1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities to assemble claimable outpoints in package of one or more transactions. Those
11 //! packages are attached metadata, guiding their aggregable or fee-bumping re-schedule. This file
12 //! also includes witness weight computation and fee computation methods.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,TxIn, Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
23 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
24 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
25 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
26 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
27 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
28 use crate::chain::keysinterface::Sign;
29 use crate::chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
30 use crate::util::byte_utils;
31 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
32 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable};
35 use crate::prelude::*;
38 use core::convert::TryInto;
41 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
43 use super::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
45 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
48 pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
49 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
50 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133;
51 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
52 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC }
55 pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
56 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
57 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139;
58 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
59 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC }
62 pub(crate) fn weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
63 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
64 const WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133;
65 const WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
66 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC }
69 pub(crate) fn weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
70 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig + empty_vec_length + empty_vec + witness_script_length + witness_script
71 const WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139;
72 const WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
73 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC }
76 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
77 pub(crate) const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77;
79 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a low priority.
80 const LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 15;
81 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a middle priority.
82 const MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 3;
83 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a high priority.
84 const HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 1;
86 /// A struct to describe a revoked output and corresponding information to generate a solving
87 /// witness spending a commitment `to_local` output or a second-stage HTLC transaction output.
89 /// CSV and pubkeys are used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used
90 /// as part of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
91 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
92 pub(crate) struct RevokedOutput {
93 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
94 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
95 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
96 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
99 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
103 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16) -> Self {
105 per_commitment_point,
106 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
107 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
109 weight: WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT,
111 on_counterparty_tx_csv
116 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RevokedOutput, {
117 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
118 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
119 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
120 (6, per_commitment_key, required),
121 (8, weight, required),
122 (10, amount, required),
123 (12, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
126 /// A struct to describe a revoked offered output and corresponding information to generate a
129 /// HTLCOuputInCommitment (hash timelock, direction) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
132 /// CSV is used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used as part
133 /// of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
134 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
135 pub(crate) struct RevokedHTLCOutput {
136 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
137 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
138 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
139 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
142 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
145 impl RevokedHTLCOutput {
146 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
147 let weight = if htlc.offered { weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) } else { weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors) };
149 per_commitment_point,
150 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
151 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
160 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RevokedHTLCOutput, {
161 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
162 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
163 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
164 (6, per_commitment_key, required),
165 (8, weight, required),
166 (10, amount, required),
167 (12, htlc, required),
170 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
172 /// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
175 /// The preimage is used as part of the witness.
176 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
178 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
179 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
180 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
181 preimage: PaymentPreimage,
182 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
183 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
186 impl CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
187 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, preimage: PaymentPreimage, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
188 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
189 per_commitment_point,
190 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
191 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
194 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
198 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
199 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
203 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, {
204 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
205 (1, opt_anchors, option),
206 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
207 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
208 (6, preimage, required),
212 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
214 /// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
216 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
217 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
218 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
219 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
220 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
221 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
222 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
225 impl CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
226 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
227 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
228 per_commitment_point,
229 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
230 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
232 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
236 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
237 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
241 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, {
242 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
243 (1, opt_anchors, option),
244 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
245 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
249 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on holder commitment transaction.
251 /// Either offered or received, the amount is always used as part of the bip143 sighash.
252 /// Preimage is only included as part of the witness in former case.
253 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
254 pub(crate) struct HolderHTLCOutput {
255 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
257 /// Defaults to 0 for HTLC-Success transactions, which have no expiry
261 impl HolderHTLCOutput {
262 pub(crate) fn build_offered(amount: u64, cltv_expiry: u32) -> Self {
270 pub(crate) fn build_accepted(preimage: PaymentPreimage, amount: u64) -> Self {
272 preimage: Some(preimage),
279 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderHTLCOutput, {
280 (0, amount, required),
281 (2, cltv_expiry, required),
282 (4, preimage, option)
285 /// A struct to describe the channel output on the funding transaction.
287 /// witnessScript is used as part of the witness redeeming the funding utxo.
288 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
289 pub(crate) struct HolderFundingOutput {
290 funding_redeemscript: Script,
291 funding_amount: Option<u64>,
292 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
296 impl HolderFundingOutput {
297 pub(crate) fn build(funding_redeemscript: Script, funding_amount: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
298 HolderFundingOutput {
299 funding_redeemscript,
300 funding_amount: Some(funding_amount),
301 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
305 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
306 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
310 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderFundingOutput, {
311 (0, funding_redeemscript, required),
312 (1, opt_anchors, option),
313 (3, funding_amount, option),
316 /// A wrapper encapsulating all in-protocol differing outputs types.
