1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
11 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::Sign message signing by hand.
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
16 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
23 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
24 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
25 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
26 use util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Message};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Witness};
38 use util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
39 use ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI};
42 use util::crypto::sign;
44 pub(crate) const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
46 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction.
48 pub fn htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
49 const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
50 const HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 706;
51 if opt_anchors { HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT }
54 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
56 pub fn htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
57 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
58 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 666;
59 if opt_anchors { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT }
63 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
69 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
70 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
71 if witness_script_len == 133 {
72 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
73 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
74 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
81 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
82 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
84 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
85 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
86 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
89 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
90 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
91 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
97 /// Build a closing transaction
98 pub fn build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat: u64, to_counterparty_value_sat: u64, to_holder_script: Script, to_counterparty_script: Script, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Transaction {
100 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
102 previous_output: funding_outpoint,
103 script_sig: Script::new(),
104 sequence: 0xffffffff,
105 witness: Witness::new(),
110 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
112 if to_counterparty_value_sat > 0 {
114 script_pubkey: to_counterparty_script,
115 value: to_counterparty_value_sat
119 if to_holder_value_sat > 0 {
121 script_pubkey: to_holder_script,
122 value: to_holder_value_sat
126 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
128 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
129 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
141 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
142 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
144 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of our counterparty in just 50*32 bytes
147 pub struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
148 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
151 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
152 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
153 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
154 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
162 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
163 /// Creates a new empty `CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets` structure.
164 pub fn new() -> Self {
165 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
169 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
171 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
178 /// Returns the minimum index of all stored secrets. Note that indexes start
179 /// at 1 << 48 and get decremented by one for each new secret.
180 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
181 //TODO This can be optimized?
182 let mut min = 1 << 48;
183 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
192 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
193 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
195 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
196 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
197 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
198 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
204 /// Inserts the `secret` at `idx`. Returns `Ok(())` if the secret
205 /// was generated in accordance with BOLT 3 and is consistent with previous secrets.
206 pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
207 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
209 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
210 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
214 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
217 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
221 /// Returns the secret at `idx`.
222 /// Returns `None` if `idx` is < [`CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::get_min_seen_secret`].
223 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
224 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
225 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
226 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
229 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
234 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
235 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
236 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
237 writer.write_all(secret)?;
238 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
240 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
244 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
245 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
247 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
248 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
249 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
251 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
252 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
256 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
257 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
259 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
260 /// generated (ie our own).
261 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
262 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
263 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
264 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
265 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
267 let mut key = base_secret.clone();
268 key.add_assign(&res)?;
272 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
273 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
274 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
276 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
277 /// generated (ie our own).
278 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
279 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
280 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
281 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
282 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
284 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
285 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
288 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
290 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
291 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
292 /// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
293 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
295 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
296 /// generated (ie our own).
297 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
298 let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
299 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
301 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
302 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
303 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
304 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
306 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
308 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
309 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
310 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
311 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
313 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
316 let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone();
317 countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
318 let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone();
319 broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
320 countersignatory_contrib.add_assign(&broadcaster_contrib[..])?;
321 Ok(countersignatory_contrib)
324 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
325 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
326 /// public key instead of private keys.
328 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
329 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
330 /// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
331 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
333 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
334 /// generated (ie our own).
335 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
336 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
337 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
338 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
339 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
341 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
343 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
344 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
345 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
346 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
348 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
351 let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone();
352 countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
353 let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone();
354 broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
355 countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
358 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
359 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
361 /// A broadcaster key is provided from potential broadcaster of the computed transaction.
362 /// A countersignatory key is coming from a protocol participant unable to broadcast the
365 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
366 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
367 /// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the
368 /// pre-calculated keys.
369 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
370 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
371 /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
372 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
373 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
374 /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
376 pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
377 /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
378 pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey,
379 /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
380 pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
381 /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
382 pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
385 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(TxCreationKeys, {
386 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
387 (2, revocation_key, required),
388 (4, broadcaster_htlc_key, required),
389 (6, countersignatory_htlc_key, required),
390 (8, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, required),
393 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
394 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
395 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
396 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
397 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
398 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
399 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
400 /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
401 /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
403 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
404 /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
405 /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
406 /// static across every commitment transaction.
