1 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
2 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
5 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
6 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
8 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{Decodable, Encodable};
9 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
10 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
12 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
13 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
14 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
15 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
17 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
18 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
19 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
28 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
30 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
31 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
34 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
40 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
41 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
42 if witness_script_len == 133 {
43 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
44 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
45 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
52 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
53 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
55 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
56 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
57 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
60 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
61 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
62 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
68 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
69 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
71 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
74 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
75 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
78 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
79 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
80 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
81 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
89 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
90 pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
91 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
95 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
97 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
104 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
105 //TODO This can be optimized?
106 let mut min = 1 << 48;
107 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
116 pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
117 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
119 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
120 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
121 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
122 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
128 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
129 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
131 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
132 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
136 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
139 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
143 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
144 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
145 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
146 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
147 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
150 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
155 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
156 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
157 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
158 writer.write_all(secret)?;
159 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
164 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
165 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
166 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
167 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
168 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
169 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
172 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
176 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
177 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
179 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
180 /// generated (ie our own).
181 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
182 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
183 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
184 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
185 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
187 let mut key = base_secret.clone();
188 key.add_assign(&res)?;
192 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
193 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
194 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
196 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
197 /// generated (ie our own).
198 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
199 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
200 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
201 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
202 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
204 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
205 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
208 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
210 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
211 /// generated (ie our own).
212 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
213 let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
214 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
216 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
217 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
218 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
219 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
221 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
223 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
224 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
225 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
226 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
228 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
231 let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
232 part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
233 let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
234 part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
235 part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
239 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
240 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
241 /// public key instead of private keys.
243 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
244 /// generated (ie our own).
245 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
246 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
247 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
248 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
249 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
251 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
253 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
254 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
255 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
256 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
258 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
261 let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
262 part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
263 let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
264 part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
265 part_a.combine(&part_b)
268 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
269 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
271 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
272 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
273 /// PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys.trust_key_derivation because we trusted the source of the
274 /// pre-calculated keys.
275 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
276 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
277 /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
278 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
279 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
280 /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
281 pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
283 pub a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
285 pub b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
286 /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
287 pub a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
289 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
290 { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key });
292 /// The per-commitment point and a set of pre-calculated public keys used for transaction creation
294 /// The pre-calculated keys are an optimization, because ChannelKeys has enough
295 /// information to re-derive them.
296 pub struct PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(TxCreationKeys);
298 impl PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys {
299 /// Create a new PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys from TxCreationKeys
300 pub fn new(keys: TxCreationKeys) -> Self {
301 PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(keys)
304 /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
305 /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
306 pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
310 /// The transaction per-commitment point
311 pub fn per_comitment_point(&self) -> &PublicKey {
312 &self.0.per_commitment_point
316 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
317 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
318 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
319 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
320 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
321 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
322 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
323 /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
324 /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
326 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
327 /// The public key which receives our immediately spendable primary channel balance in
328 /// remote-broadcasted commitment transactions. This key is static across every commitment
330 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
331 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
332 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
333 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
334 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
335 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
336 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
337 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
340 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
342 revocation_basepoint,
344 delayed_payment_basepoint,
349 impl TxCreationKeys {
350 /// Create a new TxCreationKeys from channel base points and the per-commitment point
351 pub fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
353 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
354 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
355 a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
356 b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
357 a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
362 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
363 /// key or the delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
364 /// Encumbering a `to_local` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
365 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
366 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
367 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
368 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
369 .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
370 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
371 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
372 .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
373 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
374 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
378 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
379 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
380 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
381 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
382 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
383 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
384 /// the remote party or our own.
386 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
387 /// this divided by 1000.
388 pub amount_msat: u64,
389 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
390 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
391 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
392 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
393 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
394 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
395 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
396 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
399 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
404 transaction_output_index
408 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
409 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
411 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
412 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
413 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
414 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
415 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
416 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
417 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
418 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
419 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
420 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
422 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
423 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
424 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
426 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
427 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
429 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
430 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
431 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
432 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
433 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
434 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
435 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
436 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
439 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
440 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
441 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
442 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
443 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
444 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
445 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
446 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
447 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
448 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
450 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
451 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
452 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
453 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
454 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
456 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
457 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
459 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
460 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
461 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
462 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
463 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
464 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
465 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
466 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
467 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
472 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
473 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
475 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
476 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
479 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
480 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
481 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
482 let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
483 let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
485 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
486 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
487 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
488 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
490 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
491 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
492 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
495 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
496 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
497 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
499 previous_output: OutPoint {
500 txid: prev_hash.clone(),
501 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
503 script_sig: Script::new(),
508 let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
509 feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
511 feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
514 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
516 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
517 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
522 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
529 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
530 /// to broadcast. This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature
531 /// given the relevant secret key.
532 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
533 // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
534 // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
535 // so we're probably most of the way there.
