1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to build claims and bump in-flight transactions until confirmations.
12 //! OnchainTxHandler objects are fully-part of ChannelMonitor and encapsulates all
13 //! building, tracking, bumping and notifications functions.
15 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
20 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::chain::chaininterface::compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight;
26 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
28 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
29 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, ChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
30 use crate::chain::ClaimId;
31 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
32 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER};
33 use crate::sign::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
34 use crate::chain::package::{PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate};
35 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, VecWriter};
39 use crate::prelude::*;
40 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
43 use core::mem::replace;
45 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
47 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
49 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
50 /// transaction causing it.
52 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
53 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
54 struct OnchainEventEntry {
57 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
61 impl OnchainEventEntry {
62 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
63 self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
66 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
67 height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
71 /// Events for claims the [`OnchainTxHandler`] has generated. Once the events are considered safe
72 /// from a chain reorg, the [`OnchainTxHandler`] will act accordingly.
73 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
75 /// A pending request has been claimed by a transaction spending the exact same set of outpoints
76 /// as the request. This claim can either be ours or from the counterparty. Once the claiming
77 /// transaction has met [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations, we consider it final and remove the
82 /// The counterparty has claimed an outpoint from one of our pending requests through a
83 /// different transaction than ours. If our transaction was attempting to claim multiple
84 /// outputs, we need to drop the outpoint claimed by the counterparty and regenerate a new claim
85 /// transaction for ourselves. We keep tracking, separately, the outpoint claimed by the
86 /// counterparty up to [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations to ensure we attempt to re-claim it
87 /// if the counterparty's claim is reorged from the chain.
89 package: PackageTemplate,
93 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
94 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
95 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
96 (0, self.txid, required),
97 (1, self.block_hash, option),
98 (2, self.height, required),
99 (4, self.event, required),
105 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
106 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
107 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
109 let mut block_hash = None;
110 let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
111 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
113 (1, block_hash, option),
114 (2, height, required),
115 (4, event, upgradable_required),
117 Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
121 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
123 (0, claim_id, required),
125 (1, ContentiousOutpoint) => {
126 (0, package, required),
130 impl Readable for Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>> {
131 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
132 match Readable::read(reader)? {
135 let vlen: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
136 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(vlen as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<Option<(usize, Signature)>>()));
138 ret.push(match Readable::read(reader)? {
140 1u8 => Some((<u64 as Readable>::read(reader)? as usize, Readable::read(reader)?)),
141 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
146 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
151 impl Writeable for Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>> {
152 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
156 (vec.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
157 for opt in vec.iter() {
159 &Some((ref idx, ref sig)) => {
161 (*idx as u64).write(writer)?;
164 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
168 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
174 /// The claim commonly referred to as the pre-signed second-stage HTLC transaction.
175 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
176 pub(crate) struct ExternalHTLCClaim {
177 pub(crate) commitment_txid: Txid,
178 pub(crate) per_commitment_number: u64,
179 pub(crate) htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
180 pub(crate) preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
181 pub(crate) counterparty_sig: Signature,
184 // Represents the different types of claims for which events are yielded externally to satisfy said
186 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
187 pub(crate) enum ClaimEvent {
188 /// Event yielded to signal that the commitment transaction fee must be bumped to claim any
189 /// encumbered funds and proceed to HTLC resolution, if any HTLCs exist.
191 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
192 commitment_tx: Transaction,
193 anchor_output_idx: u32,
195 /// Event yielded to signal that the commitment transaction has confirmed and its HTLCs must be
196 /// resolved by broadcasting a transaction with sufficient fee to claim them.
198 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
199 htlcs: Vec<ExternalHTLCClaim>,
200 tx_lock_time: PackedLockTime,
204 /// Represents the different ways an output can be claimed (i.e., spent to an address under our
205 /// control) onchain.
206 pub(crate) enum OnchainClaim {
207 /// A finalized transaction pending confirmation spending the output to claim.
209 /// An event yielded externally to signal additional inputs must be added to a transaction
210 /// pending confirmation spending the output to claim.
214 /// OnchainTxHandler receives claiming requests, aggregates them if it's sound, broadcast and
215 /// do RBF bumping if possible.
