1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
32 use bitcoin::ecdsa::Signature as BitcoinSignature;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
38 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, ChannelId};
39 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
40 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentKey, DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, HtlcKey, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
41 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,CommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys};
42 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
44 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
45 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
46 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
47 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
48 use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, FeerateStrategy, OnchainTxHandler};
49 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
50 use crate::chain::Filter;
51 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
52 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
53 use crate::util::byte_utils;
54 use crate::events::{ClosureReason, Event, EventHandler};
55 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
57 #[allow(unused_imports)]
58 use crate::prelude::*;
61 use crate::io::{self, Error};
63 use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
65 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
66 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
68 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
69 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
70 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
71 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
72 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
74 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
75 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
76 /// Historically, [`ChannelMonitor`]s didn't know their counterparty node id. However,
77 /// `ChannelManager` really wants to know it so that it can easily look up the corresponding
78 /// channel. For now, this results in a temporary map in `ChannelManager` to look up channels
79 /// by only the funding outpoint.
81 /// To eventually remove that, we repeat the counterparty node id here so that we can upgrade
82 /// `ChannelMonitor`s to become aware of the counterparty node id if they were generated prior
83 /// to when it was stored directly in them.
84 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
85 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
86 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
87 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
89 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
90 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
91 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
93 /// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
94 /// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
95 /// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
96 /// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
97 /// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
99 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
101 /// The channel ID associated with these updates.
103 /// Will be `None` for `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.121 and
104 /// always `Some` otherwise.
105 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
108 /// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
110 /// (1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
111 /// (2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
112 /// allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
113 /// commitment transaction.
115 /// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
116 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
118 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
119 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
120 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
121 self.update_id.write(w)?;
122 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
123 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
124 update_step.write(w)?;
126 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
127 (1, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
128 (3, self.channel_id, option),
133 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
134 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
135 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
136 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
137 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
138 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
140 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
144 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
145 let mut channel_id = None;
146 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
147 (1, counterparty_node_id, option),
148 (3, channel_id, option),
150 Ok(Self { update_id, counterparty_node_id, updates, channel_id })
154 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
155 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 pub enum MonitorEvent {
157 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
158 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
160 /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
161 /// channel. Holds information about the channel and why it was closed.
162 HolderForceClosedWithInfo {
163 /// The reason the channel was closed.
164 reason: ClosureReason,
165 /// The funding outpoint of the channel.
167 /// The channel ID of the channel.
168 channel_id: ChannelId,
171 /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
173 HolderForceClosed(OutPoint),
175 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
176 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
178 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
180 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
181 funding_txo: OutPoint,
182 /// The channel ID of the channel associated with the [`ChannelMonitor`]
183 channel_id: ChannelId,
184 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
185 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
187 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
188 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
189 monitor_update_id: u64,
192 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
193 // Note that Completed is currently never serialized to disk as it is generated only in
196 (0, funding_txo, required),
197 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
198 (4, channel_id, required),
200 (5, HolderForceClosedWithInfo) => {
201 (0, reason, upgradable_required),
202 (2, outpoint, required),
203 (4, channel_id, required),
207 (4, HolderForceClosed),
208 // 6 was `UpdateFailed` until LDK 0.0.117
211 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
212 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
213 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
214 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
216 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
217 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
218 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
219 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
221 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
222 (0, payment_hash, required),
223 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
224 (2, source, required),
225 (4, payment_preimage, option),
228 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
229 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
230 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
231 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
232 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
233 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
234 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
235 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
236 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
237 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
238 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
239 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
240 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
241 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
242 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
243 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
244 /// accurate block height.
245 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
246 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
247 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
248 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
249 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
250 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
253 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
254 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
255 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
256 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
257 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
258 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
259 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
260 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
261 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
262 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
264 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
265 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
266 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
268 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
269 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
271 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
272 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
274 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
275 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
276 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
277 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
279 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
280 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
281 struct HolderSignedTx {
282 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
284 revocation_key: RevocationKey,
287 delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey,
288 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
289 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
290 to_self_value_sat: u64,
293 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
295 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
296 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
297 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
298 (2, revocation_key, required),
299 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
300 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
301 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
302 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
303 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
304 (14, htlc_outputs, required_vec)
307 impl HolderSignedTx {
308 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
309 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
310 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
320 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
321 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
322 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
323 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
324 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: DelayedPaymentBasepoint,
325 counterparty_htlc_base_key: HtlcBasepoint,
326 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
329 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
330 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
331 w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
332 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
333 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
334 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
335 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
340 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
341 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
342 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
343 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
344 // used. Read it for compatibility.
345 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
346 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
347 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
348 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
349 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
350 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
354 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
355 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
356 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
357 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
358 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
359 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
360 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
362 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
363 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
364 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
365 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
368 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
372 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
373 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
375 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
376 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
377 struct OnchainEventEntry {
380 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
382 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
385 impl OnchainEventEntry {
386 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
387 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
389 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
390 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
392 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
393 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
394 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
396 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
397 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
398 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
399 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
400 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
407 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
408 best_block.height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
412 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
414 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
415 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, Amount)>;
417 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
418 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
419 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
421 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
422 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
423 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
424 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
425 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
426 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
429 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
430 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
431 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
432 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
433 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
435 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
436 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
438 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
440 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
442 FundingSpendConfirmation {
443 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
444 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
445 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
446 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
447 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
449 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
450 /// counterparty output.
451 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
453 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
454 /// is constructed. This is used when
455 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
456 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
457 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
458 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
459 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
461 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
462 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
464 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
465 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
466 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
467 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
468 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
469 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
470 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
471 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
475 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
476 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
477 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
478 (0, self.txid, required),
479 (1, self.transaction, option),
480 (2, self.height, required),
481 (3, self.block_hash, option),
482 (4, self.event, required),
488 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
489 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
490 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
491 let mut transaction = None;
492 let mut block_hash = None;
494 let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
495 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
497 (1, transaction, option),
498 (2, height, required),
499 (3, block_hash, option),
500 (4, event, upgradable_required),
502 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
506 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
508 (0, source, required),
509 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
510 (2, payment_hash, required),
511 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
513 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
514 (0, descriptor, required),
516 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
517 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
518 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
520 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
521 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
522 (2, preimage, option),
523 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
528 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
529 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
530 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
531 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
532 /// Note that LDK after 0.0.115 supports this only containing dust HTLCs (implying the
533 /// `Signature` field is never filled in). At that point, non-dust HTLCs are implied by the
534 /// HTLC fields in `commitment_tx` and the sources passed via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
535 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
536 claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
537 nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>,
539 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
540 commitment_txid: Txid,
541 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
542 commitment_number: u64,
543 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
544 feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>,
545 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Option<u64>,
546 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Option<u64>,
549 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
555 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
556 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
558 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
559 /// think we've fallen behind!
560 should_broadcast: bool,
563 scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
567 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
568 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
570 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
571 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
572 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
573 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
574 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
575 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
580 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
581 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
582 (0, commitment_tx, required),
583 (1, claimed_htlcs, optional_vec),
584 (2, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
585 (4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
587 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
588 (0, commitment_txid, required),
589 (1, feerate_per_kw, option),
590 (2, commitment_number, required),
591 (3, to_broadcaster_value_sat, option),
592 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
593 (5, to_countersignatory_value_sat, option),
594 (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
596 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
597 (0, payment_preimage, required),
599 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
601 (2, secret, required),
603 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
604 (0, should_broadcast, required),
606 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
607 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
611 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
613 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
615 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
616 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
618 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
619 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
620 /// force-closed now.
621 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
622 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
623 /// required to do so.
624 amount_satoshis: u64,
626 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
627 /// we consider it spendable.
628 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
629 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
630 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
631 amount_satoshis: u64,
632 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
634 confirmation_height: u32,
636 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
637 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
638 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
640 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
641 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
642 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
643 ContentiousClaimable {
644 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
645 /// required to do so.
646 amount_satoshis: u64,
647 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
650 /// The payment hash that locks this HTLC.
651 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
652 /// The preimage that can be used to claim this HTLC.
653 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
655 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
656 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
657 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
658 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
659 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
660 /// which will be required to do so.
661 amount_satoshis: u64,
662 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
664 claimable_height: u32,
665 /// The payment hash whose preimage our counterparty needs to claim this HTLC.
666 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
668 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
669 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
670 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
671 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
672 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
673 /// which will be required to do so.
