1771 found_commitment_tx = true;
1774 if !found_commitment_tx {
1775 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1776 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1777 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1778 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1779 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1780 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1781 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1786 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1787 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1788 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1790 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1791 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1792 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1794 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1795 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1797 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
1798 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
1799 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1800 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1801 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1805 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1806 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1813 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
1814 /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
1815 /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
1817 /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes HTLCs which were
1818 /// resolved by this `ChannelMonitor`.
1819 pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1820 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1821 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
1822 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1823 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1824 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1826 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1827 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1828 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1829 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1835 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1836 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1838 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1839 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1844 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1845 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1846 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1847 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1848 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1849 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1850 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1851 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1852 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1853 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1859 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
1860 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1861 // closed), just get the full set.
1863 return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
1866 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1867 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1868 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1869 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1870 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1871 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1872 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1874 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1875 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1876 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1877 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1878 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1879 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1880 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1881 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1882 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1883 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1884 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1885 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1886 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1887 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
1888 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1889 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1891 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1894 if !htlc_update_confd {
1895 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1902 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
1903 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1904 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1905 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1906 Some((a, &**source))
1909 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1910 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1911 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1913 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1914 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1915 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1916 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1924 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
1925 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
1929 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1930 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1931 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1933 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1934 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1935 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1936 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1937 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1938 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1940 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1941 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1942 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1943 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1944 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1945 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
1946 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1947 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
1949 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1950 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1951 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1952 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1953 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1954 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1955 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1956 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1957 // payment_preimage.
1958 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1959 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1960 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1961 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1963 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1965 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1966 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1967 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
1968 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
1969 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
1970 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
1971 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
1972 matched_htlc = true;
1976 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1977 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1978 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1980 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1981 *update_source != **source
1986 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1987 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
1988 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
1989 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1990 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
1991 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1992 source: (**source).clone(),
1993 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1994 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1995 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
1998 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1999 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2000 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2001 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2007 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2008 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2010 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2011 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2016 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2017 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2018 // in-line tests later.
2021 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2022 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2023 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2024 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2025 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2026 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2027 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2032 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2033 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2036 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2037 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2038 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2039 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2040 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2041 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2042 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2045 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2046 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2047 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2048 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2053 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2054 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2055 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2056 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2057 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2059 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2060 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2061 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2065 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2066 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2067 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2072 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2079 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2088 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2089 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2090 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2091 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2093 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2094 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2097 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2098 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2099 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2100 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2101 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2102 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2103 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2104 Some(old_points) => {
2105 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2106 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2107 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2108 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2109 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2111 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2114 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2118 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2121 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2122 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2123 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2129 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2130 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2131 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2132 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2133 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2134 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2135 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
2136 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
2137 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2138 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2139 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2140 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2143 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2144 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2145 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2146 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2147 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2149 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2150 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2153 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2154 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2155 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2156 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2157 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2162 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2163 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2164 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2165 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2166 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
2167 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2168 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2171 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2173 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2174 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2175 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2176 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2177 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2178 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2181 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2182 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2183 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2187 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2188 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2189 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2194 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2195 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2196 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2197 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2198 // holder commitment transactions.
2199 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2200 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2201 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2203 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2204 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2205 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2206 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
2207 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2212 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
2213 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2216 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
2217 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
2218 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2220 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2223 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
2224 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2225 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2228 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
2229 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2230 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
2231 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
2232 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
2233 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
2234 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2235 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2236 match updates.updates[0] {
2237 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
2239 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2240 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2243 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2244 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2246 let mut ret = Ok(());
2247 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2248 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2250 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
2251 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2252 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2253 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
2254 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2255 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2259 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2260 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2261 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2263 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2264 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2265 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2267 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2268 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2269 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2270 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2271 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2275 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2276 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2277 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2278 if *should_broadcast {
2279 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
2280 // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
2281 // duplicate/conflicting.
2282 let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
2283 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
2284 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
2287 if detected_funding_spend {
2290 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2291 // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
2292 // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
2293 // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm.