217 pub struct OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
218 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
219 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
220 destination_script: Script,
221 holder_commitment: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
222 // holder_htlc_sigs and prev_holder_htlc_sigs are in the order as they appear in the commitment
223 // transaction outputs (hence the Option<>s inside the Vec). The first usize is the index in
224 // the set of HTLCs in the HolderCommitmentTransaction.
225 holder_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
226 prev_holder_commitment: Option<HolderCommitmentTransaction>,
227 prev_holder_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
229 pub(super) signer: ChannelSigner,
230 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
232 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
233 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
234 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
235 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
236 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
237 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
238 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
239 // we need to regenerate new claim request with reduced set of still-claimable outpoints.
240 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
241 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
242 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
243 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
244 pub(crate) pending_claim_requests: HashMap<ClaimId, PackageTemplate>,
246 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<ClaimId, PackageTemplate>,
248 // Used to track external events that need to be forwarded to the `ChainMonitor`. This `Vec`
249 // essentially acts as an insertion-ordered `HashMap` – there should only ever be one occurrence
250 // of a `ClaimId`, which tracks its latest `ClaimEvent`, i.e., if a pending claim exists, and
251 // a new block has been connected, resulting in a new claim, the previous will be replaced with
254 // These external events may be generated in the following cases:
255 // - A channel has been force closed by broadcasting the holder's latest commitment transaction
256 // - A block being connected/disconnected
257 // - Learning the preimage for an HTLC we can claim onchain
258 pending_claim_events: Vec<(ClaimId, ClaimEvent)>,
260 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request. The keys
261 // represent the outpoints that our `ChannelMonitor` has detected we have keys/scripts to
262 // claim. The values track the pending claim request identifier and the initial confirmation
263 // block height, and are immutable until the outpoint has enough confirmations to meet our
264 // [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]. The initial confirmation block height is used to remove the entry if
265 // the block gets disconnected.
266 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
267 pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (ClaimId, u32)>,
269 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (ClaimId, u32)>,
271 locktimed_packages: BTreeMap<u32, Vec<PackageTemplate>>,
273 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
275 pub(super) secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
278 impl<ChannelSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
279 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
280 // `signer`, `secp_ctx`, and `pending_claim_events` are excluded on purpose.
281 self.channel_value_satoshis == other.channel_value_satoshis &&
282 self.channel_keys_id == other.channel_keys_id &&
283 self.destination_script == other.destination_script &&
284 self.holder_commitment == other.holder_commitment &&
285 self.holder_htlc_sigs == other.holder_htlc_sigs &&
286 self.prev_holder_commitment == other.prev_holder_commitment &&
287 self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs == other.prev_holder_htlc_sigs &&
288 self.channel_transaction_parameters == other.channel_transaction_parameters &&
289 self.pending_claim_requests == other.pending_claim_requests &&
290 self.claimable_outpoints == other.claimable_outpoints &&
291 self.locktimed_packages == other.locktimed_packages &&
292 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf == other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
296 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
297 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
299 impl<ChannelSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
300 pub(crate) fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
301 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
303 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
304 self.holder_commitment.write(writer)?;
305 self.holder_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
306 self.prev_holder_commitment.write(writer)?;
307 self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
309 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
311 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
312 self.signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
313 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
314 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
315 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
316 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
318 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
319 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
320 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
321 request.write(writer)?;
324 writer.write_all(&(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
325 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
327 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
328 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
331 writer.write_all(&(self.locktimed_packages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
332 for (ref locktime, ref packages) in self.locktimed_packages.iter() {
333 locktime.write(writer)?;
334 writer.write_all(&(packages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
335 for ref package in packages.iter() {
336 package.write(writer)?;
340 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
341 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
342 entry.write(writer)?;
345 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
350 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u64, [u8; 32])> for OnchainTxHandler<SP::Signer> {
351 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u64, [u8; 32])) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
352 let entropy_source = args.0;
353 let signer_provider = args.1;
354 let channel_value_satoshis = args.2;
355 let channel_keys_id = args.3;
357 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
359 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
361 let holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
362 let holder_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
363 let prev_holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
364 let prev_holder_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
366 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
368 // Read the serialized signer bytes, but don't deserialize them, as we'll obtain our signer
369 // by re-deriving the private key material.
