1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities to assemble claimable outpoints in package of one or more transactions. Those
11 //! packages are attached metadata, guiding their aggregable or fee-bumping re-schedule. This file
12 //! also includes witness weight computation and fee computation methods.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,TxIn, Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
23 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
24 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
25 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
26 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
27 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
28 use crate::sign::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
30 use crate::chain::onchaintx::ExternalHTLCClaim;
31 use crate::chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
32 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
33 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable};
36 use crate::prelude::*;
39 use core::convert::TryInto;
42 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
44 use super::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
46 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
49 pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
50 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
51 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133;
52 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
53 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC }
56 pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
57 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
58 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139;
59 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
60 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC }
63 pub(crate) fn weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
64 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
65 const WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133;
66 const WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
67 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC }
70 pub(crate) fn weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
71 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig + empty_vec_length + empty_vec + witness_script_length + witness_script
72 const WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139;
73 const WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
74 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC }
77 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
78 pub(crate) const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77;
80 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a low priority.
81 const LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 15;
82 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a middle priority.
83 const MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 3;
84 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a high priority.
85 const HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 1;
87 /// A struct to describe a revoked output and corresponding information to generate a solving
88 /// witness spending a commitment `to_local` output or a second-stage HTLC transaction output.
90 /// CSV and pubkeys are used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used
91 /// as part of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
92 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
93 pub(crate) struct RevokedOutput {
94 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
95 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
96 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
97 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
100 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
101 is_counterparty_balance_on_anchors: Option<()>,
105 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, is_counterparty_balance_on_anchors: bool) -> Self {
107 per_commitment_point,
108 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
109 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
111 weight: WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT,
113 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
114 is_counterparty_balance_on_anchors: if is_counterparty_balance_on_anchors { Some(()) } else { None }
119 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RevokedOutput, {
120 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
121 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
122 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
123 (6, per_commitment_key, required),
124 (8, weight, required),
125 (10, amount, required),
126 (12, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
127 (14, is_counterparty_balance_on_anchors, option)
130 /// A struct to describe a revoked offered output and corresponding information to generate a
133 /// HTLCOuputInCommitment (hash timelock, direction) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
136 /// CSV is used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used as part
137 /// of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
138 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
139 pub(crate) struct RevokedHTLCOutput {
140 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
141 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
142 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
143 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
146 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
149 impl RevokedHTLCOutput {
150 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
151 let weight = if htlc.offered { weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) } else { weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors) };
153 per_commitment_point,
154 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
155 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
164 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RevokedHTLCOutput, {
165 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
166 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
167 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
168 (6, per_commitment_key, required),
169 (8, weight, required),
170 (10, amount, required),
171 (12, htlc, required),
174 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
176 /// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
179 /// The preimage is used as part of the witness.
180 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
182 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
183 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
184 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
185 preimage: PaymentPreimage,
186 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
187 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
190 impl CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
191 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, preimage: PaymentPreimage, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
192 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
193 per_commitment_point,
194 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
195 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
198 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
202 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
203 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
207 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, {
208 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
209 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
210 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
211 (6, preimage, required),
213 (10, opt_anchors, option),
216 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
218 /// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
220 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
221 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
222 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
223 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
224 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
225 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
226 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
229 impl CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
230 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
231 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
232 per_commitment_point,
233 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
234 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
236 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
240 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
241 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
245 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, {
246 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
247 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
248 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
250 (8, opt_anchors, option),
253 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on holder commitment transaction.
255 /// Either offered or received, the amount is always used as part of the bip143 sighash.
256 /// Preimage is only included as part of the witness in former case.
257 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
258 pub(crate) struct HolderHTLCOutput {
259 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
261 /// Defaults to 0 for HTLC-Success transactions, which have no expiry
263 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
266 impl HolderHTLCOutput {
267 pub(crate) fn build_offered(amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
272 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None } ,
276 pub(crate) fn build_accepted(preimage: PaymentPreimage, amount_msat: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
278 preimage: Some(preimage),
281 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None } ,
285 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
286 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
290 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderHTLCOutput, {
291 (0, amount_msat, required),
292 (2, cltv_expiry, required),
293 (4, preimage, option),
294 (6, opt_anchors, option)
297 /// A struct to describe the channel output on the funding transaction.
299 /// witnessScript is used as part of the witness redeeming the funding utxo.