674 amount_satoshis: u64,
675 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
676 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
678 /// The payment hash whose preimage we need to claim this HTLC.
679 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
681 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
684 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
685 /// following amount.
686 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
687 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
689 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
690 /// were already spent.
691 amount_satoshis: u64,
696 /// The amount claimable, in satoshis. This excludes balances that we are unsure if we are able
697 /// to claim, this is because we are waiting for a preimage or for a timeout to expire. For more
698 /// information on these balances see [`Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC`] and
699 /// [`Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC`].
701 /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
702 pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
704 Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }|
705 Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }|
706 Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }|
707 Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }
709 Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }|
710 Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. }
716 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
717 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
718 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
719 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
720 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
721 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
723 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
724 resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
725 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
726 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
729 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
730 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
731 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
732 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
733 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
734 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
735 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
736 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
737 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
738 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
739 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
740 (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
746 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
747 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
748 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
749 let mut resolving_txid = None;
750 let mut payment_preimage = None;
751 let mut resolving_tx = None;
752 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
753 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
754 (1, resolving_txid, option),
755 (2, payment_preimage, option),
756 (3, resolving_tx, option),
759 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
767 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
768 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
770 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
771 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
773 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
774 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
775 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
776 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
777 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
778 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner> {
780 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
782 pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
785 impl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: Clone {
786 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
787 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone();
788 ChannelMonitor::from_impl(inner)
792 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
793 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner> {
794 latest_update_id: u64,
795 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
797 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
798 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>,
799 counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf,
800 shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
802 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
803 holder_revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint,
804 channel_id: ChannelId,
805 funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
806 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
807 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
809 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
810 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf,
811 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
812 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
813 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
815 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
817 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
818 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
819 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
820 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
821 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
822 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
823 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
824 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
825 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
826 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
827 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
828 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
829 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
830 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
831 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
832 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
834 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,
836 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
837 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
838 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
839 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
840 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
841 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
843 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
845 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
846 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
848 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
850 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
851 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
852 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
854 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
856 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
857 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
858 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
859 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
860 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
861 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
862 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
863 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
864 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
865 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
867 pub(super) pending_events: Vec<Event>,
868 pub(super) is_processing_pending_events: bool,
870 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
871 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
872 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
873 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
875 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
876 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
877 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
878 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
879 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>>,
882 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
884 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
886 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
887 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
888 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
889 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
891 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
892 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
893 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
895 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
896 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
897 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
898 holder_tx_signed: bool,
900 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
901 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
902 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
903 funding_spend_seen: bool,
905 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
906 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
907 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
909 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
910 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
911 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
912 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
913 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
915 /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
916 /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
917 /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
918 /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
919 /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
920 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
922 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
923 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
924 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
925 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
926 // the full block_connected).
927 best_block: BestBlock,
929 /// The node_id of our counterparty
930 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
932 /// Initial counterparty commmitment data needed to recreate the commitment tx
933 /// in the persistence pipeline for third-party watchtowers. This will only be present on
934 /// monitors created after 0.0.117.
936 /// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats,
937 /// to_countersignatory_sats)
938 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>,
940 /// The first block height at which we had no remaining claimable balances.
941 balances_empty_height: Option<u32>,
944 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
945 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
947 impl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
948 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
949 // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
950 // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
952 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
953 let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
954 let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
959 impl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
960 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
961 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
965 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
966 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
967 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
969 impl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
970 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
971 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
973 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
975 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
976 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
978 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
979 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
980 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
981 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
982 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
983 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
985 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
988 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
989 match &self.shutdown_script {
990 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
991 None => ScriptBuf::new().write(writer)?,
994 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
995 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
996 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
997 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
998 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
999 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1000 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1002 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
1003 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
1004 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
1006 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
1007 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1008 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1009 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1010 match second_option {
1011 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1012 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1015 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1020 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1024 writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
1026 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
1028 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1029 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1030 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1031 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
1032 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
1033 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1034 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1038 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1039 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1040 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1041 writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1042 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1043 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
1044 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
1045 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
1046 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1047 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
1051 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1052 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1053 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1054 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1057 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1058 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1059 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1060 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1063 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1064 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1065 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1067 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1070 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1072 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1073 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1075 writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1076 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1077 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1080 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1081 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1082 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => true,
1083 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => true,
1085 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1086 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1088 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1092 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1093 // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` replaced `HolderForceClosed` in v0.0.122. To keep
1094 // backwards compatibility, we write a `HolderForceClosed` event along with the
1095 // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` event. This is deduplicated in the reader.
1096 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1097 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1101 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1102 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1103 event.write(writer)?;
1106 self.best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
1107 writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height.to_be_bytes())?;
1109 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1110 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1111 entry.write(writer)?;
1114 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1115 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1116 txid.write(writer)?;
1117 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1118 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1120 script.write(writer)?;
1123 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1125 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1126 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1128 // If we have a `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` event, we need to write the `HolderForceClosed` for backwards compatibility.
1129 let pending_monitor_events = match self.pending_monitor_events.iter().find(|ev| match ev {
1130 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => true,
1133 Some(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { outpoint, .. }) => {
1134 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.pending_monitor_events.clone();
1135 pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(*outpoint));
1136 pending_monitor_events
1138 _ => self.pending_monitor_events.clone(),
1141 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1142 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1143 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec),
1144 (5, pending_monitor_events, required_vec),
1145 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1146 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1147 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1148 (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
1149 (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
1150 (17, self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
1151 (19, self.channel_id, required),
1152 (21, self.balances_empty_height, option),
1159 macro_rules! _process_events_body {
1160 ($self_opt: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1162 let (pending_events, repeated_events);
1163 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1164 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1165 if inner.is_processing_pending_events {
1168 inner.is_processing_pending_events = true;
1170 pending_events = inner.pending_events.clone();
1171 repeated_events = inner.get_repeated_events();
1173 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1175 for event in pending_events.into_iter().chain(repeated_events.into_iter()) {
1176 $event_to_handle = event;
1180 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1181 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1182 inner.pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1183 inner.is_processing_pending_events = false;
1184 if !inner.pending_events.is_empty() {
1185 // If there's more events to process, go ahead and do so.
1193 pub(super) use _process_events_body as process_events_body;
1195 pub(crate) struct WithChannelMonitor<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
1197 peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
1198 channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1199 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1202 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1203 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
1204 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
1205 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
1206 record.payment_hash = self.payment_hash;
1207 self.logger.log(record)
1211 impl<'a, L: Deref> WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1212 pub(crate) fn from<S: EcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor: &ChannelMonitor<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self {
1213 Self::from_impl(logger, &*monitor.inner.lock().unwrap(), payment_hash)
1216 pub(crate) fn from_impl<S: EcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor_impl: &ChannelMonitorImpl<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self {
1217 let peer_id = monitor_impl.counterparty_node_id;
1218 let channel_id = Some(monitor_impl.channel_id());
1219 WithChannelMonitor {
1220 logger, peer_id, channel_id, payment_hash,
1225 impl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1226 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1227 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1228 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1229 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1230 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1233 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1234 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
1235 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1236 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1237 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1238 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1239 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId,
1240 ) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1242 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1243 let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
1244 &channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.pubkeys().payment_point
1247 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1248 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1249 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1250 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1252 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1253 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1255 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1256 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1257 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1258 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1260 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1261 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1263 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1264 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1265 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1266 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1267 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1268 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1269 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1270 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1272 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1275 let onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(
1276 channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id, destination_script.into(), keys,
1277 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx
1280 let mut outputs_to_watch = new_hash_map();
1281 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1283 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1284 latest_update_id: 0,
1285 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1287 destination_script: destination_script.into(),
1288 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1289 counterparty_payment_script,
1293 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1296 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1297 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1299 counterparty_commitment_params,
1300 funding_redeemscript,
1301 channel_value_satoshis,
1302 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1304 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1306 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1307 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: new_hash_map(),
1308 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: new_hash_map(),
1309 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: new_hash_map(),
1310 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: new_hash_map(),
1312 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1313 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1314 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1315 current_holder_commitment_number,
1317 payment_preimages: new_hash_map(),
1318 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1319 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1320 is_processing_pending_events: false,
1322 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1327 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1328 holder_tx_signed: false,
1329 funding_spend_seen: false,
1330 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1331 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1332 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1333 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
1336 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1337 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None,
1338 balances_empty_height: None,
1343 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1344 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1347 /// A variant of `Self::provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx` used to provide
1348 /// additional information to the monitor to store in order to recreate the initial
1349 /// counterparty commitment transaction during persistence (mainly for use in third-party
1352 /// This is used to provide the counterparty commitment information directly to the monitor
1353 /// before the initial persistence of a new channel.