407 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
408 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
409 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
410 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
411 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
412 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
413 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
414 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
417 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelPublicKeys, {
418 (0, funding_pubkey, required),
419 (2, revocation_basepoint, required),
420 (4, payment_point, required),
421 (6, delayed_payment_basepoint, required),
422 (8, htlc_basepoint, required),
425 impl TxCreationKeys {
426 /// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point.
427 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
428 pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
430 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
431 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
432 broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
433 countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
434 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
438 /// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys.
439 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
440 pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
441 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(
443 &per_commitment_point,
444 &broadcaster_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
445 &broadcaster_keys.htlc_basepoint,
446 &countersignatory_keys.revocation_basepoint,
447 &countersignatory_keys.htlc_basepoint,
452 /// The maximum length of a script returned by get_revokeable_redeemscript.
453 // Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 2 bytes for contest_delay, and two public
454 // keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push).
455 pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 3 + 34*2;
457 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
458 /// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
459 /// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
460 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
461 let res = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
462 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
463 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
464 .push_int(contest_delay as i64)
465 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
466 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
467 .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
468 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
469 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
471 debug_assert!(res.len() <= REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH);
475 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
476 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
477 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
478 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
479 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
480 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
481 /// the counterparty or our own.
483 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
484 /// this divided by 1000.
485 pub amount_msat: u64,
486 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
487 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
488 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
489 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
490 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
491 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
492 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
493 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
496 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, {
497 (0, offered, required),
498 (2, amount_msat, required),
499 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
500 (6, payment_hash, required),
501 (8, transaction_output_index, option),
505 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
506 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
508 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
509 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
510 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
511 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
512 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
513 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
514 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
515 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
516 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
517 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
519 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
520 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
521 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
523 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
524 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
526 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
527 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
528 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
529 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
530 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
531 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
532 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
534 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
535 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
536 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
538 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
541 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
542 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
543 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
544 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
545 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
546 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
547 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
548 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
549 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
550 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
552 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
553 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
554 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
555 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
556 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
558 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
559 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
561 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
562 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
563 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
564 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
565 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
566 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
567 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
568 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
570 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
571 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
572 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
574 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
579 /// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
580 /// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
582 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
583 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
586 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
587 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
588 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script {
589 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
590 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
592 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
593 if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
594 builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
595 .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
597 builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
598 .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
599 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
602 /// Builds an unsigned HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction from the given channel and HTLC
603 /// parameters. This is used by [`TrustedCommitmentTransaction::get_htlc_sigs`] to fetch the
604 /// transaction which needs signing, and can be used to construct an HTLC transaction which is
605 /// broadcastable given a counterparty HTLC signature.
607 /// Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
608 /// commitment transaction).
609 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
610 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
612 previous_output: OutPoint {
613 txid: commitment_txid.clone(),
614 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
616 script_sig: Script::new(),
617 sequence: if opt_anchors { 1 } else { 0 },
618 witness: Witness::new(),
621 let weight = if htlc.offered {
622 htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
624 htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
626 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * weight / 1000;
628 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
630 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
631 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
636 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
642 /// Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled.
644 pub(crate) fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> Script {
646 .push_slice(&payment_point.serialize()[..])
647 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY)
649 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
653 /// Gets the witnessScript for an anchor output from the funding public key.
654 /// The witness in the spending input must be:
655 /// <BIP 143 funding_signature>
656 /// After 16 blocks of confirmation, an alternative satisfying witness could be:
658 /// (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule)
660 pub fn get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Script {
661 Builder::new().push_slice(&funding_pubkey.serialize()[..])
662 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
663 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IFDUP)
664 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
666 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
667 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
671 /// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction).
672 /// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty.
674 /// Normally, this is converted to the broadcaster/countersignatory-organized DirectedChannelTransactionParameters
675 /// before use, via the as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
677 pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters {
678 /// Holder public keys
679 pub holder_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
680 /// The contest delay selected by the holder, which applies to counterparty-broadcast transactions
681 pub holder_selected_contest_delay: u16,
682 /// Whether the holder is the initiator of this channel.