300 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
301 pub(crate) struct HolderFundingOutput {
302 funding_redeemscript: Script,
303 funding_amount: Option<u64>,
304 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
308 impl HolderFundingOutput {
309 pub(crate) fn build(funding_redeemscript: Script, funding_amount: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
310 HolderFundingOutput {
311 funding_redeemscript,
312 funding_amount: Some(funding_amount),
313 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
317 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
318 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
322 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderFundingOutput, {
323 (0, funding_redeemscript, required),
324 (2, opt_anchors, option),
325 (3, funding_amount, option),
328 /// A wrapper encapsulating all in-protocol differing outputs types.
330 /// The generic API offers access to an outputs common attributes or allow transformation such as
331 /// finalizing an input claiming the output.
332 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
333 pub(crate) enum PackageSolvingData {
334 RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput),
335 RevokedHTLCOutput(RevokedHTLCOutput),
336 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput),
337 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput),
338 HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput),
339 HolderFundingOutput(HolderFundingOutput),
342 impl PackageSolvingData {
343 fn amount(&self) -> u64 {
344 let amt = match self {
345 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => outp.amount,
346 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.amount,
347 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
348 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
349 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
350 debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
351 outp.amount_msat / 1000
353 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => {
354 debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
355 outp.funding_amount.unwrap()
360 fn weight(&self) -> usize {
362 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => outp.weight as usize,
363 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.weight as usize,
364 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => weight_offered_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize,
365 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => weight_received_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize,
366 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
367 debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
368 if outp.preimage.is_none() {
369 weight_offered_htlc(true) as usize
371 weight_received_htlc(true) as usize
374 // Since HolderFundingOutput maps to an untractable package that is already signed, its
375 // weight can be determined from the transaction itself.
376 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => unreachable!(),
379 fn is_compatible(&self, input: &PackageSolvingData) -> bool {
381 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => {
383 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { true },
384 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { true },
388 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => {
390 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { true },
391 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { true },
395 _ => { mem::discriminant(self) == mem::discriminant(&input) }
398 fn finalize_input<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(&self, bumped_tx: &mut Transaction, i: usize, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> bool {
400 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => {
401 let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
402 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&chan_keys.revocation_key, outp.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &chan_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key);
403 //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
404 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
405 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
406 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
407 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
408 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
409 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
410 } else { return false; }
412 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
413 let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
414 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
415 //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
416 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
417 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
418 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
419 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
420 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(chan_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec());
421 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
422 } else { return false; }
424 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
425 let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
426 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
428 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
429 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
430 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
431 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
432 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(outp.preimage.0.to_vec());
433 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
436 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
437 let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
438 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
440 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
441 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
442 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
443 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
444 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
445 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
446 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
449 _ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
453 fn get_finalized_tx<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> Option<Transaction> {
455 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
456 debug_assert!(!outp.opt_anchors());
457 return onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outpoint, &outp.preimage);
459 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => {
460 return Some(onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&outp.funding_redeemscript));
462 _ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
465 fn absolute_tx_timelock(&self, current_height: u32) -> u32 {
466 // We use `current_height` as our default locktime to discourage fee sniping and because
467 // transactions with it always propagate.
468 let absolute_timelock = match self {
469 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(_) => current_height,
470 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(_) => current_height,
471 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(_) => current_height,
472 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => cmp::max(outp.htlc.cltv_expiry, current_height),
473 // HTLC timeout/success transactions rely on a fixed timelock due to the counterparty's
475 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
476 if outp.preimage.is_some() {
477 debug_assert_eq!(outp.cltv_expiry, 0);
481 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(_) => current_height,
487 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PackageSolvingData, ;
489 (1, RevokedHTLCOutput),
490 (2, CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput),
491 (3, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput),
492 (4, HolderHTLCOutput),
493 (5, HolderFundingOutput),
496 /// A malleable package might be aggregated with other packages to save on fees.
497 /// A untractable package has been counter-signed and aggregable will break cached counterparty
499 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
500 pub(crate) enum PackageMalleability {
505 /// A structure to describe a package content that is generated by ChannelMonitor and
506 /// used by OnchainTxHandler to generate and broadcast transactions settling onchain claims.
508 /// A package is defined as one or more transactions claiming onchain outputs in reaction
509 /// to confirmation of a channel transaction. Those packages might be aggregated to save on
510 /// fees, if satisfaction of outputs's witnessScript let's us do so.