1354 pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1355 &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1356 commitment_number: u64, their_cur_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
1357 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, logger: &L,
1359 where L::Target: Logger
1361 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1362 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner, None);
1363 inner.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid,
1364 htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_cur_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
1365 to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, &logger);
1368 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1369 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1370 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1371 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1373 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1376 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1377 commitment_number: u64,
1378 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1380 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1381 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1382 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner, None);
1383 inner.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1384 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, &logger)
1388 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1389 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1390 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1391 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1392 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new(), Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
1395 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1396 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1397 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1399 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1400 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1402 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1405 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1406 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1409 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1410 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner, Some(*payment_hash));
1411 inner.provide_payment_preimage(
1412 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1415 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1418 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1419 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1421 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1427 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1428 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1431 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1432 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner, None);
1433 inner.update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1436 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1438 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1439 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1442 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1443 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
1444 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1447 /// Gets the channel_id of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1448 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1449 self.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id()
1452 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1453 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1454 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>)> {
1455 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1456 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1459 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1460 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1461 /// have been registered.
1462 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, filter: &F, logger: &L)
1464 F::Target: chain::Filter, L::Target: Logger,
1466 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1467 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*lock, None);
1468 log_trace!(&logger, "Registering funding outpoint {}", &lock.get_funding_txo().0);
1469 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1470 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1471 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1472 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1473 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 };
1474 log_trace!(logger, "Registering outpoint {} with the filter for monitoring spends", outpoint);
1475 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1478 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1484 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1485 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1486 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1487 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1490 /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
1492 /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
1493 /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
1494 /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
1495 /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
1496 /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
1498 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
1499 /// order to handle these events.
1501 /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
1502 /// [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
1503 pub fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: &H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
1505 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
1508 /// Processes any events asynchronously.
1510 /// See [`Self::process_pending_events`] for more information.
1511 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
1515 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, { handler(ev).await });
1519 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1520 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1521 let mut lck = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1522 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut lck.pending_events);
1523 ret.append(&mut lck.get_repeated_events());
1527 /// Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment
1528 /// transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of
1529 /// the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for
1530 /// watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions.
1532 /// This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except
1533 /// that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update.
1535 /// This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading
1536 /// to LDK 0.0.117+.
1538 /// [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel
1539 pub fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
1540 self.inner.lock().unwrap().initial_counterparty_commitment_tx()
1543 /// Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This
1544 /// may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned
1545 /// commitment transactions are unsigned.
1547 /// This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build
1548 /// justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be
1549 /// used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided
1550 /// with a monitor and an update. Once revoked, signing a justice transaction can be done using
1551 /// [`Self::sign_to_local_justice_tx`].
1553 /// It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty
1554 /// commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which
1555 /// the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the
1556 /// monitor can sign the justice transaction.
1558 /// This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after
1559 /// upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which
1560 /// may have been created prior to upgrading.
1562 /// [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel
1563 pub fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
1564 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(update)
1567 /// Wrapper around [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`] to make
1568 /// signing the justice transaction easier for implementors of
1569 /// [`chain::chainmonitor::Persist`]. On success this method returns the provided transaction
1570 /// signing the input at `input_idx`. This method will only produce a valid signature for
1571 /// a transaction spending the `to_local` output of a commitment transaction, i.e. this cannot
1572 /// be used for revoked HTLC outputs.
1574 /// `Value` is the value of the output being spent by the input at `input_idx`, committed
1575 /// in the BIP 143 signature.
1577 /// This method will only succeed if this monitor has received the revocation secret for the
1578 /// provided `commitment_number`. If a commitment number is provided that does not correspond
1579 /// to the commitment transaction being revoked, this will return a signed transaction, but
1580 /// the signature will not be valid.
1582 /// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`]: crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output
1583 /// [`Persist`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist
1584 pub fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(&self, justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
1585 self.inner.lock().unwrap().sign_to_local_justice_tx(justice_tx, input_idx, value, commitment_number)
1588 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1589 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1592 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1593 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1596 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1597 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1600 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1602 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1604 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1605 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1608 /// You may use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1609 /// a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our
1610 /// counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1612 /// Broadcasting these transactions in this manner is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1613 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1614 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1615 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1617 pub fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1618 &self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L
1621 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1622 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1625 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1626 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
1627 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner, None);
1628 inner.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
1631 /// Unsafe test-only version of `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` used by our test framework
1632 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1633 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1634 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1635 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1636 where L::Target: Logger {
1637 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1638 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner, None);
1639 inner.unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&logger)
1642 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1643 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1644 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1645 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1646 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1647 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1649 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1650 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1652 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1653 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1656 txdata: &TransactionData,
1661 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1663 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1664 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1667 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1668 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner, None);
1669 inner.block_connected(
1670 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1673 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1675 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1683 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1684 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1687 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1688 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner, None);
1689 inner.block_disconnected(
1690 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1693 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1694 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1696 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1697 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1699 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1700 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1703 txdata: &TransactionData,
1708 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1710 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1711 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1714 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1715 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1716 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner, None);
1717 inner.transactions_confirmed(
1718 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger)
1721 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1723 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1724 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1726 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1727 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1734 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1735 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1738 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1739 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1740 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner, None);
1741 inner.transaction_unconfirmed(
1742 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1746 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1747 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1749 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1750 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1752 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1753 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1760 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1762 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1763 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1766 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1767 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1768 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner, None);
1769 inner.best_block_updated(
1770 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1774 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1775 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1776 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1777 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1779 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.height, entry.block_hash))
1780 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1782 txids.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0).then(b.1.cmp(&a.1)));
1783 txids.dedup_by_key(|(txid, _, _)| *txid);
1787 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1788 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1789 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1790 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1793 /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
1794 /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
1795 /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
1796 /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
1797 /// connections, like on mobile.
1798 pub fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1799 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
1802 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1803 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1806 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1807 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1808 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner, None);
1809 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1810 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1811 current_height, FeerateStrategy::HighestOfPreviousOrNew, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1815 /// Returns true if the monitor has pending claim requests that are not fully confirmed yet.
1816 pub fn has_pending_claims(&self) -> bool
1818 self.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.has_pending_claims()
1821 /// Triggers rebroadcasts of pending claims from a force-closed channel after a transaction
1822 /// signature generation failure.
1823 pub fn signer_unblocked<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1824 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
1827 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1828 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1831 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1832 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1833 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner, None);
1834 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1835 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1836 current_height, FeerateStrategy::RetryPrevious, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1840 /// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the
1841 /// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]
1842 /// confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be
1843 /// returned, the transaction must have at least `max(ANTI_REORG_DELAY, to_self_delay)`
1846 /// Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`]
1847 /// once they are no longer under reorg risk. This method serves as a way to retrieve these
1848 /// descriptors at a later time, either for historical purposes, or to replay any
1849 /// missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the
1850 /// channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns
1851 /// an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending
1852 /// transactions starting from the channel's funding transaction and going down three levels.
1854 /// `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any
1855 /// outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned.
1857 /// `confirmation_height` must be the height of the block in which `tx` was included in.
1858 pub fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction, confirmation_height: u32) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1859 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1860 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1861 let mut spendable_outputs = inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx);
1862 spendable_outputs.retain(|descriptor| {
1863 let mut conf_threshold = current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1;
1864 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) = descriptor {
1865 conf_threshold = cmp::min(conf_threshold,
1866 current_height.saturating_sub(descriptor.to_self_delay as u32) + 1);
1868 conf_threshold >= confirmation_height
1873 /// Checks if the monitor is fully resolved. Resolved monitor is one that has claimed all of
1874 /// its outputs and balances (i.e. [`Self::get_claimable_balances`] returns an empty set).
1876 /// This function returns true only if [`Self::get_claimable_balances`] has been empty for at least
1877 /// 4032 blocks as an additional protection against any bugs resulting in spuriously empty balance sets.