683 /// This is an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
684 pub is_outbound_from_holder: bool,
685 /// The late-bound counterparty channel transaction parameters.
686 /// These parameters are populated at the point in the protocol where the counterparty provides them.
687 pub counterparty_parameters: Option<CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters>,
688 /// The late-bound funding outpoint
689 pub funding_outpoint: Option<chain::transaction::OutPoint>,
690 /// Are anchors used for this channel. Boolean is serialization backwards-compatible
691 pub opt_anchors: Option<()>
694 /// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
696 pub struct CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
697 /// Counter-party public keys
698 pub pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
699 /// The contest delay selected by the counterparty, which applies to holder-broadcast transactions
700 pub selected_contest_delay: u16,
703 impl ChannelTransactionParameters {
704 /// Whether the late bound parameters are populated.
705 pub fn is_populated(&self) -> bool {
706 self.counterparty_parameters.is_some() && self.funding_outpoint.is_some()
709 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
710 /// given that the holder is the broadcaster.
712 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
713 pub fn as_holder_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
714 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_holder_broadcastable");
715 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
717 holder_is_broadcaster: true
721 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
722 /// given that the counterparty is the broadcaster.
724 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
725 pub fn as_counterparty_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
726 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_counterparty_broadcastable");
727 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
729 holder_is_broadcaster: false
734 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, {
735 (0, pubkeys, required),
736 (2, selected_contest_delay, required),
739 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelTransactionParameters, {
740 (0, holder_pubkeys, required),
741 (2, holder_selected_contest_delay, required),
742 (4, is_outbound_from_holder, required),
743 (6, counterparty_parameters, option),
744 (8, funding_outpoint, option),
745 (10, opt_anchors, option),
748 /// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by
749 /// broadcaster/countersignatory.
751 /// This is derived from the holder/counterparty-organized ChannelTransactionParameters via the
752 /// as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
753 pub struct DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
754 /// The holder's channel static parameters
755 inner: &'a ChannelTransactionParameters,
756 /// Whether the holder is the broadcaster
757 holder_is_broadcaster: bool,
760 impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
761 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the broadcaster
762 pub fn broadcaster_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
763 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
764 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
766 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
770 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the countersignatory
771 pub fn countersignatory_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
772 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
773 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
775 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
779 /// Get the contest delay applicable to the transactions.
780 /// Note that the contest delay was selected by the countersignatory.
781 pub fn contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
782 let counterparty_parameters = self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
783 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { counterparty_parameters.selected_contest_delay } else { self.inner.holder_selected_contest_delay }
786 /// Whether the channel is outbound from the broadcaster.
788 /// The boolean representing the side that initiated the channel is
789 /// an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
790 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
791 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder } else { !self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder }
794 /// The funding outpoint
795 pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
796 self.inner.funding_outpoint.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint()
799 /// Whether to use anchors for this channel
800 pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
801 self.inner.opt_anchors.is_some()
805 /// Information needed to build and sign a holder's commitment transaction.
807 /// The transaction is only signed once we are ready to broadcast.
809 pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
810 inner: CommitmentTransaction,
811 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction
812 pub counterparty_sig: Signature,
813 /// All non-dust counterparty HTLC signatures, in the order they appear in the transaction
814 pub counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>,
815 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
816 // The user should be able to reconstruct this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
817 holder_sig_first: bool,
820 impl Deref for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
821 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
823 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.inner }
826 impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
827 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
828 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
829 self.inner == o.inner
833 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderCommitmentTransaction, {
834 (0, inner, required),
835 (2, counterparty_sig, required),
836 (4, holder_sig_first, required),
837 (6, counterparty_htlc_sigs, vec_type),
840 impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
842 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
843 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
844 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
845 let dummy_sig = sign(&secp_ctx, &secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
847 let keys = TxCreationKeys {
848 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
849 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
850 broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
851 countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
852 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
854 let channel_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
855 funding_pubkey: dummy_key.clone(),
856 revocation_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
857 payment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
858 delayed_payment_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
859 htlc_basepoint: dummy_key.clone()
861 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
862 holder_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(),
863 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
864 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
865 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
866 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: 0 }),
869 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
870 let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, false, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
871 HolderCommitmentTransaction {
873 counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
874 counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec::new(),
875 holder_sig_first: false
879 /// Create a new holder transaction with the given counterparty signatures.
