1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
36 use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
37 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, ChannelId};
38 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentKey, DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, HtlcKey, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
40 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,CommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys};
41 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
43 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
44 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
45 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
47 use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, OnchainTxHandler};
48 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use crate::chain::Filter;
50 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
51 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
52 use crate::util::byte_utils;
53 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler};
54 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
56 use crate::prelude::*;
58 use crate::io::{self, Error};
59 use core::convert::TryInto;
61 use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
63 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
64 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
66 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
67 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
68 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
69 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
70 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
72 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
73 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
74 /// Historically, [`ChannelMonitor`]s didn't know their counterparty node id. However,
75 /// `ChannelManager` really wants to know it so that it can easily look up the corresponding
76 /// channel. For now, this results in a temporary map in `ChannelManager` to look up channels
77 /// by only the funding outpoint.
79 /// To eventually remove that, we repeat the counterparty node id here so that we can upgrade
80 /// `ChannelMonitor`s to become aware of the counterparty node id if they were generated prior
81 /// to when it was stored directly in them.
82 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
83 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
84 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
85 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
87 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
88 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
89 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
91 /// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
92 /// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
93 /// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
94 /// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
95 /// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
97 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
101 /// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
103 /// (1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
104 /// (2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
105 /// allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
106 /// commitment transaction.
108 /// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
109 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
111 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
112 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
113 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
114 self.update_id.write(w)?;
115 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
116 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
117 update_step.write(w)?;
119 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
120 (1, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
125 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
126 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
127 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
128 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
129 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
130 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
132 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
136 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
137 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
138 (1, counterparty_node_id, option),
140 Ok(Self { update_id, counterparty_node_id, updates })
144 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
146 pub enum MonitorEvent {
147 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
148 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
150 /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
152 HolderForceClosed(OutPoint),
154 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
155 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
157 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
159 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
160 funding_txo: OutPoint,
161 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
162 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
164 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
165 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
166 monitor_update_id: u64,
169 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
170 // Note that Completed is currently never serialized to disk as it is generated only in
173 (0, funding_txo, required),
174 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
178 (4, HolderForceClosed),
179 // 6 was `UpdateFailed` until LDK 0.0.117
182 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
183 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
184 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
185 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
186 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
187 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
188 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
189 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
190 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
192 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
193 (0, payment_hash, required),
194 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
195 (2, source, required),
196 (4, payment_preimage, option),
199 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
200 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
201 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
202 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
203 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
204 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
205 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
206 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
207 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
208 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
209 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
210 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
211 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
212 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
213 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
214 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
215 /// accurate block height.
216 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
217 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
218 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
219 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
220 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
221 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
224 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
225 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
226 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
227 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
228 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
229 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
230 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
231 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
232 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
233 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
235 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
236 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
237 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
239 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
240 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
242 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
243 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
245 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
246 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
247 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
248 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
250 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
251 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
252 struct HolderSignedTx {
253 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
255 revocation_key: RevocationKey,
258 delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey,
259 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
260 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
261 to_self_value_sat: u64,
264 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
266 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
267 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
268 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
269 (2, revocation_key, required),
270 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
271 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
272 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
273 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
274 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
275 (14, htlc_outputs, required_vec)
278 impl HolderSignedTx {
279 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
280 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
281 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
291 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
292 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
293 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
294 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
295 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: DelayedPaymentBasepoint,
296 counterparty_htlc_base_key: HtlcBasepoint,
297 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
300 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
301 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
302 w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
303 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
304 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
305 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
306 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
311 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
312 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
313 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
314 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
315 // used. Read it for compatibility.
316 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
317 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
318 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
319 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
320 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
321 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
325 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
326 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
327 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
328 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
329 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
330 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
331 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
333 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
334 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
335 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
336 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
339 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
343 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
344 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
346 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
347 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
348 struct OnchainEventEntry {
351 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
353 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
356 impl OnchainEventEntry {
357 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
358 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
360 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
361 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
363 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
364 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
365 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
367 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
368 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
369 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
370 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
371 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
378 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
379 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
383 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
385 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
386 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
388 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
389 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
390 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
392 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
393 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
394 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
395 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
396 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
397 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
400 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
401 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
402 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
403 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
404 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
406 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
407 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
409 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
411 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
413 FundingSpendConfirmation {
414 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
415 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
416 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
417 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
418 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
420 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
421 /// counterparty output.
422 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
424 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
425 /// is constructed. This is used when
426 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
427 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
428 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
429 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
430 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
432 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
433 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
435 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
436 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
437 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
438 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
439 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
440 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
441 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
442 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
446 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
447 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
448 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
449 (0, self.txid, required),
450 (1, self.transaction, option),
451 (2, self.height, required),
452 (3, self.block_hash, option),
453 (4, self.event, required),
459 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
460 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
461 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
462 let mut transaction = None;
463 let mut block_hash = None;
465 let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
466 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
468 (1, transaction, option),
469 (2, height, required),
470 (3, block_hash, option),
471 (4, event, upgradable_required),
473 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
477 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
479 (0, source, required),
480 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
481 (2, payment_hash, required),
482 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
484 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
485 (0, descriptor, required),
487 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
488 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
489 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
491 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
492 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
493 (2, preimage, option),
494 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
499 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
500 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
501 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
502 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
503 /// Note that LDK after 0.0.115 supports this only containing dust HTLCs (implying the
504 /// `Signature` field is never filled in). At that point, non-dust HTLCs are implied by the
505 /// HTLC fields in `commitment_tx` and the sources passed via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
506 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
507 claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
508 nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>,
510 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
511 commitment_txid: Txid,
512 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
513 commitment_number: u64,
514 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
515 feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>,
516 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Option<u64>,
517 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Option<u64>,
520 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
526 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
527 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
529 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
530 /// think we've fallen behind!
531 should_broadcast: bool,
534 scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
538 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
539 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
541 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
542 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
543 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
544 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
545 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
546 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
551 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
552 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
553 (0, commitment_tx, required),
554 (1, claimed_htlcs, optional_vec),
555 (2, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
556 (4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
558 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
559 (0, commitment_txid, required),
560 (1, feerate_per_kw, option),
561 (2, commitment_number, required),
562 (3, to_broadcaster_value_sat, option),
563 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
564 (5, to_countersignatory_value_sat, option),
565 (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
567 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
568 (0, payment_preimage, required),
570 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
572 (2, secret, required),
574 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
575 (0, should_broadcast, required),
577 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
578 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
582 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
584 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
586 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
587 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
589 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
590 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
591 /// force-closed now.
592 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
593 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
594 /// required to do so.
595 amount_satoshis: u64,
597 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
598 /// we consider it spendable.
599 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
600 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
601 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
602 amount_satoshis: u64,
603 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
605 confirmation_height: u32,
607 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
608 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
609 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
611 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
612 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
613 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
614 ContentiousClaimable {
615 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
616 /// required to do so.
617 amount_satoshis: u64,
618 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
621 /// The payment hash that locks this HTLC.
622 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
623 /// The preimage that can be used to claim this HTLC.
624 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
626 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
627 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
628 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
629 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
630 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
631 /// which will be required to do so.
632 amount_satoshis: u64,
633 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
635 claimable_height: u32,
636 /// The payment hash whose preimage our counterparty needs to claim this HTLC.
