1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to build claims and bump in-flight transactions until confirmations.
12 //! OnchainTxHandler objects are fully-part of ChannelMonitor and encapsulates all
13 //! building, tracking, bumping and notifications functions.
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf};
19 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
20 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::chain::chaininterface::compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight;
26 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider, ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
27 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
28 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
29 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, ChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
30 use crate::chain::ClaimId;
31 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
32 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER};
33 use crate::chain::package::{PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate};
34 use crate::chain::transaction::MaybeSignedTransaction;
35 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, VecWriter};
39 use crate::prelude::*;
40 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
43 use core::mem::replace;
45 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
47 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
49 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
50 /// transaction causing it.
52 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
53 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
54 struct OnchainEventEntry {
57 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
61 impl OnchainEventEntry {
62 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
63 self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
66 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
67 height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
71 /// Events for claims the [`OnchainTxHandler`] has generated. Once the events are considered safe
72 /// from a chain reorg, the [`OnchainTxHandler`] will act accordingly.
73 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
75 /// A pending request has been claimed by a transaction spending the exact same set of outpoints
76 /// as the request. This claim can either be ours or from the counterparty. Once the claiming
77 /// transaction has met [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations, we consider it final and remove the
82 /// The counterparty has claimed an outpoint from one of our pending requests through a
83 /// different transaction than ours. If our transaction was attempting to claim multiple
84 /// outputs, we need to drop the outpoint claimed by the counterparty and regenerate a new claim
85 /// transaction for ourselves. We keep tracking, separately, the outpoint claimed by the
86 /// counterparty up to [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations to ensure we attempt to re-claim it
87 /// if the counterparty's claim is reorged from the chain.
89 package: PackageTemplate,
93 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
94 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
95 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
96 (0, self.txid, required),
97 (1, self.block_hash, option),
98 (2, self.height, required),
99 (4, self.event, required),
105 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
106 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
107 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
109 let mut block_hash = None;
110 let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
111 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
113 (1, block_hash, option),
114 (2, height, required),
115 (4, event, upgradable_required),
117 Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
121 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
123 (0, claim_id, required),
125 (1, ContentiousOutpoint) => {
126 (0, package, required),
130 impl Readable for Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>> {
131 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
132 match Readable::read(reader)? {
135 let vlen: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
136 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(vlen as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<Option<(usize, Signature)>>()));
138 ret.push(match Readable::read(reader)? {
140 1u8 => Some((<u64 as Readable>::read(reader)? as usize, Readable::read(reader)?)),
141 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
146 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
151 impl Writeable for Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>> {
152 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
156 (vec.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
157 for opt in vec.iter() {
159 &Some((ref idx, ref sig)) => {
161 (*idx as u64).write(writer)?;
164 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
168 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
174 /// The claim commonly referred to as the pre-signed second-stage HTLC transaction.
175 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
176 pub(crate) struct ExternalHTLCClaim {
177 pub(crate) commitment_txid: Txid,
178 pub(crate) per_commitment_number: u64,
179 pub(crate) htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
180 pub(crate) preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
181 pub(crate) counterparty_sig: Signature,
184 // Represents the different types of claims for which events are yielded externally to satisfy said
186 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
187 pub(crate) enum ClaimEvent {
188 /// Event yielded to signal that the commitment transaction fee must be bumped to claim any
189 /// encumbered funds and proceed to HTLC resolution, if any HTLCs exist.
191 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
192 commitment_tx: Transaction,
193 anchor_output_idx: u32,
195 /// Event yielded to signal that the commitment transaction has confirmed and its HTLCs must be
196 /// resolved by broadcasting a transaction with sufficient fee to claim them.
198 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
199 htlcs: Vec<ExternalHTLCClaim>,
200 tx_lock_time: LockTime,
204 /// Represents the different ways an output can be claimed (i.e., spent to an address under our
205 /// control) onchain.
206 pub(crate) enum OnchainClaim {
207 /// A finalized transaction pending confirmation spending the output to claim.
208 Tx(MaybeSignedTransaction),
209 /// An event yielded externally to signal additional inputs must be added to a transaction
210 /// pending confirmation spending the output to claim.
214 /// Represents the different feerate strategies a pending request can use when generating a claim.
215 pub(crate) enum FeerateStrategy {
216 /// We must reuse the most recently used feerate, if any.
218 /// We must pick the highest between the most recently used and the current feerate estimate.
