1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
38 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
40 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
41 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource};
42 use ln::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
43 use ln::package::InputDescriptors;
45 use chain::WatchedOutput;
46 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
47 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
48 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
50 use util::logger::Logger;
51 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
53 use util::events::Event;
55 use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
61 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
62 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
63 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
66 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
67 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
68 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
69 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
70 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
72 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
73 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
74 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
76 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
77 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
78 /// its docs for more details.
83 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
84 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
85 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
86 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
87 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
89 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
91 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
92 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
93 self.update_id.write(w)?;
94 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
95 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
96 update_step.write(w)?;
101 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
102 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
103 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
104 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
105 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
107 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
109 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
113 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
114 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
115 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
116 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
117 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
119 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
120 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
121 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
122 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
124 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
125 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
126 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
128 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
129 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
130 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
131 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
132 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
133 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
136 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
137 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
140 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
141 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
142 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
143 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
144 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
147 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
148 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
149 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
151 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
152 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
153 /// of this channel).
155 /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
156 /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
157 /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
158 /// update must be rejected.
160 /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
161 /// the channel monitor instance.
163 /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
164 /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
165 /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
167 /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
168 /// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
169 /// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
170 /// lagging behind on block processing.
174 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
175 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
176 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
178 /// Contains a developer-readable error message.
179 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
180 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
182 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
183 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
184 pub enum MonitorEvent {
185 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
186 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
188 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
189 CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
192 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
193 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
194 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
195 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
196 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
197 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
198 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
199 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
201 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
203 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
204 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
205 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
206 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
207 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
208 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
209 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
210 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
211 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
212 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
213 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
214 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
215 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
216 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
217 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
218 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
219 /// accurate block height.
220 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
221 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
222 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
223 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
224 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
225 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
226 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
227 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
228 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
229 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
230 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
231 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
232 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
234 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
235 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
236 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
238 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
239 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
240 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
241 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
243 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
244 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
246 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
247 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
248 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
250 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
251 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
252 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
254 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
255 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
256 struct HolderSignedTx {
257 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
259 revocation_key: PublicKey,
260 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
261 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
262 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
263 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
265 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
268 /// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
269 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
271 struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
272 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
273 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
274 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
275 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
278 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
279 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
280 self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
281 self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
282 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
283 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
284 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
285 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
286 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
287 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
294 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
295 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
296 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
297 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
298 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
299 let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
300 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
301 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
302 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
303 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
304 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
305 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
306 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
307 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
310 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
311 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
314 CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
315 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
316 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
317 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
321 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
325 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
326 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
327 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
328 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
329 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
331 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
332 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
333 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
334 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
335 input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
337 htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
338 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
341 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
342 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
343 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
344 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
345 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
348 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
352 funding_redeemscript: Script,
356 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
357 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
359 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
360 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
361 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
362 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
363 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
364 writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
365 input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
366 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
368 on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
370 &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
371 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
372 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
373 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
374 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
375 preimage.write(writer)?;
378 &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
379 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
380 preimage.write(writer)?;
381 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
383 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
384 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
385 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
392 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
393 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
394 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
396 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
397 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
398 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
399 let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
400 let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
401 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
402 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
403 let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
404 InputMaterial::Revoked {
405 per_commitment_point,
406 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
407 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
412 on_counterparty_tx_csv
416 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
417 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
418 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
419 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
420 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
421 InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
422 per_commitment_point,
423 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
424 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
430 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
431 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
432 InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
438 InputMaterial::Funding {
439 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
442 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
448 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
449 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
450 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
451 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
452 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
453 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
454 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
455 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
456 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
457 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
458 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
459 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
460 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
461 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
462 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
463 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
464 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
465 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
466 // and satisfy witness program.
467 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
470 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
471 /// transaction causing it.
