1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities for building scripts related to channels. These are
11 //! largely of interest for those implementing the traits on [`crate::sign`] by hand.
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction};
17 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
18 use bitcoin::address::Payload;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
21 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
22 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
23 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash, WPubkeyHash};
25 use crate::chain::chaininterface::fee_for_weight;
26 use crate::chain::package::WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT;
27 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
28 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, RequiredWrapper, Writeable, Writer};
31 use crate::util::transaction_utils;
33 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Scalar};
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Message};
36 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence, Witness};
37 use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey;
41 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
42 use crate::util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
43 use crate::ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI};
46 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
47 use crate::crypto::utils::{sign, sign_with_aux_rand};
48 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
50 #[allow(unused_imports)]
51 use crate::prelude::*;
53 /// Maximum number of one-way in-flight HTLC (protocol-level value).
54 pub const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
55 /// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "offered HTLC output" on a commitment transaction, non-anchor variant.
56 pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
57 /// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "offered HTLC output" on a commitment transaction, anchor variant.
58 pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS: usize = 136;
60 /// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "received HTLC output" can vary in function of its CLTV argument value.
61 /// We define a range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants.
62 pub(crate) const MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 136;
63 /// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "received HTLC output" can vary in function of its CLTV argument value.
64 /// We define a range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants.
65 /// This is the maximum post-anchor value.
66 pub const MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 143;
68 /// The upper bound weight of an anchor input.
69 pub const ANCHOR_INPUT_WITNESS_WEIGHT: u64 = 116;
70 /// The upper bound weight of an HTLC timeout input from a commitment transaction with anchor
72 pub const HTLC_TIMEOUT_INPUT_ANCHOR_WITNESS_WEIGHT: u64 = 288;
73 /// The upper bound weight of an HTLC success input from a commitment transaction with anchor
75 pub const HTLC_SUCCESS_INPUT_ANCHOR_WITNESS_WEIGHT: u64 = 327;
77 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction.
79 pub fn htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
80 const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
81 const HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 706;
82 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT }
85 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
87 pub fn htlc_timeout_tx_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
88 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
89 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 666;
90 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT }
93 /// Describes the type of HTLC claim as determined by analyzing the witness.
94 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
96 /// Claims an offered output on a commitment transaction through the timeout path.
98 /// Claims an offered output on a commitment transaction through the success path.
100 /// Claims an accepted output on a commitment transaction through the timeout path.
102 /// Claims an accepted output on a commitment transaction through the success path.
104 /// Claims an offered/accepted output on a commitment transaction through the revocation path.
109 /// Check if a given input witness attempts to claim a HTLC.
110 pub fn from_witness(witness: &Witness) -> Option<Self> {
111 debug_assert_eq!(OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS, MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
112 if witness.len() < 2 {
115 let witness_script = witness.last().unwrap();
116 let second_to_last = witness.second_to_last().unwrap();
117 if witness_script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
118 if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
119 // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
120 Some(Self::Revocation)
121 } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
122 // <remotehtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
123 Some(Self::OfferedPreimage)
124 } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
125 // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
126 Some(Self::OfferedTimeout)
130 } else if witness_script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS {
131 // It's possible for the weight of `offered_htlc_script` and `accepted_htlc_script` to
132 // match so we check for both here.
133 if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
134 // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
135 Some(Self::Revocation)
136 } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
137 // <remotehtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
138 Some(Self::OfferedPreimage)
139 } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
140 // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
141 Some(Self::OfferedTimeout)
142 } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
143 // <remotehtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
144 Some(Self::AcceptedTimeout)
145 } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
146 // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
147 Some(Self::AcceptedPreimage)
151 } else if witness_script.len() > MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT &&
152 witness_script.len() <= MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
153 // Handle remaining range of ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
154 if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 {
155 // <revocation sig> <revocationpubkey> <witness_script>
156 Some(Self::Revocation)
157 } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 0 {
158 // <remotehtlcsig> <> <witness_script>
159 Some(Self::AcceptedTimeout)
160 } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 32 {
161 // 0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig> <payment_preimage> <witness_script>
162 Some(Self::AcceptedPreimage)
172 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
173 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
175 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
176 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
177 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
180 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
181 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
182 res = Sha256::hash(&res).to_byte_array();
188 /// Build a closing transaction
189 pub fn build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat: u64, to_counterparty_value_sat: u64, to_holder_script: ScriptBuf, to_counterparty_script: ScriptBuf, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Transaction {
191 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
193 previous_output: funding_outpoint,
194 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
195 sequence: Sequence::MAX,
196 witness: Witness::new(),
201 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
203 if to_counterparty_value_sat > 0 {
205 script_pubkey: to_counterparty_script,
206 value: to_counterparty_value_sat
210 if to_holder_value_sat > 0 {
212 script_pubkey: to_holder_script,
213 value: to_holder_value_sat
217 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
219 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
220 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
226 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
232 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
233 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
235 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of our counterparty in just 50*32 bytes
238 pub struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
239 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
242 impl Eq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {}
243 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
244 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
245 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
246 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
254 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
255 /// Creates a new empty `CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets` structure.
256 pub fn new() -> Self {
257 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
261 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
263 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
270 /// Returns the minimum index of all stored secrets. Note that indexes start
271 /// at 1 << 48 and get decremented by one for each new secret.
272 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
273 //TODO This can be optimized?
274 let mut min = 1 << 48;
275 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
284 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
285 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
287 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
288 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
289 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
290 res = Sha256::hash(&res).to_byte_array();
296 /// Inserts the `secret` at `idx`. Returns `Ok(())` if the secret
297 /// was generated in accordance with BOLT 3 and is consistent with previous secrets.
298 pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
299 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
301 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
302 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
306 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
309 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
313 /// Returns the secret at `idx`.
314 /// Returns `None` if `idx` is < [`CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::get_min_seen_secret`].
315 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
316 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
317 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
318 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
321 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
326 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
327 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
328 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
329 writer.write_all(secret)?;
330 writer.write_all(&idx.to_be_bytes())?;
332 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
336 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
337 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
338 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
339 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
340 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
341 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
343 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
344 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
348 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
349 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
350 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey {
351 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
352 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
353 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
354 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array();
356 base_secret.clone().add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(res).unwrap())
357 .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak contains the hash of the key.")
