1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
11 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::Sign message signing by hand.
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
16 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
23 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
24 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
25 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
26 use crate::util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Scalar};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Message};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
32 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, secp256k1, Sequence, Witness};
35 use crate::prelude::*;
37 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
38 use crate::util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
39 use crate::ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI};
42 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
44 pub(crate) const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
45 pub(crate) const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
46 pub(crate) const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS: usize = 136;
47 // The weight of `accepted_htlc_script` can vary in function of its CLTV argument value. We define a
48 // range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants.
49 pub(crate) const MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 136;
50 pub(crate) const MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 143;
52 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction.
54 pub fn htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
55 const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
56 const HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 706;
57 if opt_anchors { HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT }
60 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
62 pub fn htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
63 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
64 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 666;
65 if opt_anchors { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT }
68 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
69 pub(crate) enum HTLCClaim {
78 /// Check if a given input witness attempts to claim a HTLC.
79 pub(crate) fn from_witness(witness: &Witness) -> Option<Self> {
80 debug_assert_eq!(OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS, MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
81 if witness.len() < 2 {
84 let witness_script = witness.last().unwrap();
85 let second_to_last = witness.second_to_last().unwrap();
86 if witness_script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
87 if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
88 // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
89 Some(Self::Revocation)
90 } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
91 // <remotehtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
92 Some(Self::OfferedPreimage)
93 } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
94 // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
95 Some(Self::OfferedTimeout)
99 } else if witness_script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS {
100 // It's possible for the weight of `offered_htlc_script` and `accepted_htlc_script` to
101 // match so we check for both here.
102 if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
103 // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
104 Some(Self::Revocation)
105 } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
106 // <remotehtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
107 Some(Self::OfferedPreimage)
108 } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
109 // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
110 Some(Self::OfferedTimeout)
111 } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
112 // <remotehtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
113 Some(Self::AcceptedTimeout)
114 } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
115 // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
116 Some(Self::AcceptedPreimage)
120 } else if witness_script.len() > MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT &&
121 witness_script.len() <= MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
122 // Handle remaining range of ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
123 if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
124 // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
125 Some(Self::Revocation)
126 } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
127 // <remotehtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
128 Some(Self::AcceptedTimeout)
129 } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
130 // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
131 Some(Self::AcceptedPreimage)
141 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
142 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
144 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
145 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
146 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
149 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
150 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
151 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
157 /// Build a closing transaction
158 pub fn build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat: u64, to_counterparty_value_sat: u64, to_holder_script: Script, to_counterparty_script: Script, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Transaction {
160 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
162 previous_output: funding_outpoint,
163 script_sig: Script::new(),
164 sequence: Sequence::MAX,
165 witness: Witness::new(),
170 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
172 if to_counterparty_value_sat > 0 {
174 script_pubkey: to_counterparty_script,
175 value: to_counterparty_value_sat
179 if to_holder_value_sat > 0 {
181 script_pubkey: to_holder_script,
182 value: to_holder_value_sat
186 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
188 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
189 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
195 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
201 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
202 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
204 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of our counterparty in just 50*32 bytes
207 pub struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
208 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
211 impl Eq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {}
212 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
213 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
214 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
215 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
223 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
224 /// Creates a new empty `CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets` structure.
225 pub fn new() -> Self {
226 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
230 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
232 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
239 /// Returns the minimum index of all stored secrets. Note that indexes start
240 /// at 1 << 48 and get decremented by one for each new secret.
241 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
242 //TODO This can be optimized?
243 let mut min = 1 << 48;
244 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
253 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
254 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
256 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
257 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
258 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
259 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
265 /// Inserts the `secret` at `idx`. Returns `Ok(())` if the secret
266 /// was generated in accordance with BOLT 3 and is consistent with previous secrets.
267 pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
268 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
270 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
271 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
275 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
278 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
282 /// Returns the secret at `idx`.
283 /// Returns `None` if `idx` is < [`CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::get_min_seen_secret`].
284 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
285 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
286 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
287 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
290 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
295 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
296 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
297 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
298 writer.write_all(secret)?;
299 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
301 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
305 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
306 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
307 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
308 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
309 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
310 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
312 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
313 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
317 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
318 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
319 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey {
320 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
321 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
322 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
323 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
325 base_secret.clone().add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(res).unwrap())
326 .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak contains the hash of the key.")
