1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
38 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
39 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use crate::ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
42 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
44 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
47 use crate::chain::onchaintx::ClaimEvent;
48 use crate::chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
49 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
50 use crate::chain::Filter;
51 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
52 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
53 use crate::util::byte_utils;
54 use crate::util::events::Event;
56 use crate::util::events::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
58 use crate::prelude::*;
60 use crate::io::{self, Error};
61 use core::convert::TryInto;
63 use crate::sync::Mutex;
65 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
66 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
68 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
69 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
70 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
71 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
72 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
75 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
76 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
77 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
78 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
79 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
81 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
82 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
83 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
85 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
86 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
87 /// its docs for more details.
89 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
94 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
95 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
96 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
97 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
98 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
100 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
102 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
103 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
104 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
105 self.update_id.write(w)?;
106 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
107 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
108 update_step.write(w)?;
110 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
114 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
115 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
116 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
117 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
118 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
119 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
121 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
125 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
126 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
130 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
131 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
132 pub enum MonitorEvent {
133 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
134 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
136 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
137 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
139 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
140 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
142 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
144 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
145 funding_txo: OutPoint,
146 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
147 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
149 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
150 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
151 monitor_update_id: u64,
154 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
155 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
157 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
158 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
160 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
161 // Note that Completed and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
162 // generated only in ChainMonitor
164 (0, funding_txo, required),
165 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
169 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
173 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
174 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
175 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
176 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
178 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
179 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
180 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
181 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
183 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
184 (0, payment_hash, required),
185 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
186 (2, source, required),
187 (4, payment_preimage, option),
190 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
191 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
192 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
193 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
194 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
195 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
196 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
197 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
198 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
199 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
200 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
201 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
202 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
203 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
204 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
205 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
206 /// accurate block height.
207 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
208 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
209 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
210 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
211 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
212 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
215 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
216 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
217 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
218 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
219 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
220 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
221 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
222 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
223 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
224 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
226 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
227 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
228 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
230 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
231 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
233 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
234 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
236 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
237 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
238 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
239 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
241 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
242 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
243 struct HolderSignedTx {
244 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
246 revocation_key: PublicKey,
247 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
248 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
249 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
250 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
251 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
252 to_self_value_sat: u64,
255 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
257 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
258 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
259 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
260 (2, revocation_key, required),
261 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
262 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
263 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
264 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
265 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
266 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
270 impl HolderSignedTx {
271 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
272 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
273 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
283 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
284 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
285 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
286 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
287 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
288 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
289 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
292 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
293 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
294 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
295 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
296 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
297 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
298 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
303 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
304 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
305 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
306 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
307 // used. Read it for compatibility.
308 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
309 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
310 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
311 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
312 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
313 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
317 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
318 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
319 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
320 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
321 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
322 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
323 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
325 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
326 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
327 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
328 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
331 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
335 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
336 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
338 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
339 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
340 struct OnchainEventEntry {
343 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
345 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
348 impl OnchainEventEntry {
349 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
350 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
352 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
353 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
355 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
356 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
357 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
359 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
360 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
361 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
362 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
363 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
370 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
371 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
375 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
377 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
378 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
380 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
381 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
382 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
384 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
385 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
386 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
387 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
388 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
389 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
392 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
393 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
394 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
395 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
396 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
398 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
399 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
401 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
403 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
405 FundingSpendConfirmation {
406 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
407 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
408 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
409 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
410 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
412 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
413 /// counterparty output.
414 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
416 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
417 /// is constructed. This is used when
418 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
419 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
420 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
421 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
422 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
424 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
425 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
427 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
428 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
429 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
430 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
431 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
432 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
433 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
434 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
438 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
439 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
440 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
441 (0, self.txid, required),
442 (1, self.transaction, option),
443 (2, self.height, required),
444 (3, self.block_hash, option),
445 (4, self.event, required),
451 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
452 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
453 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
454 let mut transaction = None;
455 let mut block_hash = None;
457 let mut event = None;
458 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
460 (1, transaction, option),
461 (2, height, required),
462 (3, block_hash, option),
463 (4, event, ignorable),
465 if let Some(ev) = event {
466 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: ev }))
473 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
475 (0, source, required),
476 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
477 (2, payment_hash, required),
478 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
480 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
481 (0, descriptor, required),
483 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
484 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
485 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
487 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
488 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
489 (2, preimage, option),
490 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
495 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))]
497 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
498 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
499 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
500 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
502 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
503 commitment_txid: Txid,
504 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
505 commitment_number: u64,
506 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
509 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
515 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
516 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
518 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
519 /// think we've fallen behind!