637 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
639 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
640 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
641 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
642 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
643 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
644 /// which will be required to do so.
645 amount_satoshis: u64,
646 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
647 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
649 /// The payment hash whose preimage we need to claim this HTLC.
650 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
652 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
655 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
656 /// following amount.
657 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
658 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
660 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
661 /// were already spent.
662 amount_satoshis: u64,
667 /// The amount claimable, in satoshis. This excludes balances that we are unsure if we are able
668 /// to claim, this is because we are waiting for a preimage or for a timeout to expire. For more
669 /// information on these balances see [`Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC`] and
670 /// [`Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC`].
672 /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
673 pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
675 Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }|
676 Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }|
677 Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }|
678 Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }
680 Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }|
681 Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. }
687 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
688 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
689 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
690 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
691 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
692 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
694 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
695 resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
696 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
697 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
700 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
701 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
702 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
703 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
704 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
705 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
706 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
707 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
708 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
709 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
710 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
711 (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
717 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
718 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
719 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
720 let mut resolving_txid = None;
721 let mut payment_preimage = None;
722 let mut resolving_tx = None;
723 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
724 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
725 (1, resolving_txid, option),
726 (2, payment_preimage, option),
727 (3, resolving_tx, option),
730 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
738 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
739 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
741 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
742 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
744 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
745 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
746 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
747 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
748 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
749 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
751 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
753 pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
756 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: Clone {
757 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
758 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone();
759 ChannelMonitor::from_impl(inner)
763 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
764 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
765 latest_update_id: u64,
766 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
768 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
769 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>,
770 counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf,
771 shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
773 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
774 holder_revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint,
775 funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
776 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
777 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
779 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
780 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf,
781 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
782 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
783 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
785 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
787 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
788 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
789 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
790 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
791 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
792 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
793 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
794 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
795 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
796 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
797 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
798 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
799 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
800 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
801 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
802 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
804 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,
806 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
807 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
808 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
809 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
810 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
811 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
813 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
815 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
816 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
818 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
820 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
821 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
822 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
824 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
826 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
827 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
828 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
829 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
830 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
831 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
832 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
833 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
834 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
835 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
837 pub(super) pending_events: Vec<Event>,
838 pub(super) is_processing_pending_events: bool,
840 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
841 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
842 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
843 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
845 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
846 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
847 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
848 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
849 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>>,
852 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
854 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
856 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
857 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
858 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
859 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
861 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
862 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
863 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
865 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
866 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
867 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
868 holder_tx_signed: bool,
870 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
871 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
872 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
873 funding_spend_seen: bool,
875 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
876 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
877 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
879 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
880 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
881 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
882 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
883 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
885 /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
886 /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
887 /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
888 /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
889 /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
890 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
892 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
893 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
894 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
895 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
896 // the full block_connected).
897 best_block: BestBlock,
899 /// The node_id of our counterparty
900 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
902 /// Initial counterparty commmitment data needed to recreate the commitment tx
903 /// in the persistence pipeline for third-party watchtowers. This will only be present on
904 /// monitors created after 0.0.117.
906 /// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats,
907 /// to_countersignatory_sats)
908 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>,
911 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
912 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
914 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
915 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
916 // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
917 // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
919 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
920 let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
921 let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
926 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
927 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
928 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
932 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
933 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
934 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
936 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
937 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
938 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
940 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
942 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
943 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
945 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
946 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
947 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
948 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
949 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
950 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
952 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
955 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
956 match &self.shutdown_script {
957 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
958 None => ScriptBuf::new().write(writer)?,
961 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
962 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
963 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
964 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
965 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
966 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
967 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
969 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
970 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
971 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
973 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
974 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
975 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
976 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
977 match second_option {
978 Some(second_pubkey) => {
979 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
982 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
987 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
991 writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
993 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
995 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
996 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
997 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
998 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
999 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
1000 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1001 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1005 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1006 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1007 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1008 writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1009 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1010 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
1011 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
1012 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
1013 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1014 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
1018 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1019 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1020 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1021 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1024 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1025 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1026 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1027 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1030 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1031 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1032 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1034 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1037 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1039 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1040 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1042 writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1043 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1044 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1047 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1048 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1049 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => true,
1051 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1052 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1054 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1058 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1059 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1063 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1064 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1065 event.write(writer)?;
1068 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1069 writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height().to_be_bytes())?;
1071 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1072 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1073 entry.write(writer)?;
1076 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1077 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1078 txid.write(writer)?;
1079 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1080 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1082 script.write(writer)?;
1085 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1087 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1088 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1090 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1091 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1092 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec),
1093 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, required_vec),
1094 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1095 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1096 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1097 (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
1098 (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
1099 (17, self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
1106 macro_rules! _process_events_body {
1107 ($self_opt: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1109 let (pending_events, repeated_events);
1110 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1111 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1112 if inner.is_processing_pending_events {
1115 inner.is_processing_pending_events = true;
1117 pending_events = inner.pending_events.clone();
1118 repeated_events = inner.get_repeated_events();
1120 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1122 for event in pending_events.into_iter().chain(repeated_events.into_iter()) {
1123 $event_to_handle = event;
1127 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1128 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1129 inner.pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1130 inner.is_processing_pending_events = false;
1131 if !inner.pending_events.is_empty() {
1132 // If there's more events to process, go ahead and do so.
1140 pub(super) use _process_events_body as process_events_body;
1142 pub(crate) struct WithChannelMonitor<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
1144 peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
1145 channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1148 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1149 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
1150 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
1151 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
1152 self.logger.log(record)
1156 impl<'a, L: Deref> WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1157 pub(crate) fn from<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor: &ChannelMonitor<S>) -> Self {
1158 Self::from_impl(logger, &*monitor.inner.lock().unwrap())
1161 pub(crate) fn from_impl<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor_impl: &ChannelMonitorImpl<S>) -> Self {
1162 let peer_id = monitor_impl.counterparty_node_id;
1163 let channel_id = Some(monitor_impl.funding_info.0.to_channel_id());
1164 WithChannelMonitor {
1165 logger, peer_id, channel_id,
1170 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1171 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1172 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1173 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1174 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1175 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1178 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1179 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
1180 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1181 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1182 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1183 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1184 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1186 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1187 let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
1188 &channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.pubkeys().payment_point
1191 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1192 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1193 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1194 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1196 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1197 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1199 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1200 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1201 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1202 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1204 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1205 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1207 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1208 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1209 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1210 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1211 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1212 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1213 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1214 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1216 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1219 let onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(
1220 channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id, destination_script.into(), keys,
1221 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx
1224 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1225 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1227 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1228 latest_update_id: 0,
1229 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1231 destination_script: destination_script.into(),
1232 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1233 counterparty_payment_script,
1237 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1239 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1240 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1242 counterparty_commitment_params,
1243 funding_redeemscript,
1244 channel_value_satoshis,
1245 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1247 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1249 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1250 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1251 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1252 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1253 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1255 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1256 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1257 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1258 current_holder_commitment_number,
1260 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1261 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1262 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1263 is_processing_pending_events: false,
1265 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1270 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1271 holder_tx_signed: false,
1272 funding_spend_seen: false,
1273 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1274 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1275 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1276 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
1279 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1280 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None,
1285 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1286 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1289 /// A variant of `Self::provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx` used to provide
1290 /// additional information to the monitor to store in order to recreate the initial
1291 /// counterparty commitment transaction during persistence (mainly for use in third-party
1294 /// This is used to provide the counterparty commitment information directly to the monitor
1295 /// before the initial persistence of a new channel.
