1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to build claims and bump in-flight transactions until confirmations.
12 //! OnchainTxHandler objects are fully-part of ChannelMonitor and encapsulates all
13 //! building, tracking, bumping and notifications functions.
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
24 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
25 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
27 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
28 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
30 use crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget;
31 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
32 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER};
33 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
35 use crate::chain::package::PackageSolvingData;
36 use crate::chain::package::PackageTemplate;
37 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
38 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, VecWriter};
39 use crate::util::byte_utils;
42 use crate::prelude::*;
43 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
46 use core::mem::replace;
49 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
51 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
53 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
54 /// transaction causing it.
56 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
57 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
58 struct OnchainEventEntry {
61 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
65 impl OnchainEventEntry {
66 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
67 self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
70 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
71 height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
75 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
76 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
77 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
79 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
80 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
84 /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a counterparty party tx.
85 /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
86 /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
88 package: PackageTemplate,
92 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
93 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
94 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
95 (0, self.txid, required),
96 (1, self.block_hash, option),
97 (2, self.height, required),
98 (4, self.event, required),
104 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
105 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
106 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
108 let mut block_hash = None;
109 let mut event = None;
110 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
112 (1, block_hash, option),
113 (2, height, required),
114 (4, event, ignorable),
116 if let Some(ev) = event {
117 Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, block_hash, event: ev }))
124 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
126 (0, claim_request, required),
128 (1, ContentiousOutpoint) => {
129 (0, package, required),
133 impl Readable for Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>> {
134 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
135 match Readable::read(reader)? {
138 let vlen: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
139 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(vlen as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<Option<(usize, Signature)>>()));
141 ret.push(match Readable::read(reader)? {
143 1u8 => Some((<u64 as Readable>::read(reader)? as usize, Readable::read(reader)?)),
144 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
149 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
154 impl Writeable for Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>> {
155 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
159 (vec.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
160 for opt in vec.iter() {
162 &Some((ref idx, ref sig)) => {
164 (*idx as u64).write(writer)?;
167 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
171 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
177 // Represents the different types of claims for which events are yielded externally to satisfy said
180 pub(crate) enum ClaimEvent {
181 /// Event yielded to signal that the commitment transaction fee must be bumped to claim any
182 /// encumbered funds and proceed to HTLC resolution, if any HTLCs exist.
184 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
185 commitment_tx: Transaction,
186 anchor_output_idx: u32,
190 /// Represents the different ways an output can be claimed (i.e., spent to an address under our
191 /// control) onchain.
192 pub(crate) enum OnchainClaim {
193 /// A finalized transaction pending confirmation spending the output to claim.
196 /// An event yielded externally to signal additional inputs must be added to a transaction
197 /// pending confirmation spending the output to claim.
201 /// OnchainTxHandler receives claiming requests, aggregates them if it's sound, broadcast and
202 /// do RBF bumping if possible.
203 pub struct OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner: Sign> {
204 destination_script: Script,
205 holder_commitment: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
206 // holder_htlc_sigs and prev_holder_htlc_sigs are in the order as they appear in the commitment
207 // transaction outputs (hence the Option<>s inside the Vec). The first usize is the index in
208 // the set of HTLCs in the HolderCommitmentTransaction.
209 holder_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
210 prev_holder_commitment: Option<HolderCommitmentTransaction>,
211 prev_holder_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
213 pub(super) signer: ChannelSigner,
214 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
216 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
217 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
218 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
219 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
220 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
221 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
222 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
223 // we need to regenerate new claim request with reduced set of still-claimable outpoints.
224 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
225 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
226 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
227 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
228 pub(crate) pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Txid, PackageTemplate>,
230 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Txid, PackageTemplate>,
232 pending_claim_events: HashMap<Txid, ClaimEvent>,
234 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
235 // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
236 // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
237 // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
238 // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
239 // block with output gets disconnected.
