1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
38 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
39 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use crate::ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
42 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
44 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
47 use crate::chain::onchaintx::ClaimEvent;
48 use crate::chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
49 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
50 use crate::chain::Filter;
51 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
52 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
53 use crate::util::byte_utils;
54 use crate::util::events::Event;
56 use crate::util::events::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
58 use crate::prelude::*;
60 use crate::io::{self, Error};
61 use core::convert::TryInto;
63 use crate::sync::Mutex;
65 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
66 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
68 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
69 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
70 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
71 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
72 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
75 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
76 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
77 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
78 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
79 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
81 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
82 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
83 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
85 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
86 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
87 /// its docs for more details.
89 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
94 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
95 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
96 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
97 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
98 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
100 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
102 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
103 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
104 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
105 self.update_id.write(w)?;
106 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
107 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
108 update_step.write(w)?;
110 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
114 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
115 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
116 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
117 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
118 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
119 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
121 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
125 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
126 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
130 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
131 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
132 pub enum MonitorEvent {
133 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
134 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
136 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
137 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
139 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
140 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
142 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
144 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
145 funding_txo: OutPoint,
146 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
147 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
149 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
150 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
151 monitor_update_id: u64,
154 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
155 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
157 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
158 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
160 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
161 // Note that Completed and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
162 // generated only in ChainMonitor
164 (0, funding_txo, required),
165 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
169 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
173 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
174 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
175 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
176 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
178 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
179 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
180 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
181 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
183 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
184 (0, payment_hash, required),
185 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
186 (2, source, required),
187 (4, payment_preimage, option),
190 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
191 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
192 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
193 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
194 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
195 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
196 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
197 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
198 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
199 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
200 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
201 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
202 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
203 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
204 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
205 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
206 /// accurate block height.
207 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
208 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
209 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
210 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
211 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
212 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
215 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
216 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
217 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
218 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
219 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
220 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
221 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
222 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
223 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
224 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
226 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
227 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
228 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
230 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
231 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
233 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
234 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
236 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
237 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
238 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
239 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
241 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
242 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
243 struct HolderSignedTx {
244 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
246 revocation_key: PublicKey,
247 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
248 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
249 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
250 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
251 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
252 to_self_value_sat: u64,
255 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
257 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
258 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
259 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
260 (2, revocation_key, required),
261 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
262 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
263 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
264 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
265 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
266 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
270 impl HolderSignedTx {
271 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
272 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
273 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
283 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
284 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
285 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
286 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
287 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
288 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
289 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
292 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
293 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
294 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
295 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
296 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
297 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
298 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
303 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
304 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
305 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
306 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
307 // used. Read it for compatibility.
308 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
309 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
310 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
311 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
312 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
313 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
317 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
318 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
319 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
320 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
321 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
322 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
323 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
325 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
326 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
327 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
328 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
331 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
335 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
336 /// transaction causing it.
338 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
339 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
340 struct OnchainEventEntry {
344 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
347 impl OnchainEventEntry {
348 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
349 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
351 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
352 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
354 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
355 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
356 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
358 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
359 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
360 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
361 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
362 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
369 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
370 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
374 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
376 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
377 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
379 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
380 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
381 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
383 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
384 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
385 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
386 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
387 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
388 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
391 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
392 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
393 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
394 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
395 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
397 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
398 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
400 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
402 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
404 FundingSpendConfirmation {
405 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
406 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
407 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
408 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
409 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
411 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
412 /// counterparty output.
413 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
415 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
416 /// is constructed. This is used when
417 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
418 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
419 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
420 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
421 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
423 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
424 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
426 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
427 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
428 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
429 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
430 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
431 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
432 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
433 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
437 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
438 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
439 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
440 (0, self.txid, required),
441 (1, self.transaction, option),
442 (2, self.height, required),
443 (4, self.event, required),
449 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
450 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
451 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
452 let mut transaction = None;
454 let mut event = None;
455 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
457 (1, transaction, option),
458 (2, height, required),
459 (4, event, ignorable),
461 if let Some(ev) = event {
462 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, event: ev }))
469 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
471 (0, source, required),
472 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
473 (2, payment_hash, required),
474 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
476 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
477 (0, descriptor, required),
479 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
480 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
481 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
483 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
484 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
485 (2, preimage, option),
486 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
491 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
493 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
494 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
495 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
496 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
498 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
499 commitment_txid: Txid,
500 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
501 commitment_number: u64,
502 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
505 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
511 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
512 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
514 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
515 /// think we've fallen behind!
