1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
38 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
39 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use crate::ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
42 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
44 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
47 use crate::chain::onchaintx::ClaimEvent;
48 use crate::chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
49 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
50 use crate::chain::Filter;
51 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
52 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
53 use crate::util::byte_utils;
54 use crate::util::events::Event;
56 use crate::util::events::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
58 use crate::prelude::*;
60 use crate::io::{self, Error};
61 use core::convert::TryInto;
63 use crate::sync::Mutex;
65 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
66 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
68 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
69 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
70 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
71 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
72 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
75 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
76 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
77 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
78 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
79 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
81 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
82 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
83 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
85 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
86 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
87 /// its docs for more details.
89 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
94 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
95 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
96 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
97 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
98 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
100 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
102 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
103 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
104 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
105 self.update_id.write(w)?;
106 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
107 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
108 update_step.write(w)?;
110 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
114 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
115 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
116 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
117 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
118 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
119 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
121 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
125 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
126 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
130 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
131 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
132 pub enum MonitorEvent {
133 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
134 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
136 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
137 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
139 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
140 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
142 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
144 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
145 funding_txo: OutPoint,
146 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
147 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
149 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
150 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
151 monitor_update_id: u64,
154 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
155 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
157 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
158 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
160 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
161 // Note that Completed and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
162 // generated only in ChainMonitor
164 (0, funding_txo, required),
165 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
169 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
173 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
174 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
175 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
176 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
178 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
179 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
180 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
181 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
183 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
184 (0, payment_hash, required),
185 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
186 (2, source, required),
187 (4, payment_preimage, option),
190 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
191 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
192 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
193 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
194 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
195 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
196 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
197 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
198 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
199 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
200 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
201 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
202 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
203 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
204 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
205 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
206 /// accurate block height.
207 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
208 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
209 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
210 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
211 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
212 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
215 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
216 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
217 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
218 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
219 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
220 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
221 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
222 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
223 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
224 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
226 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
227 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
228 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
230 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
231 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
233 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
234 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
236 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
237 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
238 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
239 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
241 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
242 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
243 struct HolderSignedTx {
244 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
246 revocation_key: PublicKey,
247 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
248 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
249 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
250 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
251 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
252 to_self_value_sat: u64,
255 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
257 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
258 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
259 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
260 (2, revocation_key, required),
261 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
262 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
263 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
264 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
265 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
266 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
270 impl HolderSignedTx {
271 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
272 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
273 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
283 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
284 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
285 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
286 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
287 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
288 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
289 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
292 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
293 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
294 w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
295 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
296 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
297 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
298 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
303 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
304 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
305 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
306 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
307 // used. Read it for compatibility.
308 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
309 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
310 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
311 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
312 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
313 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
317 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
318 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
319 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
320 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
321 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
322 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
323 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
325 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
326 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
327 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
328 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
331 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
335 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
336 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
338 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
339 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
340 struct OnchainEventEntry {
343 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
345 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
348 impl OnchainEventEntry {
349 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
350 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
352 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
353 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
355 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
356 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
357 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
359 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
360 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
361 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
362 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
363 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
370 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
371 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
375 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
377 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
378 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
380 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
381 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
382 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
384 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
385 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
386 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
387 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
388 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
389 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
392 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
393 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
394 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
395 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
396 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
398 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
399 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
401 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
403 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
405 FundingSpendConfirmation {
406 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
407 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
408 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
409 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
410 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
412 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
413 /// counterparty output.
414 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
416 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
417 /// is constructed. This is used when
418 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
419 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
420 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
421 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
422 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
424 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
425 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
427 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
428 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
429 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
430 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
431 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
432 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
433 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
434 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
438 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
439 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
440 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
441 (0, self.txid, required),
442 (1, self.transaction, option),
443 (2, self.height, required),
444 (3, self.block_hash, option),
445 (4, self.event, required),
451 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
452 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
453 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
454 let mut transaction = None;
455 let mut block_hash = None;
457 let mut event = None;
458 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
460 (1, transaction, option),
461 (2, height, required),
462 (3, block_hash, option),
463 (4, event, ignorable),
465 if let Some(ev) = event {
466 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: ev }))
473 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
475 (0, source, required),
476 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
477 (2, payment_hash, required),
478 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
480 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
481 (0, descriptor, required),
483 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
484 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
485 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
487 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
488 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
489 (2, preimage, option),
490 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
495 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
497 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
498 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
499 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
500 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
502 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
503 commitment_txid: Txid,
504 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
505 commitment_number: u64,
506 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
509 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
515 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
516 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
518 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
519 /// think we've fallen behind!