240 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
241 pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Txid, u32)>,
243 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Txid, u32)>,
245 locktimed_packages: BTreeMap<u32, Vec<PackageTemplate>>,
247 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
249 pub(super) secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
252 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
253 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
255 impl<ChannelSigner: Sign> OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
256 pub(crate) fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
257 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
259 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
260 self.holder_commitment.write(writer)?;
261 self.holder_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
262 self.prev_holder_commitment.write(writer)?;
263 self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
265 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
267 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
268 self.signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
269 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
270 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
271 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
272 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
274 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
275 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
276 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
277 request.write(writer)?;
280 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
281 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
283 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
284 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
287 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.locktimed_packages.len() as u64))?;
288 for (ref locktime, ref packages) in self.locktimed_packages.iter() {
289 locktime.write(writer)?;
290 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(packages.len() as u64))?;
291 for ref package in packages.iter() {
292 package.write(writer)?;
296 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
297 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
298 entry.write(writer)?;
301 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
306 impl<'a, K: KeysInterface> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for OnchainTxHandler<K::Signer> {
307 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
308 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
310 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
312 let holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
313 let holder_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
314 let prev_holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
315 let prev_holder_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
317 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
319 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
320 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
321 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
322 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
323 let mut data = [0; 1024];
324 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
325 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
326 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
328 let signer = keys_manager.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
330 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
331 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
332 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
333 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
336 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
337 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
338 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
339 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
340 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
341 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
342 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
345 let locktimed_packages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
346 let mut locktimed_packages = BTreeMap::new();
347 for _ in 0..locktimed_packages_len {
348 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
349 let packages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
350 let mut packages = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(packages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / core::mem::size_of::<PackageTemplate>()));
351 for _ in 0..packages_len {
352 packages.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
354 locktimed_packages.insert(locktime, packages);
357 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
358 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
359 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
360 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
361 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
365 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
367 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
368 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
370 Ok(OnchainTxHandler {
374 prev_holder_commitment,
375 prev_holder_htlc_sigs,
377 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
380 pending_claim_requests,
381 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
383 pending_claim_events: HashMap::new(),
389 impl<ChannelSigner: Sign> OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
390 pub(crate) fn new(destination_script: Script, signer: ChannelSigner, channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters, holder_commitment: HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Self {
394 holder_htlc_sigs: None,
395 prev_holder_commitment: None,
396 prev_holder_htlc_sigs: None,
398 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
399 pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
400 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
401 locktimed_packages: BTreeMap::new(),
402 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
404 pending_claim_events: HashMap::new(),
410 pub(crate) fn get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value(&self) -> Option<u64> {
411 self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().map(|commitment| commitment.to_broadcaster_value_sat())
414 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value(&self) -> u64 {
415 self.holder_commitment.to_broadcaster_value_sat()
419 pub(crate) fn get_and_clear_pending_claim_events(&mut self) -> Vec<ClaimEvent> {
420 let mut ret = HashMap::new();
421 swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_claim_events);
422 ret.into_iter().map(|(_, event)| event).collect::<Vec<_>>()
425 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize counterparty
426 /// onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock
427 /// expiration (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may get stuck
428 /// in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or
429 /// Child-Pay-For-Parent.
431 /// Panics if there are signing errors, because signing operations in reaction to on-chain
432 /// events are not expected to fail, and if they do, we may lose funds.
433 fn generate_claim<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, cur_height: u32, cached_request: &PackageTemplate, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(Option<u32>, u64, OnchainClaim)>
434 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
437 let request_outpoints = cached_request.outpoints();
438 if request_outpoints.is_empty() {
439 // Don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs. Untractable
440 // packages cannot be aggregated and will never be split, so we cannot end up with an
442 debug_assert!(cached_request.is_malleable());
445 // If we've seen transaction inclusion in the chain for all outpoints in our request, we
446 // don't need to continue generating more claims. We'll keep tracking the request to fully
447 // remove it once it reaches the confirmation threshold, or to generate a new claim if the
448 // transaction is reorged out.
449 let mut all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = true;
450 for outpoint in &request_outpoints {
451 if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(outpoint) {
452 // We check for outpoint spends within claims individually rather than as a set
453 // since requests can have outpoints split off.