219 HighestOfPreviousOrNew,
220 /// We must force a bump of the most recently used feerate, either by using the current feerate
221 /// estimate if it's higher, or manually bumping.
225 /// OnchainTxHandler receives claiming requests, aggregates them if it's sound, broadcast and
226 /// do RBF bumping if possible.
228 pub struct OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
229 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
230 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
231 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
232 holder_commitment: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
233 prev_holder_commitment: Option<HolderCommitmentTransaction>,
235 pub(super) signer: ChannelSigner,
236 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
238 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
239 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
240 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
241 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
242 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
243 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
244 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
245 // we need to regenerate new claim request with reduced set of still-claimable outpoints.
246 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
247 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
248 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
249 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
250 pub(crate) pending_claim_requests: HashMap<ClaimId, PackageTemplate>,
252 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<ClaimId, PackageTemplate>,
254 // Used to track external events that need to be forwarded to the `ChainMonitor`. This `Vec`
255 // essentially acts as an insertion-ordered `HashMap` – there should only ever be one occurrence
256 // of a `ClaimId`, which tracks its latest `ClaimEvent`, i.e., if a pending claim exists, and
257 // a new block has been connected, resulting in a new claim, the previous will be replaced with
260 // These external events may be generated in the following cases:
261 // - A channel has been force closed by broadcasting the holder's latest commitment transaction
262 // - A block being connected/disconnected
263 // - Learning the preimage for an HTLC we can claim onchain
264 pending_claim_events: Vec<(ClaimId, ClaimEvent)>,
266 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request. The keys
267 // represent the outpoints that our `ChannelMonitor` has detected we have keys/scripts to
268 // claim. The values track the pending claim request identifier and the initial confirmation
269 // block height, and are immutable until the outpoint has enough confirmations to meet our
270 // [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]. The initial confirmation block height is used to remove the entry if
271 // the block gets disconnected.
272 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
273 pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (ClaimId, u32)>,
275 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (ClaimId, u32)>,
277 locktimed_packages: BTreeMap<u32, Vec<PackageTemplate>>,
279 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
281 pub(super) secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
284 impl<ChannelSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
285 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
286 // `signer`, `secp_ctx`, and `pending_claim_events` are excluded on purpose.
287 self.channel_value_satoshis == other.channel_value_satoshis &&
288 self.channel_keys_id == other.channel_keys_id &&
289 self.destination_script == other.destination_script &&
290 self.holder_commitment == other.holder_commitment &&
291 self.prev_holder_commitment == other.prev_holder_commitment &&
292 self.channel_transaction_parameters == other.channel_transaction_parameters &&
293 self.pending_claim_requests == other.pending_claim_requests &&
294 self.claimable_outpoints == other.claimable_outpoints &&
295 self.locktimed_packages == other.locktimed_packages &&
296 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf == other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
300 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
301 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
303 impl<ChannelSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
304 pub(crate) fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
305 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
307 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
308 self.holder_commitment.write(writer)?;
309 None::<Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>>.write(writer)?; // holder_htlc_sigs
310 self.prev_holder_commitment.write(writer)?;
311 None::<Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>>.write(writer)?; // prev_holder_htlc_sigs
313 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
315 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
316 self.signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
317 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
318 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
319 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
320 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
322 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
323 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
324 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
325 request.write(writer)?;
328 writer.write_all(&(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
329 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
331 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
332 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
335 writer.write_all(&(self.locktimed_packages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
336 for (ref locktime, ref packages) in self.locktimed_packages.iter() {
337 locktime.write(writer)?;
338 writer.write_all(&(packages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
339 for ref package in packages.iter() {
340 package.write(writer)?;
344 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
345 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
346 entry.write(writer)?;
349 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
354 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u64, [u8; 32])> for OnchainTxHandler<SP::EcdsaSigner> {
355 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u64, [u8; 32])) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
356 let entropy_source = args.0;
357 let signer_provider = args.1;
358 let channel_value_satoshis = args.2;
359 let channel_keys_id = args.3;
361 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
363 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
365 let holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
366 let _holder_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>> = Readable::read(reader)?;
367 let prev_holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
368 let _prev_holder_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>> = Readable::read(reader)?;
370 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
372 // Read the serialized signer bytes, but don't deserialize them, as we'll obtain our signer
373 // by re-deriving the private key material.
