1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities to assemble claimable outpoints in package of one or more transactions. Those
11 //! packages are attached metadata, guiding their aggregable or fee-bumping re-schedule. This file
12 //! also includes witness weight computation and fee computation methods.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,TxIn, Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
23 use ln::PaymentPreimage;
24 use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
27 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
28 use chain::keysinterface::Sign;
29 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
31 use util::logger::Logger;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable};
39 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
41 use super::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
43 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
46 pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
47 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
48 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133;
49 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
50 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC }
53 pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
54 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
55 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139;
56 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
57 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC }
60 pub(crate) fn weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
61 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
62 const WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133;
63 const WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
64 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC }
67 pub(crate) fn weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
68 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig + empty_vec_length + empty_vec + witness_script_length + witness_script
69 const WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139;
70 const WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
71 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC }
74 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
75 pub(crate) const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77;
77 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a low priority.
78 const LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 15;
79 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a middle priority.
80 const MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 3;
81 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a high priority.
82 const HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 1;
84 /// A struct to describe a revoked output and corresponding information to generate a solving
85 /// witness spending a commitment `to_local` output or a second-stage HTLC transaction output.
87 /// CSV and pubkeys are used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used
88 /// as part of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
89 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
90 pub(crate) struct RevokedOutput {
91 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
92 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
93 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
94 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
97 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
101 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16) -> Self {
103 per_commitment_point,
104 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
105 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
107 weight: WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT,
109 on_counterparty_tx_csv
114 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RevokedOutput, {
115 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
116 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
117 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
118 (6, per_commitment_key, required),
119 (8, weight, required),
120 (10, amount, required),
121 (12, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
124 /// A struct to describe a revoked offered output and corresponding information to generate a
127 /// HTLCOuputInCommitment (hash timelock, direction) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
130 /// CSV is used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used as part
131 /// of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
132 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
133 pub(crate) struct RevokedHTLCOutput {
134 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
135 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
136 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
137 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
140 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
143 impl RevokedHTLCOutput {
144 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
145 let weight = if htlc.offered { weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) } else { weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors) };
147 per_commitment_point,
148 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
149 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
158 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RevokedHTLCOutput, {
159 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
160 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
161 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
162 (6, per_commitment_key, required),
163 (8, weight, required),
164 (10, amount, required),
165 (12, htlc, required),
168 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
170 /// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
173 /// The preimage is used as part of the witness.
174 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
175 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
176 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
177 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
178 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
179 preimage: PaymentPreimage,
180 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
181 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
184 impl CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
185 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, preimage: PaymentPreimage, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
186 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
187 per_commitment_point,
188 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
189 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
192 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
196 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
197 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
201 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, {
202 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
203 (1, opt_anchors, option),
204 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
205 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
206 (6, preimage, required),
210 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
212 /// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
214 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
216 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
217 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
218 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
219 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
220 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
223 impl CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
224 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
225 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
226 per_commitment_point,
227 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
228 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
230 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
234 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
235 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
239 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, {
240 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
241 (1, opt_anchors, option),
242 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
243 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
247 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on holder commitment transaction.
249 /// Either offered or received, the amount is always used as part of the bip143 sighash.
250 /// Preimage is only included as part of the witness in former case.
251 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
252 pub(crate) struct HolderHTLCOutput {
253 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
255 /// Defaults to 0 for HTLC-Success transactions, which have no expiry
259 impl HolderHTLCOutput {
260 pub(crate) fn build_offered(amount: u64, cltv_expiry: u32) -> Self {
268 pub(crate) fn build_accepted(preimage: PaymentPreimage, amount: u64) -> Self {
270 preimage: Some(preimage),
277 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderHTLCOutput, {
278 (0, amount, required),
279 (2, cltv_expiry, required),
280 (4, preimage, option)
283 /// A struct to describe the channel output on the funding transaction.
285 /// witnessScript is used as part of the witness redeeming the funding utxo.
286 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
287 pub(crate) struct HolderFundingOutput {
288 funding_redeemscript: Script,
289 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
293 impl HolderFundingOutput {
294 pub(crate) fn build(funding_redeemscript: Script, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
295 HolderFundingOutput {
296 funding_redeemscript,
297 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
301 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
302 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
306 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderFundingOutput, {
307 (0, funding_redeemscript, required),
308 (1, opt_anchors, option),
311 /// A wrapper encapsulating all in-protocol differing outputs types.