1878 pub fn is_fully_resolved<L: Logger>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool {
1879 let mut is_all_funds_claimed = self.get_claimable_balances().is_empty();
1880 let current_height = self.current_best_block().height;
1881 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1883 if is_all_funds_claimed {
1884 if !inner.funding_spend_seen {
1885 debug_assert!(false, "We should see funding spend by the time a monitor clears out");
1886 is_all_funds_claimed = false;
1890 const BLOCKS_THRESHOLD: u32 = 4032; // ~four weeks
1891 match (inner.balances_empty_height, is_all_funds_claimed) {
1892 (Some(balances_empty_height), true) => {
1893 // Claimed all funds, check if reached the blocks threshold.
1894 return current_height >= balances_empty_height + BLOCKS_THRESHOLD;
1896 (Some(_), false) => {
1897 // previously assumed we claimed all funds, but we have new funds to claim.
1898 // Should not happen in practice.
1899 debug_assert!(false, "Thought we were done claiming funds, but claimable_balances now has entries");
1901 "WARNING: LDK thought it was done claiming all the available funds in the ChannelMonitor for channel {}, but later decided it had more to claim. This is potentially an important bug in LDK, please report it at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/new",
1902 inner.get_funding_txo().0);
1903 inner.balances_empty_height = None;
1907 // Claimed all funds but `balances_empty_height` is None. It is set to the
1908 // current block height.
1910 "ChannelMonitor funded at {} is now fully resolved. It will become archivable in {} blocks",
1911 inner.get_funding_txo().0, BLOCKS_THRESHOLD);
1912 inner.balances_empty_height = Some(current_height);
1916 // Have funds to claim.
1923 pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1924 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script.clone()
1928 pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: ScriptBuf) {
1929 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script;
1933 pub fn do_signer_call<F: FnMut(&Signer) -> ()>(&self, mut f: F) {
1934 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1935 f(&inner.onchain_tx_handler.signer);
1939 impl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1940 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1941 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1942 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1943 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1944 -> Option<Balance> {
1945 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1946 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1948 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1949 let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
1950 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1951 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1952 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1953 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1955 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1956 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1957 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1958 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1959 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1960 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1961 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1962 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1963 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1965 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1966 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1967 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1968 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1969 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1970 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1971 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1972 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1974 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1975 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1976 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1977 .any(|(input_idx, inp)|
1978 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1979 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx &&
1980 // A maturing output for an HTLC claim will always be at the same
1981 // index as the HTLC input. This is true pre-anchors, as there's
1982 // only 1 input and 1 output. This is also true post-anchors,
1983 // because we have a SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY signature from our
1984 // channel counterparty.
1985 descriptor.outpoint.index as usize == input_idx
1989 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1990 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1995 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1996 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1997 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1998 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
1999 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
2000 htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
2003 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
2005 let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
2006 let htlc_output_to_spend =
2007 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
2008 // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
2009 // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
2010 // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
2011 // in the commitment.
2012 if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
2013 let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
2014 .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
2015 .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
2016 debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
2017 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
2019 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
2020 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
2023 htlc_commitment_outpoint
2025 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
2027 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
2028 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
2029 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2030 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2031 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2033 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
2034 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
2035 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
2036 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
2037 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
2038 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2039 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
2040 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
2041 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2042 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2043 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
2045 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
2046 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
2047 tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
2049 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
2050 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
2052 })).unwrap_or(false) {
2057 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
2058 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
2059 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
2060 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
2061 // need to do so again here.
2063 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
2064 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
2065 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
2066 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
2067 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
2068 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2071 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
2072 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
2073 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
2074 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2075 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
2076 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2077 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2078 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2081 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
2082 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2083 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2084 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2087 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2088 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
2089 // we know the preimage.
2090 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
2091 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
2092 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2093 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
2094 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
2095 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2096 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2097 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2100 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
2101 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2102 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2103 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2104 payment_preimage: *payment_preimage,
2107 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
2108 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
2109 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2110 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2111 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2118 impl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
2119 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
2120 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
2123 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
2124 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
2125 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
2126 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
2128 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
2129 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, not all or excess balances may be included.
2131 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
2132 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
2133 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
2134 let mut res = Vec::new();
2135 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2137 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
2138 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
2139 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
2140 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2141 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
2144 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
2145 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
2148 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
2149 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
2150 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
2151 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
2152 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
2155 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2156 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2157 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
2158 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2160 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
2168 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
2169 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
2170 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
2171 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
2172 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2173 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2174 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2175 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
2177 Some(descriptor.output.value)
2180 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2181 amount_satoshis: value.to_sat(),
2182 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2185 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
2186 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
2187 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
2190 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2191 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2193 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2194 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
2195 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
2196 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
2197 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
2198 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
2199 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
2200 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2201 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
2203 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2204 amount_satoshis: output.value.to_sat(),
2205 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
2207 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
2208 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
2209 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
2210 ).unwrap_or(false) {
2211 spent_counterparty_output = true;
2217 if spent_counterparty_output {
2218 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
2219 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
2220 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
2221 if output_spendable {
2222 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
2223 amount_satoshis: amt.to_sat(),
2227 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
2228 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
2231 found_commitment_tx = true;
2232 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2233 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2234 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2235 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2236 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2237 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2240 found_commitment_tx = true;
2241 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2242 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2243 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2244 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2245 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2246 amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
2247 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2250 found_commitment_tx = true;
2253 if !found_commitment_tx {
2254 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2255 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
2256 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
2257 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
2258 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2259 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2260 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2265 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
2266 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2267 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
2269 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
2270 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2271 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2272 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2274 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
2275 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
2277 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
2278 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
2279 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
2280 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2281 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2282 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2286 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
2287 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
2294 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
2295 /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
2296 /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
2298 /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
2299 /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
2300 /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
2301 pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2302 let mut res = new_hash_map();
2303 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
2304 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
2305 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2306 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
2308 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2309 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2310 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2311 res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
2312 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
2318 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2319 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2321 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2322 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2327 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
2328 /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
2330 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
2332 /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
2333 /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
2334 pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2335 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2336 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
2337 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
2338 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
2339 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2340 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2341 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
2347 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
2348 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
2349 // closed), just get the full set.
2351 return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
2354 let mut res = new_hash_map();
2355 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2356 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2357 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
2358 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
2359 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
2360 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
2362 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
2363 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
2364 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
2365 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
2366 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
2367 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2368 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
2369 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
2370 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
2371 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
2372 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
2373 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
2374 us.best_block.height >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
2375 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
2376 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
2377 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
2379 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
2382 let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
2383 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
2384 if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
2385 res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
2392 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
2393 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2394 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
2395 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
2396 Some((a, &**source))
2399 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2400 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2401 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2403 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2404 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2405 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2406 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2414 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
2415 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
2419 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
2420 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
2421 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
2423 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
2424 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
2425 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
2426 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
2427 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
2428 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
2430 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
2431 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
2432 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
2433 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
2434 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
2435 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
2436 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
2437 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
2439 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
2440 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $per_commitment_outpoints: expr) => {
2441 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $per_commitment_outpoints {
2442 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2443 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2444 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
2445 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
2446 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
2447 // payment_preimage.
2448 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
2449 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
2450 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
2451 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
2453 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
2455 let mut matched_htlc = false;
2456 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
2457 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
2458 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
2459 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
2460 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
2461 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
2462 matched_htlc = true;
2466 if matched_htlc { continue; }
2467 if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
2470 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2471 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
2473 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
2474 *update_source != **source
2479 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2480 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
2481 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
2482 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
2483 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
2484 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2485 source: (**source).clone(),
2486 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
2487 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
2488 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
2491 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
2492 &htlc.payment_hash, $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2493 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2494 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2500 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2501 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid));
2503 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2504 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid));
2509 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2510 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2511 // in-line tests later.