374 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
375 let mut bytes_read = 0;
376 while bytes_read != keys_len as usize {
377 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
378 let mut data = [0; 1024];
379 let bytes_to_read = cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - bytes_read);
380 let read_slice = &mut data[0..bytes_to_read];
381 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
382 bytes_read += bytes_to_read;
385 let mut signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
386 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
388 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
389 let mut pending_claim_requests = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
390 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
391 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
394 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
395 let mut claimable_outpoints = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
396 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
397 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
398 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
399 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
400 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
403 let locktimed_packages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
404 let mut locktimed_packages = BTreeMap::new();
405 for _ in 0..locktimed_packages_len {
406 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
407 let packages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
408 let mut packages = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(packages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / core::mem::size_of::<PackageTemplate>()));
409 for _ in 0..packages_len {
410 packages.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
412 locktimed_packages.insert(locktime, packages);
415 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
416 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
417 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
418 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
419 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
423 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
425 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
426 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
428 Ok(OnchainTxHandler {
429 channel_value_satoshis,
433 prev_holder_commitment,
435 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
438 pending_claim_requests,
439 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
440 pending_claim_events: Vec::new(),
446 impl<ChannelSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
448 channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32], destination_script: ScriptBuf,
449 signer: ChannelSigner, channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
450 holder_commitment: HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>
453 channel_value_satoshis,
457 prev_holder_commitment: None,
459 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
460 pending_claim_requests: new_hash_map(),
461 claimable_outpoints: new_hash_map(),
462 locktimed_packages: BTreeMap::new(),
463 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
464 pending_claim_events: Vec::new(),
469 pub(crate) fn get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value(&self) -> Option<u64> {
470 self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().map(|commitment| commitment.to_broadcaster_value_sat())
473 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value(&self) -> u64 {
474 self.holder_commitment.to_broadcaster_value_sat()
477 pub(crate) fn get_and_clear_pending_claim_events(&mut self) -> Vec<(ClaimId, ClaimEvent)> {
478 let mut events = Vec::new();
479 swap(&mut events, &mut self.pending_claim_events);
483 /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
484 /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
485 /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
486 /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
487 /// connections, like on mobile.
488 pub(super) fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Logger>(
489 &mut self, current_height: u32, feerate_strategy: FeerateStrategy, broadcaster: &B,
490 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L,
493 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
494 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
496 let mut bump_requests = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_claim_requests.len());
497 for (claim_id, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
498 let inputs = request.outpoints();
499 log_info!(logger, "Triggering rebroadcast/fee-bump for request with inputs {:?}", inputs);
500 bump_requests.push((*claim_id, request.clone()));
502 for (claim_id, request) in bump_requests {
503 self.generate_claim(current_height, &request, &feerate_strategy, fee_estimator, logger)
504 .map(|(_, new_feerate, claim)| {
505 let mut bumped_feerate = false;
506 if let Some(mut_request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&claim_id) {
507 bumped_feerate = request.previous_feerate() > new_feerate;
508 mut_request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
511 OnchainClaim::Tx(tx) => {
512 if tx.is_fully_signed() {
513 let log_start = if bumped_feerate { "Broadcasting RBF-bumped" } else { "Rebroadcasting" };
514 log_info!(logger, "{} onchain {}", log_start, log_tx!(tx.0));
515 broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx.0]);
517 log_info!(logger, "Waiting for signature of unsigned onchain transaction {}", tx.0.txid());
520 OnchainClaim::Event(event) => {
521 let log_start = if bumped_feerate { "Yielding fee-bumped" } else { "Replaying" };
522 log_info!(logger, "{} onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", log_start,
523 request.outpoints());
524 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
525 debug_assert!(request.requires_external_funding());
526 let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
527 .filter(|entry| entry.0 == claim_id).count();
528 assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1);
530 self.pending_claim_events.retain(|event| event.0 != claim_id);
531 self.pending_claim_events.push((claim_id, event));
538 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize counterparty
539 /// onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock
540 /// expiration (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may get stuck
541 /// in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or
542 /// Child-Pay-For-Parent.
544 /// Panics if there are signing errors, because signing operations in reaction to on-chain
545 /// events are not expected to fail, and if they do, we may lose funds.