520 should_broadcast: bool,
523 scriptpubkey: Script,
527 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
528 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
530 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
531 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
532 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
533 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
534 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
535 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
540 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
541 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
542 (0, commitment_tx, required),
543 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
545 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
546 (0, commitment_txid, required),
547 (2, commitment_number, required),
548 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
549 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
551 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
552 (0, payment_preimage, required),
554 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
556 (2, secret, required),
558 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
559 (0, should_broadcast, required),
561 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
562 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
566 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
568 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
570 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
571 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
573 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
574 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
575 /// force-closed now.
576 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
577 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
578 /// required to do so.
579 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
581 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
582 /// we consider it spendable.
583 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
584 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
585 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
586 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
587 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
589 confirmation_height: u32,
591 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
592 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
593 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
595 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
596 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
597 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
598 ContentiousClaimable {
599 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
600 /// required to do so.
601 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
602 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
606 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
607 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
608 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
609 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
610 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
611 /// which will be required to do so.
612 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
613 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
615 claimable_height: u32,
617 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
618 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
619 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
620 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
621 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
622 /// which will be required to do so.
623 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
624 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
625 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
628 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
631 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
632 /// following amount.
633 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
634 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
636 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
637 /// were already spent.
638 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
642 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
643 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
644 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
645 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
646 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
647 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
649 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
650 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
651 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
654 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
655 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
656 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
657 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
658 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
659 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
660 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
661 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
662 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
663 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
664 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
670 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
671 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
672 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
673 let mut resolving_txid = None;
674 let mut payment_preimage = None;
675 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
676 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
677 (1, resolving_txid, option),
678 (2, payment_preimage, option),
681 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
688 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
689 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
691 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
692 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
694 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
695 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
696 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
697 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
699 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
700 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
701 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
702 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
703 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
704 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
706 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
708 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
711 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
712 latest_update_id: u64,
713 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
715 destination_script: Script,
716 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
717 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
718 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
720 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
721 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
722 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
723 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
724 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
726 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
727 funding_redeemscript: Script,
728 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
729 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
730 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
732 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
734 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
735 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
736 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
737 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
738 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
739 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
740 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
741 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
742 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
743 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
744 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
745 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
746 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
747 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
748 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
749 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
751 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
752 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
753 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
754 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
755 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
756 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
758 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
760 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
761 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
763 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
765 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
766 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
767 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
769 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
771 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
772 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
773 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
774 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
775 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
776 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
777 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
778 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
779 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
780 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
782 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
784 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
785 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
786 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
787 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
789 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
790 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
791 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
792 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
793 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
796 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
798 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
800 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
801 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
802 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
803 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
805 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
806 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
807 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
809 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
810 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
811 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
812 holder_tx_signed: bool,
814 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
815 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
816 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
817 funding_spend_seen: bool,
819 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
820 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
821 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
823 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
824 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
825 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
826 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
827 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
829 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
830 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
831 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
832 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
833 // the full block_connected).
