1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! keysinterface provides keys into rust-lightning and defines some useful enums which describe
11 //! spendable on-chain outputs which the user owns and is responsible for using just as any other
12 //! on-chain output which is theirs.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
17 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
18 use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ExtendedPrivKey, ExtendedPubKey, ChildNumber};
19 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
21 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
22 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
23 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::HashEngine as Sha256State;
24 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
26 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Signing};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
33 use util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
34 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
36 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CommitmentTransaction, ClosingTransaction};
39 use ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement;
40 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
43 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
44 use io::{self, Error};
45 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
46 use util::invoice::construct_invoice_preimage;
48 /// Used as initial key material, to be expanded into multiple secret keys (but not to be used
49 /// directly). This is used within LDK to encrypt/decrypt inbound payment data.
50 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
51 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
52 pub struct KeyMaterial(pub [u8; 32]);
54 /// Information about a spendable output to a P2WSH script. See
55 /// SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput for more details on how to spend this.
56 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
57 pub struct DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
58 /// The outpoint which is spendable
59 pub outpoint: OutPoint,
60 /// Per commitment point to derive delayed_payment_key by key holder
61 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
62 /// The nSequence value which must be set in the spending input to satisfy the OP_CSV in
63 /// the witness_script.
64 pub to_self_delay: u16,
65 /// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint
67 /// The revocation point specific to the commitment transaction which was broadcast. Used to
68 /// derive the witnessScript for this output.
69 pub revocation_pubkey: PublicKey,
70 /// Arbitrary identification information returned by a call to
71 /// `Sign::channel_keys_id()`. This may be useful in re-deriving keys used in
72 /// the channel to spend the output.
73 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
74 /// The value of the channel which this output originated from, possibly indirectly.
75 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
77 impl DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
78 /// The maximum length a well-formed witness spending one of these should have.
79 // Calculated as 1 byte length + 73 byte signature, 1 byte empty vec push, 1 byte length plus
80 // redeemscript push length.
81 pub const MAX_WITNESS_LENGTH: usize = 1 + 73 + 1 + chan_utils::REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH + 1;
84 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, {
85 (0, outpoint, required),
86 (2, per_commitment_point, required),
87 (4, to_self_delay, required),
88 (6, output, required),
89 (8, revocation_pubkey, required),
90 (10, channel_keys_id, required),
91 (12, channel_value_satoshis, required),
94 /// Information about a spendable output to our "payment key". See
95 /// SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput for more details on how to spend this.
96 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
97 pub struct StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
98 /// The outpoint which is spendable
99 pub outpoint: OutPoint,
100 /// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint
102 /// Arbitrary identification information returned by a call to
103 /// `Sign::channel_keys_id()`. This may be useful in re-deriving keys used in
104 /// the channel to spend the output.
105 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
106 /// The value of the channel which this transactions spends.
107 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
109 impl StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
110 /// The maximum length a well-formed witness spending one of these should have.
111 // Calculated as 1 byte legnth + 73 byte signature, 1 byte empty vec push, 1 byte length plus
112 // redeemscript push length.
113 pub const MAX_WITNESS_LENGTH: usize = 1 + 73 + 34;
115 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, {
116 (0, outpoint, required),
117 (2, output, required),
118 (4, channel_keys_id, required),
119 (6, channel_value_satoshis, required),
122 /// When on-chain outputs are created by rust-lightning (which our counterparty is not able to
123 /// claim at any point in the future) an event is generated which you must track and be able to
124 /// spend on-chain. The information needed to do this is provided in this enum, including the
125 /// outpoint describing which txid and output index is available, the full output which exists at
126 /// that txid/index, and any keys or other information required to sign.
127 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
128 pub enum SpendableOutputDescriptor {
129 /// An output to a script which was provided via KeysInterface directly, either from
130 /// `get_destination_script()` or `get_shutdown_scriptpubkey()`, thus you should already know
131 /// how to spend it. No secret keys are provided as rust-lightning was never given any key.
132 /// These may include outputs from a transaction punishing our counterparty or claiming an HTLC
133 /// on-chain using the payment preimage or after it has timed out.
135 /// The outpoint which is spendable
137 /// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint.
140 /// An output to a P2WSH script which can be spent with a single signature after a CSV delay.