329 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
330 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
331 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
332 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> PublicKey {
333 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
334 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
335 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
336 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
338 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx,
339 &SecretKey::from_slice(&res).expect("Hashes should always be valid keys unless SHA-256 is broken"));
340 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
341 .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak contains the hash of the key.")
344 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
346 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
347 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
348 /// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
349 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
350 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
351 per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey)
353 let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
354 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
356 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
357 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
358 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
359 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
361 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
363 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
364 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
365 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
366 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
368 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
371 let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())
372 .expect("Multiplying a secret key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
373 let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())
374 .expect("Multiplying a secret key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
375 countersignatory_contrib.add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(broadcaster_contrib.secret_bytes()).unwrap())
376 .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.")
379 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
380 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
381 /// public key instead of private keys.
383 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
384 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
385 /// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
386 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
388 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
389 /// generated (ie our own).
390 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
391 per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey)
393 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
394 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
395 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
396 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
398 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
400 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
401 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
402 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
403 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
405 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
408 let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())
409 .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
410 let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())
411 .expect("Multiplying a valid public key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
412 countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
413 .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.")
416 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
417 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
419 /// A broadcaster key is provided from potential broadcaster of the computed transaction.
420 /// A countersignatory key is coming from a protocol participant unable to broadcast the
423 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
424 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
425 /// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the
426 /// pre-calculated keys.
427 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]
428 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
429 /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
430 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
431 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
432 /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
434 pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
435 /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
436 pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey,
437 /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
438 pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
439 /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
440 pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
443 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(TxCreationKeys, {
444 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
445 (2, revocation_key, required),
446 (4, broadcaster_htlc_key, required),
447 (6, countersignatory_htlc_key, required),
448 (8, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, required),
451 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
452 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
453 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
454 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
455 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
456 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
457 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
458 /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
459 /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
461 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
462 /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
463 /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
464 /// static across every commitment transaction.
465 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
466 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
467 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
468 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
469 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
470 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
471 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
472 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelPublicKeys, {
476 (0, funding_pubkey, required),
477 (2, revocation_basepoint, required),
478 (4, payment_point, required),
479 (6, delayed_payment_basepoint, required),
480 (8, htlc_basepoint, required),
483 impl TxCreationKeys {
484 /// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point.
485 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
486 pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
488 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
489 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base),
490 broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base),
491 countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base),
492 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base),
496 /// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys.
497 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
498 pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
499 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(
501 &per_commitment_point,
502 &broadcaster_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
503 &broadcaster_keys.htlc_basepoint,
504 &countersignatory_keys.revocation_basepoint,
505 &countersignatory_keys.htlc_basepoint,
510 /// The maximum length of a script returned by get_revokeable_redeemscript.
511 // Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 2 bytes for contest_delay, and two public
512 // keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push).
513 pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 3 + 34*2;
515 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
516 /// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
517 /// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
518 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
519 let res = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
520 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
521 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
522 .push_int(contest_delay as i64)
523 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
524 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
525 .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
526 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
527 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
529 debug_assert!(res.len() <= REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH);
533 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
534 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
535 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
536 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
537 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
538 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
539 /// the counterparty or our own.
541 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
542 /// this divided by 1000.
543 pub amount_msat: u64,
544 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
545 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
546 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
547 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
548 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
549 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
550 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
551 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
554 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, {
555 (0, offered, required),
556 (2, amount_msat, required),
557 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
558 (6, payment_hash, required),
559 (8, transaction_output_index, option),
563 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
564 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
566 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
567 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
568 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
569 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
570 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
571 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
572 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
573 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
574 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
575 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
577 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
578 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
579 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
581 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
582 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
584 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
585 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
586 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
587 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
588 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
589 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
590 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
592 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
593 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
594 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
596 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
599 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
600 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
601 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
602 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
603 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
604 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
605 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
606 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
607 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
608 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
610 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
611 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
612 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
613 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
614 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
616 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
617 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
619 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
620 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
621 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
622 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
623 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
624 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
625 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
626 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
628 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
629 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
630 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
632 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
637 /// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
638 /// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
640 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
641 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
644 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
645 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
646 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script {
647 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
648 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
650 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
651 if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
652 builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
653 .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
655 builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
656 .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
657 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
660 /// Builds an unsigned HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction from the given channel and HTLC
661 /// parameters. This is used by [`TrustedCommitmentTransaction::get_htlc_sigs`] to fetch the
662 /// transaction which needs signing, and can be used to construct an HTLC transaction which is
663 /// broadcastable given a counterparty HTLC signature.