834 best_block: BestBlock,
836 /// The node_id of our counterparty
837 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
839 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
842 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
843 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
845 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
846 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
848 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
849 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
850 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
851 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
856 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
857 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
859 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
860 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
861 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
862 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
863 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
864 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
865 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
866 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
867 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
868 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
869 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
870 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
871 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
872 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
873 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
874 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
875 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
876 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
877 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
878 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
879 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
880 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
881 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
882 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
883 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
884 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
885 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
886 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
887 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
888 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
889 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
890 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
891 self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
892 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
893 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
894 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
903 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
904 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
905 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
909 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
910 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
911 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
913 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
914 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
915 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
917 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
919 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
920 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
922 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
923 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
924 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
925 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
926 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
927 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
929 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
932 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
933 match &self.shutdown_script {
934 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
935 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
938 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
939 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
940 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
941 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
942 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
943 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
944 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
946 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
947 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
948 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
950 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
951 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
952 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
953 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
954 match second_option {
955 Some(second_pubkey) => {
956 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
959 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
964 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
968 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
970 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
972 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
973 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
974 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
975 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
976 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
977 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
978 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
982 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
983 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
984 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
985 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
986 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
987 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
988 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
989 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
990 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
991 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
995 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
996 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
997 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
998 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1001 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1002 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1003 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1004 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1007 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1008 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1009 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1011 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1014 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1016 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1017 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1019 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1020 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1021 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1024 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1025 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1026 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
1028 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1029 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1031 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1035 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1036 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1040 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1041 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1042 event.write(writer)?;
1045 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1046 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
1048 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1049 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1050 entry.write(writer)?;
1053 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1054 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1055 txid.write(writer)?;
1056 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1057 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1059 script.write(writer)?;
1062 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1064 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1065 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1067 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1068 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1069 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
1070 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
1071 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1072 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1073 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1080 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1081 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1082 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1083 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1084 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1085 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1088 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
1089 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1090 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1091 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1092 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1093 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1094 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1096 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1097 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1098 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1100 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1101 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1102 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1103 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1105 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1106 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1108 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1109 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1110 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1111 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1113 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1114 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1116 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1117 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1118 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1119 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1120 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1121 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1122 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1123 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1125 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1128 let onchain_tx_handler =
1129 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1130 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1132 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1133 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1135 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1136 latest_update_id: 0,
1137 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1139 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1140 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1141 counterparty_payment_script,
1145 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1147 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1148 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1150 counterparty_commitment_params,
1151 funding_redeemscript,
1152 channel_value_satoshis,
1153 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1155 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1157 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1158 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1159 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1160 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1162 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1163 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1164 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1165 current_holder_commitment_number,
1167 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1168 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1169 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1171 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1176 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1177 holder_tx_signed: false,
1178 funding_spend_seen: false,
1179 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1180 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1181 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1184 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1191 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1192 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1195 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1196 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1197 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1198 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1199 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1202 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1203 commitment_number: u64,
1204 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1206 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1207 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1208 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1212 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1213 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1214 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1215 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1216 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1219 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1220 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1221 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1223 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1224 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1226 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1229 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1230 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1233 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1234 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1237 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1242 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1245 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1248 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1251 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1252 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1254 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1260 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1261 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1264 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1267 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1269 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1270 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1273 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1274 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1275 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1278 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1279 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1280 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1281 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1282 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1285 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1286 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1287 /// have been registered.
1288 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1289 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1290 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1291 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1292 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1293 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1294 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1296 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1297 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1303 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1304 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1305 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1306 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1309 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1312 /// This is called by the [`EventsProvider::process_pending_events`] implementation for
1313 /// [`ChainMonitor`].
1315 /// [`EventsProvider::process_pending_events`]: crate::util::events::EventsProvider::process_pending_events
1316 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1317 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1318 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1321 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1322 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1325 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1326 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1329 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1330 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1333 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1335 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1337 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1338 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1341 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1342 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1344 /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1345 /// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've
1346 /// fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation
1347 /// secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1349 /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1350 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1351 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1352 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1353 /// to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you.
1355 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
1356 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1357 where L::Target: Logger {
1358 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1361 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1362 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1363 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1364 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1365 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1366 where L::Target: Logger {
1367 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1370 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1371 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1372 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1373 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1374 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1375 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1377 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1378 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1380 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1381 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1383 header: &BlockHeader,
1384 txdata: &TransactionData,
1389 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1391 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1392 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1395 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1396 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1399 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1401 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1403 header: &BlockHeader,
1409 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1410 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1413 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1414 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1417 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1418 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1420 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1421 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1423 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1424 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1426 header: &BlockHeader,
1427 txdata: &TransactionData,
1432 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1434 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1435 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1438 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1439 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1440 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1443 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1445 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1446 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1448 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1449 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1456 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1457 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1460 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1461 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1462 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1465 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1466 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1468 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1469 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1471 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1472 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1474 header: &BlockHeader,
1479 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1481 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1482 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1485 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1486 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1487 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1490 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1491 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1492 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1493 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1495 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.block_hash))
1496 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1498 txids.sort_unstable();
1503 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1504 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1505 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1506 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1510 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1511 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1512 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1513 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1514 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1515 -> Option<Balance> {
1516 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1517 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1519 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1520 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1521 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1522 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1523 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1525 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1526 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1527 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1528 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1529 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1530 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1531 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1533 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1534 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1535 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1536 htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
1537 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1538 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1540 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1541 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1542 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1543 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1544 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1549 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1550 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1551 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1552 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid;
1555 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1557 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1558 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1560 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_none(),
1561 "This code needs updating for anchors");
1562 BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, 0)
1564 BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx)
1566 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1568 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1569 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1570 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1571 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1572 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1574 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1575 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1576 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1577 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1578 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1579 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1580 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1581 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1582 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1583 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1584 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1586 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1587 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1588 Some(tx.txid()) == htlc_spend_txid_opt ||
1589 inp.previous_output.txid == htlc_spend_txid
1591 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1592 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1594 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1599 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1600 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1601 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1602 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1603 // need to do so again here.
