1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
11 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::Sign message signing by hand.
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
16 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
23 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
24 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
25 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
26 use crate::util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Scalar};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Message};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
32 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, secp256k1, Sequence, Witness};
35 use crate::prelude::*;
37 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
38 use crate::util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
39 use crate::ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI};
42 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
44 /// Maximum number of one-way in-flight HTLC (protocol-level value).
45 pub const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
46 /// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "offered HTLC output" on a commitment transaction, non-anchor variant.
47 pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
48 /// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "offered HTLC output" on a commitment transaction, anchor variant.
49 pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS: usize = 136;
51 /// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "received HTLC output" can vary in function of its CLTV argument value.
52 /// We define a range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants.
53 pub(crate) const MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 136;
54 /// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "received HTLC output" can vary in function of its CLTV argument value.
55 /// We define a range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants.
56 /// This is the maximum post-anchor value.
57 pub const MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 143;
59 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction.
61 pub fn htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
62 const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
63 const HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 706;
64 if opt_anchors { HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT }
67 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
69 pub fn htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
70 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
71 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 666;
72 if opt_anchors { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT }
75 /// Describes the type of HTLC claim as determined by analyzing the witness.
76 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
78 /// Claims an offered output on a commitment transaction through the timeout path.
80 /// Claims an offered output on a commitment transaction through the success path.
82 /// Claims an accepted output on a commitment transaction through the timeout path.
84 /// Claims an accepted output on a commitment transaction through the success path.
86 /// Claims an offered/accepted output on a commitment transaction through the revocation path.
91 /// Check if a given input witness attempts to claim a HTLC.
92 pub fn from_witness(witness: &Witness) -> Option<Self> {
93 debug_assert_eq!(OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS, MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
94 if witness.len() < 2 {
97 let witness_script = witness.last().unwrap();
98 let second_to_last = witness.second_to_last().unwrap();
99 if witness_script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
100 if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
101 // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
102 Some(Self::Revocation)
103 } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
104 // <remotehtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
105 Some(Self::OfferedPreimage)
106 } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
107 // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
108 Some(Self::OfferedTimeout)
112 } else if witness_script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS {
113 // It's possible for the weight of `offered_htlc_script` and `accepted_htlc_script` to
114 // match so we check for both here.
115 if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
116 // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
117 Some(Self::Revocation)
118 } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
119 // <remotehtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
120 Some(Self::OfferedPreimage)
121 } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
122 // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
123 Some(Self::OfferedTimeout)
124 } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
125 // <remotehtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
126 Some(Self::AcceptedTimeout)
127 } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
128 // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
129 Some(Self::AcceptedPreimage)
133 } else if witness_script.len() > MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT &&
134 witness_script.len() <= MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
135 // Handle remaining range of ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
136 if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
137 // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
138 Some(Self::Revocation)
139 } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
140 // <remotehtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
141 Some(Self::AcceptedTimeout)
142 } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
143 // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
144 Some(Self::AcceptedPreimage)
154 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
155 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
157 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
158 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
159 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
162 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
163 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
164 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
170 /// Build a closing transaction
171 pub fn build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat: u64, to_counterparty_value_sat: u64, to_holder_script: Script, to_counterparty_script: Script, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Transaction {
173 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
175 previous_output: funding_outpoint,
176 script_sig: Script::new(),
177 sequence: Sequence::MAX,
178 witness: Witness::new(),
183 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
185 if to_counterparty_value_sat > 0 {
187 script_pubkey: to_counterparty_script,
188 value: to_counterparty_value_sat
192 if to_holder_value_sat > 0 {
194 script_pubkey: to_holder_script,
195 value: to_holder_value_sat
199 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
201 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
202 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
208 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
214 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
215 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
217 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of our counterparty in just 50*32 bytes
220 pub struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
221 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
224 impl Eq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {}
225 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
226 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
227 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
228 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
236 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
237 /// Creates a new empty `CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets` structure.
238 pub fn new() -> Self {
239 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
243 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
245 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
252 /// Returns the minimum index of all stored secrets. Note that indexes start
253 /// at 1 << 48 and get decremented by one for each new secret.
