1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to build claims and bump in-flight transactions until confirmations.
12 //! OnchainTxHandler objects are fully-part of ChannelMonitor and encapsulates all
13 //! building, tracking, bumping and notifications functions.
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
24 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
25 use ln::PaymentPreimage;
26 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
27 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface};
28 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER};
29 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
30 use chain::package::PackageTemplate;
31 use util::logger::Logger;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writer, Writeable, VecWriter};
36 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
37 use std::collections::HashMap;
40 use core::mem::replace;
42 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
44 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
45 /// transaction causing it.
47 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
49 struct OnchainEventEntry {
55 impl OnchainEventEntry {
56 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
57 self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
60 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
61 height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
65 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
66 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
69 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
70 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
74 /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a counterparty party tx.
75 /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
76 /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
78 package: PackageTemplate,
82 impl Readable for Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>> {
83 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
84 match Readable::read(reader)? {
87 let vlen: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
88 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(vlen as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<Option<(usize, Signature)>>()));
90 ret.push(match Readable::read(reader)? {
92 1u8 => Some((<u64 as Readable>::read(reader)? as usize, Readable::read(reader)?)),
93 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
98 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
103 impl Writeable for Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>> {
104 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
108 (vec.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
109 for opt in vec.iter() {
111 &Some((ref idx, ref sig)) => {
113 (*idx as u64).write(writer)?;
116 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
120 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
127 /// OnchainTxHandler receives claiming requests, aggregates them if it's sound, broadcast and
128 /// do RBF bumping if possible.
129 pub struct OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner: Sign> {
130 destination_script: Script,
131 holder_commitment: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
132 // holder_htlc_sigs and prev_holder_htlc_sigs are in the order as they appear in the commitment
133 // transaction outputs (hence the Option<>s inside the Vec). The first usize is the index in
134 // the set of HTLCs in the HolderCommitmentTransaction.
135 holder_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
136 prev_holder_commitment: Option<HolderCommitmentTransaction>,
137 prev_holder_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
139 pub(super) signer: ChannelSigner,
140 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
142 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
143 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
144 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
145 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
146 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
147 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
148 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
149 // we need to regenerate new claim request with reduced set of still-claimable outpoints.
150 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
151 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
152 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
153 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
154 pub(crate) pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Txid, PackageTemplate>,
156 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Txid, PackageTemplate>,
158 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
159 // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
160 // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
161 // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
162 // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
163 // block with output gets disconnected.
164 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
165 pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Txid, u32)>,
167 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Txid, u32)>,
169 locktimed_packages: BTreeMap<u32, Vec<PackageTemplate>>,
171 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
173 pub(super) secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
176 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
177 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
179 impl<ChannelSigner: Sign> OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
180 pub(crate) fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
181 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
183 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
184 self.holder_commitment.write(writer)?;
185 self.holder_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
186 self.prev_holder_commitment.write(writer)?;
187 self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
189 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
191 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
192 self.signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
193 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
194 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
195 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
196 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
198 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
199 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
200 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
201 request.write(writer)?;
204 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
205 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
207 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
208 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
211 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.locktimed_packages.len() as u64))?;
212 for (ref locktime, ref packages) in self.locktimed_packages.iter() {
213 locktime.write(writer)?;
214 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(packages.len() as u64))?;
215 for ref package in packages.iter() {
216 package.write(writer)?;
220 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
221 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
222 entry.txid.write(writer)?;
223 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(entry.height))?;
225 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
226 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
227 claim_request.write(writer)?;
229 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref package } => {
230 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
231 package.write(writer)?;
236 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {});
241 impl<'a, K: KeysInterface> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for OnchainTxHandler<K::Signer> {
242 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
243 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
245 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
247 let holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
248 let holder_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
249 let prev_holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
250 let prev_holder_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
252 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
254 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
255 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
256 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
257 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
258 let mut data = [0; 1024];
259 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
260 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
261 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
263 let signer = keys_manager.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
265 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
266 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
267 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
268 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
271 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
272 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
273 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
274 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
275 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
276 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
277 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
280 let locktimed_packages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
281 let mut locktimed_packages = BTreeMap::new();
282 for _ in 0..locktimed_packages_len {
283 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
284 let packages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
285 let mut packages = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(packages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / std::mem::size_of::<PackageTemplate>()));
286 for _ in 0..packages_len {
287 packages.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
289 locktimed_packages.insert(locktime, packages);
292 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
293 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
294 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
295 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
296 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
297 let event = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
299 let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
300 OnchainEvent::Claim {
305 let package = Readable::read(reader)?;
306 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
310 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
312 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry { txid, height, event });
315 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
317 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
318 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
320 Ok(OnchainTxHandler {
324 prev_holder_commitment,
325 prev_holder_htlc_sigs,
327 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
330 pending_claim_requests,
331 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
337 impl<ChannelSigner: Sign> OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
338 pub(crate) fn new(destination_script: Script, signer: ChannelSigner, channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters, holder_commitment: HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Self {
342 holder_htlc_sigs: None,
343 prev_holder_commitment: None,
344 prev_holder_htlc_sigs: None,
346 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
347 pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
348 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
349 locktimed_packages: BTreeMap::new(),
350 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
356 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
357 /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
358 /// Panics if there are signing errors, because signing operations in reaction to on-chain events
359 /// are not expected to fail, and if they do, we may lose funds.