1605 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1606 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1607 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1608 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1609 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1610 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1613 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1614 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1615 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1616 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1617 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1618 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1619 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1620 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1623 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1624 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1625 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1628 } else if self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1629 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1630 // we know the preimage.
1631 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1632 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1633 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1634 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1635 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1636 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1637 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1638 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1641 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1642 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1643 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1646 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1647 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1648 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1649 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1656 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1657 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1658 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1661 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1662 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1663 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1664 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1666 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1667 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
1668 /// a revoked state.
1670 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1671 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1672 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1673 let mut res = Vec::new();
1674 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1676 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1677 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1678 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1679 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1680 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1683 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
1684 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1687 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1688 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1689 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1690 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1691 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1694 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1695 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1696 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1697 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1699 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
1707 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1708 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1709 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1710 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
1711 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1712 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1713 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1714 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1716 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1719 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1720 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1721 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1724 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1725 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1726 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1729 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1730 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1732 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1733 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
1734 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
1735 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
1736 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
1737 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
1738 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1739 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1740 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
1742 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1743 claimable_amount_satoshis: output.value,
1744 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
1746 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
1747 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
1748 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
1749 ).unwrap_or(false) {
1750 spent_counterparty_output = true;
1756 if spent_counterparty_output {
1757 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
1758 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
1759 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
1760 if output_spendable {
1761 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1762 claimable_amount_satoshis: amt,
1766 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
1767 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
1770 found_commitment_tx = true;
1771 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1772 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1773 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1774 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1775 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1776 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1779 found_commitment_tx = true;
1780 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1781 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1782 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1783 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1784 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1785 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1786 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1789 found_commitment_tx = true;
1792 if !found_commitment_tx {
1793 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1794 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1795 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1796 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1797 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1798 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1799 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1804 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1805 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1806 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1808 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1809 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1810 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1812 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1813 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1815 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
1816 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
1817 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1818 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1819 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1823 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1824 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1831 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
1832 /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
1833 /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
1835 /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes HTLCs which were
1836 /// resolved by this `ChannelMonitor`.
1837 pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1838 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1839 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
1840 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1841 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1842 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1844 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1845 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1846 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1847 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1853 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1854 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1856 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1857 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1862 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1863 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1864 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1865 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1866 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1867 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1868 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1869 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1870 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1871 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1877 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
1878 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1879 // closed), just get the full set.
1881 return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
1884 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1885 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1886 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1887 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1888 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1889 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1890 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1892 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1893 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1894 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1895 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1896 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1897 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1898 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1899 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1900 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1901 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1902 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1903 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1904 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1905 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
1906 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1907 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1909 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1912 if !htlc_update_confd {
1913 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1920 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
1921 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1922 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1923 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1924 Some((a, &**source))
1927 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1928 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1929 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1931 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1932 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1933 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1934 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1942 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
1943 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
1947 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1948 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1949 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1951 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1952 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1953 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1954 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1955 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1956 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1958 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1959 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1960 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1961 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1962 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1963 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
1964 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1965 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
1967 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1968 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1969 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1970 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1971 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1972 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1973 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1974 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1975 // payment_preimage.
1976 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1977 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1978 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1979 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1981 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1983 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1984 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1985 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
1986 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
1987 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
1988 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
1989 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
1990 matched_htlc = true;
1994 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1995 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1996 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1998 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1999 *update_source != **source
2004 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2005 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
2006 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
2007 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
2008 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
2009 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2010 source: (**source).clone(),
2011 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
2012 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
2013 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
2016 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
2017 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2018 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2019 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2025 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2026 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2028 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2029 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2034 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2035 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2036 // in-line tests later.