370 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
371 let mut bytes_read = 0;
372 while bytes_read != keys_len as usize {
373 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
374 let mut data = [0; 1024];
375 let bytes_to_read = cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - bytes_read);
376 let read_slice = &mut data[0..bytes_to_read];
377 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
378 bytes_read += bytes_to_read;
381 let mut signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
382 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
384 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
385 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
386 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
387 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
390 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
391 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
392 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
393 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
394 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
395 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
396 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
399 let locktimed_packages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
400 let mut locktimed_packages = BTreeMap::new();
401 for _ in 0..locktimed_packages_len {
402 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
403 let packages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
404 let mut packages = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(packages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / core::mem::size_of::<PackageTemplate>()));
405 for _ in 0..packages_len {
406 packages.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
408 locktimed_packages.insert(locktime, packages);
411 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
412 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
413 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
414 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
415 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
419 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
421 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
422 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
424 Ok(OnchainTxHandler {
425 channel_value_satoshis,
430 prev_holder_commitment,
431 prev_holder_htlc_sigs,
433 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
436 pending_claim_requests,
437 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
438 pending_claim_events: Vec::new(),
444 impl<ChannelSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
446 channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32], destination_script: Script,
447 signer: ChannelSigner, channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
448 holder_commitment: HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
451 channel_value_satoshis,
455 holder_htlc_sigs: None,
456 prev_holder_commitment: None,
457 prev_holder_htlc_sigs: None,
459 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
460 pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
461 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
462 locktimed_packages: BTreeMap::new(),
463 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
464 pending_claim_events: Vec::new(),
469 pub(crate) fn get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value(&self) -> Option<u64> {
470 self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().map(|commitment| commitment.to_broadcaster_value_sat())
473 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value(&self) -> u64 {
474 self.holder_commitment.to_broadcaster_value_sat()
477 pub(crate) fn get_and_clear_pending_claim_events(&mut self) -> Vec<(ClaimId, ClaimEvent)> {
478 let mut events = Vec::new();
479 swap(&mut events, &mut self.pending_claim_events);
483 /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
484 /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
485 /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
486 /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
487 /// connections, like on mobile.
488 pub(crate) fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
489 &mut self, current_height: u32, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
493 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
494 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
497 let mut bump_requests = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_claim_requests.len());
498 for (claim_id, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
499 let inputs = request.outpoints();
500 log_info!(logger, "Triggering rebroadcast/fee-bump for request with inputs {:?}", inputs);
501 bump_requests.push((*claim_id, request.clone()));
503 for (claim_id, request) in bump_requests {
504 self.generate_claim(current_height, &request, false /* force_feerate_bump */, fee_estimator, logger)
505 .map(|(_, new_feerate, claim)| {
506 let mut bumped_feerate = false;
507 if let Some(mut_request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&claim_id) {
508 bumped_feerate = request.previous_feerate() > new_feerate;
509 mut_request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
512 OnchainClaim::Tx(tx) => {
513 let log_start = if bumped_feerate { "Broadcasting RBF-bumped" } else { "Rebroadcasting" };
514 log_info!(logger, "{} onchain {}", log_start, log_tx!(tx));
515 broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
517 OnchainClaim::Event(event) => {
518 let log_start = if bumped_feerate { "Yielding fee-bumped" } else { "Replaying" };
519 log_info!(logger, "{} onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", log_start,
520 request.outpoints());
521 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
522 debug_assert!(request.requires_external_funding());
523 let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
524 .filter(|entry| entry.0 == claim_id).count();
525 assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1);
527 self.pending_claim_events.retain(|event| event.0 != claim_id);
528 self.pending_claim_events.push((claim_id, event));
535 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize counterparty
536 /// onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock
537 /// expiration (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may get stuck
538 /// in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or
539 /// Child-Pay-For-Parent.
541 /// Panics if there are signing errors, because signing operations in reaction to on-chain
542 /// events are not expected to fail, and if they do, we may lose funds.
543 fn generate_claim<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
544 &mut self, cur_height: u32, cached_request: &PackageTemplate, force_feerate_bump: bool,
545 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L,
546 ) -> Option<(u32, u64, OnchainClaim)>
548 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
551 let request_outpoints = cached_request.outpoints();
552 if request_outpoints.is_empty() {
553 // Don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs. Untractable
554 // packages cannot be aggregated and will never be split, so we cannot end up with an
556 debug_assert!(cached_request.is_malleable());
559 // If we've seen transaction inclusion in the chain for all outpoints in our request, we
560 // don't need to continue generating more claims. We'll keep tracking the request to fully
561 // remove it once it reaches the confirmation threshold, or to generate a new claim if the
562 // transaction is reorged out.