360 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
362 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
363 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
364 /// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
365 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
366 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
367 per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey)
369 let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
370 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
372 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
373 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
374 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
375 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
377 Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array()
379 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
380 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
381 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
382 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
384 Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array()
387 let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())
388 .expect("Multiplying a secret key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
389 let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())
390 .expect("Multiplying a secret key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs");
391 countersignatory_contrib.add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(broadcaster_contrib.secret_bytes()).unwrap())
392 .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.")
395 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
396 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
398 /// A broadcaster key is provided from potential broadcaster of the computed transaction.
399 /// A countersignatory key is coming from a protocol participant unable to broadcast the
402 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
403 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
404 /// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the
405 /// pre-calculated keys.
406 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Debug)]
407 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
408 /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
409 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
410 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
411 /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
413 pub revocation_key: RevocationKey,
414 /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
415 pub broadcaster_htlc_key: HtlcKey,
416 /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
417 pub countersignatory_htlc_key: HtlcKey,
418 /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
419 pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey,
422 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(TxCreationKeys, {
423 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
424 (2, revocation_key, required),
425 (4, broadcaster_htlc_key, required),
426 (6, countersignatory_htlc_key, required),
427 (8, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, required),
430 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
431 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
432 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
433 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
434 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
435 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
436 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
437 /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
438 /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
440 pub revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint,
441 /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
442 /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
443 /// static across every commitment transaction.
444 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
445 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
446 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
447 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
448 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint,
449 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
450 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
451 pub htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint,
454 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelPublicKeys, {
455 (0, funding_pubkey, required),
456 (2, revocation_basepoint, required),
457 (4, payment_point, required),
458 (6, delayed_payment_basepoint, required),
459 (8, htlc_basepoint, required),
462 impl TxCreationKeys {
463 /// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point.
464 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
465 pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &DelayedPaymentBasepoint, broadcaster_htlc_base: &HtlcBasepoint, countersignatory_revocation_base: &RevocationBasepoint, countersignatory_htlc_base: &HtlcBasepoint) -> TxCreationKeys {
467 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
468 revocation_key: RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base, &per_commitment_point),
469 broadcaster_htlc_key: HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &broadcaster_htlc_base, &per_commitment_point),
470 countersignatory_htlc_key: HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_htlc_base, &per_commitment_point),
471 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base, &per_commitment_point),
475 /// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys.
476 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
477 pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TxCreationKeys {
478 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(
480 &per_commitment_point,
481 &broadcaster_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
482 &broadcaster_keys.htlc_basepoint,
483 &countersignatory_keys.revocation_basepoint,
484 &countersignatory_keys.htlc_basepoint,
489 /// The maximum length of a script returned by get_revokeable_redeemscript.
490 // Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 3 bytes for contest_delay, and two public
491 // keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push). Generally, pushes are only 2 bytes (for values below 0x7fff, i.e.
492 // around 7 months), however, a 7 month contest delay shouldn't result in being unable to reclaim
494 pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 4 + 34*2;
496 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
497 /// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
498 /// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
499 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &RevocationKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &DelayedPaymentKey) -> ScriptBuf {
500 let res = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
501 .push_slice(&revocation_key.to_public_key().serialize())
502 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
503 .push_int(contest_delay as i64)
504 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
505 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
506 .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.to_public_key().serialize())
507 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
508 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
510 debug_assert!(res.len() <= REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH);
514 /// Returns the script for the counterparty's output on a holder's commitment transaction based on
515 /// the channel type.
516 pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, payment_key: &PublicKey) -> ScriptBuf {
517 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
518 get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh()
520 ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&payment_key.serialize()))
524 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
525 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
526 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
527 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
528 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
529 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
530 /// the counterparty or our own.
532 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
533 /// this divided by 1000.
534 pub amount_msat: u64,
535 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
536 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
537 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
538 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
539 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
540 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
541 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
542 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
545 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, {
546 (0, offered, required),
547 (2, amount_msat, required),
548 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
549 (6, payment_hash, required),
550 (8, transaction_output_index, option),
554 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_htlc_key: &HtlcKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &HtlcKey, revocation_key: &RevocationKey) -> ScriptBuf {
555 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).to_byte_array();
557 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
558 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
559 .push_slice(PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.to_public_key().serialize()))
560 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
561 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
562 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
563 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
564 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize())
565 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
566 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
568 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
569 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
570 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
572 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
573 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize())
575 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
576 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
577 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
578 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
579 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
580 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
581 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
582 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
583 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
584 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
585 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
587 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
590 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
591 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
592 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.to_public_key().serialize()))
593 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
594 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
595 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
596 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
597 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize())
598 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
599 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
601 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
602 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
603 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
604 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
605 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
607 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
608 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize())
610 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
611 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
612 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
613 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
614 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
615 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
616 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
617 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
618 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
619 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
620 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
621 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
623 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
628 /// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
629 /// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
631 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> ScriptBuf {
632 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
635 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
636 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
637 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> ScriptBuf {
638 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
639 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
641 make_funding_redeemscript_from_slices(&broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key)
644 pub(crate) fn make_funding_redeemscript_from_slices(broadcaster_funding_key: &[u8; 33], countersignatory_funding_key: &[u8; 33]) -> ScriptBuf {
645 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
646 if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
647 builder.push_slice(broadcaster_funding_key)
648 .push_slice(countersignatory_funding_key)
650 builder.push_slice(countersignatory_funding_key)
651 .push_slice(broadcaster_funding_key)
652 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
655 /// Builds an unsigned HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction from the given channel and HTLC
656 /// parameters. This is used by [`TrustedCommitmentTransaction::get_htlc_sigs`] to fetch the
657 /// transaction which needs signing, and can be used to construct an HTLC transaction which is
658 /// broadcastable given a counterparty HTLC signature.
660 /// Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
661 /// commitment transaction).