546 fn generate_claim<F: Deref, L: Logger>(
547 &mut self, cur_height: u32, cached_request: &PackageTemplate, feerate_strategy: &FeerateStrategy,
548 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L,
549 ) -> Option<(u32, u64, OnchainClaim)>
550 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
552 let request_outpoints = cached_request.outpoints();
553 if request_outpoints.is_empty() {
554 // Don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs. Untractable
555 // packages cannot be aggregated and will never be split, so we cannot end up with an
557 debug_assert!(cached_request.is_malleable());
560 // If we've seen transaction inclusion in the chain for all outpoints in our request, we
561 // don't need to continue generating more claims. We'll keep tracking the request to fully
562 // remove it once it reaches the confirmation threshold, or to generate a new claim if the
563 // transaction is reorged out.
564 let mut all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = true;
565 for outpoint in request_outpoints.iter() {
566 if let Some((request_claim_id, _)) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(*outpoint) {
567 // We check for outpoint spends within claims individually rather than as a set
568 // since requests can have outpoints split off.
569 if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter()
570 .any(|event_entry| if let OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_id } = event_entry.event {
571 *request_claim_id == claim_id
573 // The onchain event is not a claim, keep seeking until we find one.
577 // Either we had no `OnchainEvent::Claim`, or we did but none matched the
578 // outpoint's registered spend.
579 all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = false;
582 // The request's outpoint spend does not exist yet.
583 all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = false;
586 if all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend {
590 // Compute new height timer to decide when we need to regenerate a new bumped version of the claim tx (if we
591 // didn't receive confirmation of it before, or not enough reorg-safe depth on top of it).
592 let new_timer = cached_request.get_height_timer(cur_height);
593 if cached_request.is_malleable() {
594 if cached_request.requires_external_funding() {
595 let target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = cached_request.compute_package_feerate(
596 fee_estimator, ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep, feerate_strategy,
598 if let Some(htlcs) = cached_request.construct_malleable_package_with_external_funding(self) {
601 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64,
602 OnchainClaim::Event(ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
603 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
605 tx_lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(cached_request.package_locktime(cur_height)),
613 let predicted_weight = cached_request.package_weight(&self.destination_script);
614 if let Some((output_value, new_feerate)) = cached_request.compute_package_output(
615 predicted_weight, self.destination_script.dust_value().to_sat(),
616 feerate_strategy, fee_estimator, logger,
618 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
620 let transaction = cached_request.maybe_finalize_malleable_package(
621 cur_height, self, output_value, self.destination_script.clone(), logger
623 assert!(predicted_weight >= transaction.0.weight().to_wu());
624 return Some((new_timer, new_feerate, OnchainClaim::Tx(transaction)));
627 // Untractable packages cannot have their fees bumped through Replace-By-Fee. Some
628 // packages may support fee bumping through Child-Pays-For-Parent, indicated by those
629 // which require external funding.
630 let mut inputs = cached_request.inputs();
631 debug_assert_eq!(inputs.len(), 1);
632 let tx = match cached_request.maybe_finalize_untractable_package(self, logger) {
636 if !cached_request.requires_external_funding() {
637 return Some((new_timer, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx)));
639 return inputs.find_map(|input| match input {
640 // Commitment inputs with anchors support are the only untractable inputs supported
641 // thus far that require external funding.
642 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(output) => {
643 debug_assert_eq!(tx.0.txid(), self.holder_commitment.trust().txid(),
644 "Holder commitment transaction mismatch");
646 let conf_target = ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep;
647 let package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = cached_request
648 .compute_package_feerate(fee_estimator, conf_target, feerate_strategy);
649 if let Some(input_amount_sat) = output.funding_amount {
650 let fee_sat = input_amount_sat - tx.0.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
651 let commitment_tx_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight =
652 compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(fee_sat, tx.0.weight().to_wu());
653 if commitment_tx_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight >= package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight {
654 log_debug!(logger, "Pre-signed commitment {} already has feerate {} sat/kW above required {} sat/kW",
655 tx.0.txid(), commitment_tx_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
656 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight);
657 return Some((new_timer, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx.clone())));
661 // We'll locate an anchor output we can spend within the commitment transaction.
662 let funding_pubkey = &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey;
663 match chan_utils::get_anchor_output(&tx.0, funding_pubkey) {
664 // An anchor output was found, so we should yield a funding event externally.
666 // TODO: Use a lower confirmation target when both our and the
667 // counterparty's latest commitment don't have any HTLCs present.
670 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64,
671 OnchainClaim::Event(ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
672 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
673 commitment_tx: tx.0.clone(),
674 anchor_output_idx: idx,
678 // An anchor output was not found. There's nothing we can do other than
679 // attempt to broadcast the transaction with its current fee rate and hope
680 // it confirms. This is essentially the same behavior as a commitment
681 // transaction without anchor outputs.