512 /// As packages are time-sensitive, we fee-bump and rebroadcast them at scheduled intervals.
513 /// Failing to confirm a package translate as a loss of funds for the user.
514 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
515 pub struct PackageTemplate {
516 // List of onchain outputs and solving data to generate satisfying witnesses.
517 inputs: Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, PackageSolvingData)>,
518 // Packages are deemed as malleable if we have local knwoledge of at least one set of
519 // private keys yielding a satisfying witnesses. Malleability implies that we can aggregate
520 // packages among them to save on fees or rely on RBF to bump their feerates.
521 // Untractable packages have been counter-signed and thus imply that we can't aggregate
522 // them without breaking signatures. Fee-bumping strategy will also rely on CPFP.
523 malleability: PackageMalleability,
524 // Block height after which the earlier-output belonging to this package is mature for a
525 // competing claim by the counterparty. As our chain tip becomes nearer from the timelock,
526 // the fee-bumping frequency will increase. See `OnchainTxHandler::get_height_timer`.
527 soonest_conf_deadline: u32,
528 // Determines if this package can be aggregated.
529 // Timelocked outputs belonging to the same transaction might have differing
530 // satisfying heights. Picking up the later height among the output set would be a valid
531 // aggregable strategy but it comes with at least 2 trade-offs :
532 // * earlier-output fund are going to take longer to come back
533 // * CLTV delta backing up a corresponding HTLC on an upstream channel could be swallowed
534 // by the requirement of the later-output part of the set
535 // For now, we mark such timelocked outputs as non-aggregable, though we might introduce
536 // smarter aggregable strategy in the future.
538 // Cache of package feerate committed at previous (re)broadcast. If bumping resources
539 // (either claimed output value or external utxo), it will keep increasing until holder
540 // or counterparty successful claim.
541 feerate_previous: u64,
542 // Cache of next height at which fee-bumping and rebroadcast will be attempted. In
543 // the future, we might abstract it to an observed mempool fluctuation.
545 // Confirmation height of the claimed outputs set transaction. In case of reorg reaching
546 // it, we wipe out and forget the package.
547 height_original: u32,
550 impl PackageTemplate {
551 pub(crate) fn is_malleable(&self) -> bool {
552 self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Malleable
554 pub(crate) fn timelock(&self) -> u32 {
555 self.soonest_conf_deadline
557 pub(crate) fn aggregable(&self) -> bool {
560 pub(crate) fn previous_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
561 self.feerate_previous
563 pub(crate) fn set_feerate(&mut self, new_feerate: u64) {
564 self.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
566 pub(crate) fn timer(&self) -> u32 {
569 pub(crate) fn set_timer(&mut self, new_timer: u32) {
570 self.height_timer = new_timer;
572 pub(crate) fn outpoints(&self) -> Vec<&BitcoinOutPoint> {
573 self.inputs.iter().map(|(o, _)| o).collect()
575 pub(crate) fn inputs(&self) -> impl ExactSizeIterator<Item = &PackageSolvingData> {
576 self.inputs.iter().map(|(_, i)| i)
578 pub(crate) fn split_package(&mut self, split_outp: &BitcoinOutPoint) -> Option<PackageTemplate> {
579 match self.malleability {
580 PackageMalleability::Malleable => {
581 let mut split_package = None;
582 let timelock = self.soonest_conf_deadline;
583 let aggregable = self.aggregable;
584 let feerate_previous = self.feerate_previous;
585 let height_timer = self.height_timer;
586 let height_original = self.height_original;
587 self.inputs.retain(|outp| {
588 if *split_outp == outp.0 {
589 split_package = Some(PackageTemplate {
590 inputs: vec![(outp.0, outp.1.clone())],
591 malleability: PackageMalleability::Malleable,
592 soonest_conf_deadline: timelock,
602 return split_package;
605 // Note, we may try to split on remote transaction for
606 // which we don't have a competing one (HTLC-Success before
607 // timelock expiration). This explain we don't panic!
608 // We should refactor OnchainTxHandler::block_connected to
609 // only test equality on competing claims.
