1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities to assemble claimable outpoints in package of one or more transactions. Those
11 //! packages are attached metadata, guiding their aggregable or fee-bumping re-schedule. This file
12 //! also includes witness weight computation and fee computation methods.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,TxIn, Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
23 use ln::PaymentPreimage;
24 use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
27 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
28 use chain::keysinterface::Sign;
29 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
31 use util::logger::Logger;
32 use util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable};
39 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
41 use super::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
43 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
46 pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
47 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
48 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133;
49 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
50 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC }
53 pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
54 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
55 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139;
56 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
57 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC }
60 pub(crate) fn weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
61 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
62 const WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133;
63 const WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
64 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC }
67 pub(crate) fn weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
68 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig + empty_vec_length + empty_vec + witness_script_length + witness_script
69 const WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139;
70 const WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
71 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC }
74 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
75 pub(crate) const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77;
77 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a low priority.
78 const LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 15;
79 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a middle priority.
80 const MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 3;
81 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a high priority.
82 const HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 1;
84 /// A struct to describe a revoked output and corresponding information to generate a solving
85 /// witness spending a commitment `to_local` output or a second-stage HTLC transaction output.
87 /// CSV and pubkeys are used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used
88 /// as part of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
89 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
90 pub(crate) struct RevokedOutput {
91 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
92 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
93 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
94 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
97 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
101 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16) -> Self {
103 per_commitment_point,
104 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
105 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
107 weight: WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT,
109 on_counterparty_tx_csv
114 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RevokedOutput, {
115 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
116 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
117 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
118 (6, per_commitment_key, required),
119 (8, weight, required),
120 (10, amount, required),
121 (12, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
124 /// A struct to describe a revoked offered output and corresponding information to generate a
127 /// HTLCOuputInCommitment (hash timelock, direction) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
130 /// CSV is used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used as part
131 /// of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
132 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
133 pub(crate) struct RevokedHTLCOutput {
134 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
135 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
136 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
137 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
140 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
143 impl RevokedHTLCOutput {
144 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
145 let weight = if htlc.offered { weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) } else { weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors) };
147 per_commitment_point,
148 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
149 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
158 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RevokedHTLCOutput, {
159 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
160 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
161 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
162 (6, per_commitment_key, required),
163 (8, weight, required),
164 (10, amount, required),
165 (12, htlc, required),
168 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
170 /// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
173 /// The preimage is used as part of the witness.
174 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
175 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
176 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
177 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
178 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
179 preimage: PaymentPreimage,
180 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
181 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
184 impl CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
185 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, preimage: PaymentPreimage, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
186 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
187 per_commitment_point,
188 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
189 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
192 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
196 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
197 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
201 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, {
202 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
203 (1, opt_anchors, option),
204 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
205 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
206 (6, preimage, required),
210 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
212 /// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
214 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
216 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
217 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
218 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
219 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
220 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
223 impl CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
224 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
225 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
226 per_commitment_point,
227 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
228 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
230 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
234 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
235 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
239 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, {
240 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
241 (1, opt_anchors, option),
242 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
243 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
247 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on holder commitment transaction.
249 /// Either offered or received, the amount is always used as part of the bip143 sighash.
250 /// Preimage is only included as part of the witness in former case.
251 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
252 pub(crate) struct HolderHTLCOutput {
253 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
255 /// Defaults to 0 for HTLC-Success transactions, which have no expiry
259 impl HolderHTLCOutput {
260 pub(crate) fn build_offered(amount: u64, cltv_expiry: u32) -> Self {
268 pub(crate) fn build_accepted(preimage: PaymentPreimage, amount: u64) -> Self {
270 preimage: Some(preimage),
277 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderHTLCOutput, {
278 (0, amount, required),
279 (2, cltv_expiry, required),
280 (4, preimage, option)
283 /// A struct to describe the channel output on the funding transaction.
285 /// witnessScript is used as part of the witness redeeming the funding utxo.
286 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
287 pub(crate) struct HolderFundingOutput {
288 funding_redeemscript: Script,
291 impl HolderFundingOutput {
292 pub(crate) fn build(funding_redeemscript: Script) -> Self {
293 HolderFundingOutput {
294 funding_redeemscript,
299 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderFundingOutput, {
300 (0, funding_redeemscript, required),
303 /// A wrapper encapsulating all in-protocol differing outputs types.