516 should_broadcast: bool,
519 scriptpubkey: Script,
523 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
524 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
526 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
527 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
528 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
529 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
530 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
531 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
536 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
537 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
538 (0, commitment_tx, required),
539 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
541 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
542 (0, commitment_txid, required),
543 (2, commitment_number, required),
544 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
545 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
547 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
548 (0, payment_preimage, required),
550 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
552 (2, secret, required),
554 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
555 (0, should_broadcast, required),
557 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
558 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
562 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
564 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
566 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
567 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
569 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
570 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
571 /// force-closed now.
572 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
573 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
574 /// required to do so.
575 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
577 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
578 /// we consider it spendable.
579 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
580 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
581 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
582 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
583 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
585 confirmation_height: u32,
587 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
588 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
589 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
591 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
592 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
593 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
594 ContentiousClaimable {
595 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
596 /// required to do so.
597 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
598 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
602 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
603 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
604 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
605 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
606 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
607 /// which will be required to do so.
608 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
609 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
611 claimable_height: u32,
613 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
614 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
615 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
616 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
617 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
618 /// which will be required to do so.
619 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
620 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
621 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
624 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
627 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
628 /// following amount.
629 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
630 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
632 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
633 /// were already spent.
634 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
638 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
639 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
640 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
641 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
642 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
643 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
645 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
646 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
647 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
650 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
651 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
652 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
653 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
654 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
655 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
656 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
657 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
658 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
659 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
660 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
666 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
667 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
668 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
669 let mut resolving_txid = None;
670 let mut payment_preimage = None;
671 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
672 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
673 (1, resolving_txid, option),
674 (2, payment_preimage, option),
677 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
684 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
685 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
687 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
688 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
690 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
691 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
692 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
693 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
695 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
696 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
697 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
698 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
699 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
700 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
702 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
704 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
707 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
708 latest_update_id: u64,
709 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
711 destination_script: Script,
712 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
713 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
714 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
716 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
717 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
718 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
719 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
720 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
722 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
723 funding_redeemscript: Script,
724 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
725 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
726 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
728 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
730 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
731 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
732 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
733 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
734 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
735 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
736 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
737 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
738 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
739 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
740 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
741 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
742 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
743 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
744 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
745 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
747 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
748 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
749 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
750 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
751 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
752 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
754 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
756 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
757 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
759 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
761 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
762 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
763 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
765 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
767 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
768 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
769 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
770 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
771 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
772 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
773 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
774 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
775 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
776 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
778 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
780 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
781 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
782 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
783 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
785 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
786 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
787 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
788 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
789 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
792 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
794 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
796 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
797 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
798 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
799 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
801 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
802 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
803 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
805 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
806 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
807 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
808 holder_tx_signed: bool,
810 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
811 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
812 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
813 funding_spend_seen: bool,
815 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
816 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
817 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
819 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
820 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
821 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
822 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
823 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
825 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
826 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
827 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
828 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
829 // the full block_connected).