318 /// The generic API offers access to an outputs common attributes or allow transformation such as
319 /// finalizing an input claiming the output.
320 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
321 pub(crate) enum PackageSolvingData {
322 RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput),
323 RevokedHTLCOutput(RevokedHTLCOutput),
324 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput),
325 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput),
326 HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput),
327 HolderFundingOutput(HolderFundingOutput),
330 impl PackageSolvingData {
331 fn amount(&self) -> u64 {
332 let amt = match self {
333 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => outp.amount,
334 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.amount,
335 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
336 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
337 // Note: Currently, amounts of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
338 // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
339 // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
340 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => unreachable!(),
341 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => {
342 debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
343 outp.funding_amount.unwrap()
348 fn weight(&self) -> usize {
349 let weight = match self {
350 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => { outp.weight as usize },
351 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.weight as usize },
352 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { weight_offered_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize },
353 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { weight_received_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize },
354 // Note: Currently, weights of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
355 // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
356 // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
357 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
358 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
362 fn is_compatible(&self, input: &PackageSolvingData) -> bool {
364 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => {
366 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { true },
367 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { true },
371 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => {
373 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { true },
374 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { true },
378 _ => { mem::discriminant(self) == mem::discriminant(&input) }
381 fn finalize_input<Signer: Sign>(&self, bumped_tx: &mut Transaction, i: usize, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> bool {
383 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => {
384 if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
385 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&chan_keys.revocation_key, outp.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &chan_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key);
386 //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
387 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
388 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
389 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
390 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
391 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
392 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
393 } else { return false; }
396 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
397 if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
398 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
399 //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
400 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
401 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
402 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
403 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
404 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(chan_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec());
405 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
406 } else { return false; }
409 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
410 if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
411 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
413 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
414 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
415 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
416 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
417 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(outp.preimage.0.to_vec());
418 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
422 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
423 if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
424 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
426 bumped_tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(outp.htlc.cltv_expiry); // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation
427 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
428 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
429 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
430 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
431 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
432 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
433 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
437 _ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
441 fn get_finalized_tx<Signer: Sign>(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> Option<Transaction> {
443 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { return onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outpoint, &outp.preimage); }
444 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => { return Some(onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&outp.funding_redeemscript)); }
445 _ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
448 fn absolute_tx_timelock(&self, output_conf_height: u32) -> u32 {
449 // Get the absolute timelock at which this output can be spent given the height at which
450 // this output was confirmed. We use `output_conf_height + 1` as a safe default as we can
451 // be confirmed in the next block and transactions with time lock `current_height + 1`
453 let absolute_timelock = match self {
454 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
455 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
456 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
457 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => cmp::max(outp.htlc.cltv_expiry, output_conf_height + 1),
458 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => cmp::max(outp.cltv_expiry, output_conf_height + 1),
459 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
465 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PackageSolvingData, ;
467 (1, RevokedHTLCOutput),
468 (2, CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput),
469 (3, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput),
470 (4, HolderHTLCOutput),
471 (5, HolderFundingOutput),
474 /// A malleable package might be aggregated with other packages to save on fees.
475 /// A untractable package has been counter-signed and aggregable will break cached counterparty
477 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
478 pub(crate) enum PackageMalleability {
483 /// A structure to describe a package content that is generated by ChannelMonitor and
484 /// used by OnchainTxHandler to generate and broadcast transactions settling onchain claims.
486 /// A package is defined as one or more transactions claiming onchain outputs in reaction
487 /// to confirmation of a channel transaction. Those packages might be aggregated to save on
488 /// fees, if satisfaction of outputs's witnessScript let's us do so.
490 /// As packages are time-sensitive, we fee-bump and rebroadcast them at scheduled intervals.
491 /// Failing to confirm a package translate as a loss of funds for the user.
492 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
493 pub struct PackageTemplate {
494 // List of onchain outputs and solving data to generate satisfying witnesses.
495 inputs: Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, PackageSolvingData)>,
496 // Packages are deemed as malleable if we have local knwoledge of at least one set of
497 // private keys yielding a satisfying witnesses. Malleability implies that we can aggregate
498 // packages among them to save on fees or rely on RBF to bump their feerates.
