1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 //! [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
30 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
32 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
33 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
34 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
37 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
38 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
40 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
42 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
43 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
44 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
45 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
46 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
47 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
48 use util::logger::Logger;
49 use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
51 use util::events::Event;
53 use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet, hash_map};
58 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
59 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
60 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
63 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
64 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
65 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
66 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
67 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
69 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
70 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
71 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
75 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
76 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
77 self.update_id.write(w)?;
78 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
79 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
80 update_step.write(w)?;
85 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
86 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
87 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
88 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
89 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
91 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
93 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
97 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
99 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
100 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
101 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
103 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
104 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
105 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
106 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
108 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
109 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
110 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
112 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
113 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
114 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
115 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
116 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
117 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
120 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
121 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
124 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
125 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
126 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
127 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
128 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
131 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
132 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
133 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
135 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
136 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
137 /// of this channel).
139 /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
140 /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
141 /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
142 /// update must be rejected.
144 /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
145 /// the channel monitor instance.
147 /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
148 /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
149 /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
151 /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
152 /// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
153 /// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
154 /// lagging behind on block processing.
158 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
159 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
160 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
162 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
164 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
166 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
168 pub enum MonitorEvent {
169 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
170 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
172 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
173 CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
176 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
177 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
178 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
180 /// [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
181 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
182 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
183 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
184 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
185 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
187 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
189 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
190 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
191 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
192 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
193 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
194 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
195 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
196 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
197 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
198 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
199 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
200 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
201 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
202 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
203 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
204 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
205 /// accurate block height.
206 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
207 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
208 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
209 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
210 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
211 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
212 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
213 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
214 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
215 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
216 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
217 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
218 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
220 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
221 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
222 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
224 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
225 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
226 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
227 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
229 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
230 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
232 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
233 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
234 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
236 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
237 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
238 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
240 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
241 struct HolderSignedTx {
242 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
244 revocation_key: PublicKey,
245 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
246 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
247 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
248 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
250 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
253 /// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
254 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
256 struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
257 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
258 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
259 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
260 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
263 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
264 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
265 self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
266 self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
267 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
268 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
269 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
270 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
271 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
272 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
279 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
280 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
282 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
283 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
284 let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
285 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
286 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
287 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
288 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
289 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
290 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
291 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
292 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
295 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
296 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
299 CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
300 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
301 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
302 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
306 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
310 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
311 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
312 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
313 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
314 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
316 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
317 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
318 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
319 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
320 input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
322 htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
323 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
326 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
327 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
328 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
329 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
330 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
333 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
337 funding_redeemscript: Script,
341 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
342 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
344 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
345 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
346 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
347 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
348 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
349 writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
350 input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
351 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
353 on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
355 &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
356 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
357 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
358 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
359 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
360 preimage.write(writer)?;
363 &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
364 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
365 preimage.write(writer)?;
366 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
368 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
369 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
370 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
377 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
378 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
379 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
381 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
382 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
383 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
384 let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
385 let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
386 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
387 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
388 let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
389 InputMaterial::Revoked {
390 per_commitment_point,
391 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
392 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
397 on_counterparty_tx_csv
401 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
402 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
403 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
404 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
405 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
406 InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
407 per_commitment_point,
408 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
409 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
415 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
416 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
417 InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
423 InputMaterial::Funding {
424 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
427 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
433 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
434 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
435 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
436 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
437 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
438 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
439 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
440 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
441 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
442 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
443 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
444 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
445 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
446 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
447 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
448 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
449 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
450 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
451 // and satisfy witness program.
452 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
455 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
456 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
457 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
459 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
460 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
461 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
463 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
466 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
470 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
471 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
473 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
475 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
476 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
477 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
478 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
480 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
481 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
482 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
483 commitment_number: u64,
484 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
487 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
493 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
494 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
496 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
497 /// think we've fallen behind!