830 best_block: BestBlock,
832 /// The node_id of our counterparty
833 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
835 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
838 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
839 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
841 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
842 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
844 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
845 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
846 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
847 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
852 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
853 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
855 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
856 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
857 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
858 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
859 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
860 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
861 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
862 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
863 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
864 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
865 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
866 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
867 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
868 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
869 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
870 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
871 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
872 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
873 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
874 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
875 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
876 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
877 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
878 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
879 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
880 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
881 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
882 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
883 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
884 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
885 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
886 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
887 self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
888 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
889 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
890 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
899 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
900 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
901 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
905 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
906 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
907 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
909 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
910 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
911 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
913 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
915 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
916 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
918 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
919 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
920 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
921 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
922 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
923 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
925 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
928 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
929 match &self.shutdown_script {
930 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
931 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
934 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
935 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
936 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
937 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
938 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
939 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
940 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
942 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
943 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
944 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
946 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
947 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
948 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
949 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
950 match second_option {
951 Some(second_pubkey) => {
952 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
955 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
960 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
964 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
966 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
968 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
969 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
970 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
971 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
972 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
973 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
974 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
978 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
979 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
980 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
981 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
982 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
983 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
984 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
985 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
986 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
987 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
991 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
992 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
993 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
994 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
997 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
998 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
999 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1000 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1003 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1004 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1005 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1007 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1010 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1012 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1013 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1015 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1016 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1017 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1020 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1021 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1022 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
1024 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1025 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1027 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1031 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1032 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1036 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1037 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1038 event.write(writer)?;
1041 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1042 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
1044 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1045 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1046 entry.write(writer)?;
1049 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1050 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1051 txid.write(writer)?;
1052 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1053 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1055 script.write(writer)?;
1058 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1060 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1061 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1063 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1064 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1065 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
1066 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
1067 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1068 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1069 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1076 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1077 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1078 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1079 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1080 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1081 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1084 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
1085 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1086 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1087 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1088 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1089 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1090 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1092 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1093 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1094 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1096 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1097 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1098 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1099 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1101 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1102 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1104 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1105 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1106 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1107 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1109 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1110 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1112 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1113 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1114 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1115 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1116 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1117 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1118 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1119 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1121 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1124 let onchain_tx_handler =
1125 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1126 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1128 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1129 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1131 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1132 latest_update_id: 0,
1133 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1135 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1136 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1137 counterparty_payment_script,
1141 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1143 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1144 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1146 counterparty_commitment_params,
1147 funding_redeemscript,
1148 channel_value_satoshis,
1149 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1151 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1153 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1154 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1155 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1156 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1158 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1159 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1160 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1161 current_holder_commitment_number,
1163 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1164 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1165 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1167 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1172 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1173 holder_tx_signed: false,
1174 funding_spend_seen: false,
1175 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1176 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1177 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1180 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1187 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1188 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1191 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1192 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1193 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1194 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1195 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1198 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1199 commitment_number: u64,
1200 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1202 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1203 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1204 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1208 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1209 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1210 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1211 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1212 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1215 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1216 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1217 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1219 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1220 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1222 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1225 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1226 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1229 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1230 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1233 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1238 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1241 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1244 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1247 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1248 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1250 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1256 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1257 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1260 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1263 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1265 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1266 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1269 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1270 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1271 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1274 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1275 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1276 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1277 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1278 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1281 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1282 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1283 /// have been registered.
1284 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1285 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1286 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1287 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1288 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1289 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1290 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1292 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1293 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1299 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1300 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1301 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1302 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1305 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1308 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1309 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1310 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1311 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1312 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1315 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1316 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1319 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1320 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1323 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1324 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1327 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1329 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1331 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1332 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1335 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1336 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1338 /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1339 /// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've
1340 /// fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation
1341 /// secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1343 /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1344 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1345 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1346 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1347 /// to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you.
1349 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
1350 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1351 where L::Target: Logger {
1352 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1355 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1356 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1357 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1358 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1359 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1360 where L::Target: Logger {
1361 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1364 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1365 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1366 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1367 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1368 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1369 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1371 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1372 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1374 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1375 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1377 header: &BlockHeader,
1378 txdata: &TransactionData,
1383 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1385 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1386 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1389 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1390 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1393 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1395 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1397 header: &BlockHeader,
1403 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1404 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1407 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1408 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1411 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1412 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1414 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1415 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1417 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1418 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1420 header: &BlockHeader,
1421 txdata: &TransactionData,
1426 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1428 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1429 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1432 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1433 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1434 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1437 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1439 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1440 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1442 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1443 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1450 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1451 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1454 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1455 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1456 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1459 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1460 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1462 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1463 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1465 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1466 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1468 header: &BlockHeader,
1473 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1475 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1476 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1479 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1480 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1481 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1484 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1485 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1486 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1487 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1489 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1490 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1492 txids.sort_unstable();
1497 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1498 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1499 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1500 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1504 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1505 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1506 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1507 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1508 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1509 -> Option<Balance> {
1510 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1511 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1513 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1514 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1515 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1516 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1517 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1519 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1520 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1521 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1522 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1523 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1524 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1525 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1527 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1528 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1529 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1530 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1531 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1532 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1534 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1535 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1536 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1537 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1538 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1543 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1544 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1545 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1546 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid;
1549 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1551 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1552 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1554 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_none(),
1555 "This code needs updating for anchors");
1556 BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, 0)
1558 BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx)
1560 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1562 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1563 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1564 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1565 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1566 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1568 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1569 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1570 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1571 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1572 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1573 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1574 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1575 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1576 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1577 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1578 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1580 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1581 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1582 Some(tx.txid()) == htlc_spend_txid_opt ||
1583 inp.previous_output.txid == htlc_spend_txid
1585 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1586 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1588 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1593 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1594 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1595 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1596 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1597 // need to do so again here.