1296 pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1297 &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1298 commitment_number: u64, their_cur_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
1299 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, logger: &L,
1301 where L::Target: Logger
1303 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1304 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1305 inner.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid,
1306 htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_cur_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
1307 to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, &logger);
1310 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1311 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1312 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1313 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1315 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1318 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1319 commitment_number: u64,
1320 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1322 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1323 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1324 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1325 inner.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1326 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, &logger)
1330 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1331 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1332 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1333 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1334 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new(), Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
1337 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1338 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1339 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1341 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1342 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1344 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1347 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1348 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1351 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1352 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1353 inner.provide_payment_preimage(
1354 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1357 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1360 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1361 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1363 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1369 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1370 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1373 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1374 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1375 inner.update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1378 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1380 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1381 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1384 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1385 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
1386 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1389 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1390 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1391 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>)> {
1392 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1393 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1396 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1397 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1398 /// have been registered.
1399 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, filter: &F, logger: &L)
1401 F::Target: chain::Filter, L::Target: Logger,
1403 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1404 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*lock);
1405 log_trace!(&logger, "Registering funding outpoint {}", &lock.get_funding_txo().0);
1406 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1407 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1408 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1409 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1410 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 };
1411 log_trace!(logger, "Registering outpoint {} with the filter for monitoring spends", outpoint);
1412 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1415 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1421 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1422 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1423 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1424 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1427 /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
1429 /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
1430 /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
1431 /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
1432 /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
1433 /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
1435 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
1436 /// order to handle these events.
1438 /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
1439 /// [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
1440 pub fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: &H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
1442 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
1445 /// Processes any events asynchronously.
1447 /// See [`Self::process_pending_events`] for more information.
1448 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
1452 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, { handler(ev).await });
1456 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1457 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1458 let mut lck = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1459 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut lck.pending_events);
1460 ret.append(&mut lck.get_repeated_events());
1464 /// Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment
1465 /// transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of
1466 /// the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for
1467 /// watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions.
1469 /// This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except
1470 /// that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update.
1472 /// This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading
1473 /// to LDK 0.0.117+.
1475 /// [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel
1476 pub fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
1477 self.inner.lock().unwrap().initial_counterparty_commitment_tx()
1480 /// Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This
1481 /// may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned
1482 /// commitment transactions are unsigned.
1484 /// This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build
1485 /// justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be
1486 /// used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided
1487 /// with a monitor and an update. Once revoked, signing a justice transaction can be done using
1488 /// [`Self::sign_to_local_justice_tx`].
1490 /// It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty
1491 /// commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which
1492 /// the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the
1493 /// monitor can sign the justice transaction.
1495 /// This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after
1496 /// upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which
1497 /// may have been created prior to upgrading.
1499 /// [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel
1500 pub fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
1501 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(update)
1504 /// Wrapper around [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`] to make
1505 /// signing the justice transaction easier for implementors of
1506 /// [`chain::chainmonitor::Persist`]. On success this method returns the provided transaction
1507 /// signing the input at `input_idx`. This method will only produce a valid signature for
1508 /// a transaction spending the `to_local` output of a commitment transaction, i.e. this cannot
1509 /// be used for revoked HTLC outputs.
1511 /// `Value` is the value of the output being spent by the input at `input_idx`, committed
1512 /// in the BIP 143 signature.
1514 /// This method will only succeed if this monitor has received the revocation secret for the
1515 /// provided `commitment_number`. If a commitment number is provided that does not correspond
1516 /// to the commitment transaction being revoked, this will return a signed transaction, but
1517 /// the signature will not be valid.
1519 /// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`]: crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output
1520 /// [`Persist`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist
1521 pub fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(&self, justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
1522 self.inner.lock().unwrap().sign_to_local_justice_tx(justice_tx, input_idx, value, commitment_number)
1525 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1526 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1529 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1530 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1533 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1534 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1537 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1539 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1541 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1542 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1545 /// Used by [`ChannelManager`] deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy
1546 /// of the channel state was out-of-date.
1548 /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1549 /// a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our
1550 /// counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1552 /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1553 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1554 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1555 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1558 /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
1559 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1560 where L::Target: Logger {
1561 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1562 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1563 inner.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&logger)
1566 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1567 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1568 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1569 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1570 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1571 where L::Target: Logger {
1572 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1573 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1574 inner.unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&logger)
1577 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1578 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1579 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1580 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1581 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1582 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1584 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1585 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1587 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1588 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1591 txdata: &TransactionData,
1596 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1598 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1599 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1602 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1603 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1604 inner.block_connected(
1605 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1608 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1610 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1618 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1619 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1622 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1623 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1624 inner.block_disconnected(
1625 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1628 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1629 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1631 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1632 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1634 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1635 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1638 txdata: &TransactionData,
1643 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1645 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1646 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1649 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1650 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1651 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1652 inner.transactions_confirmed(
1653 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger)
1656 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1658 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1659 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1661 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1662 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1669 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1670 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1673 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1674 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1675 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1676 inner.transaction_unconfirmed(
1677 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1681 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1682 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1684 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1685 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1687 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1688 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1695 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1697 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1698 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1701 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1702 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1703 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1704 inner.best_block_updated(
1705 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1709 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1710 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1711 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1712 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1714 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.height, entry.block_hash))
1715 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1717 txids.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0).then(b.1.cmp(&a.1)));
1718 txids.dedup_by_key(|(txid, _, _)| *txid);
1722 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1723 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1724 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1725 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1728 /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
1729 /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
1730 /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
1731 /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
1732 /// connections, like on mobile.
1733 pub fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1734 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
1737 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1738 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1741 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1742 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1743 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1744 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1745 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1746 current_height, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1750 /// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the
1751 /// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]
1752 /// confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be
1753 /// returned, the transaction must have at least `max(ANTI_REORG_DELAY, to_self_delay)`
1756 /// Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`]
1757 /// once they are no longer under reorg risk. This method serves as a way to retrieve these
1758 /// descriptors at a later time, either for historical purposes, or to replay any
1759 /// missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the
1760 /// channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns
1761 /// an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending
1762 /// transactions starting from the channel's funding transaction and going down three levels.
1764 /// `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any
1765 /// outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned.
1767 /// `confirmation_height` must be the height of the block in which `tx` was included in.
1768 pub fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction, confirmation_height: u32) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1769 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1770 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1771 let mut spendable_outputs = inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx);
1772 spendable_outputs.retain(|descriptor| {
1773 let mut conf_threshold = current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1;
1774 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) = descriptor {
1775 conf_threshold = cmp::min(conf_threshold,
1776 current_height.saturating_sub(descriptor.to_self_delay as u32) + 1);
1778 conf_threshold >= confirmation_height
1784 pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1785 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script.clone()
1789 pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: ScriptBuf) {
1790 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script;
1794 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1795 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1796 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1797 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1798 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1799 -> Option<Balance> {
1800 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1801 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1803 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1804 let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
1805 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1806 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1807 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1808 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1810 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1811 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1812 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1813 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1814 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1815 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1816 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1817 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1818 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1820 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1821 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1822 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1823 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1824 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1825 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1826 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1827 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1829 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1830 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1831 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1832 .any(|(input_idx, inp)|
1833 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1834 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx &&
1835 // A maturing output for an HTLC claim will always be at the same
1836 // index as the HTLC input. This is true pre-anchors, as there's
1837 // only 1 input and 1 output. This is also true post-anchors,
1838 // because we have a SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY signature from our
1839 // channel counterparty.