665 /// Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
666 /// commitment transaction).
667 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, use_non_zero_fee_anchors: bool, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
668 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
670 previous_output: OutPoint {
671 txid: commitment_txid.clone(),
672 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
674 script_sig: Script::new(),
675 sequence: Sequence(if opt_anchors { 1 } else { 0 }),
676 witness: Witness::new(),
679 let weight = if htlc.offered {
680 htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
682 htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
684 let output_value = if opt_anchors && !use_non_zero_fee_anchors {
685 htlc.amount_msat / 1000
687 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * weight / 1000;
688 htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee
691 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
693 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
699 lock_time: PackedLockTime(if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 }),
705 /// Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled.
707 pub(crate) fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> Script {
709 .push_slice(&payment_point.serialize()[..])
710 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY)
712 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
716 /// Gets the witnessScript for an anchor output from the funding public key.
717 /// The witness in the spending input must be:
718 /// <BIP 143 funding_signature>
719 /// After 16 blocks of confirmation, an alternative satisfying witness could be:
721 /// (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule)
723 pub fn get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Script {
724 Builder::new().push_slice(&funding_pubkey.serialize()[..])
725 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
726 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IFDUP)
727 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
729 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
730 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
735 /// Locates the output with an anchor script paying to `funding_pubkey` within `commitment_tx`.
736 pub(crate) fn get_anchor_output<'a>(commitment_tx: &'a Transaction, funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<(u32, &'a TxOut)> {
737 let anchor_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey).to_v0_p2wsh();
738 commitment_tx.output.iter().enumerate()
739 .find(|(_, txout)| txout.script_pubkey == anchor_script)
740 .map(|(idx, txout)| (idx as u32, txout))
743 /// Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend an anchor input.
744 pub fn build_anchor_input_witness(funding_key: &PublicKey, funding_sig: &Signature) -> Witness {
745 let anchor_redeem_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_key);
746 let mut funding_sig = funding_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
747 funding_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
748 Witness::from_vec(vec![funding_sig, anchor_redeem_script.to_bytes()])
751 /// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction).
752 /// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty.
754 /// Normally, this is converted to the broadcaster/countersignatory-organized DirectedChannelTransactionParameters
755 /// before use, via the as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
757 pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters {
758 /// Holder public keys
759 pub holder_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
760 /// The contest delay selected by the holder, which applies to counterparty-broadcast transactions
761 pub holder_selected_contest_delay: u16,
762 /// Whether the holder is the initiator of this channel.
763 /// This is an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
764 pub is_outbound_from_holder: bool,
765 /// The late-bound counterparty channel transaction parameters.
766 /// These parameters are populated at the point in the protocol where the counterparty provides them.
767 pub counterparty_parameters: Option<CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters>,
768 /// The late-bound funding outpoint
769 pub funding_outpoint: Option<chain::transaction::OutPoint>,
770 /// Are anchors (zero fee HTLC transaction variant) used for this channel. Boolean is
771 /// serialization backwards-compatible.
772 pub opt_anchors: Option<()>,
773 /// Are non-zero-fee anchors are enabled (used in conjuction with opt_anchors)
774 /// It is intended merely for backwards compatibility with signers that need it.
775 /// There is no support for this feature in LDK channel negotiation.
776 pub opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: Option<()>,
779 /// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
781 pub struct CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
782 /// Counter-party public keys
783 pub pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
784 /// The contest delay selected by the counterparty, which applies to holder-broadcast transactions
785 pub selected_contest_delay: u16,
788 impl ChannelTransactionParameters {
789 /// Whether the late bound parameters are populated.