520 should_broadcast: bool,
523 scriptpubkey: Script,
527 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
528 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
530 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
531 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
532 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
533 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
534 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
535 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
540 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
541 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
542 (0, commitment_tx, required),
543 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
545 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
546 (0, commitment_txid, required),
547 (2, commitment_number, required),
548 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
549 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
551 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
552 (0, payment_preimage, required),
554 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
556 (2, secret, required),
558 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
559 (0, should_broadcast, required),
561 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
562 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
566 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
568 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
570 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
571 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
573 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
574 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
575 /// force-closed now.
576 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
577 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
578 /// required to do so.
579 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
581 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
582 /// we consider it spendable.
583 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
584 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
585 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
586 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
587 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
589 confirmation_height: u32,
591 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
592 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
593 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
595 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
596 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
597 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
598 ContentiousClaimable {
599 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
600 /// required to do so.
601 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
602 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
606 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
607 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
608 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
609 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
610 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
611 /// which will be required to do so.
612 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
613 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
615 claimable_height: u32,
617 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
618 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
619 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
620 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
621 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
622 /// which will be required to do so.
623 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
624 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
625 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
628 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
631 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
632 /// following amount.
633 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
634 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
636 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
637 /// were already spent.
638 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
642 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
643 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
644 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
645 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
646 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
647 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
649 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
650 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
651 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
654 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
655 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
656 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
657 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
658 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
659 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
660 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
661 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
662 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
663 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
664 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
670 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
671 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
672 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
673 let mut resolving_txid = None;
674 let mut payment_preimage = None;
675 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
676 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
677 (1, resolving_txid, option),
678 (2, payment_preimage, option),
681 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
688 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
689 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
691 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
692 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
694 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
695 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
696 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
697 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
699 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
700 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
701 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
702 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
703 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
704 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
706 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
708 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
711 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
712 latest_update_id: u64,
713 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
715 destination_script: Script,
716 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
717 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
718 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
720 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
721 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
722 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
723 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
724 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
726 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
727 funding_redeemscript: Script,
728 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
729 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
730 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
732 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
734 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
735 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
736 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
737 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
738 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
739 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
740 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
741 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
742 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
743 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
744 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
745 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
746 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
747 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
748 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
749 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
751 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
752 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
753 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
754 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
755 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
756 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
758 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
760 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
761 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
763 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
765 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
766 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
767 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
769 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
771 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
772 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
773 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
774 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
775 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
776 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
777 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
778 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
779 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
780 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
782 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
784 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
785 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
786 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
787 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
789 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
790 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
791 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
792 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
793 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
796 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
798 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
800 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
801 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
802 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
803 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
805 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
806 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
807 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
809 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
810 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
811 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
812 holder_tx_signed: bool,
814 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
815 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
816 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
817 funding_spend_seen: bool,
819 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
820 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
821 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
823 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
824 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
825 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
826 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
827 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
829 /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
830 /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
831 /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
832 /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
833 /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
834 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
836 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
837 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
838 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
839 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
840 // the full block_connected).
841 best_block: BestBlock,
843 /// The node_id of our counterparty
844 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
846 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
849 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
850 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
852 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
853 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
855 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
856 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
857 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
858 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
863 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
864 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
866 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
867 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
868 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
869 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
870 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
871 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
872 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
873 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
874 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
875 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
876 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
877 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
878 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
879 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
880 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
881 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
882 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
883 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
884 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
885 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
886 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
887 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
888 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
889 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
890 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
891 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
892 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
893 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
894 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
895 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
896 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
897 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
898 self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
899 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
900 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
901 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
910 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
911 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
912 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
916 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
917 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
918 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
920 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
921 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
922 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
924 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
926 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
927 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
929 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
930 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
931 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
932 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
933 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
934 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
936 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
939 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
940 match &self.shutdown_script {
941 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
942 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
945 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
946 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
947 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
948 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
949 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
950 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
951 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
953 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
954 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
955 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
957 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
958 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
959 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
960 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
961 match second_option {
962 Some(second_pubkey) => {
963 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
966 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
971 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
975 writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
977 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
979 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
980 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
981 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
982 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
983 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
984 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
985 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
989 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
990 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
991 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
992 writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
993 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
994 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
995 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
996 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
997 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
998 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
1002 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1003 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1004 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1005 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1008 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1009 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1010 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1011 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1014 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1015 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1016 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1018 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1021 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1023 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1024 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1026 writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1027 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1028 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1031 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1032 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1033 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