880 /// The funding keys are used to figure out which signature should go first when building the transaction for broadcast.
881 pub fn new(commitment_tx: CommitmentTransaction, counterparty_sig: Signature, counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>, holder_funding_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Self {
883 inner: commitment_tx,
885 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
886 holder_sig_first: holder_funding_key.serialize()[..] < counterparty_funding_key.serialize()[..],
890 pub(crate) fn add_holder_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, holder_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
891 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
892 let mut tx = self.inner.built.transaction.clone();
893 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
894 let mut ser_holder_sig = holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
895 ser_holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
896 let mut ser_cp_sig = self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
897 ser_cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
899 if self.holder_sig_first {
900 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
901 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
903 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
904 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
907 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
912 /// A pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction and its txid.
914 pub struct BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
915 /// The commitment transaction
916 pub transaction: Transaction,
917 /// The txid for the commitment transaction.
919 /// This is provided as a performance optimization, instead of calling transaction.txid()
924 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BuiltCommitmentTransaction, {
925 (0, transaction, required),
929 impl BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
930 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
932 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
933 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
934 let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.transaction).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
935 hash_to_message!(sighash)
938 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
939 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
940 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
941 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
942 sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key)
946 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a closing transaction and will
947 /// actually build it and sign.
949 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
951 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq)]
952 pub struct ClosingTransaction {
953 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
954 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
955 to_holder_script: Script,
956 to_counterparty_script: Script,
960 impl ClosingTransaction {
961 /// Construct an object of the class
963 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
964 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
965 to_holder_script: Script,
966 to_counterparty_script: Script,
967 funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
969 let built = build_closing_transaction(
970 to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat,
971 to_holder_script.clone(), to_counterparty_script.clone(),
976 to_counterparty_value_sat,
978 to_counterparty_script,
983 /// Trust our pre-built transaction.
985 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
987 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
988 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
989 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedClosingTransaction {
990 TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self }
993 /// Verify our pre-built transaction.
995 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
997 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
998 /// or using the built transaction.
999 pub fn verify(&self, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Result<TrustedClosingTransaction, ()> {
1000 let built = build_closing_transaction(
1001 self.to_holder_value_sat, self.to_counterparty_value_sat,
1002 self.to_holder_script.clone(), self.to_counterparty_script.clone(),
1005 if self.built != built {
1008 Ok(TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self })
1011 /// The value to be sent to the holder, or zero if the output will be omitted
1012 pub fn to_holder_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1013 self.to_holder_value_sat
1016 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty, or zero if the output will be omitted
1017 pub fn to_counterparty_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1018 self.to_counterparty_value_sat
1021 /// The destination of the holder's output
1022 pub fn to_holder_script(&self) -> &Script {
1023 &self.to_holder_script
1026 /// The destination of the counterparty's output
1027 pub fn to_counterparty_script(&self) -> &Script {
1028 &self.to_counterparty_script
1032 /// A wrapper on ClosingTransaction indicating that the built bitcoin
1033 /// transaction is trusted.
1035 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1037 /// This structure implements Deref.
1038 pub struct TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1039 inner: &'a ClosingTransaction,
1042 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1043 type Target = ClosingTransaction;
1045 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1048 impl<'a> TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1049 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1050 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &Transaction {
1054 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
1056 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
1057 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
1058 let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.inner.built).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
1059 hash_to_message!(sighash)
1062 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
1063 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
1064 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
1065 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
1066 sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key)
1070 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a commitment transaction and will
1071 /// actually build it and sign. It is used for holder transactions that we sign only when needed
1072 /// and for transactions we sign for the counterparty.