563 let mut all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = true;
564 for outpoint in request_outpoints.iter() {
565 if let Some((request_claim_id, _)) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(*outpoint) {
566 // We check for outpoint spends within claims individually rather than as a set
567 // since requests can have outpoints split off.
568 if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter()
569 .any(|event_entry| if let OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_id } = event_entry.event {
570 *request_claim_id == claim_id
572 // The onchain event is not a claim, keep seeking until we find one.
576 // Either we had no `OnchainEvent::Claim`, or we did but none matched the
577 // outpoint's registered spend.
578 all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = false;
581 // The request's outpoint spend does not exist yet.
582 all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = false;
585 if all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend {
589 // Compute new height timer to decide when we need to regenerate a new bumped version of the claim tx (if we
590 // didn't receive confirmation of it before, or not enough reorg-safe depth on top of it).
591 let new_timer = cached_request.get_height_timer(cur_height);
592 if cached_request.is_malleable() {
593 if cached_request.requires_external_funding() {
594 let target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = cached_request.compute_package_feerate(
595 fee_estimator, ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority, force_feerate_bump
597 if let Some(htlcs) = cached_request.construct_malleable_package_with_external_funding(self) {
600 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64,
601 OnchainClaim::Event(ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
602 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
604 tx_lock_time: PackedLockTime(cached_request.package_locktime(cur_height)),
612 let predicted_weight = cached_request.package_weight(&self.destination_script);
613 if let Some((output_value, new_feerate)) = cached_request.compute_package_output(
614 predicted_weight, self.destination_script.dust_value().to_sat(),
615 force_feerate_bump, fee_estimator, logger,
617 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
619 let transaction = cached_request.finalize_malleable_package(
620 cur_height, self, output_value, self.destination_script.clone(), logger
622 log_trace!(logger, "...with timer {} and feerate {}", new_timer, new_feerate);
623 assert!(predicted_weight >= transaction.weight());
624 return Some((new_timer, new_feerate, OnchainClaim::Tx(transaction)));
627 // Untractable packages cannot have their fees bumped through Replace-By-Fee. Some
628 // packages may support fee bumping through Child-Pays-For-Parent, indicated by those
629 // which require external funding.
630 let mut inputs = cached_request.inputs();
631 debug_assert_eq!(inputs.len(), 1);
632 let tx = match cached_request.finalize_untractable_package(self, logger) {
636 if !cached_request.requires_external_funding() {
637 return Some((new_timer, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx)));
639 return inputs.find_map(|input| match input {
640 // Commitment inputs with anchors support are the only untractable inputs supported
641 // thus far that require external funding.
642 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(output) => {
643 debug_assert_eq!(tx.txid(), self.holder_commitment.trust().txid(),
644 "Holder commitment transaction mismatch");
646 let conf_target = ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority;
647 let package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = cached_request
648 .compute_package_feerate(fee_estimator, conf_target, force_feerate_bump);
649 if let Some(input_amount_sat) = output.funding_amount {
650 let fee_sat = input_amount_sat - tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
651 let commitment_tx_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight =
652 compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(fee_sat, tx.weight() as u64);
653 if commitment_tx_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight >= package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight {
654 log_debug!(logger, "Pre-signed {} already has feerate {} sat/kW above required {} sat/kW",
655 log_tx!(tx), commitment_tx_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
656 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight);
657 return Some((new_timer, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx.clone())));
661 // We'll locate an anchor output we can spend within the commitment transaction.
662 let funding_pubkey = &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey;
663 match chan_utils::get_anchor_output(&tx, funding_pubkey) {
664 // An anchor output was found, so we should yield a funding event externally.
666 // TODO: Use a lower confirmation target when both our and the
667 // counterparty's latest commitment don't have any HTLCs present.
670 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64,
671 OnchainClaim::Event(ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
672 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
673 commitment_tx: tx.clone(),
674 anchor_output_idx: idx,
678 // An anchor output was not found. There's nothing we can do other than
679 // attempt to broadcast the transaction with its current fee rate and hope
680 // it confirms. This is essentially the same behavior as a commitment
681 // transaction without anchor outputs.