360 fn generate_claim_tx<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, cached_request: &PackageTemplate, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Option<(Option<u32>, u64, Transaction)>
361 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
364 if cached_request.outpoints().len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
366 // Compute new height timer to decide when we need to regenerate a new bumped version of the claim tx (if we
367 // didn't receive confirmation of it before, or not enough reorg-safe depth on top of it).
368 let new_timer = Some(cached_request.get_height_timer(height));
369 if cached_request.is_malleable() {
370 let predicted_weight = cached_request.package_weight(&self.destination_script);
371 if let Some((output_value, new_feerate)) = cached_request.compute_package_output(predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
372 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
374 let transaction = cached_request.finalize_package(self, output_value, self.destination_script.clone(), logger).unwrap();
375 log_trace!(logger, "...with timer {} and feerate {}", new_timer.unwrap(), new_feerate);
376 assert!(predicted_weight >= transaction.get_weight());
377 return Some((new_timer, new_feerate, transaction))
380 // Note: Currently, amounts of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
381 // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
382 // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
383 if let Some(transaction) = cached_request.finalize_package(self, 0, self.destination_script.clone(), logger) {
384 return Some((None, 0, transaction));
390 /// Upon channelmonitor.block_connected(..) or upon provision of a preimage on the forward link
391 /// for this channel, provide new relevant on-chain transactions and/or new claim requests.
392 /// Formerly this was named `block_connected`, but it is now also used for claiming an HTLC output
393 /// if we receive a preimage after force-close.
394 pub(crate) fn update_claims_view<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], requests: Vec<PackageTemplate>, height: u32, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
395 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
396 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
399 log_trace!(logger, "Updating claims view at height {} with {} matched transactions and {} claim requests", height, txn_matched.len(), requests.len());
400 let mut preprocessed_requests = Vec::with_capacity(requests.len());
401 let mut aggregated_request = None;
403 // Try to aggregate outputs if their timelock expiration isn't imminent (package timelock
404 // <= CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER) and they don't require an immediate nLockTime (aggregable).