1035 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1036 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1038 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1042 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1043 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1047 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1048 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1049 event.write(writer)?;
1052 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1053 writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height().to_be_bytes())?;
1055 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1056 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1057 entry.write(writer)?;
1060 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1061 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1062 txid.write(writer)?;
1063 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1064 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1066 script.write(writer)?;
1069 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1071 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1072 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1074 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1075 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1076 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
1077 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
1078 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1079 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1080 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1081 (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, vec_type),
1088 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1089 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1090 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1091 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1092 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1093 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1096 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
1097 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1098 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1099 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1100 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1101 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1102 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1104 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1105 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1106 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1108 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1109 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1110 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1111 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1113 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1114 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1116 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1117 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1118 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1119 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1121 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1122 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1124 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1125 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1126 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1127 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1128 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1129 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1130 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1131 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1133 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1136 let onchain_tx_handler =
1137 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1138 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1140 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1141 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1143 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1144 latest_update_id: 0,
1145 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1147 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1148 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1149 counterparty_payment_script,
1153 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1155 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1156 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1158 counterparty_commitment_params,
1159 funding_redeemscript,
1160 channel_value_satoshis,
1161 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1163 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1165 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1166 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1167 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1168 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1170 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1171 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1172 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1173 current_holder_commitment_number,
1175 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1176 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1177 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1179 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1184 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1185 holder_tx_signed: false,
1186 funding_spend_seen: false,
1187 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1188 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1189 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1190 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
1193 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1200 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1201 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1204 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1205 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1206 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1207 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1208 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1211 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1212 commitment_number: u64,
1213 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1215 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1216 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1217 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1221 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1222 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1223 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1224 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1225 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1228 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1229 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1230 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1232 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1233 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1235 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1238 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1239 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1242 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1243 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1246 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1251 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1254 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1257 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1260 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1261 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1263 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1269 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1270 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1273 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1276 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1278 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1279 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1282 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1283 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1284 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1287 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1288 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1289 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1290 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1291 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1294 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1295 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1296 /// have been registered.
1297 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1298 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1299 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1300 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1301 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1302 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1303 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1305 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1306 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1312 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1313 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1314 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1315 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1318 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1321 /// This is called by the [`EventsProvider::process_pending_events`] implementation for
1322 /// [`ChainMonitor`].
1324 /// [`EventsProvider::process_pending_events`]: crate::util::events::EventsProvider::process_pending_events
1325 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1326 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1327 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1330 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1331 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1334 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1335 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1338 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1339 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1342 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1344 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1346 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1347 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1350 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1351 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1353 /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1354 /// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've
1355 /// fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation
1356 /// secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1358 /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1359 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1360 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1361 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1362 /// to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you.
1364 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
1365 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1366 where L::Target: Logger {
1367 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1370 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1371 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1372 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1373 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1374 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1375 where L::Target: Logger {
1376 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1379 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1380 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1381 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1382 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1383 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1384 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1386 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1387 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1389 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1390 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1392 header: &BlockHeader,
1393 txdata: &TransactionData,
1398 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1400 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1401 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1404 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1405 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1408 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1410 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1412 header: &BlockHeader,
1418 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1419 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1422 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1423 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1426 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1427 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1429 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1430 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1432 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1433 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1435 header: &BlockHeader,
1436 txdata: &TransactionData,
1441 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1443 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1444 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1447 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1448 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1449 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1452 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1454 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1455 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1457 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1458 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1465 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1466 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1469 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1470 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1471 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1474 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1475 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1477 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1478 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1480 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1481 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1483 header: &BlockHeader,
1488 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1490 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1491 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1494 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1495 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1496 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1499 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1500 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1501 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1502 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1504 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.block_hash))
1505 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1507 txids.sort_unstable();
1512 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1513 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1514 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1515 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1519 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1520 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1521 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1522 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1523 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1524 -> Option<Balance> {
1525 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1526 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1528 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1529 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1530 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1531 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1532 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1534 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1535 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1536 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1537 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1538 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1539 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1540 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1542 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1543 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1544 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1545 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1546 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1547 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1549 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1550 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1551 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1552 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1553 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1558 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1559 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1560 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1561 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid;
1564 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1566 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1567 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1569 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_none(),
1570 "This code needs updating for anchors");
1571 BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, 0)
1573 BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx)
1575 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1577 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1578 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1579 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1580 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1581 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1583 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1584 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1585 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1586 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1587 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1588 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1589 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1590 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1591 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1592 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1593 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1595 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1596 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1597 Some(tx.txid()) == htlc_spend_txid_opt ||
1598 inp.previous_output.txid == htlc_spend_txid
1600 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1601 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1603 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1608 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1609 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1610 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1611 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1612 // need to do so again here.