1599 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1600 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1601 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1602 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1603 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1604 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1607 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1608 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1609 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1610 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1611 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1612 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1613 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1614 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1617 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1618 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1619 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1622 } else if self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1623 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1624 // we know the preimage.
1625 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1626 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1627 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1628 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1629 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1630 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1631 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1632 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1635 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1636 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1637 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1640 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1641 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1642 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1643 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1650 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1651 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1652 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1655 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1656 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1657 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1658 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1660 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1661 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
1662 /// a revoked state.
1664 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1665 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1666 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1667 let mut res = Vec::new();
1668 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1670 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1671 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1672 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1673 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1674 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1677 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
1678 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1681 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1682 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1683 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1684 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1685 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1688 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1689 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1690 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1691 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1693 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
1701 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1702 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1703 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1704 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
1705 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1706 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1707 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1708 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1710 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1713 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1714 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1715 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1718 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1719 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1720 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1723 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1724 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1726 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1727 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
1728 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
1729 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
1730 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
1731 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
1732 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1733 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1734 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
1736 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1737 claimable_amount_satoshis: output.value,
1738 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
1740 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
1741 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
1742 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
1743 ).unwrap_or(false) {
1744 spent_counterparty_output = true;
1750 if spent_counterparty_output {
1751 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
1752 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
1753 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
1754 if output_spendable {
1755 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1756 claimable_amount_satoshis: amt,
1760 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
1761 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
1764 found_commitment_tx = true;
1765 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1766 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1767 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1768 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1769 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1770 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1773 found_commitment_tx = true;
1774 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1775 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1776 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1777 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1778 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1779 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1780 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1783 found_commitment_tx = true;
1786 if !found_commitment_tx {
1787 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1788 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1789 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1790 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1791 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1792 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1793 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1798 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1799 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1800 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1802 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1803 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1804 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1806 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1807 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1809 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
1810 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
1811 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1812 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1813 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1817 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1818 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1825 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1826 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1827 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1828 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1829 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1831 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1832 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1833 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1834 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1835 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1836 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1838 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1839 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1840 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1841 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1842 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1843 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1844 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1845 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1846 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1847 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1848 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1849 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1850 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1851 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
1852 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1853 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1855 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1858 if !htlc_update_confd {
1859 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1866 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1867 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1868 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1869 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1870 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1871 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1876 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1877 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1878 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1879 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1880 Some((a, &**source))
1883 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1884 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1885 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1887 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1888 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1889 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1890 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1895 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1896 // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
1897 // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1898 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1900 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1901 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1902 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1903 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1909 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1910 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1912 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1913 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1920 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
1921 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
1925 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1926 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1927 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1929 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1930 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1931 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1932 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1933 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1934 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1936 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1937 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1938 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1939 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1940 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1941 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
1942 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1943 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
1945 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1946 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1947 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1948 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1949 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1950 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1951 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1952 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1953 // payment_preimage.
1954 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1955 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1956 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1957 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1959 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1961 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1962 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1963 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
1964 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
1965 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
1966 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
1967 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
1968 matched_htlc = true;
1972 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1973 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1974 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1976 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1977 *update_source != **source
1982 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1983 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
1984 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
1985 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1986 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1987 source: (**source).clone(),
1988 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1989 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1990 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
1993 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1994 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
1995 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1996 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2002 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2003 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2005 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2006 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2011 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2012 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2013 // in-line tests later.