142 /// The witness in the spending input should be:
143 /// <BIP 143 signature> <empty vector> (MINIMALIF standard rule) <provided witnessScript>
145 /// Note that the nSequence field in the spending input must be set to to_self_delay
146 /// (which means the transaction is not broadcastable until at least to_self_delay
147 /// blocks after the outpoint confirms).
149 /// These are generally the result of a "revocable" output to us, spendable only by us unless
150 /// it is an output from an old state which we broadcast (which should never happen).
152 /// To derive the delayed_payment key which is used to sign for this input, you must pass the
153 /// holder delayed_payment_base_key (ie the private key which corresponds to the pubkey in
154 /// Sign::pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) and the provided per_commitment_point to
155 /// chan_utils::derive_private_key. The public key can be generated without the secret key
156 /// using chan_utils::derive_public_key and only the delayed_payment_basepoint which appears in
159 /// To derive the revocation_pubkey provided here (which is used in the witness
160 /// script generation), you must pass the counterparty revocation_basepoint (which appears in the
161 /// call to Sign::ready_channel) and the provided per_commitment point
162 /// to chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key.
164 /// The witness script which is hashed and included in the output script_pubkey may be
165 /// regenerated by passing the revocation_pubkey (derived as above), our delayed_payment pubkey
166 /// (derived as above), and the to_self_delay contained here to
167 /// chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript.
168 DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor),
169 /// An output to a P2WPKH, spendable exclusively by our payment key (ie the private key which
170 /// corresponds to the public key in Sign::pubkeys().payment_point).
171 /// The witness in the spending input, is, thus, simply:
172 /// <BIP 143 signature> <payment key>
174 /// These are generally the result of our counterparty having broadcast the current state,
175 /// allowing us to claim the non-HTLC-encumbered outputs immediately.
176 StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor),
179 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SpendableOutputDescriptor,
180 (0, StaticOutput) => {
181 (0, outpoint, required),
182 (2, output, required),
185 (1, DelayedPaymentOutput),
186 (2, StaticPaymentOutput),
189 /// A trait to sign lightning channel transactions as described in BOLT 3.
191 /// Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet. In this case,
192 /// the current Sign would be a front-end on top of a communication
193 /// channel connected to your secure device and lightning key material wouldn't
194 /// reside on a hot server. Nevertheless, a this deployment would still need
195 /// to trust the ChannelManager to avoid loss of funds as this latest component
196 /// could ask to sign commitment transaction with HTLCs paying to attacker pubkeys.
198 /// A more secure iteration would be to use hashlock (or payment points) to pair
199 /// invoice/incoming HTLCs with outgoing HTLCs to implement a no-trust-ChannelManager
200 /// at the price of more state and computation on the hardware wallet side. In the future,
201 /// we are looking forward to design such interface.
203 /// In any case, ChannelMonitor or fallback watchtowers are always going to be trusted
204 /// to act, as liveness and breach reply correctness are always going to be hard requirements
205 /// of LN security model, orthogonal of key management issues.
206 // TODO: We should remove Clone by instead requesting a new Sign copy when we create
207 // ChannelMonitors instead of expecting to clone the one out of the Channel into the monitors.
209 /// Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
211 /// Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
212 fn get_per_commitment_point(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> PublicKey;
213 /// Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
215 /// An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
216 /// and should refuse to sign it in the future.
218 /// May be called more than once for the same index.
220 /// Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
221 // TODO: return a Result so we can signal a validation error
222 fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32];
223 /// Validate the counterparty's signatures on the holder commitment transaction and HTLCs.
225 /// This is required in order for the signer to make sure that releasing a commitment
226 /// secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
227 /// Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
228 /// sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
229 fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> Result<(), ()>;
230 /// Gets the holder's channel public keys and basepoints
231 fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys;
232 /// Gets an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
233 /// some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. This should be sufficient to identify this
234 /// Sign object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
235 fn channel_keys_id(&self) -> [u8; 32];
237 /// Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
239 /// Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
241 /// Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
242 /// sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
244 // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
245 fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
246 /// Validate the counterparty's revocation.