790 pub fn is_populated(&self) -> bool {
791 self.counterparty_parameters.is_some() && self.funding_outpoint.is_some()
794 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
795 /// given that the holder is the broadcaster.
797 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
798 pub fn as_holder_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
799 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_holder_broadcastable");
800 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
802 holder_is_broadcaster: true
806 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
807 /// given that the counterparty is the broadcaster.
809 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
810 pub fn as_counterparty_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
811 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_counterparty_broadcastable");
812 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
814 holder_is_broadcaster: false
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, {
820 (0, pubkeys, required),
821 (2, selected_contest_delay, required),
824 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelTransactionParameters, {
825 (0, holder_pubkeys, required),
826 (2, holder_selected_contest_delay, required),
827 (4, is_outbound_from_holder, required),
828 (6, counterparty_parameters, option),
829 (8, funding_outpoint, option),
830 (10, opt_anchors, option),
831 (12, opt_non_zero_fee_anchors, option),
834 /// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by
835 /// broadcaster/countersignatory.
837 /// This is derived from the holder/counterparty-organized ChannelTransactionParameters via the
838 /// as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
839 pub struct DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
840 /// The holder's channel static parameters
841 inner: &'a ChannelTransactionParameters,
842 /// Whether the holder is the broadcaster
843 holder_is_broadcaster: bool,
846 impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
847 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the broadcaster
848 pub fn broadcaster_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
849 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
850 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
852 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
856 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the countersignatory
857 pub fn countersignatory_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
858 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
859 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
861 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
865 /// Get the contest delay applicable to the transactions.
866 /// Note that the contest delay was selected by the countersignatory.
867 pub fn contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
868 let counterparty_parameters = self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
869 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { counterparty_parameters.selected_contest_delay } else { self.inner.holder_selected_contest_delay }
872 /// Whether the channel is outbound from the broadcaster.
874 /// The boolean representing the side that initiated the channel is
875 /// an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
876 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
877 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder } else { !self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder }
880 /// The funding outpoint
881 pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
882 self.inner.funding_outpoint.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint()
885 /// Whether to use anchors for this channel
886 pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
887 self.inner.opt_anchors.is_some()
891 /// Information needed to build and sign a holder's commitment transaction.
893 /// The transaction is only signed once we are ready to broadcast.
895 pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
896 inner: CommitmentTransaction,
897 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction
898 pub counterparty_sig: Signature,
899 /// All non-dust counterparty HTLC signatures, in the order they appear in the transaction
900 pub counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>,
901 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
902 // The user should be able to reconstruct this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
903 holder_sig_first: bool,
906 impl Deref for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
907 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
909 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.inner }
912 impl Eq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {}
913 impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
914 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
915 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
916 self.inner == o.inner
920 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderCommitmentTransaction, {
921 (0, inner, required),
922 (2, counterparty_sig, required),
923 (4, holder_sig_first, required),
924 (6, counterparty_htlc_sigs, vec_type),
927 impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
929 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
930 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
931 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
932 let dummy_sig = sign(&secp_ctx, &secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
934 let keys = TxCreationKeys {
935 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
936 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
937 broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
938 countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
939 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
941 let channel_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
942 funding_pubkey: dummy_key.clone(),
943 revocation_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
944 payment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
945 delayed_payment_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
946 htlc_basepoint: dummy_key.clone()
948 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
949 holder_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(),
950 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
951 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
952 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
953 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
955 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
957 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
958 let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, false, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
959 HolderCommitmentTransaction {
961 counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
962 counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec::new(),
963 holder_sig_first: false
967 /// Create a new holder transaction with the given counterparty signatures.
968 /// The funding keys are used to figure out which signature should go first when building the transaction for broadcast.
969 pub fn new(commitment_tx: CommitmentTransaction, counterparty_sig: Signature, counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>, holder_funding_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Self {
971 inner: commitment_tx,
973 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
974 holder_sig_first: holder_funding_key.serialize()[..] < counterparty_funding_key.serialize()[..],
978 pub(crate) fn add_holder_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, holder_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
979 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
980 let mut tx = self.inner.built.transaction.clone();
981 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
982 let mut ser_holder_sig = holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
983 ser_holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
984 let mut ser_cp_sig = self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
985 ser_cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
987 if self.holder_sig_first {
988 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
989 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
991 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
992 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
995 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
1000 /// A pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction and its txid.