2016 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2017 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2018 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2019 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2020 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2021 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2022 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2027 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2028 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2031 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2032 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2033 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2034 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2035 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2036 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2037 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2040 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2041 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2042 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2043 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2048 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2049 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2050 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2051 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2052 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2054 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2055 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2056 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2060 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2061 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2062 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2067 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2074 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2083 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2084 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2085 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2086 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2088 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2089 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2092 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2093 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2094 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2095 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2096 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2097 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2098 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2099 Some(old_points) => {
2100 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2101 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2102 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2103 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2104 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2106 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2109 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2113 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2116 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2117 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2118 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2124 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2125 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2126 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2127 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2128 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2129 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2130 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
2131 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
2132 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2133 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2134 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2135 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2138 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2139 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2140 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2141 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2142 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2144 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2145 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2148 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2149 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2150 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2151 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2152 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2157 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2158 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2159 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2160 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2161 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
2162 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2163 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2166 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2168 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2169 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2170 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2171 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2172 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2173 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2176 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2177 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2178 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2182 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2183 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2184 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2189 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2190 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2191 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2192 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2193 // holder commitment transactions.
2194 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2195 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2196 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2198 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2199 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2200 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2201 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
2202 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2207 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
2208 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2211 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
2212 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
2213 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2215 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2218 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
2219 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2220 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2223 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
2224 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2225 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
2226 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
2227 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
2228 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
2229 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2230 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2231 match updates.updates[0] {
2232 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
2234 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2235 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2238 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2239 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2241 let mut ret = Ok(());
2242 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2243 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2245 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
2246 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2247 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2248 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
2249 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2250 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2254 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2255 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2256 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2258 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2259 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2260 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2262 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2263 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2264 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2265 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2266 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2270 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2271 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2272 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2273 if *should_broadcast {
2274 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2275 // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
2276 // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
2277 // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm.
2278 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2279 let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2280 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2281 self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors(),
2283 let best_block_height = self.best_block.height();
2284 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2285 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2286 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output),
2287 best_block_height, false, best_block_height,
2289 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(
2290 &[], vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height,
2291 broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger,
2294 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2295 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2296 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()));
2297 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
2299 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2300 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2301 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2302 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2305 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2306 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2307 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2308 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2313 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2315 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
2316 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2321 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2322 self.latest_update_id
2325 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2329 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2330 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2331 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2332 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2333 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2334 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2336 &self.outputs_to_watch
2339 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2340 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2341 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2345 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2346 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2347 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
2349 for claim_event in self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events().drain(..) {
2351 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
2352 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
2354 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2355 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
2356 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
2357 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
2358 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
2359 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
2360 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2362 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
2363 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
2364 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2365 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2366 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
2367 txid: commitment_txid,
2368 vout: anchor_output_idx,
2379 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2380 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2381 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2384 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2385 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2388 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2389 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2392 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2393 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2396 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2397 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2398 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2399 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2401 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
2402 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
2404 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L)
2405 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
2406 where L::Target: Logger {
2407 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2408 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2409 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2410 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2411 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
2413 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2414 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2416 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2417 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2420 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2425 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2426 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2427 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2428 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2429 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2430 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
2431 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
2433 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2434 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2436 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2437 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2438 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2439 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2440 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2441 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2442 to_counterparty_output_info =
2443 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2447 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2448 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2449 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2450 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2451 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2452 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2453 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2454 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
2455 to_counterparty_output_info);
2457 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2458 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2459 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2464 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2465 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2466 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2467 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2468 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2469 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2471 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2473 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2474 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2475 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2476 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2479 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2480 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2481 [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2484 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2485 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2486 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2487 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2488 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2489 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2490 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2492 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2493 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2495 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2497 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2498 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2499 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2500 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2503 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
2504 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2505 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
2506 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2507 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2511 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2514 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
2515 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
2516 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
2517 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2518 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
2520 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2521 Some(outputs) => outputs,
2522 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2524 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2525 Some(points) => points,
2526 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2529 let per_commitment_point =
2530 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2531 // per-commitment point
2532 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
2533 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2534 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2535 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2536 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2537 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2539 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
2540 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
2542 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2543 let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
2544 if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
2545 &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
2547 if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
2548 &per_commitment_point,
2549 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
2551 Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
2552 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2553 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
2555 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
2559 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
2562 if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
2563 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
2564 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2565 to_counterparty_output_info =
2566 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2572 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2573 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2574 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2575 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2576 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2577 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2578 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
2581 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2582 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2583 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2584 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2585 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2586 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2587 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2588 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
2590 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2591 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2592 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2593 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2594 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
2596 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2597 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2598 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2603 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
2606 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2607 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2608 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2609 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
2610 return (Vec::new(), None)
2613 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2614 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2617 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2622 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2623 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2624 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2626 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2627 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2628 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2629 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2630 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2631 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2634 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2635 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2636 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2637 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2638 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2640 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2641 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2643 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2644 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2645 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2646 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2648 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2651 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2654 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2656 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2657 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2661 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2664 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2665 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2666 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2667 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2668 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2669 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2675 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2676 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2677 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2678 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2679 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2680 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2681 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2682 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2684 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2685 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2686 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2687 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2688 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2692 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2693 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2695 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2696 is_holder_tx = true;
2697 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2698 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2699 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2700 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2701 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2702 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2703 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2704 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2705 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2706 is_holder_tx = true;
2707 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2708 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2709 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2710 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2711 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2712 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
2718 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2724 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2725 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2726 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2727 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2728 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2729 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2730 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
2731 // transaction confirms.