313 /// The generic API offers access to an outputs common attributes or allow transformation such as
314 /// finalizing an input claiming the output.
315 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
316 pub(crate) enum PackageSolvingData {
317 RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput),
318 RevokedHTLCOutput(RevokedHTLCOutput),
319 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput),
320 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput),
321 HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput),
322 HolderFundingOutput(HolderFundingOutput),
325 impl PackageSolvingData {
326 fn amount(&self) -> u64 {
327 let amt = match self {
328 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => { outp.amount },
329 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.amount },
330 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000 },
331 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000 },
332 // Note: Currently, amounts of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
333 // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
334 // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
335 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
336 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
340 fn weight(&self) -> usize {
341 let weight = match self {
342 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => { outp.weight as usize },
343 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.weight as usize },
344 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { weight_offered_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize },
345 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { weight_received_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize },
346 // Note: Currently, weights of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
347 // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
348 // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
349 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
350 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
354 fn is_compatible(&self, input: &PackageSolvingData) -> bool {
356 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => {
358 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { true },
359 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { true },
363 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => {
365 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { true },
366 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { true },
370 _ => { mem::discriminant(self) == mem::discriminant(&input) }
373 fn finalize_input<Signer: Sign>(&self, bumped_tx: &mut Transaction, i: usize, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> bool {
375 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => {
376 if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
377 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&chan_keys.revocation_key, outp.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &chan_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key);
378 //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
379 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
380 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
381 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
382 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
383 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
384 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
385 } else { return false; }
388 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
389 if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
390 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
391 //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
392 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
393 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
394 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
395 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
396 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(chan_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec());
397 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
398 } else { return false; }
401 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
402 if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
403 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
405 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
406 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
407 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
408 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
409 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(outp.preimage.0.to_vec());
410 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
414 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
415 if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
416 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
418 bumped_tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(outp.htlc.cltv_expiry); // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation
419 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
420 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
421 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
422 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
423 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
424 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
425 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
429 _ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
433 fn get_finalized_tx<Signer: Sign>(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> Option<Transaction> {
435 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { return onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outpoint, &outp.preimage); }
436 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => { return Some(onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&outp.funding_redeemscript)); }
437 _ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
440 fn absolute_tx_timelock(&self, output_conf_height: u32) -> u32 {
441 // Get the absolute timelock at which this output can be spent given the height at which
442 // this output was confirmed. We use `output_conf_height + 1` as a safe default as we can
443 // be confirmed in the next block and transactions with time lock `current_height + 1`
445 let absolute_timelock = match self {
446 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
447 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
448 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
449 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => cmp::max(outp.htlc.cltv_expiry, output_conf_height + 1),
450 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => cmp::max(outp.cltv_expiry, output_conf_height + 1),
451 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
457 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PackageSolvingData, ;
459 (1, RevokedHTLCOutput),
460 (2, CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput),
461 (3, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput),
462 (4, HolderHTLCOutput),
463 (5, HolderFundingOutput),
466 /// A malleable package might be aggregated with other packages to save on fees.
467 /// A untractable package has been counter-signed and aggregable will break cached counterparty
469 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
470 pub(crate) enum PackageMalleability {
475 /// A structure to describe a package content that is generated by ChannelMonitor and
476 /// used by OnchainTxHandler to generate and broadcast transactions settling onchain claims.
478 /// A package is defined as one or more transactions claiming onchain outputs in reaction
479 /// to confirmation of a channel transaction. Those packages might be aggregated to save on
480 /// fees, if satisfaction of outputs's witnessScript let's us do so.
482 /// As packages are time-sensitive, we fee-bump and rebroadcast them at scheduled intervals.
483 /// Failing to confirm a package translate as a loss of funds for the user.
484 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
485 pub struct PackageTemplate {
486 // List of onchain outputs and solving data to generate satisfying witnesses.
487 inputs: Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, PackageSolvingData)>,
488 // Packages are deemed as malleable if we have local knwoledge of at least one set of
489 // private keys yielding a satisfying witnesses. Malleability implies that we can aggregate
490 // packages among them to save on fees or rely on RBF to bump their feerates.