662 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &DelayedPaymentKey, revocation_key: &RevocationKey) -> Transaction {
663 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
664 txins.push(build_htlc_input(commitment_txid, htlc, channel_type_features));
666 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
667 txouts.push(build_htlc_output(
668 feerate_per_kw, contest_delay, htlc, channel_type_features,
669 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, revocation_key
674 lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 }),
680 pub(crate) fn build_htlc_input(commitment_txid: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> TxIn {
682 previous_output: OutPoint {
683 txid: commitment_txid.clone(),
684 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
686 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
687 sequence: Sequence(if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 1 } else { 0 }),
688 witness: Witness::new(),
692 pub(crate) fn build_htlc_output(
693 feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &DelayedPaymentKey, revocation_key: &RevocationKey
695 let weight = if htlc.offered {
696 htlc_timeout_tx_weight(channel_type_features)
698 htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features)
700 let output_value = if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() && !channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx() {
701 htlc.amount_msat / 1000
703 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * weight / 1000;
704 htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee
708 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
713 /// Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend a HTLC input.
714 pub fn build_htlc_input_witness(
715 local_sig: &Signature, remote_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>,
716 redeem_script: &Script, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
718 let remote_sighash_type = if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
719 EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay
721 EcdsaSighashType::All
724 let mut witness = Witness::new();
725 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
726 witness.push(vec![]);
727 witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&remote_sig.serialize_der(), remote_sighash_type);
728 witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&local_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
729 if let Some(preimage) = preimage {
730 witness.push(preimage.0.to_vec());
732 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
733 witness.push(vec![]);
735 witness.push(redeem_script.to_bytes());
739 /// Pre-anchors channel type features did not use to get serialized in the following six structs:
740 /// — [`ChannelTransactionParameters`]
741 /// — [`CommitmentTransaction`]
742 /// — [`CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput`]
743 /// — [`CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput`]
744 /// — [`HolderHTLCOutput`]
745 /// — [`HolderFundingOutput`]
747 /// To ensure a forwards-compatible serialization, we use odd TLV fields. However, if new features
748 /// are used that could break security, where old signers should be prevented from handling the
749 /// serialized data, an optional even-field TLV will be used as a stand-in to break compatibility.
751 /// This method determines whether or not that option needs to be set based on the chanenl type
752 /// features, and returns it.
754 /// [`CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput`]: crate::chain::package::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput
755 /// [`CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput`]: crate::chain::package::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput
756 /// [`HolderHTLCOutput`]: crate::chain::package::HolderHTLCOutput
757 /// [`HolderFundingOutput`]: crate::chain::package::HolderFundingOutput
758 pub(crate) fn legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> Option<()> {
759 let mut legacy_version_bit_set = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
760 legacy_version_bit_set.set_scid_privacy_required();
761 legacy_version_bit_set.set_zero_conf_required();
763 if features.is_subset(&legacy_version_bit_set) {
770 /// Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled.
772 pub fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> ScriptBuf {
774 .push_slice(payment_point.serialize())
775 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY)
777 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
781 /// Gets the witnessScript for an anchor output from the funding public key.
782 /// The witness in the spending input must be:
783 /// <BIP 143 funding_signature>
784 /// After 16 blocks of confirmation, an alternative satisfying witness could be:
786 /// (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule)
788 pub fn get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> ScriptBuf {
789 Builder::new().push_slice(funding_pubkey.serialize())
790 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
791 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IFDUP)
792 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
794 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
795 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
799 /// Locates the output with an anchor script paying to `funding_pubkey` within `commitment_tx`.
800 pub(crate) fn get_anchor_output<'a>(commitment_tx: &'a Transaction, funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<(u32, &'a TxOut)> {
801 let anchor_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey).to_v0_p2wsh();
802 commitment_tx.output.iter().enumerate()
803 .find(|(_, txout)| txout.script_pubkey == anchor_script)
804 .map(|(idx, txout)| (idx as u32, txout))
807 /// Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend an anchor input.
808 pub fn build_anchor_input_witness(funding_key: &PublicKey, funding_sig: &Signature) -> Witness {
809 let anchor_redeem_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_key);
810 let mut ret = Witness::new();
811 ret.push_bitcoin_signature(&funding_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
812 ret.push(anchor_redeem_script.as_bytes());
816 /// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction).
817 /// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty.
819 /// Normally, this is converted to the broadcaster/countersignatory-organized DirectedChannelTransactionParameters
820 /// before use, via the as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
821 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
822 pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters {
823 /// Holder public keys
824 pub holder_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
825 /// The contest delay selected by the holder, which applies to counterparty-broadcast transactions
826 pub holder_selected_contest_delay: u16,
827 /// Whether the holder is the initiator of this channel.
828 /// This is an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
829 pub is_outbound_from_holder: bool,
830 /// The late-bound counterparty channel transaction parameters.
831 /// These parameters are populated at the point in the protocol where the counterparty provides them.
832 pub counterparty_parameters: Option<CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters>,
833 /// The late-bound funding outpoint
834 pub funding_outpoint: Option<chain::transaction::OutPoint>,
835 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open. For old objects where this field
836 /// wasn't serialized, it will default to static_remote_key at deserialization.
837 pub channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures
840 /// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
841 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
842 pub struct CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
843 /// Counter-party public keys
844 pub pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
845 /// The contest delay selected by the counterparty, which applies to holder-broadcast transactions
846 pub selected_contest_delay: u16,
849 impl ChannelTransactionParameters {
850 /// Whether the late bound parameters are populated.
851 pub fn is_populated(&self) -> bool {
852 self.counterparty_parameters.is_some() && self.funding_outpoint.is_some()
855 /// Whether the channel supports zero-fee HTLC transaction anchors.
856 pub(crate) fn supports_anchors(&self) -> bool {
857 self.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx()
860 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
861 /// given that the holder is the broadcaster.
863 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
864 pub fn as_holder_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
865 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_holder_broadcastable");
866 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
868 holder_is_broadcaster: true
872 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
873 /// given that the counterparty is the broadcaster.