2732 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2733 return holder_transactions;
2735 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2736 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2737 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2738 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2739 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2742 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2743 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2744 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2745 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2746 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2747 // confirmed in the next block.
2750 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2751 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2752 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2756 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2757 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2761 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2762 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2763 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2764 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2765 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2766 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2767 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2768 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
2769 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
2770 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2771 return holder_transactions;
2773 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2774 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2775 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2776 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2777 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2781 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2782 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2783 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2790 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2791 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2792 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2795 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2796 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2798 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2799 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2802 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2804 header: &BlockHeader,
2807 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2809 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2811 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2812 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2815 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2817 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2818 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2819 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2820 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2821 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2822 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2823 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2825 } else { Vec::new() }
2828 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2830 header: &BlockHeader,
2831 txdata: &TransactionData,
2834 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2836 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2838 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2839 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2842 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2843 for tx in &txn_matched {
2844 let mut output_val = 0;
2845 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2846 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2847 output_val += out.value;
2848 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2852 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2854 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2855 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2856 for tx in &txn_matched {
2857 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2858 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2859 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2860 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2862 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2863 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2864 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2865 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2866 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
2867 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2868 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
2869 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2870 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
2871 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2872 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
2873 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2874 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2876 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2877 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2878 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
2879 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
2880 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
2881 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2882 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2884 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2885 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2889 let txid = tx.txid();
2890 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2892 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
2894 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2895 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2896 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
2900 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2901 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2902 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2903 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2904 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2909 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2910 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2911 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2912 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2914 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2917 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2918 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2921 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2924 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2925 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2926 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2927 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2929 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2930 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2931 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2934 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2935 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2936 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2938 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2940 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2942 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2943 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2946 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2947 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2949 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2950 if should_broadcast {
2951 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors());
2952 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2953 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2954 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2955 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2956 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2957 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
2958 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
2959 // `transactions_confirmed`.
2960 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2961 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2962 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2963 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2964 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2965 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2966 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2967 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2969 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2973 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2974 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2975 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2976 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2977 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2978 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2979 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2981 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2985 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2986 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2987 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2989 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2990 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2994 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2995 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2997 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2998 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3000 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3001 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3002 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3005 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3006 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3007 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3008 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3010 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3011 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3012 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3013 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3014 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3017 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3018 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
3019 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3021 payment_preimage: None,
3022 source: source.clone(),
3023 htlc_value_satoshis,
3025 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3026 commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3027 payment_preimage: None,
3030 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3031 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3032 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3033 outputs: vec![descriptor]
3036 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3037 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3038 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3039 payment_preimage: preimage,
3042 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3043 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3044 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3049 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3051 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3052 // updating the latter in the process.
3053 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3054 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3055 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3059 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3060 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3061 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3062 for tx in &txn_matched {
3063 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3064 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3065 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3066 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3074 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
3075 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3076 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3079 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3082 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3083 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3084 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3086 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3087 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3089 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3092 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3096 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3099 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3100 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3103 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
3104 log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
3107 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3110 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3111 /// transactions thereof.
3112 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3113 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
3114 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3115 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3116 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3117 if matches { break; }
3118 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3123 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3126 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3129 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3130 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3131 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3132 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3133 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3134 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3137 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3138 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3139 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3140 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3141 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3142 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3143 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3144 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3148 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3149 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3150 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3151 } else { panic!(); }
3162 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3163 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
3164 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
3165 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
3166 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
3167 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
3173 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3174 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3175 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3176 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3177 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3178 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3179 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3180 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3181 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3182 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3183 let height = self.best_block.height();
3184 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3185 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3186 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3187 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3188 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3189 // time out the HTLC first.