305 /// The generic API offers access to an outputs common attributes or allow transformation such as
306 /// finalizing an input claiming the output.
307 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
308 pub(crate) enum PackageSolvingData {
309 RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput),
310 RevokedHTLCOutput(RevokedHTLCOutput),
311 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput),
312 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput),
313 HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput),
314 HolderFundingOutput(HolderFundingOutput),
317 impl PackageSolvingData {
318 fn amount(&self) -> u64 {
319 let amt = match self {
320 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => { outp.amount },
321 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.amount },
322 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000 },
323 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000 },
324 // Note: Currently, amounts of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
325 // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
326 // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
327 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
328 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
332 fn weight(&self) -> usize {
333 let weight = match self {
334 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => { outp.weight as usize },
335 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.weight as usize },
336 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { weight_offered_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize },
337 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { weight_received_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize },
338 // Note: Currently, weights of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
339 // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
340 // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
341 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
342 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { unreachable!() },
346 fn is_compatible(&self, input: &PackageSolvingData) -> bool {
348 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => {
350 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { true },
351 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { true },
355 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => {
357 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { true },
358 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { true },
362 _ => { mem::discriminant(self) == mem::discriminant(&input) }
365 fn finalize_input<Signer: Sign>(&self, bumped_tx: &mut Transaction, i: usize, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> bool {
367 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => {
368 if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
369 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&chan_keys.revocation_key, outp.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &chan_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key);
370 //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
371 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
372 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
373 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
374 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
375 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
376 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
377 } else { return false; }
380 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
381 if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
382 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
383 //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
384 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
385 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
386 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
387 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
388 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(chan_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec());
389 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
390 } else { return false; }
393 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
394 if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
395 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
397 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
398 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
399 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
400 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
401 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(outp.preimage.0.to_vec());
402 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
406 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
407 if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
408 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
410 bumped_tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(outp.htlc.cltv_expiry); // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation
411 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
412 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
413 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
414 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
415 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
416 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
417 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
421 _ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
425 fn get_finalized_tx<Signer: Sign>(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> Option<Transaction> {
427 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { return onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outpoint, &outp.preimage); }
428 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => { return Some(onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&outp.funding_redeemscript)); }
429 _ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
432 fn absolute_tx_timelock(&self, output_conf_height: u32) -> u32 {
433 // Get the absolute timelock at which this output can be spent given the height at which
434 // this output was confirmed. We use `output_conf_height + 1` as a safe default as we can
435 // be confirmed in the next block and transactions with time lock `current_height + 1`
437 let absolute_timelock = match self {
438 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
439 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
440 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
441 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => cmp::max(outp.htlc.cltv_expiry, output_conf_height + 1),
442 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => cmp::max(outp.cltv_expiry, output_conf_height + 1),
443 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(_) => output_conf_height + 1,
449 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PackageSolvingData, ;
451 (1, RevokedHTLCOutput),
452 (2, CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput),
453 (3, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput),
454 (4, HolderHTLCOutput),
455 (5, HolderFundingOutput),
458 /// A malleable package might be aggregated with other packages to save on fees.
459 /// A untractable package has been counter-signed and aggregable will break cached counterparty
461 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
462 pub(crate) enum PackageMalleability {
467 /// A structure to describe a package content that is generated by ChannelMonitor and
468 /// used by OnchainTxHandler to generate and broadcast transactions settling onchain claims.
470 /// A package is defined as one or more transactions claiming onchain outputs in reaction
471 /// to confirmation of a channel transaction. Those packages might be aggregated to save on
472 /// fees, if satisfaction of outputs's witnessScript let's us do so.
474 /// As packages are time-sensitive, we fee-bump and rebroadcast them at scheduled intervals.
475 /// Failing to confirm a package translate as a loss of funds for the user.
476 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
477 pub struct PackageTemplate {
478 // List of onchain outputs and solving data to generate satisfying witnesses.
479 inputs: Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, PackageSolvingData)>,
480 // Packages are deemed as malleable if we have local knwoledge of at least one set of
481 // private keys yielding a satisfying witnesses. Malleability implies that we can aggregate
482 // packages among them to save on fees or rely on RBF to bump their feerates.