498 should_broadcast: bool,
502 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
503 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
505 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
507 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
508 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
509 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
515 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
517 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
518 commitment_number.write(w)?;
519 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
520 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
521 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
523 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
526 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
528 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
530 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
535 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
537 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
543 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
544 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
545 match Readable::read(r)? {
547 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
548 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
550 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
551 let mut res = Vec::new();
553 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
560 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
561 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
562 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
563 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
565 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
566 let mut res = Vec::new();
568 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
575 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
576 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
580 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
581 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
582 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
586 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
587 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
590 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
595 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
596 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
598 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
599 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
601 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
602 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
603 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
604 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
605 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
606 latest_update_id: u64,
607 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
609 destination_script: Script,
610 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
611 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
612 shutdown_script: Script,
615 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
616 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
617 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
619 counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
620 funding_redeemscript: Script,
621 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
622 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
623 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
625 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
627 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
628 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
629 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
630 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
631 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
632 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
633 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
634 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
635 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
636 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
637 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
638 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
639 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
641 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
642 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
643 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
644 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
645 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
646 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
648 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
650 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
651 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
653 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
655 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
657 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
658 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
660 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
661 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
662 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
663 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
665 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
666 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
667 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
668 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
669 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
672 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
674 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
676 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
677 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
678 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
679 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
681 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
682 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
683 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
685 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
686 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
687 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
688 holder_tx_signed: bool,
690 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
691 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
692 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
693 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
694 // the full block_connected).
695 last_block_hash: BlockHash,
696 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
699 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
700 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
701 /// underlying object
702 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
703 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
704 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
705 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
706 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
707 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
708 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
709 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
710 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
711 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
712 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
713 self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
714 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
715 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
716 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
717 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
718 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
719 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
720 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
721 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
722 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
723 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
724 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
725 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
726 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
727 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
728 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
729 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
730 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
731 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
732 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
741 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
742 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
744 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
745 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
746 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
747 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
748 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
749 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
750 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
751 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
752 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
753 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
755 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
757 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
758 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
760 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
761 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
762 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
763 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
764 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
765 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
767 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
770 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
771 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
773 self.keys.write(writer)?;
774 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
775 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
776 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
777 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
778 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
780 self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
781 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
782 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
784 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
785 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
786 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
787 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
788 match second_option {
789 Some(second_pubkey) => {
790 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
793 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
798 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
802 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
804 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
806 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
807 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
808 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
809 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
810 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
811 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
812 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
816 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
817 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
818 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
819 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
820 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
821 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
822 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
826 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
827 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
828 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
829 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
830 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
831 for script in txouts.iter() {
832 script.write(writer)?;
836 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
837 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
838 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
839 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
842 macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
843 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
844 $holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
845 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
846 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
847 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
848 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
849 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
851 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
852 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
853 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
854 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
855 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
857 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
861 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
866 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
867 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
868 serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
870 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
873 serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
875 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
876 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
878 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
879 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
880 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
883 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
884 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
886 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
890 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
894 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
895 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
896 event.write(writer)?;
899 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
901 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
902 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
903 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
904 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
905 for ev in events.iter() {
907 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
909 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
910 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
912 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
914 descriptor.write(writer)?;
920 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
921 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
923 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
924 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
925 script.write(writer)?;
928 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
930 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
931 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
937 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
938 pub(crate) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
939 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
940 counterparty_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
941 on_holder_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
942 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
943 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
945 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
946 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
947 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
948 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
949 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
951 let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: *counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: *counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
953 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_holder_tx_csv);
955 let holder_tx_sequence = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
956 let holder_tx_locktime = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
957 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
958 txid: initial_holder_commitment_tx.txid(),
959 revocation_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
960 a_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
961 b_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
962 delayed_payment_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
963 per_commitment_point: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
964 feerate_per_kw: initial_holder_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
965 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
967 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);
969 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
970 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![funding_info.1.clone()]);
974 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
976 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
977 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
978 counterparty_payment_script,
983 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
984 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
986 counterparty_tx_cache,
987 funding_redeemscript,
988 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
989 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
993 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
994 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
995 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
996 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
998 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
999 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1000 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1001 current_holder_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((holder_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (holder_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
1003 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1004 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1005 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1007 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1012 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1013 holder_tx_signed: false,