2514 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2515 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2516 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2517 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2518 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2519 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2520 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2521 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2526 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2527 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2530 impl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2531 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2532 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2533 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2534 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2535 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2536 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2539 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2540 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2541 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2542 if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
2543 let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2544 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2545 for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2546 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2547 if !cur_claimables.iter()
2548 .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
2550 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
2554 for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2558 assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
2562 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2563 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2564 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2565 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2566 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2568 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2569 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2570 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2574 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2575 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2576 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2581 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2588 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2597 fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2598 &mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2599 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
2600 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2601 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2602 self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info = Some((their_per_commitment_point.clone(),
2603 feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value));
2605 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2606 let rebuilt_commitment_tx = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_tx().unwrap();
2607 debug_assert_eq!(rebuilt_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), txid);
2610 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number,
2611 their_per_commitment_point, logger);
2614 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2615 &mut self, txid: Txid,
2616 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2617 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2618 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2619 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2620 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2621 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2623 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2624 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2627 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2628 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2629 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2630 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2631 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2632 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2633 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2634 Some(old_points) => {
2635 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2636 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2637 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2638 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2639 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2641 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2644 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2648 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2651 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2652 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2653 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2659 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2660 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2661 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2662 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2663 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2664 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, mut htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)], nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2665 if htlc_outputs.iter().any(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()) {
2666 // If we have non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, ensure they match the HTLCs in the
2667 // `holder_commitment_tx`. In the future, we'll no longer provide the redundant data
2668 // and just pass in source data via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
2669 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len());
2670 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).map(|(h, _, _)| h).zip(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()) {
2671 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2673 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2674 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, s, _)| s.as_ref()).zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter()) {
2675 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2677 debug_assert!(nondust_htlc_sources.is_empty());
2679 // If we don't have any non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, assume they were all passed via
2680 // `nondust_htlc_sources`, building up the final htlc_outputs by combining
2681 // `nondust_htlc_sources` and the `holder_commitment_tx`
2682 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2684 for htlc in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter() {
2685 assert!(htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32 > prev);
2686 prev = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32;
2689 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(htlc, _, _)| htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()));
2690 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(_, sig_opt, _)| sig_opt.is_none()));
2691 debug_assert_eq!(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2693 let mut sources_iter = nondust_htlc_sources.into_iter();
2695 for (htlc, counterparty_sig) in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()
2696 .zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter())
2699 let source = sources_iter.next().expect("Non-dust HTLC sources didn't match commitment tx");
2700 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2701 assert!(source.possibly_matches_output(htlc));
2703 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), Some(source)));
2705 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), None));
2708 debug_assert!(sources_iter.next().is_none());
2711 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2712 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2713 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2714 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2715 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
2717 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2718 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2719 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2720 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2721 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2723 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2724 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2726 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2727 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2728 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2729 for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
2730 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2731 let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2732 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2733 assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
2734 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2735 SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
2739 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
2741 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2742 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2747 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2748 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2749 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2750 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2751 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>)
2752 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2753 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2756 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2758 let confirmed_spend_txid = self.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2759 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| match event.event {
2760 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => Some(event.txid),
2764 let confirmed_spend_txid = if let Some(txid) = confirmed_spend_txid {
2770 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2771 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2772 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2773 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr, $htlcs: expr) => {
2774 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None, $htlcs);
2775 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2778 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2779 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2780 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2781 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid, self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid));
2783 debug_assert!(false);
2784 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2789 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2790 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2791 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2792 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid, self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid));
2794 debug_assert!(false);
2795 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2801 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2802 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2803 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2804 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2805 // holder commitment transactions.
2806 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2807 let holder_commitment_tx = if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2808 Some(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx)
2809 } else if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2810 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2811 Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx)
2818 if let Some(holder_commitment_tx) = holder_commitment_tx {
2819 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2820 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2822 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height);
2823 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2828 fn generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(&mut self, reason: ClosureReason) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Vec<TransactionOutputs>) {
2829 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2830 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(),
2831 self.channel_value_satoshis,
2832 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
2834 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2835 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2836 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp),
2837 self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height
2839 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![commitment_package];
2840 let event = MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo {
2842 outpoint: self.funding_info.0,
2843 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2845 self.pending_monitor_events.push(event);
2847 // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
2848 // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
2849 // new channel updates.
2850 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2851 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2852 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
2853 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
2854 // `transactions_confirmed`.
2855 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2856 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2857 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2858 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2859 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(
2860 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height
2862 let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
2863 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(
2864 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx
2866 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2867 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2869 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2871 (claimable_outpoints, watch_outputs)
2874 pub(crate) fn queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2875 &mut self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2878 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2879 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2882 let (claimable_outpoints, _) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) });
2883 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2884 claimable_outpoints, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster,
2885 fee_estimator, logger
2889 fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2890 &mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2892 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2893 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2896 if self.latest_update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2897 log_info!(logger, "Applying post-force-closed update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2898 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2899 } else if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2900 log_info!(logger, "Applying force close update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2901 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2903 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
2904 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2907 if updates.counterparty_node_id.is_some() {
2908 if self.counterparty_node_id.is_none() {
2909 self.counterparty_node_id = updates.counterparty_node_id;
2911 debug_assert_eq!(self.counterparty_node_id, updates.counterparty_node_id);
2915 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
2916 // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
2917 // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
2918 // sentinel value instead.
2920 // The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
2921 // thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
2923 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2924 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2925 match updates.updates[0] {
2926 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
2927 // We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
2928 // provide a preimage at this point.
2929 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
2930 debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
2932 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2933 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2936 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2937 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2939 let mut ret = Ok(());
2940 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
2941 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2943 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
2944 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2945 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2946 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources.clone()) {
2947 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2948 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2952 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2953 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2954 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2956 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2957 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2958 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2960 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2961 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2962 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2963 debug_assert!(false, "Latest counterparty commitment secret was invalid");
2964 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2965 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2969 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2970 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2971 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2972 if *should_broadcast {
2973 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
2974 // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
2975 // duplicate/conflicting.
2976 let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
2977 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
2978 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
2981 if detected_funding_spend {
2982 log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
2985 self.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
2986 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2987 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2988 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.channel_id());
2989 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn to take manual action!");
2991 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager
2992 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2993 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2994 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2997 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2998 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2999 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
3000 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
3006 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
3007 self.counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(updates);
3010 // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
3011 // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
3012 if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
3016 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
3018 // Refuse updates after we've detected a spend onchain, but only if we haven't processed a
3019 // force closed monitor update yet.
3020 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen && self.latest_update_id != CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
3021 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
3026 fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3027 self.latest_update_id
3030 fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
3034 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
3038 fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>> {
3039 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
3040 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
3041 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
3042 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
3043 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
3045 &self.outputs_to_watch
3048 fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
3049 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3050 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
3054 /// Gets the set of events that are repeated regularly (e.g. those which RBF bump
3055 /// transactions). We're okay if we lose these on restart as they'll be regenerated for us at
3056 /// some regular interval via [`ChannelMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims`].
3057 pub(super) fn get_repeated_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
3058 let pending_claim_events = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events();
3059 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pending_claim_events.len());
3060 for (claim_id, claim_event) in pending_claim_events {
3062 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
3063 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
3065 let channel_id = self.channel_id;
3066 // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels,
3067 // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some`
3069 let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap();
3070 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3071 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
3072 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
3073 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
3074 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value.to_sat());
3075 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
3077 counterparty_node_id,
3079 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
3081 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
3082 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
3083 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
3084 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3085 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3086 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
3088 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
3089 txid: commitment_txid,
3090 vout: anchor_output_idx,
3096 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
3097 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs, tx_lock_time,
3099 let channel_id = self.channel_id;
3100 // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels,
3101 // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some`
3103 let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap();
3104 let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
3106 htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
3107 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
3108 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3109 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3110 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
3112 commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
3113 per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
3114 per_commitment_point: htlc.per_commitment_point,
3117 preimage: htlc.preimage,
3118 counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
3121 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
3123 counterparty_node_id,
3125 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
3135 fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
3136 let (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value,
3137 to_countersignatory_value) = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info?;
3138 let htlc_outputs = vec![];
3140 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
3141 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value,
3142 feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs);
3146 fn build_counterparty_commitment_tx(
3147 &self, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
3148 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3149 mut nondust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>
3150 ) -> CommitmentTransaction {
3151 let broadcaster_keys = &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters
3152 .counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys;
3153 let countersignatory_keys =
3154 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys;
3156 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey;
3157 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey;
3158 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&their_per_commitment_point,
3159 &broadcaster_keys, &countersignatory_keys, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx);
3160 let channel_parameters =
3161 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable();
3163 CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
3164 to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, broadcaster_funding_key,
3165 countersignatory_funding_key, keys, feerate_per_kw, &mut nondust_htlcs,
3169 fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
3170 update.updates.iter().filter_map(|update| {
3172 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid,
3173 ref htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point,
3174 feerate_per_kw: Some(feerate_per_kw),
3175 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(to_broadcaster_value),
3176 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(to_countersignatory_value) } => {
3178 let nondust_htlcs = htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _)| {
3179 htlc.transaction_output_index.map(|_| (htlc.clone(), None))
3180 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3182 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_number,
3183 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value,
3184 to_countersignatory_value, feerate_per_kw, nondust_htlcs);
3186 debug_assert_eq!(commitment_tx.trust().txid(), commitment_txid);
3195 fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(
3196 &self, mut justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64
3197 ) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
3198 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).ok_or(())?;
3199 let per_commitment_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secret).map_err(|_| ())?;
3200 let their_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(
3201 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3203 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3204 &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &their_per_commitment_point);
3205 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3206 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &their_per_commitment_point);
3207 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3208 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3210 let sig = self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(
3211 &justice_tx, input_idx, value, &per_commitment_key, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx)?;
3212 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push_ecdsa_signature(&BitcoinSignature::sighash_all(sig));
3213 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(&[1u8]);
3214 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(revokeable_redeemscript.as_bytes());
3218 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
3219 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
3220 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
3223 fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
3224 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
3227 fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3228 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
3231 fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3232 self.current_holder_commitment_number
3235 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
3236 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
3237 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
3238 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
3240 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s) and general information about the output that
3241 /// is to the counterparty in the commitment transaction.