248 /// This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
249 /// forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
250 fn validate_counterparty_revocation(&self, idx: u64, secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<(), ()>;
252 /// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
253 /// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
254 /// latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
255 /// This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
256 /// reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
258 /// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
260 /// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
262 /// May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
264 // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
265 // TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err
266 fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
268 /// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
269 /// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
270 /// state. Thus, needs its own method as sign_holder_commitment may enforce that we only ever
272 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
273 fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;
275 /// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
276 /// or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
278 /// A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
279 /// similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
280 /// It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
281 /// to an upcoming timelock expiration.
283 /// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
285 /// per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
286 /// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
287 /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
289 fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
291 /// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
292 /// HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
294 /// A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
295 /// similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
296 /// It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
297 /// to an upcoming timelock expiration.
299 /// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
301 /// per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
302 /// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
303 /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
306 /// htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
307 /// (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
308 fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
310 /// Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
311 /// transaction, either offered or received.
313 /// Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
314 /// preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
315 /// signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
316 /// needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
318 /// Witness_script is either a offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
321 /// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
323 /// Per_commitment_point is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
324 /// detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
325 /// channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
326 /// BIP 143 signature.
327 fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
329 /// Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
331 /// Note that, due to rounding, there may be one "missing" satoshi, and either party may have
332 /// chosen to forgo their output as dust.
333 fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
335 /// Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
336 /// of the channel participants.
338 /// Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
339 /// our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
341 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
343 /// Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
344 /// counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
345 /// This is done as soon as the funding outpoint is known. Since these are static channel data,
346 /// they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set.
348 /// channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
350 /// We bind holder_selected_contest_delay late here for API convenience.
352 /// Will be called before any signatures are applied.
353 fn ready_channel(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters);
356 /// A cloneable signer.
358 /// Although we require signers to be cloneable, it may be useful for developers to be able to use
359 /// signers in an un-sized way, for example as `dyn BaseSign`. Therefore we separate the Clone trait,
360 /// which implies Sized, into this derived trait.
361 pub trait Sign: BaseSign + Writeable + Clone {
364 /// A trait to describe an object which can get user secrets and key material.
365 pub trait KeysInterface {
366 /// A type which implements Sign which will be returned by get_channel_signer.
369 /// Get node secret key (aka node_id or network_key).
371 /// This method must return the same value each time it is called.
372 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey;
373 /// Get a script pubkey which we send funds to when claiming on-chain contestable outputs.
375 /// This method should return a different value each time it is called, to avoid linking
376 /// on-chain funds across channels as controlled to the same user.
377 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script;
378 /// Get a script pubkey which we will send funds to when closing a channel.
380 /// This method should return a different value each time it is called, to avoid linking
381 /// on-chain funds across channels as controlled to the same user.
382 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript;
383 /// Get a new set of Sign for per-channel secrets. These MUST be unique even if you
384 /// restarted with some stale data!
386 /// This method must return a different value each time it is called.
387 fn get_channel_signer(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::Signer;
388 /// Gets a unique, cryptographically-secure, random 32 byte value. This is used for encrypting
389 /// onion packets and for temporary channel IDs. There is no requirement that these be
390 /// persisted anywhere, though they must be unique across restarts.
392 /// This method must return a different value each time it is called.
393 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32];
395 /// Reads a `Signer` for this `KeysInterface` from the given input stream.
396 /// This is only called during deserialization of other objects which contain
397 /// `Sign`-implementing objects (ie `ChannelMonitor`s and `ChannelManager`s).
398 /// The bytes are exactly those which `<Self::Signer as Writeable>::write()` writes, and
399 /// contain no versioning scheme. You may wish to include your own version prefix and ensure
400 /// you've read all of the provided bytes to ensure no corruption occurred.
401 fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError>;
404 /// By parameterizing by the raw invoice bytes instead of the hash, we allow implementors of
405 /// this trait to parse the invoice and make sure they're signing what they expect, rather than
406 /// blindly signing the hash.
407 /// The hrp is ascii bytes, while the invoice data is base32.
408 fn sign_invoice(&self, hrp_bytes: &[u8], invoice_data: &[u5]) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()>;
410 /// Get secret key material as bytes for use in encrypting and decrypting inbound payment data.
412 /// This method must return the same value each time it is called.