2294 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2295 let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2296 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2297 self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors(),
2299 let best_block_height = self.best_block.height();
2300 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2301 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2302 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output),
2303 best_block_height, false, best_block_height,
2305 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2306 vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height,
2307 broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger,
2310 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2311 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2312 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()));
2313 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
2315 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2316 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2317 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2318 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2321 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2322 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2323 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2324 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2329 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2331 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
2332 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2337 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2338 self.latest_update_id
2341 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2345 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2346 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2347 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2348 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2349 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2350 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2352 &self.outputs_to_watch
2355 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2356 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2357 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2361 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2362 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2363 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
2365 for claim_event in self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events().drain(..) {
2367 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
2368 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
2370 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2371 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
2372 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
2373 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
2374 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
2375 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
2376 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2378 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
2379 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
2380 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2381 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2382 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
2383 txid: commitment_txid,
2384 vout: anchor_output_idx,
2390 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
2391 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs,
2393 let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
2395 htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
2396 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2397 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2398 channel_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2399 commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
2400 per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
2402 preimage: htlc.preimage,
2403 counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
2406 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
2407 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2416 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2417 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2418 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2421 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2422 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2425 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2426 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2429 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2430 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2433 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2434 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2435 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2436 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2438 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
2439 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
2441 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
2442 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
2443 where L::Target: Logger {
2444 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2445 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2446 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2447 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2448 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
2450 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2451 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2453 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2454 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2457 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2462 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2463 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2464 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2465 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2466 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2467 let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
2468 let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
2470 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2471 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2473 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2474 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2475 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2476 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2477 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2478 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2479 to_counterparty_output_info =
2480 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2484 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2485 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2486 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2487 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2488 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2489 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2490 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2491 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
2492 to_counterparty_output_info);
2494 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2495 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2496 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2501 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2502 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2503 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2504 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2505 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2506 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2508 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2510 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2511 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2512 block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2513 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2516 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2517 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2518 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2521 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2522 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2523 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2524 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2525 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2526 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2527 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2529 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2530 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2532 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2534 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2535 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
2536 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2537 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2540 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
2541 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2542 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
2543 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2544 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2548 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2551 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
2552 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
2553 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
2554 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2555 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
2557 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2558 Some(outputs) => outputs,
2559 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2561 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2562 Some(points) => points,
2563 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2566 let per_commitment_point =
2567 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2568 // per-commitment point
2569 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
2570 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2571 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2572 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2573 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2574 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2576 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
2577 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
2579 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2580 let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
2581 &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
2582 let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
2583 &per_commitment_point,
2584 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
2585 let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
2586 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2587 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
2588 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
2589 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2590 to_counterparty_output_info =
2591 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2596 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2597 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2598 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2599 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2600 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2601 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2602 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
2605 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2606 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2607 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2608 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2609 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2610 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2611 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2612 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
2614 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2615 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2616 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2617 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2618 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
2620 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2621 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2622 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2627 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
2630 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2631 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
2632 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
2633 ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2634 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2635 let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
2637 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2639 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2641 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2642 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
2643 let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
2644 // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
2645 // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
2646 // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
2647 // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
2648 // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
2649 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
2651 // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
2652 // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
2653 // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
2654 for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
2655 if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
2656 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
2657 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
2658 per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2659 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
2660 tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv
2662 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2663 htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
2664 height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height
2666 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2667 if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
2668 outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
2670 outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
2673 (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
2676 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2677 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2678 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2679 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2680 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2682 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2683 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2685 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2686 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2687 let (htlc_output, aggregable) = if htlc.offered {
2688 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
2689 htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()
2691 (htlc_output, false)
2693 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2696 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2699 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
2700 payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()
2702 (htlc_output, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors())
2704 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2705 holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
2706 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
2707 htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, conf_height
2709 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2713 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2716 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2717 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2718 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2719 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2720 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2721 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2727 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2728 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2729 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2730 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2731 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2732 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2733 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2734 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2736 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2737 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2738 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2739 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2740 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2744 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2745 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2747 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2748 is_holder_tx = true;
2749 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2750 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2751 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2752 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2753 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2754 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2755 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2756 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2757 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2758 is_holder_tx = true;
2759 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2760 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2761 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2762 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2763 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
2764 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
2770 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2776 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2777 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2778 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2779 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2780 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2781 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2782 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
2783 // transaction confirms.
2784 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2785 return holder_transactions;
2787 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2788 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2789 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2790 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2791 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2794 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2795 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2796 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2797 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2798 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2799 // confirmed in the next block.