1015 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1016 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1020 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1021 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1022 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1023 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1024 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1025 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1028 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1029 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1030 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1031 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1036 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1037 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1038 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1039 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1040 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1042 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1043 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1044 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1048 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1049 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1050 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1055 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1062 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1071 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1072 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1073 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1074 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1075 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1076 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1077 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1078 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1080 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1081 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1084 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1085 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1086 log_trace!(logger, "New potential counterparty commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1087 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1088 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1089 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1090 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1091 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1092 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1093 Some(old_points) => {
1094 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1095 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1096 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1097 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1098 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1100 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1103 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1107 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1110 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1111 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1112 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1116 self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
1119 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1120 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1121 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1122 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1123 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1124 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1125 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1126 let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1127 let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1128 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1130 revocation_key: commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
1131 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1132 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1133 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1134 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
1135 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1136 htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
1138 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(commitment_tx);
1139 self.current_holder_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1140 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1141 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1142 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1143 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
1148 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1149 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1150 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1151 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1154 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1155 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1158 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1159 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1161 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1164 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1167 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1168 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1169 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1172 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1173 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1175 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1177 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1178 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1179 self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1181 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1182 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1183 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1184 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1185 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1186 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1187 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1188 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1189 if should_broadcast {
1190 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1192 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1197 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1201 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1203 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1204 self.latest_update_id
1207 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1208 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1212 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1213 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1215 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
1216 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
1217 &self.outputs_to_watch
1220 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1221 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1222 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1223 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1225 /// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
1226 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
1227 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1228 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1229 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1230 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1236 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1237 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1239 /// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
1240 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1241 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1242 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
1246 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1249 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1250 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1251 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1252 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
1253 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1254 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1258 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1259 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1260 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1263 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1264 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1267 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1268 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
1271 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1272 self.current_holder_commitment_number
1275 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1276 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1277 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1278 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1279 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1280 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
1281 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1282 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1283 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1284 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1285 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1287 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1288 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1290 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1291 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1294 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1299 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1300 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1301 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1302 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1303 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1304 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1305 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
1307 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1308 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1310 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
1311 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1312 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1313 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1314 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1318 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1319 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1320 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1321 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1322 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1323 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1324 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1326 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1327 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1332 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1333 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1334 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
1335 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1336 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1337 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1339 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1340 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1341 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1342 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1343 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1344 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1345 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1346 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1347 let e = entry.get_mut();
1348 e.retain(|ref event| {
1350 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1351 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1356 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1358 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1359 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1367 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1368 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1370 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1371 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
1373 // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
1375 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1376 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1377 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1378 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1379 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1380 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1381 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1383 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1384 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1386 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1388 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1389 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1390 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1391 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1392 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1393 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1394 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1395 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1396 // payment_preimage.
1397 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1398 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1399 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1400 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1402 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1403 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1407 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1408 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1409 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1410 let e = entry.get_mut();
1411 e.retain(|ref event| {
1413 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1414 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1419 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1421 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1422 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1430 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1431 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1433 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1434 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1437 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1438 let revocation_point_option =
1439 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1440 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1441 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1443 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1444 self.counterparty_payment_script = {
1445 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1446 // script_pubkey version
1447 let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1448 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
1451 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1452 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1453 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1454 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1455 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1456 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1458 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1459 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1460 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1461 let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
1462 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1469 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1472 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1473 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1474 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1475 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1476 return (Vec::new(), None)
1479 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1480 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1483 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1488 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1489 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1490 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1492 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1493 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1494 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1495 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
1498 fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1499 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1500 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1502 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1503 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1505 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1506 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1507 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1508 witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
1509 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1510 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1511 Some(preimage.clone())
1513 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1517 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1519 watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1523 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
1526 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1527 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
1528 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1529 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1530 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1531 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1532 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1534 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1535 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1536 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1537 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1538 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1539 let e = entry.get_mut();