254 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
255 //TODO This can be optimized?
256 let mut min = 1 << 48;
257 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
266 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
267 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
269 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
270 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
271 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
272 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
278 /// Inserts the `secret` at `idx`. Returns `Ok(())` if the secret
279 /// was generated in accordance with BOLT 3 and is consistent with previous secrets.
280 pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
281 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
283 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
284 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
288 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
291 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
295 /// Returns the secret at `idx`.
296 /// Returns `None` if `idx` is < [`CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::get_min_seen_secret`].
297 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
298 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
299 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
300 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
303 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
308 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
309 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
310 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
311 writer.write_all(secret)?;
312 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
314 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
318 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
319 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
320 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
321 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
322 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
323 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
325 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
326 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
330 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
331 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
333 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
334 /// generated (ie our own).
335 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
336 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
337 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
338 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
339 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
341 base_secret.clone().add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(res).unwrap())
344 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
345 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
346 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
348 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
349 /// generated (ie our own).
350 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
351 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
352 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
353 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
354 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
356 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
357 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
360 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
362 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
363 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
364 /// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
365 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
367 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
368 /// generated (ie our own).
369 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
370 let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
371 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
373 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
374 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
375 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
376 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
378 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
380 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
381 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
382 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
383 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
385 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
388 let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())?;
389 let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())?;
390 countersignatory_contrib.add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(broadcaster_contrib.secret_bytes()).unwrap())
393 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
394 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
395 /// public key instead of private keys.
397 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
398 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
399 /// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
400 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
402 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
403 /// generated (ie our own).
404 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
405 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
406 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
407 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
408 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
410 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
412 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
413 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
414 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
415 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
417 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
420 let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())?;
421 let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())?;
422 countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
425 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
426 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
428 /// A broadcaster key is provided from potential broadcaster of the computed transaction.
429 /// A countersignatory key is coming from a protocol participant unable to broadcast the
432 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
433 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
434 /// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the
435 /// pre-calculated keys.
436 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone)]
437 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
438 /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
439 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
440 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
441 /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
443 pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
444 /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
445 pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey,
446 /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
447 pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
448 /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
449 pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
452 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(TxCreationKeys, {
453 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
454 (2, revocation_key, required),
455 (4, broadcaster_htlc_key, required),
456 (6, countersignatory_htlc_key, required),
457 (8, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, required),
460 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
461 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
462 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
463 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
464 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
465 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
466 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
467 /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
468 /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
470 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
471 /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
472 /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
473 /// static across every commitment transaction.
474 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
475 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
476 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
477 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
478 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
479 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
480 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
481 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
484 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelPublicKeys, {
485 (0, funding_pubkey, required),
486 (2, revocation_basepoint, required),
487 (4, payment_point, required),
488 (6, delayed_payment_basepoint, required),
489 (8, htlc_basepoint, required),
492 impl TxCreationKeys {
493 /// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point.
494 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
495 pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
497 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
498 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
499 broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
500 countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
501 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
505 /// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys.
506 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
507 pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
508 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(
510 &per_commitment_point,
511 &broadcaster_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
512 &broadcaster_keys.htlc_basepoint,
513 &countersignatory_keys.revocation_basepoint,
514 &countersignatory_keys.htlc_basepoint,
519 /// The maximum length of a script returned by get_revokeable_redeemscript.
520 // Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 2 bytes for contest_delay, and two public
521 // keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push).
522 pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 3 + 34*2;
524 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
525 /// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
526 /// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
527 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
528 let res = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
529 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
530 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
531 .push_int(contest_delay as i64)
532 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
533 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
534 .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
535 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
536 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
538 debug_assert!(res.len() <= REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH);
542 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
543 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
544 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
545 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
546 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
547 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
548 /// the counterparty or our own.
550 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
551 /// this divided by 1000.