2039 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2040 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2041 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2042 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2043 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2044 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2045 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2050 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2051 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2054 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2055 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2056 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2057 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2058 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2059 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2060 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2063 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2064 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2065 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2066 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2071 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2072 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2073 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2074 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2075 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2077 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2078 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2079 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2083 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2084 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2085 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2090 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2097 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2106 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2107 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2108 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2109 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2111 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2112 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2115 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2116 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2117 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2118 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2119 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2120 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2121 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2122 Some(old_points) => {
2123 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2124 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2125 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2126 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2127 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2129 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2132 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2136 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2139 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2140 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2141 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2147 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2148 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2149 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2150 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2151 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2152 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2153 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
2154 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
2155 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2156 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2157 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2158 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2161 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2162 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2163 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2164 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2165 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2167 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2168 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2171 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2172 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2173 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2174 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2175 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2180 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2181 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2182 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2183 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2184 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
2185 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2186 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2189 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2191 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2192 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2193 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2194 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2195 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2196 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2199 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2200 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2201 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2205 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2206 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2207 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2212 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2213 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2214 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2215 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2216 // holder commitment transactions.
2217 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2218 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2219 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2221 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2222 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2223 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2224 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
2225 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2230 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
2231 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2234 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
2235 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
2236 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2238 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2241 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
2242 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2243 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2246 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
2247 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2248 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
2249 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
2250 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
2251 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
2252 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2253 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2254 match updates.updates[0] {
2255 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
2257 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2258 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2261 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2262 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2264 let mut ret = Ok(());
2265 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2266 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2268 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
2269 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2270 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2271 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
2272 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2273 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2277 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
2278 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2279 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2281 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2282 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2283 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2285 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2286 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2287 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2288 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2289 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2293 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2294 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2295 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2296 if *should_broadcast {
2297 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2298 // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
2299 // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
2300 // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm.
2301 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2302 let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2303 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2304 self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors(),
2306 let best_block_height = self.best_block.height();
2307 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2308 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2309 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output),
2310 best_block_height, false, best_block_height,
2312 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2313 vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height,
2314 broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger,
2317 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2318 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2319 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()));
2320 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
2322 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2323 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2324 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2325 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2328 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2329 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2330 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2331 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2336 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2338 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
2339 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2344 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2345 self.latest_update_id
2348 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2352 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2353 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2354 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2355 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2356 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2357 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2359 &self.outputs_to_watch
2362 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2363 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2364 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2368 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2369 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2370 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
2372 for claim_event in self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events().drain(..) {
2374 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
2375 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
2377 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2378 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
2379 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
2380 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
2381 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
2382 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
2383 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2385 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
2386 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
2387 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2388 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2389 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
2390 txid: commitment_txid,
2391 vout: anchor_output_idx,
2402 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2403 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2404 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2407 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2408 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2411 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2412 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2415 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2416 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2419 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2420 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2421 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2422 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2424 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
2425 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
2427 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
2428 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
2429 where L::Target: Logger {
2430 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2431 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2432 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2433 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2434 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
2436 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2437 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2439 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2440 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2443 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2448 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2449 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2450 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2451 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2452 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2453 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
2454 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
2456 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2457 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2459 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2460 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2461 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2462 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2463 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2464 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2465 to_counterparty_output_info =
2466 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2470 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2471 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2472 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2473 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2474 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2475 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2476 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2477 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
2478 to_counterparty_output_info);
2480 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2481 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2482 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2487 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2488 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2489 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2490 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2491 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2492 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2494 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2496 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2497 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2498 block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2499 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2502 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2503 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2504 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2507 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2508 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2509 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2510 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2511 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2512 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2513 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2515 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2516 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2518 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2520 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2521 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
2522 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2523 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2526 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
2527 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2528 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
2529 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2530 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2534 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2537 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
2538 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
2539 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
2540 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2541 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
2543 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2544 Some(outputs) => outputs,
2545 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2547 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2548 Some(points) => points,
2549 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2552 let per_commitment_point =
2553 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2554 // per-commitment point
2555 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
2556 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2557 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2558 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2559 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2560 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2562 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
2563 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
2565 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2566 let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
2567 if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
2568 &self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
2570 if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
2571 &per_commitment_point,
2572 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
2574 Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
2575 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2576 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
2578 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
2582 debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
2585 if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
2586 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
2587 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2588 to_counterparty_output_info =
2589 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2595 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2596 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2597 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2598 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2599 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2600 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2601 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
2604 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2605 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2606 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2607 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2608 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2609 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2610 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2611 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
2613 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2614 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2615 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2616 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2617 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()))
2619 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2620 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2621 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2626 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
2629 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2630 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2631 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2632 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
2633 return (Vec::new(), None)
2636 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2637 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2640 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2645 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2646 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2647 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2649 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2650 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2651 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2652 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2653 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2654 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2657 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2658 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2659 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2660 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2661 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2663 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2664 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2666 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2667 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2668 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2669 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2671 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2674 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2677 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2679 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2680 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2684 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2687 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2688 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2689 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2690 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2691 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2692 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2698 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2699 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2700 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2701 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2702 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2703 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2704 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2705 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2707 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2708 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2709 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2710 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2711 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2715 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2716 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2718 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2719 is_holder_tx = true;
2720 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2721 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2722 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2723 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2724 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2725 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2726 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2727 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2728 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2729 is_holder_tx = true;
2730 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2731 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2732 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2733 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2734 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
2735 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
2741 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2747 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2748 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2749 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2750 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2751 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2752 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2753 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
2754 // transaction confirms.