875 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
876 pub fn as_counterparty_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
877 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_counterparty_broadcastable");
878 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
880 holder_is_broadcaster: false
885 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, {
886 (0, pubkeys, required),
887 (2, selected_contest_delay, required),
890 impl Writeable for ChannelTransactionParameters {
891 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
892 let legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker = legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(&self.channel_type_features);
893 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
894 (0, self.holder_pubkeys, required),
895 (2, self.holder_selected_contest_delay, required),
896 (4, self.is_outbound_from_holder, required),
897 (6, self.counterparty_parameters, option),
898 (8, self.funding_outpoint, option),
899 (10, legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
900 (11, self.channel_type_features, required),
906 impl Readable for ChannelTransactionParameters {
907 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
908 let mut holder_pubkeys = RequiredWrapper(None);
909 let mut holder_selected_contest_delay = RequiredWrapper(None);
910 let mut is_outbound_from_holder = RequiredWrapper(None);
911 let mut counterparty_parameters = None;
912 let mut funding_outpoint = None;
913 let mut _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker: Option<()> = None;
914 let mut channel_type_features = None;
916 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
917 (0, holder_pubkeys, required),
918 (2, holder_selected_contest_delay, required),
919 (4, is_outbound_from_holder, required),
920 (6, counterparty_parameters, option),
921 (8, funding_outpoint, option),
922 (10, _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
923 (11, channel_type_features, option),
926 let mut additional_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
927 additional_features.set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
928 chain::package::verify_channel_type_features(&channel_type_features, Some(&additional_features))?;
931 holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.0.unwrap(),
932 holder_selected_contest_delay: holder_selected_contest_delay.0.unwrap(),
933 is_outbound_from_holder: is_outbound_from_holder.0.unwrap(),
934 counterparty_parameters,
936 channel_type_features: channel_type_features.unwrap_or(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key())
941 /// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by
942 /// broadcaster/countersignatory.
944 /// This is derived from the holder/counterparty-organized ChannelTransactionParameters via the
945 /// as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
946 pub struct DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
947 /// The holder's channel static parameters
948 inner: &'a ChannelTransactionParameters,
949 /// Whether the holder is the broadcaster
950 holder_is_broadcaster: bool,
953 impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
954 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the broadcaster
955 pub fn broadcaster_pubkeys(&self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys {
956 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
957 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
959 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
963 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the countersignatory
964 pub fn countersignatory_pubkeys(&self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys {
965 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
966 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
968 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
972 /// Get the contest delay applicable to the transactions.
973 /// Note that the contest delay was selected by the countersignatory.
974 pub fn contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
975 let counterparty_parameters = self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
976 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { counterparty_parameters.selected_contest_delay } else { self.inner.holder_selected_contest_delay }
979 /// Whether the channel is outbound from the broadcaster.
981 /// The boolean representing the side that initiated the channel is
982 /// an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
983 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
984 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder } else { !self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder }
987 /// The funding outpoint
988 pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
989 self.inner.funding_outpoint.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint()
992 /// Whether to use anchors for this channel
993 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &'a ChannelTypeFeatures {
994 &self.inner.channel_type_features
998 /// Information needed to build and sign a holder's commitment transaction.
1000 /// The transaction is only signed once we are ready to broadcast.
1001 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1002 pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
1003 inner: CommitmentTransaction,
1004 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction
1005 pub counterparty_sig: Signature,
1006 /// All non-dust counterparty HTLC signatures, in the order they appear in the transaction
1007 pub counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>,
1008 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
1009 // The user should be able to reconstruct this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
1010 holder_sig_first: bool,
1013 impl Deref for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
1014 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
1016 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.inner }
1019 impl Eq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {}
1020 impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
1021 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
1022 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
1023 self.inner == o.inner
1027 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderCommitmentTransaction, {
1028 (0, inner, required),
1029 (2, counterparty_sig, required),
1030 (4, holder_sig_first, required),
1031 (6, counterparty_htlc_sigs, required_vec),
1034 impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
1036 pub fn dummy(htlcs: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())>) -> Self {
1037 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1038 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
1039 let dummy_sig = sign(&secp_ctx, &secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
1041 let keys = TxCreationKeys {
1042 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
1043 revocation_key: RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(dummy_key), &dummy_key),
1044 broadcaster_htlc_key: HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(dummy_key), &dummy_key),
1045 countersignatory_htlc_key: HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(dummy_key), &dummy_key),
1046 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(dummy_key), &dummy_key),
1048 let channel_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1049 funding_pubkey: dummy_key.clone(),
1050 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(dummy_key),
1051 payment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
1052 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(dummy_key.clone()),
1053 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(dummy_key.clone())
1055 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
1056 holder_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(),
1057 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
1058 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1059 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
1060 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
1061 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(),
1063 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
1064 for _ in 0..htlcs.len() {
1065 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(dummy_sig);
1067 let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, htlcs, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
1068 htlcs.sort_by_key(|htlc| htlc.0.transaction_output_index);
1069 HolderCommitmentTransaction {
1071 counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
1072 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
1073 holder_sig_first: false
1077 /// Create a new holder transaction with the given counterparty signatures.
1078 /// The funding keys are used to figure out which signature should go first when building the transaction for broadcast.
1079 pub fn new(commitment_tx: CommitmentTransaction, counterparty_sig: Signature, counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>, holder_funding_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Self {
1081 inner: commitment_tx,
1083 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
1084 holder_sig_first: holder_funding_key.serialize()[..] < counterparty_funding_key.serialize()[..],
1088 pub(crate) fn add_holder_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, holder_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
1089 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
1090 let mut tx = self.inner.built.transaction.clone();
1091 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1093 if self.holder_sig_first {
1094 tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&holder_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
1095 tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
1097 tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
1098 tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&holder_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
1101 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
1106 /// A pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction and its txid.
1107 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1108 pub struct BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1109 /// The commitment transaction
1110 pub transaction: Transaction,
1111 /// The txid for the commitment transaction.
1113 /// This is provided as a performance optimization, instead of calling transaction.txid()
1118 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BuiltCommitmentTransaction, {
1119 (0, transaction, required),
1120 (2, txid, required),
1123 impl BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1124 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
1126 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
1127 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
1128 let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.transaction).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
1129 hash_to_message!(sighash)
1132 /// Signs the counterparty's commitment transaction.
1133 pub fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
1134 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
1135 sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key)
1138 /// Signs the holder commitment transaction because we are about to broadcast it.