552 pub amount_msat: u64,
553 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
554 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
555 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
556 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
557 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
558 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
559 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
560 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
563 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, {
564 (0, offered, required),
565 (2, amount_msat, required),
566 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
567 (6, payment_hash, required),
568 (8, transaction_output_index, option),
572 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
573 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
575 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
576 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
577 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
578 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
579 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
580 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
581 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
582 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
583 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
584 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
586 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
587 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
588 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
590 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
591 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
593 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
594 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
595 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
596 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
597 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
598 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
599 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
601 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
602 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
603 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
605 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
608 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
609 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
610 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
611 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
612 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
613 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
614 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
615 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
616 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
617 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
619 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
620 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
621 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
622 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
623 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
625 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
626 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
628 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
629 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
630 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
631 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
632 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
633 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
634 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
635 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
637 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
638 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
639 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
641 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
646 /// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
647 /// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
649 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
650 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
653 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
654 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
655 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script {
656 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
657 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
659 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
660 if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
661 builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
662 .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
664 builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
665 .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
666 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
669 /// Builds an unsigned HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction from the given channel and HTLC
670 /// parameters. This is used by [`TrustedCommitmentTransaction::get_htlc_sigs`] to fetch the
671 /// transaction which needs signing, and can be used to construct an HTLC transaction which is
672 /// broadcastable given a counterparty HTLC signature.
674 /// Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
675 /// commitment transaction).
676 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
677 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
679 previous_output: OutPoint {
680 txid: commitment_txid.clone(),
681 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
683 script_sig: Script::new(),
684 sequence: Sequence(if opt_anchors { 1 } else { 0 }),
685 witness: Witness::new(),
688 let weight = if htlc.offered {
689 htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
691 htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
693 let output_value = if opt_anchors {
694 htlc.amount_msat / 1000
696 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * weight / 1000;
697 htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee
700 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
702 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
708 lock_time: PackedLockTime(if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 }),
714 /// Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled.
716 pub(crate) fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> Script {
718 .push_slice(&payment_point.serialize()[..])
719 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY)
721 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
725 /// Gets the witnessScript for an anchor output from the funding public key.
726 /// The witness in the spending input must be:
727 /// <BIP 143 funding_signature>
728 /// After 16 blocks of confirmation, an alternative satisfying witness could be:
730 /// (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule)
732 pub fn get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Script {
733 Builder::new().push_slice(&funding_pubkey.serialize()[..])
734 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
735 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IFDUP)
736 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
738 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
739 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
744 /// Locates the output with an anchor script paying to `funding_pubkey` within `commitment_tx`.
745 pub(crate) fn get_anchor_output<'a>(commitment_tx: &'a Transaction, funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<(u32, &'a TxOut)> {
746 let anchor_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey).to_v0_p2wsh();
747 commitment_tx.output.iter().enumerate()
748 .find(|(_, txout)| txout.script_pubkey == anchor_script)
749 .map(|(idx, txout)| (idx as u32, txout))
752 /// Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend an anchor input.
753 pub fn build_anchor_input_witness(funding_key: &PublicKey, funding_sig: &Signature) -> Witness {
754 let anchor_redeem_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_key);
755 let mut funding_sig = funding_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
756 funding_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
757 Witness::from_vec(vec![funding_sig, anchor_redeem_script.to_bytes()])
760 /// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction).
761 /// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty.
763 /// Normally, this is converted to the broadcaster/countersignatory-organized DirectedChannelTransactionParameters
764 /// before use, via the as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
766 pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters {
767 /// Holder public keys
768 pub holder_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
769 /// The contest delay selected by the holder, which applies to counterparty-broadcast transactions
770 pub holder_selected_contest_delay: u16,
771 /// Whether the holder is the initiator of this channel.
772 /// This is an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
773 pub is_outbound_from_holder: bool,
774 /// The late-bound counterparty channel transaction parameters.
775 /// These parameters are populated at the point in the protocol where the counterparty provides them.
776 pub counterparty_parameters: Option<CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters>,
777 /// The late-bound funding outpoint
778 pub funding_outpoint: Option<chain::transaction::OutPoint>,
779 /// Are anchors (zero fee HTLC transaction variant) used for this channel. Boolean is
780 /// serialization backwards-compatible.
781 pub opt_anchors: Option<()>
784 /// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
786 pub struct CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
787 /// Counter-party public keys
788 pub pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
789 /// The contest delay selected by the counterparty, which applies to holder-broadcast transactions
790 pub selected_contest_delay: u16,
793 impl ChannelTransactionParameters {
794 /// Whether the late bound parameters are populated.