1614 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1615 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1616 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1617 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1618 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1619 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1622 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1623 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1624 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1625 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1626 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1627 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1628 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1629 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1632 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1633 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1634 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1637 } else if self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1638 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1639 // we know the preimage.
1640 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1641 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1642 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1643 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1644 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1645 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1646 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1647 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1650 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1651 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1652 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1655 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1656 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1657 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1658 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1665 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1666 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1667 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1670 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1671 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1672 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1673 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1675 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1676 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
1677 /// a revoked state.
1679 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1680 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1681 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1682 let mut res = Vec::new();
1683 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1685 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1686 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1687 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1688 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1689 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1692 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
1693 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1696 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1697 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1698 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1699 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1700 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1703 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1704 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1705 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1706 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1708 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
1716 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1717 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1718 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1719 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
1720 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1721 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1722 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1723 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1725 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1728 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1729 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1730 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1733 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1734 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1735 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1738 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1739 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1741 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1742 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
1743 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
1744 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
1745 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
1746 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
1747 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1748 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1749 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
1751 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1752 claimable_amount_satoshis: output.value,
1753 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
1755 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
1756 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
1757 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
1758 ).unwrap_or(false) {
1759 spent_counterparty_output = true;
1765 if spent_counterparty_output {
1766 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
1767 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
1768 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
1769 if output_spendable {
1770 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1771 claimable_amount_satoshis: amt,
1775 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
1776 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
1779 found_commitment_tx = true;
1780 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1781 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1782 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1783 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1784 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1785 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1788 found_commitment_tx = true;
1789 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1790 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1791 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1792 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1793 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1794 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1795 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1798 found_commitment_tx = true;
1801 if !found_commitment_tx {
1802 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1803 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1804 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1805 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1806 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1807 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1808 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1813 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1814 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1815 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1817 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1818 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1819 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1821 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1822 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1824 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
1825 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
1826 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1827 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1828 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1832 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1833 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1840 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
1841 /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
1842 /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
1844 /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes HTLCs which were
1845 /// resolved by this `ChannelMonitor`.
1846 pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1847 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1848 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
1849 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1850 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1851 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1853 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1854 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1855 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1856 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1862 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1863 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1865 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1866 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1871 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1872 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1873 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1874 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1875 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1876 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1877 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1878 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1879 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1880 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1886 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
1887 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1888 // closed), just get the full set.
1890 return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
1893 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1894 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1895 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1896 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1897 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1898 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1899 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1901 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1902 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1903 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1904 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1905 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1906 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1907 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1908 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1909 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1910 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1911 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1912 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1913 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1914 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
1915 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1916 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1918 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1921 if !htlc_update_confd {
1922 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1929 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
1930 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1931 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1932 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1933 Some((a, &**source))
1936 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1937 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1938 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1940 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1941 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1942 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1943 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1951 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
1952 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
1956 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1957 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1958 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1960 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1961 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1962 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1963 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1964 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1965 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1967 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1968 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1969 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1970 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1971 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1972 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
1973 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1974 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
1976 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1977 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1978 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1979 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1980 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1981 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1982 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1983 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1984 // payment_preimage.
1985 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1986 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1987 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1988 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1990 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1992 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1993 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1994 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
1995 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
1996 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
1997 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
1998 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
1999 matched_htlc = true;
2003 if matched_htlc { continue; }
2004 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2005 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
2007 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
2008 *update_source != **source
2013 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2014 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
2015 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
2016 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
2017 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
2018 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2019 source: (**source).clone(),
2020 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
2021 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
2022 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
2025 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
2026 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2027 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2028 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2034 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2035 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2037 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2038 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2043 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2044 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2045 // in-line tests later.