1840 descriptor.outpoint.index as usize == input_idx
1844 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1845 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1850 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1851 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1852 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1853 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
1854 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1855 htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
1858 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1860 let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
1861 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1862 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1863 // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
1864 // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
1865 // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
1866 // in the commitment.
1867 if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
1868 let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1869 .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
1870 .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
1871 debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
1872 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
1874 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1875 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
1878 htlc_commitment_outpoint
1880 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1882 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1883 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1884 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1885 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1886 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1888 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1889 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1890 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1891 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1892 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1893 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1894 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1895 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1896 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1897 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1898 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1900 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1901 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1902 tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
1904 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1905 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1907 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1912 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1913 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1914 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1915 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1916 // need to do so again here.
1918 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1919 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1920 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1921 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1922 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1923 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1926 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1927 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1928 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1929 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1930 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1931 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1932 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1933 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1936 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1937 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1938 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1939 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1942 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1943 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1944 // we know the preimage.
1945 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1946 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1947 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1948 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1949 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1950 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1951 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1952 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1955 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1956 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1957 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1958 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1959 payment_preimage: *payment_preimage,
1962 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1963 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1964 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1965 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1966 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1973 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1974 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1975 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1978 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1979 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1980 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1981 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1983 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1984 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, not all or excess balances may be included.
1986 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1987 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1988 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1989 let mut res = Vec::new();
1990 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1992 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1993 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1994 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1995 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1996 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1999 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
2000 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
2003 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
2004 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
2005 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
2006 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
2007 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
2010 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2011 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2012 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
2013 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2015 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
2023 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
2024 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
2025 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
2026 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
2027 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2028 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2029 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2030 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
2032 Some(descriptor.output.value)
2035 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2036 amount_satoshis: value,
2037 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2040 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
2041 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
2042 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
2045 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2046 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2048 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2049 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
2050 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
2051 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
2052 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
2053 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
2054 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
2055 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2056 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
2058 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2059 amount_satoshis: output.value,
2060 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
2062 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
2063 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
2064 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
2065 ).unwrap_or(false) {
2066 spent_counterparty_output = true;
2072 if spent_counterparty_output {
2073 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
2074 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
2075 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
2076 if output_spendable {
2077 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
2078 amount_satoshis: amt,
2082 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
2083 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
2086 found_commitment_tx = true;
2087 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2088 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2089 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2090 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2091 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2092 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2095 found_commitment_tx = true;
2096 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2097 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2098 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2099 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2100 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2101 amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
2102 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2105 found_commitment_tx = true;
2108 if !found_commitment_tx {
2109 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2110 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
2111 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
2112 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
2113 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2114 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2115 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2120 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
2121 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2122 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
2124 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
2125 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2126 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2127 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2129 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
2130 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
2132 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
2133 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
2134 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
2135 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2136 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2137 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2141 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
2142 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
2149 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
2150 /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
2151 /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
2153 /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
2154 /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
2155 /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
2156 pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2157 let mut res = HashMap::new();
2158 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
2159 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
2160 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2161 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
2163 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2164 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2165 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2166 res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
2167 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
2173 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2174 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2176 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2177 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2182 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
2183 /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
2185 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
2187 /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
2188 /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
2189 pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2190 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2191 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
2192 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
2193 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
2194 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2195 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2196 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
2202 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
2203 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
2204 // closed), just get the full set.
2206 return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
2209 let mut res = HashMap::new();
2210 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2211 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2212 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
2213 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
2214 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
2215 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
2217 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
2218 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
2219 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
2220 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
2221 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
2222 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2223 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
2224 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
2225 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
2226 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
2227 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
2228 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
2229 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
2230 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
2231 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
2232 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
2234 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
2237 let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
2238 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
2239 if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
2240 res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
2247 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
2248 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2249 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
2250 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
2251 Some((a, &**source))
2254 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2255 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2256 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2258 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2259 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2260 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2261 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2269 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
2270 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
2274 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
2275 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
2276 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
2278 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
2279 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
2280 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
2281 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
2282 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
2283 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
2285 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
2286 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
2287 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
2288 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
2289 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
2290 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
2291 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
2292 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
2294 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
2295 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
2296 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2297 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2298 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2299 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
2300 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
2301 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
2302 // payment_preimage.
2303 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
2304 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
2305 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
2306 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
2308 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
2310 let mut matched_htlc = false;
2311 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
2312 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
2313 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
2314 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
2315 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
2316 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
2317 matched_htlc = true;
2321 if matched_htlc { continue; }
2322 if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
2325 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2326 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
2328 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
2329 *update_source != **source
2334 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2335 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
2336 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
2337 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
2338 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
2339 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2340 source: (**source).clone(),
2341 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
2342 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
2343 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
2346 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
2347 &htlc.payment_hash, $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2348 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2349 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2355 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2356 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2358 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2359 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2364 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2365 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2366 // in-line tests later.
2369 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2370 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2371 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2372 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2373 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2374 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2375 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2376 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2381 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2382 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2385 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2386 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2387 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2388 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2389 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2390 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2391 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2394 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2395 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2396 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2397 if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
2398 let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2399 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2400 for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2401 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2402 if !cur_claimables.iter()
2403 .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
2405 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
2409 for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2413 assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
2417 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2418 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2419 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2420 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2421 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2423 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2424 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2425 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2429 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2430 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2431 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2436 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2443 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2452 fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2453 &mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2454 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
2455 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2456 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2457 self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info = Some((their_per_commitment_point.clone(),
2458 feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value));
2460 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2461 let rebuilt_commitment_tx = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_tx().unwrap();
2462 debug_assert_eq!(rebuilt_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), txid);
2465 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number,
2466 their_per_commitment_point, logger);
2469 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2470 &mut self, txid: Txid,
2471 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2472 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2473 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2474 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2475 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2476 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2478 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2479 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2482 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2483 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2484 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2485 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2486 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2487 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2488 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2489 Some(old_points) => {
2490 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2491 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2492 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2493 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2494 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2496 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2499 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2503 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2506 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2507 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2508 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2514 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2515 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2516 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2517 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2518 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2519 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, mut htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)], nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2520 if htlc_outputs.iter().any(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()) {
2521 // If we have non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, ensure they match the HTLCs in the
2522 // `holder_commitment_tx`. In the future, we'll no longer provide the redundant data
2523 // and just pass in source data via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
2524 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len());
2525 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).map(|(h, _, _)| h).zip(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()) {
2526 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2528 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2529 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, s, _)| s.as_ref()).zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter()) {
2530 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2532 debug_assert!(nondust_htlc_sources.is_empty());
2534 // If we don't have any non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, assume they were all passed via
2535 // `nondust_htlc_sources`, building up the final htlc_outputs by combining
2536 // `nondust_htlc_sources` and the `holder_commitment_tx`
2537 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2539 for htlc in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter() {
2540 assert!(htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32 > prev);
2541 prev = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32;
2544 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(htlc, _, _)| htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()));
2545 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(_, sig_opt, _)| sig_opt.is_none()));
2546 debug_assert_eq!(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2548 let mut sources_iter = nondust_htlc_sources.into_iter();
2550 for (htlc, counterparty_sig) in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()
2551 .zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter())
2554 let source = sources_iter.next().expect("Non-dust HTLC sources didn't match commitment tx");
2555 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2556 assert!(source.possibly_matches_output(htlc));
2558 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), Some(source)));
2560 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), None));
2563 debug_assert!(sources_iter.next().is_none());
2566 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2567 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2568 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2569 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2570 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
2572 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2573 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2574 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2575 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2576 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2578 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2579 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2581 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2582 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2583 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2584 for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
2585 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2586 let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2587 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2588 assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
2589 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2590 SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
2594 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
2596 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2597 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2602 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2603 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2604 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2605 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2606 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>)
2607 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2608 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2611 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2613 let confirmed_spend_txid = self.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2614 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| match event.event {
2615 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => Some(event.txid),
2619 let confirmed_spend_txid = if let Some(txid) = confirmed_spend_txid {
2625 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2626 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2627 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2628 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2629 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2630 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2633 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2634 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2635 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2636 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2638 debug_assert!(false);
2639 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2644 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2645 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2646 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2647 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2649 debug_assert!(false);
2650 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2656 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2657 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2658 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2659 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2660 // holder commitment transactions.