795 pub fn is_populated(&self) -> bool {
796 self.counterparty_parameters.is_some() && self.funding_outpoint.is_some()
799 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
800 /// given that the holder is the broadcaster.
802 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
803 pub fn as_holder_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
804 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_holder_broadcastable");
805 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
807 holder_is_broadcaster: true
811 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
812 /// given that the counterparty is the broadcaster.
814 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
815 pub fn as_counterparty_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
816 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_counterparty_broadcastable");
817 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
819 holder_is_broadcaster: false
824 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, {
825 (0, pubkeys, required),
826 (2, selected_contest_delay, required),
829 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelTransactionParameters, {
830 (0, holder_pubkeys, required),
831 (2, holder_selected_contest_delay, required),
832 (4, is_outbound_from_holder, required),
833 (6, counterparty_parameters, option),
834 (8, funding_outpoint, option),
835 (10, opt_anchors, option),
838 /// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by
839 /// broadcaster/countersignatory.
841 /// This is derived from the holder/counterparty-organized ChannelTransactionParameters via the
842 /// as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
843 pub struct DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
844 /// The holder's channel static parameters
845 inner: &'a ChannelTransactionParameters,
846 /// Whether the holder is the broadcaster
847 holder_is_broadcaster: bool,
850 impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
851 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the broadcaster
852 pub fn broadcaster_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
853 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
854 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
856 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
860 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the countersignatory
861 pub fn countersignatory_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
862 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
863 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
865 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
869 /// Get the contest delay applicable to the transactions.
870 /// Note that the contest delay was selected by the countersignatory.
871 pub fn contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
872 let counterparty_parameters = self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
873 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { counterparty_parameters.selected_contest_delay } else { self.inner.holder_selected_contest_delay }
876 /// Whether the channel is outbound from the broadcaster.
878 /// The boolean representing the side that initiated the channel is
879 /// an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
880 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
881 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder } else { !self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder }
884 /// The funding outpoint
885 pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
886 self.inner.funding_outpoint.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint()
889 /// Whether to use anchors for this channel
890 pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
891 self.inner.opt_anchors.is_some()
895 /// Information needed to build and sign a holder's commitment transaction.
897 /// The transaction is only signed once we are ready to broadcast.
899 pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
900 inner: CommitmentTransaction,
901 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction
902 pub counterparty_sig: Signature,
903 /// All non-dust counterparty HTLC signatures, in the order they appear in the transaction
904 pub counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>,
905 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
906 // The user should be able to reconstruct this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
907 holder_sig_first: bool,
910 impl Deref for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
911 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
913 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.inner }
916 impl Eq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {}
917 impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
918 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
919 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
920 self.inner == o.inner
924 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderCommitmentTransaction, {
925 (0, inner, required),
926 (2, counterparty_sig, required),
927 (4, holder_sig_first, required),
928 (6, counterparty_htlc_sigs, vec_type),
931 impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
933 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
934 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
935 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
936 let dummy_sig = sign(&secp_ctx, &secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
938 let keys = TxCreationKeys {
939 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
940 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
941 broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
942 countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
943 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
945 let channel_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
946 funding_pubkey: dummy_key.clone(),
947 revocation_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
948 payment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
949 delayed_payment_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
950 htlc_basepoint: dummy_key.clone()
952 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
953 holder_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(),
954 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
955 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
956 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
957 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
960 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
961 let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, false, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
962 HolderCommitmentTransaction {
964 counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
965 counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec::new(),
966 holder_sig_first: false
970 /// Create a new holder transaction with the given counterparty signatures.
971 /// The funding keys are used to figure out which signature should go first when building the transaction for broadcast.
972 pub fn new(commitment_tx: CommitmentTransaction, counterparty_sig: Signature, counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>, holder_funding_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Self {
974 inner: commitment_tx,
976 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
977 holder_sig_first: holder_funding_key.serialize()[..] < counterparty_funding_key.serialize()[..],
981 pub(crate) fn add_holder_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, holder_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
982 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
983 let mut tx = self.inner.built.transaction.clone();
984 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
985 let mut ser_holder_sig = holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
986 ser_holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
987 let mut ser_cp_sig = self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
988 ser_cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
990 if self.holder_sig_first {
991 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
992 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
994 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
995 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
998 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
1003 /// A pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction and its txid.