413 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial;
417 /// A simple implementation of Sign that just keeps the private keys in memory.
419 /// This implementation performs no policy checks and is insufficient by itself as
420 /// a secure external signer.
421 pub struct InMemorySigner {
422 /// Private key of anchor tx
423 pub funding_key: SecretKey,
424 /// Holder secret key for blinded revocation pubkey
425 pub revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
426 /// Holder secret key used for our balance in counterparty-broadcasted commitment transactions
427 pub payment_key: SecretKey,
428 /// Holder secret key used in HTLC tx
429 pub delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
430 /// Holder htlc secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs
431 pub htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
433 pub commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
434 /// Holder public keys and basepoints
435 pub(crate) holder_channel_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
436 /// Counterparty public keys and counterparty/holder selected_contest_delay, populated on channel acceptance
437 channel_parameters: Option<ChannelTransactionParameters>,
438 /// The total value of this channel
439 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
440 /// Key derivation parameters
441 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
444 impl InMemorySigner {
445 /// Create a new InMemorySigner
446 pub fn new<C: Signing>(
447 secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>,
448 funding_key: SecretKey,
449 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
450 payment_key: SecretKey,
451 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
452 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
453 commitment_seed: [u8; 32],
454 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
455 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> InMemorySigner {
456 let holder_channel_pubkeys =
457 InMemorySigner::make_holder_keys(secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
458 &payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key,
464 delayed_payment_base_key,
467 channel_value_satoshis,
468 holder_channel_pubkeys,
469 channel_parameters: None,
474 fn make_holder_keys<C: Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>,
475 funding_key: &SecretKey,
476 revocation_base_key: &SecretKey,
477 payment_key: &SecretKey,
478 delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey,
479 htlc_base_key: &SecretKey) -> ChannelPublicKeys {
480 let from_secret = |s: &SecretKey| PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, s);
482 funding_pubkey: from_secret(&funding_key),
483 revocation_basepoint: from_secret(&revocation_base_key),
484 payment_point: from_secret(&payment_key),
485 delayed_payment_basepoint: from_secret(&delayed_payment_base_key),
486 htlc_basepoint: from_secret(&htlc_base_key),
490 /// Counterparty pubkeys.
491 /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
492 pub fn counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.get_channel_parameters().counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys }
494 /// The contest_delay value specified by our counterparty and applied on holder-broadcastable
495 /// transactions, ie the amount of time that we have to wait to recover our funds if we
496 /// broadcast a transaction.
497 /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
498 pub fn counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.get_channel_parameters().counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay }
500 /// The contest_delay value specified by us and applied on transactions broadcastable
501 /// by our counterparty, ie the amount of time that they have to wait to recover their funds
502 /// if they broadcast a transaction.
503 /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
504 pub fn holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.get_channel_parameters().holder_selected_contest_delay }
506 /// Whether the holder is the initiator
507 /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
508 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool { self.get_channel_parameters().is_outbound_from_holder }
511 /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
512 pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> &OutPoint { self.get_channel_parameters().funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap() }
514 /// Obtain a ChannelTransactionParameters for this channel, to be used when verifying or
515 /// building transactions.
517 /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
518 pub fn get_channel_parameters(&self) -> &ChannelTransactionParameters {
519 self.channel_parameters.as_ref().unwrap()
522 /// Whether anchors should be used.
523 /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called.
524 pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
525 self.get_channel_parameters().opt_anchors.is_some()
528 /// Sign the single input of spend_tx at index `input_idx` which spends the output
529 /// described by descriptor, returning the witness stack for the input.
531 /// Returns an Err if the input at input_idx does not exist, has a non-empty script_sig,
532 /// or is not spending the outpoint described by `descriptor.outpoint`.
533 pub fn sign_counterparty_payment_input<C: Signing>(&self, spend_tx: &Transaction, input_idx: usize, descriptor: &StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
534 // TODO: We really should be taking the SigHashCache as a parameter here instead of
535 // spend_tx, but ideally the SigHashCache would expose the transaction's inputs read-only
536 // so that we can check them. This requires upstream rust-bitcoin changes (as well as
537 // bindings updates to support SigHashCache objects).