499 // Untractable packages have been counter-signed and thus imply that we can't aggregate
500 // them without breaking signatures. Fee-bumping strategy will also rely on CPFP.
501 malleability: PackageMalleability,
502 // Block height after which the earlier-output belonging to this package is mature for a
503 // competing claim by the counterparty. As our chain tip becomes nearer from the timelock,
504 // the fee-bumping frequency will increase. See `OnchainTxHandler::get_height_timer`.
505 soonest_conf_deadline: u32,
506 // Determines if this package can be aggregated.
507 // Timelocked outputs belonging to the same transaction might have differing
508 // satisfying heights. Picking up the later height among the output set would be a valid
509 // aggregable strategy but it comes with at least 2 trade-offs :
510 // * earlier-output fund are going to take longer to come back
511 // * CLTV delta backing up a corresponding HTLC on an upstream channel could be swallowed
512 // by the requirement of the later-output part of the set
513 // For now, we mark such timelocked outputs as non-aggregable, though we might introduce
514 // smarter aggregable strategy in the future.
516 // Cache of package feerate committed at previous (re)broadcast. If bumping resources
517 // (either claimed output value or external utxo), it will keep increasing until holder
518 // or counterparty successful claim.
519 feerate_previous: u64,
520 // Cache of next height at which fee-bumping and rebroadcast will be attempted. In
521 // the future, we might abstract it to an observed mempool fluctuation.
522 height_timer: Option<u32>,
523 // Confirmation height of the claimed outputs set transaction. In case of reorg reaching
524 // it, we wipe out and forget the package.
525 height_original: u32,
528 impl PackageTemplate {
529 pub(crate) fn is_malleable(&self) -> bool {
530 self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Malleable
532 pub(crate) fn timelock(&self) -> u32 {
533 self.soonest_conf_deadline
535 pub(crate) fn aggregable(&self) -> bool {
538 pub(crate) fn set_feerate(&mut self, new_feerate: u64) {
539 self.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
541 pub(crate) fn timer(&self) -> Option<u32> {
542 if let Some(ref timer) = self.height_timer {
547 pub(crate) fn set_timer(&mut self, new_timer: Option<u32>) {
548 self.height_timer = new_timer;
550 pub(crate) fn outpoints(&self) -> Vec<&BitcoinOutPoint> {
551 self.inputs.iter().map(|(o, _)| o).collect()
553 pub(crate) fn inputs(&self) -> impl ExactSizeIterator<Item = &PackageSolvingData> {
554 self.inputs.iter().map(|(_, i)| i)
556 pub(crate) fn split_package(&mut self, split_outp: &BitcoinOutPoint) -> Option<PackageTemplate> {
557 match self.malleability {
558 PackageMalleability::Malleable => {
559 let mut split_package = None;
560 let timelock = self.soonest_conf_deadline;
561 let aggregable = self.aggregable;
562 let feerate_previous = self.feerate_previous;
563 let height_timer = self.height_timer;
564 let height_original = self.height_original;
565 self.inputs.retain(|outp| {
566 if *split_outp == outp.0 {
567 split_package = Some(PackageTemplate {
568 inputs: vec![(outp.0, outp.1.clone())],
569 malleability: PackageMalleability::Malleable,
570 soonest_conf_deadline: timelock,
580 return split_package;
583 // Note, we may try to split on remote transaction for
584 // which we don't have a competing one (HTLC-Success before
585 // timelock expiration). This explain we don't panic!
586 // We should refactor OnchainTxHandler::block_connected to
587 // only test equality on competing claims.
592 pub(crate) fn merge_package(&mut self, mut merge_from: PackageTemplate) {
593 assert_eq!(self.height_original, merge_from.height_original);
594 if self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Untractable || merge_from.malleability == PackageMalleability::Untractable {
595 panic!("Merging template on untractable packages");
597 if !self.aggregable || !merge_from.aggregable {
598 panic!("Merging non aggregatable packages");
600 if let Some((_, lead_input)) = self.inputs.first() {
601 for (_, v) in merge_from.inputs.iter() {
602 if !lead_input.is_compatible(v) { panic!("Merging outputs from differing types !"); }
604 } else { panic!("Merging template on an empty package"); }
605 for (k, v) in merge_from.inputs.drain(..) {
606 self.inputs.push((k, v));
608 //TODO: verify coverage and sanity?