473 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
475 struct OnchainEventEntry {
481 impl OnchainEventEntry {
482 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
483 self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
486 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
487 height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
491 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
492 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
495 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
496 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
497 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
499 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
502 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
506 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
508 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
509 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
510 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
511 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
513 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
514 commitment_txid: Txid,
515 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
516 commitment_number: u64,
517 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
520 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
526 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
527 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
529 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
530 /// think we've fallen behind!
531 should_broadcast: bool,
535 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
536 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
538 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
540 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
541 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
542 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
548 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
550 commitment_txid.write(w)?;
551 commitment_number.write(w)?;
552 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
553 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
554 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
556 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
559 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
561 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
563 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
568 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
570 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
576 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
577 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
578 match Readable::read(r)? {
580 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
581 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
583 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
584 let mut res = Vec::new();
586 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
593 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
594 commitment_txid: Readable::read(r)?,
595 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
596 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
598 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
599 let mut res = Vec::new();
601 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
608 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
609 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
613 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
614 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
615 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
619 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
620 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
623 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
628 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
629 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
631 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
632 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
634 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
635 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
636 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
637 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
639 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
640 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
641 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
642 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
643 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
644 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
646 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
648 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
651 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
652 latest_update_id: u64,
653 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
655 destination_script: Script,
656 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
657 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
658 shutdown_script: Script,
660 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
661 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
662 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
663 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
664 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
666 counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
667 funding_redeemscript: Script,
668 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
669 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
670 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
672 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
674 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
675 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
676 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
677 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
678 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
679 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
680 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
681 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
682 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
683 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
684 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
685 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
686 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
688 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
689 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
690 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
691 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
692 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
693 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
695 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
697 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
698 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
700 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
702 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
704 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
705 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
707 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
708 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
709 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
710 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
712 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
713 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
714 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
715 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
716 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
719 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
721 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
723 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
724 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
725 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
726 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
728 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
729 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
730 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
732 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
733 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
734 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
735 holder_tx_signed: bool,
737 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
738 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
739 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
740 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
741 // the full block_connected).
742 best_block: BestBlock,
744 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
747 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
748 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
750 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
751 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
752 /// underlying object
753 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
754 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
755 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
756 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
761 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
762 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
763 /// underlying object
764 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
765 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
766 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
767 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
768 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
769 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
770 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
771 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
772 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
773 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
774 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
775 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
776 self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
777 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
778 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
779 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
780 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
781 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
782 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
783 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
784 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
785 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
786 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
787 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
788 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
789 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
790 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
791 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
792 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
793 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
794 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
795 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
804 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
805 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
806 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
810 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
811 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
813 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
814 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
815 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
817 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
819 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
820 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
822 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
823 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
824 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
825 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
826 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
827 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
829 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
832 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
833 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
835 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
836 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
837 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
838 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
839 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
840 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
841 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
843 self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
844 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
845 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
847 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
848 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
849 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
850 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
851 match second_option {
852 Some(second_pubkey) => {
853 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
856 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
861 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
865 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
867 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
869 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
870 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
871 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
872 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
873 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
874 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
875 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
879 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
880 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
881 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
882 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
883 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
884 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
885 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
889 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
890 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
891 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
892 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
895 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
896 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
897 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
898 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
901 macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
902 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
903 $holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
904 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
905 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
906 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
907 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
908 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
910 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
911 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
912 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
913 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
914 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
916 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
920 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
925 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
926 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
927 serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
929 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
932 serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
934 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
935 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
937 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
938 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
939 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
942 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
943 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
945 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
949 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
953 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
954 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
955 event.write(writer)?;
958 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
959 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
961 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
962 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
963 entry.txid.write(writer)?;
964 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(entry.height))?;
966 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
968 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
969 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
971 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
973 descriptor.write(writer)?;
978 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
979 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
981 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
982 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
984 script.write(writer)?;
987 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
989 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
990 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
992 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {});
998 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
999 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