1002 pub struct BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1003 /// The commitment transaction
1004 pub transaction: Transaction,
1005 /// The txid for the commitment transaction.
1007 /// This is provided as a performance optimization, instead of calling transaction.txid()
1012 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BuiltCommitmentTransaction, {
1013 (0, transaction, required),
1014 (2, txid, required),
1017 impl BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1018 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
1020 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
1021 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
1022 let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.transaction).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
1023 hash_to_message!(sighash)
1026 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
1027 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
1028 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
1029 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
1030 sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key)
1034 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a closing transaction and will
1035 /// actually build it and sign.
1037 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
1039 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1040 pub struct ClosingTransaction {
1041 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
1042 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
1043 to_holder_script: Script,
1044 to_counterparty_script: Script,
1048 impl ClosingTransaction {
1049 /// Construct an object of the class
1051 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
1052 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
1053 to_holder_script: Script,
1054 to_counterparty_script: Script,
1055 funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
1057 let built = build_closing_transaction(
1058 to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat,
1059 to_holder_script.clone(), to_counterparty_script.clone(),
1062 ClosingTransaction {
1063 to_holder_value_sat,
1064 to_counterparty_value_sat,
1066 to_counterparty_script,
1071 /// Trust our pre-built transaction.
1073 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
1075 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
1076 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
1077 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedClosingTransaction {
1078 TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self }
1081 /// Verify our pre-built transaction.
1083 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
1085 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
1086 /// or using the built transaction.
1087 pub fn verify(&self, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Result<TrustedClosingTransaction, ()> {
1088 let built = build_closing_transaction(
1089 self.to_holder_value_sat, self.to_counterparty_value_sat,
1090 self.to_holder_script.clone(), self.to_counterparty_script.clone(),
1093 if self.built != built {
1096 Ok(TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self })
1099 /// The value to be sent to the holder, or zero if the output will be omitted
1100 pub fn to_holder_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1101 self.to_holder_value_sat
1104 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty, or zero if the output will be omitted
1105 pub fn to_counterparty_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1106 self.to_counterparty_value_sat
1109 /// The destination of the holder's output
1110 pub fn to_holder_script(&self) -> &Script {
1111 &self.to_holder_script
1114 /// The destination of the counterparty's output
1115 pub fn to_counterparty_script(&self) -> &Script {
1116 &self.to_counterparty_script
1120 /// A wrapper on ClosingTransaction indicating that the built bitcoin
1121 /// transaction is trusted.
1123 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1125 /// This structure implements Deref.
1126 pub struct TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1127 inner: &'a ClosingTransaction,
1130 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1131 type Target = ClosingTransaction;
1133 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1136 impl<'a> TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1137 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1138 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &Transaction {
1142 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
1144 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
1145 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
1146 let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.inner.built).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
1147 hash_to_message!(sighash)
1150 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
1151 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
1152 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
1153 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
1154 sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key)
1158 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a commitment transaction and will
1159 /// actually build it and sign. It is used for holder transactions that we sign only when needed
1160 /// and for transactions we sign for the counterparty.
1162 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
1165 pub struct CommitmentTransaction {
1166 commitment_number: u64,
1167 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64,
1168 to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64,
1169 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1170 htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
1171 // A boolean that is serialization backwards-compatible
1172 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
1173 // Whether non-zero-fee anchors should be used
1174 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: Option<()>,
1175 // A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust()
1176 keys: TxCreationKeys,
1177 // For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust()
1178 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction,
1181 impl Eq for CommitmentTransaction {}
1182 impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction {
1183 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
1184 let eq = self.commitment_number == o.commitment_number &&
1185 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat == o.to_broadcaster_value_sat &&
1186 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat == o.to_countersignatory_value_sat &&
1187 self.feerate_per_kw == o.feerate_per_kw &&
1188 self.htlcs == o.htlcs &&
1189 self.opt_anchors == o.opt_anchors &&
1190 self.keys == o.keys;
1192 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.transaction, o.built.transaction);
1193 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.txid, o.built.txid);
1199 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CommitmentTransaction, {
1200 (0, commitment_number, required),
1201 (2, to_broadcaster_value_sat, required),
1202 (4, to_countersignatory_value_sat, required),
1203 (6, feerate_per_kw, required),
1204 (8, keys, required),
1205 (10, built, required),
1206 (12, htlcs, vec_type),
1207 (14, opt_anchors, option),
1208 (16, opt_non_zero_fee_anchors, option),
1211 impl CommitmentTransaction {
1212 /// Construct an object of the class while assigning transaction output indices to HTLCs.