3242 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
3243 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
3244 where L::Target: Logger {
3245 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
3246 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
3247 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3248 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
3250 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
3251 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
3253 macro_rules! ignore_error {
3254 ( $thing : expr ) => {
3257 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
3262 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
3263 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
3264 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
3265 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
3266 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3267 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,);
3268 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
3270 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3271 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
3273 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
3274 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3275 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3276 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
3277 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height);
3278 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3279 to_counterparty_output_info =
3280 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3284 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
3285 if let Some(per_commitment_claimable_data) = per_commitment_option {
3286 for (htlc, _) in per_commitment_claimable_data {
3287 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3288 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
3289 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.to_bitcoin_amount() {
3290 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3291 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
3293 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
3294 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, height);
3295 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3300 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
3301 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
3302 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
3303 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
3304 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3306 if let Some(per_commitment_claimable_data) = per_commitment_option {
3307 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3308 block_hash, per_commitment_claimable_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3309 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3312 // Our fuzzers aren't constrained by pesky things like valid signatures, so can
3313 // spend our funding output with a transaction which doesn't match our past
3314 // commitment transactions. Thus, we can only debug-assert here when not
3316 debug_assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
3317 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3318 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
3321 } else if let Some(per_commitment_claimable_data) = per_commitment_option {
3322 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
3323 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
3324 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
3325 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
3326 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
3327 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
3329 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3331 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
3332 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3333 per_commitment_claimable_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3334 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3336 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
3337 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx), per_commitment_option);
3338 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
3339 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
3340 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
3344 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
3347 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
3348 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>, per_commitment_option: Option<&Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>)
3349 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
3350 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3351 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
3353 let per_commitment_claimable_data = match per_commitment_option {
3354 Some(outputs) => outputs,
3355 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3357 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
3358 Some(points) => points,
3359 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3362 let per_commitment_point =
3363 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
3364 // per-commitment point
3365 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
3366 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
3367 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
3368 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
3369 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
3370 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
3372 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
3373 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
3375 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3376 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
3377 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point);
3379 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &per_commitment_point);
3381 let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3382 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3383 &delayed_key).to_p2wsh();
3384 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
3385 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3386 to_counterparty_output_info =
3387 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3392 for &(ref htlc, _) in per_commitment_claimable_data.iter() {
3393 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3394 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3395 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
3396 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.to_bitcoin_amount() {
3397 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3398 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
3401 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
3402 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
3403 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
3404 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
3405 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3406 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3407 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3408 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3410 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
3411 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3412 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3413 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3414 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3416 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry, 0);
3417 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
3422 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
3425 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
3426 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
3427 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
3428 ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
3429 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
3430 let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
3432 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
3434 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3436 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
3437 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
3438 let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
3439 // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
3440 // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
3441 // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
3442 // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
3443 // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
3444 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
3446 // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
3447 // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
3448 // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
3449 for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
3450 if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
3451 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
3452 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
3453 per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3454 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
3455 tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3458 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3459 htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
3460 height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height
3462 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3463 if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
3464 outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
3466 outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
3469 (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
3472 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
3473 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
3474 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
3475 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>) {
3476 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3478 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
3479 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
3481 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3482 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3483 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
3484 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
3485 htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3489 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
3492 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3495 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
3496 payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3500 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3501 holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
3502 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
3503 htlc.cltv_expiry, conf_height
3505 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
3509 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
3512 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
3513 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
3514 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3515 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3516 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3517 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
3523 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
3524 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
3525 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
3526 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
3527 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
3528 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
3529 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
3530 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3532 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
3533 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
3534 claim_requests = $updates.0;
3535 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
3536 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
3540 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
3541 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
3543 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3544 is_holder_tx = true;
3545 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3546 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
3547 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
3548 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3549 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3550 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
3551 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
3552 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3553 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3554 is_holder_tx = true;
3555 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3556 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
3557 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
3558 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3559 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3560 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
3566 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
3572 /// Cancels any existing pending claims for a commitment that previously confirmed and has now
3573 /// been replaced by another.
3574 pub fn cancel_prev_commitment_claims<L: Deref>(
3575 &mut self, logger: &L, confirmed_commitment_txid: &Txid
3576 ) where L::Target: Logger {
3577 for (counterparty_commitment_txid, _) in &self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain {
3578 // Cancel any pending claims for counterparty commitments we've seen confirm.
3579 if counterparty_commitment_txid == confirmed_commitment_txid {
3582 // If we have generated claims for counterparty_commitment_txid earlier, we can rely on always
3583 // having claim related htlcs for counterparty_commitment_txid in counterparty_claimable_outpoints.
3584 for (htlc, _) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(counterparty_commitment_txid).unwrap_or(&vec![]) {
3585 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously confirmed counterparty commitment {}",
3586 counterparty_commitment_txid);
3587 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: *counterparty_commitment_txid, vout: 0 };
3588 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3589 outpoint.vout = vout;
3590 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3594 if self.holder_tx_signed {
3595 // If we've signed, we may have broadcast either commitment (prev or current), and
3596 // attempted to claim from it immediately without waiting for a confirmation.
3597 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3598 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3599 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3600 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3601 for (htlc, _, _) in &self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3602 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3603 outpoint.vout = vout;
3604 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3608 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3609 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3610 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3611 prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3612 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3613 for (htlc, _, _) in &prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3614 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3615 outpoint.vout = vout;
3616 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3622 // No previous claim.
3626 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
3627 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
3628 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3629 &mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3630 ) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3631 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
3632 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3633 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3634 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3635 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
3636 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
3637 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3638 return holder_transactions;
3640 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3641 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3642 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3643 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3644 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3648 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_maybe_signed_htlc_tx(
3649 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage
3651 if htlc_tx.is_fully_signed() {
3652 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx.0);
3660 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3661 &mut self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B,
3662 fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3663 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3664 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3665 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3668 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3669 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3671 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3672 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
3675 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3680 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3681 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3682 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3684 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3685 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3688 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3690 if height > self.best_block.height {
3691 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3692 log_trace!(logger, "Connecting new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3693 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3694 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash {
3695 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3696 log_trace!(logger, "Best block re-orged, replaced with new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3697 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
3698 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3700 } else { Vec::new() }
3703 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3706 txdata: &TransactionData,
3709 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3710 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3711 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3713 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3714 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3717 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
3718 for tx in &txn_matched {
3719 let mut output_val = Amount::ZERO;
3720 for out in tx.output.iter() {
3721 if out.value > Amount::MAX_MONEY { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3722 output_val += out.value;
3723 if output_val > Amount::MAX_MONEY { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3727 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3729 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3730 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3731 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
3732 let txid = tx.txid();
3733 log_trace!(logger, "Transaction {} confirmed in block {}", txid , block_hash);
3734 // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
3735 if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
3736 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3739 for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3740 if ev.txid == txid {
3741 if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
3742 assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
3743 "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
3744 This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
3746 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3750 for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
3751 if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
3752 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3756 for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
3757 if txid == *spendable_txid {
3758 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3763 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
3764 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
3765 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
3766 // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
3767 // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
3768 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
3769 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
3770 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
3771 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
3772 &self.channel_id(), txid);
3773 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
3774 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
3775 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
3776 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
3777 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3778 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3781 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3782 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
3784 let mut new_watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3785 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3786 new_watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3788 watch_outputs.push((txid, new_watch_outputs));
3790 let (mut new_outpoints, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
3791 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3792 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
3794 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3797 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3799 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
3801 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
3802 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
3803 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
3804 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
3807 // Now that we've detected a confirmed commitment transaction, attempt to cancel
3808 // pending claims for any commitments that were previously confirmed such that
3809 // we don't continue claiming inputs that no longer exist.