1000 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1001 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1002 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1003 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1004 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1005 best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1007 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1008 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1009 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1010 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1011 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1013 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1014 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1015 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1016 let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
1018 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1019 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1021 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1022 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1023 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1024 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1026 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1027 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1029 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1030 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1031 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1032 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1033 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1034 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1035 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1037 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1040 let onchain_tx_handler =
1041 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1042 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1044 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1045 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1048 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1049 latest_update_id: 0,
1050 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1052 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1053 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1054 counterparty_payment_script,
1058 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1060 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1061 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1063 counterparty_tx_cache,
1064 funding_redeemscript,
1065 channel_value_satoshis,
1066 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1068 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1070 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1071 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1072 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1073 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1075 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1076 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1077 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1078 current_holder_commitment_number,
1080 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1081 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1082 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1084 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1089 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1090 holder_tx_signed: false,
1100 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1101 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1104 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1105 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1106 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1107 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1108 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1111 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1112 commitment_number: u64,
1113 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
1115 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1116 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1117 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
1121 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1123 holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1124 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1125 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1126 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1127 holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)
1131 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1133 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1134 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1139 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1140 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1143 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1144 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1147 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1152 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1155 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1158 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1161 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1162 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1164 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1168 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1170 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1171 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1174 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1177 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1179 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1180 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1183 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1184 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1185 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1188 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1189 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1190 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1191 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1192 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1195 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1196 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1197 /// have been registered.
1198 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1199 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1200 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1201 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1202 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1203 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1204 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1206 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1207 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1213 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1214 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1215 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1216 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1219 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1222 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1223 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1224 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1225 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1226 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1229 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1230 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1233 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1234 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1237 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1238 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1241 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1242 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1243 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1244 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1245 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1246 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1247 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1248 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1249 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1250 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1251 where L::Target: Logger {
1252 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1255 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1256 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1257 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1258 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1259 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1260 where L::Target: Logger {
1261 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1264 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1265 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1266 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1267 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1268 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1269 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1271 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1272 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1274 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1275 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1277 header: &BlockHeader,
1278 txdata: &TransactionData,
1283 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1285 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1286 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1289 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1290 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1293 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1295 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1297 header: &BlockHeader,
1303 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1304 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1307 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1308 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1311 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1312 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1314 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1315 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1317 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1318 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1320 header: &BlockHeader,
1321 txdata: &TransactionData,
1326 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1328 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1329 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1332 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1333 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1336 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1338 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1339 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1341 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1342 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1349 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1350 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1353 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1354 txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1357 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1358 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1360 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1361 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1363 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1364 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1366 header: &BlockHeader,
1371 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1373 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1374 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1377 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1378 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1381 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1382 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1383 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1384 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1386 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1387 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1389 txids.sort_unstable();
1395 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1396 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1397 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1398 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1399 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1400 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1401 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1404 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1405 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1406 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1407 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1412 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1413 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1414 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1415 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1416 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1418 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1419 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1420 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1424 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1425 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1426 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1431 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1438 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1447 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1448 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1449 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1450 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1452 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1453 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1456 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1457 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1458 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1459 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1460 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1461 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1462 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1463 Some(old_points) => {
1464 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1465 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1466 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1467 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1468 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1470 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1473 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1477 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1480 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1481 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1482 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1486 self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs);
1489 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1490 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1491 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1492 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1493 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1494 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1495 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1496 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1497 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1498 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1499 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1500 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1503 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1504 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1505 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1506 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1507 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1508 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1512 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1513 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1514 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1515 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1516 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
1521 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1522 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1523 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
1524 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1525 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1528 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1530 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1531 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1532 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1533 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1534 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1535 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1538 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1539 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1540 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1544 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1545 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1546 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1551 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1552 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1553 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1554 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1555 // holder commitment transactions.