682 None => Some((new_timer, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx.clone()))),
686 debug_assert!(false, "Only HolderFundingOutput inputs should be untractable and require external funding");
694 /// Upon channelmonitor.block_connected(..) or upon provision of a preimage on the forward link
695 /// for this channel, provide new relevant on-chain transactions and/or new claim requests.
696 /// Together with `update_claims_view_from_matched_txn` this used to be named
697 /// `block_connected`, but it is now also used for claiming an HTLC output if we receive a
698 /// preimage after force-close.
700 /// `conf_height` represents the height at which the request was generated. This
701 /// does not need to equal the current blockchain tip height, which should be provided via
702 /// `cur_height`, however it must never be higher than `cur_height`.
703 pub(crate) fn update_claims_view_from_requests<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
704 &mut self, requests: Vec<PackageTemplate>, conf_height: u32, cur_height: u32,
705 broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
707 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
708 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
711 log_debug!(logger, "Updating claims view at height {} with {} claim requests", cur_height, requests.len());
712 let mut preprocessed_requests = Vec::with_capacity(requests.len());
713 let mut aggregated_request = None;
715 // Try to aggregate outputs if their timelock expiration isn't imminent (package timelock
716 // <= CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER) and they don't require an immediate nLockTime (aggregable).
717 for req in requests {
718 // Don't claim a outpoint twice that would be bad for privacy and may uselessly lock a CPFP input for a while
719 if let Some(_) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(req.outpoints()[0]) {
720 log_info!(logger, "Ignoring second claim for outpoint {}:{}, already registered its claiming request", req.outpoints()[0].txid, req.outpoints()[0].vout);
722 let timelocked_equivalent_package = self.locktimed_packages.iter().map(|v| v.1.iter()).flatten()
723 .find(|locked_package| locked_package.outpoints() == req.outpoints());
724 if let Some(package) = timelocked_equivalent_package {
725 log_info!(logger, "Ignoring second claim for outpoint {}:{}, we already have one which we're waiting on a timelock at {} for.",
726 req.outpoints()[0].txid, req.outpoints()[0].vout, package.package_locktime(cur_height));
730 let package_locktime = req.package_locktime(cur_height);
731 if package_locktime > cur_height + 1 {
732 log_info!(logger, "Delaying claim of package until its timelock at {} (current height {}), the following outpoints are spent:", package_locktime, cur_height);
733 for outpoint in req.outpoints() {
734 log_info!(logger, " Outpoint {}", outpoint);
736 self.locktimed_packages.entry(package_locktime).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(req);
740 log_trace!(logger, "Test if outpoint can be aggregated with expiration {} against {}", req.timelock(), cur_height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER);
741 if req.timelock() <= cur_height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER || !req.aggregable() {
742 // Don't aggregate if outpoint package timelock is soon or marked as non-aggregable
743 preprocessed_requests.push(req);
744 } else if aggregated_request.is_none() {
745 aggregated_request = Some(req);
747 aggregated_request.as_mut().unwrap().merge_package(req);
751 if let Some(req) = aggregated_request {
752 preprocessed_requests.push(req);
755 // Claim everything up to and including `cur_height`
756 let remaining_locked_packages = self.locktimed_packages.split_off(&(cur_height + 1));
757 for (pop_height, mut entry) in self.locktimed_packages.iter_mut() {
758 log_trace!(logger, "Restoring delayed claim of package(s) at their timelock at {}.", pop_height);
759 preprocessed_requests.append(&mut entry);
761 self.locktimed_packages = remaining_locked_packages;
763 // Generate claim transactions and track them to bump if necessary at
764 // height timer expiration (i.e in how many blocks we're going to take action).
765 for mut req in preprocessed_requests {
766 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, claim)) = self.generate_claim(
767 cur_height, &req, true /* force_feerate_bump */, &*fee_estimator, &*logger,
769 req.set_timer(new_timer);
770 req.set_feerate(new_feerate);
771 // Once a pending claim has an id assigned, it remains fixed until the claim is
772 // satisfied, regardless of whether the claim switches between different variants of
774 let claim_id = match claim {
775 OnchainClaim::Tx(tx) => {
776 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
777 broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
778 ClaimId(tx.txid().into_inner())
780 OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
781 log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", req.outpoints());
782 let claim_id = match claim_event {
783 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment { ref commitment_tx, .. } =>
784 // For commitment claims, we can just use their txid as it should
785 // already be unique.