483 // Untractable packages have been counter-signed and thus imply that we can't aggregate
484 // them without breaking signatures. Fee-bumping strategy will also rely on CPFP.
485 malleability: PackageMalleability,
486 // Block height after which the earlier-output belonging to this package is mature for a
487 // competing claim by the counterparty. As our chain tip becomes nearer from the timelock,
488 // the fee-bumping frequency will increase. See `OnchainTxHandler::get_height_timer`.
489 soonest_conf_deadline: u32,
490 // Determines if this package can be aggregated.
491 // Timelocked outputs belonging to the same transaction might have differing
492 // satisfying heights. Picking up the later height among the output set would be a valid
493 // aggregable strategy but it comes with at least 2 trade-offs :
494 // * earlier-output fund are going to take longer to come back
495 // * CLTV delta backing up a corresponding HTLC on an upstream channel could be swallowed
496 // by the requirement of the later-output part of the set
497 // For now, we mark such timelocked outputs as non-aggregable, though we might introduce
498 // smarter aggregable strategy in the future.
500 // Cache of package feerate committed at previous (re)broadcast. If bumping resources
501 // (either claimed output value or external utxo), it will keep increasing until holder
502 // or counterparty successful claim.
503 feerate_previous: u64,
504 // Cache of next height at which fee-bumping and rebroadcast will be attempted. In
505 // the future, we might abstract it to an observed mempool fluctuation.
506 height_timer: Option<u32>,
507 // Confirmation height of the claimed outputs set transaction. In case of reorg reaching
508 // it, we wipe out and forget the package.
509 height_original: u32,
512 impl PackageTemplate {
513 pub(crate) fn is_malleable(&self) -> bool {
514 self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Malleable
516 pub(crate) fn timelock(&self) -> u32 {
517 self.soonest_conf_deadline
519 pub(crate) fn aggregable(&self) -> bool {
522 pub(crate) fn set_feerate(&mut self, new_feerate: u64) {
523 self.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
525 pub(crate) fn timer(&self) -> Option<u32> {
526 if let Some(ref timer) = self.height_timer {
531 pub(crate) fn set_timer(&mut self, new_timer: Option<u32>) {
532 self.height_timer = new_timer;
534 pub(crate) fn outpoints(&self) -> Vec<&BitcoinOutPoint> {
535 self.inputs.iter().map(|(o, _)| o).collect()
537 pub(crate) fn split_package(&mut self, split_outp: &BitcoinOutPoint) -> Option<PackageTemplate> {
538 match self.malleability {
539 PackageMalleability::Malleable => {
540 let mut split_package = None;
541 let timelock = self.soonest_conf_deadline;
542 let aggregable = self.aggregable;
543 let feerate_previous = self.feerate_previous;
544 let height_timer = self.height_timer;
545 let height_original = self.height_original;
546 self.inputs.retain(|outp| {
547 if *split_outp == outp.0 {
548 split_package = Some(PackageTemplate {
549 inputs: vec![(outp.0, outp.1.clone())],
550 malleability: PackageMalleability::Malleable,
551 soonest_conf_deadline: timelock,
561 return split_package;
564 // Note, we may try to split on remote transaction for
565 // which we don't have a competing one (HTLC-Success before
566 // timelock expiration). This explain we don't panic!
567 // We should refactor OnchainTxHandler::block_connected to
568 // only test equality on competing claims.
573 pub(crate) fn merge_package(&mut self, mut merge_from: PackageTemplate) {
574 assert_eq!(self.height_original, merge_from.height_original);
575 if self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Untractable || merge_from.malleability == PackageMalleability::Untractable {
576 panic!("Merging template on untractable packages");
578 if !self.aggregable || !merge_from.aggregable {
579 panic!("Merging non aggregatable packages");
581 if let Some((_, lead_input)) = self.inputs.first() {
582 for (_, v) in merge_from.inputs.iter() {
583 if !lead_input.is_compatible(v) { panic!("Merging outputs from differing types !"); }
585 } else { panic!("Merging template on an empty package"); }
586 for (k, v) in merge_from.inputs.drain(..) {
587 self.inputs.push((k, v));
589 //TODO: verify coverage and sanity?