682 None => Some((new_timer, 0, OnchainClaim::Tx(tx.clone()))),
686 debug_assert!(false, "Only HolderFundingOutput inputs should be untractable and require external funding");
694 pub fn abandon_claim(&mut self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint) {
695 let claim_id = self.claimable_outpoints.get(outpoint).map(|(claim_id, _)| *claim_id)
697 self.pending_claim_requests.iter()
698 .find(|(_, claim)| claim.outpoints().iter().any(|claim_outpoint| *claim_outpoint == outpoint))
699 .map(|(claim_id, _)| *claim_id)
701 if let Some(claim_id) = claim_id {
702 if let Some(claim) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_id) {
703 for outpoint in claim.outpoints() {
704 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(outpoint);
708 self.locktimed_packages.values_mut().for_each(|claims|
709 claims.retain(|claim| !claim.outpoints().iter().any(|claim_outpoint| *claim_outpoint == outpoint)));
713 /// Upon channelmonitor.block_connected(..) or upon provision of a preimage on the forward link
714 /// for this channel, provide new relevant on-chain transactions and/or new claim requests.
715 /// Together with `update_claims_view_from_matched_txn` this used to be named
716 /// `block_connected`, but it is now also used for claiming an HTLC output if we receive a
717 /// preimage after force-close.
719 /// `conf_height` represents the height at which the request was generated. This
720 /// does not need to equal the current blockchain tip height, which should be provided via
721 /// `cur_height`, however it must never be higher than `cur_height`.
722 pub(super) fn update_claims_view_from_requests<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Logger>(
723 &mut self, requests: Vec<PackageTemplate>, conf_height: u32, cur_height: u32,
724 broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
726 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
727 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
729 if !requests.is_empty() {
730 log_debug!(logger, "Updating claims view at height {} with {} claim requests", cur_height, requests.len());
733 let mut preprocessed_requests = Vec::with_capacity(requests.len());
734 let mut aggregated_request = None;
736 // Try to aggregate outputs if their timelock expiration isn't imminent (package timelock
737 // <= CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER) and they don't require an immediate nLockTime (aggregable).
738 for req in requests {
739 // Don't claim a outpoint twice that would be bad for privacy and may uselessly lock a CPFP input for a while
740 if let Some(_) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(req.outpoints()[0]) {
741 log_info!(logger, "Ignoring second claim for outpoint {}:{}, already registered its claiming request", req.outpoints()[0].txid, req.outpoints()[0].vout);
743 let timelocked_equivalent_package = self.locktimed_packages.iter().map(|v| v.1.iter()).flatten()
744 .find(|locked_package| locked_package.outpoints() == req.outpoints());
745 if let Some(package) = timelocked_equivalent_package {
746 log_info!(logger, "Ignoring second claim for outpoint {}:{}, we already have one which we're waiting on a timelock at {} for.",
747 req.outpoints()[0].txid, req.outpoints()[0].vout, package.package_locktime(cur_height));
751 let package_locktime = req.package_locktime(cur_height);
752 if package_locktime > cur_height + 1 {
753 log_info!(logger, "Delaying claim of package until its timelock at {} (current height {}), the following outpoints are spent:", package_locktime, cur_height);
754 for outpoint in req.outpoints() {
755 log_info!(logger, " Outpoint {}", outpoint);
757 self.locktimed_packages.entry(package_locktime).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(req);
761 log_trace!(logger, "Test if outpoint can be aggregated with expiration {} against {}", req.timelock(), cur_height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER);
762 if req.timelock() <= cur_height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER || !req.aggregable() {
763 // Don't aggregate if outpoint package timelock is soon or marked as non-aggregable
764 preprocessed_requests.push(req);
765 } else if aggregated_request.is_none() {
766 aggregated_request = Some(req);
768 aggregated_request.as_mut().unwrap().merge_package(req);
772 if let Some(req) = aggregated_request {
773 preprocessed_requests.push(req);
776 // Claim everything up to and including `cur_height`
777 let remaining_locked_packages = self.locktimed_packages.split_off(&(cur_height + 1));
778 if !self.locktimed_packages.is_empty() {
780 "Updating claims view at height {} with {} locked packages available for claim",
782 self.locktimed_packages.len());
784 for (pop_height, mut entry) in self.locktimed_packages.iter_mut() {
785 log_trace!(logger, "Restoring delayed claim of package(s) at their timelock at {}.", pop_height);
786 preprocessed_requests.append(&mut entry);
788 self.locktimed_packages = remaining_locked_packages;
790 // Generate claim transactions and track them to bump if necessary at
791 // height timer expiration (i.e in how many blocks we're going to take action).