1139 pub fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing, ES: Deref>(
1140 &self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1141 entropy_source: &ES, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
1142 ) -> Signature where ES::Target: EntropySource {
1143 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
1144 sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key, entropy_source)
1148 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a closing transaction and will
1149 /// actually build it and sign.
1151 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
1153 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1154 pub struct ClosingTransaction {
1155 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
1156 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
1157 to_holder_script: ScriptBuf,
1158 to_counterparty_script: ScriptBuf,
1162 impl ClosingTransaction {
1163 /// Construct an object of the class
1165 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
1166 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
1167 to_holder_script: ScriptBuf,
1168 to_counterparty_script: ScriptBuf,
1169 funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
1171 let built = build_closing_transaction(
1172 to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat,
1173 to_holder_script.clone(), to_counterparty_script.clone(),
1176 ClosingTransaction {
1177 to_holder_value_sat,
1178 to_counterparty_value_sat,
1180 to_counterparty_script,
1185 /// Trust our pre-built transaction.
1187 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
1189 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
1190 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
1191 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedClosingTransaction {
1192 TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self }
1195 /// Verify our pre-built transaction.
1197 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
1199 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
1200 /// or using the built transaction.
1201 pub fn verify(&self, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Result<TrustedClosingTransaction, ()> {
1202 let built = build_closing_transaction(
1203 self.to_holder_value_sat, self.to_counterparty_value_sat,
1204 self.to_holder_script.clone(), self.to_counterparty_script.clone(),
1207 if self.built != built {
1210 Ok(TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self })
1213 /// The value to be sent to the holder, or zero if the output will be omitted
1214 pub fn to_holder_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1215 self.to_holder_value_sat
1218 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty, or zero if the output will be omitted
1219 pub fn to_counterparty_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1220 self.to_counterparty_value_sat
1223 /// The destination of the holder's output
1224 pub fn to_holder_script(&self) -> &Script {
1225 &self.to_holder_script
1228 /// The destination of the counterparty's output
1229 pub fn to_counterparty_script(&self) -> &Script {
1230 &self.to_counterparty_script
1234 /// A wrapper on ClosingTransaction indicating that the built bitcoin
1235 /// transaction is trusted.
1237 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1239 /// This structure implements Deref.
1240 pub struct TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1241 inner: &'a ClosingTransaction,
1244 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1245 type Target = ClosingTransaction;
1247 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1250 impl<'a> TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1251 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1252 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &'a Transaction {
1256 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
1258 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
1259 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
1260 let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.inner.built).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
1261 hash_to_message!(sighash)
1264 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
1265 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
1266 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
1267 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
1268 sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key)
1272 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a commitment transaction and will
1273 /// actually build it and sign. It is used for holder transactions that we sign only when needed
1274 /// and for transactions we sign for the counterparty.
1276 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
1278 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1279 pub struct CommitmentTransaction {
1280 commitment_number: u64,
1281 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64,
1282 to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64,
1283 to_broadcaster_delay: Option<u16>, // Added in 0.0.117
1284 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1285 htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
1286 // Note that on upgrades, some features of existing outputs may be missed.
1287 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1288 // A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust()
1289 keys: TxCreationKeys,
1290 // For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust()
1291 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction,
1294 impl Eq for CommitmentTransaction {}
1295 impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction {
1296 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
1297 let eq = self.commitment_number == o.commitment_number &&
1298 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat == o.to_broadcaster_value_sat &&
1299 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat == o.to_countersignatory_value_sat &&
1300 self.feerate_per_kw == o.feerate_per_kw &&
1301 self.htlcs == o.htlcs &&
1302 self.channel_type_features == o.channel_type_features &&
1303 self.keys == o.keys;
1305 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.transaction, o.built.transaction);
1306 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.txid, o.built.txid);
1312 impl Writeable for CommitmentTransaction {
1313 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1314 let legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker = legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(&self.channel_type_features);
1315 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1316 (0, self.commitment_number, required),
1317 (1, self.to_broadcaster_delay, option),
1318 (2, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, required),
1319 (4, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, required),
1320 (6, self.feerate_per_kw, required),
1321 (8, self.keys, required),
1322 (10, self.built, required),
1323 (12, self.htlcs, required_vec),
1324 (14, legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
1325 (15, self.channel_type_features, required),
1331 impl Readable for CommitmentTransaction {
1332 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1333 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
1334 (0, commitment_number, required),
1335 (1, to_broadcaster_delay, option),
1336 (2, to_broadcaster_value_sat, required),
1337 (4, to_countersignatory_value_sat, required),
1338 (6, feerate_per_kw, required),
1339 (8, keys, required),
1340 (10, built, required),
1341 (12, htlcs, required_vec),
1342 (14, _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option),
1343 (15, channel_type_features, option),
1346 let mut additional_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
1347 additional_features.set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
1348 chain::package::verify_channel_type_features(&channel_type_features, Some(&additional_features))?;
1351 commitment_number: commitment_number.0.unwrap(),
1352 to_broadcaster_value_sat: to_broadcaster_value_sat.0.unwrap(),
1353 to_countersignatory_value_sat: to_countersignatory_value_sat.0.unwrap(),
1354 to_broadcaster_delay,
1355 feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw.0.unwrap(),
1356 keys: keys.0.unwrap(),
1357 built: built.0.unwrap(),
1359 channel_type_features: channel_type_features.unwrap_or(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key())
1364 impl CommitmentTransaction {
1365 /// Construct an object of the class while assigning transaction output indices to HTLCs.
1367 /// Populates HTLCOutputInCommitment.transaction_output_index in htlcs_with_aux.
1369 /// The generic T allows the caller to match the HTLC output index with auxiliary data.
1370 /// This auxiliary data is not stored in this object.
1372 /// Only include HTLCs that are above the dust limit for the channel.