1556 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1557 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1558 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1559 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1560 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx);
1561 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1566 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1567 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1570 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1571 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
1572 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1574 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1577 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1578 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1579 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1582 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1583 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1584 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1585 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1586 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1587 match updates.updates[0] {
1588 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
1589 _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
1591 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1592 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1593 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1595 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
1597 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1598 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
1599 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1600 self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone())?
1602 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
1603 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
1604 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
1606 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
1607 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
1608 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1610 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
1611 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
1612 self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?
1614 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1615 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
1616 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1617 if *should_broadcast {
1618 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1619 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
1620 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1622 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted, the ChannelManager
1623 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
1624 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
1625 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
1630 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1634 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1635 self.latest_update_id
1638 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1642 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
1643 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
1644 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
1645 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
1646 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1647 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
1649 &self.outputs_to_watch
1652 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1653 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1654 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
1658 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
1659 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1660 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1664 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1665 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1666 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1669 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1670 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1673 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1674 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
1677 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1678 self.current_holder_commitment_number
1681 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1682 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1683 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1684 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1685 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1686 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
1687 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
1688 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1689 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1690 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1691 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1693 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1694 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1696 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1697 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1700 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1705 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1706 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1707 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1708 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1709 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1710 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
1711 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
1713 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1714 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1716 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
1717 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1718 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1719 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1720 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1724 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1725 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1726 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1727 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1728 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1729 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1730 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1732 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1733 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1738 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1739 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1740 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
1741 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1742 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1743 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1745 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1747 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1748 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1749 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1750 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1751 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1752 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1753 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1755 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1756 htlc_update.0 != **source
1761 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1764 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1765 htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())
1768 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1769 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1775 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1776 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1778 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1779 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
1781 // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
1783 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1784 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1785 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1786 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1787 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1788 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1789 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1791 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1792 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1794 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1796 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1798 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1799 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1800 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1801 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1802 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1803 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1804 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1805 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1806 // payment_preimage.
1807 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1808 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1809 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1810 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1812 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1813 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1817 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1818 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1819 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1821 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1822 htlc_update.0 != **source
1827 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
1830 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1831 htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())
1839 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1840 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1842 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1843 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1846 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
1847 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
1848 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
1852 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1855 fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<ClaimRequest> {
1856 let mut claims = Vec::new();
1857 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
1858 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1859 let revocation_point_option =
1860 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
1861 // per-commitment point
1862 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1863 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1864 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
1865 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
1866 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
1867 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1869 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1870 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1871 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1872 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
1873 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
1874 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1875 return claims; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1880 if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1884 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1885 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1886 let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
1887 claims.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1897 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1898 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
1899 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1900 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1901 return (Vec::new(), None)
1904 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1905 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1908 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1913 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1914 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1915 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1917 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1918 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1919 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1920 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
1921 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
1924 // Returns (1) `ClaimRequest`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
1925 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
1926 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
1927 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1928 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1930 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1931 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1933 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1934 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1935 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::core::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1936 witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
1937 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1938 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1939 Some(preimage.clone())
1941 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1945 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1950 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
1953 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
1954 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
1955 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1956 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1957 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1958 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
1964 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1965 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
1966 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1967 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
1968 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1969 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1970 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1972 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1973 ($source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1974 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1975 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1977 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1978 htlc_update.0 != $source
1983 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1984 txid: commitment_txid,
1986 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash) },
1988 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1989 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1993 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1994 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
1995 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1996 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
1997 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2001 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2002 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2004 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2005 is_holder_tx = true;
2006 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2007 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2008 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2009 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2010 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2011 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2012 is_holder_tx = true;
2013 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2014 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx);
2015 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2016 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2020 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2021 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
2022 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
2023 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2024 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2025 wait_threshold_conf!(source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2033 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2034 if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2035 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
2039 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2042 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2043 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2044 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2045 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2046 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2047 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
2048 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2049 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2050 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2051 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2052 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2056 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2057 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2062 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2063 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2067 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2068 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2069 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2070 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2071 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2072 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