590 if self.soonest_conf_deadline > merge_from.soonest_conf_deadline {
591 self.soonest_conf_deadline = merge_from.soonest_conf_deadline;
593 if self.feerate_previous > merge_from.feerate_previous {
594 self.feerate_previous = merge_from.feerate_previous;
596 self.height_timer = cmp::min(self.height_timer, merge_from.height_timer);
598 /// Gets the amount of all outptus being spent by this package, only valid for malleable
600 fn package_amount(&self) -> u64 {
602 for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
603 amounts += outp.amount();
607 pub(crate) fn package_timelock(&self) -> u32 {
608 self.inputs.iter().map(|(_, outp)| outp.absolute_tx_timelock(self.height_original))
609 .max().expect("There must always be at least one output to spend in a PackageTemplate")
611 pub(crate) fn package_weight(&self, destination_script: &Script) -> usize {
612 let mut inputs_weight = 0;
613 let mut witnesses_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
614 for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
615 // previous_out_point: 36 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; sequence: 4 bytes
616 inputs_weight += 41 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
617 witnesses_weight += outp.weight();
619 // version: 4 bytes ; count_tx_in: 1 byte ; count_tx_out: 1 byte ; lock_time: 4 bytes
620 let transaction_weight = 10 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
621 // value: 8 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; pk_script: `destination_script.len()`
622 let output_weight = (8 + 1 + destination_script.len()) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
623 inputs_weight + witnesses_weight + transaction_weight + output_weight
625 pub(crate) fn finalize_package<L: Deref, Signer: Sign>(&self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, value: u64, destination_script: Script, logger: &L) -> Option<Transaction>
626 where L::Target: Logger,
628 match self.malleability {
629 PackageMalleability::Malleable => {
630 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
632 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
635 script_pubkey: destination_script,
639 for (outpoint, _) in self.inputs.iter() {
640 bumped_tx.input.push(TxIn {
641 previous_output: *outpoint,
642 script_sig: Script::new(),
643 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
644 witness: Witness::new(),
647 for (i, (outpoint, out)) in self.inputs.iter().enumerate() {
648 log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
649 if !out.finalize_input(&mut bumped_tx, i, onchain_handler) { return None; }
651 log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", bumped_tx.txid());
652 return Some(bumped_tx);
654 PackageMalleability::Untractable => {
655 debug_assert_eq!(value, 0, "value is ignored for non-malleable packages, should be zero to ensure callsites are correct");
656 if let Some((outpoint, outp)) = self.inputs.first() {
657 if let Some(final_tx) = outp.get_finalized_tx(outpoint, onchain_handler) {
658 log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
659 log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", final_tx.txid());
660 return Some(final_tx);
663 } else { panic!("API Error: Package must not be inputs empty"); }
667 /// In LN, output claimed are time-sensitive, which means we have to spend them before reaching some timelock expiration. At in-channel
668 /// output detection, we generate a first version of a claim tx and associate to it a height timer. A height timer is an absolute block
669 /// height that once reached we should generate a new bumped "version" of the claim tx to be sure that we safely claim outputs before
670 /// that our counterparty can do so. If timelock expires soon, height timer is going to be scaled down in consequence to increase
671 /// frequency of the bump and so increase our bets of success.