1374 /// This is not exported to bindings users due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
1375 pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, broadcaster_funding_key: PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
1376 // Sort outputs and populate output indices while keeping track of the auxiliary data
1377 let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, &broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key).unwrap();
1379 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1380 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1381 let txid = transaction.txid();
1382 CommitmentTransaction {
1384 to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1385 to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1386 to_broadcaster_delay: Some(channel_parameters.contest_delay()),
1389 channel_type_features: channel_parameters.channel_type_features().clone(),
1391 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1398 /// Use non-zero fee anchors
1400 /// This is not exported to bindings users due to move, and also not likely to be useful for binding users
1401 pub fn with_non_zero_fee_anchors(mut self) -> Self {
1402 self.channel_type_features.set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
1406 fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<BuiltCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1407 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1409 let mut htlcs_with_aux = self.htlcs.iter().map(|h| (h.clone(), ())).collect();
1410 let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, broadcaster_funding_key, countersignatory_funding_key)?;
1412 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1413 let txid = transaction.txid();
1414 let built_transaction = BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1418 Ok(built_transaction)
1421 fn make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number: u64, txins: Vec<TxIn>, outputs: Vec<TxOut>) -> Transaction {
1424 lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32)),
1430 // This is used in two cases:
1431 // - initial sorting of outputs / HTLCs in the constructor, in which case T is auxiliary data the
1432 // caller needs to have sorted together with the HTLCs so it can keep track of the output index
1433 // - building of a bitcoin transaction during a verify() call, in which case T is just ()
1434 fn internal_build_outputs<T>(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<(Vec<TxOut>, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), ()> {
1435 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1436 let contest_delay = channel_parameters.contest_delay();
1438 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<&mut HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::new();
1440 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 {
1441 let script = if channel_parameters.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1442 get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh()
1444 Payload::p2wpkh(&BitcoinPublicKey::new(countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)).unwrap().script_pubkey()
1448 script_pubkey: script.clone(),
1449 value: to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1455 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 {
1456 let redeem_script = get_revokeable_redeemscript(
1457 &keys.revocation_key,
1459 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1463 script_pubkey: redeem_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1464 value: to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1470 if channel_parameters.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1471 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1472 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(broadcaster_funding_key);
1475 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1476 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1482 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1483 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(countersignatory_funding_key);
1486 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1487 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1494 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_with_aux.len());
1495 for (htlc, _) in htlcs_with_aux {
1496 let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &channel_parameters.channel_type_features(), &keys);
1498 script_pubkey: script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1499 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1501 txouts.push((txout, Some(htlc)));
1504 // Sort output in BIP-69 order (amount, scriptPubkey). Tie-breaks based on HTLC
1505 // CLTV expiration height.
1506 sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
1507 if let &Some(ref a_htlcout) = a {
1508 if let &Some(ref b_htlcout) = b {
1509 a_htlcout.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlcout.cltv_expiry)
1510 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
1511 // here for fuzzing mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
1513 .then(a_htlcout.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlcout.payment_hash.0))
1514 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1515 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1516 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1517 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1520 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1521 for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1522 if let Some(htlc) = out.1 {
1523 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1524 htlcs.push(htlc.clone());
1526 outputs.push(out.0);
1528 Ok((outputs, htlcs))
1531 fn internal_build_inputs(commitment_number: u64, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> (u64, Vec<TxIn>) {
1532 let broadcaster_pubkeys = channel_parameters.broadcaster_pubkeys();
1533 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1534 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1535 &broadcaster_pubkeys.payment_point,
1536 &countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point,
1537 channel_parameters.is_outbound(),
1540 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number =
1541 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
1544 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1546 previous_output: channel_parameters.funding_outpoint(),
1547 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
1548 sequence: Sequence(((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
1549 | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32)),
1550 witness: Witness::new(),
1554 (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins)
1557 /// The backwards-counting commitment number
1558 pub fn commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1559 self.commitment_number
1562 /// The per commitment point used by the broadcaster.
1563 pub fn per_commitment_point(&self) -> PublicKey {
1564 self.keys.per_commitment_point
1567 /// The value to be sent to the broadcaster
1568 pub fn to_broadcaster_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1569 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat
1572 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty
1573 pub fn to_countersignatory_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1574 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat
1577 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction.
1578 pub fn feerate_per_kw(&self) -> u32 {
1582 /// The non-dust HTLCs (direction, amt, height expiration, hash, transaction output index)
1583 /// which were included in this commitment transaction in output order.
1584 /// The transaction index is always populated.
1586 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should
1587 /// expose a less effecient version which creates a Vec of references in the future.
1588 pub fn htlcs(&self) -> &Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1592 /// Trust our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1594 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1596 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
1597 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
1598 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction {
1599 TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self }
1602 /// Verify our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1604 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1606 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
1607 /// or using the built transaction.
1608 pub fn verify<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1609 // This is the only field of the key cache that we trust
1610 let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point;
1611 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx);
1612 if keys != self.keys {
1615 let tx = self.internal_rebuild_transaction(&keys, channel_parameters, &broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey, &countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey)?;
1616 if self.built.transaction != tx.transaction || self.built.txid != tx.txid {
1619 Ok(TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self })
1623 /// A wrapper on CommitmentTransaction indicating that the derived fields (the built bitcoin
1624 /// transaction and the transaction creation keys) are trusted.
1626 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1628 /// This structure implements Deref.
1629 pub struct TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1630 inner: &'a CommitmentTransaction,
1633 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1634 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
1636 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1639 impl<'a> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1640 /// The transaction ID of the built Bitcoin transaction
1641 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
1642 self.inner.built.txid
1645 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1646 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &'a BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1650 /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
1651 pub fn keys(&self) -> &'a TxCreationKeys {
1655 /// Should anchors be used.
1656 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &'a ChannelTypeFeatures {
1657 &self.inner.channel_type_features
1660 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
1661 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
1663 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order.
1665 /// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses EcdsaSighashType::All.
1666 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing, ES: Deref>(
1667 &self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters,
1668 entropy_source: &ES, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
1669 ) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> where ES::Target: EntropySource {
1670 let inner = self.inner;
1671 let keys = &inner.keys;
1672 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1673 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(inner.htlcs.len());
1674 let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key);
1676 for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() {
1677 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1678 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1680 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1682 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
1683 ret.push(sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, &holder_htlc_key, entropy_source));
1688 /// Builds the second-level holder HTLC transaction for the HTLC with index `htlc_index`.