2661 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2662 let holder_commitment_tx = if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2663 Some(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx)
2664 } else if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2665 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2666 Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx)
2673 if let Some(holder_commitment_tx) = holder_commitment_tx {
2674 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2675 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2677 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2678 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2683 fn generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(&mut self) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Vec<TransactionOutputs>) {
2684 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2685 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(),
2686 self.channel_value_satoshis,
2687 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
2689 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2690 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2691 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp),
2692 self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height()
2694 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![commitment_package];
2695 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
2696 // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
2697 // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
2698 // new channel updates.
2699 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2700 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2701 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
2702 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
2703 // `transactions_confirmed`.
2704 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2705 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2706 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2707 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2708 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(
2709 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height()
2711 let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
2712 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(
2713 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx
2715 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2716 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2718 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2720 (claimable_outpoints, watch_outputs)
2723 pub(crate) fn queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2724 &mut self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2727 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2728 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2731 let (claimable_outpoints, _) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs();
2732 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2733 claimable_outpoints, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster,
2734 fee_estimator, logger
2738 fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2739 &mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2741 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2742 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2745 if self.latest_update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2746 log_info!(logger, "Applying post-force-closed update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2747 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2748 } else if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2749 log_info!(logger, "Applying force close update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2750 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2752 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
2753 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2756 if updates.counterparty_node_id.is_some() {
2757 if self.counterparty_node_id.is_none() {
2758 self.counterparty_node_id = updates.counterparty_node_id;
2760 debug_assert_eq!(self.counterparty_node_id, updates.counterparty_node_id);
2764 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
2765 // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
2766 // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
2767 // sentinel value instead.
2769 // The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
2770 // thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
2772 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2773 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2774 match updates.updates[0] {
2775 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
2776 // We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
2777 // provide a preimage at this point.
2778 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
2779 debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
2781 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2782 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2785 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2786 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2788 let mut ret = Ok(());
2789 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
2790 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2792 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
2793 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2794 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2795 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources.clone()) {
2796 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2797 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2801 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2802 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2803 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2805 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2806 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2807 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2809 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2810 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2811 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2812 debug_assert!(false, "Latest counterparty commitment secret was invalid");
2813 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2814 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2818 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2819 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2820 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2821 if *should_broadcast {
2822 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
2823 // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
2824 // duplicate/conflicting.
2825 let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
2826 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
2827 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
2830 if detected_funding_spend {
2831 log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
2834 self.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
2835 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2836 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2837 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id());
2838 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
2840 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager
2841 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2842 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2843 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2846 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2847 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2848 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2849 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2855 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2856 self.counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(updates);
2859 // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
2860 // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
2861 if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
2865 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2867 // Refuse updates after we've detected a spend onchain, but only if we haven't processed a
2868 // force closed monitor update yet.
2869 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen && self.latest_update_id != CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2870 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2875 fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2876 self.latest_update_id
2879 fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
2883 fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>> {
2884 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2885 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2886 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2887 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2888 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2890 &self.outputs_to_watch
2893 fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2894 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2895 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2899 /// Gets the set of events that are repeated regularly (e.g. those which RBF bump
2900 /// transactions). We're okay if we lose these on restart as they'll be regenerated for us at
2901 /// some regular interval via [`ChannelMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims`].
2902 pub(super) fn get_repeated_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2903 let pending_claim_events = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events();
2904 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pending_claim_events.len());
2905 for (claim_id, claim_event) in pending_claim_events {
2907 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
2908 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
2910 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2911 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
2912 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
2913 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
2914 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
2915 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
2917 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2919 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
2920 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
2921 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2922 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2923 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2924 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2926 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
2927 txid: commitment_txid,
2928 vout: anchor_output_idx,
2934 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
2935 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs, tx_lock_time,
2937 let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
2939 htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
2940 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2941 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2942 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2943 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2945 commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
2946 per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
2947 per_commitment_point: self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.get_per_commitment_point(
2948 htlc.per_commitment_number, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
2952 preimage: htlc.preimage,
2953 counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
2956 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
2958 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2968 fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
2969 let (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value,
2970 to_countersignatory_value) = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info?;
2971 let htlc_outputs = vec![];
2973 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2974 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value,
2975 feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs);
2979 fn build_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2980 &self, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
2981 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, feerate_per_kw: u32,
2982 mut nondust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>
2983 ) -> CommitmentTransaction {
2984 let broadcaster_keys = &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters
2985 .counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys;
2986 let countersignatory_keys =
2987 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys;
2989 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey;
2990 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey;
2991 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&their_per_commitment_point,
2992 &broadcaster_keys, &countersignatory_keys, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx);
2993 let channel_parameters =
2994 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable();
2996 CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2997 to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, broadcaster_funding_key,
2998 countersignatory_funding_key, keys, feerate_per_kw, &mut nondust_htlcs,
3002 fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
3003 update.updates.iter().filter_map(|update| {
3005 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid,
3006 ref htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point,
3007 feerate_per_kw: Some(feerate_per_kw),
3008 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(to_broadcaster_value),
3009 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(to_countersignatory_value) } => {
3011 let nondust_htlcs = htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _)| {
3012 htlc.transaction_output_index.map(|_| (htlc.clone(), None))
3013 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3015 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_number,
3016 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value,
3017 to_countersignatory_value, feerate_per_kw, nondust_htlcs);
3019 debug_assert_eq!(commitment_tx.trust().txid(), commitment_txid);
3028 fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(
3029 &self, mut justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64
3030 ) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
3031 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).ok_or(())?;
3032 let per_commitment_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secret).map_err(|_| ())?;
3033 let their_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(
3034 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3036 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3037 &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &their_per_commitment_point);
3038 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3039 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &their_per_commitment_point);
3040 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3041 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3043 let sig = self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(
3044 &justice_tx, input_idx, value, &per_commitment_key, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx)?;
3045 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
3046 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(&[1u8]);
3047 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(revokeable_redeemscript.as_bytes());
3051 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
3052 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
3053 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
3056 fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
3057 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
3060 fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3061 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
3064 fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3065 self.current_holder_commitment_number
3068 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
3069 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
3070 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
3071 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
3073 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
3074 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
3076 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
3077 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
3078 where L::Target: Logger {
3079 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
3080 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
3081 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3082 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3083 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
3085 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
3086 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
3088 macro_rules! ignore_error {
3089 ( $thing : expr ) => {
3092 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3097 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
3098 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
3099 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
3100 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
3101 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3102 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,);
3103 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
3105 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3106 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
3108 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
3109 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3110 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3111 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
3112 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height);
3113 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3114 to_counterparty_output_info =
3115 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3119 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
3120 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3121 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
3122 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3123 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
3124 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3125 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3126 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
3127 to_counterparty_output_info);
3129 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
3130 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, height);
3131 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3136 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
3137 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
3138 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
3139 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
3140 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3141 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3143 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3145 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3146 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3147 block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3148 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3151 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
3152 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3153 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
3156 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3157 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
3158 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
3159 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
3160 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
3161 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
3162 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