491 // Untractable packages have been counter-signed and thus imply that we can't aggregate
492 // them without breaking signatures. Fee-bumping strategy will also rely on CPFP.
493 malleability: PackageMalleability,
494 // Block height after which the earlier-output belonging to this package is mature for a
495 // competing claim by the counterparty. As our chain tip becomes nearer from the timelock,
496 // the fee-bumping frequency will increase. See `OnchainTxHandler::get_height_timer`.
497 soonest_conf_deadline: u32,
498 // Determines if this package can be aggregated.
499 // Timelocked outputs belonging to the same transaction might have differing
500 // satisfying heights. Picking up the later height among the output set would be a valid
501 // aggregable strategy but it comes with at least 2 trade-offs :
502 // * earlier-output fund are going to take longer to come back
503 // * CLTV delta backing up a corresponding HTLC on an upstream channel could be swallowed
504 // by the requirement of the later-output part of the set
505 // For now, we mark such timelocked outputs as non-aggregable, though we might introduce
506 // smarter aggregable strategy in the future.
508 // Cache of package feerate committed at previous (re)broadcast. If bumping resources
509 // (either claimed output value or external utxo), it will keep increasing until holder
510 // or counterparty successful claim.
511 feerate_previous: u64,
512 // Cache of next height at which fee-bumping and rebroadcast will be attempted. In
513 // the future, we might abstract it to an observed mempool fluctuation.
514 height_timer: Option<u32>,
515 // Confirmation height of the claimed outputs set transaction. In case of reorg reaching
516 // it, we wipe out and forget the package.
517 height_original: u32,
520 impl PackageTemplate {
521 pub(crate) fn is_malleable(&self) -> bool {
522 self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Malleable
524 pub(crate) fn timelock(&self) -> u32 {
525 self.soonest_conf_deadline
527 pub(crate) fn aggregable(&self) -> bool {
530 pub(crate) fn set_feerate(&mut self, new_feerate: u64) {
531 self.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
533 pub(crate) fn timer(&self) -> Option<u32> {
534 if let Some(ref timer) = self.height_timer {
539 pub(crate) fn set_timer(&mut self, new_timer: Option<u32>) {
540 self.height_timer = new_timer;
542 pub(crate) fn outpoints(&self) -> Vec<&BitcoinOutPoint> {
543 self.inputs.iter().map(|(o, _)| o).collect()
545 pub(crate) fn split_package(&mut self, split_outp: &BitcoinOutPoint) -> Option<PackageTemplate> {
546 match self.malleability {
547 PackageMalleability::Malleable => {
548 let mut split_package = None;
549 let timelock = self.soonest_conf_deadline;
550 let aggregable = self.aggregable;
551 let feerate_previous = self.feerate_previous;
552 let height_timer = self.height_timer;
553 let height_original = self.height_original;
554 self.inputs.retain(|outp| {
555 if *split_outp == outp.0 {
556 split_package = Some(PackageTemplate {
557 inputs: vec![(outp.0, outp.1.clone())],
558 malleability: PackageMalleability::Malleable,
559 soonest_conf_deadline: timelock,
569 return split_package;
572 // Note, we may try to split on remote transaction for
573 // which we don't have a competing one (HTLC-Success before
574 // timelock expiration). This explain we don't panic!
575 // We should refactor OnchainTxHandler::block_connected to
576 // only test equality on competing claims.
581 pub(crate) fn merge_package(&mut self, mut merge_from: PackageTemplate) {
582 assert_eq!(self.height_original, merge_from.height_original);
583 if self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Untractable || merge_from.malleability == PackageMalleability::Untractable {
584 panic!("Merging template on untractable packages");
586 if !self.aggregable || !merge_from.aggregable {
587 panic!("Merging non aggregatable packages");
589 if let Some((_, lead_input)) = self.inputs.first() {
590 for (_, v) in merge_from.inputs.iter() {
591 if !lead_input.is_compatible(v) { panic!("Merging outputs from differing types !"); }
593 } else { panic!("Merging template on an empty package"); }
594 for (k, v) in merge_from.inputs.drain(..) {
595 self.inputs.push((k, v));
597 //TODO: verify coverage and sanity?