614 pub(crate) fn merge_package(&mut self, mut merge_from: PackageTemplate) {
615 assert_eq!(self.height_original, merge_from.height_original);
616 if self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Untractable || merge_from.malleability == PackageMalleability::Untractable {
617 panic!("Merging template on untractable packages");
619 if !self.aggregable || !merge_from.aggregable {
620 panic!("Merging non aggregatable packages");
622 if let Some((_, lead_input)) = self.inputs.first() {
623 for (_, v) in merge_from.inputs.iter() {
624 if !lead_input.is_compatible(v) { panic!("Merging outputs from differing types !"); }
626 } else { panic!("Merging template on an empty package"); }
627 for (k, v) in merge_from.inputs.drain(..) {
628 self.inputs.push((k, v));
630 //TODO: verify coverage and sanity?
631 if self.soonest_conf_deadline > merge_from.soonest_conf_deadline {
632 self.soonest_conf_deadline = merge_from.soonest_conf_deadline;
634 if self.feerate_previous > merge_from.feerate_previous {
635 self.feerate_previous = merge_from.feerate_previous;
637 self.height_timer = cmp::min(self.height_timer, merge_from.height_timer);
639 /// Gets the amount of all outptus being spent by this package, only valid for malleable
641 pub(crate) fn package_amount(&self) -> u64 {
643 for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
644 amounts += outp.amount();
648 pub(crate) fn package_locktime(&self, current_height: u32) -> u32 {
649 let locktime = self.inputs.iter().map(|(_, outp)| outp.absolute_tx_timelock(current_height))
650 .max().expect("There must always be at least one output to spend in a PackageTemplate");
652 // If we ever try to aggregate a `HolderHTLCOutput`s with another output type, we'll likely
653 // end up with an incorrect transaction locktime since the counterparty has included it in
654 // its HTLC signature. This should never happen unless we decide to aggregate outputs across
655 // different channel commitments.
656 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
657 if self.inputs.iter().any(|(_, outp)|
658 if let PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(outp) = outp {
659 outp.preimage.is_some()
664 debug_assert_eq!(locktime, 0);
666 for timeout_htlc_expiry in self.inputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, outp)|
667 if let PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(outp) = outp {
668 if outp.preimage.is_none() {
669 Some(outp.cltv_expiry)
673 debug_assert_eq!(locktime, timeout_htlc_expiry);
679 pub(crate) fn package_weight(&self, destination_script: &Script) -> usize {
680 let mut inputs_weight = 0;
681 let mut witnesses_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
682 for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
683 // previous_out_point: 36 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; sequence: 4 bytes
684 inputs_weight += 41 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
685 witnesses_weight += outp.weight();
687 // version: 4 bytes ; count_tx_in: 1 byte ; count_tx_out: 1 byte ; lock_time: 4 bytes
688 let transaction_weight = 10 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
689 // value: 8 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; pk_script: `destination_script.len()`
690 let output_weight = (8 + 1 + destination_script.len()) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
691 inputs_weight + witnesses_weight + transaction_weight + output_weight
694 pub(crate) fn construct_malleable_package_with_external_funding<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(
695 &self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
696 ) -> Option<Vec<ExternalHTLCClaim>> {
697 debug_assert!(self.requires_external_funding());
698 let mut htlcs: Option<Vec<ExternalHTLCClaim>> = None;
699 for (previous_output, input) in &self.inputs {
701 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
702 debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
703 onchain_handler.generate_external_htlc_claim(&previous_output, &outp.preimage).map(|htlc| {
704 htlcs.get_or_insert_with(|| Vec::with_capacity(self.inputs.len())).push(htlc);
707 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Expected HolderHTLCOutputs to not be aggregated with other input types"),
712 pub(crate) fn finalize_malleable_package<L: Deref, Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(
713 &self, current_height: u32, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, value: u64,
714 destination_script: Script, logger: &L
715 ) -> Option<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
716 debug_assert!(self.is_malleable());
717 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
719 lock_time: PackedLockTime(self.package_locktime(current_height)),
722 script_pubkey: destination_script,
726 for (outpoint, _) in self.inputs.iter() {
727 bumped_tx.input.push(TxIn {
728 previous_output: *outpoint,
729 script_sig: Script::new(),
730 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
731 witness: Witness::new(),
734 for (i, (outpoint, out)) in self.inputs.iter().enumerate() {
735 log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
736 if !out.finalize_input(&mut bumped_tx, i, onchain_handler) { return None; }
738 log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", bumped_tx.txid());
741 pub(crate) fn finalize_untractable_package<L: Deref, Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(
742 &self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, logger: &L,
743 ) -> Option<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
744 debug_assert!(!self.is_malleable());
745 if let Some((outpoint, outp)) = self.inputs.first() {
746 if let Some(final_tx) = outp.get_finalized_tx(outpoint, onchain_handler) {
747 log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
748 log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", final_tx.txid());
749 return Some(final_tx);
752 } else { panic!("API Error: Package must not be inputs empty"); }
754 /// In LN, output claimed are time-sensitive, which means we have to spend them before reaching some timelock expiration. At in-channel
755 /// output detection, we generate a first version of a claim tx and associate to it a height timer. A height timer is an absolute block
756 /// height that once reached we should generate a new bumped "version" of the claim tx to be sure that we safely claim outputs before
757 /// that our counterparty can do so. If timelock expires soon, height timer is going to be scaled down in consequence to increase
758 /// frequency of the bump and so increase our bets of success.