786 ClaimId(commitment_tx.txid().into_inner()),
787 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC { ref htlcs, .. } => {
788 // For HTLC claims, commit to the entire set of HTLC outputs to
789 // claim, which will always be unique per request. Once a claim ID
790 // is generated, it is assigned and remains unchanged, even if the
791 // underlying set of HTLCs changes.
792 let mut engine = Sha256::engine();
794 engine.input(&htlc.commitment_txid.into_inner());
795 engine.input(&htlc.htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap().to_be_bytes());
797 ClaimId(Sha256::from_engine(engine).into_inner())
800 debug_assert!(self.pending_claim_requests.get(&claim_id).is_none());
801 debug_assert_eq!(self.pending_claim_events.iter().filter(|entry| entry.0 == claim_id).count(), 0);
802 self.pending_claim_events.push((claim_id, claim_event));
806 debug_assert!(self.pending_claim_requests.get(&claim_id).is_none());
807 for k in req.outpoints() {
808 log_info!(logger, "Registering claiming request for {}:{}", k.txid, k.vout);
809 self.claimable_outpoints.insert(k.clone(), (claim_id, conf_height));
811 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(claim_id, req);
816 /// Upon channelmonitor.block_connected(..) or upon provision of a preimage on the forward link
817 /// for this channel, provide new relevant on-chain transactions and/or new claim requests.
818 /// Together with `update_claims_view_from_requests` this used to be named `block_connected`,
819 /// but it is now also used for claiming an HTLC output if we receive a preimage after force-close.
821 /// `conf_height` represents the height at which the transactions in `txn_matched` were
822 /// confirmed. This does not need to equal the current blockchain tip height, which should be
823 /// provided via `cur_height`, however it must never be higher than `cur_height`.
824 pub(crate) fn update_claims_view_from_matched_txn<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
825 &mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], conf_height: u32, conf_hash: BlockHash,
826 cur_height: u32, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
828 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
829 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
832 log_debug!(logger, "Updating claims view at height {} with {} matched transactions in block {}", cur_height, txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
833 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
834 for tx in txn_matched {
835 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
836 let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
837 for inp in &tx.input {
838 if let Some((claim_id, _)) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
839 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
840 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(claim_id) {
841 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
842 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
844 let mut are_sets_equal = true;
845 let mut tx_inputs = tx.input.iter().map(|input| &input.previous_output).collect::<Vec<_>>();
846 tx_inputs.sort_unstable();
847 for request_input in request.outpoints() {
848 if tx_inputs.binary_search(&request_input).is_err() {
849 are_sets_equal = false;
854 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
856 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
859 block_hash: Some(conf_hash),
860 event: OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_id: *claim_id }
862 if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.contains(&entry) {
863 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
868 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
869 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
870 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
872 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
873 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
874 let mut at_least_one_drop = false;
875 for input in tx.input.iter() {
876 if let Some(package) = request.split_package(&input.previous_output) {
877 claimed_outputs_material.push(package);
878 at_least_one_drop = true;
880 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
881 if request.outpoints().is_empty() {
882 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
885 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
886 if at_least_one_drop {
887 bump_candidates.insert(*claim_id, request.clone());
888 // If we have any pending claim events for the request being updated
889 // that have yet to be consumed, we'll remove them since they will
890 // end up producing an invalid transaction by double spending
891 // input(s) that already have a confirmed spend. If such spend is
892 // reorged out of the chain, then we'll attempt to re-spend the
893 // inputs once we see it.