1005 pub struct BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1006 /// The commitment transaction
1007 pub transaction: Transaction,
1008 /// The txid for the commitment transaction.
1010 /// This is provided as a performance optimization, instead of calling transaction.txid()
1015 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BuiltCommitmentTransaction, {
1016 (0, transaction, required),
1017 (2, txid, required),
1020 impl BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1021 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
1023 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
1024 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
1025 let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.transaction).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
1026 hash_to_message!(sighash)
1029 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
1030 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
1031 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
1032 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
1033 sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key)
1037 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a closing transaction and will
1038 /// actually build it and sign.
1040 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
1042 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1043 pub struct ClosingTransaction {
1044 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
1045 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
1046 to_holder_script: Script,
1047 to_counterparty_script: Script,
1051 impl ClosingTransaction {
1052 /// Construct an object of the class
1054 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
1055 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
1056 to_holder_script: Script,
1057 to_counterparty_script: Script,
1058 funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
1060 let built = build_closing_transaction(
1061 to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat,
1062 to_holder_script.clone(), to_counterparty_script.clone(),
1065 ClosingTransaction {
1066 to_holder_value_sat,
1067 to_counterparty_value_sat,
1069 to_counterparty_script,
1074 /// Trust our pre-built transaction.
1076 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
1078 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
1079 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
1080 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedClosingTransaction {
1081 TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self }
1084 /// Verify our pre-built transaction.
1086 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
1088 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
1089 /// or using the built transaction.
1090 pub fn verify(&self, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Result<TrustedClosingTransaction, ()> {
1091 let built = build_closing_transaction(
1092 self.to_holder_value_sat, self.to_counterparty_value_sat,
1093 self.to_holder_script.clone(), self.to_counterparty_script.clone(),
1096 if self.built != built {
1099 Ok(TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self })
1102 /// The value to be sent to the holder, or zero if the output will be omitted
1103 pub fn to_holder_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1104 self.to_holder_value_sat
1107 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty, or zero if the output will be omitted
1108 pub fn to_counterparty_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1109 self.to_counterparty_value_sat
1112 /// The destination of the holder's output
1113 pub fn to_holder_script(&self) -> &Script {
1114 &self.to_holder_script
1117 /// The destination of the counterparty's output
1118 pub fn to_counterparty_script(&self) -> &Script {
1119 &self.to_counterparty_script
1123 /// A wrapper on ClosingTransaction indicating that the built bitcoin
1124 /// transaction is trusted.
1126 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1128 /// This structure implements Deref.
1129 pub struct TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1130 inner: &'a ClosingTransaction,
1133 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1134 type Target = ClosingTransaction;
1136 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1139 impl<'a> TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1140 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1141 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &Transaction {
1145 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
1147 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
1148 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
1149 let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.inner.built).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
1150 hash_to_message!(sighash)
1153 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
1154 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
1155 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
1156 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
1157 sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key)
1161 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a commitment transaction and will
1162 /// actually build it and sign. It is used for holder transactions that we sign only when needed
1163 /// and for transactions we sign for the counterparty.
1165 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
1168 pub struct CommitmentTransaction {
1169 commitment_number: u64,
1170 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64,
1171 to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64,
1172 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1173 htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
1174 // A boolean that is serialization backwards-compatible
1175 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
1176 // A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust()
1177 keys: TxCreationKeys,
1178 // For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust()
1179 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction,
1182 impl Eq for CommitmentTransaction {}
1183 impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction {
1184 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
1185 let eq = self.commitment_number == o.commitment_number &&
1186 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat == o.to_broadcaster_value_sat &&
1187 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat == o.to_countersignatory_value_sat &&
1188 self.feerate_per_kw == o.feerate_per_kw &&
1189 self.htlcs == o.htlcs &&
1190 self.opt_anchors == o.opt_anchors &&
1191 self.keys == o.keys;
1193 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.transaction, o.built.transaction);
1194 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.txid, o.built.txid);
1200 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CommitmentTransaction, {
1201 (0, commitment_number, required),
1202 (2, to_broadcaster_value_sat, required),
1203 (4, to_countersignatory_value_sat, required),
1204 (6, feerate_per_kw, required),
1205 (8, keys, required),
1206 (10, built, required),
1207 (12, htlcs, vec_type),
1208 (14, opt_anchors, option),
1211 impl CommitmentTransaction {
1212 /// Construct an object of the class while assigning transaction output indices to HTLCs.