1074 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
1077 pub struct CommitmentTransaction {
1078 commitment_number: u64,
1079 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64,
1080 to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64,
1081 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1082 htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
1083 // A boolean that is serialization backwards-compatible
1084 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
1085 // A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust()
1086 keys: TxCreationKeys,
1087 // For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust()
1088 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction,
1091 impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction {
1092 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
1093 let eq = self.commitment_number == o.commitment_number &&
1094 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat == o.to_broadcaster_value_sat &&
1095 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat == o.to_countersignatory_value_sat &&
1096 self.feerate_per_kw == o.feerate_per_kw &&
1097 self.htlcs == o.htlcs &&
1098 self.opt_anchors == o.opt_anchors &&
1099 self.keys == o.keys;
1101 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.transaction, o.built.transaction);
1102 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.txid, o.built.txid);
1108 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CommitmentTransaction, {
1109 (0, commitment_number, required),
1110 (2, to_broadcaster_value_sat, required),
1111 (4, to_countersignatory_value_sat, required),
1112 (6, feerate_per_kw, required),
1113 (8, keys, required),
1114 (10, built, required),
1115 (12, htlcs, vec_type),
1116 (14, opt_anchors, option),
1119 impl CommitmentTransaction {
1120 /// Construct an object of the class while assigning transaction output indices to HTLCs.
1122 /// Populates HTLCOutputInCommitment.transaction_output_index in htlcs_with_aux.
1124 /// The generic T allows the caller to match the HTLC output index with auxiliary data.
1125 /// This auxiliary data is not stored in this object.
1127 /// Only include HTLCs that are above the dust limit for the channel.
1129 /// (C-not exported) due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
1130 pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
1131 // Sort outputs and populate output indices while keeping track of the auxiliary data
1132 let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, opt_anchors, &broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key).unwrap();
1134 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1135 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1136 let txid = transaction.txid();
1137 CommitmentTransaction {
1139 to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1140 to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1143 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1145 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1152 fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<BuiltCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1153 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1155 let mut htlcs_with_aux = self.htlcs.iter().map(|h| (h.clone(), ())).collect();
1156 let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, self.opt_anchors.is_some(), broadcaster_funding_key, countersignatory_funding_key)?;
1158 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1159 let txid = transaction.txid();
1160 let built_transaction = BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1164 Ok(built_transaction)
1167 fn make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number: u64, txins: Vec<TxIn>, outputs: Vec<TxOut>) -> Transaction {
1170 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
1176 // This is used in two cases:
1177 // - initial sorting of outputs / HTLCs in the constructor, in which case T is auxiliary data the
1178 // caller needs to have sorted together with the HTLCs so it can keep track of the output index
1179 // - building of a bitcoin transaction during a verify() call, in which case T is just ()
1180 fn internal_build_outputs<T>(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<(Vec<TxOut>, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), ()> {
1181 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1182 let contest_delay = channel_parameters.contest_delay();
1184 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<&mut HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::new();
1186 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 {
1187 let script = if opt_anchors {
1188 get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh()
1190 get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)
1194 script_pubkey: script.clone(),
1195 value: to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1201 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 {
1202 let redeem_script = get_revokeable_redeemscript(
1203 &keys.revocation_key,
1205 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1209 script_pubkey: redeem_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1210 value: to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1217 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1218 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(broadcaster_funding_key);
1221 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1222 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1228 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1229 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(countersignatory_funding_key);
1232 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1233 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1240 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_with_aux.len());
1241 for (htlc, _) in htlcs_with_aux {
1242 let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, opt_anchors, &keys);
1244 script_pubkey: script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1245 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1247 txouts.push((txout, Some(htlc)));
1250 // Sort output in BIP-69 order (amount, scriptPubkey). Tie-breaks based on HTLC
1251 // CLTV expiration height.
1252 sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
1253 if let &Some(ref a_htlcout) = a {
1254 if let &Some(ref b_htlcout) = b {
1255 a_htlcout.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlcout.cltv_expiry)
1256 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
1257 // here for fuzzing mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
1259 .then(a_htlcout.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlcout.payment_hash.0))
1260 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1261 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1262 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1263 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1266 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1267 for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1268 if let Some(htlc) = out.1 {
1269 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1270 htlcs.push(htlc.clone());
1272 outputs.push(out.0);
1274 Ok((outputs, htlcs))
1277 fn internal_build_inputs(commitment_number: u64, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> (u64, Vec<TxIn>) {
1278 let broadcaster_pubkeys = channel_parameters.broadcaster_pubkeys();
1279 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1280 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1281 &broadcaster_pubkeys.payment_point,
1282 &countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point,
1283 channel_parameters.is_outbound(),
1286 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number =
1287 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
1290 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1292 previous_output: channel_parameters.funding_outpoint(),
1293 script_sig: Script::new(),
1294 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
1295 | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32),
1296 witness: Witness::new(),
1300 (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins)
1303 /// The backwards-counting commitment number
1304 pub fn commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1305 self.commitment_number
1308 /// The value to be sent to the broadcaster
1309 pub fn to_broadcaster_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1310 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat
1313 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty
1314 pub fn to_countersignatory_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1315 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat
1318 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction.