2802 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2803 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2804 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2808 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2809 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2813 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2814 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2815 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2816 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2817 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2818 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2819 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2820 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
2821 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
2822 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2823 return holder_transactions;
2825 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2826 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2827 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2828 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2829 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2833 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2834 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2835 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2842 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2843 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2844 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2847 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2848 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2850 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2851 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2854 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2856 header: &BlockHeader,
2859 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2861 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2863 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2864 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2867 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2869 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2870 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2871 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2872 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2873 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2874 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2875 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2877 } else { Vec::new() }
2880 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2882 header: &BlockHeader,
2883 txdata: &TransactionData,
2886 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2888 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2890 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2891 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2894 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2895 for tx in &txn_matched {
2896 let mut output_val = 0;
2897 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2898 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2899 output_val += out.value;
2900 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2904 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2906 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2907 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2908 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
2909 let txid = tx.txid();
2910 // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
2911 if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
2912 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
2915 for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
2916 if ev.txid == txid {
2917 if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
2918 assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
2919 "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
2920 This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
2922 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
2926 for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
2927 if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
2928 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
2932 for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
2933 if txid == *spendable_txid {
2934 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
2939 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2940 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2941 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
2942 // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
2943 // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
2944 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2945 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2946 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2947 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2948 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), txid);
2949 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2950 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
2951 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2952 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
2953 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
2954 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
2955 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2956 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2958 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2959 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2960 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
2961 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
2962 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
2963 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2964 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2966 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2967 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2971 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2973 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
2975 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
2976 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2977 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2978 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
2983 if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
2984 // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
2985 // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
2986 // other ways which can have more than one output.
2987 for tx_input in &tx.input {
2988 let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
2989 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
2990 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
2991 &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
2993 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2994 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2995 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2997 // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
2998 // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
2999 // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
3000 // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
3004 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3006 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3010 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3011 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3014 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
3017 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
3018 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
3019 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
3020 /// complexity especially in
3021 /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
3023 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
3024 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
3025 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3028 conf_hash: BlockHash,
3029 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
3030 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
3031 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
3033 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3035 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3037 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3038 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3041 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
3042 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
3044 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
3045 if should_broadcast {
3046 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors());
3047 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
3048 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
3049 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
3050 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3051 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
3052 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
3053 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
3054 // `transactions_confirmed`.
3055 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
3056 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
3057 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
3058 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
3059 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
3060 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
3061 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
3062 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
3064 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3068 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3069 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3070 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3071 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3072 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3073 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3074 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3076 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3080 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3081 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3082 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3084 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3085 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3089 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3090 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3092 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3093 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3095 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3096 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3097 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3100 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3101 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3102 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3103 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3105 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3106 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3107 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3108 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3109 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3112 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3113 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
3114 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3116 payment_preimage: None,
3117 source: source.clone(),
3118 htlc_value_satoshis,
3120 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3121 commitment_tx_output_idx,
3122 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3123 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3124 payment_preimage: None,
3127 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3128 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3129 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3130 outputs: vec![descriptor]
3132 self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
3134 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3135 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3136 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
3137 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3138 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3139 payment_preimage: preimage,
3142 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3143 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3144 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3149 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3150 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3152 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3153 // updating the latter in the process.
3154 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3155 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3156 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3160 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3161 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3162 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3163 for tx in &txn_matched {
3164 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3165 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3166 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3167 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3175 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
3176 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3177 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3180 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3183 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3184 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3185 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3187 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3188 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3190 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3193 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3197 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3200 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3201 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3204 let mut removed_height = None;
3205 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3206 if entry.txid == *txid {
3207 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
3212 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
3213 log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
3214 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
3215 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
3220 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
3222 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3225 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3226 /// transactions thereof.
3227 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3228 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
3229 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3230 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3231 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3232 if matches { break; }
3233 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3238 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3241 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3244 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3245 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3246 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3247 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3248 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3249 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3252 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3253 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3254 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3255 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3256 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3257 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3258 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3259 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3263 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3264 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3265 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3266 } else { panic!(); }
3277 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3278 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
3279 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
3280 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
3281 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
3282 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
3288 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3289 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3290 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3291 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3292 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3293 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3294 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3295 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3296 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3297 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3298 let height = self.best_block.height();
3299 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3300 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3301 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3302 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3303 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3304 // time out the HTLC first.