1214 /// Populates HTLCOutputInCommitment.transaction_output_index in htlcs_with_aux.
1216 /// The generic T allows the caller to match the HTLC output index with auxiliary data.
1217 /// This auxiliary data is not stored in this object.
1219 /// Only include HTLCs that are above the dust limit for the channel.
1221 /// (C-not exported) due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
1222 pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
1223 // Sort outputs and populate output indices while keeping track of the auxiliary data
1224 let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, opt_anchors, &broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key).unwrap();
1226 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1227 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1228 let txid = transaction.txid();
1229 CommitmentTransaction {
1231 to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1232 to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1235 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1237 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1244 fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<BuiltCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1245 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1247 let mut htlcs_with_aux = self.htlcs.iter().map(|h| (h.clone(), ())).collect();
1248 let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, self.opt_anchors.is_some(), broadcaster_funding_key, countersignatory_funding_key)?;
1250 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1251 let txid = transaction.txid();
1252 let built_transaction = BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1256 Ok(built_transaction)
1259 fn make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number: u64, txins: Vec<TxIn>, outputs: Vec<TxOut>) -> Transaction {
1262 lock_time: PackedLockTime(((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32)),
1268 // This is used in two cases:
1269 // - initial sorting of outputs / HTLCs in the constructor, in which case T is auxiliary data the
1270 // caller needs to have sorted together with the HTLCs so it can keep track of the output index
1271 // - building of a bitcoin transaction during a verify() call, in which case T is just ()
1272 fn internal_build_outputs<T>(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<(Vec<TxOut>, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), ()> {
1273 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1274 let contest_delay = channel_parameters.contest_delay();
1276 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<&mut HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::new();
1278 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 {
1279 let script = if opt_anchors {
1280 get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh()
1282 get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)
1286 script_pubkey: script.clone(),
1287 value: to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1293 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 {
1294 let redeem_script = get_revokeable_redeemscript(
1295 &keys.revocation_key,
1297 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1301 script_pubkey: redeem_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1302 value: to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1309 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1310 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(broadcaster_funding_key);
1313 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1314 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1320 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1321 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(countersignatory_funding_key);
1324 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1325 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1332 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_with_aux.len());
1333 for (htlc, _) in htlcs_with_aux {
1334 let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, opt_anchors, &keys);
1336 script_pubkey: script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1337 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1339 txouts.push((txout, Some(htlc)));
1342 // Sort output in BIP-69 order (amount, scriptPubkey). Tie-breaks based on HTLC
1343 // CLTV expiration height.
1344 sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
1345 if let &Some(ref a_htlcout) = a {
1346 if let &Some(ref b_htlcout) = b {
1347 a_htlcout.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlcout.cltv_expiry)
1348 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
1349 // here for fuzzing mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
1351 .then(a_htlcout.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlcout.payment_hash.0))
1352 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1353 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1354 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1355 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1358 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1359 for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1360 if let Some(htlc) = out.1 {
1361 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1362 htlcs.push(htlc.clone());
1364 outputs.push(out.0);
1366 Ok((outputs, htlcs))
1369 fn internal_build_inputs(commitment_number: u64, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> (u64, Vec<TxIn>) {
1370 let broadcaster_pubkeys = channel_parameters.broadcaster_pubkeys();
1371 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1372 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1373 &broadcaster_pubkeys.payment_point,
1374 &countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point,
1375 channel_parameters.is_outbound(),
1378 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number =
1379 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
1382 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1384 previous_output: channel_parameters.funding_outpoint(),
1385 script_sig: Script::new(),
1386 sequence: Sequence(((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
1387 | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32)),
1388 witness: Witness::new(),
1392 (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins)
1395 /// The backwards-counting commitment number
1396 pub fn commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1397 self.commitment_number
1400 /// The value to be sent to the broadcaster
1401 pub fn to_broadcaster_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1402 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat
1405 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty
1406 pub fn to_countersignatory_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1407 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat
1410 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction.