609 if self.soonest_conf_deadline > merge_from.soonest_conf_deadline {
610 self.soonest_conf_deadline = merge_from.soonest_conf_deadline;
612 if self.feerate_previous > merge_from.feerate_previous {
613 self.feerate_previous = merge_from.feerate_previous;
615 self.height_timer = cmp::min(self.height_timer, merge_from.height_timer);
617 /// Gets the amount of all outptus being spent by this package, only valid for malleable
619 pub(crate) fn package_amount(&self) -> u64 {
621 for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
622 amounts += outp.amount();
626 pub(crate) fn package_timelock(&self) -> u32 {
627 self.inputs.iter().map(|(_, outp)| outp.absolute_tx_timelock(self.height_original))
628 .max().expect("There must always be at least one output to spend in a PackageTemplate")
630 pub(crate) fn package_weight(&self, destination_script: &Script) -> usize {
631 let mut inputs_weight = 0;
632 let mut witnesses_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
633 for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
634 // previous_out_point: 36 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; sequence: 4 bytes
635 inputs_weight += 41 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
636 witnesses_weight += outp.weight();
638 // version: 4 bytes ; count_tx_in: 1 byte ; count_tx_out: 1 byte ; lock_time: 4 bytes
639 let transaction_weight = 10 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
640 // value: 8 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; pk_script: `destination_script.len()`
641 let output_weight = (8 + 1 + destination_script.len()) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
642 inputs_weight + witnesses_weight + transaction_weight + output_weight
644 pub(crate) fn finalize_malleable_package<L: Deref, Signer: Sign>(
645 &self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, value: u64, destination_script: Script, logger: &L
646 ) -> Option<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
647 debug_assert!(self.is_malleable());
648 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
650 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
653 script_pubkey: destination_script,
657 for (outpoint, _) in self.inputs.iter() {
658 bumped_tx.input.push(TxIn {
659 previous_output: *outpoint,
660 script_sig: Script::new(),
661 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
662 witness: Witness::new(),
665 for (i, (outpoint, out)) in self.inputs.iter().enumerate() {
666 log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
667 if !out.finalize_input(&mut bumped_tx, i, onchain_handler) { return None; }
669 log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", bumped_tx.txid());
672 pub(crate) fn finalize_untractable_package<L: Deref, Signer: Sign>(
673 &self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, logger: &L,
674 ) -> Option<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
675 debug_assert!(!self.is_malleable());
676 if let Some((outpoint, outp)) = self.inputs.first() {
677 if let Some(final_tx) = outp.get_finalized_tx(outpoint, onchain_handler) {
678 log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
679 log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", final_tx.txid());
680 return Some(final_tx);
683 } else { panic!("API Error: Package must not be inputs empty"); }
685 /// In LN, output claimed are time-sensitive, which means we have to spend them before reaching some timelock expiration. At in-channel
686 /// output detection, we generate a first version of a claim tx and associate to it a height timer. A height timer is an absolute block
687 /// height that once reached we should generate a new bumped "version" of the claim tx to be sure that we safely claim outputs before
688 /// that our counterparty can do so. If timelock expires soon, height timer is going to be scaled down in consequence to increase
689 /// frequency of the bump and so increase our bets of success.
690 pub(crate) fn get_height_timer(&self, current_height: u32) -> u32 {
691 if self.soonest_conf_deadline <= current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
692 return current_height + HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
693 } else if self.soonest_conf_deadline - current_height <= LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
694 return current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
696 current_height + LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
699 /// Returns value in satoshis to be included as package outgoing output amount and feerate
700 /// which was used to generate the value. Will not return less than `dust_limit_sats` for the
702 pub(crate) fn compute_package_output<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, predicted_weight: usize, dust_limit_sats: u64, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
703 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
706 debug_assert!(self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Malleable, "The package output is fixed for non-malleable packages");
707 let input_amounts = self.package_amount();
708 assert!(dust_limit_sats as i64 > 0, "Output script must be broadcastable/have a 'real' dust limit.");
709 // If old feerate is 0, first iteration of this claim, use normal fee calculation
710 if self.feerate_previous != 0 {
711 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = feerate_bump(predicted_weight, input_amounts, self.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, logger) {
712 return Some((cmp::max(input_amounts as i64 - new_fee as i64, dust_limit_sats as i64) as u64, feerate));
715 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
716 return Some((cmp::max(input_amounts as i64 - new_fee as i64, dust_limit_sats as i64) as u64, feerate));
723 /// Computes a feerate based on the given confirmation target. If a previous feerate was used,
724 /// and the new feerate is below it, we'll use a 25% increase of the previous feerate instead of
726 pub(crate) fn compute_package_feerate<F: Deref>(
727 &self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget,
728 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
729 let feerate_estimate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(conf_target);
730 if self.feerate_previous != 0 {
731 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
732 if feerate_estimate as u64 > self.feerate_previous {
735 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
736 (self.feerate_previous + (self.feerate_previous / 4)).try_into().unwrap_or(u32::max_value())
743 /// Determines whether a package contains an input which must have additional external inputs
744 /// attached to help the spending transaction reach confirmation.