454 if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter()
455 .any(|event_entry| if let OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } = event_entry.event {
456 first_claim_txid_height.0 == claim_request
458 // The onchain event is not a claim, keep seeking until we find one.
462 // Either we had no `OnchainEvent::Claim`, or we did but none matched the
463 // outpoint's registered spend.
464 all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = false;
467 // The request's outpoint spend does not exist yet.
468 all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = false;
471 if all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend {
475 // Compute new height timer to decide when we need to regenerate a new bumped version of the claim tx (if we
476 // didn't receive confirmation of it before, or not enough reorg-safe depth on top of it).
477 let new_timer = Some(cached_request.get_height_timer(cur_height));
478 if cached_request.is_malleable() {
479 let predicted_weight = cached_request.package_weight(&self.destination_script);
480 if let Some((output_value, new_feerate)) =
481 cached_request.compute_package_output(predicted_weight, self.destination_script.dust_value().to_sat(), fee_estimator, logger) {
482 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
484 let transaction = cached_request.finalize_malleable_package(self, output_value, self.destination_script.clone(), logger).unwrap();
485 log_trace!(logger, "...with timer {} and feerate {}", new_timer.unwrap(), new_feerate);
486 assert!(predicted_weight >= transaction.weight());
487 return Some((new_timer, new_feerate, OnchainClaim::Tx(transaction)))
490 // Untractable packages cannot have their fees bumped through Replace-By-Fee. Some
491 // packages may support fee bumping through Child-Pays-For-Parent, indicated by those
492 // which require external funding.
494 let inputs = cached_request.inputs();
496 let mut inputs = cached_request.inputs();
497 debug_assert_eq!(inputs.len(), 1);
498 let tx = match cached_request.finalize_untractable_package(self, logger) {
502 if !cached_request.requires_external_funding() {
503 return Some((None, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx)));
506 return inputs.find_map(|input| match input {
507 // Commitment inputs with anchors support are the only untractable inputs supported
508 // thus far that require external funding.
509 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => {
510 debug_assert_eq!(tx.txid(), self.holder_commitment.trust().txid(),
511 "Holder commitment transaction mismatch");
512 // We'll locate an anchor output we can spend within the commitment transaction.
513 let funding_pubkey = &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey;
514 match chan_utils::get_anchor_output(&tx, funding_pubkey) {
515 // An anchor output was found, so we should yield a funding event externally.
517 // TODO: Use a lower confirmation target when both our and the
518 // counterparty's latest commitment don't have any HTLCs present.
519 let conf_target = ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority;
520 let package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = cached_request
521 .compute_package_feerate(fee_estimator, conf_target);
524 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64,
525 OnchainClaim::Event(ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
526 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
527 commitment_tx: tx.clone(),
528 anchor_output_idx: idx,
532 // An anchor output was not found. There's nothing we can do other than
533 // attempt to broadcast the transaction with its current fee rate and hope
534 // it confirms. This is essentially the same behavior as a commitment
535 // transaction without anchor outputs.
536 None => Some((None, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx.clone()))),
540 debug_assert!(false, "Only HolderFundingOutput inputs should be untractable and require external funding");
548 /// Upon channelmonitor.block_connected(..) or upon provision of a preimage on the forward link
549 /// for this channel, provide new relevant on-chain transactions and/or new claim requests.
550 /// Together with `update_claims_view_from_matched_txn` this used to be named
551 /// `block_connected`, but it is now also used for claiming an HTLC output if we receive a
552 /// preimage after force-close.
554 /// `conf_height` represents the height at which the request was generated. This
555 /// does not need to equal the current blockchain tip height, which should be provided via
556 /// `cur_height`, however it must never be higher than `cur_height`.
557 pub(crate) fn update_claims_view_from_requests<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
558 &mut self, requests: Vec<PackageTemplate>, conf_height: u32, cur_height: u32,
559 broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
561 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
562 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
565 log_debug!(logger, "Updating claims view at height {} with {} claim requests", cur_height, requests.len());
566 let mut preprocessed_requests = Vec::with_capacity(requests.len());
567 let mut aggregated_request = None;
569 // Try to aggregate outputs if their timelock expiration isn't imminent (package timelock
570 // <= CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER) and they don't require an immediate nLockTime (aggregable).