2073 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2074 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2075 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2076 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2077 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2081 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2082 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2090 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2091 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2092 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2095 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2096 log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
2097 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2099 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2102 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2104 header: &BlockHeader,
2109 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2111 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2112 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2115 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2116 log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
2118 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2119 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2120 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2122 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2123 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2124 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2129 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2131 header: &BlockHeader,
2132 txdata: &TransactionData,
2137 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2139 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2140 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2143 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2144 for tx in &txn_matched {
2145 let mut output_val = 0;
2146 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2147 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2148 output_val += out.value;
2149 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2153 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2154 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2156 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2157 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2158 for tx in &txn_matched {
2159 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2160 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2161 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2162 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2164 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2165 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2166 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2167 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2168 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2169 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2171 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2172 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2173 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2174 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2176 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2178 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2181 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2182 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2183 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2184 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2185 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2190 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2191 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2192 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2193 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2195 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2198 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2201 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2204 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2205 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2206 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<ClaimRequest>,
2210 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2212 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2213 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2216 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
2217 if should_broadcast {
2218 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
2219 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
2220 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2221 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2222 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2223 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2224 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2225 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2227 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2230 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2231 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2232 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2233 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2234 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2235 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(height) {
2236 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2238 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2242 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2243 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2244 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2246 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2247 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => Some(htlc_update.0.clone()),
2248 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { .. } => None,
2251 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2252 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2254 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2255 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2257 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2258 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2259 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2262 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &htlc_update.0).is_none(),
2263 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2264 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2265 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2267 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &htlc_update.0).is_none(),
2268 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2269 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2270 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2271 matured_htlcs.push(htlc_update.0.clone());
2274 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2275 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2276 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
2277 payment_preimage: None,
2278 source: htlc_update.0,
2281 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2282 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2283 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2284 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2290 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, Some(height), &&*broadcaster, &&*fee_estimator, &&*logger);
2292 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2293 // updating the latter in the process.
2294 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2295 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2296 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2300 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2301 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2302 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2303 for tx in &txn_matched {
2304 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2305 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2306 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2307 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2315 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2316 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2317 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2320 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2323 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2324 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2325 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2327 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2329 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2332 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2339 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2340 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2343 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.txid != *txid);
2344 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2347 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2348 /// transactions thereof.
2349 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2350 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2351 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2352 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2353 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2354 if matches { break; }
2355 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2360 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2363 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2366 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2367 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2368 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2369 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2370 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2371 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2374 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2375 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2376 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2377 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2378 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2379 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2380 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2381 } else { panic!(); }
2392 fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2393 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2394 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2395 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2396 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2397 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2398 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2399 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2400 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2401 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2402 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2403 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2404 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2405 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2406 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2407 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2408 // time out the HTLC first.
2409 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2410 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2411 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2412 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2413 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2414 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2415 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2416 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2417 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2418 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2419 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2420 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2421 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2422 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2423 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2424 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2425 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2426 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2427 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2428 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2429 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2430 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2431 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2432 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2439 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2441 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2442 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2443 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2446 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2447 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2448 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2455 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2456 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2457 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2458 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2459 let mut payment_data = None;
2460 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2461 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2462 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2463 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2465 macro_rules! log_claim {
2466 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2467 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2468 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
2469 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2470 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2471 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2472 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2473 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2474 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2475 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2476 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2477 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2479 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2480 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2481 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2482 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2487 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2488 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2489 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2490 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2491 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2492 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2493 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2494 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2503 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2504 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2505 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2506 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2507 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2508 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2509 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2510 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2511 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2512 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2513 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2514 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2515 } else if !$holder_tx {
2516 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2517 if payment_data.is_none() {
2518 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2521 if payment_data.is_none() {
2522 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2523 continue 'outer_loop;
2530 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2531 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2532 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2534 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2535 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2536 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2537 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2540 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2541 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2542 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2545 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2546 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2547 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2548 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2549 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2550 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2551 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2552 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2553 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2555 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2559 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2560 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2561 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
2562 upd.source == source
2564 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2565 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2567 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2572 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2573 if entry.height != height { return true; }
2575 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2576 htlc_update.0 != source
2581 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2584 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash) },
2586 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2587 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2593 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2594 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2595 let mut spendable_output = None;
2596 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2597 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
2598 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2599 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2600 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2601 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2602 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2603 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2604 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2605 // non-standard due to their size.