1214 /// Populates HTLCOutputInCommitment.transaction_output_index in htlcs_with_aux.
1216 /// The generic T allows the caller to match the HTLC output index with auxiliary data.
1217 /// This auxiliary data is not stored in this object.
1219 /// Only include HTLCs that are above the dust limit for the channel.
1221 /// (C-not exported) due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
1222 pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
1223 // Sort outputs and populate output indices while keeping track of the auxiliary data
1224 let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, opt_anchors, &broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key).unwrap();
1226 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1227 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1228 let txid = transaction.txid();
1229 CommitmentTransaction {
1231 to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1232 to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1235 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1237 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1241 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
1245 /// Use non-zero fee anchors
1247 /// (C-not exported) due to move, and also not likely to be useful for binding users
1248 pub fn with_non_zero_fee_anchors(mut self) -> Self {
1249 self.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors = Some(());
1253 fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<BuiltCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1254 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1256 let mut htlcs_with_aux = self.htlcs.iter().map(|h| (h.clone(), ())).collect();
1257 let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, self.opt_anchors.is_some(), broadcaster_funding_key, countersignatory_funding_key)?;
1259 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1260 let txid = transaction.txid();
1261 let built_transaction = BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1265 Ok(built_transaction)
1268 fn make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number: u64, txins: Vec<TxIn>, outputs: Vec<TxOut>) -> Transaction {
1271 lock_time: PackedLockTime(((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32)),
1277 // This is used in two cases:
1278 // - initial sorting of outputs / HTLCs in the constructor, in which case T is auxiliary data the
1279 // caller needs to have sorted together with the HTLCs so it can keep track of the output index
1280 // - building of a bitcoin transaction during a verify() call, in which case T is just ()
1281 fn internal_build_outputs<T>(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<(Vec<TxOut>, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), ()> {
1282 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1283 let contest_delay = channel_parameters.contest_delay();
1285 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<&mut HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::new();
1287 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 {
1288 let script = if opt_anchors {
1289 get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh()
1291 get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)
1295 script_pubkey: script.clone(),
1296 value: to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1302 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 {
1303 let redeem_script = get_revokeable_redeemscript(
1304 &keys.revocation_key,
1306 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1310 script_pubkey: redeem_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1311 value: to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1318 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1319 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(broadcaster_funding_key);
1322 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1323 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1329 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1330 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(countersignatory_funding_key);
1333 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1334 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1341 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_with_aux.len());
1342 for (htlc, _) in htlcs_with_aux {
1343 let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, opt_anchors, &keys);
1345 script_pubkey: script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1346 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1348 txouts.push((txout, Some(htlc)));
1351 // Sort output in BIP-69 order (amount, scriptPubkey). Tie-breaks based on HTLC
1352 // CLTV expiration height.
1353 sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
1354 if let &Some(ref a_htlcout) = a {
1355 if let &Some(ref b_htlcout) = b {
1356 a_htlcout.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlcout.cltv_expiry)
1357 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
1358 // here for fuzzing mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
1360 .then(a_htlcout.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlcout.payment_hash.0))
1361 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1362 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1363 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1364 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1367 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1368 for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1369 if let Some(htlc) = out.1 {
1370 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1371 htlcs.push(htlc.clone());
1373 outputs.push(out.0);
1375 Ok((outputs, htlcs))
1378 fn internal_build_inputs(commitment_number: u64, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> (u64, Vec<TxIn>) {
1379 let broadcaster_pubkeys = channel_parameters.broadcaster_pubkeys();
1380 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1381 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1382 &broadcaster_pubkeys.payment_point,
1383 &countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point,
1384 channel_parameters.is_outbound(),
1387 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number =
1388 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
1391 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1393 previous_output: channel_parameters.funding_outpoint(),
1394 script_sig: Script::new(),
1395 sequence: Sequence(((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
1396 | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32)),
1397 witness: Witness::new(),
1401 (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins)
1404 /// The backwards-counting commitment number
1405 pub fn commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1406 self.commitment_number
1409 /// The value to be sent to the broadcaster
1410 pub fn to_broadcaster_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1411 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat
1414 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty
1415 pub fn to_countersignatory_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1416 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat
1419 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction.