2048 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2049 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2050 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2051 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2052 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2053 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2054 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2059 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2060 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2063 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2064 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2065 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2066 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2067 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2068 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2069 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2072 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2073 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2074 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2075 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2080 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2081 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2082 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2083 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2084 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2086 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2087 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2088 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2092 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2093 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2094 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2099 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2106 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2115 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2116 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2117 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2118 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2120 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2121 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2124 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2125 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2126 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2127 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2128 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2129 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2130 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2131 Some(old_points) => {
2132 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2133 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2134 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2135 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2136 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2138 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2141 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2145 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2148 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2149 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2150 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2156 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2157 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2158 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2159 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2160 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2161 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2162 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
2163 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
2164 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2165 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2166 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2167 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2170 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2171 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2172 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2173 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2174 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2176 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2177 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2180 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2181 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2182 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2183 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2184 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2189 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2190 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2191 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2192 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2193 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
2194 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2195 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2198 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2200 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2201 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2202 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2203 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2204 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2205 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2208 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2209 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2210 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2214 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2215 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2216 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2221 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2222 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2223 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2224 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2225 // holder commitment transactions.
2226 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2227 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2228 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2230 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2231 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2232 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2233 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
2234 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2239 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
2240 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2243 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
2244 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
2245 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2247 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2250 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
2251 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2252 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2255 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
2256 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2257 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
2258 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
2259 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
2260 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
2261 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2262 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2263 match updates.updates[0] {
2264 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
2266 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2267 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2270 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2271 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2273 let mut ret = Ok(());
2274 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2275 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2277 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
2278 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2279 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2280 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
2281 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2282 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2286 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2287 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2288 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2290 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2291 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2292 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2294 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2295 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2296 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2297 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2298 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2302 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2303 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2304 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2305 if *should_broadcast {
2306 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2307 // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
2308 // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
2309 // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm.
2310 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2311 let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2312 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2313 self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors(),
2315 let best_block_height = self.best_block.height();
2316 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2317 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2318 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output),
2319 best_block_height, false, best_block_height,
2321 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2322 vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height,
2323 broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger,
2326 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2327 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2328 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()));
2329 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
2331 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2332 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2333 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2334 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2337 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2338 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2339 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2340 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2345 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2347 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
2348 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2353 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2354 self.latest_update_id
2357 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2361 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2362 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2363 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2364 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2365 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2366 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2368 &self.outputs_to_watch
2371 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2372 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2373 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2377 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2378 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2379 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
2381 for claim_event in self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events().drain(..) {
2383 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
2384 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
2386 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2387 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
2388 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
2389 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
2390 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
2391 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
2392 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2394 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
2395 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
2396 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2397 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2398 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
2399 txid: commitment_txid,
2400 vout: anchor_output_idx,
2411 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2412 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2413 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2416 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2417 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2420 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2421 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2424 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2425 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2428 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2429 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2430 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2431 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2433 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
2434 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
2436 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
2437 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
2438 where L::Target: Logger {
2439 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2440 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2441 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2442 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2443 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
2445 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2446 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2448 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2449 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2452 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2457 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2458 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2459 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2460 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2461 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2462 let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
2463 let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
2465 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2466 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2468 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2469 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2470 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2471 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2472 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2473 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2474 to_counterparty_output_info =
2475 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2479 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2480 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2481 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2482 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2483 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2484 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2485 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2486 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
2487 to_counterparty_output_info);
2489 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2490 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2491 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2496 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2497 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2498 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2499 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2500 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2501 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2503 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2505 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2506 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2507 block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2508 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2511 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2512 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2513 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2516 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2517 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2518 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2519 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2520 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2521 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2522 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2524 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2525 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2527 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2529 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2530 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
2531 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2532 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2535 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
2536 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2537 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
2538 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2539 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2543 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2546 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
2547 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
2548 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
2549 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2550 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
2552 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2553 Some(outputs) => outputs,
2554 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2556 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2557 Some(points) => points,
2558 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2561 let per_commitment_point =
2562 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2563 // per-commitment point
2564 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
2565 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2566 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2567 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2568 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2569 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2571 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
2572 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
2574 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2575 let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
2576 &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
2577 let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
2578 &per_commitment_point,
2579 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
2580 let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
2581 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2582 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
2583 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
2584 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2585 to_counterparty_output_info =
2586 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2591 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2592 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2593 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2594 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2595 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2596 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2597 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
2600 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2601 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2602 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2603 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2604 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2605 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2606 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2607 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
2609 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2610 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2611 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2612 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2613 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
2615 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2616 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2617 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2622 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
2625 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2626 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2627 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2628 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
2629 return (Vec::new(), None)
2632 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2633 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2636 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2641 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2642 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2643 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2645 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2646 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2647 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2648 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2649 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2650 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2653 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2654 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2655 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2656 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2657 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2659 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2660 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2662 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2663 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2664 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2665 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2667 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2670 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2673 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2675 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2676 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2680 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2683 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2684 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2685 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2686 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2687 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2688 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2694 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2695 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2696 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2697 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2698 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2699 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2700 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2701 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2703 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2704 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2705 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2706 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2707 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2711 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2712 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2714 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2715 is_holder_tx = true;
2716 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2717 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2718 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2719 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2720 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2721 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2722 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2723 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2724 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2725 is_holder_tx = true;
2726 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2727 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2728 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2729 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2730 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
2731 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
2737 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2743 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2744 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2745 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2746 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2747 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2748 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2749 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
2750 // transaction confirms.