2606 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2607 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2608 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2611 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2612 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2613 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2614 output: outp.clone(),
2617 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
2618 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2619 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2620 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2621 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
2622 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
2623 output: outp.clone(),
2624 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2625 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2626 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2630 } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2631 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2632 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2633 output: outp.clone(),
2634 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2635 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2638 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2639 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2640 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2641 output: outp.clone(),
2645 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2646 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2649 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
2651 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2652 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2657 /// `Persist` defines behavior for persisting channel monitors: this could mean
2658 /// writing once to disk, and/or uploading to one or more backup services.
2660 /// Note that for every new monitor, you **must** persist the new `ChannelMonitor`
2661 /// to disk/backups. And, on every update, you **must** persist either the
2662 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself. Otherwise, there is risk
2663 /// of situations such as revoking a transaction, then crashing before this
2664 /// revocation can be persisted, then unintentionally broadcasting a revoked
2665 /// transaction and losing money. This is a risk because previous channel states
2666 /// are toxic, so it's important that whatever channel state is persisted is
2667 /// kept up-to-date.
2668 pub trait Persist<ChannelSigner: Sign> {
2669 /// Persist a new channel's data. The data can be stored any way you want, but
2670 /// the identifier provided by Rust-Lightning is the channel's outpoint (and
2671 /// it is up to you to maintain a correct mapping between the outpoint and the
2672 /// stored channel data). Note that you **must** persist every new monitor to
2673 /// disk. See the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2675 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2676 /// and [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2677 fn persist_new_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2679 /// Update one channel's data. The provided `ChannelMonitor` has already
2680 /// applied the given update.
2682 /// Note that on every update, you **must** persist either the
2683 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself to disk/backups. See
2684 /// the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2686 /// If an implementer chooses to persist the updates only, they need to make
2687 /// sure that all the updates are applied to the `ChannelMonitors` *before*
2688 /// the set of channel monitors is given to the `ChannelManager`
2689 /// deserialization routine. See [`ChannelMonitor::update_monitor`] for
2690 /// applying a monitor update to a monitor. If full `ChannelMonitors` are
2691 /// persisted, then there is no need to persist individual updates.
2693 /// Note that there could be a performance tradeoff between persisting complete
2694 /// channel monitors on every update vs. persisting only updates and applying
2695 /// them in batches. The size of each monitor grows `O(number of state updates)`
2696 /// whereas updates are small and `O(1)`.