792 for mut req in preprocessed_requests {
793 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, claim)) = self.generate_claim(
794 cur_height, &req, &FeerateStrategy::ForceBump, &*fee_estimator, &*logger,
796 req.set_timer(new_timer);
797 req.set_feerate(new_feerate);
798 // Once a pending claim has an id assigned, it remains fixed until the claim is
799 // satisfied, regardless of whether the claim switches between different variants of
801 let claim_id = match claim {
802 OnchainClaim::Tx(tx) => {
803 if tx.is_fully_signed() {
804 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(tx.0));
805 broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx.0]);
807 log_info!(logger, "Waiting for signature of unsigned onchain transaction {}", tx.0.txid());
809 ClaimId(tx.0.txid().to_byte_array())
811 OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
812 log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", req.outpoints());
813 let claim_id = match claim_event {
814 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment { ref commitment_tx, .. } =>
815 // For commitment claims, we can just use their txid as it should
816 // already be unique.
817 ClaimId(commitment_tx.txid().to_byte_array()),
818 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC { ref htlcs, .. } => {
819 // For HTLC claims, commit to the entire set of HTLC outputs to
820 // claim, which will always be unique per request. Once a claim ID
821 // is generated, it is assigned and remains unchanged, even if the
822 // underlying set of HTLCs changes.
823 let mut engine = Sha256::engine();
825 engine.input(&htlc.commitment_txid.to_byte_array());
826 engine.input(&htlc.htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap().to_be_bytes());
828 ClaimId(Sha256::from_engine(engine).to_byte_array())
831 debug_assert!(self.pending_claim_requests.get(&claim_id).is_none());
832 debug_assert_eq!(self.pending_claim_events.iter().filter(|entry| entry.0 == claim_id).count(), 0);
833 self.pending_claim_events.push((claim_id, claim_event));
837 // Because fuzzing can cause hash collisions, we can end up with conflicting claim
838 // ids here, so we only assert when not fuzzing.
839 debug_assert!(cfg!(fuzzing) || self.pending_claim_requests.get(&claim_id).is_none());
840 for k in req.outpoints() {
841 log_info!(logger, "Registering claiming request for {}:{}", k.txid, k.vout);
842 self.claimable_outpoints.insert(k.clone(), (claim_id, conf_height));
844 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(claim_id, req);
849 /// Upon channelmonitor.block_connected(..) or upon provision of a preimage on the forward link
850 /// for this channel, provide new relevant on-chain transactions and/or new claim requests.
851 /// Together with `update_claims_view_from_requests` this used to be named `block_connected`,
852 /// but it is now also used for claiming an HTLC output if we receive a preimage after force-close.
854 /// `conf_height` represents the height at which the transactions in `txn_matched` were
855 /// confirmed. This does not need to equal the current blockchain tip height, which should be
856 /// provided via `cur_height`, however it must never be higher than `cur_height`.
857 pub(super) fn update_claims_view_from_matched_txn<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Logger>(
858 &mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], conf_height: u32, conf_hash: BlockHash,
859 cur_height: u32, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
861 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
862 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
864 let mut have_logged_intro = false;
865 let mut maybe_log_intro = || {
866 if !have_logged_intro {
867 log_debug!(logger, "Updating claims view at height {} with {} matched transactions in block {}", cur_height, txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
868 have_logged_intro = true;
871 let mut bump_candidates = new_hash_map();
872 if !txn_matched.is_empty() { maybe_log_intro(); }
873 for tx in txn_matched {
874 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
875 let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
876 for inp in &tx.input {
877 if let Some((claim_id, _)) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
878 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
879 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(claim_id) {
880 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
881 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
883 let mut are_sets_equal = true;
884 let mut tx_inputs = tx.input.iter().map(|input| &input.previous_output).collect::<Vec<_>>();
885 tx_inputs.sort_unstable();
886 for request_input in request.outpoints() {
887 if tx_inputs.binary_search(&request_input).is_err() {
888 are_sets_equal = false;
893 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
895 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
898 block_hash: Some(conf_hash),
899 event: OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_id: *claim_id }
901 if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.contains(&entry) {
902 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
907 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
908 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
909 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
911 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
912 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
913 let mut at_least_one_drop = false;
914 for input in tx.input.iter() {
915 if let Some(package) = request.split_package(&input.previous_output) {
916 claimed_outputs_material.push(package);
917 at_least_one_drop = true;
919 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
920 if request.outpoints().is_empty() {
921 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
924 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
925 if at_least_one_drop {
926 bump_candidates.insert(*claim_id, request.clone());
927 // If we have any pending claim events for the request being updated
928 // that have yet to be consumed, we'll remove them since they will
929 // end up producing an invalid transaction by double spending
930 // input(s) that already have a confirmed spend. If such spend is
931 // reorged out of the chain, then we'll attempt to re-spend the
932 // inputs once we see it.