1319 pub fn feerate_per_kw(&self) -> u32 {
1323 /// The non-dust HTLCs (direction, amt, height expiration, hash, transaction output index)
1324 /// which were included in this commitment transaction in output order.
1325 /// The transaction index is always populated.
1327 /// (C-not exported) as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should
1328 /// expose a less effecient version which creates a Vec of references in the future.
1329 pub fn htlcs(&self) -> &Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1333 /// Trust our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1335 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1337 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
1338 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
1339 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction {
1340 TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self }
1343 /// Verify our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1345 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1347 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
1348 /// or using the built transaction.
1349 pub fn verify<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1350 // This is the only field of the key cache that we trust
1351 let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point;
1352 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx).unwrap();
1353 if keys != self.keys {
1356 let tx = self.internal_rebuild_transaction(&keys, channel_parameters, &broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey, &countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey)?;
1357 if self.built.transaction != tx.transaction || self.built.txid != tx.txid {
1360 Ok(TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self })
1364 /// A wrapper on CommitmentTransaction indicating that the derived fields (the built bitcoin
1365 /// transaction and the transaction creation keys) are trusted.
1367 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1369 /// This structure implements Deref.
1370 pub struct TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1371 inner: &'a CommitmentTransaction,
1374 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1375 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
1377 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1380 impl<'a> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1381 /// The transaction ID of the built Bitcoin transaction
1382 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
1383 self.inner.built.txid
1386 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1387 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1391 /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
1392 pub fn keys(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
1396 /// Should anchors be used.
1397 pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
1398 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
1401 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
1402 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
1404 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order.
1406 /// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses EcdsaSighashType::All.
1407 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
1408 let inner = self.inner;
1409 let keys = &inner.keys;
1410 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1411 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(inner.htlcs.len());
1412 let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
1414 for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() {
1415 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1416 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1418 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1420 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
1421 ret.push(sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
1426 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature.
1427 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_index: usize, counterparty_signature: &Signature, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Transaction {
1428 let inner = self.inner;
1429 let keys = &inner.keys;
1430 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1431 let this_htlc = &inner.htlcs[htlc_index];
1432 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1433 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
1434 if !this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
1435 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
1436 if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
1438 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1440 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1442 let sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
1444 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
1445 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1447 let mut cp_sig_ser = counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
1448 cp_sig_ser.push(sighashtype as u8);
1449 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig_ser);
1450 let mut holder_sig_ser = signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
1451 holder_sig_ser.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
1452 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig_ser);
1454 if this_htlc.offered {
1455 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
1456 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1458 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
1461 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
1466 /// Commitment transaction numbers which appear in the transactions themselves are XOR'd with a
1467 /// shared secret first. This prevents on-chain observers from discovering how many commitment
1468 /// transactions occurred in a channel before it was closed.
1470 /// This function gets the shared secret from relevant channel public keys and can be used to
1471 /// "decrypt" the commitment transaction number given a commitment transaction on-chain.
1472 pub fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1473 broadcaster_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1474 countersignatory_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1475 outbound_from_broadcaster: bool,
1477 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1479 if outbound_from_broadcaster {
1480 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1481 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1483 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1484 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1486 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
1488 ((res[26] as u64) << 5 * 8)
1489 | ((res[27] as u64) << 4 * 8)
1490 | ((res[28] as u64) << 3 * 8)
1491 | ((res[29] as u64) << 2 * 8)
1492 | ((res[30] as u64) << 1 * 8)
1493 | ((res[31] as u64) << 0 * 8)
1496 fn get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
1497 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1498 .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&key.serialize())[..])