2751 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2752 return holder_transactions;
2754 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2755 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2756 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2757 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2758 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2761 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2762 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2763 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2764 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2765 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2766 // confirmed in the next block.
2769 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2770 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2771 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2775 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2776 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2780 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2781 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2782 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2783 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2784 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2785 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2786 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2787 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
2788 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
2789 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2790 return holder_transactions;
2792 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2793 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2794 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2795 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2796 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2800 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2801 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2802 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2809 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2810 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2811 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2814 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2815 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2817 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2818 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2821 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2823 header: &BlockHeader,
2826 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2828 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2830 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2831 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2834 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2836 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2837 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2838 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2839 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2840 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2841 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2842 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2844 } else { Vec::new() }
2847 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2849 header: &BlockHeader,
2850 txdata: &TransactionData,
2853 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2855 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2857 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2858 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2861 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2862 for tx in &txn_matched {
2863 let mut output_val = 0;
2864 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2865 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2866 output_val += out.value;
2867 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2871 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2873 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2874 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2875 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
2876 let txid = tx.txid();
2877 // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
2878 if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
2879 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
2882 for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
2883 if ev.txid == txid {
2884 if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
2885 assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
2886 "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
2887 This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
2889 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
2893 for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
2894 if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
2895 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
2899 for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
2900 if txid == *spendable_txid {
2901 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
2906 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2907 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2908 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2909 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2911 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2912 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2913 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2914 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2915 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), txid);
2916 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2917 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
2918 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2919 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
2920 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
2921 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
2922 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2923 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2925 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2926 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2927 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
2928 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
2929 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
2930 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2931 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2933 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2934 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2938 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2940 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
2942 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
2943 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2944 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2945 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
2949 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2950 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2951 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2952 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2953 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2958 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2959 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2960 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2961 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
2963 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
2966 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2967 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2970 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2973 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2974 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2975 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2976 /// complexity especially in
2977 /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
2979 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2980 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2981 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2984 conf_hash: BlockHash,
2985 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2986 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2987 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2989 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2991 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2993 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2994 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2997 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2998 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
3000 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
3001 if should_broadcast {
3002 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors());
3003 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
3004 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
3005 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
3006 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3007 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
3008 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
3009 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
3010 // `transactions_confirmed`.
3011 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
3012 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
3013 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
3014 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
3015 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
3016 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
3017 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
3018 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
3020 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3024 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3025 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3026 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3027 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3028 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3029 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3030 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3032 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3036 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3037 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3038 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3040 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3041 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3045 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3046 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3048 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3049 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3051 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3052 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3053 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3056 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3057 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3058 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3059 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3061 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3062 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3063 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3064 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3065 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3068 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3069 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
3070 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3072 payment_preimage: None,
3073 source: source.clone(),
3074 htlc_value_satoshis,
3076 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3077 commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3078 payment_preimage: None,
3081 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3082 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3083 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3084 outputs: vec![descriptor]
3086 self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
3088 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3089 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3090 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3091 payment_preimage: preimage,
3094 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3095 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3096 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3101 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3102 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3104 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3105 // updating the latter in the process.
3106 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3107 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3108 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3112 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3113 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3114 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3115 for tx in &txn_matched {
3116 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3117 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3118 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3119 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3127 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
3128 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3129 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3132 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3135 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3136 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3137 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3139 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3140 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3142 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3145 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3149 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3152 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3153 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3156 let mut removed_height = None;
3157 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3158 if entry.txid == *txid {
3159 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
3164 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
3165 log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
3166 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
3167 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
3172 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
3174 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3177 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3178 /// transactions thereof.
3179 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3180 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
3181 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3182 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3183 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3184 if matches { break; }
3185 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3190 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3193 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3196 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3197 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3198 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3199 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3200 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3201 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3204 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3205 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3206 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3207 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3208 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3209 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3210 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3211 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3215 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3216 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3217 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3218 } else { panic!(); }
3229 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3230 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
3231 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
3232 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
3233 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
3234 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
3240 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3241 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3242 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3243 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3244 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3245 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3246 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3247 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3248 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3249 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3250 let height = self.best_block.height();
3251 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3252 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3253 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3254 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3255 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3256 // time out the HTLC first.