745 pub(crate) fn requires_external_funding(&self) -> bool {
746 self.inputs.iter().find(|input| match input.1 {
747 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => outp.opt_anchors(),
752 pub (crate) fn build_package(txid: Txid, vout: u32, input_solving_data: PackageSolvingData, soonest_conf_deadline: u32, aggregable: bool, height_original: u32) -> Self {
753 let malleability = match input_solving_data {
754 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
755 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
756 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
757 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
758 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Untractable,
759 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Untractable,
761 let mut inputs = Vec::with_capacity(1);
762 inputs.push((BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout }, input_solving_data));
766 soonest_conf_deadline,
775 impl Writeable for PackageTemplate {
776 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
777 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.inputs.len() as u64))?;
778 for (ref outpoint, ref rev_outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
779 outpoint.write(writer)?;
780 rev_outp.write(writer)?;
782 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
783 (0, self.soonest_conf_deadline, required),
784 (2, self.feerate_previous, required),
785 (4, self.height_original, required),
786 (6, self.height_timer, option)
792 impl Readable for PackageTemplate {
793 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
794 let inputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
795 let mut inputs: Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, PackageSolvingData)> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(inputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
796 for _ in 0..inputs_count {
797 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
798 let rev_outp = Readable::read(reader)?;
799 inputs.push((outpoint, rev_outp));
801 let (malleability, aggregable) = if let Some((_, lead_input)) = inputs.first() {
803 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
804 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
805 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
806 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, false) },
807 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false) },
808 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false) },
810 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); };
811 let mut soonest_conf_deadline = 0;
812 let mut feerate_previous = 0;
813 let mut height_timer = None;
814 let mut height_original = 0;
815 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
816 (0, soonest_conf_deadline, required),
817 (2, feerate_previous, required),
818 (4, height_original, required),
819 (6, height_timer, option),
824 soonest_conf_deadline,
833 /// Attempt to propose a bumping fee for a transaction from its spent output's values and predicted
834 /// weight. We start with the highest priority feerate returned by the node's fee estimator then
835 /// fall-back to lower priorities until we have enough value available to suck from.
837 /// If the proposed fee is less than the available spent output's values, we return the proposed
838 /// fee and the corresponding updated feerate. If the proposed fee is equal or more than the
839 /// available spent output's values, we return nothing
840 fn compute_fee_from_spent_amounts<F: Deref, L: Deref>(input_amounts: u64, predicted_weight: usize, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
841 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
844 let mut updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64;
845 let mut fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
846 if input_amounts <= fee {
847 updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64;
848 fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
849 if input_amounts <= fee {
850 updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u64;
851 fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
852 if input_amounts <= fee {
853 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
857 log_warn!(logger, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
859 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
862 log_warn!(logger, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
864 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
867 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
871 /// Attempt to propose a bumping fee for a transaction from its spent output's values and predicted
872 /// weight. If feerates proposed by the fee-estimator have been increasing since last fee-bumping
873 /// attempt, use them. Otherwise, blindly bump the feerate by 25% of the previous feerate. We also
874 /// verify that those bumping heuristics respect BIP125 rules 3) and 4) and if required adjust
875 /// the new fee to meet the RBF policy requirement.