3190 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3191 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3192 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3193 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3194 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3195 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3196 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
3197 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
3198 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
3199 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
3200 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
3201 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
3202 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3203 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3204 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3205 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
3206 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
3207 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
3208 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
3209 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
3210 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
3211 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
3212 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
3213 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3220 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
3222 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3223 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3224 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3227 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3228 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3229 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3236 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
3237 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
3238 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3239 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
3240 let mut payment_data = None;
3241 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
3242 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
3243 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
3244 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3245 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
3246 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
3247 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3248 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
3250 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3251 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
3252 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
3255 macro_rules! log_claim {
3256 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
3257 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
3258 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
3260 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3261 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3262 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3263 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3264 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
3265 // matched by any HTLC spend:
3266 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3267 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
3268 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
3269 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
3270 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
3271 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
3272 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
3273 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3274 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3275 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
3277 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
3278 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3279 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3280 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
3285 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
3286 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
3287 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
3288 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
3289 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
3290 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
3291 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
3292 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
3301 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3302 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3303 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3304 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3305 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3306 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
3307 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3308 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
3309 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3310 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3311 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3312 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
3313 } else if !$holder_tx {
3314 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3315 if payment_data.is_none() {
3316 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3319 if payment_data.is_none() {
3320 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
3321 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
3322 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3323 txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3324 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3325 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3326 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
3327 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
3328 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
3329 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
3330 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
3331 // accepted_preimage_claim).
3332 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
3333 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
3336 continue 'outer_loop;
3343 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
3344 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3345 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
3347 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3348 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3349 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3350 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
3353 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3354 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3355 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
3358 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3359 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3360 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
3361 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3362 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3363 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
3364 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3367 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3368 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3369 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3370 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3371 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3374 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3376 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3378 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3381 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3382 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3383 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3384 upd.source == source
3386 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3388 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3390 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3391 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3392 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3393 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3396 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3398 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3400 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3404 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3405 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3407 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3408 *htlc_source != source
3413 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3415 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3417 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3418 source, payment_hash,
3419 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3420 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3423 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3424 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3430 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3431 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3432 let mut spendable_output = None;
3433 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3434 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3435 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3436 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3437 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3438 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3439 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3440 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3441 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3442 // non-standard due to their size.
3443 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3444 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3445 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3448 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3449 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3450 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3451 output: outp.clone(),
3455 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3456 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3457 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3458 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3459 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3460 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3461 output: outp.clone(),
3462 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3463 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3464 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3469 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3470 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3471 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3472 output: outp.clone(),
3473 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3474 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3478 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3479 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3480 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3481 output: outp.clone(),
3486 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3487 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3489 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3491 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3493 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3494 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3499 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3501 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3502 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3505 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3506 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3509 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3510 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3514 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3516 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3517 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3520 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3521 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3524 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3525 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3528 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3529 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3532 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3533 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3537 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3539 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
3540 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
3541 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3542 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3546 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3551 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3553 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3554 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3556 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3557 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3559 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3560 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3561 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3562 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3565 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3567 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3568 let shutdown_script = {
3569 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3570 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3573 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3574 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3575 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3576 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3577 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3578 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3579 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3581 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3582 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3583 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3585 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3586 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3587 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3589 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3590 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3594 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3595 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3596 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3597 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3599 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3604 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3606 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3608 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3611 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3612 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3613 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3614 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3615 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3617 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3618 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3624 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3625 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3626 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3627 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3628 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3629 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3630 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3631 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3633 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3634 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3638 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3639 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3640 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3641 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3642 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3643 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3644 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3648 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3649 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3650 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3651 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3652 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3653 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3654 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3658 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3659 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3662 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3664 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3666 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3668 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3669 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3671 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3672 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3673 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3674 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3675 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3676 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3677 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3681 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3682 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3683 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3684 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3685 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3686 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3687 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3688 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3690 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3693 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3694 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3695 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3696 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3697 pending_events.push(event);
3701 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3703 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3704 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3705 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3706 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3707 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3711 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3712 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3713 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3714 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3715 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3716 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3717 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3718 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3720 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3721 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3724 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3726 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3727 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3729 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3730 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3731 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3732 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3733 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3734 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3735 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3739 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3740 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3741 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3742 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3743 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3746 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3747 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3748 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3749 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