538 if spend_tx.input.len() <= input_idx { return Err(()); }
539 if !spend_tx.input[input_idx].script_sig.is_empty() { return Err(()); }
540 if spend_tx.input[input_idx].previous_output != descriptor.outpoint.into_bitcoin_outpoint() { return Err(()); }
542 let remotepubkey = self.pubkeys().payment_point;
543 let witness_script = bitcoin::Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: remotepubkey}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
544 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(spend_tx).signature_hash(input_idx, &witness_script, descriptor.output.value, SigHashType::All)[..]);
545 let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.payment_key);
547 let mut witness = Vec::with_capacity(2);
548 witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der().to_vec());
549 witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
550 witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec());
554 /// Sign the single input of spend_tx at index `input_idx` which spends the output
555 /// described by descriptor, returning the witness stack for the input.
557 /// Returns an Err if the input at input_idx does not exist, has a non-empty script_sig,
558 /// is not spending the outpoint described by `descriptor.outpoint`, or does not have a
559 /// sequence set to `descriptor.to_self_delay`.
560 pub fn sign_dynamic_p2wsh_input<C: Signing>(&self, spend_tx: &Transaction, input_idx: usize, descriptor: &DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>, ()> {
561 // TODO: We really should be taking the SigHashCache as a parameter here instead of
562 // spend_tx, but ideally the SigHashCache would expose the transaction's inputs read-only
563 // so that we can check them. This requires upstream rust-bitcoin changes (as well as
564 // bindings updates to support SigHashCache objects).
565 if spend_tx.input.len() <= input_idx { return Err(()); }
566 if !spend_tx.input[input_idx].script_sig.is_empty() { return Err(()); }
567 if spend_tx.input[input_idx].previous_output != descriptor.outpoint.into_bitcoin_outpoint() { return Err(()); }
568 if spend_tx.input[input_idx].sequence != descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 { return Err(()); }
570 let delayed_payment_key = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &descriptor.per_commitment_point, &self.delayed_payment_base_key)
571 .expect("We constructed the payment_base_key, so we can only fail here if the RNG is busted.");
572 let delayed_payment_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &delayed_payment_key);
573 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&descriptor.revocation_pubkey, descriptor.to_self_delay, &delayed_payment_pubkey);
574 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(spend_tx).signature_hash(input_idx, &witness_script, descriptor.output.value, SigHashType::All)[..]);
575 let local_delayedsig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &delayed_payment_key);
577 let mut witness = Vec::with_capacity(3);
578 witness.push(local_delayedsig.serialize_der().to_vec());
579 witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
580 witness.push(vec!()); //MINIMALIF
581 witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
586 impl BaseSign for InMemorySigner {
587 fn get_per_commitment_point(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> PublicKey {
588 let commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx)).unwrap();
589 PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &commitment_secret)
592 fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
593 chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx)
596 fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, _holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> Result<(), ()> {
600 fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.holder_channel_pubkeys }
601 fn channel_keys_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { self.channel_keys_id }
603 fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
604 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
605 let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
607 let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
608 let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
610 let built_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
611 let commitment_sig = built_tx.sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
612 let commitment_txid = built_tx.txid;
614 let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.htlcs().len());
615 for htlc in commitment_tx.htlcs() {
616 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(), self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
617 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
618 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { SigHashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { SigHashType::All };
619 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype)[..]);
620 let holder_htlc_key = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
621 htlc_sigs.push(secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
624 Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
627 fn validate_counterparty_revocation(&self, _idx: u64, _secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<(), ()> {
631 fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
632 let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
633 let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
634 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
635 let sig = trusted_tx.built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
636 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
637 let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)?;
641 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
642 fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
643 let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
644 let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
645 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
646 let sig = trusted_tx.built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
647 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
648 let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)?;
652 fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
653 let revocation_key = chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
654 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
655 let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint).map_err(|_| ())?;
656 let witness_script = {
657 let counterparty_delayedpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint).map_err(|_| ())?;
658 chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), &counterparty_delayedpubkey)