3164 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3165 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3167 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3169 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
3170 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3171 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3172 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3175 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
3176 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
3177 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
3178 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
3179 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
3183 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3186 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
3187 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
3188 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
3189 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3190 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
3192 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
3193 Some(outputs) => outputs,
3194 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3196 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
3197 Some(points) => points,
3198 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3201 let per_commitment_point =
3202 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
3203 // per-commitment point
3204 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
3205 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
3206 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
3207 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
3208 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
3209 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
3211 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
3212 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
3214 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3215 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
3216 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point);
3218 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &per_commitment_point);
3220 let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3221 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3222 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
3223 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
3224 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3225 to_counterparty_output_info =
3226 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3231 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
3232 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3233 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3234 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
3235 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3236 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3237 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
3240 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
3241 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
3242 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
3243 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
3244 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3245 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3246 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3247 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3249 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
3250 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3251 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3252 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3253 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3255 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry, 0);
3256 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
3261 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
3264 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
3265 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
3266 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
3267 ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
3268 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
3269 let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
3271 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
3273 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3275 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
3276 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
3277 let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
3278 // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
3279 // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
3280 // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
3281 // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
3282 // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
3283 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
3285 // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
3286 // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
3287 // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
3288 for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
3289 if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
3290 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
3291 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
3292 per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3293 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
3294 tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3297 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3298 htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
3299 height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height
3301 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3302 if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
3303 outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
3305 outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
3308 (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
3311 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
3312 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
3313 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
3314 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>) {
3315 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3317 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
3318 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
3320 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3321 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3322 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
3323 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
3324 htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3328 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
3331 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3334 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
3335 payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3339 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3340 holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
3341 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
3342 htlc.cltv_expiry, conf_height
3344 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
3348 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
3351 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
3352 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
3353 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3354 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3355 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3356 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
3362 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
3363 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
3364 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
3365 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
3366 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
3367 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
3368 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
3369 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3371 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
3372 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
3373 claim_requests = $updates.0;
3374 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
3375 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
3379 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
3380 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
3382 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3383 is_holder_tx = true;
3384 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3385 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
3386 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
3387 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3388 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3389 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
3390 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
3391 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3392 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3393 is_holder_tx = true;
3394 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3395 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
3396 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
3397 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3398 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3399 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
3405 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
3411 /// Cancels any existing pending claims for a commitment that previously confirmed and has now
3412 /// been replaced by another.
3413 pub fn cancel_prev_commitment_claims<L: Deref>(
3414 &mut self, logger: &L, confirmed_commitment_txid: &Txid
3415 ) where L::Target: Logger {
3416 for (counterparty_commitment_txid, _) in &self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain {
3417 // Cancel any pending claims for counterparty commitments we've seen confirm.
3418 if counterparty_commitment_txid == confirmed_commitment_txid {
3421 for (htlc, _) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(counterparty_commitment_txid).unwrap_or(&vec![]) {
3422 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously confirmed counterparty commitment {}",
3423 counterparty_commitment_txid);
3424 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: *counterparty_commitment_txid, vout: 0 };
3425 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3426 outpoint.vout = vout;
3427 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3431 if self.holder_tx_signed {
3432 // If we've signed, we may have broadcast either commitment (prev or current), and
3433 // attempted to claim from it immediately without waiting for a confirmation.
3434 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3435 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3436 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3437 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3438 for (htlc, _, _) in &self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3439 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3440 outpoint.vout = vout;
3441 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3445 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3446 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3447 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3448 prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3449 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3450 for (htlc, _, _) in &prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3451 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3452 outpoint.vout = vout;
3453 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3459 // No previous claim.
3463 fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3464 &mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3465 ) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3466 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
3467 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
3468 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3469 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3470 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3471 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
3472 // transaction confirms.
3473 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3474 return holder_transactions;
3476 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3477 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3478 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3479 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3480 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3483 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
3484 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
3485 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
3486 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
3487 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
3488 // confirmed in the next block.
3491 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
3492 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
3493 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
3497 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
3498 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
3502 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
3503 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
3504 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3505 &mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3506 ) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3507 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
3508 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3509 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3510 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3511 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
3512 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
3513 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3514 return holder_transactions;
3516 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3517 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3518 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3519 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3520 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3524 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
3525 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
3526 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
3533 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3534 &mut self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B,
3535 fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3536 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3537 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3538 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3541 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3542 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3544 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3545 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
3548 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3553 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3554 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3555 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3557 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3558 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3561 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3563 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3564 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3565 log_trace!(logger, "Connecting new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3566 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3567 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
3568 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3569 log_trace!(logger, "Best block re-orged, replaced with new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3570 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
3571 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3573 } else { Vec::new() }
3576 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3579 txdata: &TransactionData,
3582 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3583 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3584 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3586 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3587 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3590 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
3591 for tx in &txn_matched {
3592 let mut output_val = 0;
3593 for out in tx.output.iter() {
3594 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3595 output_val += out.value;
3596 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3600 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3602 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3603 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3604 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
3605 let txid = tx.txid();
3606 log_trace!(logger, "Transaction {} confirmed in block {}", txid , block_hash);
3607 // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
3608 if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
3609 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3612 for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3613 if ev.txid == txid {
3614 if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
3615 assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
3616 "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
3617 This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
3619 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3623 for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
3624 if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
3625 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3629 for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
3630 if txid == *spendable_txid {
3631 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3636 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
3637 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
3638 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
3639 // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
3640 // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
3641 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
3642 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
3643 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
3644 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
3645 &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id(), txid);
3646 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
3647 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
3648 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
3649 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
3650 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3651 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
3652 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3653 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3655 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3656 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
3657 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
3658 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
3659 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
3660 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3661 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3663 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3664 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
3668 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3670 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
3672 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
3673 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
3674 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
3675 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
3678 // Now that we've detected a confirmed commitment transaction, attempt to cancel
3679 // pending claims for any commitments that were previously confirmed such that
3680 // we don't continue claiming inputs that no longer exist.