672 pub(crate) fn get_height_timer(&self, current_height: u32) -> u32 {
673 if self.soonest_conf_deadline <= current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
674 return current_height + HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
675 } else if self.soonest_conf_deadline - current_height <= LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
676 return current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
678 current_height + LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
681 /// Returns value in satoshis to be included as package outgoing output amount and feerate
682 /// which was used to generate the value. Will not return less than `dust_limit_sats` for the
684 pub(crate) fn compute_package_output<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, predicted_weight: usize, dust_limit_sats: u64, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
685 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
688 debug_assert!(self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Malleable, "The package output is fixed for non-malleable packages");
689 let input_amounts = self.package_amount();
690 assert!(dust_limit_sats as i64 > 0, "Output script must be broadcastable/have a 'real' dust limit.");
691 // If old feerate is 0, first iteration of this claim, use normal fee calculation
692 if self.feerate_previous != 0 {
693 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = feerate_bump(predicted_weight, input_amounts, self.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, logger) {
694 return Some((cmp::max(input_amounts as i64 - new_fee as i64, dust_limit_sats as i64) as u64, feerate));
697 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
698 return Some((cmp::max(input_amounts as i64 - new_fee as i64, dust_limit_sats as i64) as u64, feerate));
703 pub (crate) fn build_package(txid: Txid, vout: u32, input_solving_data: PackageSolvingData, soonest_conf_deadline: u32, aggregable: bool, height_original: u32) -> Self {
704 let malleability = match input_solving_data {
705 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
706 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
707 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
708 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
709 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Untractable },
710 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Untractable },
712 let mut inputs = Vec::with_capacity(1);
713 inputs.push((BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout }, input_solving_data));
717 soonest_conf_deadline,
726 impl Writeable for PackageTemplate {
727 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
728 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.inputs.len() as u64))?;
729 for (ref outpoint, ref rev_outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
730 outpoint.write(writer)?;
731 rev_outp.write(writer)?;
733 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
734 (0, self.soonest_conf_deadline, required),
735 (2, self.feerate_previous, required),
736 (4, self.height_original, required),
737 (6, self.height_timer, option)
743 impl Readable for PackageTemplate {
744 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
745 let inputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
746 let mut inputs: Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, PackageSolvingData)> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(inputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
747 for _ in 0..inputs_count {
748 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
749 let rev_outp = Readable::read(reader)?;
750 inputs.push((outpoint, rev_outp));
752 let (malleability, aggregable) = if let Some((_, lead_input)) = inputs.first() {
754 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
755 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
756 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
757 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, false) },
758 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false) },
759 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false) },
761 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); };
762 let mut soonest_conf_deadline = 0;
763 let mut feerate_previous = 0;
764 let mut height_timer = None;
765 let mut height_original = 0;
766 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
767 (0, soonest_conf_deadline, required),
768 (2, feerate_previous, required),
769 (4, height_original, required),
770 (6, height_timer, option),
775 soonest_conf_deadline,
784 /// Attempt to propose a bumping fee for a transaction from its spent output's values and predicted
785 /// weight. We start with the highest priority feerate returned by the node's fee estimator then
786 /// fall-back to lower priorities until we have enough value available to suck from.
788 /// If the proposed fee is less than the available spent output's values, we return the proposed
789 /// fee and the corresponding updated feerate. If the proposed fee is equal or more than the
790 /// available spent output's values, we return nothing
791 fn compute_fee_from_spent_amounts<F: Deref, L: Deref>(input_amounts: u64, predicted_weight: usize, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
792 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
795 let mut updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64;
796 let mut fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
797 if input_amounts <= fee {
798 updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64;
799 fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
800 if input_amounts <= fee {
801 updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u64;
802 fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
803 if input_amounts <= fee {
804 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
808 log_warn!(logger, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
810 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
813 log_warn!(logger, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
815 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
818 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
822 /// Attempt to propose a bumping fee for a transaction from its spent output's values and predicted
823 /// weight. If feerates proposed by the fee-estimator have been increasing since last fee-bumping
824 /// attempt, use them. Otherwise, blindly bump the feerate by 25% of the previous feerate. We also
825 /// verify that those bumping heuristics respect BIP125 rules 3) and 4) and if required adjust
826 /// the new fee to meet the RBF policy requirement.