1411 pub fn feerate_per_kw(&self) -> u32 {
1415 /// The non-dust HTLCs (direction, amt, height expiration, hash, transaction output index)
1416 /// which were included in this commitment transaction in output order.
1417 /// The transaction index is always populated.
1419 /// (C-not exported) as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should
1420 /// expose a less effecient version which creates a Vec of references in the future.
1421 pub fn htlcs(&self) -> &Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1425 /// Trust our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1427 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1429 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
1430 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
1431 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction {
1432 TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self }
1435 /// Verify our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1437 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1439 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
1440 /// or using the built transaction.
1441 pub fn verify<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1442 // This is the only field of the key cache that we trust
1443 let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point;
1444 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx).unwrap();
1445 if keys != self.keys {
1448 let tx = self.internal_rebuild_transaction(&keys, channel_parameters, &broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey, &countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey)?;
1449 if self.built.transaction != tx.transaction || self.built.txid != tx.txid {
1452 Ok(TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self })
1456 /// A wrapper on CommitmentTransaction indicating that the derived fields (the built bitcoin
1457 /// transaction and the transaction creation keys) are trusted.
1459 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1461 /// This structure implements Deref.
1462 pub struct TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1463 inner: &'a CommitmentTransaction,
1466 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1467 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
1469 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1472 impl<'a> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1473 /// The transaction ID of the built Bitcoin transaction
1474 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
1475 self.inner.built.txid
1478 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1479 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1483 /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
1484 pub fn keys(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
1488 /// Should anchors be used.
1489 pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
1490 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
1493 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
1494 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
1496 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order.
1498 /// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses EcdsaSighashType::All.
1499 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
1500 let inner = self.inner;
1501 let keys = &inner.keys;
1502 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1503 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(inner.htlcs.len());
1504 let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
1506 for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() {
1507 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1508 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1510 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1512 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
1513 ret.push(sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
1518 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature.
1519 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_index: usize, counterparty_signature: &Signature, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Transaction {
1520 let inner = self.inner;
1521 let keys = &inner.keys;
1522 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1523 let this_htlc = &inner.htlcs[htlc_index];
1524 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1525 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
1526 if !this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
1527 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
1528 if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
1530 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1532 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1534 let sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
1536 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
1537 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1539 let mut cp_sig_ser = counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
1540 cp_sig_ser.push(sighashtype as u8);
1541 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig_ser);
1542 let mut holder_sig_ser = signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
1543 holder_sig_ser.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
1544 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig_ser);
1546 if this_htlc.offered {
1547 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
1548 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1550 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
1553 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
1558 /// Commitment transaction numbers which appear in the transactions themselves are XOR'd with a
1559 /// shared secret first. This prevents on-chain observers from discovering how many commitment
1560 /// transactions occurred in a channel before it was closed.
1562 /// This function gets the shared secret from relevant channel public keys and can be used to
1563 /// "decrypt" the commitment transaction number given a commitment transaction on-chain.
1564 pub fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1565 broadcaster_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1566 countersignatory_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1567 outbound_from_broadcaster: bool,
1569 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1571 if outbound_from_broadcaster {
1572 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1573 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1575 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1576 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1578 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
1580 ((res[26] as u64) << 5 * 8)
1581 | ((res[27] as u64) << 4 * 8)
1582 | ((res[28] as u64) << 3 * 8)
1583 | ((res[29] as u64) << 2 * 8)
1584 | ((res[30] as u64) << 1 * 8)
1585 | ((res[31] as u64) << 0 * 8)
1588 fn get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
1589 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1590 .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&key.serialize())[..])