876 fn feerate_bump<F: Deref, L: Deref>(predicted_weight: usize, input_amounts: u64, previous_feerate: u64, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
877 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
880 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
881 let new_fee = if let Some((new_fee, _)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
882 let updated_feerate = new_fee / (predicted_weight as u64 * 1000);
883 if updated_feerate > previous_feerate {
886 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
887 let new_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 750;
888 if input_amounts <= new_fee {
889 log_warn!(logger, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
895 log_warn!(logger, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
899 let previous_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
900 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
901 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
902 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
903 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
904 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
905 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
909 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / (predicted_weight as u64)))
914 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageTemplate, PackageSolvingData, RevokedOutput, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc};
915 use crate::chain::Txid;
916 use crate::ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
917 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
919 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
920 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
921 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
923 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
925 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
926 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
928 macro_rules! dumb_revk_output {
929 ($secp_ctx: expr) => {
931 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
932 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
933 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_scalar, 0, 0))
938 macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_output {
939 ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
941 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
942 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
943 let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
944 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: true, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 0, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
945 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, htlc, $opt_anchors))
950 macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_offered_output {
951 ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
953 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
954 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
955 let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
956 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
957 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: false, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 1000, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
958 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, preimage, htlc, $opt_anchors))
963 macro_rules! dumb_htlc_output {
966 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
967 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(preimage, 0))
974 fn test_package_differing_heights() {
975 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
976 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
977 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
979 let mut package_one_hundred = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
980 let package_two_hundred = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 200);
981 package_one_hundred.merge_package(package_two_hundred);
986 fn test_package_untractable_merge_to() {
987 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
988 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
989 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
990 let htlc_outp = dumb_htlc_output!();
992 let mut untractable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
993 let malleable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, htlc_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
994 untractable_package.merge_package(malleable_package);
999 fn test_package_untractable_merge_from() {
1000 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1001 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1002 let htlc_outp = dumb_htlc_output!();
1003 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1005 let mut malleable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, htlc_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1006 let untractable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1007 malleable_package.merge_package(untractable_package);
1012 fn test_package_noaggregation_to() {
1013 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1014 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1015 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1017 let mut noaggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, false, 100);
1018 let aggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1019 noaggregation_package.merge_package(aggregation_package);
1024 fn test_package_noaggregation_from() {
1025 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1026 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1027 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1029 let mut aggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1030 let noaggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, false, 100);
1031 aggregation_package.merge_package(noaggregation_package);
1036 fn test_package_empty() {
1037 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1038 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1039 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1041 let mut empty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1042 empty_package.inputs = vec![];
1043 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1044 empty_package.merge_package(package);
1049 fn test_package_differing_categories() {
1050 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1051 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1052 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1053 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 0, false);
1055 let mut revoked_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1056 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1057 revoked_package.merge_package(counterparty_package);
1061 fn test_package_split_malleable() {
1062 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1063 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1064 let revk_outp_one = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1065 let revk_outp_two = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1066 let revk_outp_three = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1068 let mut package_one = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp_one, 1000, true, 100);
1069 let package_two = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp_two, 1000, true, 100);
1070 let package_three = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 2, revk_outp_three, 1000, true, 100);
1072 package_one.merge_package(package_two);
1073 package_one.merge_package(package_three);
1074 assert_eq!(package_one.outpoints().len(), 3);
1076 if let Some(split_package) = package_one.split_package(&BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout: 1 }) {
1077 // Packages attributes should be identical
1078 assert!(split_package.is_malleable());
1079 assert_eq!(split_package.soonest_conf_deadline, package_one.soonest_conf_deadline);
1080 assert_eq!(split_package.aggregable, package_one.aggregable);
1081 assert_eq!(split_package.feerate_previous, package_one.feerate_previous);
1082 assert_eq!(split_package.height_timer, package_one.height_timer);
1083 assert_eq!(split_package.height_original, package_one.height_original);
1084 } else { panic!(); }
1085 assert_eq!(package_one.outpoints().len(), 2);
1089 fn test_package_split_untractable() {
1090 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1091 let htlc_outp_one = dumb_htlc_output!();
1093 let mut package_one = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, htlc_outp_one, 1000, true, 100);
1094 let ret_split = package_one.split_package(&BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout: 0});
1095 assert!(ret_split.is_none());
1099 fn test_package_timer() {
1100 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1101 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1102 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1104 let mut package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1105 let timer_none = package.timer();
1106 assert!(timer_none.is_none());
1107 package.set_timer(Some(100));
1108 if let Some(timer_some) = package.timer() {
1109 assert_eq!(timer_some, 100);
1114 fn test_package_amounts() {
1115 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1116 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1117 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, false);
1119 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1120 assert_eq!(package.package_amount(), 1000);
1124 fn test_package_weight() {
1125 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1126 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1128 // (nVersion (4) + nLocktime (4) + count_tx_in (1) + prevout (36) + sequence (4) + script_length (1) + count_tx_out (1) + value (8) + var_int (1)) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR + witness marker (2)
1129 let weight_sans_output = (4 + 4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 8 + 1) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR + 2;
1132 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1133 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 0, true, 100);
1134 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT as usize);
1138 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
1139 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
1140 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1141 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
1146 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
1147 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_offered_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
1148 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1149 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);