405 for req in requests {
406 // Don't claim a outpoint twice that would be bad for privacy and may uselessly lock a CPFP input for a while
407 if let Some(_) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(req.outpoints()[0]) {
408 log_trace!(logger, "Ignoring second claim for outpoint {}:{}, already registered its claiming request", req.outpoints()[0].txid, req.outpoints()[0].vout);
410 let timelocked_equivalent_package = self.locktimed_packages.iter().map(|v| v.1.iter()).flatten()
411 .find(|locked_package| locked_package.outpoints() == req.outpoints());
412 if let Some(package) = timelocked_equivalent_package {
413 log_trace!(logger, "Ignoring second claim for outpoint {}:{}, we already have one which we're waiting on a timelock at {} for.",
414 req.outpoints()[0].txid, req.outpoints()[0].vout, package.package_timelock());
418 if req.package_timelock() > height + 1 {
419 log_debug!(logger, "Delaying claim of package until its timelock at {} (current height {}), the following outpoints are spent:", req.package_timelock(), height);
420 for outpoint in req.outpoints() {
421 log_debug!(logger, " Outpoint {}", outpoint);
423 self.locktimed_packages.entry(req.package_timelock()).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(req);
427 log_trace!(logger, "Test if outpoint can be aggregated with expiration {} against {}", req.timelock(), height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER);
428 if req.timelock() <= height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER || !req.aggregable() {
429 // Don't aggregate if outpoint package timelock is soon or marked as non-aggregable
430 preprocessed_requests.push(req);
431 } else if aggregated_request.is_none() {
432 aggregated_request = Some(req);
434 aggregated_request.as_mut().unwrap().merge_package(req);
438 if let Some(req) = aggregated_request {
439 preprocessed_requests.push(req);
442 // Claim everything up to and including height + 1
443 let remaining_locked_packages = self.locktimed_packages.split_off(&(height + 2));
444 for (pop_height, mut entry) in self.locktimed_packages.iter_mut() {
445 log_trace!(logger, "Restoring delayed claim of package(s) at their timelock at {}.", pop_height);
446 preprocessed_requests.append(&mut entry);
448 self.locktimed_packages = remaining_locked_packages;
450 // Generate claim transactions and track them to bump if necessary at
451 // height timer expiration (i.e in how many blocks we're going to take action).
452 for mut req in preprocessed_requests {
453 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &req, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
454 req.set_timer(new_timer);
455 req.set_feerate(new_feerate);
456 let txid = tx.txid();
457 for k in req.outpoints() {
458 log_trace!(logger, "Registering claiming request for {}:{}", k.txid, k.vout);
459 self.claimable_outpoints.insert(k.clone(), (txid, height));
461 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(txid, req);
462 log_trace!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
463 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
467 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
468 for tx in txn_matched {
469 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
470 let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
471 for inp in &tx.input {
472 if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
473 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
474 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
475 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
476 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
478 let mut set_equality = true;
479 if request.outpoints().len() != tx.input.len() {
480 set_equality = false;
482 for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in request.outpoints().iter().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
483 if **claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
484 set_equality = false;
489 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
491 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
494 event: OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() }
496 if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.contains(&entry) {
497 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
502 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
503 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
504 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
506 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
507 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
508 let mut at_least_one_drop = false;
509 for input in tx.input.iter() {
510 if let Some(package) = request.split_package(&input.previous_output) {
511 claimed_outputs_material.push(package);
512 at_least_one_drop = true;
514 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
515 if request.outpoints().is_empty() {
516 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
519 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
520 if at_least_one_drop {
521 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone(), request.clone());
524 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
526 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
530 for package in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
531 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
534 event: OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package },
536 if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.contains(&entry) {
537 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
542 // After security delay, either our claim tx got enough confs or outpoint is definetely out of reach
543 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
544 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
545 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
546 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(height) {
548 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
549 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
550 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
551 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
552 for outpoint in request.outpoints() {
553 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
557 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package } => {
558 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&package.outpoints()[0]);
562 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
566 // Check if any pending claim request must be rescheduled
567 for (first_claim_txid, ref request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
568 if let Some(h) = request.timer() {
570 bump_candidates.insert(*first_claim_txid, (*request).clone());
575 // Build, bump and rebroadcast tx accordingly
576 log_trace!(logger, "Bumping {} candidates", bump_candidates.len());
577 for (first_claim_txid, request) in bump_candidates.iter() {
578 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &request, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
579 log_trace!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
580 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
581 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
582 request.set_timer(new_timer);
583 request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
589 pub(crate) fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
596 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
597 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
600 let mut height = None;
601 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
602 if entry.txid == *txid {
603 height = Some(entry.height);
608 if let Some(height) = height {
609 self.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
613 pub(crate) fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
614 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
615 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
618 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
619 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
620 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
621 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
622 if entry.height >= height {
623 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
624 //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
626 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package } => {
627 if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&package.outpoints()[0]) {
628 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
629 request.merge_package(package);
630 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
631 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
632 bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), request.clone());
639 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
642 for (_, request) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
643 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &request, &&*fee_estimator, &&*logger) {
644 request.set_timer(new_timer);
645 request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
646 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
647 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
650 for (ancestor_claim_txid, request) in bump_candidates.drain() {
651 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, request);
653 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
654 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
655 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
656 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
658 remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
661 for req in remove_request {
662 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
666 pub(crate) fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
667 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
669 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
671 txids.sort_unstable();
676 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_holder_tx(&mut self, tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) {
677 self.prev_holder_commitment = Some(replace(&mut self.holder_commitment, tx));
678 self.holder_htlc_sigs = None;
681 // Normally holder HTLCs are signed at the same time as the holder commitment tx. However,
682 // in some configurations, the holder commitment tx has been signed and broadcast by a
683 // ChannelMonitor replica, so we handle that case here.