571 for req in requests {
572 // Don't claim a outpoint twice that would be bad for privacy and may uselessly lock a CPFP input for a while
573 if let Some(_) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(req.outpoints()[0]) {
574 log_info!(logger, "Ignoring second claim for outpoint {}:{}, already registered its claiming request", req.outpoints()[0].txid, req.outpoints()[0].vout);
576 let timelocked_equivalent_package = self.locktimed_packages.iter().map(|v| v.1.iter()).flatten()
577 .find(|locked_package| locked_package.outpoints() == req.outpoints());
578 if let Some(package) = timelocked_equivalent_package {
579 log_info!(logger, "Ignoring second claim for outpoint {}:{}, we already have one which we're waiting on a timelock at {} for.",
580 req.outpoints()[0].txid, req.outpoints()[0].vout, package.package_timelock());
584 if req.package_timelock() > cur_height + 1 {
585 log_info!(logger, "Delaying claim of package until its timelock at {} (current height {}), the following outpoints are spent:", req.package_timelock(), cur_height);
586 for outpoint in req.outpoints() {
587 log_info!(logger, " Outpoint {}", outpoint);
589 self.locktimed_packages.entry(req.package_timelock()).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(req);
593 log_trace!(logger, "Test if outpoint can be aggregated with expiration {} against {}", req.timelock(), cur_height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER);
594 if req.timelock() <= cur_height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER || !req.aggregable() {
595 // Don't aggregate if outpoint package timelock is soon or marked as non-aggregable
596 preprocessed_requests.push(req);
597 } else if aggregated_request.is_none() {
598 aggregated_request = Some(req);
600 aggregated_request.as_mut().unwrap().merge_package(req);
604 if let Some(req) = aggregated_request {
605 preprocessed_requests.push(req);
608 // Claim everything up to and including cur_height + 1
609 let remaining_locked_packages = self.locktimed_packages.split_off(&(cur_height + 2));
610 for (pop_height, mut entry) in self.locktimed_packages.iter_mut() {
611 log_trace!(logger, "Restoring delayed claim of package(s) at their timelock at {}.", pop_height);
612 preprocessed_requests.append(&mut entry);
614 self.locktimed_packages = remaining_locked_packages;
616 // Generate claim transactions and track them to bump if necessary at
617 // height timer expiration (i.e in how many blocks we're going to take action).
618 for mut req in preprocessed_requests {
619 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, claim)) = self.generate_claim(cur_height, &req, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
620 req.set_timer(new_timer);
621 req.set_feerate(new_feerate);
622 let txid = match claim {
623 OnchainClaim::Tx(tx) => {
624 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
625 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
629 OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
630 log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", req.outpoints());
631 let txid = match claim_event {
632 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment { ref commitment_tx, .. } => commitment_tx.txid(),
634 self.pending_claim_events.insert(txid, claim_event);
638 for k in req.outpoints() {
639 log_info!(logger, "Registering claiming request for {}:{}", k.txid, k.vout);
640 self.claimable_outpoints.insert(k.clone(), (txid, conf_height));
642 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(txid, req);
647 /// Upon channelmonitor.block_connected(..) or upon provision of a preimage on the forward link
648 /// for this channel, provide new relevant on-chain transactions and/or new claim requests.
649 /// Together with `update_claims_view_from_requests` this used to be named `block_connected`,
650 /// but it is now also used for claiming an HTLC output if we receive a preimage after force-close.
652 /// `conf_height` represents the height at which the transactions in `txn_matched` were
653 /// confirmed. This does not need to equal the current blockchain tip height, which should be
654 /// provided via `cur_height`, however it must never be higher than `cur_height`.