3305 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3306 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3307 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3308 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3309 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3310 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3311 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
3312 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
3313 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
3314 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
3315 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
3316 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
3317 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3318 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3319 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3320 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
3321 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
3322 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
3323 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
3324 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
3325 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
3326 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
3327 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
3328 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3335 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
3337 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3338 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3339 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3342 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3343 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3344 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3351 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
3352 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
3353 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3354 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
3355 let mut payment_data = None;
3356 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
3357 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
3358 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
3359 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3360 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
3361 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
3362 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3363 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
3365 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3366 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
3367 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
3370 macro_rules! log_claim {
3371 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
3372 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
3373 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
3375 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3376 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3377 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3378 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3379 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
3380 // matched by any HTLC spend:
3381 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3382 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
3383 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
3384 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
3385 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
3386 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
3387 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
3388 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3389 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3390 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
3392 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
3393 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3394 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3395 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
3400 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
3401 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
3402 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
3403 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
3404 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
3405 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
3406 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
3407 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
3416 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3417 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3418 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3419 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3420 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3421 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
3422 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3423 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
3424 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3425 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3426 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3427 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
3428 } else if !$holder_tx {
3429 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3430 if payment_data.is_none() {
3431 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3434 if payment_data.is_none() {
3435 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
3436 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
3437 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3438 txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3439 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3440 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3441 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
3442 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
3443 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
3444 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
3445 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
3446 // accepted_preimage_claim).
3447 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
3448 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
3451 continue 'outer_loop;
3458 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
3459 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3460 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
3462 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3463 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3464 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3465 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
3468 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3469 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3470 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
3473 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3474 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3475 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
3476 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3477 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3478 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
3479 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3482 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3483 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3484 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3485 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3486 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3487 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3490 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3492 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3494 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3497 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3498 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3499 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3500 upd.source == source
3502 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3504 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3506 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3507 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3508 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3509 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3510 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3513 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3515 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3517 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3521 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3522 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3524 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3525 *htlc_source != source
3530 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3532 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3534 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3535 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3536 source, payment_hash,
3537 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3538 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3541 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3542 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3548 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3549 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3550 let mut spendable_output = None;
3551 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3552 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3553 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3554 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3555 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3556 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3557 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3558 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3559 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3560 // non-standard due to their size.
3561 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3562 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3563 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3566 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3567 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3568 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3569 output: outp.clone(),
3573 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3574 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3575 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3576 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3577 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3578 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3579 output: outp.clone(),
3580 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3581 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3582 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3587 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3588 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3589 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3590 output: outp.clone(),
3591 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3592 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3596 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3597 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3598 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3599 output: outp.clone(),
3604 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3605 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3607 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3609 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3610 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3612 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3613 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3618 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3620 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3621 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3624 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3625 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3628 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3629 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3633 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3635 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3636 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3639 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3640 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3643 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3644 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3647 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3648 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3651 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
3652 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3656 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3658 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
3659 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::Signer>) {
3660 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3661 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3665 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3670 let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
3672 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3674 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3675 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3677 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3678 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3680 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3681 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3682 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3683 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3686 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3688 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3689 let shutdown_script = {
3690 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3691 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3694 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3695 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3696 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3697 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3698 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3699 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3700 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3702 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3703 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3704 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3706 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3707 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3708 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3710 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3711 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3715 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3716 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3717 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3718 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3720 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3725 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3727 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3729 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3732 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3733 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3734 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3735 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3736 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3738 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3739 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3745 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3746 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3747 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3748 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3749 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3750 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3751 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3752 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3754 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3755 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3759 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3760 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3761 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3762 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3763 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3764 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3765 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3769 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3770 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3771 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3772 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3773 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3774 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3775 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3779 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3780 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3783 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3785 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3787 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3789 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3790 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3792 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3793 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3794 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3795 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3796 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3797 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3798 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3802 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3803 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3804 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3805 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3806 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3807 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3808 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3809 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3811 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3814 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3815 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3816 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3817 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3818 pending_events.push(event);
3822 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3824 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3825 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3826 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3827 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3828 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3832 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3833 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3834 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3835 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3836 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3837 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3838 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3839 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3841 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3842 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3845 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(
3846 reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