684 fn sign_latest_holder_htlcs(&mut self) {
685 if self.holder_htlc_sigs.is_none() {
686 let (_sig, sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign holder commitment");
687 self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, sigs));
691 // Normally only the latest commitment tx and HTLCs need to be signed. However, in some
692 // configurations we may have updated our holder commitment but a replica of the ChannelMonitor
693 // broadcast the previous one before we sync with it. We handle that case here.
694 fn sign_prev_holder_htlcs(&mut self) {
695 if self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.is_none() {
696 if let Some(ref holder_commitment) = self.prev_holder_commitment {
697 let (_sig, sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign previous holder commitment");
698 self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment, sigs));
703 fn extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, sigs: Vec<Signature>) -> Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>> {
704 let mut ret = Vec::new();
705 for (htlc_idx, (holder_sig, htlc)) in sigs.iter().zip(holder_commitment.htlcs().iter()).enumerate() {
706 let tx_idx = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap();
707 if ret.len() <= tx_idx as usize { ret.resize(tx_idx as usize + 1, None); }
708 ret[tx_idx as usize] = Some((htlc_idx, holder_sig.clone()));
713 //TODO: getting lastest holder transactions should be infallible and result in us "force-closing the channel", but we may
714 // have empty holder commitment transaction if a ChannelMonitor is asked to force-close just after Channel::get_outbound_funding_created,
715 // before providing a initial commitment transaction. For outbound channel, init ChannelMonitor at Channel::funding_signed, there is nothing
716 // to monitor before.
717 pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Transaction {
718 let (sig, htlc_sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("signing holder commitment");
719 self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, htlc_sigs));
720 self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)
723 #[cfg(any(test, feature="unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
724 pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Transaction {
725 let (sig, htlc_sigs) = self.signer.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign holder commitment");
726 self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, htlc_sigs));
727 self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)
730 pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
731 let mut htlc_tx = None;
732 let commitment_txid = self.holder_commitment.trust().txid();
733 // Check if the HTLC spends from the current holder commitment
734 if commitment_txid == outp.txid {
735 self.sign_latest_holder_htlcs();
736 if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.holder_htlc_sigs {
737 let &(ref htlc_idx, ref htlc_sig) = htlc_sigs[outp.vout as usize].as_ref().unwrap();
738 let trusted_tx = self.holder_commitment.trust();
739 let counterparty_htlc_sig = self.holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[*htlc_idx];
740 htlc_tx = Some(trusted_tx
741 .get_signed_htlc_tx(&self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), *htlc_idx, &counterparty_htlc_sig, htlc_sig, preimage));
744 // If the HTLC doesn't spend the current holder commitment, check if it spends the previous one
745 if htlc_tx.is_none() && self.prev_holder_commitment.is_some() {
746 let commitment_txid = self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().unwrap().trust().txid();
747 if commitment_txid == outp.txid {
748 self.sign_prev_holder_htlcs();
749 if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs {
750 let &(ref htlc_idx, ref htlc_sig) = htlc_sigs[outp.vout as usize].as_ref().unwrap();
751 let holder_commitment = self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().unwrap();
752 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment.trust();
753 let counterparty_htlc_sig = holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[*htlc_idx];
754 htlc_tx = Some(trusted_tx
755 .get_signed_htlc_tx(&self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), *htlc_idx, &counterparty_htlc_sig, htlc_sig, preimage));
762 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
763 pub(crate) fn unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
764 let latest_had_sigs = self.holder_htlc_sigs.is_some();
765 let prev_had_sigs = self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.is_some();
766 let ret = self.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outp, preimage);
767 if !latest_had_sigs {
768 self.holder_htlc_sigs = None;
771 self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs = None;