536 /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
537 pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
538 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
539 pub their_sig: Signature,
540 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
541 // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
543 /// The key derivation parameters for this commitment transaction
544 pub local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
545 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
546 /// controlled by the channel initiator.
547 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
548 /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
550 /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
551 /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
552 /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
554 /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
555 /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
556 pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
558 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
560 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
561 let dummy_input = TxIn {
562 previous_output: OutPoint {
563 txid: Default::default(),
566 script_sig: Default::default(),
570 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
571 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
573 unsigned_tx: Transaction {
575 input: vec![dummy_input],
579 their_sig: dummy_sig,
580 our_sig_first: false,
581 local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
582 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
583 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
584 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
585 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
586 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
593 /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
594 /// remote signature and both parties keys
595 pub(crate) fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
596 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
597 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
602 our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
609 /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
610 /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
611 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
612 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
615 /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
617 /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
618 /// by your ChannelKeys.
619 /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
620 /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
621 /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
622 /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
623 pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
624 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
625 .sighash_all(&self.unsigned_tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
626 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
629 pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
630 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
631 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
632 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
634 if self.our_sig_first {
635 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
636 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
638 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
639 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
641 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
642 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
644 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
648 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
649 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
651 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
652 /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
654 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
655 let txid = self.txid();
656 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
657 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
659 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
660 if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
661 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
663 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
665 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
666 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
674 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
675 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
676 let txid = self.txid();
677 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
678 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
679 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
680 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
681 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
682 if this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
684 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
685 // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
686 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
687 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
689 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
691 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
692 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
694 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
695 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
696 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
697 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
699 if this_htlc.0.offered {
700 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
701 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
703 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
706 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
710 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
711 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
712 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
713 self.txid() == o.txid()
716 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
717 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
718 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
720 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
721 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
724 self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
725 self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
726 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
727 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
728 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
729 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
736 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
737 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
738 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
741 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
742 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
745 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
746 let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
747 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
748 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
749 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
750 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
751 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
752 let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
753 let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
754 per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
757 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
758 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
759 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
774 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
778 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
779 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
780 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
783 macro_rules! test_secrets {
785 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
786 for secret in secrets.iter() {
787 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
790 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
791 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
796 // insert_secret correct sequence
797 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
800 secrets.push([0; 32]);
801 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
802 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
805 secrets.push([0; 32]);
806 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
807 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
810 secrets.push([0; 32]);
811 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
812 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
815 secrets.push([0; 32]);
816 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
817 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
820 secrets.push([0; 32]);
821 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
822 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
825 secrets.push([0; 32]);
826 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
827 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
830 secrets.push([0; 32]);
831 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
832 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
835 secrets.push([0; 32]);
836 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
837 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
842 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
843 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
846 secrets.push([0; 32]);
847 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
848 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
851 secrets.push([0; 32]);
852 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
853 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
857 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
858 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
861 secrets.push([0; 32]);
862 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
863 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
866 secrets.push([0; 32]);
867 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
868 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
871 secrets.push([0; 32]);
872 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
873 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
876 secrets.push([0; 32]);
877 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
878 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
882 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
883 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
886 secrets.push([0; 32]);
887 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
888 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
891 secrets.push([0; 32]);
892 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
893 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
896 secrets.push([0; 32]);
897 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
898 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
901 secrets.push([0; 32]);
902 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
903 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
907 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
908 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
911 secrets.push([0; 32]);
912 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
913 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
916 secrets.push([0; 32]);
917 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
918 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
921 secrets.push([0; 32]);
922 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
923 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
926 secrets.push([0; 32]);
927 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
928 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
931 secrets.push([0; 32]);
932 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
933 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
936 secrets.push([0; 32]);
937 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
938 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
941 secrets.push([0; 32]);
942 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
943 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
946 secrets.push([0; 32]);
947 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
948 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
952 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
953 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
956 secrets.push([0; 32]);
957 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
958 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
961 secrets.push([0; 32]);
962 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
963 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
966 secrets.push([0; 32]);
967 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
968 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
971 secrets.push([0; 32]);
972 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
973 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
976 secrets.push([0; 32]);
977 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
978 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
981 secrets.push([0; 32]);
982 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
983 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
987 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
988 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
991 secrets.push([0; 32]);
992 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
993 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
996 secrets.push([0; 32]);
997 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
998 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1001 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1002 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1003 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1006 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1007 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1008 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1011 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1012 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1013 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1016 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1017 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1018 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1021 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1022 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1023 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1026 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1027 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1028 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1032 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1033 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1036 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1037 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1038 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1041 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1042 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1043 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1046 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1047 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1048 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1051 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1052 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1053 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1056 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1057 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1058 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1061 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1062 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1063 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1066 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1067 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1068 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1071 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1072 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1073 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1077 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1078 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1081 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1082 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1083 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1086 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1087 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1088 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1091 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1092 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1093 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1096 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1097 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1098 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1101 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1102 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1103 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1106 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1107 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1108 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1111 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1112 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1113 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1116 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1117 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1118 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());