598 if self.soonest_conf_deadline > merge_from.soonest_conf_deadline {
599 self.soonest_conf_deadline = merge_from.soonest_conf_deadline;
601 if self.feerate_previous > merge_from.feerate_previous {
602 self.feerate_previous = merge_from.feerate_previous;
604 self.height_timer = cmp::min(self.height_timer, merge_from.height_timer);
606 /// Gets the amount of all outptus being spent by this package, only valid for malleable
608 fn package_amount(&self) -> u64 {
610 for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
611 amounts += outp.amount();
615 pub(crate) fn package_timelock(&self) -> u32 {
616 self.inputs.iter().map(|(_, outp)| outp.absolute_tx_timelock(self.height_original))
617 .max().expect("There must always be at least one output to spend in a PackageTemplate")
619 pub(crate) fn package_weight(&self, destination_script: &Script) -> usize {
620 let mut inputs_weight = 0;
621 let mut witnesses_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
622 for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
623 // previous_out_point: 36 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; sequence: 4 bytes
624 inputs_weight += 41 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
625 witnesses_weight += outp.weight();
627 // version: 4 bytes ; count_tx_in: 1 byte ; count_tx_out: 1 byte ; lock_time: 4 bytes
628 let transaction_weight = 10 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
629 // value: 8 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; pk_script: `destination_script.len()`
630 let output_weight = (8 + 1 + destination_script.len()) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
631 inputs_weight + witnesses_weight + transaction_weight + output_weight
633 pub(crate) fn finalize_package<L: Deref, Signer: Sign>(&self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, value: u64, destination_script: Script, logger: &L) -> Option<Transaction>
634 where L::Target: Logger,
636 match self.malleability {
637 PackageMalleability::Malleable => {
638 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
640 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
643 script_pubkey: destination_script,
647 for (outpoint, _) in self.inputs.iter() {
648 bumped_tx.input.push(TxIn {
649 previous_output: *outpoint,
650 script_sig: Script::new(),
651 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
652 witness: Witness::new(),
655 for (i, (outpoint, out)) in self.inputs.iter().enumerate() {
656 log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
657 if !out.finalize_input(&mut bumped_tx, i, onchain_handler) { return None; }
659 log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", bumped_tx.txid());
660 return Some(bumped_tx);
662 PackageMalleability::Untractable => {
663 debug_assert_eq!(value, 0, "value is ignored for non-malleable packages, should be zero to ensure callsites are correct");
664 if let Some((outpoint, outp)) = self.inputs.first() {
665 if let Some(final_tx) = outp.get_finalized_tx(outpoint, onchain_handler) {
666 log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
667 log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", final_tx.txid());
668 return Some(final_tx);
671 } else { panic!("API Error: Package must not be inputs empty"); }
675 /// In LN, output claimed are time-sensitive, which means we have to spend them before reaching some timelock expiration. At in-channel
676 /// output detection, we generate a first version of a claim tx and associate to it a height timer. A height timer is an absolute block
677 /// height that once reached we should generate a new bumped "version" of the claim tx to be sure that we safely claim outputs before
678 /// that our counterparty can do so. If timelock expires soon, height timer is going to be scaled down in consequence to increase
679 /// frequency of the bump and so increase our bets of success.
