1 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
2 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
5 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
6 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
8 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{Decodable, Encodable};
9 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
10 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
12 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
13 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
14 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
15 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
17 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
18 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
19 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
28 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
30 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
31 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
34 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
40 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
41 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
42 if witness_script_len == 133 {
43 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
44 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
45 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
52 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
53 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
55 pub(super) fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
56 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
59 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
60 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
61 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
67 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
68 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
70 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
73 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
74 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
77 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
78 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
79 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
80 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
88 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
89 pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
90 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
94 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
96 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
103 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
104 //TODO This can be optimized?
105 let mut min = 1 << 48;
106 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
115 pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
116 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
118 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
119 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
120 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
121 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
127 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
128 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
130 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
131 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
135 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
138 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
142 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
143 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
144 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
145 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
146 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
149 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
154 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
155 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
156 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
157 writer.write_all(secret)?;
158 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
163 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
164 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
165 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
166 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
167 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
168 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
171 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
175 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
176 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
178 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
179 /// generated (ie our own).
180 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
181 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
182 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
183 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
184 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
186 let mut key = base_secret.clone();
187 key.add_assign(&res)?;
191 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
192 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
193 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
195 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
196 /// generated (ie our own).
197 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
198 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
199 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
200 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
201 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
203 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
204 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
207 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
209 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
210 /// generated (ie our own).
211 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
212 let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
213 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
215 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
216 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
217 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
218 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
220 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
222 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
223 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
224 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
225 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
227 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
230 let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
231 part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
232 let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
233 part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
234 part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
238 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
239 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
240 /// public key instead of private keys.
242 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
243 /// generated (ie our own).
244 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
245 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
246 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
247 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
248 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
250 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
252 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
253 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
254 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
255 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
257 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
260 let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
261 part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
262 let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
263 part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
264 part_a.combine(&part_b)
267 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
268 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
269 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
270 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
271 /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
272 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
273 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
274 /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
275 pub(crate) revocation_key: PublicKey,
277 pub(crate) a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
279 pub(crate) b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
280 /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
281 pub(crate) a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
283 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
284 { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key });
286 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
287 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
288 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
289 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
290 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
291 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
292 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
293 /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
294 /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
296 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
297 /// The public key which receives our immediately spendable primary channel balance in
298 /// remote-broadcasted commitment transactions. This key is static across every commitment
300 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
301 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
302 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
303 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
304 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
305 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
306 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
307 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
310 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
312 revocation_basepoint,
314 delayed_payment_basepoint,
319 impl TxCreationKeys {
320 pub(crate) fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
322 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
323 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
324 a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
325 b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
326 a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
331 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
332 /// key or the delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
333 /// Encumbering a `to_local` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
334 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
335 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
336 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
337 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
338 .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
339 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
340 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
341 .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
342 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
343 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
347 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
348 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
349 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
350 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
351 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
352 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
353 /// the remote party or our own.
355 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
356 /// this divided by 1000.
357 pub amount_msat: u64,
358 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
359 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
360 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
361 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
362 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
363 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
364 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
365 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
368 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
373 transaction_output_index
377 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
378 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
380 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
381 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
382 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
383 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
384 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
385 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
386 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
387 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
388 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
389 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
391 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
392 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
393 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
395 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
396 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
398 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
399 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
400 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
401 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
402 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
403 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
404 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
405 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
408 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
409 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
410 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
411 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
412 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
413 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
414 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
415 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
416 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
417 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
419 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
420 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
421 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
422 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
423 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
425 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
426 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
428 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
429 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
430 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
431 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
432 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
433 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
434 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
435 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
436 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
441 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
442 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
444 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
445 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
448 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
449 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
450 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
451 let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
452 let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
454 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
455 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
456 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
457 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
459 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
460 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
461 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
464 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
465 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
466 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
468 previous_output: OutPoint {
469 txid: prev_hash.clone(),
470 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
472 script_sig: Script::new(),
477 let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
478 feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
480 feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
483 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
485 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
486 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
491 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
498 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
499 /// to broadcast. Eventually this will require a signer which is possibly external, but for now we
500 /// just pass in the SecretKeys required.
501 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
502 // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
503 // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
504 // so we're probably most of the way there.
505 /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
506 pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
507 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
508 pub their_sig: Signature,
509 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
510 // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
512 /// The key derivation parameters for this commitment transaction
513 pub local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
514 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
515 /// controlled by the channel initiator.