894 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
895 let existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
896 .filter(|entry| entry.0 == *claim_id).count();
897 assert!(existing == 0 || existing == 1);
899 self.pending_claim_events.retain(|entry| entry.0 != *claim_id);
902 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
904 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
908 for package in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
909 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
912 block_hash: Some(conf_hash),
913 event: OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package },
915 if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.contains(&entry) {
916 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
921 // After security delay, either our claim tx got enough confs or outpoint is definetely out of reach
922 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
923 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
924 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
925 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(cur_height) {
927 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_id } => {
928 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
929 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
930 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_id) {
931 for outpoint in request.outpoints() {
932 log_debug!(logger, "Removing claim tracking for {} due to maturation of claim package {}.",
933 outpoint, log_bytes!(claim_id.0));
934 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(outpoint);
936 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
937 let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
938 .filter(|entry| entry.0 == claim_id).count();
939 assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1);
941 self.pending_claim_events.retain(|(id, _)| *id != claim_id);
944 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package } => {
945 log_debug!(logger, "Removing claim tracking due to maturation of claim tx for outpoints:");
946 log_debug!(logger, " {:?}", package.outpoints());
947 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(package.outpoints()[0]);
951 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
955 // Check if any pending claim request must be rescheduled
956 for (claim_id, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
957 if cur_height >= request.timer() {
958 bump_candidates.insert(*claim_id, request.clone());
962 // Build, bump and rebroadcast tx accordingly
963 log_trace!(logger, "Bumping {} candidates", bump_candidates.len());
964 for (claim_id, request) in bump_candidates.iter() {
965 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_claim)) = self.generate_claim(
966 cur_height, &request, true /* force_feerate_bump */, &*fee_estimator, &*logger,
969 OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => {
970 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting RBF-bumped onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
971 broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&bump_tx]);
973 OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
974 log_info!(logger, "Yielding RBF-bumped onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints());
975 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
976 let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter().
977 filter(|entry| entry.0 == *claim_id).count();
978 assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1);
980 self.pending_claim_events.retain(|event| event.0 != *claim_id);
981 self.pending_claim_events.push((*claim_id, claim_event));
984 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(claim_id) {
985 request.set_timer(new_timer);
986 request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
992 pub(crate) fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
996 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
999 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1000 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1003 let mut height = None;
1004 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1005 if entry.txid == *txid {
1006 height = Some(entry.height);
1011 if let Some(height) = height {
1012 self.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1016 pub(crate) fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L)
1017 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1018 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1021 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
1022 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
1023 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
1024 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
1025 if entry.height >= height {
1026 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
1027 //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
1029 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package } => {
1030 if let Some(pending_claim) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(package.outpoints()[0]) {
1031 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&pending_claim.0) {
1032 request.merge_package(package);
1033 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
1034 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
1035 bump_candidates.insert(pending_claim.clone(), request.clone());
1042 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1045 for ((_claim_id, _), ref mut request) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
1046 // `height` is the height being disconnected, so our `current_height` is 1 lower.
1047 let current_height = height - 1;
1048 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_claim)) = self.generate_claim(
1049 current_height, &request, true /* force_feerate_bump */, fee_estimator, &&*logger
1051 request.set_timer(new_timer);
1052 request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
1054 OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => {
1055 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
1056 broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&bump_tx]);
1058 OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
1059 log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event after reorg to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints());
1060 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1061 let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
1062 .filter(|entry| entry.0 == *_claim_id).count();
1063 assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1);
1065 self.pending_claim_events.retain(|event| event.0 != *_claim_id);
1066 self.pending_claim_events.push((*_claim_id, claim_event));
1071 for (ancestor_claim_txid, request) in bump_candidates.drain() {
1072 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, request);
1074 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
1075 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
1076 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
1077 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
1079 remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
1082 for req in remove_request {
1083 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
1087 pub(crate) fn is_output_spend_pending(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint) -> bool {
1088 self.claimable_outpoints.get(outpoint).is_some()
1091 pub(crate) fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1092 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1094 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.block_hash))
1096 txids.sort_unstable_by_key(|(txid, _)| *txid);
1101 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_holder_tx(&mut self, tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) {
1102 self.prev_holder_commitment = Some(replace(&mut self.holder_commitment, tx));
1103 self.holder_htlc_sigs = None;
1106 // Normally holder HTLCs are signed at the same time as the holder commitment tx. However,
1107 // in some configurations, the holder commitment tx has been signed and broadcast by a
1108 // ChannelMonitor replica, so we handle that case here.
1109 fn sign_latest_holder_htlcs(&mut self) {
1110 if self.holder_htlc_sigs.is_none() {
1111 let (_sig, sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign holder commitment");
1112 self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, sigs));
1116 // Normally only the latest commitment tx and HTLCs need to be signed. However, in some
1117 // configurations we may have updated our holder commitment but a replica of the ChannelMonitor
1118 // broadcast the previous one before we sync with it. We handle that case here.