680 pub(crate) fn get_height_timer(&self, current_height: u32) -> u32 {
681 if self.soonest_conf_deadline <= current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
682 return current_height + HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
683 } else if self.soonest_conf_deadline - current_height <= LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
684 return current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
686 current_height + LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
689 /// Returns value in satoshis to be included as package outgoing output amount and feerate
690 /// which was used to generate the value. Will not return less than `dust_limit_sats` for the
692 pub(crate) fn compute_package_output<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, predicted_weight: usize, dust_limit_sats: u64, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
693 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
696 debug_assert!(self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Malleable, "The package output is fixed for non-malleable packages");
697 let input_amounts = self.package_amount();
698 assert!(dust_limit_sats as i64 > 0, "Output script must be broadcastable/have a 'real' dust limit.");
699 // If old feerate is 0, first iteration of this claim, use normal fee calculation
700 if self.feerate_previous != 0 {
701 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = feerate_bump(predicted_weight, input_amounts, self.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, logger) {
702 return Some((cmp::max(input_amounts as i64 - new_fee as i64, dust_limit_sats as i64) as u64, feerate));
705 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
706 return Some((cmp::max(input_amounts as i64 - new_fee as i64, dust_limit_sats as i64) as u64, feerate));
711 pub (crate) fn build_package(txid: Txid, vout: u32, input_solving_data: PackageSolvingData, soonest_conf_deadline: u32, aggregable: bool, height_original: u32) -> Self {
712 let malleability = match input_solving_data {
713 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
714 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
715 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
716 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
717 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Untractable },
718 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Untractable },
720 let mut inputs = Vec::with_capacity(1);
721 inputs.push((BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout }, input_solving_data));
725 soonest_conf_deadline,
734 impl Writeable for PackageTemplate {
735 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
736 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.inputs.len() as u64))?;
737 for (ref outpoint, ref rev_outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
738 outpoint.write(writer)?;
739 rev_outp.write(writer)?;
741 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
742 (0, self.soonest_conf_deadline, required),
743 (2, self.feerate_previous, required),
744 (4, self.height_original, required),
745 (6, self.height_timer, option)
751 impl Readable for PackageTemplate {
752 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
753 let inputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
754 let mut inputs: Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, PackageSolvingData)> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(inputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
755 for _ in 0..inputs_count {
756 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
757 let rev_outp = Readable::read(reader)?;
758 inputs.push((outpoint, rev_outp));
760 let (malleability, aggregable) = if let Some((_, lead_input)) = inputs.first() {
762 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
763 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
764 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
765 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, false) },
766 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false) },
767 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false) },
769 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); };
770 let mut soonest_conf_deadline = 0;
771 let mut feerate_previous = 0;
772 let mut height_timer = None;
773 let mut height_original = 0;
774 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
775 (0, soonest_conf_deadline, required),
776 (2, feerate_previous, required),
777 (4, height_original, required),
778 (6, height_timer, option),
783 soonest_conf_deadline,
792 /// Attempt to propose a bumping fee for a transaction from its spent output's values and predicted
793 /// weight. We start with the highest priority feerate returned by the node's fee estimator then
794 /// fall-back to lower priorities until we have enough value available to suck from.
796 /// If the proposed fee is less than the available spent output's values, we return the proposed
797 /// fee and the corresponding updated feerate. If the proposed fee is equal or more than the
798 /// available spent output's values, we return nothing
799 fn compute_fee_from_spent_amounts<F: Deref, L: Deref>(input_amounts: u64, predicted_weight: usize, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
800 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
803 let mut updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64;
804 let mut fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
805 if input_amounts <= fee {
806 updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64;
807 fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
808 if input_amounts <= fee {
809 updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u64;
810 fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
811 if input_amounts <= fee {
812 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
816 log_warn!(logger, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
818 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
821 log_warn!(logger, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
823 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
826 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
830 /// Attempt to propose a bumping fee for a transaction from its spent output's values and predicted
831 /// weight. If feerates proposed by the fee-estimator have been increasing since last fee-bumping
832 /// attempt, use them. Otherwise, blindly bump the feerate by 25% of the previous feerate. We also
833 /// verify that those bumping heuristics respect BIP125 rules 3) and 4) and if required adjust
834 /// the new fee to meet the RBF policy requirement.