933 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
934 let existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
935 .filter(|entry| entry.0 == *claim_id).count();
936 assert!(existing == 0 || existing == 1);
938 self.pending_claim_events.retain(|entry| entry.0 != *claim_id);
941 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
943 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
947 for package in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
948 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
951 block_hash: Some(conf_hash),
952 event: OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package },
954 if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.contains(&entry) {
955 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
960 // After security delay, either our claim tx got enough confs or outpoint is definetely out of reach
961 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
962 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
963 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
964 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(cur_height) {
967 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_id } => {
968 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
969 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
970 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_id) {
971 for outpoint in request.outpoints() {
972 log_debug!(logger, "Removing claim tracking for {} due to maturation of claim package {}.",
973 outpoint, log_bytes!(claim_id.0));
974 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(outpoint);
976 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
977 let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
978 .filter(|entry| entry.0 == claim_id).count();
979 assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1);
981 self.pending_claim_events.retain(|(id, _)| *id != claim_id);
984 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package } => {
985 log_debug!(logger, "Removing claim tracking due to maturation of claim tx for outpoints:");
986 log_debug!(logger, " {:?}", package.outpoints());
987 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(package.outpoints()[0]);
991 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
995 // Check if any pending claim request must be rescheduled
996 for (claim_id, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
997 if cur_height >= request.timer() {
998 bump_candidates.insert(*claim_id, request.clone());
1002 // Build, bump and rebroadcast tx accordingly
1003 if !bump_candidates.is_empty() {
1005 log_trace!(logger, "Bumping {} candidates", bump_candidates.len());
1008 for (claim_id, request) in bump_candidates.iter() {
1009 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_claim)) = self.generate_claim(
1010 cur_height, &request, &FeerateStrategy::ForceBump, &*fee_estimator, &*logger,
1013 OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => {
1014 if bump_tx.is_fully_signed() {
1015 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting RBF-bumped onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx.0));
1016 broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&bump_tx.0]);
1018 log_info!(logger, "Waiting for signature of RBF-bumped unsigned onchain transaction {}",
1022 OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
1023 log_info!(logger, "Yielding RBF-bumped onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints());
1024 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1025 let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter().
1026 filter(|entry| entry.0 == *claim_id).count();
1027 assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1);
1029 self.pending_claim_events.retain(|event| event.0 != *claim_id);
1030 self.pending_claim_events.push((*claim_id, claim_event));
1033 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(claim_id) {
1034 request.set_timer(new_timer);
1035 request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
1041 pub(super) fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Logger>(
1045 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1048 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1049 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1051 let mut height = None;
1052 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1053 if entry.txid == *txid {
1054 height = Some(entry.height);
1059 if let Some(height) = height {
1060 self.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1064 pub(super) fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Logger>(&mut self, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
1065 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1066 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1068 let mut bump_candidates = new_hash_map();
1069 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
1070 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
1071 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
1072 if entry.height >= height {
1073 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
1074 //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
1076 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package } => {
1077 if let Some(pending_claim) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(package.outpoints()[0]) {
1078 if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&pending_claim.0) {
1079 request.merge_package(package);
1080 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
1081 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
1082 bump_candidates.insert(pending_claim.clone(), request.clone());
1089 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1092 for ((_claim_id, _), ref mut request) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
1093 // `height` is the height being disconnected, so our `current_height` is 1 lower.