655 pub(crate) fn update_claims_view_from_matched_txn<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
656 &mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], conf_height: u32, conf_hash: BlockHash,
657 cur_height: u32, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
659 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
660 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
663 log_debug!(logger, "Updating claims view at height {} with {} matched transactions in block {}", cur_height, txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
664 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
665 for tx in txn_matched {
666 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
667 let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
668 for inp in &tx.input {
669 if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
670 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
671 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
672 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
673 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
675 let mut set_equality = true;
676 if request.outpoints().len() != tx.input.len() {
677 set_equality = false;
679 for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in request.outpoints().iter().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
680 if **claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
681 set_equality = false;
686 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
688 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
691 block_hash: Some(conf_hash),
692 event: OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() }
694 if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.contains(&entry) {
695 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
700 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
701 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
702 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
704 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
705 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
706 let mut at_least_one_drop = false;
707 for input in tx.input.iter() {
708 if let Some(package) = request.split_package(&input.previous_output) {
709 claimed_outputs_material.push(package);
710 at_least_one_drop = true;
712 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
713 if request.outpoints().is_empty() {
714 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
717 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
718 if at_least_one_drop {
719 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone(), request.clone());
722 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
724 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
728 for package in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
729 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
732 block_hash: Some(conf_hash),
733 event: OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package },
735 if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.contains(&entry) {
736 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
741 // After security delay, either our claim tx got enough confs or outpoint is definetely out of reach
742 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
743 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
744 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
745 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(cur_height) {
747 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
748 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
749 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
750 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
751 for outpoint in request.outpoints() {
752 log_debug!(logger, "Removing claim tracking for {} due to maturation of claim tx {}.", outpoint, claim_request);
753 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
755 self.pending_claim_events.remove(&claim_request);
759 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package } => {
760 log_debug!(logger, "Removing claim tracking due to maturation of claim tx for outpoints:");
761 log_debug!(logger, " {:?}", package.outpoints());
762 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&package.outpoints()[0]);
766 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
770 // Check if any pending claim request must be rescheduled
771 for (first_claim_txid, ref request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
772 if let Some(h) = request.timer() {
774 bump_candidates.insert(*first_claim_txid, (*request).clone());
779 // Build, bump and rebroadcast tx accordingly
780 log_trace!(logger, "Bumping {} candidates", bump_candidates.len());
781 for (first_claim_txid, request) in bump_candidates.iter() {
782 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_claim)) = self.generate_claim(cur_height, &request, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
784 OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => {
785 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting RBF-bumped onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
786 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
789 OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
790 log_info!(logger, "Yielding RBF-bumped onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints());
791 self.pending_claim_events.insert(*first_claim_txid, claim_event);
794 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
795 request.set_timer(new_timer);
796 request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
802 pub(crate) fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
806 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
809 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
810 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
813 let mut height = None;
814 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
815 if entry.txid == *txid {
816 height = Some(entry.height);
821 if let Some(height) = height {
822 self.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
826 pub(crate) fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L)
827 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
828 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
831 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
832 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
833 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
834 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
835 if entry.height >= height {
836 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
837 //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
839 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package } => {
840 if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&package.outpoints()[0]) {
841 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
842 request.merge_package(package);
843 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
844 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
845 bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), request.clone());
852 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
855 for (_first_claim_txid_height, request) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
856 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_claim)) = self.generate_claim(height, &request, fee_estimator, &&*logger) {
857 request.set_timer(new_timer);
858 request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
860 OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => {
861 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
862 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
865 OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
866 log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event after reorg to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints());
867 self.pending_claim_events.insert(_first_claim_txid_height.0, claim_event);
872 for (ancestor_claim_txid, request) in bump_candidates.drain() {
873 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, request);
875 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
876 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
877 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
878 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
880 remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
883 for req in remove_request {
884 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
888 pub(crate) fn is_output_spend_pending(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint) -> bool {
889 self.claimable_outpoints.get(outpoint).is_some()
892 pub(crate) fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
893 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
895 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.block_hash))
897 txids.sort_unstable_by_key(|(txid, _)| *txid);
902 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_holder_tx(&mut self, tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) {
903 self.prev_holder_commitment = Some(replace(&mut self.holder_commitment, tx));
904 self.holder_htlc_sigs = None;
907 // Normally holder HTLCs are signed at the same time as the holder commitment tx. However,
908 // in some configurations, the holder commitment tx has been signed and broadcast by a
909 // ChannelMonitor replica, so we handle that case here.