660 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(justice_tx);
661 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
662 return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
665 fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
666 let revocation_key = chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
667 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
668 let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint).map_err(|_| ())?;
669 let witness_script = {
670 let counterparty_htlcpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint).map_err(|_| ())?;
671 let holder_htlcpubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint).map_err(|_| ())?;
672 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &holder_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
674 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(justice_tx);
675 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
676 return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
679 fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
680 if let Ok(htlc_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) {
681 let witness_script = if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint) {
682 if let Ok(counterparty_htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
683 if let Ok(htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
684 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey)
685 } else { return Err(()) }
686 } else { return Err(()) }
687 } else { return Err(()) };
688 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(htlc_tx);
689 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
690 return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key))
695 fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
696 let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
697 let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
698 Ok(closing_tx.trust().sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
701 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
702 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
703 Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.funding_key))
706 fn ready_channel(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters) {
707 assert!(self.channel_parameters.is_none(), "Acceptance already noted");
708 assert!(channel_parameters.is_populated(), "Channel parameters must be fully populated");
709 self.channel_parameters = Some(channel_parameters.clone());
713 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
714 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
716 impl Sign for InMemorySigner {}
718 impl Writeable for InMemorySigner {
719 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
720 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
722 self.funding_key.write(writer)?;
723 self.revocation_base_key.write(writer)?;
724 self.payment_key.write(writer)?;
725 self.delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
726 self.htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
727 self.commitment_seed.write(writer)?;
728 self.channel_parameters.write(writer)?;
729 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
730 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
732 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
738 impl Readable for InMemorySigner {
739 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
740 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
742 let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
743 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
744 let payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
745 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
746 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
747 let commitment_seed = Readable::read(reader)?;
748 let counterparty_channel_data = Readable::read(reader)?;
749 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
750 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
751 let holder_channel_pubkeys =
752 InMemorySigner::make_holder_keys(&secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key,
753 &payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key,
755 let keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
757 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
763 delayed_payment_base_key,
766 channel_value_satoshis,
767 holder_channel_pubkeys,
768 channel_parameters: counterparty_channel_data,
769 channel_keys_id: keys_id,
774 /// Simple KeysInterface implementor that takes a 32-byte seed for use as a BIP 32 extended key
775 /// and derives keys from that.
777 /// Your node_id is seed/0'
778 /// ChannelMonitor closes may use seed/1'
779 /// Cooperative closes may use seed/2'
780 /// The two close keys may be needed to claim on-chain funds!
781 pub struct KeysManager {
782 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
783 node_secret: SecretKey,
784 inbound_payment_key: KeyMaterial,
785 destination_script: Script,
786 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
787 channel_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
788 channel_child_index: AtomicUsize,
790 rand_bytes_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey,
791 rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize,
792 rand_bytes_unique_start: Sha256State,
795 starting_time_secs: u64,
796 starting_time_nanos: u32,
800 /// Constructs a KeysManager from a 32-byte seed. If the seed is in some way biased (eg your
801 /// CSRNG is busted) this may panic (but more importantly, you will possibly lose funds).
802 /// starting_time isn't strictly required to actually be a time, but it must absolutely,
803 /// without a doubt, be unique to this instance. ie if you start multiple times with the same
804 /// seed, starting_time must be unique to each run. Thus, the easiest way to achieve this is to
805 /// simply use the current time (with very high precision).
807 /// The seed MUST be backed up safely prior to use so that the keys can be re-created, however,
808 /// obviously, starting_time should be unique every time you reload the library - it is only
809 /// used to generate new ephemeral key data (which will be stored by the individual channel if
812 /// Note that the seed is required to recover certain on-chain funds independent of
813 /// ChannelMonitor data, though a current copy of ChannelMonitor data is also required for any
814 /// channel, and some on-chain during-closing funds.
816 /// Note that until the 0.1 release there is no guarantee of backward compatibility between
817 /// versions. Once the library is more fully supported, the docs will be updated to include a
818 /// detailed description of the guarantee.