2755 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2756 return holder_transactions;
2758 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2759 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2760 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2761 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2762 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2765 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2766 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2767 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2768 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2769 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2770 // confirmed in the next block.
2773 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2774 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2775 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2779 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2780 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2784 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2785 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2786 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2787 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2788 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2789 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2790 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2791 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
2792 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
2793 if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2794 return holder_transactions;
2796 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2797 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2798 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2799 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2800 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2804 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2805 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2806 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2813 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2814 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2815 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2818 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2819 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2821 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
2822 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2825 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2827 header: &BlockHeader,
2830 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2832 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2834 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2835 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2838 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2840 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2841 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2842 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2843 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2844 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2845 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2846 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2848 } else { Vec::new() }
2851 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2853 header: &BlockHeader,
2854 txdata: &TransactionData,
2857 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2859 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2861 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2862 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2865 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2866 for tx in &txn_matched {
2867 let mut output_val = 0;
2868 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2869 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2870 output_val += out.value;
2871 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2875 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2877 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2878 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2879 for tx in &txn_matched {
2880 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2881 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2882 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2883 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2885 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2886 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2887 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2888 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2889 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
2890 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2891 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
2892 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2893 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
2894 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
2895 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
2896 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2897 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2899 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2900 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2901 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
2902 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
2903 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
2904 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2905 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2907 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2908 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2912 let txid = tx.txid();
2913 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2915 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
2917 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
2918 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2919 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2920 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
2924 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2925 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2926 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2927 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2928 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2933 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2934 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2935 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2936 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
2938 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
2941 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2942 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2945 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2948 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2949 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2950 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2951 /// complexity especially in
2952 /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
2954 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2955 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2956 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2959 conf_hash: BlockHash,
2960 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2961 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2962 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2964 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2966 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2968 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2969 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2972 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2973 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2975 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2976 if should_broadcast {
2977 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors());
2978 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2979 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2980 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2981 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2982 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2983 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
2984 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
2985 // `transactions_confirmed`.
2986 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() {
2987 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2988 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2989 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2990 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2991 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2992 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2993 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2995 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2999 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3000 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3001 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3002 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3003 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3004 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3005 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3007 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3011 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3012 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3013 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3015 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3016 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3020 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3021 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3023 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3024 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3026 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3027 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3028 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3031 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3032 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3033 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3034 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3036 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3037 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3038 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3039 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3040 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3043 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3044 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
3045 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3047 payment_preimage: None,
3048 source: source.clone(),
3049 htlc_value_satoshis,
3051 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3052 commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3053 payment_preimage: None,
3056 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3057 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3058 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3059 outputs: vec![descriptor]
3062 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3063 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3064 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3065 payment_preimage: preimage,
3068 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3069 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3070 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3075 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3076 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3078 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3079 // updating the latter in the process.
3080 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3081 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3082 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3086 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3087 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3088 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3089 for tx in &txn_matched {
3090 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3091 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3092 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3093 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3101 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
3102 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3103 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3106 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3109 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3110 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3111 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3113 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3114 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3116 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3119 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3123 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3126 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3127 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3130 let mut removed_height = None;
3131 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3132 if entry.txid == *txid {
3133 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
3138 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
3139 log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
3140 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
3141 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
3146 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
3148 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3151 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3152 /// transactions thereof.
3153 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3154 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
3155 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3156 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3157 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3158 if matches { break; }
3159 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3164 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3167 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3170 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3171 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3172 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3173 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3174 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3175 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3178 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3179 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3180 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3181 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3182 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3183 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3184 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3185 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3189 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3190 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3191 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3192 } else { panic!(); }
3203 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3204 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
3205 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
3206 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
3207 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
3208 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
3214 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3215 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3216 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3217 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3218 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3219 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3220 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3221 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3222 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3223 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3224 let height = self.best_block.height();
3225 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3226 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3227 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3228 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3229 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3230 // time out the HTLC first.