1689 pub(crate) fn build_unsigned_htlc_tx(
1690 &self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_index: usize,
1691 preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1693 let keys = &self.inner.keys;
1694 let this_htlc = &self.inner.htlcs[htlc_index];
1695 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1696 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
1697 if !this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
1698 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
1699 if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
1701 build_htlc_transaction(
1702 &self.inner.built.txid, self.inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc,
1703 &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key
1708 /// Builds the witness required to spend the input for the HTLC with index `htlc_index` in a
1709 /// second-level holder HTLC transaction.
1710 pub(crate) fn build_htlc_input_witness(
1711 &self, htlc_index: usize, counterparty_signature: &Signature, signature: &Signature,
1712 preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>
1714 let keys = &self.inner.keys;
1715 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(
1716 &self.inner.htlcs[htlc_index], &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1717 &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key
1719 chan_utils::build_htlc_input_witness(
1720 signature, counterparty_signature, preimage, &htlc_redeemscript, &self.channel_type_features,
1724 /// Returns the index of the revokeable output, i.e. the `to_local` output sending funds to
1725 /// the broadcaster, in the built transaction, if any exists.
1727 /// There are two cases where this may return `None`:
1728 /// - The balance of the revokeable output is below the dust limit (only found on commitments
1729 /// early in the channel's lifetime, i.e. before the channel reserve is met).
1730 /// - This commitment was created before LDK 0.0.117. In this case, the
1731 /// commitment transaction previously didn't contain enough information to locate the
1732 /// revokeable output.
1733 pub fn revokeable_output_index(&self) -> Option<usize> {
1734 let revokeable_redeemscript = get_revokeable_redeemscript(
1735 &self.keys.revocation_key,
1736 self.to_broadcaster_delay?,
1737 &self.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1739 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1740 let outputs = &self.inner.built.transaction.output;
1741 outputs.iter().enumerate()
1742 .find(|(_, out)| out.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh)
1743 .map(|(idx, _)| idx)
1746 /// Helper method to build an unsigned justice transaction spending the revokeable
1747 /// `to_local` output to a destination script. Fee estimation accounts for the expected
1748 /// revocation witness data that will be added when signed.
1750 /// This method will error if the given fee rate results in a fee greater than the value
1751 /// of the output being spent, or if there exists no revokeable `to_local` output on this
1752 /// commitment transaction. See [`Self::revokeable_output_index`] for more details.
1754 /// The built transaction will allow fee bumping with RBF, and this method takes
1755 /// `feerate_per_kw` as an input such that multiple copies of a justice transaction at different
1756 /// fee rates may be built.
1757 pub fn build_to_local_justice_tx(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, destination_script: ScriptBuf)
1758 -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
1759 let output_idx = self.revokeable_output_index().ok_or(())?;
1760 let input = vec![TxIn {
1761 previous_output: OutPoint {
1762 txid: self.trust().txid(),
1763 vout: output_idx as u32,
1765 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
1766 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
1767 witness: Witness::new(),
1769 let value = self.inner.built.transaction.output[output_idx].value;
1770 let output = vec![TxOut {
1771 script_pubkey: destination_script,
1774 let mut justice_tx = Transaction {
1776 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1780 let weight = justice_tx.weight().to_wu() + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT;
1781 let fee = fee_for_weight(feerate_per_kw as u32, weight);
1782 justice_tx.output[0].value = value.checked_sub(fee).ok_or(())?;
1788 /// Commitment transaction numbers which appear in the transactions themselves are XOR'd with a
1789 /// shared secret first. This prevents on-chain observers from discovering how many commitment
1790 /// transactions occurred in a channel before it was closed.
1792 /// This function gets the shared secret from relevant channel public keys and can be used to
1793 /// "decrypt" the commitment transaction number given a commitment transaction on-chain.
1794 pub fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1795 broadcaster_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1796 countersignatory_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1797 outbound_from_broadcaster: bool,
1799 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1801 if outbound_from_broadcaster {
1802 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1803 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1805 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1806 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1808 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array();
1810 ((res[26] as u64) << 5 * 8)
1811 | ((res[27] as u64) << 4 * 8)
1812 | ((res[28] as u64) << 3 * 8)
1813 | ((res[29] as u64) << 2 * 8)
1814 | ((res[30] as u64) << 1 * 8)
1815 | ((res[31] as u64) << 0 * 8)
1820 use super::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, ChannelPublicKeys};
1822 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
1823 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Secp256k1};
1824 use crate::util::test_utils;
1825 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, SignerProvider};
1826 use bitcoin::{Network, Txid, ScriptBuf};
1827 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1828 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
1829 use crate::ln::types::PaymentHash;
1830 use bitcoin::address::Payload;
1831 use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey;
1832 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
1834 #[allow(unused_imports)]
1835 use crate::prelude::*;
1837 struct TestCommitmentTxBuilder {
1838 commitment_number: u64,
1839 holder_funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
1840 counterparty_funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
1841 keys: TxCreationKeys,
1842 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1843 htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())>,
1844 channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1845 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1848 impl TestCommitmentTxBuilder {
1850 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1851 let seed = [42; 32];
1852 let network = Network::Testnet;
1853 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
1854 let signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(3000, keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, 1_000_000, 0));
1855 let counterparty_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(3000, keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, 1_000_000, 1));
1856 let delayed_payment_base = &signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1857 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1858 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
1859 let htlc_basepoint = &signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1860 let holder_pubkeys = signer.pubkeys();
1861 let counterparty_pubkeys = counterparty_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1862 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
1863 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
1864 holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.clone(),
1865 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
1866 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1867 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
1868 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
1869 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(),
1871 let htlcs_with_aux = Vec::new();
1874 commitment_number: 0,
1875 holder_funding_pubkey: holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1876 counterparty_funding_pubkey: counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1881 counterparty_pubkeys,
1885 fn build(&mut self, to_broadcaster_sats: u64, to_countersignatory_sats: u64) -> CommitmentTransaction {
1886 CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1887 self.commitment_number, to_broadcaster_sats, to_countersignatory_sats,
1888 self.holder_funding_pubkey.clone(),
1889 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey.clone(),
1890 self.keys.clone(), self.feerate_per_kw,
1891 &mut self.htlcs_with_aux, &self.channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1898 let mut builder = TestCommitmentTxBuilder::new();
1900 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs
1901 let tx = builder.build(1000, 2000);
1902 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1903 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, Payload::p2wpkh(&BitcoinPublicKey::new(builder.counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point)).unwrap().script_pubkey());
1905 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs as well as two anchors
1906 builder.channel_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
1907 let tx = builder.build(1000, 2000);
1908 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 4);
1909 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&builder.counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh());
1911 // Generate broadcaster output and anchor
1912 let tx = builder.build(3000, 0);
1913 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1915 // Generate counterparty output and anchor
1916 let tx = builder.build(0, 3000);
1917 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1919 let received_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1921 amount_msat: 400000,
1923 payment_hash: PaymentHash([42; 32]),
1924 transaction_output_index: None,
1927 let offered_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1929 amount_msat: 600000,
1931 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
1932 transaction_output_index: None,
1935 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, w/o anchors
1936 builder.channel_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1937 builder.htlcs_with_aux = vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())];
1938 let tx = builder.build(3000, 0);
1939 let keys = &builder.keys.clone();
1940 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 3);
1941 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[0].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1942 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1943 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex_string(),
1944 "0020e43a7c068553003fe68fcae424fb7b28ec5ce48cd8b6744b3945631389bad2fb");
1945 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex_string(),
1946 "0020215d61bba56b19e9eadb6107f5a85d7f99c40f65992443f69229c290165bc00d");
1948 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, with anchors
1949 builder.channel_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
1950 builder.htlcs_with_aux = vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())];
1951 let tx = builder.build(3000, 0);
1952 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 5);
1953 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[2].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1954 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1955 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex_string(),
1956 "0020b70d0649c72b38756885c7a30908d912a7898dd5d79457a7280b8e9a20f3f2bc");
1957 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex_string(),
1958 "002087a3faeb1950a469c0e2db4a79b093a41b9526e5a6fc6ef5cb949bde3be379c7");
1962 fn test_finding_revokeable_output_index() {
1963 let mut builder = TestCommitmentTxBuilder::new();
1965 // Revokeable output present
1966 let tx = builder.build(1000, 2000);
1967 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1968 assert_eq!(tx.trust().revokeable_output_index(), Some(0));
1970 // Revokeable output present (but to_broadcaster_delay missing)
1971 let tx = CommitmentTransaction { to_broadcaster_delay: None, ..tx };
1972 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1973 assert_eq!(tx.trust().revokeable_output_index(), None);
1975 // Revokeable output not present (our balance is dust)
1976 let tx = builder.build(0, 2000);
1977 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 1);
1978 assert_eq!(tx.trust().revokeable_output_index(), None);