3681 self.cancel_prev_commitment_claims(&logger, &txid);
3684 if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
3685 // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
3686 // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
3687 // other ways which can have more than one output.
3688 for tx_input in &tx.input {
3689 let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
3690 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
3691 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
3692 &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
3694 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3695 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
3696 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3698 // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
3699 // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
3700 // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
3701 // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
3705 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3707 self.check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3711 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3712 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3715 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3718 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
3719 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
3720 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
3721 /// complexity especially in
3722 /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
3724 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
3725 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
3726 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3729 conf_hash: BlockHash,
3730 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
3731 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
3732 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
3734 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3735 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3736 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3738 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3739 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3742 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
3743 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
3745 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
3746 if should_broadcast {
3747 let (mut new_outpoints, mut new_outputs) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs();
3748 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3749 watch_outputs.append(&mut new_outputs);
3752 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3753 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3754 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3755 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3756 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3757 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3758 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3760 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3764 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3765 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3766 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3768 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3769 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3773 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3774 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3776 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3777 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3779 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3780 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3781 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3784 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3785 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3786 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3787 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3789 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3790 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3791 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3792 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3793 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3796 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3797 &payment_hash, entry.txid);
3798 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3800 payment_preimage: None,
3801 source: source.clone(),
3802 htlc_value_satoshis,
3804 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3805 commitment_tx_output_idx,
3806 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3807 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3808 payment_preimage: None,
3811 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3812 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3813 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3814 outputs: vec![descriptor],
3815 channel_id: Some(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()),
3817 self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
3819 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3820 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3821 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
3822 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3823 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3824 payment_preimage: preimage,
3827 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3828 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3829 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3834 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3835 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3837 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3838 // updating the latter in the process.
3839 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3840 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3841 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3845 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3846 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3847 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3848 for tx in &txn_matched {
3849 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3850 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3851 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3852 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3860 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3861 &mut self, header: &Header, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3862 ) where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3863 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3866 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3869 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3870 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3871 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3873 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3874 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3876 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3879 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3883 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3884 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3886 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3887 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3890 let mut removed_height = None;
3891 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3892 if entry.txid == *txid {
3893 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
3898 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
3899 log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
3900 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
3901 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
3906 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
3908 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3911 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3912 /// transactions thereof.
3913 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3914 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
3915 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3916 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3917 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3918 if matches { break; }
3919 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3924 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3927 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3930 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3931 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3932 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3933 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3934 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3935 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3938 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3939 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3940 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3941 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3942 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3943 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3944 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3945 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3949 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&ScriptBuf::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3950 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3951 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3952 } else { panic!(); }
3963 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3964 &self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3965 ) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3966 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
3967 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
3968 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
3969 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
3970 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
3976 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3977 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3978 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3979 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3980 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3981 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3982 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3983 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3984 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3985 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3986 let height = self.best_block.height();
3987 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3988 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3989 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3990 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3991 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3992 // time out the HTLC first.
3993 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3994 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3995 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3996 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3997 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3998 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3999 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
4000 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
4001 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
4002 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
4003 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
4004 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
4005 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4006 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4007 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4008 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
4009 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
4010 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
4011 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
4012 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
4013 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
4014 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
4015 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
4016 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4023 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
4025 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4026 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4027 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4030 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4031 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4032 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4039 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
4040 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
4041 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(
4042 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4043 ) where L::Target: Logger {
4044 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
4045 let mut payment_data = None;
4046 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
4047 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
4048 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
4049 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4050 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
4051 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
4052 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4053 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
4055 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4056 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
4057 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
4060 macro_rules! log_claim {
4061 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
4062 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
4063 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
4065 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4066 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4067 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4068 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4069 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
4070 // matched by any HTLC spend:
4071 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4072 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
4073 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
4074 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
4075 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
4076 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
4077 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
4078 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4079 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4080 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
4082 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
4083 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4084 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4085 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
4090 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
4091 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
4092 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
4093 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
4094 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
4095 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
4096 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
4097 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
4106 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
4107 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
4108 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
4109 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
4110 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
4111 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
4112 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
4113 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
4114 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
4115 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
4116 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
4117 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
4118 } else if !$holder_tx {
4119 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4120 if payment_data.is_none() {
4121 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4124 if payment_data.is_none() {
4125 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
4126 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
4127 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4128 txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4129 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4130 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4131 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
4132 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
4133 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
4134 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
4135 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
4136 // accepted_preimage_claim).
4137 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
4138 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
4141 continue 'outer_loop;
4148 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
4149 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4150 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
4152 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
4153 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
4154 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4155 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
4158 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
4159 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
4160 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
4163 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
4164 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
4165 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
4166 if accepted_preimage_claim {
4167 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4168 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
4169 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4172 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4173 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4174 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4175 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4176 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4177 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4180 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4182 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4184 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4187 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
4188 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4189 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
4190 upd.source == source
4192 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4194 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4196 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4197 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4198 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4199 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4200 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4203 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4205 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4207 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4211 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
4212 if entry.height != height { return true; }
4214 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
4215 *htlc_source != source
4220 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4222 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4224 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4225 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
4226 source, payment_hash,
4227 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4228 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
4231 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", &payment_hash, entry.confirmation_threshold());
4232 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4238 fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
4239 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
4240 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4241 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
4242 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4243 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4244 output: outp.clone(),
4245 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4248 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
4249 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
4250 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4251 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4252 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
4253 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
4254 output: outp.clone(),
4255 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2,
4256 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4257 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4261 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
4262 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4263 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4264 output: outp.clone(),
4265 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4266 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4267 channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()),
4270 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
4271 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4272 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4273 output: outp.clone(),
4274 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4281 /// Checks if the confirmed transaction is paying funds back to some address we can assume to
4283 fn check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs<L: Deref>(
4284 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4285 ) where L::Target: Logger {
4286 for spendable_output in self.get_spendable_outputs(tx) {
4287 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4289 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4291 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4292 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
4294 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
4295 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4300 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
4302 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4303 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4306 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4307 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4310 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4311 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4315 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, M, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (M, T, F, L)
4317 M: Deref<Target = ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4318 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4319 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4322 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4323 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4326 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4327 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4330 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4331 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4334 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
4335 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
4339 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4341 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
4342 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::EcdsaSigner>) {
4343 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4344 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
4348 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4353 let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
4355 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4357 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4358 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4360 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4361 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4363 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
4364 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4365 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4366 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
4369 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4371 let mut counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf = Readable::read(reader)?;
4372 let shutdown_script = {
4373 let script = <ScriptBuf as Readable>::read(reader)?;
4374 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
4377 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4378 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
4379 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
4380 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
4381 let outpoint = OutPoint {
4382 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
4383 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
4385 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
4386 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4387 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4389 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
4390 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
4391 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4393 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
4394 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4398 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4399 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
4400 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
4401 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
4403 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
4408 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4410 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4412 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
4415 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
4416 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4417 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4418 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4419 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
4421 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4422 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
4428 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4429 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
4430 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
4431 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4432 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4433 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4434 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
4435 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
4437 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
4438 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4442 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4443 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4444 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
4445 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4446 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4447 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
4448 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4452 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4453 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4454 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
4455 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4456 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4457 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
4458 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4462 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
4463 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4466 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
4468 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4470 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
4472 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4473 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4475 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4476 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4477 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
4478 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
4479 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4480 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
4481 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4485 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4486 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
4487 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
4488 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
4489 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4490 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
4491 1 => MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_info.0),
4492 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4494 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
4497 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4498 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
4499 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
4500 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4501 pending_events.push(event);
4505 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
4507 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4508 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
4509 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
4510 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4511 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
4515 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4516 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<ScriptBuf>>())));
4517 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
4518 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4519 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4520 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<ScriptBuf>())));
4521 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
4522 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4524 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
4525 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4528 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::EcdsaSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(
4529 reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
4532 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
4533 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4535 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
4536 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4537 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
4538 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4539 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
4540 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
4541 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4545 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4546 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4547 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
4548 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
4549 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4552 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
4553 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
4554 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
4555 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
4556 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
4557 let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
4558 let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new());
4559 let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None;
4560 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4561 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
4562 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
4563 (5, pending_monitor_events, optional_vec),
4564 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
4565 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
4566 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
4567 (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
4568 (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
4569 (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
4572 // Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the
4573 // wrong `counterparty_payment_script` was being tracked. Fix it now on deserialization to
4574 // give them a chance to recognize the spendable output.