3231 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3232 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3233 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3234 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3235 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3236 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3237 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
3238 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
3239 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
3240 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
3241 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
3242 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
3243 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3244 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3245 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3246 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
3247 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
3248 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
3249 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
3250 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
3251 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
3252 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
3253 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
3254 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3261 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
3263 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3264 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3265 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3268 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3269 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3270 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3277 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
3278 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
3279 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3280 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
3281 let mut payment_data = None;
3282 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
3283 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
3284 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
3285 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3286 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
3287 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
3288 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3289 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
3291 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3292 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
3293 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
3296 macro_rules! log_claim {
3297 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
3298 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
3299 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
3301 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3302 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3303 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3304 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3305 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
3306 // matched by any HTLC spend:
3307 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3308 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
3309 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
3310 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
3311 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
3312 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
3313 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
3314 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3315 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3316 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
3318 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
3319 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3320 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
3321 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
3326 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
3327 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
3328 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
3329 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
3330 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
3331 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
3332 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
3333 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
3342 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3343 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3344 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3345 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3346 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3347 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
3348 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3349 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
3350 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3351 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3352 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3353 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
3354 } else if !$holder_tx {
3355 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3356 if payment_data.is_none() {
3357 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3360 if payment_data.is_none() {
3361 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
3362 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
3363 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3364 txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3365 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3366 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3367 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
3368 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
3369 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
3370 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
3371 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
3372 // accepted_preimage_claim).
3373 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
3374 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
3377 continue 'outer_loop;
3384 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
3385 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3386 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
3388 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3389 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3390 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3391 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
3394 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3395 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3396 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
3399 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3400 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3401 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
3402 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3403 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3404 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
3405 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3408 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3409 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3410 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3411 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3412 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3413 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3416 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3418 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3420 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3423 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3424 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3425 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3426 upd.source == source
3428 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3430 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3432 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3433 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3434 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3435 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3436 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3439 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3441 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3443 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3447 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3448 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3450 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3451 *htlc_source != source
3456 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3458 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3460 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3461 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3462 source, payment_hash,
3463 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3464 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3467 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3468 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3474 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3475 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3476 let mut spendable_output = None;
3477 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3478 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3479 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3480 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3481 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3482 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3483 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3484 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3485 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3486 // non-standard due to their size.
3487 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3488 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3489 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3492 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3493 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3494 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3495 output: outp.clone(),
3499 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3500 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3501 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3502 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3503 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3504 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3505 output: outp.clone(),
3506 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3507 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3508 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3513 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3514 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3515 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3516 output: outp.clone(),
3517 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3518 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3522 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3523 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3524 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3525 output: outp.clone(),
3530 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3531 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3533 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3535 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3536 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3538 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3539 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3544 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3546 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3547 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3550 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3551 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3554 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3555 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3559 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3561 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3562 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3565 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3566 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3569 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3570 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3573 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3574 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3577 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
3578 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3582 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3584 impl<'a, K: KeysInterface> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
3585 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<K::Signer>) {
3586 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3587 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3591 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3596 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3598 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3599 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3601 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3602 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3604 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3605 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3606 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3607 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3610 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3612 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3613 let shutdown_script = {
3614 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3615 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3618 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3619 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3620 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3621 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3622 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3623 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3624 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3626 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3627 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3628 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3630 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3631 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3632 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3634 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3635 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3639 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3640 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3641 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3642 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3644 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3649 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3651 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3653 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3656 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3657 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3658 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3659 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3660 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3662 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3663 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3669 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3670 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3671 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3672 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3673 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3674 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3675 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3676 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3678 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3679 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3683 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3684 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3685 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3686 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3687 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3688 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3689 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3693 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3694 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3695 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3696 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3697 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3698 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3699 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3703 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3704 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3707 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3709 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3711 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3713 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3714 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3716 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3717 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3718 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3719 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3720 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3721 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3722 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3726 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3727 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3728 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3729 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3730 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3731 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3732 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3733 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3735 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3738 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3739 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3740 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3741 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3742 pending_events.push(event);