1596 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
1597 use crate::{hex, chain};
1598 use crate::prelude::*;
1599 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
1600 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Secp256k1};
1601 use crate::util::test_utils;
1602 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, BaseSign};
1603 use bitcoin::{Network, Txid};
1604 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1605 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
1606 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
1610 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1612 let seed = [42; 32];
1613 let network = Network::Testnet;
1614 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
1615 let signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
1616 let counterparty_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
1617 let delayed_payment_base = &signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1618 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1619 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
1620 let htlc_basepoint = &signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1621 let holder_pubkeys = signer.pubkeys();
1622 let counterparty_pubkeys = counterparty_signer.pubkeys();
1623 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1624 let mut channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
1625 holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.clone(),
1626 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
1627 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1628 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
1629 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
1633 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
1635 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs
1636 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1639 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1640 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1642 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1644 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1645 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point));
1647 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs as well as two anchors
1648 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1651 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1652 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1654 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1656 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 4);
1657 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh());
1659 // Generate broadcaster output and anchor
1660 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1663 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1664 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1666 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1668 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1670 // Generate counterparty output and anchor
1671 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1674 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1675 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1677 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1679 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1681 let received_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1683 amount_msat: 400000,
1685 payment_hash: PaymentHash([42; 32]),
1686 transaction_output_index: None,
1689 let offered_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1691 amount_msat: 600000,
1693 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
1694 transaction_output_index: None,
1697 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, w/o anchors
1698 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1701 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1702 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1704 &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
1705 &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1707 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 3);
1708 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[0].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1709 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1710 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1711 "002085cf52e41ba7c099a39df504e7b61f6de122971ceb53b06731876eaeb85e8dc5");
1712 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1713 "002049f0736bb335c61a04d2623a24df878a7592a3c51fa7258d41b2c85318265e73");
1715 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, with anchors
1716 channel_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
1717 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1720 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1721 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1723 &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
1724 &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1726 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 5);
1727 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[2].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1728 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1729 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1730 "002067114123af3f95405bae4fd930fc95de03e3c86baaee8b2dd29b43dd26cf613c");
1731 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1732 "0020a06e3b0d4fcf704f2b9c41e16a70099e39989466c3142b8573a1154542f28f57");
1736 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1737 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1738 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1741 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1743 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1744 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1745 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1748 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1749 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
1754 // insert_secret correct sequence
1755 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1758 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1759 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1760 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1763 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1764 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1765 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1768 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1769 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1770 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1773 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1774 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1775 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1778 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1779 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1780 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1783 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1784 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1785 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1788 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1789 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1790 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1793 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1794 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1795 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1800 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1801 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1804 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1805 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1806 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1809 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1810 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1811 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1815 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1816 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1819 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1820 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1821 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1824 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1825 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1826 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1829 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1830 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1831 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1834 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1835 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1836 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1840 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1841 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1844 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1845 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1846 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1849 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1850 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1851 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1854 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1855 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1856 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1859 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1860 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1861 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1865 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1866 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1869 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1870 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1871 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1874 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1875 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1876 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1879 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1880 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1881 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1884 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1885 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1886 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1889 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1890 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1891 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1894 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1895 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1896 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1899 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1900 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1901 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1904 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1905 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1906 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1910 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1911 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1914 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1915 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1916 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1919 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1920 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1921 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1924 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1925 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1926 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1929 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1930 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1931 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1934 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1935 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1936 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1939 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1940 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1941 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1945 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1946 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1949 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1950 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1951 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1954 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1955 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1956 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1959 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1960 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1961 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1964 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1965 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1966 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1969 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1970 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1971 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1974 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1975 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1976 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1979 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1980 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1981 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1984 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1985 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1986 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1990 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1991 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1994 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1995 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1996 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1999 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2000 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2001 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2004 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2005 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2006 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2009 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2010 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2011 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2014 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2015 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2016 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2019 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2020 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2021 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2024 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2025 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2026 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2029 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2030 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2031 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
2035 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2036 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
2039 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2040 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2041 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2044 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2045 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2046 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2049 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2050 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2051 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2054 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2055 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2056 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2059 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2060 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2061 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2064 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2065 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2066 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2069 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2070 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2071 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2074 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2075 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2076 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());