1540 e.retain(|ref event| {
1542 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1543 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1548 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1550 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1551 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1557 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1558 ($updates: expr) => {
1559 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1560 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1561 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1565 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1566 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
1568 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1569 is_holder_tx = true;
1570 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1571 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1572 append_onchain_update!(res);
1573 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1574 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1575 is_holder_tx = true;
1576 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1577 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, holder_tx);
1578 append_onchain_update!(res);
1582 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1583 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
1584 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
1585 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1586 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1587 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1595 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1596 if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1597 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
1601 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1604 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1605 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1606 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1607 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1608 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1609 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1610 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1611 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1612 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1613 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1614 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
1615 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
1616 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1617 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1618 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1619 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1620 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1621 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1622 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1623 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1627 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1628 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1633 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1634 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1640 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1641 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1642 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1643 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1644 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1645 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
1646 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1647 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1648 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1649 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1650 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1651 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1652 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1653 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1657 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1658 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1668 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1669 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1670 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1671 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1672 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1673 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1675 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1676 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1678 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1679 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
1680 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1681 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1684 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
1685 for tx in &txn_matched {
1686 let mut output_val = 0;
1687 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1688 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1689 output_val += out.value;
1690 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1694 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
1695 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1697 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1698 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1699 for tx in &txn_matched {
1700 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1701 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1702 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1703 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1705 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1706 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1707 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1708 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1709 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1710 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1712 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1713 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1714 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1715 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1717 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1719 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1722 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1723 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
1724 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1725 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1726 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1731 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1732 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1733 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1734 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1736 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1738 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
1739 if should_broadcast {
1740 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
1742 if should_broadcast {
1743 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1744 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1745 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
1746 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1747 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1748 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1750 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1753 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1756 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1757 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1758 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
1759 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1760 payment_preimage: None,
1761 source: htlc_update.0,
1764 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1765 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1766 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
1767 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1774 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
1775 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1777 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
1778 // updating the latter in the process.
1779 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
1780 let output_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect();
1781 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts).is_none()
1786 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1788 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
1789 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1790 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1793 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
1794 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
1796 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1798 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1799 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
1802 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1804 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1807 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
1808 /// transactions thereof.
1809 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
1810 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
1811 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
1812 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
1813 for input in tx.input.iter() {
1814 if matches { break; }
1815 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1820 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
1823 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
1826 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
1827 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
1828 for input in tx.input.iter() {
1829 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1830 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1831 if idx == input.previous_output.vout as usize {
1841 fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
1842 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1843 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1844 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1845 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1846 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1847 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1848 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1849 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1850 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1851 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1852 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1853 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
1854 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1855 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1856 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1857 // time out the HTLC first.
1858 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1859 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1860 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1861 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1862 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1863 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1864 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1865 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1866 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1867 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1868 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1869 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1870 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1871 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1872 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1873 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1874 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
1875 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1876 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
1877 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
1878 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
1879 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1880 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1881 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1888 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
1890 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1891 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1892 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1895 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1896 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1897 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1904 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
1905 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1906 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1907 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
1908 let mut payment_data = None;
1909 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
1910 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
1911 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
1912 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
1914 macro_rules! log_claim {
1915 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
1916 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
1917 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
1918 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
1919 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
1920 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
1921 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
1922 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
1923 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
1924 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1925 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1926 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
1928 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
1929 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1930 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1931 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
1936 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
1937 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
1938 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
1939 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
1940 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
1941 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
1942 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
1943 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
1952 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1953 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
1954 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
1955 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
1956 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
1957 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
1958 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
1959 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
1960 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
1961 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
1962 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
1963 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
1964 } else if !$holder_tx {
1965 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
1966 if payment_data.is_none() {
1967 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
1970 if payment_data.is_none() {
1971 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
1972 continue 'outer_loop;
1979 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1980 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
1981 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
1983 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1984 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
1985 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
1986 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
1989 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1990 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
1991 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
1994 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
1995 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
1996 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
1997 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
1998 if accepted_preimage_claim {
1999 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2000 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2001 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2002 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2004 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2008 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2009 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2010 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
2011 upd.source == source
2013 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2014 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2016 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2021 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2022 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2024 let e = entry.get_mut();
2025 e.retain(|ref event| {
2027 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2028 return htlc_update.0 != source
2033 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2035 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2036 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2044 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2045 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2046 let mut spendable_output = None;
2047 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2048 if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize {
2049 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2050 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2051 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2052 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2053 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2054 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2055 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2056 // non-standard due to their size.