3257 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3258 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3259 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3260 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3261 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3262 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3263 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
3264 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
3265 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
3266 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
3267 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
3268 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
3269 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3270 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3271 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3272 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
3273 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
3274 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
3275 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
3276 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
3277 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
3278 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
3279 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
3280 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3287 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
3289 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3290 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3291 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3294 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3295 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3296 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3303 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
3304 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
3305 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3306 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
3307 let mut payment_data = None;
3308 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
3309 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
3310 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
3311 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3312 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
3313 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
3314 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3315 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
3317 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3318 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
3319 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
3322 macro_rules! log_claim {
3323 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
3324 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
3325 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
3327 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3328 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3329 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3330 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3331 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
3332 // matched by any HTLC spend:
3333 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3334 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
3335 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
3336 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
3337 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
3338 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
3339 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
3340 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3341 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3342 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
3344 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
3345 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3346 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3347 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
3352 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
3353 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
3354 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
3355 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
3356 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
3357 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
3358 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
3359 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
3368 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3369 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3370 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3371 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3372 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3373 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
3374 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3375 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
3376 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3377 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3378 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3379 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
3380 } else if !$holder_tx {
3381 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3382 if payment_data.is_none() {
3383 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3386 if payment_data.is_none() {
3387 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
3388 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
3389 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3390 txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3391 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3392 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3393 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
3394 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
3395 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
3396 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
3397 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
3398 // accepted_preimage_claim).
3399 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
3400 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
3403 continue 'outer_loop;
3410 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
3411 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3412 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
3414 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3415 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3416 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3417 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
3420 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3421 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3422 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
3425 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3426 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3427 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
3428 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3429 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3430 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
3431 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3434 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3435 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3436 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3437 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3438 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3439 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3442 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3444 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3446 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3449 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3450 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3451 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3452 upd.source == source
3454 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3456 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3458 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3459 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3460 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3461 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3462 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3465 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3467 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3469 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3473 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3474 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3476 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3477 *htlc_source != source
3482 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3484 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3486 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3487 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3488 source, payment_hash,
3489 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3490 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3493 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3494 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3500 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3501 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3502 let mut spendable_output = None;
3503 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3504 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3505 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3506 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3507 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3508 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3509 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3510 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3511 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3512 // non-standard due to their size.
3513 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3514 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3515 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3518 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3519 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3520 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3521 output: outp.clone(),
3525 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3526 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3527 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3528 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3529 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3530 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3531 output: outp.clone(),
3532 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3533 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3534 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3539 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3540 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3541 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3542 output: outp.clone(),
3543 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3544 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3548 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3549 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3550 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3551 output: outp.clone(),
3556 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3557 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3559 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3561 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3562 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3564 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3565 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3570 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3572 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3573 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3576 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3577 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3580 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3581 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3585 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3587 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3588 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3591 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3592 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3595 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3596 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3599 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3600 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3603 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
3604 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3608 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3610 impl<'a, K: KeysInterface> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
3611 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<K::Signer>) {
3612 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3613 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3617 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3622 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3624 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3625 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3627 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3628 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3630 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3631 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3632 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3633 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3636 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3638 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3639 let shutdown_script = {
3640 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3641 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3644 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3645 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3646 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3647 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3648 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3649 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3650 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3652 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3653 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3654 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3656 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3657 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3658 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3660 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3661 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3665 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3666 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3667 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3668 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3670 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3675 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3677 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3679 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3682 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3683 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3684 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3685 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3686 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3688 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3689 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3695 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3696 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3697 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3698 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3699 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3700 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3701 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3702 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3704 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3705 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3709 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3710 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3711 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3712 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3713 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3714 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3715 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3719 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3720 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3721 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3722 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3723 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3724 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3725 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3729 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3730 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3733 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3735 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3737 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3739 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3740 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3742 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3743 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3744 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3745 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3746 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3747 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3748 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3752 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3753 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3754 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3755 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3756 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3757 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3758 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3759 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3761 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3764 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3765 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3766 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3767 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3768 pending_events.push(event);
3772 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3774 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3775 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3776 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3777 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3778 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3782 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3783 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3784 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3785 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3786 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3787 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3788 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3789 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3791 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3792 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3795 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<K::Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(
3796 reader, (keys_manager, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