3849 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3850 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3852 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3853 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3854 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3855 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3856 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3857 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3858 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3862 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3863 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3864 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3865 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3866 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3869 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3870 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3871 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3872 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
3873 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
3874 let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
3875 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3876 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3877 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3878 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3879 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3880 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
3881 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
3882 (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, vec_type),
3885 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3886 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
3888 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3890 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3893 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3894 counterparty_payment_script,
3898 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3900 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3901 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3903 counterparty_commitment_params,
3904 funding_redeemscript,
3905 channel_value_satoshis,
3906 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
3911 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3912 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3913 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3915 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3916 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3917 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3918 current_holder_commitment_number,
3921 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3924 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3929 lockdown_from_offchain,
3931 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3932 funding_spend_confirmed,
3933 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
3934 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3935 spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
3938 counterparty_node_id,
3947 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3948 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3949 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3950 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
3951 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3952 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
3953 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3954 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3955 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3956 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3957 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3958 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3959 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3963 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
3965 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3966 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3967 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3968 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3969 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3970 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3971 use crate::chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3972 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3973 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
3974 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3975 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId};
3976 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3977 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3978 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
3979 use crate::util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3980 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3981 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3982 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3984 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
3985 use crate::prelude::*;
3987 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3988 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3989 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3990 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3991 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3992 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3993 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3994 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3995 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3997 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3998 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3999 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4000 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4001 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4002 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4003 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4004 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4006 // Rebalance somewhat
4007 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
4009 // First route two payments for testing at the end
4010 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4011 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4013 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
4014 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4015 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
4016 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
4017 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
4018 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
4019 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
4021 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
4022 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
4023 let new_header = BlockHeader {
4024 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
4025 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
4026 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
4027 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4028 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
4029 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
4031 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
4032 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
4033 (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
4035 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
4036 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
4037 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
4038 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)),
4039 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
4040 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
4041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
4042 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4043 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
4045 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
4046 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
4047 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
4048 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
4049 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
4050 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
4051 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
4052 } else { panic!(); }
4053 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
4054 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
4056 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
4058 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
4060 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
4062 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4063 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
4064 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
4065 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
4066 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
4067 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
4068 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4069 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
4070 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
4073 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
4074 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
4075 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4079 fn test_prune_preimages() {
4080 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4081 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4082 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
4083 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4085 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4086 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4088 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4091 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4092 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4093 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4097 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4098 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4100 let mut res = Vec::new();
4101 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4102 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4106 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4107 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4114 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
4115 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4117 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
4118 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
4124 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4125 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4126 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4127 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4132 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4134 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4135 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4136 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4137 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4138 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4144 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4145 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4146 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
4147 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4148 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
4149 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
4151 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4152 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4153 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4154 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4155 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4156 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4157 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4158 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4160 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4162 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
4164 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4166 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4167 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
4168 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4169 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
4170 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
4171 &channel_parameters,
4172 Script::new(), 46, 0,
4173 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
4175 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
4176 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
4177 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4178 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4179 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4180 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4181 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4182 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4183 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4186 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4187 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4188 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4189 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4190 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4191 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4192 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4194 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4195 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4196 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4197 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4198 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4199 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4201 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4202 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4203 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
4204 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4205 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4206 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4207 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4208 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4210 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4211 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
4212 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4213 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4214 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4215 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4219 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4220 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4221 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4223 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4224 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4225 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4227 macro_rules! sign_input {
4228 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4229 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4230 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4232 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4233 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4234 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4236 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
4237 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4238 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4239 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4240 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4241 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
4242 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4243 witness.push(ser_sig);
4244 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4245 witness.push(vec!(1));
4246 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4247 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4248 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4249 witness.push(vec![0]);
4251 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4253 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4254 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4255 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4256 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4257 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4261 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4262 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4264 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4265 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4266 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4267 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4269 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4270 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4274 script_sig: Script::new(),
4275 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4276 witness: Witness::new(),
4279 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4280 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4283 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4284 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4285 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4287 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4288 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4289 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4290 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4293 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4296 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
4297 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4298 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4299 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4301 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4302 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4306 script_sig: Script::new(),
4307 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4308 witness: Witness::new(),
4311 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4312 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4315 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4316 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4317 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4319 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4320 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4321 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4322 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4325 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4328 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
4329 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4330 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4331 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4332 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4333 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4337 script_sig: Script::new(),
4338 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4339 witness: Witness::new(),
4341 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4342 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4345 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4346 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
4347 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4349 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4350 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4351 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4352 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4355 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4359 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.