516 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
517 /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
519 /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
520 /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
521 /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
523 /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
524 /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
525 pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
527 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
529 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
530 let dummy_input = TxIn {
531 previous_output: OutPoint {
532 txid: Default::default(),
535 script_sig: Default::default(),
539 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
540 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
542 unsigned_tx: Transaction {
544 input: vec![dummy_input],
548 their_sig: dummy_sig,
549 our_sig_first: false,
550 local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
551 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
552 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
553 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
554 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
555 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
562 /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
563 /// remote signature and both parties keys
564 pub(crate) fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
565 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
566 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
571 our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
578 /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
579 /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
580 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
581 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
584 /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
586 /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
587 /// by your ChannelKeys.
588 /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
589 /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
590 /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
591 /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
592 pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
593 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
594 .sighash_all(&self.unsigned_tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
595 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
598 pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
599 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
600 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
601 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
603 if self.our_sig_first {
604 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
605 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
607 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
608 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
610 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
611 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
613 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
617 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
618 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
620 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
621 /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
623 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
624 let txid = self.txid();
625 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
626 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
628 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
629 if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
630 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
632 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
634 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
635 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
643 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
644 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
645 let txid = self.txid();
646 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
647 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
648 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
649 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
650 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
651 if this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
653 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
654 // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
655 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
656 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
658 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
660 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
661 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
663 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
664 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
665 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
666 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
668 if this_htlc.0.offered {
669 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
670 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
672 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
675 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
679 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
680 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
681 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
682 self.txid() == o.txid()
685 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
686 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
687 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
689 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
690 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
693 self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
694 self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
695 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
696 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
697 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
698 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
705 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
706 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
707 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
710 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
711 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
714 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
715 let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
716 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
717 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
718 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
719 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
720 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
721 let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
722 let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
723 per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
726 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
727 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
728 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
743 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
747 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
748 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
749 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
752 macro_rules! test_secrets {
754 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
755 for secret in secrets.iter() {
756 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
759 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
760 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
765 // insert_secret correct sequence
766 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
769 secrets.push([0; 32]);
770 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
771 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
774 secrets.push([0; 32]);
775 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
776 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
779 secrets.push([0; 32]);
780 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
781 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
784 secrets.push([0; 32]);
785 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
786 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
789 secrets.push([0; 32]);
790 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
791 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
794 secrets.push([0; 32]);
795 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
796 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
799 secrets.push([0; 32]);
800 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
801 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
804 secrets.push([0; 32]);
805 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
806 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
811 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
812 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
815 secrets.push([0; 32]);
816 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
817 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
820 secrets.push([0; 32]);
821 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
822 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
826 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
827 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
830 secrets.push([0; 32]);
831 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
832 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
835 secrets.push([0; 32]);
836 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
837 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
840 secrets.push([0; 32]);
841 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
842 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
845 secrets.push([0; 32]);
846 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
847 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
851 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
852 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
855 secrets.push([0; 32]);
856 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
857 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
860 secrets.push([0; 32]);
861 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
862 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
865 secrets.push([0; 32]);
866 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
867 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
870 secrets.push([0; 32]);
871 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
872 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
876 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
877 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
880 secrets.push([0; 32]);
881 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
882 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
885 secrets.push([0; 32]);
886 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
887 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
890 secrets.push([0; 32]);
891 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
892 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
895 secrets.push([0; 32]);
896 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
897 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
900 secrets.push([0; 32]);
901 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
902 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
905 secrets.push([0; 32]);
906 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
907 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
910 secrets.push([0; 32]);
911 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
912 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
915 secrets.push([0; 32]);
916 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
917 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
921 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
922 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
925 secrets.push([0; 32]);
926 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
927 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
930 secrets.push([0; 32]);
931 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
932 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
935 secrets.push([0; 32]);
936 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
937 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
940 secrets.push([0; 32]);
941 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
942 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
945 secrets.push([0; 32]);
946 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
947 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
950 secrets.push([0; 32]);
951 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
952 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
956 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
957 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
960 secrets.push([0; 32]);
961 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
962 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
965 secrets.push([0; 32]);
966 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
967 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
970 secrets.push([0; 32]);
971 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
972 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
975 secrets.push([0; 32]);
976 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
977 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
980 secrets.push([0; 32]);
981 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
982 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
985 secrets.push([0; 32]);
986 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
987 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
990 secrets.push([0; 32]);
991 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
992 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
995 secrets.push([0; 32]);
996 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
997 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1001 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1002 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1005 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1006 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1007 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1010 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1011 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1012 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1015 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1016 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1017 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1020 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1021 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1022 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1025 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1026 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1027 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1030 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1031 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1032 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1035 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1036 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1037 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1040 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1041 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1042 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1046 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1047 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1050 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1051 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1052 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1055 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1056 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1057 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1060 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1061 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1062 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1065 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1066 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1067 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1070 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1071 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1072 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1075 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1076 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1077 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1080 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1081 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1082 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1085 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1086 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1087 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());