3799 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3800 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3802 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3803 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3804 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3805 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3806 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3807 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3808 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3812 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3813 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3814 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3815 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3816 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3819 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3820 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3821 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3822 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
3823 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
3824 let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
3825 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3826 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3827 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3828 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3829 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3830 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
3831 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
3832 (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, vec_type),
3835 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3836 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3838 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3840 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3843 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3844 counterparty_payment_script,
3848 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3850 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3851 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3853 counterparty_commitment_params,
3854 funding_redeemscript,
3855 channel_value_satoshis,
3856 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
3861 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3862 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3863 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3865 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3866 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3867 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3868 current_holder_commitment_number,
3871 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3874 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3879 lockdown_from_offchain,
3881 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3882 funding_spend_confirmed,
3883 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
3884 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3885 spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
3888 counterparty_node_id,
3897 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3898 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3899 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3900 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
3901 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3902 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
3903 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3904 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3905 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3906 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3907 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3908 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3909 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3913 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
3915 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3916 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3917 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3918 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3919 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3920 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3921 use crate::chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3922 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3923 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
3924 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3925 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId};
3926 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3927 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3928 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
3929 use crate::util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3930 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3931 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3932 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3934 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
3935 use crate::prelude::*;
3937 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3938 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3939 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3940 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3941 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3942 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3943 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3944 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3945 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3947 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3948 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3949 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3950 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3951 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3952 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3953 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3954 &nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3955 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3956 &nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3958 // Rebalance somewhat
3959 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
3961 // First route two payments for testing at the end
3962 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3963 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3965 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
3966 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
3967 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
3968 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
3969 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
3970 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
3971 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
3973 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
3974 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
3975 let new_header = BlockHeader {
3976 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
3977 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
3978 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
3979 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3980 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
3981 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
3983 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
3984 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
3985 &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
3987 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
3988 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
3989 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
3990 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)),
3991 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
3992 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
3993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
3994 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3995 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
3997 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
3998 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
3999 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
4000 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
4001 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
4002 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
4003 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
4004 } else { panic!(); }
4005 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
4006 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
4008 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
4010 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
4012 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
4014 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4015 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
4016 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
4017 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
4018 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
4019 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
4020 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4021 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
4022 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
4025 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
4026 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
4027 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4031 fn test_prune_preimages() {
4032 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4033 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4034 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
4035 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4037 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4038 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4040 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4043 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4044 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4045 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4049 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4050 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4052 let mut res = Vec::new();
4053 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4054 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4058 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4059 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4066 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
4067 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4069 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
4070 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
4076 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4077 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4078 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4079 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4084 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4086 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4087 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4088 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4089 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4090 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4091 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4097 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4098 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4099 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
4100 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4101 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
4102 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
4104 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4105 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4106 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4107 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4108 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4109 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4110 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4111 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4113 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4115 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
4117 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4119 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4120 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
4121 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4122 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
4123 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
4124 &channel_parameters,
4125 Script::new(), 46, 0,
4126 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
4128 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
4129 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
4130 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4131 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4132 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4133 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4134 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4135 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4136 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4139 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4140 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4141 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4142 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4143 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4144 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4145 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4147 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4148 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4149 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4150 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4151 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4152 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4154 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4155 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4156 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
4157 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4158 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4159 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4160 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4161 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4163 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4164 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
4165 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4166 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4167 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4168 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4172 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4173 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4174 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4176 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4177 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4178 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4180 macro_rules! sign_input {
4181 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4182 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4183 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4185 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4186 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4187 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4189 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
4190 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4191 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4192 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4193 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4194 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
4195 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4196 witness.push(ser_sig);
4197 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4198 witness.push(vec!(1));
4199 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4200 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4201 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4202 witness.push(vec![0]);
4204 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4206 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4207 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4208 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4209 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4210 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4214 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4215 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4217 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4218 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4219 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4220 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4222 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4223 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4227 script_sig: Script::new(),
4228 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4229 witness: Witness::new(),
4232 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4233 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4236 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4237 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4238 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4240 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4241 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4242 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4243 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4246 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4249 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
4250 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4251 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4252 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4254 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4255 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4259 script_sig: Script::new(),
4260 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4261 witness: Witness::new(),
4264 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4265 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4268 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4269 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4270 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4272 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4273 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4274 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4275 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4278 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4281 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
4282 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4283 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4284 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4285 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4286 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4290 script_sig: Script::new(),
4291 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4292 witness: Witness::new(),
4294 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4295 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4298 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4299 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
4300 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4302 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4303 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4304 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4305 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4308 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4312 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.