759 pub(crate) fn get_height_timer(&self, current_height: u32) -> u32 {
760 if self.soonest_conf_deadline <= current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
761 return current_height + HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
762 } else if self.soonest_conf_deadline - current_height <= LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
763 return current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
765 current_height + LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
768 /// Returns value in satoshis to be included as package outgoing output amount and feerate
769 /// which was used to generate the value. Will not return less than `dust_limit_sats` for the
771 pub(crate) fn compute_package_output<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
772 &self, predicted_weight: usize, dust_limit_sats: u64, force_feerate_bump: bool,
773 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L,
774 ) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
776 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
779 debug_assert!(self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Malleable, "The package output is fixed for non-malleable packages");
780 let input_amounts = self.package_amount();
781 assert!(dust_limit_sats as i64 > 0, "Output script must be broadcastable/have a 'real' dust limit.");
782 // If old feerate is 0, first iteration of this claim, use normal fee calculation
783 if self.feerate_previous != 0 {
784 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = feerate_bump(
785 predicted_weight, input_amounts, self.feerate_previous, force_feerate_bump,
786 fee_estimator, logger,
788 return Some((cmp::max(input_amounts as i64 - new_fee as i64, dust_limit_sats as i64) as u64, feerate));
791 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
792 return Some((cmp::max(input_amounts as i64 - new_fee as i64, dust_limit_sats as i64) as u64, feerate));
799 /// Computes a feerate based on the given confirmation target. If a previous feerate was used,
800 /// the new feerate is below it, and `force_feerate_bump` is set, we'll use a 25% increase of
801 /// the previous feerate instead of the new feerate.
802 pub(crate) fn compute_package_feerate<F: Deref>(
803 &self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget,
804 force_feerate_bump: bool,
805 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
806 let feerate_estimate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(conf_target);
807 if self.feerate_previous != 0 {
808 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
809 if feerate_estimate as u64 > self.feerate_previous {
811 } else if !force_feerate_bump {
812 self.feerate_previous.try_into().unwrap_or(u32::max_value())
814 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
815 (self.feerate_previous + (self.feerate_previous / 4)).try_into().unwrap_or(u32::max_value())
822 /// Determines whether a package contains an input which must have additional external inputs
823 /// attached to help the spending transaction reach confirmation.