1982 fn test_building_to_local_justice_tx() {
1983 let mut builder = TestCommitmentTxBuilder::new();
1985 // Revokeable output not present (our balance is dust)
1986 let tx = builder.build(0, 2000);
1987 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 1);
1988 assert!(tx.trust().build_to_local_justice_tx(253, ScriptBuf::new()).is_err());
1990 // Revokeable output present
1991 let tx = builder.build(1000, 2000);
1992 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1995 assert!(tx.trust().build_to_local_justice_tx(100_000, ScriptBuf::new()).is_err());
1997 // Generate a random public key for destination script
1998 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(
1999 &<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100")
2000 .unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2001 let pubkey_hash = BitcoinPublicKey::new(
2002 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &secret_key)).wpubkey_hash().unwrap();
2003 let destination_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash);
2005 let justice_tx = tx.trust().build_to_local_justice_tx(253, destination_script.clone()).unwrap();
2006 assert_eq!(justice_tx.input.len(), 1);
2007 assert_eq!(justice_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.built.transaction.txid());
2008 assert_eq!(justice_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, tx.trust().revokeable_output_index().unwrap() as u32);
2009 assert!(justice_tx.input[0].sequence.is_rbf());
2011 assert_eq!(justice_tx.output.len(), 1);
2012 assert!(justice_tx.output[0].value < 1000);
2013 assert_eq!(justice_tx.output[0].script_pubkey, destination_script);
2017 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2018 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2019 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2022 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2024 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2025 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2026 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2029 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2030 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2035 // insert_secret correct sequence
2036 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
2039 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2040 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2041 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2044 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2045 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2046 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2049 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2050 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2051 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2054 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2055 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2056 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2059 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2060 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2061 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2064 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2065 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2066 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2069 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2070 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2071 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2074 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2075 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2076 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2081 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2082 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
2085 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2086 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2087 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2090 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2091 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2092 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
2096 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2097 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
2100 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2101 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2102 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2105 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2106 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2107 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2110 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2111 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2112 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2115 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2116 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2117 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
2121 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2122 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
2125 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2126 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2127 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2130 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2131 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2132 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2135 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2136 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2137 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2140 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2141 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2142 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
2146 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2147 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
2150 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2151 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2152 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2155 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2156 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2157 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2160 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2161 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2162 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2165 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2166 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2167 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2170 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2171 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2172 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2175 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2176 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2177 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2180 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2181 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2182 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2185 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2186 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2187 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
2191 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2192 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
2195 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2196 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2197 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2200 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2201 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2202 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2205 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2206 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2207 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2210 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2211 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2212 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2215 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2216 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2217 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2220 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2221 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2222 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
2226 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
2227 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
2230 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2231 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2232 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2235 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2236 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2237 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2240 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2241 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2242 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2245 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2246 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2247 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2250 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2251 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2252 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2255 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2256 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
2257 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2260 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2261 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2262 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2265 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2266 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2267 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
2271 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
2272 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
2275 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2276 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2277 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2280 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2281 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2282 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2285 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2286 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2287 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2290 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2291 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2292 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2295 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2296 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2297 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2300 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2301 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2302 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2305 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2306 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
2307 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2310 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2311 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2312 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
2316 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2317 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
2320 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2321 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2322 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2325 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2326 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2327 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2330 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2331 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2332 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2335 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2336 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2337 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2340 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2341 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2342 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2345 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2346 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2347 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2350 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2351 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2352 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2355 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2356 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2357 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());