4575 if onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() &&
4576 counterparty_payment_script.is_v0_p2wpkh()
4578 let payment_point = onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.payment_point;
4579 counterparty_payment_script =
4580 chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh();
4583 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
4585 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
4588 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
4589 counterparty_payment_script,
4593 holder_revocation_basepoint,
4595 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4596 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4598 counterparty_commitment_params,
4599 funding_redeemscript,
4600 channel_value_satoshis,
4601 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
4606 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
4607 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
4608 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
4609 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),
4611 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
4612 current_holder_commitment_tx,
4613 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
4614 current_holder_commitment_number,
4617 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
4619 is_processing_pending_events: false,
4621 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
4626 lockdown_from_offchain,
4628 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
4629 funding_spend_confirmed,
4630 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
4631 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
4632 spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
4635 counterparty_node_id,
4636 initial_counterparty_commitment_info,
4643 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
4644 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
4645 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4646 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut};
4647 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4648 use bitcoin::sighash;
4649 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
4650 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4651 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4652 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4653 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
4654 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4655 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4656 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
4657 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Witness};
4659 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
4661 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
4662 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
4663 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
4664 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, WithChannelMonitor};
4665 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
4666 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4667 use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
4668 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4669 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint, RevocationKey};
4670 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
4671 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
4672 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4673 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
4674 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
4675 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
4676 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
4677 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
4678 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4680 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
4681 use crate::prelude::*;
4683 use std::str::FromStr;
4685 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
4686 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
4687 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
4688 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
4689 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
4690 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
4691 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
4692 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
4693 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
4695 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
4696 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
4697 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4698 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4699 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4700 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4701 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4702 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4704 // Rebalance somewhat
4705 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
4707 // First route two payments for testing at the end
4708 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4709 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4711 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
4712 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4713 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
4714 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
4715 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
4716 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
4717 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
4719 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
4720 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
4721 let new_header = create_dummy_header(nodes[0].best_block_info().0, 0);
4722 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4723 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
4724 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
4726 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
4727 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
4728 (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
4730 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
4731 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
4732 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
4733 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
4734 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
4735 ), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress, {});
4736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4738 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
4739 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
4740 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
4741 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
4742 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().next().unwrap().clone();
4743 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
4744 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
4745 } else { panic!(); }
4746 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
4747 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
4749 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
4751 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
4753 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
4755 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4756 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
4757 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
4758 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
4759 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
4760 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
4761 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4762 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
4763 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
4766 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
4767 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
4768 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4772 fn test_prune_preimages() {
4773 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4774 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4775 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster::new(Network::Testnet));
4776 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4778 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4780 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4783 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4784 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4785 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4789 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlcs {
4790 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4792 let mut res = Vec::new();
4793 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4794 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4798 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4799 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4806 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4807 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4808 preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
4811 let dummy_sig = crate::crypto::utils::sign(&secp_ctx,
4812 &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
4813 &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4815 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4816 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4817 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4818 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4823 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4825 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4826 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4827 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4828 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4829 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4836 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4837 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4838 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
4839 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4840 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
4841 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap()))
4843 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4844 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4845 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4846 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4847 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4848 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4849 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4850 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4852 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4853 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
4855 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4857 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4858 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
4859 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4860 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
4861 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
4862 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
4863 best_block, dummy_key);
4865 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
4866 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4868 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4869 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4870 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"1").to_byte_array()),
4871 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4872 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"2").to_byte_array()),
4873 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4874 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4875 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4876 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4879 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4880 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4881 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4882 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4883 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4884 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4885 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4887 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"3").to_byte_array()),
4888 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4890 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4891 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4892 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4893 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4894 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4895 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4897 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"4").to_byte_array()),
4898 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4900 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4901 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4902 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]);
4903 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4904 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4905 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4906 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4907 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4908 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4909 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4910 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4912 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4913 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]);
4914 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4915 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
4916 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4917 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4918 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4919 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4920 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4924 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4925 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4926 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4928 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4929 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4930 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4932 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint};
4933 macro_rules! sign_input {
4934 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4935 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4936 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4938 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4939 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4940 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4942 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), 256, &DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) };
4943 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4944 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4945 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4946 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4947 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len() as u64;
4948 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4949 witness.push(ser_sig);
4950 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4951 witness.push(vec!(1));
4952 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4953 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4954 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4955 witness.push(vec![0]);
4957 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4959 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4960 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4961 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4962 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4963 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4967 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4968 let txid = Txid::from_str("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4970 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4971 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4972 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4973 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4975 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4976 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4980 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
4981 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4982 witness: Witness::new(),
4985 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4986 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4989 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
4990 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
4991 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4993 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4994 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4995 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
4996 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4999 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5002 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
5003 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5004 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5005 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5007 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5008 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5012 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5013 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5014 witness: Witness::new(),
5017 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5018 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5021 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5022 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
5023 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5025 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5026 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5027 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5028 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5031 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5034 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
5035 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5036 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5037 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5038 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5039 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5043 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5044 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5045 witness: Witness::new(),
5047 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5048 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5051 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5052 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
5053 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5055 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5056 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5057 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5058 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5061 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5066 fn test_with_channel_monitor_impl_logger() {
5067 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5068 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
5070 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5072 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
5074 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5075 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5076 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5077 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5078 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5085 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5086 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
5087 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
5088 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
5089 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
5090 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())),
5092 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
5093 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
5094 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
5095 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
5096 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5097 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5098 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5099 selected_contest_delay: 67,
5101 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
5102 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
5104 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5105 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
5106 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
5107 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
5108 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
5109 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
5110 best_block, dummy_key);
5112 let chan_id = monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().funding_info.0.to_channel_id().clone();
5113 let context_logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&logger, &monitor);
5114 log_error!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5115 log_warn!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5116 log_debug!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5117 log_trace!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5118 log_gossip!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5119 log_info!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5120 logger.assert_log_context_contains("lightning::chain::channelmonitor::tests", Some(dummy_key), Some(chan_id), 6);
5122 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.