819 pub fn new(seed: &[u8; 32], starting_time_secs: u64, starting_time_nanos: u32) -> Self {
820 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
821 // Note that when we aren't serializing the key, network doesn't matter
822 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(Network::Testnet, seed) {
824 let node_secret = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(0).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted").private_key.key;
825 let destination_script = match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(1).unwrap()) {
826 Ok(destination_key) => {
827 let wpubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &destination_key).public_key.to_bytes());
828 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
829 .push_slice(&wpubkey_hash.into_inner())
832 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
834 let shutdown_pubkey = match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(2).unwrap()) {
835 Ok(shutdown_key) => ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &shutdown_key).public_key.key,
836 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
838 let channel_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(3).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
839 let rand_bytes_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted");
840 let inbound_payment_key: SecretKey = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(5).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted").private_key.key;
841 let mut inbound_pmt_key_bytes = [0; 32];
842 inbound_pmt_key_bytes.copy_from_slice(&inbound_payment_key[..]);
844 let mut rand_bytes_unique_start = Sha256::engine();
845 rand_bytes_unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(starting_time_secs));
846 rand_bytes_unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(starting_time_nanos));
847 rand_bytes_unique_start.input(seed);
849 let mut res = KeysManager {
852 inbound_payment_key: KeyMaterial(inbound_pmt_key_bytes),
858 channel_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
860 rand_bytes_master_key,
861 rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0),
862 rand_bytes_unique_start,
868 let secp_seed = res.get_secure_random_bytes();
869 res.secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&secp_seed);
872 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
875 /// Derive an old Sign containing per-channel secrets based on a key derivation parameters.
877 /// Key derivation parameters are accessible through a per-channel secrets
878 /// Sign::channel_keys_id and is provided inside DynamicOuputP2WSH in case of
879 /// onchain output detection for which a corresponding delayed_payment_key must be derived.
880 pub fn derive_channel_keys(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, params: &[u8; 32]) -> InMemorySigner {
881 let chan_id = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(¶ms[0..8]);
882 assert!(chan_id <= core::u32::MAX as u64); // Otherwise the params field wasn't created by us
883 let mut unique_start = Sha256::engine();
884 unique_start.input(params);
885 unique_start.input(&self.seed);
887 // We only seriously intend to rely on the channel_master_key for true secure
888 // entropy, everything else just ensures uniqueness. We rely on the unique_start (ie
889 // starting_time provided in the constructor) to be unique.
890 let child_privkey = self.channel_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(chan_id as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
891 unique_start.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
893 let seed = Sha256::from_engine(unique_start).into_inner();
895 let commitment_seed = {
896 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
898 sha.input(&b"commitment seed"[..]);
899 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
901 macro_rules! key_step {
902 ($info: expr, $prev_key: expr) => {{
903 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
905 sha.input(&$prev_key[..]);
906 sha.input(&$info[..]);
907 SecretKey::from_slice(&Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("SHA-256 is busted")
910 let funding_key = key_step!(b"funding key", commitment_seed);
911 let revocation_base_key = key_step!(b"revocation base key", funding_key);
912 let payment_key = key_step!(b"payment key", revocation_base_key);
913 let delayed_payment_base_key = key_step!(b"delayed payment base key", payment_key);
914 let htlc_base_key = key_step!(b"HTLC base key", delayed_payment_base_key);
921 delayed_payment_base_key,
924 channel_value_satoshis,
929 /// Creates a Transaction which spends the given descriptors to the given outputs, plus an
930 /// output to the given change destination (if sufficient change value remains). The
931 /// transaction will have a feerate, at least, of the given value.
933 /// Returns `Err(())` if the output value is greater than the input value minus required fee or
934 /// if a descriptor was duplicated.
936 /// We do not enforce that outputs meet the dust limit or that any output scripts are standard.
938 /// May panic if the `SpendableOutputDescriptor`s were not generated by Channels which used
939 /// this KeysManager or one of the `InMemorySigner` created by this KeysManager.