1504 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
1507 use ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
1508 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Secp256k1};
1509 use util::test_utils;
1510 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, BaseSign};
1511 use bitcoin::Network;
1512 use ln::PaymentHash;
1513 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
1517 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1519 let seed = [42; 32];
1520 let network = Network::Testnet;
1521 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
1522 let signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
1523 let counterparty_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
1524 let delayed_payment_base = &signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1525 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1526 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
1527 let htlc_basepoint = &signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1528 let holder_pubkeys = signer.pubkeys();
1529 let counterparty_pubkeys = counterparty_signer.pubkeys();
1530 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1531 let mut channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
1532 holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.clone(),
1533 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
1534 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1535 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
1536 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: 0 }),
1540 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
1542 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs
1543 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1546 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1547 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1549 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1551 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1552 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point));
1554 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs as well as two anchors
1555 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1558 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1559 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1561 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1563 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 4);
1564 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh());
1566 // Generate broadcaster output and anchor
1567 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1570 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1571 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1573 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1575 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1577 // Generate counterparty output and anchor
1578 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1581 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1582 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1584 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1586 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1588 let received_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1590 amount_msat: 400000,
1592 payment_hash: PaymentHash([42; 32]),
1593 transaction_output_index: None,
1596 let offered_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1598 amount_msat: 600000,
1600 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
1601 transaction_output_index: None,
1604 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, w/o anchors
1605 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1608 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1609 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1611 &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
1612 &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1614 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 3);
1615 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[0].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1616 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1617 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1618 "002085cf52e41ba7c099a39df504e7b61f6de122971ceb53b06731876eaeb85e8dc5");
1619 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1620 "002049f0736bb335c61a04d2623a24df878a7592a3c51fa7258d41b2c85318265e73");
1622 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, with anchors
1623 channel_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
1624 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1627 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1628 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1630 &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
1631 &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1633 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 5);
1634 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[2].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1635 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1636 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1637 "002067114123af3f95405bae4fd930fc95de03e3c86baaee8b2dd29b43dd26cf613c");
1638 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1639 "0020a06e3b0d4fcf704f2b9c41e16a70099e39989466c3142b8573a1154542f28f57");
1643 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1644 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1645 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1648 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1650 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1651 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1652 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1655 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1656 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
1661 // insert_secret correct sequence
1662 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1665 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1666 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1667 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1670 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1671 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1672 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1675 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1676 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1677 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1680 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1681 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1682 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1685 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1686 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1687 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1690 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1691 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1692 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1695 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1696 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1697 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1700 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1701 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1702 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1707 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1708 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1711 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1712 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1713 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1716 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1717 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1718 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1722 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1723 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1726 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1727 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1728 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1731 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1732 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1733 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1736 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1737 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1738 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1741 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1742 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1743 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1747 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1748 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1751 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1752 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1753 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1756 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1757 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1758 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1761 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1762 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1763 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1766 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1767 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1768 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1772 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1773 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1776 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1777 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1778 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1781 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1782 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1783 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1786 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1787 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1788 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1791 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1792 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1793 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1796 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1797 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1798 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1801 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1802 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1803 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1806 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1807 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1808 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1811 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1812 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1813 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1817 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1818 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1821 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1822 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1823 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1826 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1827 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1828 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1831 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1832 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1833 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1836 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1837 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1838 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1841 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1842 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1843 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1846 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1847 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1848 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1852 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1853 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1856 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1857 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1858 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1861 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1862 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1863 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1866 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1867 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1868 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1871 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1872 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1873 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1876 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1877 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1878 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1881 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1882 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1883 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1886 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1887 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1888 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1891 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1892 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1893 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1897 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1898 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1901 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1902 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1903 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1906 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1907 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1908 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1911 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1912 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1913 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1916 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1917 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1918 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1921 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1922 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1923 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1926 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1927 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1928 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1931 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1932 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1933 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1936 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1937 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1938 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1942 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1943 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1946 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1947 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1948 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1951 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1952 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1953 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1956 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1957 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1958 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1961 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1962 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1963 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1966 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1967 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1968 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1971 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1972 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1973 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1976 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1977 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1978 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1981 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1982 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1983 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());