1420 pub fn feerate_per_kw(&self) -> u32 {
1424 /// The non-dust HTLCs (direction, amt, height expiration, hash, transaction output index)
1425 /// which were included in this commitment transaction in output order.
1426 /// The transaction index is always populated.
1428 /// (C-not exported) as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should
1429 /// expose a less effecient version which creates a Vec of references in the future.
1430 pub fn htlcs(&self) -> &Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1434 /// Trust our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1436 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1438 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
1439 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
1440 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction {
1441 TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self }
1444 /// Verify our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1446 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1448 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
1449 /// or using the built transaction.
1450 pub fn verify<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1451 // This is the only field of the key cache that we trust
1452 let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point;
1453 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx).unwrap();
1454 if keys != self.keys {
1457 let tx = self.internal_rebuild_transaction(&keys, channel_parameters, &broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey, &countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey)?;
1458 if self.built.transaction != tx.transaction || self.built.txid != tx.txid {
1461 Ok(TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self })
1465 /// A wrapper on CommitmentTransaction indicating that the derived fields (the built bitcoin
1466 /// transaction and the transaction creation keys) are trusted.
1468 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1470 /// This structure implements Deref.
1471 pub struct TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1472 inner: &'a CommitmentTransaction,
1475 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1476 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
1478 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1481 impl<'a> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1482 /// The transaction ID of the built Bitcoin transaction
1483 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
1484 self.inner.built.txid
1487 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1488 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1492 /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
1493 pub fn keys(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
1497 /// Should anchors be used.
1498 pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
1499 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
1502 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
1503 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
1505 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order.
1507 /// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses EcdsaSighashType::All.
1508 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
1509 let inner = self.inner;
1510 let keys = &inner.keys;
1511 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1512 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(inner.htlcs.len());
1513 let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key);
1515 for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() {
1516 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1517 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), self.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_some(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1519 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1521 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
1522 ret.push(sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
1527 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature.
1528 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_index: usize, counterparty_signature: &Signature, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Transaction {
1529 let inner = self.inner;
1530 let keys = &inner.keys;
1531 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1532 let this_htlc = &inner.htlcs[htlc_index];
1533 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1534 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
1535 if !this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
1536 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
1537 if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
1539 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), self.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_some(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1541 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1543 let sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
1545 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
1546 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1548 let mut cp_sig_ser = counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
1549 cp_sig_ser.push(sighashtype as u8);
1550 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig_ser);
1551 let mut holder_sig_ser = signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
1552 holder_sig_ser.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
1553 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig_ser);
1555 if this_htlc.offered {
1556 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
1557 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1559 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
1562 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
1567 /// Commitment transaction numbers which appear in the transactions themselves are XOR'd with a
1568 /// shared secret first. This prevents on-chain observers from discovering how many commitment
1569 /// transactions occurred in a channel before it was closed.
1571 /// This function gets the shared secret from relevant channel public keys and can be used to
1572 /// "decrypt" the commitment transaction number given a commitment transaction on-chain.
1573 pub fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1574 broadcaster_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1575 countersignatory_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1576 outbound_from_broadcaster: bool,
1578 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1580 if outbound_from_broadcaster {
1581 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1582 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1584 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1585 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1587 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
1589 ((res[26] as u64) << 5 * 8)
1590 | ((res[27] as u64) << 4 * 8)
1591 | ((res[28] as u64) << 3 * 8)
1592 | ((res[29] as u64) << 2 * 8)
1593 | ((res[30] as u64) << 1 * 8)
1594 | ((res[31] as u64) << 0 * 8)
1597 fn get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
1598 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1599 .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&key.serialize())[..])