1094 let current_height = height - 1;
1095 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_claim)) = self.generate_claim(
1096 current_height, &request, &FeerateStrategy::ForceBump, fee_estimator, logger
1098 request.set_timer(new_timer);
1099 request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
1101 OnchainClaim::Tx(bump_tx) => {
1102 if bump_tx.is_fully_signed() {
1103 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx.0));
1104 broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&bump_tx.0]);
1106 log_info!(logger, "Waiting for signature of unsigned onchain transaction {}", bump_tx.0.txid());
1109 OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => {
1110 log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event after reorg to spend inputs {:?}", request.outpoints());
1111 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1112 let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter()
1113 .filter(|entry| entry.0 == *_claim_id).count();
1114 assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1);
1116 self.pending_claim_events.retain(|event| event.0 != *_claim_id);
1117 self.pending_claim_events.push((*_claim_id, claim_event));
1122 for (ancestor_claim_txid, request) in bump_candidates.drain() {
1123 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, request);
1125 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
1126 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
1127 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
1128 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
1130 remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
1133 for req in remove_request {
1134 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
1138 pub(crate) fn is_output_spend_pending(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint) -> bool {
1139 self.claimable_outpoints.get(outpoint).is_some()
1142 pub(crate) fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1143 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1145 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.height, entry.block_hash))
1147 txids.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0).then(b.1.cmp(&a.1)));
1148 txids.dedup_by_key(|(txid, _, _)| *txid);
1152 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_holder_tx(&mut self, tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) {
1153 self.prev_holder_commitment = Some(replace(&mut self.holder_commitment, tx));
1156 pub(crate) fn get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx(&self) -> &Transaction {
1157 &self.holder_commitment.trust().built_transaction().transaction
1160 pub(crate) fn get_maybe_signed_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> MaybeSignedTransaction {
1161 let tx = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx)
1162 .map(|sig| self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig))
1163 .unwrap_or_else(|_| self.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx().clone());
1164 MaybeSignedTransaction(tx)
1167 #[cfg(any(test, feature="unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1168 pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Transaction {
1169 let sig = self.signer.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign holder commitment");
1170 self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)
1173 pub(crate) fn get_maybe_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<MaybeSignedTransaction> {
1174 let get_signed_htlc_tx = |holder_commitment: &HolderCommitmentTransaction| {
1175 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment.trust();
1176 if trusted_tx.txid() != outp.txid {
1179 let (htlc_idx, htlc) = trusted_tx.htlcs().iter().enumerate()
1180 .find(|(_, htlc)| htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() == outp.vout)
1182 let counterparty_htlc_sig = holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[htlc_idx];
1183 let mut htlc_tx = trusted_tx.build_unsigned_htlc_tx(
1184 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), htlc_idx, preimage,
1187 let htlc_descriptor = HTLCDescriptor {
1188 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
1189 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
1190 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
1191 transaction_parameters: self.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
1193 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
1194 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
1195 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
1196 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1198 preimage: preimage.clone(),
1199 counterparty_sig: counterparty_htlc_sig.clone(),
1201 if let Ok(htlc_sig) = self.signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &htlc_descriptor, &self.secp_ctx) {
1202 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness(
1203 htlc_idx, &counterparty_htlc_sig, &htlc_sig, preimage,
1206 Some(MaybeSignedTransaction(htlc_tx))
1209 // Check if the HTLC spends from the current holder commitment first, or the previous.
1210 get_signed_htlc_tx(&self.holder_commitment)
1211 .or_else(|| self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().and_then(|prev_holder_commitment| get_signed_htlc_tx(prev_holder_commitment)))
1214 pub(crate) fn generate_external_htlc_claim(
1215 &self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>
1216 ) -> Option<ExternalHTLCClaim> {
1217 let find_htlc = |holder_commitment: &HolderCommitmentTransaction| -> Option<ExternalHTLCClaim> {
1218 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment.trust();
1219 if outp.txid != trusted_tx.txid() {
1222 trusted_tx.htlcs().iter().enumerate()
1223 .find(|(_, htlc)| if let Some(output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1224 output_index == outp.vout
1228 .map(|(htlc_idx, htlc)| {
1229 let counterparty_htlc_sig = holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[htlc_idx];
1231 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
1232 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
1234 preimage: *preimage,
1235 counterparty_sig: counterparty_htlc_sig,
1239 // Check if the HTLC spends from the current holder commitment or the previous one otherwise.
1240 find_htlc(&self.holder_commitment)
1241 .or_else(|| self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().map(|c| find_htlc(c)).flatten())
1244 pub(crate) fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1245 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features