1119 fn sign_prev_holder_htlcs(&mut self) {
1120 if self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.is_none() {
1121 if let Some(ref holder_commitment) = self.prev_holder_commitment {
1122 let (_sig, sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign previous holder commitment");
1123 self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment, sigs));
1128 fn extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, sigs: Vec<Signature>) -> Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>> {
1129 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1130 for (htlc_idx, (holder_sig, htlc)) in sigs.iter().zip(holder_commitment.htlcs().iter()).enumerate() {
1131 let tx_idx = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap();
1132 if ret.len() <= tx_idx as usize { ret.resize(tx_idx as usize + 1, None); }
1133 ret[tx_idx as usize] = Some((htlc_idx, holder_sig.clone()));
1138 pub(crate) fn get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx(&self) -> &Transaction {
1139 &self.holder_commitment.trust().built_transaction().transaction
1142 //TODO: getting lastest holder transactions should be infallible and result in us "force-closing the channel", but we may
1143 // have empty holder commitment transaction if a ChannelMonitor is asked to force-close just after OutboundV1Channel::get_funding_created,
1144 // before providing a initial commitment transaction. For outbound channel, init ChannelMonitor at Channel::funding_signed, there is nothing
1145 // to monitor before.
1146 pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Transaction {
1147 let (sig, htlc_sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("signing holder commitment");
1148 self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, htlc_sigs));
1149 self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)
1152 #[cfg(any(test, feature="unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1153 pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Transaction {
1154 let (sig, htlc_sigs) = self.signer.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign holder commitment");
1155 self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, htlc_sigs));
1156 self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)
1159 pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
1160 let mut htlc_tx = None;
1161 let commitment_txid = self.holder_commitment.trust().txid();
1162 // Check if the HTLC spends from the current holder commitment
1163 if commitment_txid == outp.txid {
1164 self.sign_latest_holder_htlcs();
1165 if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.holder_htlc_sigs {
1166 let &(ref htlc_idx, ref htlc_sig) = htlc_sigs[outp.vout as usize].as_ref().unwrap();
1167 let trusted_tx = self.holder_commitment.trust();
1168 let counterparty_htlc_sig = self.holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[*htlc_idx];
1169 htlc_tx = Some(trusted_tx
1170 .get_signed_htlc_tx(&self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), *htlc_idx, &counterparty_htlc_sig, htlc_sig, preimage));
1173 // If the HTLC doesn't spend the current holder commitment, check if it spends the previous one
1174 if htlc_tx.is_none() && self.prev_holder_commitment.is_some() {
1175 let commitment_txid = self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().unwrap().trust().txid();
1176 if commitment_txid == outp.txid {
1177 self.sign_prev_holder_htlcs();
1178 if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs {
1179 let &(ref htlc_idx, ref htlc_sig) = htlc_sigs[outp.vout as usize].as_ref().unwrap();
1180 let holder_commitment = self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().unwrap();
1181 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment.trust();
1182 let counterparty_htlc_sig = holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[*htlc_idx];
1183 htlc_tx = Some(trusted_tx
1184 .get_signed_htlc_tx(&self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), *htlc_idx, &counterparty_htlc_sig, htlc_sig, preimage));
1191 pub(crate) fn generate_external_htlc_claim(
1192 &self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>
1193 ) -> Option<ExternalHTLCClaim> {
1194 let find_htlc = |holder_commitment: &HolderCommitmentTransaction| -> Option<ExternalHTLCClaim> {
1195 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment.trust();
1196 if outp.txid != trusted_tx.txid() {
1199 trusted_tx.htlcs().iter().enumerate()
1200 .find(|(_, htlc)| if let Some(output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1201 output_index == outp.vout
1205 .map(|(htlc_idx, htlc)| {
1206 let counterparty_htlc_sig = holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[htlc_idx];
1208 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
1209 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
1211 preimage: *preimage,
1212 counterparty_sig: counterparty_htlc_sig,
1216 // Check if the HTLC spends from the current holder commitment or the previous one otherwise.
1217 find_htlc(&self.holder_commitment)
1218 .or_else(|| self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().map(|c| find_htlc(c)).flatten())
1221 pub(crate) fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1222 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features
1225 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1226 pub(crate) fn unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
1227 let latest_had_sigs = self.holder_htlc_sigs.is_some();
1228 let prev_had_sigs = self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.is_some();
1229 let ret = self.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outp, preimage);
1230 if !latest_had_sigs {
1231 self.holder_htlc_sigs = None;
1234 self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs = None;