827 fn feerate_bump<F: Deref, L: Deref>(predicted_weight: usize, input_amounts: u64, previous_feerate: u64, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
828 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
831 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
832 let new_fee = if let Some((new_fee, _)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
833 let updated_feerate = new_fee / (predicted_weight as u64 * 1000);
834 if updated_feerate > previous_feerate {
837 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
838 let new_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 750;
839 if input_amounts <= new_fee {
840 log_warn!(logger, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
846 log_warn!(logger, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
850 let previous_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
851 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
852 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
853 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
854 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
855 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
856 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
860 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / (predicted_weight as u64)))
865 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageTemplate, PackageSolvingData, RevokedOutput, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc};
867 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
868 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
870 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
871 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
872 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
874 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
876 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
877 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
879 macro_rules! dumb_revk_output {
880 ($secp_ctx: expr) => {
882 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
883 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
884 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_scalar, 0, 0))
889 macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_output {
890 ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
892 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
893 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
894 let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
895 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: true, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 0, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
896 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, htlc, $opt_anchors))
901 macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_offered_output {
902 ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
904 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
905 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
906 let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
907 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
908 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: false, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 1000, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
909 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, preimage, htlc, $opt_anchors))
914 macro_rules! dumb_htlc_output {
917 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
918 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(preimage, 0))
925 fn test_package_differing_heights() {
926 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
927 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
928 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
930 let mut package_one_hundred = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
931 let package_two_hundred = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 200);
932 package_one_hundred.merge_package(package_two_hundred);
937 fn test_package_untractable_merge_to() {
938 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
939 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
940 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
941 let htlc_outp = dumb_htlc_output!();
943 let mut untractable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
944 let malleable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, htlc_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
945 untractable_package.merge_package(malleable_package);
950 fn test_package_untractable_merge_from() {
951 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
952 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
953 let htlc_outp = dumb_htlc_output!();
954 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
956 let mut malleable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, htlc_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
957 let untractable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
958 malleable_package.merge_package(untractable_package);
963 fn test_package_noaggregation_to() {
964 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
965 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
966 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
968 let mut noaggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, false, 100);
969 let aggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
970 noaggregation_package.merge_package(aggregation_package);
975 fn test_package_noaggregation_from() {
976 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
977 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
978 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
980 let mut aggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
981 let noaggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, false, 100);
982 aggregation_package.merge_package(noaggregation_package);
987 fn test_package_empty() {
988 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
989 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
990 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
992 let mut empty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
993 empty_package.inputs = vec![];
994 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
995 empty_package.merge_package(package);
1000 fn test_package_differing_categories() {
1001 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1002 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1003 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1004 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 0, false);
1006 let mut revoked_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1007 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1008 revoked_package.merge_package(counterparty_package);
1012 fn test_package_split_malleable() {
1013 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1014 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1015 let revk_outp_one = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1016 let revk_outp_two = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1017 let revk_outp_three = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1019 let mut package_one = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp_one, 1000, true, 100);
1020 let package_two = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp_two, 1000, true, 100);
1021 let package_three = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 2, revk_outp_three, 1000, true, 100);
1023 package_one.merge_package(package_two);
1024 package_one.merge_package(package_three);
1025 assert_eq!(package_one.outpoints().len(), 3);
1027 if let Some(split_package) = package_one.split_package(&BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout: 1 }) {
1028 // Packages attributes should be identical
1029 assert!(split_package.is_malleable());
1030 assert_eq!(split_package.soonest_conf_deadline, package_one.soonest_conf_deadline);
1031 assert_eq!(split_package.aggregable, package_one.aggregable);
1032 assert_eq!(split_package.feerate_previous, package_one.feerate_previous);
1033 assert_eq!(split_package.height_timer, package_one.height_timer);
1034 assert_eq!(split_package.height_original, package_one.height_original);
1035 } else { panic!(); }
1036 assert_eq!(package_one.outpoints().len(), 2);
1040 fn test_package_split_untractable() {
1041 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1042 let htlc_outp_one = dumb_htlc_output!();
1044 let mut package_one = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, htlc_outp_one, 1000, true, 100);
1045 let ret_split = package_one.split_package(&BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout: 0});
1046 assert!(ret_split.is_none());
1050 fn test_package_timer() {
1051 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1052 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1053 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1055 let mut package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1056 let timer_none = package.timer();
1057 assert!(timer_none.is_none());
1058 package.set_timer(Some(100));
1059 if let Some(timer_some) = package.timer() {
1060 assert_eq!(timer_some, 100);
1065 fn test_package_amounts() {
1066 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1067 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1068 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, false);
1070 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1071 assert_eq!(package.package_amount(), 1000);
1075 fn test_package_weight() {
1076 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1077 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1079 // (nVersion (4) + nLocktime (4) + count_tx_in (1) + prevout (36) + sequence (4) + script_length (1) + count_tx_out (1) + value (8) + var_int (1)) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR + witness marker (2)
1080 let weight_sans_output = (4 + 4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 8 + 1) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR + 2;
1083 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1084 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 0, true, 100);
1085 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT as usize);
1089 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
1090 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
1091 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1092 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
1097 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
1098 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_offered_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
1099 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1100 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);