3810 self.cancel_prev_commitment_claims(&logger, &txid);
3813 if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
3814 // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
3815 // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
3816 // other ways which can have more than one output.
3817 for tx_input in &tx.input {
3818 let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
3819 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
3820 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
3821 &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
3823 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3824 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
3825 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3827 // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
3828 // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
3829 // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
3830 // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
3834 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3836 self.check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3840 if height > self.best_block.height {
3841 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3844 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3847 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
3848 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
3849 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
3850 /// complexity especially in
3851 /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
3853 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
3854 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
3855 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3858 conf_hash: BlockHash,
3859 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
3860 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
3861 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
3863 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3864 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3865 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3867 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3868 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3871 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
3872 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height >= conf_height);
3874 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
3875 if should_broadcast {
3876 let (mut new_outpoints, mut new_outputs) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut);
3877 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3878 watch_outputs.append(&mut new_outputs);
3881 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3882 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3883 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3884 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3885 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3886 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3887 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3889 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3893 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3894 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3895 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3897 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3898 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3902 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3903 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3905 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3906 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3908 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3909 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3910 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3913 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3914 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3915 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3916 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3918 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3919 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3920 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3921 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3922 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3925 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3926 &payment_hash, entry.txid);
3927 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3929 payment_preimage: None,
3930 source: source.clone(),
3931 htlc_value_satoshis,
3933 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3934 commitment_tx_output_idx,
3935 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3936 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3937 payment_preimage: None,
3940 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3941 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3942 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3943 outputs: vec![descriptor],
3944 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3946 self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
3948 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3949 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3950 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
3951 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3952 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3953 payment_preimage: preimage,
3956 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3957 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3958 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3963 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3964 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3966 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3967 // updating the latter in the process.
3968 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3969 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3970 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3974 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3975 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3976 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3977 for tx in &txn_matched {
3978 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3979 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3980 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3981 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3989 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3990 &mut self, header: &Header, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3991 ) where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3992 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3995 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3998 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3999 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
4000 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
4002 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
4003 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
4005 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
4008 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4012 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
4013 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4015 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4016 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4019 let mut removed_height = None;
4020 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
4021 if entry.txid == *txid {
4022 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
4027 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
4028 log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
4029 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
4030 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
4035 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
4037 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
4040 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
4041 /// transactions thereof.
4042 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
4043 let mut matched_txn = new_hash_set();
4044 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
4045 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
4046 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4047 if matches { break; }
4048 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
4053 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
4056 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
4059 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
4060 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
4061 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4062 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
4063 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
4064 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
4067 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
4068 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
4069 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
4070 if _script_pubkey.is_p2wsh() {
4071 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
4072 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
4073 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
4074 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
4078 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&ScriptBuf::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
4079 } else if _script_pubkey.is_p2wpkh() {
4080 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
4081 } else { panic!(); }
4092 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
4093 &self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
4094 ) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
4095 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
4096 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
4097 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
4098 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
4099 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
4105 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
4106 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
4107 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
4108 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
4109 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
4110 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
4111 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
4112 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
4113 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
4114 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
4115 let height = self.best_block.height;
4116 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
4117 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
4118 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
4119 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
4120 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
4121 // time out the HTLC first.
4122 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
4123 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
4124 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
4125 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
4126 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
4127 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
4128 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
4129 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
4130 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
4131 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
4132 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
4133 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
4134 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4135 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4136 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4137 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
4138 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
4139 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
4140 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
4141 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
4142 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
4143 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
4144 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
4145 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4152 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
4154 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4155 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4156 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4159 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4160 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4161 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4168 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
4169 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
4170 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(
4171 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4172 ) where L::Target: Logger {
4173 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
4174 let mut payment_data = None;
4175 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
4176 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
4177 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
4178 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4179 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
4180 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
4181 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4182 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
4184 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4185 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
4186 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
4189 macro_rules! log_claim {
4190 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
4191 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
4192 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
4194 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4195 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4196 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4197 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4198 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
4199 // matched by any HTLC spend:
4200 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4201 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
4202 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
4203 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
4204 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
4205 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
4206 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
4207 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4208 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4209 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
4211 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
4212 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4213 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4214 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
4219 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
4220 ($htlc_output: expr, $per_commitment_data: expr) => {
4221 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in $per_commitment_data {
4222 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
4223 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
4224 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
4225 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
4233 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
4234 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
4235 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
4236 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
4237 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
4238 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
4239 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
4240 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
4241 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
4242 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
4243 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
4244 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
4245 } else if !$holder_tx {
4246 if let Some(current_counterparty_commitment_txid) = &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4247 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(htlc_output, self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(current_counterparty_commitment_txid).unwrap());
4249 if payment_data.is_none() {
4250 if let Some(prev_counterparty_commitment_txid) = &self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4251 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(htlc_output, self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(prev_counterparty_commitment_txid).unwrap());
4255 if payment_data.is_none() {
4256 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
4257 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
4258 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4259 txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4260 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4261 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4262 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
4263 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
4264 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
4265 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
4266 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
4267 // accepted_preimage_claim).
4268 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
4269 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
4272 continue 'outer_loop;
4279 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
4280 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4281 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
4283 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
4284 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
4285 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4286 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
4289 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
4290 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref().map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
4291 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
4294 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
4295 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
4296 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
4297 if accepted_preimage_claim {
4298 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4299 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
4300 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4303 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4304 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4305 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4306 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4307 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4308 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4311 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4313 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4315 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4318 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
4319 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4320 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
4321 upd.source == source
4323 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4325 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4327 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4328 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4329 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4330 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4331 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4334 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4336 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4338 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4342 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
4343 if entry.height != height { return true; }
4345 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
4346 *htlc_source != source
4351 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4353 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4355 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4356 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
4357 source, payment_hash,
4358 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4359 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
4362 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", &payment_hash, entry.confirmation_threshold());
4363 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4369 fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
4370 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
4371 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4372 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
4373 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4374 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4375 output: outp.clone(),
4376 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4379 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
4380 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
4381 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4382 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4383 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
4384 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
4385 output: outp.clone(),
4386 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2,
4387 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4388 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4389 channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()),
4393 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
4394 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4395 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4396 output: outp.clone(),
4397 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4398 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4399 channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()),
4402 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
4403 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4404 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4405 output: outp.clone(),
4406 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4413 /// Checks if the confirmed transaction is paying funds back to some address we can assume to
4415 fn check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs<L: Deref>(
4416 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4417 ) where L::Target: Logger {
4418 for spendable_output in self.get_spendable_outputs(tx) {
4419 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4421 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4423 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4424 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
4426 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
4427 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4432 impl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
4434 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4435 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4438 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4439 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4442 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4443 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4447 impl<Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner, M, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (M, T, F, L)
4449 M: Deref<Target = ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4450 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4451 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4454 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4455 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4458 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4459 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4462 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4463 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4466 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
4467 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
4471 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4473 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
4474 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::EcdsaSigner>) {
4475 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4476 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
4480 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4485 let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
4487 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4489 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4490 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4492 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4493 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4495 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
4496 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4497 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4498 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
4501 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4503 let mut counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf = Readable::read(reader)?;
4504 let shutdown_script = {
4505 let script = <ScriptBuf as Readable>::read(reader)?;
4506 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
4509 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4510 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
4511 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
4512 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
4513 let outpoint = OutPoint {
4514 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
4515 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
4517 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
4518 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4519 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4521 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
4522 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
4523 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4525 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
4526 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4530 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4531 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
4532 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
4533 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
4535 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
4540 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4542 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4544 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
4547 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
4548 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4549 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4550 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4551 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
4553 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4554 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
4560 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4561 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
4562 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
4563 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4564 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4565 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4566 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
4567 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
4569 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
4570 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4574 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4575 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4576 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
4577 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4578 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4579 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
4580 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4584 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4585 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4586 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
4587 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4588 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4589 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
4590 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4594 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
4595 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4598 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
4600 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4602 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
4604 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4605 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4607 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4608 let mut payment_preimages = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4609 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
4610 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
4611 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4612 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
4613 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4617 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4618 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
4619 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
4620 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
4621 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4622 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
4623 1 => MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_info.0),
4624 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4626 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
4629 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4630 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
4631 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
4632 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4633 pending_events.push(event);
4637 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
4639 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4640 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
4641 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
4642 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4643 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
4647 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4648 let mut outputs_to_watch = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<ScriptBuf>>())));
4649 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
4650 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4651 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4652 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<ScriptBuf>())));
4653 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
4654 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4656 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
4657 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4660 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::EcdsaSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(
4661 reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
4664 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
4665 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4667 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
4668 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4669 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
4670 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4671 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
4672 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
4673 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4677 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4678 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4679 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
4680 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
4681 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4684 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
4685 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
4686 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
4687 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
4688 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
4689 let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
4690 let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(new_hash_map());
4691 let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None;
4692 let mut balances_empty_height = None;
4693 let mut channel_id = None;
4694 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4695 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
4696 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
4697 (5, pending_monitor_events, optional_vec),
4698 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
4699 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
4700 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
4701 (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
4702 (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
4703 (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
4704 (19, channel_id, option),
4705 (21, balances_empty_height, option),
4708 // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` replaced `HolderForceClosed` in v0.0.122. If we have both
4709 // events, we can remove the `HolderForceClosed` event and just keep the `HolderForceClosedWithInfo`.