1605 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
1606 use crate::{hex, chain};
1607 use crate::prelude::*;
1608 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
1609 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Secp256k1};
1610 use crate::util::test_utils;
1611 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, BaseSign};
1612 use bitcoin::{Network, Txid};
1613 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1614 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
1615 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
1619 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1621 let seed = [42; 32];
1622 let network = Network::Testnet;
1623 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
1624 let signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
1625 let counterparty_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
1626 let delayed_payment_base = &signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1627 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1628 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
1629 let htlc_basepoint = &signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1630 let holder_pubkeys = signer.pubkeys();
1631 let counterparty_pubkeys = counterparty_signer.pubkeys();
1632 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1633 let mut channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
1634 holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.clone(),
1635 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
1636 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1637 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
1638 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
1640 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None,
1643 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
1645 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs
1646 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1649 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1650 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1652 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1654 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1655 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point));
1657 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs as well as two anchors
1658 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1661 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1662 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1664 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1666 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 4);
1667 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh());
1669 // Generate broadcaster output and anchor
1670 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1673 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1674 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1676 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1678 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1680 // Generate counterparty output and anchor
1681 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1684 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1685 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1687 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1689 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1691 let received_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1693 amount_msat: 400000,
1695 payment_hash: PaymentHash([42; 32]),
1696 transaction_output_index: None,
1699 let offered_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1701 amount_msat: 600000,
1703 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
1704 transaction_output_index: None,
1707 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, w/o anchors
1708 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1711 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1712 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1714 &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
1715 &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1717 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 3);
1718 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[0].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1719 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1720 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1721 "002085cf52e41ba7c099a39df504e7b61f6de122971ceb53b06731876eaeb85e8dc5");
1722 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1723 "002049f0736bb335c61a04d2623a24df878a7592a3c51fa7258d41b2c85318265e73");
1725 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, with anchors
1726 channel_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
1727 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1730 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1731 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1733 &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
1734 &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1736 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 5);
1737 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[2].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1738 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1739 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1740 "002067114123af3f95405bae4fd930fc95de03e3c86baaee8b2dd29b43dd26cf613c");
1741 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1742 "0020a06e3b0d4fcf704f2b9c41e16a70099e39989466c3142b8573a1154542f28f57");
1746 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1747 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1748 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1751 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1753 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1754 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1755 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1758 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1759 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
1764 // insert_secret correct sequence
1765 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1768 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1769 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1770 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1773 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1774 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1775 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1778 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1779 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1780 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1783 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1784 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1785 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1788 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1789 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1790 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1793 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1794 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1795 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1798 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1799 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1800 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1803 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1804 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1805 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1810 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1811 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1814 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1815 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1816 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1819 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1820 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1821 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1825 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1826 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1829 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1830 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1831 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1834 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1835 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1836 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1839 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1840 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1841 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1844 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1845 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1846 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1850 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1851 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1854 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1855 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1856 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1859 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1860 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1861 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1864 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1865 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1866 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1869 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1870 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1871 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1875 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1876 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1879 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1880 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1881 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1884 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1885 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1886 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1889 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1890 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1891 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1894 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1895 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1896 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1899 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1900 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1901 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1904 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1905 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1906 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1909 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1910 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1911 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1914 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1915 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1916 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1920 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1921 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1924 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1925 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1926 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1929 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1930 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1931 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1934 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1935 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1936 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1939 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1940 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1941 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1944 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1945 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1946 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1949 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1950 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1951 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1955 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1956 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1959 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1960 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1961 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1964 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1965 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1966 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1969 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1970 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1971 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1974 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1975 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1976 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1979 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1980 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1981 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1984 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1985 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1986 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1989 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1990 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1991 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1994 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1995 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1996 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
2000 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2001 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
2004 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2005 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2006 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2009 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2010 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2011 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2014 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2015 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2016 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2019 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2020 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2021 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2024 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2025 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2026 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2029 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2030 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2031 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2034 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2035 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2036 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2039 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2040 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2041 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
2045 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2046 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
2049 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2050 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2051 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2054 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2055 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2056 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2059 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2060 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2061 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2064 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2065 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2066 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2069 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2070 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2071 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2074 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2075 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2076 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2079 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2080 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2081 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2084 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2085 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2086 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());