3746 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3748 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3749 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3750 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3751 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3752 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3756 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3757 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3758 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3759 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3760 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3761 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3762 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3763 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3765 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3766 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3769 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<K::Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3771 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3772 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3774 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3775 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3776 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3777 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3778 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3779 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3780 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3784 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3785 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3786 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3787 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3788 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3791 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3792 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3793 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3794 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
3795 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
3796 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3797 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3798 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3799 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3800 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3801 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
3802 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
3805 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3806 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3808 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3810 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3813 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3814 counterparty_payment_script,
3818 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3820 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3821 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3823 counterparty_commitment_params,
3824 funding_redeemscript,
3825 channel_value_satoshis,
3826 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
3831 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3832 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3833 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3835 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3836 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3837 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3838 current_holder_commitment_number,
3841 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3844 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3849 lockdown_from_offchain,
3851 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3852 funding_spend_confirmed,
3853 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
3854 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3857 counterparty_node_id,
3866 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3867 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3868 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3869 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
3870 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3871 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
3872 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3873 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3874 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3875 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3876 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3877 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3878 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3882 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
3884 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3885 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3886 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3887 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3888 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3889 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3890 use crate::chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3891 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3892 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
3893 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3894 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId};
3895 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3896 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3897 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
3898 use crate::util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3899 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3900 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3901 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3903 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
3904 use crate::prelude::*;
3906 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3907 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3908 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3909 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3910 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3911 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3912 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3913 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3914 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3916 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3917 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3918 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3919 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3920 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3921 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3922 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3923 &nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3924 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3925 &nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3927 // Rebalance somewhat
3928 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
3930 // First route two payments for testing at the end
3931 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3932 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3934 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
3935 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
3936 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
3937 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
3938 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
3939 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
3940 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
3942 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
3943 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
3944 let new_header = BlockHeader {
3945 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
3946 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
3947 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
3948 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3949 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
3950 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
3952 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
3953 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
3954 &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
3956 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
3957 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
3958 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
3959 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)),
3960 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
3961 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
3962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
3963 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3964 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
3966 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
3967 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
3968 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
3969 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
3970 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
3971 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
3972 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
3973 } else { panic!(); }
3974 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
3975 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
3977 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
3979 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
3981 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
3983 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3984 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
3985 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
3986 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
3987 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
3988 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3989 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
3990 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
3991 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
3994 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
3995 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
3996 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4000 fn test_prune_preimages() {
4001 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4002 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4003 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
4004 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4006 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4007 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4009 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4012 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4013 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4014 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4018 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4019 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4021 let mut res = Vec::new();
4022 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4023 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4027 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4028 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4035 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
4036 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4038 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
4039 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
4045 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4046 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4047 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4048 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4053 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4055 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4056 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4057 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4058 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4059 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4060 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4066 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4067 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4068 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
4069 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4070 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
4071 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
4073 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4074 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4075 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4076 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4077 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4078 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4079 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4080 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4082 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4085 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4087 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4088 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
4089 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4090 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
4091 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
4092 &channel_parameters,
4093 Script::new(), 46, 0,
4094 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
4096 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
4097 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
4098 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4099 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4100 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4101 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4102 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4103 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4104 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4107 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4108 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4109 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4110 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4111 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4112 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4113 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4115 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4116 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4117 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4118 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4119 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4120 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4122 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4123 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4124 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
4125 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4126 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4127 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4128 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4129 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4131 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4132 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
4133 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4134 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4135 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4136 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4140 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4141 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4142 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4144 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4145 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4146 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4148 macro_rules! sign_input {
4149 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4150 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4151 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4153 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4154 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4155 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4157 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
4158 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4159 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4160 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4161 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4162 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
4163 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4164 witness.push(ser_sig);
4165 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4166 witness.push(vec!(1));
4167 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4168 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4169 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4170 witness.push(vec![0]);
4172 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4174 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4175 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4176 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4177 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4178 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4182 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4183 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4185 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4186 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4187 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4188 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4190 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4191 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4195 script_sig: Script::new(),
4196 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4197 witness: Witness::new(),
4200 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4201 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4204 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4205 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4206 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4208 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4209 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4210 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4211 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4214 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4217 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
4218 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4219 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4220 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4222 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4223 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4227 script_sig: Script::new(),
4228 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4229 witness: Witness::new(),
4232 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4233 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4236 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4237 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
4238 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4240 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4241 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4242 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4243 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4246 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4249 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
4250 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
4251 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4252 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4253 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4254 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4258 script_sig: Script::new(),
4259 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4260 witness: Witness::new(),
4262 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4263 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4266 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4267 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
4268 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4270 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4271 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4272 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
4273 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4276 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4280 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.