4710 if let Some(ref mut pending_monitor_events) = pending_monitor_events {
4711 if pending_monitor_events.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_))) &&
4712 pending_monitor_events.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. }))
4714 pending_monitor_events.retain(|e| !matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_)));
4718 // Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the
4719 // wrong `counterparty_payment_script` was being tracked. Fix it now on deserialization to
4720 // give them a chance to recognize the spendable output.
4721 if onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() &&
4722 counterparty_payment_script.is_p2wpkh()
4724 let payment_point = onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.payment_point;
4725 counterparty_payment_script =
4726 chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point).to_p2wsh();
4729 Ok((best_block.block_hash, ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
4731 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
4734 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
4735 counterparty_payment_script,
4739 holder_revocation_basepoint,
4740 channel_id: channel_id.unwrap_or(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint)),
4742 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4743 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4745 counterparty_commitment_params,
4746 funding_redeemscript,
4747 channel_value_satoshis,
4748 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
4753 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
4754 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
4755 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
4756 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),
4758 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
4759 current_holder_commitment_tx,
4760 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
4761 current_holder_commitment_number,
4764 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
4766 is_processing_pending_events: false,
4768 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
4773 lockdown_from_offchain,
4775 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
4776 funding_spend_confirmed,
4777 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
4778 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
4779 spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
4782 counterparty_node_id,
4783 initial_counterparty_commitment_info,
4784 balances_empty_height,
4791 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
4792 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
4793 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
4794 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4795 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Version};
4796 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4797 use bitcoin::sighash;
4798 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
4799 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4800 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4801 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4802 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
4803 use bitcoin::network::Network;
4804 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4805 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
4806 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Witness};
4808 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
4810 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
4811 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
4812 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
4813 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, WithChannelMonitor};
4814 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
4815 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4816 use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
4817 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, ChannelId};
4818 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint, RevocationKey};
4819 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
4820 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
4821 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4822 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
4823 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
4824 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
4825 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
4826 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
4827 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4829 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
4831 #[allow(unused_imports)]
4832 use crate::prelude::*;
4834 use std::str::FromStr;
4836 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
4837 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
4838 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
4839 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
4840 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
4841 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
4842 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
4843 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
4844 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
4846 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
4847 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
4848 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4849 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4850 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4851 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4852 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4853 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4855 // Rebalance somewhat
4856 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
4858 // First route two payments for testing at the end
4859 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4860 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4862 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
4863 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4864 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
4865 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
4866 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
4867 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
4868 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
4870 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
4871 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
4872 let new_header = create_dummy_header(nodes[0].best_block_info().0, 0);
4873 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4874 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
4875 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
4877 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
4878 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
4879 (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
4881 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
4882 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
4883 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
4884 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
4885 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
4886 ), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress, {});
4887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4889 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
4890 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
4891 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
4892 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
4893 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().next().unwrap().clone();
4894 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
4895 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
4896 } else { panic!(); }
4897 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
4898 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
4900 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
4902 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
4904 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
4906 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4907 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
4908 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
4909 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
4910 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
4911 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
4912 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4913 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
4914 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
4917 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
4918 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
4919 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4923 fn test_prune_preimages() {
4924 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4925 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4926 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster::new(Network::Testnet));
4927 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4929 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4931 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4934 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4935 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4936 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4940 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlcs {
4941 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4943 let mut res = Vec::new();
4944 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4945 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4949 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4950 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4957 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4958 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4959 preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
4962 let dummy_sig = crate::crypto::utils::sign(&secp_ctx,
4963 &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_digest([42; 32]),
4964 &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4966 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4967 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4968 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4969 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4974 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4976 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4977 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4978 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4979 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4980 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4987 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4988 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4989 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
4990 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4991 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
4992 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap()))
4994 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4995 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
4996 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4997 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4998 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4999 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5000 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5001 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5002 selected_contest_delay: 67,
5004 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
5005 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
5007 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
5009 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5010 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
5011 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
5012 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
5013 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
5014 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
5015 best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);
5017 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
5018 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
5020 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
5021 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
5022 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"1").to_byte_array()),
5023 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
5024 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"2").to_byte_array()),
5025 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
5026 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
5027 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
5028 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
5031 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
5032 let mut secret = [0; 32];
5033 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
5034 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
5035 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
5036 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
5037 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
5039 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"3").to_byte_array()),
5040 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
5042 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
5043 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
5044 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
5045 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
5046 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
5047 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
5049 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"4").to_byte_array()),
5050 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
5052 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
5053 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
5054 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]);
5055 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
5056 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
5057 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
5058 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
5059 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
5060 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
5061 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
5062 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
5064 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
5065 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]);
5066 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
5067 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
5068 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
5069 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
5070 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
5071 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
5072 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
5076 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
5077 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
5078 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
5080 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5081 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5082 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
5084 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint};
5085 macro_rules! sign_input {
5086 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
5087 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
5088 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
5090 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
5091 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
5092 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
5094 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), 256, &DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) };
5095 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.p2wsh_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
5096 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
5097 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5098 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5099 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len() as u64;
5100 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
5101 witness.push(ser_sig);
5102 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
5103 witness.push(vec!(1));
5104 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
5105 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
5106 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
5107 witness.push(vec![0]);
5109 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
5111 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
5112 let witness = witness.to_vec();
5113 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
5114 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
5115 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
5119 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
5120 let txid = Txid::from_str("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
5122 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
5123 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5124 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: Version(0), lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5125 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5127 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5128 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5132 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5133 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5134 witness: Witness::new(),
5137 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5138 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5139 value: Amount::ZERO,
5141 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5142 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
5143 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5145 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5146 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5147 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, Amount::ZERO, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5148 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5151 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5154 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
5155 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5156 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: Version(0), lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5157 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5159 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5160 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5164 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5165 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5166 witness: Witness::new(),
5169 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5170 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5171 value: Amount::ZERO,
5173 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5174 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
5175 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5177 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5178 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5179 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, Amount::ZERO, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5180 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5183 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5186 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
5187 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5188 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: Version(0), lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5189 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5190 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5191 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5195 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5196 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5197 witness: Witness::new(),
5199 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5200 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5201 value: Amount::ZERO,
5203 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5204 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
5205 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5207 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5208 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5209 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, Amount::ZERO, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5210 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5213 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5218 fn test_with_channel_monitor_impl_logger() {
5219 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5220 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
5222 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5224 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
5226 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5227 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5228 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5229 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5230 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5237 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5238 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
5239 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
5240 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
5241 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
5242 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())),
5244 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
5245 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
5246 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
5247 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
5248 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
5249 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5250 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5251 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5252 selected_contest_delay: 67,
5254 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
5255 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
5257 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5258 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
5259 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
5260 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
5261 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
5262 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
5263 best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);
5265 let chan_id = monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id();
5266 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
5267 let context_logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&logger, &monitor, Some(payment_hash));
5268 log_error!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5269 log_warn!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5270 log_debug!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5271 log_trace!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5272 log_gossip!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5273 log_info!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5274 logger.assert_log_context_contains("lightning::chain::channelmonitor::tests", Some(dummy_key), Some(chan_id), 6);
5276 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.