835 fn feerate_bump<F: Deref, L: Deref>(predicted_weight: usize, input_amounts: u64, previous_feerate: u64, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
836 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
839 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
840 let new_fee = if let Some((new_fee, _)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
841 let updated_feerate = new_fee / (predicted_weight as u64 * 1000);
842 if updated_feerate > previous_feerate {
845 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
846 let new_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 750;
847 if input_amounts <= new_fee {
848 log_warn!(logger, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
854 log_warn!(logger, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
858 let previous_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
859 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
860 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
861 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
862 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
863 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
864 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
868 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / (predicted_weight as u64)))
873 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageTemplate, PackageSolvingData, RevokedOutput, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc};
875 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
876 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
878 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
879 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
880 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
882 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
884 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
885 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
887 macro_rules! dumb_revk_output {
888 ($secp_ctx: expr) => {
890 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
891 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
892 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_scalar, 0, 0))
897 macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_output {
898 ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
900 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
901 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
902 let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
903 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: true, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 0, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
904 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, htlc, $opt_anchors))
909 macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_offered_output {
910 ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
912 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
913 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
914 let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
915 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
916 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: false, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 1000, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
917 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, preimage, htlc, $opt_anchors))
922 macro_rules! dumb_htlc_output {
925 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
926 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(preimage, 0))
933 fn test_package_differing_heights() {
934 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
935 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
936 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
938 let mut package_one_hundred = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
939 let package_two_hundred = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 200);
940 package_one_hundred.merge_package(package_two_hundred);
945 fn test_package_untractable_merge_to() {
946 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
947 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
948 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
949 let htlc_outp = dumb_htlc_output!();
951 let mut untractable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
952 let malleable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, htlc_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
953 untractable_package.merge_package(malleable_package);
958 fn test_package_untractable_merge_from() {
959 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
960 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
961 let htlc_outp = dumb_htlc_output!();
962 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
964 let mut malleable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, htlc_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
965 let untractable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
966 malleable_package.merge_package(untractable_package);
971 fn test_package_noaggregation_to() {
972 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
973 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
974 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
976 let mut noaggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, false, 100);
977 let aggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
978 noaggregation_package.merge_package(aggregation_package);
983 fn test_package_noaggregation_from() {
984 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
985 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
986 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
988 let mut aggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
989 let noaggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, false, 100);
990 aggregation_package.merge_package(noaggregation_package);
995 fn test_package_empty() {
996 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
997 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
998 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1000 let mut empty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1001 empty_package.inputs = vec![];
1002 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1003 empty_package.merge_package(package);
1008 fn test_package_differing_categories() {
1009 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1010 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1011 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1012 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 0, false);
1014 let mut revoked_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1015 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1016 revoked_package.merge_package(counterparty_package);
1020 fn test_package_split_malleable() {
1021 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1022 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1023 let revk_outp_one = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1024 let revk_outp_two = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1025 let revk_outp_three = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1027 let mut package_one = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp_one, 1000, true, 100);
1028 let package_two = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp_two, 1000, true, 100);
1029 let package_three = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 2, revk_outp_three, 1000, true, 100);
1031 package_one.merge_package(package_two);
1032 package_one.merge_package(package_three);
1033 assert_eq!(package_one.outpoints().len(), 3);
1035 if let Some(split_package) = package_one.split_package(&BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout: 1 }) {
1036 // Packages attributes should be identical
1037 assert!(split_package.is_malleable());
1038 assert_eq!(split_package.soonest_conf_deadline, package_one.soonest_conf_deadline);
1039 assert_eq!(split_package.aggregable, package_one.aggregable);
1040 assert_eq!(split_package.feerate_previous, package_one.feerate_previous);
1041 assert_eq!(split_package.height_timer, package_one.height_timer);
1042 assert_eq!(split_package.height_original, package_one.height_original);
1043 } else { panic!(); }
1044 assert_eq!(package_one.outpoints().len(), 2);
1048 fn test_package_split_untractable() {
1049 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1050 let htlc_outp_one = dumb_htlc_output!();
1052 let mut package_one = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, htlc_outp_one, 1000, true, 100);
1053 let ret_split = package_one.split_package(&BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout: 0});
1054 assert!(ret_split.is_none());
1058 fn test_package_timer() {
1059 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1060 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1061 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1063 let mut package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1064 let timer_none = package.timer();
1065 assert!(timer_none.is_none());
1066 package.set_timer(Some(100));
1067 if let Some(timer_some) = package.timer() {
1068 assert_eq!(timer_some, 100);
1073 fn test_package_amounts() {
1074 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1075 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1076 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, false);
1078 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1079 assert_eq!(package.package_amount(), 1000);
1083 fn test_package_weight() {
1084 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1085 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1087 // (nVersion (4) + nLocktime (4) + count_tx_in (1) + prevout (36) + sequence (4) + script_length (1) + count_tx_out (1) + value (8) + var_int (1)) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR + witness marker (2)
1088 let weight_sans_output = (4 + 4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 8 + 1) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR + 2;
1091 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1092 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 0, true, 100);
1093 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT as usize);
1097 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
1098 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
1099 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1100 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
1105 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
1106 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_offered_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
1107 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1108 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);