910 fn sign_latest_holder_htlcs(&mut self) {
911 if self.holder_htlc_sigs.is_none() {
912 let (_sig, sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign holder commitment");
913 self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, sigs));
917 // Normally only the latest commitment tx and HTLCs need to be signed. However, in some
918 // configurations we may have updated our holder commitment but a replica of the ChannelMonitor
919 // broadcast the previous one before we sync with it. We handle that case here.
920 fn sign_prev_holder_htlcs(&mut self) {
921 if self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.is_none() {
922 if let Some(ref holder_commitment) = self.prev_holder_commitment {
923 let (_sig, sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign previous holder commitment");
924 self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment, sigs));
929 fn extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, sigs: Vec<Signature>) -> Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>> {
930 let mut ret = Vec::new();
931 for (htlc_idx, (holder_sig, htlc)) in sigs.iter().zip(holder_commitment.htlcs().iter()).enumerate() {
932 let tx_idx = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap();
933 if ret.len() <= tx_idx as usize { ret.resize(tx_idx as usize + 1, None); }
934 ret[tx_idx as usize] = Some((htlc_idx, holder_sig.clone()));
939 //TODO: getting lastest holder transactions should be infallible and result in us "force-closing the channel", but we may
940 // have empty holder commitment transaction if a ChannelMonitor is asked to force-close just after Channel::get_outbound_funding_created,
941 // before providing a initial commitment transaction. For outbound channel, init ChannelMonitor at Channel::funding_signed, there is nothing
942 // to monitor before.
943 pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Transaction {
944 let (sig, htlc_sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("signing holder commitment");
945 self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, htlc_sigs));
946 self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)
949 #[cfg(any(test, feature="unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
950 pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Transaction {
951 let (sig, htlc_sigs) = self.signer.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign holder commitment");
952 self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, htlc_sigs));
953 self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)
956 pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
957 let mut htlc_tx = None;
958 let commitment_txid = self.holder_commitment.trust().txid();
959 // Check if the HTLC spends from the current holder commitment
960 if commitment_txid == outp.txid {
961 self.sign_latest_holder_htlcs();
962 if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.holder_htlc_sigs {
963 let &(ref htlc_idx, ref htlc_sig) = htlc_sigs[outp.vout as usize].as_ref().unwrap();
964 let trusted_tx = self.holder_commitment.trust();
965 let counterparty_htlc_sig = self.holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[*htlc_idx];
966 htlc_tx = Some(trusted_tx
967 .get_signed_htlc_tx(&self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), *htlc_idx, &counterparty_htlc_sig, htlc_sig, preimage));
970 // If the HTLC doesn't spend the current holder commitment, check if it spends the previous one
971 if htlc_tx.is_none() && self.prev_holder_commitment.is_some() {
972 let commitment_txid = self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().unwrap().trust().txid();
973 if commitment_txid == outp.txid {
974 self.sign_prev_holder_htlcs();
975 if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs {
976 let &(ref htlc_idx, ref htlc_sig) = htlc_sigs[outp.vout as usize].as_ref().unwrap();
977 let holder_commitment = self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().unwrap();
978 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment.trust();
979 let counterparty_htlc_sig = holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[*htlc_idx];
980 htlc_tx = Some(trusted_tx
981 .get_signed_htlc_tx(&self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), *htlc_idx, &counterparty_htlc_sig, htlc_sig, preimage));
988 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
989 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
992 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
993 pub(crate) fn unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
994 let latest_had_sigs = self.holder_htlc_sigs.is_some();
995 let prev_had_sigs = self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.is_some();
996 let ret = self.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outp, preimage);
997 if !latest_had_sigs {
998 self.holder_htlc_sigs = None;
1001 self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs = None;