824 pub(crate) fn requires_external_funding(&self) -> bool {
825 self.inputs.iter().find(|input| match input.1 {
826 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => outp.opt_anchors(),
827 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.opt_anchors(),
832 pub (crate) fn build_package(txid: Txid, vout: u32, input_solving_data: PackageSolvingData, soonest_conf_deadline: u32, aggregable: bool, height_original: u32) -> Self {
833 let (malleability, aggregable) = Self::map_output_type_flags(&input_solving_data);
834 let mut inputs = Vec::with_capacity(1);
835 inputs.push((BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout }, input_solving_data));
839 soonest_conf_deadline,
842 height_timer: height_original,
847 fn map_output_type_flags(input_solving_data: &PackageSolvingData) -> (PackageMalleability, bool) {
848 let (malleability, aggregable) = match input_solving_data {
849 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput { is_counterparty_balance_on_anchors: Some(()), .. }) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, false) },
850 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput { is_counterparty_balance_on_anchors: None, .. }) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
851 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
852 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
853 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, false) },
854 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false) },
855 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false) },
857 (malleability, aggregable)
861 impl Writeable for PackageTemplate {
862 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
863 writer.write_all(&(self.inputs.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
864 for (ref outpoint, ref rev_outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
865 outpoint.write(writer)?;
866 rev_outp.write(writer)?;
868 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
869 (0, self.soonest_conf_deadline, required),
870 (2, self.feerate_previous, required),
871 (4, self.height_original, required),
872 (6, self.height_timer, required)
878 impl Readable for PackageTemplate {
879 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
880 let inputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
881 let mut inputs: Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, PackageSolvingData)> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(inputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
882 for _ in 0..inputs_count {
883 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
884 let rev_outp = Readable::read(reader)?;
885 inputs.push((outpoint, rev_outp));
887 let (malleability, aggregable) = if let Some((_, lead_input)) = inputs.first() {
888 Self::map_output_type_flags(&lead_input)
889 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); };
890 let mut soonest_conf_deadline = 0;
891 let mut feerate_previous = 0;
892 let mut height_timer = None;
893 let mut height_original = 0;
894 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
895 (0, soonest_conf_deadline, required),
896 (2, feerate_previous, required),
897 (4, height_original, required),
898 (6, height_timer, option),
900 if height_timer.is_none() {
901 height_timer = Some(height_original);
906 soonest_conf_deadline,
909 height_timer: height_timer.unwrap(),
915 /// Attempt to propose a bumping fee for a transaction from its spent output's values and predicted
916 /// weight. We start with the highest priority feerate returned by the node's fee estimator then
917 /// fall-back to lower priorities until we have enough value available to suck from.
919 /// If the proposed fee is less than the available spent output's values, we return the proposed
920 /// fee and the corresponding updated feerate. If the proposed fee is equal or more than the
921 /// available spent output's values, we return nothing
922 fn compute_fee_from_spent_amounts<F: Deref, L: Deref>(input_amounts: u64, predicted_weight: usize, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
923 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
926 let mut updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64;
927 let mut fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
928 if input_amounts <= fee {
929 updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64;
930 fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
931 if input_amounts <= fee {
932 updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u64;
933 fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
934 if input_amounts <= fee {
935 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
939 log_warn!(logger, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
941 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
944 log_warn!(logger, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
946 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
949 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
953 /// Attempt to propose a bumping fee for a transaction from its spent output's values and predicted
954 /// weight. If feerates proposed by the fee-estimator have been increasing since last fee-bumping
955 /// attempt, use them. If `force_feerate_bump` is set, we bump the feerate by 25% of the previous
956 /// feerate, or just use the previous feerate otherwise. If a feerate bump did happen, we also
957 /// verify that those bumping heuristics respect BIP125 rules 3) and 4) and if required adjust the
958 /// new fee to meet the RBF policy requirement.
959 fn feerate_bump<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
960 predicted_weight: usize, input_amounts: u64, previous_feerate: u64, force_feerate_bump: bool,
961 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L,
962 ) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
964 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
967 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
968 let (new_fee, new_feerate) = if let Some((new_fee, new_feerate)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
969 if new_feerate > previous_feerate {
970 (new_fee, new_feerate)
971 } else if !force_feerate_bump {
972 let previous_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
973 (previous_fee, previous_feerate)
975 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
976 let bumped_feerate = previous_feerate + (previous_feerate / 4);
977 let bumped_fee = bumped_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
978 if input_amounts <= bumped_fee {
979 log_warn!(logger, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
982 (bumped_fee, bumped_feerate)
985 log_warn!(logger, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
989 // Our feerates should never decrease. If it hasn't changed though, we just need to
990 // rebroadcast/re-sign the previous claim.