3750 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
3751 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3752 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3753 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3754 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3755 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3756 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
3757 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
3760 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3761 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3763 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3765 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3768 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3769 counterparty_payment_script,
3773 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3775 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3776 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3778 counterparty_commitment_params,
3779 funding_redeemscript,
3780 channel_value_satoshis,
3781 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
3786 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3787 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3788 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3790 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3791 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3792 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3793 current_holder_commitment_number,
3796 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3799 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3804 lockdown_from_offchain,
3806 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3807 funding_spend_confirmed,
3808 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
3809 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3812 counterparty_node_id,
3821 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3822 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3823 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3824 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
3825 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3826 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
3827 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3828 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3829 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3830 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3831 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3832 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3833 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3837 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
3839 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3840 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3841 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3842 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3843 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3844 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3845 use crate::chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3846 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3847 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
3848 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3849 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId};
3850 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3851 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3852 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
3853 use crate::util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3854 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3855 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3856 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3858 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
3859 use crate::prelude::*;
3861 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3862 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3863 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3864 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3865 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3866 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3867 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3868 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3869 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3871 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3872 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3873 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3874 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3875 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3876 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3877 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3878 &nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3879 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3880 &nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3882 // Rebalance somewhat
3883 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
3885 // First route two payments for testing at the end
3886 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3887 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3889 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
3890 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
3891 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
3892 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
3893 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
3894 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
3895 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
3897 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
3898 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
3899 let new_header = BlockHeader {
3900 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
3901 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
3902 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
3903 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3904 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
3905 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
3907 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
3908 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
3909 &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
3911 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
3912 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
3913 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
3914 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)),
3915 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
3916 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
3917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
3918 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3919 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
3921 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
3922 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
3923 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
3924 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
3925 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
3926 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
3927 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
3928 } else { panic!(); }
3929 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
3930 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
3932 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
3934 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
3936 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
3938 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3939 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
3940 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
3941 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
3942 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
3943 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3944 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
3945 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
3946 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
3949 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
3950 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
3951 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
3955 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3956 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3957 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3958 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
3959 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
3961 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3962 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3964 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3967 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3968 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3969 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3973 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3974 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3976 let mut res = Vec::new();
3977 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3978 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3982 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3983 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3990 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3991 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3993 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3994 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
4000 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4001 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4002 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4003 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4008 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4010 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4011 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4012 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4013 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4014 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4015 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4021 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4022 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4023 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
4024 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4025 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
4026 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
4028 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4029 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4030 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4031 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4032 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4033 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4034 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4035 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4037 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4040 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4042 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4043 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
4044 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4045 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
4046 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
4047 &channel_parameters,
4048 Script::new(), 46, 0,
4049 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
4051 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
4052 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
4053 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4054 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4055 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4056 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4057 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4058 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4059 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4062 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4063 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4064 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4065 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4066 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4067 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4068 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4070 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4071 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4072 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4073 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4074 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4075 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4077 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4078 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4079 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
4080 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4081 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4082 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4083 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4084 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4086 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4087 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
4088 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4089 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4090 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4091 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4095 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4096 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4097 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4099 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4100 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4101 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4103 macro_rules! sign_input {
4104 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4105 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4106 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4108 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4109 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4110 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4112 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
4113 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4114 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4115 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4116 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4117 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
4118 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4119 witness.push(ser_sig);
4120 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4121 witness.push(vec!(1));
4122 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4123 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4124 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4125 witness.push(vec![0]);
4127 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4129 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4130 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4131 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4132 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4133 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4137 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4138 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4140 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4141 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4142 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4143 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4145 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4146 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4150 script_sig: Script::new(),
4151 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4152 witness: Witness::new(),
4155 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4156 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4159 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4160 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4161 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4163 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4164 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4165 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4166 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4169 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4172 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
4173 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4174 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4175 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4177 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4178 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4182 script_sig: Script::new(),
4183 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4184 witness: Witness::new(),
4187 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4188 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4191 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4192 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4193 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4195 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4196 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4197 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4198 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4201 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4204 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
4205 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4206 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4207 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4208 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4209 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4213 script_sig: Script::new(),
4214 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4215 witness: Witness::new(),
4217 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4218 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4221 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4222 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
4223 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4225 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4226 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4227 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4228 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4231 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4235 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.