940 pub fn spend_spendable_outputs<C: Signing>(&self, descriptors: &[&SpendableOutputDescriptor], outputs: Vec<TxOut>, change_destination_script: Script, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
941 let mut input = Vec::new();
942 let mut input_value = 0;
943 let mut witness_weight = 0;
944 let mut output_set = HashSet::with_capacity(descriptors.len());
945 for outp in descriptors {
947 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor) => {
949 previous_output: descriptor.outpoint.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
950 script_sig: Script::new(),
954 witness_weight += StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor::MAX_WITNESS_LENGTH;
955 input_value += descriptor.output.value;
956 if !output_set.insert(descriptor.outpoint) { return Err(()); }
958 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) => {
960 previous_output: descriptor.outpoint.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
961 script_sig: Script::new(),
962 sequence: descriptor.to_self_delay as u32,
965 witness_weight += DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::MAX_WITNESS_LENGTH;
966 input_value += descriptor.output.value;
967 if !output_set.insert(descriptor.outpoint) { return Err(()); }
969 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => {
971 previous_output: outpoint.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
972 script_sig: Script::new(),
976 witness_weight += 1 + 73 + 34;
977 input_value += output.value;
978 if !output_set.insert(*outpoint) { return Err(()); }
981 if input_value > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 { return Err(()); }
983 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
989 let expected_max_weight =
990 transaction_utils::maybe_add_change_output(&mut spend_tx, input_value, witness_weight, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, change_destination_script)?;
992 let mut keys_cache: Option<(InMemorySigner, [u8; 32])> = None;
993 let mut input_idx = 0;
994 for outp in descriptors {
996 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor) => {
997 if keys_cache.is_none() || keys_cache.as_ref().unwrap().1 != descriptor.channel_keys_id {
999 self.derive_channel_keys(descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &descriptor.channel_keys_id),
1000 descriptor.channel_keys_id));
1002 spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness = keys_cache.as_ref().unwrap().0.sign_counterparty_payment_input(&spend_tx, input_idx, &descriptor, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
1004 SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) => {
1005 if keys_cache.is_none() || keys_cache.as_ref().unwrap().1 != descriptor.channel_keys_id {
1007 self.derive_channel_keys(descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &descriptor.channel_keys_id),
1008 descriptor.channel_keys_id));
1010 spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness = keys_cache.as_ref().unwrap().0.sign_dynamic_p2wsh_input(&spend_tx, input_idx, &descriptor, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
1012 SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref output, .. } => {
1013 let derivation_idx = if output.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
1019 // Note that when we aren't serializing the key, network doesn't matter
1020 match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(Network::Testnet, &self.seed) {
1022 match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(derivation_idx).expect("key space exhausted")) {
1024 Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
1027 Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"),
1030 let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
1031 if derivation_idx == 2 {
1032 assert_eq!(pubkey.key, self.shutdown_pubkey);
1034 let witness_script = bitcoin::Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
1035 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&spend_tx).signature_hash(input_idx, &witness_script, output.value, SigHashType::All)[..]);
1036 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.private_key.key);
1037 spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1038 spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1039 spend_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(pubkey.key.serialize().to_vec());
1045 debug_assert!(expected_max_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1046 // Note that witnesses with a signature vary somewhat in size, so allow
1047 // `expected_max_weight` to overshoot by up to 3 bytes per input.
1048 debug_assert!(expected_max_weight <= spend_tx.get_weight() + descriptors.len() * 3);
1054 impl KeysInterface for KeysManager {
1055 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
1057 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
1058 self.node_secret.clone()
1061 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
1062 self.inbound_payment_key.clone()
1065 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
1066 self.destination_script.clone()
1069 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
1070 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(self.shutdown_pubkey.clone())
1073 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::Signer {
1074 let child_ix = self.channel_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
1075 assert!(child_ix <= core::u32::MAX as usize);
1076 let mut id = [0; 32];
1077 id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(child_ix as u64));
1078 id[8..16].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.starting_time_nanos as u64));
1079 id[16..24].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.starting_time_secs));
1080 self.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, &id)
1083 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
1084 let mut sha = self.rand_bytes_unique_start.clone();
1086 let child_ix = self.rand_bytes_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
1087 let child_privkey = self.rand_bytes_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted");
1088 sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]);
1090 sha.input(b"Unique Secure Random Bytes Salt");
1091 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1094 fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> {
1095 InMemorySigner::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(reader))
1098 fn sign_invoice(&self, hrp_bytes: &[u8], invoice_data: &[u5]) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
1099 let preimage = construct_invoice_preimage(&hrp_bytes, &invoice_data);
1100 Ok(self.secp_ctx.sign_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&preimage)), &self.get_node_secret()))
1104 // Ensure that BaseSign can have a vtable
1107 let _signer: Box<dyn BaseSign>;