991 debug_assert!(new_feerate >= previous_feerate);
992 if new_feerate == previous_feerate {
993 return Some((new_fee, new_feerate));
996 let previous_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
997 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
998 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
999 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
1000 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
1001 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
1002 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
1006 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / (predicted_weight as u64)))
1011 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageTemplate, PackageSolvingData, RevokedOutput, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc};
1012 use crate::chain::Txid;
1013 use crate::ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
1014 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
1016 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
1017 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1018 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
1020 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
1022 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1023 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1025 macro_rules! dumb_revk_output {
1026 ($secp_ctx: expr, $is_counterparty_balance_on_anchors: expr) => {
1028 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1029 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
1030 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_scalar, 0, 0, $is_counterparty_balance_on_anchors))
1035 macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_output {
1036 ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
1038 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1039 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
1040 let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
1041 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: true, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 0, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
1042 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, htlc, $opt_anchors))
1047 macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_offered_output {
1048 ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
1050 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1051 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
1052 let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
1053 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
1054 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: false, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 1000, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
1055 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, preimage, htlc, $opt_anchors))
1060 macro_rules! dumb_htlc_output {
1063 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
1064 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(preimage, 0, false))
1071 fn test_package_differing_heights() {
1072 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1073 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1074 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx, false);
1076 let mut package_one_hundred = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1077 let package_two_hundred = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 200);
1078 package_one_hundred.merge_package(package_two_hundred);
1083 fn test_package_untractable_merge_to() {
1084 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1085 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1086 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx, false);
1087 let htlc_outp = dumb_htlc_output!();
1089 let mut untractable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1090 let malleable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, htlc_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1091 untractable_package.merge_package(malleable_package);
1096 fn test_package_untractable_merge_from() {
1097 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1098 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1099 let htlc_outp = dumb_htlc_output!();
1100 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx, false);
1102 let mut malleable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, htlc_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1103 let untractable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1104 malleable_package.merge_package(untractable_package);
1109 fn test_package_noaggregation_to() {
1110 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1111 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1112 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx, true);
1114 let mut noaggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, false, 100);
1115 let aggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1116 noaggregation_package.merge_package(aggregation_package);
1121 fn test_package_noaggregation_from() {
1122 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1123 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1124 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx, true);
1126 let mut aggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1127 let noaggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, false, 100);
1128 aggregation_package.merge_package(noaggregation_package);
1133 fn test_package_empty() {
1134 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1135 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1136 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx, false);
1138 let mut empty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1139 empty_package.inputs = vec![];
1140 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1141 empty_package.merge_package(package);
1146 fn test_package_differing_categories() {
1147 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1148 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1149 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx, false);
1150 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 0, false);
1152 let mut revoked_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1153 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1154 revoked_package.merge_package(counterparty_package);
1158 fn test_package_split_malleable() {
1159 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1160 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1161 let revk_outp_one = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx, false);
1162 let revk_outp_two = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx, false);
1163 let revk_outp_three = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx, false);
1165 let mut package_one = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp_one, 1000, true, 100);
1166 let package_two = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp_two, 1000, true, 100);
1167 let package_three = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 2, revk_outp_three, 1000, true, 100);
1169 package_one.merge_package(package_two);
1170 package_one.merge_package(package_three);
1171 assert_eq!(package_one.outpoints().len(), 3);
1173 if let Some(split_package) = package_one.split_package(&BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout: 1 }) {
1174 // Packages attributes should be identical
1175 assert!(split_package.is_malleable());
1176 assert_eq!(split_package.soonest_conf_deadline, package_one.soonest_conf_deadline);
1177 assert_eq!(split_package.aggregable, package_one.aggregable);
1178 assert_eq!(split_package.feerate_previous, package_one.feerate_previous);
1179 assert_eq!(split_package.height_timer, package_one.height_timer);
1180 assert_eq!(split_package.height_original, package_one.height_original);
1181 } else { panic!(); }
1182 assert_eq!(package_one.outpoints().len(), 2);
1186 fn test_package_split_untractable() {
1187 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1188 let htlc_outp_one = dumb_htlc_output!();
1190 let mut package_one = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, htlc_outp_one, 1000, true, 100);
1191 let ret_split = package_one.split_package(&BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout: 0});
1192 assert!(ret_split.is_none());
1196 fn test_package_timer() {
1197 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1198 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1199 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx, false);
1201 let mut package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1202 assert_eq!(package.timer(), 100);
1203 package.set_timer(101);
1204 assert_eq!(package.timer(), 101);
1208 fn test_package_amounts() {
1209 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1210 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1211 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, false);
1213 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1214 assert_eq!(package.package_amount(), 1000);
1218 fn test_package_weight() {
1219 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1220 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1222 // (nVersion (4) + nLocktime (4) + count_tx_in (1) + prevout (36) + sequence (4) + script_length (1) + count_tx_out (1) + value (8) + var_int (1)) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR + witness marker (2)
1223 let weight_sans_output = (4 + 4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 8 + 1) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR + 2;
1226 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx, false);
1227 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 0, true, 100);
1228 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT as usize);
1232 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
1233 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
1234 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1235 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
1240 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
1241 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_offered_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
1242 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1243 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);