2698 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2699 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::write`] for writing out an update, and
2700 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2701 fn update_persisted_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2704 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2706 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2707 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2710 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
2711 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
2712 self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2715 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2716 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2720 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2722 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2723 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2726 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
2727 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2730 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
2731 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2734 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2735 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2738 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
2739 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
2743 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2745 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
2746 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
2747 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2748 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2752 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2757 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
2759 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2760 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2762 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2763 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2765 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2766 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2767 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2768 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2771 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2773 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2774 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2776 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2777 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2778 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2779 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2780 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2781 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2782 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2784 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2785 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2786 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2788 let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2789 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2790 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2792 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2793 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2797 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2798 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2799 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2800 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2802 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2807 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2809 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2811 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2814 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2815 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2816 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2817 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2818 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2820 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2821 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2827 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2828 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2829 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
2830 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2831 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2832 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2833 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2834 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2836 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2837 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2841 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2842 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2843 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2844 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2845 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2846 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
2847 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2851 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2852 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2853 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
2854 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2855 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2856 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2857 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2861 macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
2864 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2865 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2866 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2867 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2868 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2869 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2870 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2872 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2873 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2874 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2875 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2876 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2878 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2879 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2881 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2886 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2893 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2896 Some(read_holder_tx!())
2898 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2900 let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
2902 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2903 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2905 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2906 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2907 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2908 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2909 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2910 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2911 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2915 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2916 let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2917 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
2918 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2919 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
2920 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
2921 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2923 pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
2926 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2927 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
2928 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2929 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2930 pending_events.push(event);
2934 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
2936 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2937 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2938 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2939 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2940 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
2941 let event = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2943 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2944 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2945 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2946 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2950 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2951 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2955 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2957 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry { txid, height, event });
2960 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2961 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2962 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2963 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2964 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2965 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
2966 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2967 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
2969 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2970 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2973 let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
2975 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2976 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2978 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
2980 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2981 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2983 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
2984 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
2986 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2989 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
2990 counterparty_payment_script,
2994 holder_revocation_basepoint,
2996 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2997 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2999 counterparty_tx_cache,
3000 funding_redeemscript,
3001 channel_value_satoshis,
3002 their_cur_revocation_points,
3007 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3008 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3009 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3011 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3012 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3013 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3014 current_holder_commitment_number,
3017 pending_monitor_events,
3020 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3025 lockdown_from_offchain,
3038 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3039 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3040 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3041 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3042 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3043 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3044 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3045 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3046 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
3047 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3049 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3050 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3051 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3052 use ln::channelmanager::BestBlock;
3054 use ln::package::InputDescriptors;
3056 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3057 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3058 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3059 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3060 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3061 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3064 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3065 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3066 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3067 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
3068 let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
3070 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3071 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3073 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3076 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3077 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3078 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3082 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3083 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3085 let mut res = Vec::new();
3086 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3087 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3091 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3092 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3099 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3100 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3102 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3103 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3109 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3110 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3111 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3112 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3117 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3119 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3120 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3121 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3122 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3123 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3129 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3130 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3131 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3132 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3133 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3134 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3136 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
3137 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3138 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3139 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3140 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3141 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3142 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3143 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3145 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3147 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3149 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3150 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3151 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
3152 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3153 &channel_parameters,
3154 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3155 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
3157 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3158 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3159 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3160 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3161 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3162 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3163 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3164 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
3167 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3168 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3169 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3170 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3171 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3172 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3173 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3175 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3176 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3177 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3178 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3179 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3180 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3182 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3183 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3184 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3185 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3186 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3187 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3188 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3189 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3191 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3192 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3193 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3194 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3195 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3196 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3200 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3201 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3202 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3204 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3205 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3206 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3207 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3209 macro_rules! sign_input {
3210 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3211 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3212 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3214 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3215 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3216 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3218 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3219 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3220 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3221 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3222 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3223 sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
3224 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3225 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
3226 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3227 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3228 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3229 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
3231 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3233 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3234 println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
3235 println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
3236 println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
3240 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3241 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3243 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3244 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3246 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3247 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3251 script_sig: Script::new(),
3252 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3253 witness: Vec::new(),
3256 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3257 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3260 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3261 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3263 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3264 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
3265 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3268 assert_eq!(base_weight + package::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3270 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3271 claim_tx.input.clear();
3272 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3274 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3275 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3279 script_sig: Script::new(),
3280 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3281 witness: Vec::new(),
3284 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3285 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3287 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3288 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
3289 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3292 assert_eq!(base_weight + package::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3294 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3295 claim_tx.input.clear();
3296 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3297 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3298 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3302 script_sig: Script::new(),
3303 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3304 witness: Vec::new(),
3306 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3307 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3309 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3310 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
3311 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3314 assert_eq!(base_weight + package::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3317 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.