2057 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2058 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2059 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2062 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2063 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2064 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2065 output: outp.clone(),
2068 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
2069 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2070 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2071 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2072 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
2073 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
2074 output: outp.clone(),
2075 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2076 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2080 } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2081 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
2082 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2083 output: outp.clone(),
2084 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2087 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2088 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2089 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2090 output: outp.clone(),
2094 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2095 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2096 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2097 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2098 let e = entry.get_mut();
2099 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2101 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2102 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2109 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2111 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2112 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2113 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2117 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2122 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2123 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2124 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2125 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2128 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2129 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2131 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2132 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2134 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2135 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2136 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2137 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2140 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2142 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2143 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2145 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2146 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2147 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2148 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2149 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2150 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2152 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2153 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2154 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2156 let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2157 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2158 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2160 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2161 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2165 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2166 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2167 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2168 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2170 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2175 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2177 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2179 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2182 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2183 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2184 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2185 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2186 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2188 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2189 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2195 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2196 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2197 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
2198 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2199 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2200 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2201 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2202 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2204 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2205 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2209 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2210 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2211 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2212 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2213 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2214 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2215 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2216 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2217 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2219 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2220 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2224 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2225 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2226 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
2227 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2228 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2229 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2230 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2234 macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
2237 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2238 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2239 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2240 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2241 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2242 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2243 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2245 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2246 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2247 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2248 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2249 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2251 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2252 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2254 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2259 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2266 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2269 Some(read_holder_tx!())
2271 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2273 let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
2275 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2276 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2278 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2279 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2280 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2281 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2282 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2283 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2284 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2288 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2289 let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2290 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
2291 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2292 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
2293 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
2294 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2296 pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
2299 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2300 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
2301 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2302 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2303 pending_events.push(event);
2307 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2309 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2310 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2311 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2312 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2313 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2314 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2315 for _ in 0..events_len {
2316 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2318 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2319 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2320 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2321 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2325 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2326 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2330 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2334 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2337 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2338 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2339 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2340 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2341 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2342 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
2343 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2344 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2346 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2347 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2350 let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
2352 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2353 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2355 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2357 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2360 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
2361 counterparty_payment_script,
2366 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2367 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2369 counterparty_tx_cache,
2370 funding_redeemscript,
2371 channel_value_satoshis,
2372 their_cur_revocation_points,
2377 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
2378 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2379 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
2381 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
2382 current_holder_commitment_tx,
2383 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
2384 current_holder_commitment_number,
2387 pending_monitor_events,
2390 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2395 lockdown_from_offchain,
2399 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2406 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2407 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2408 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2409 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2410 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2411 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2412 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2413 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2414 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2416 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2417 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2418 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2419 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2421 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
2422 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2423 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2424 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2426 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2429 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2430 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2431 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2433 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2434 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2436 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2439 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
2440 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2441 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2445 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2446 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2448 let mut res = Vec::new();
2449 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2450 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2454 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2455 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2462 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
2463 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2465 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2466 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2472 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2473 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2474 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2475 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2480 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2482 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2483 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2484 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2485 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2486 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2492 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2494 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2495 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2496 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2497 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2498 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2499 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
2501 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2502 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
2503 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
2504 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
2505 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
2506 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2507 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2510 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2511 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2512 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2513 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2514 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2515 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2516 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2518 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2519 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2520 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2521 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2522 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2523 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2525 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2526 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2527 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2528 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2529 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2530 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2531 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2532 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2534 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2535 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2536 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2537 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2538 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2539 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2543 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2544 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2545 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2547 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2548 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2549 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2550 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2552 macro_rules! sign_input {
2553 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2554 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2555 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2557 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2558 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2559 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
2561 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2562 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2563 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2564 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2565 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2566 sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
2567 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2568 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
2569 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2570 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2571 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2572 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
2574 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2576 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2577 println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
2578 println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
2579 println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
2583 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2584 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2586 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2587 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2589 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2590 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2594 script_sig: Script::new(),
2595 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2596 witness: Vec::new(),
2599 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2600 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2603 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2604 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2606 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
2607 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
2608 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
2611 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2613 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2614 claim_tx.input.clear();
2615 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2617 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2618 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2622 script_sig: Script::new(),
2623 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2624 witness: Vec::new(),
2627 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2628 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2630 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
2631 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
2632 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
2635 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2637 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2638 claim_tx.input.clear();
2639 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2640 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2641 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2645 script_sig: Script::new(),
2646 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2647 witness: Vec::new(),
2649 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2650 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2652 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
2653 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
2654 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
2657 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2660 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.