1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
11 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::Sign message signing by hand.
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
16 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
23 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
24 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
25 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, MAX_BUF_SIZE};
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Message};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
37 use ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
42 // Maximum size of a serialized HTLCOutputInCommitment
43 pub(crate) const HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE: usize = 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5;
45 pub(crate) const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
47 // This checks that the buffer size is greater than the maximum possible size for serialized HTLCS
48 const _EXCESS_BUFFER_SIZE: usize = MAX_BUF_SIZE - MAX_HTLCS as usize * HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE;
50 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
51 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
54 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
60 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
61 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
62 if witness_script_len == 133 {
63 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
64 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
65 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
72 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
73 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
75 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
76 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
77 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
80 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
81 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
82 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
88 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
89 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
91 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
94 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
95 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
98 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
99 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
100 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
101 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
109 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
110 pub(crate) fn new() -> Self {
111 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
115 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
117 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
124 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
125 //TODO This can be optimized?
126 let mut min = 1 << 48;
127 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
136 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
137 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
139 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
140 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
141 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
142 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
148 pub(crate) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
149 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
151 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
152 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
156 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
159 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
163 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
164 pub(crate) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
165 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
166 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
167 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
170 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
175 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
176 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
177 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
178 writer.write_all(secret)?;
179 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
181 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {});
185 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
186 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
188 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
189 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
190 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
192 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
193 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
197 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
198 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
200 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
201 /// generated (ie our own).
202 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
203 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
204 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
205 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
206 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
208 let mut key = base_secret.clone();
209 key.add_assign(&res)?;
213 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
214 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
215 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
217 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
218 /// generated (ie our own).
219 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
220 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
221 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
222 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
223 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
225 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
226 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
229 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
231 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
232 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
233 /// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
234 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
236 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
237 /// generated (ie our own).
238 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
239 let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
240 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
242 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
243 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
244 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
245 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
247 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
249 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
250 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
251 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
252 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
254 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
257 let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone();
258 countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
259 let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone();
260 broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
261 countersignatory_contrib.add_assign(&broadcaster_contrib[..])?;
262 Ok(countersignatory_contrib)
265 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
266 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
267 /// public key instead of private keys.
269 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
270 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
271 /// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
272 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
274 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
275 /// generated (ie our own).
276 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
277 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
278 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
279 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
280 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
282 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
284 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
285 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
286 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
287 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
289 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
292 let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone();
293 countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
294 let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone();
295 broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
296 countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
299 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
300 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
302 /// A broadcaster key is provided from potential broadcaster of the computed transaction.
303 /// A countersignatory key is coming from a protocol participant unable to broadcast the
306 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
307 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
308 /// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the
309 /// pre-calculated keys.
310 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
311 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
312 /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
313 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
314 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
315 /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
317 pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
318 /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
319 pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey,
320 /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
321 pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
322 /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
323 pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
326 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(TxCreationKeys, {
327 (0, per_commitment_point),
329 (4, broadcaster_htlc_key),
330 (6, countersignatory_htlc_key),
331 (8, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key),
334 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
335 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
336 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
337 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
338 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
339 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
340 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
341 /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
342 /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
344 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
345 /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
346 /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
347 /// static across every commitment transaction.
348 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
349 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
350 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
351 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
352 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
353 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
354 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
355 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
358 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelPublicKeys, {
360 (2, revocation_basepoint),
362 (6, delayed_payment_basepoint),
366 impl TxCreationKeys {
367 /// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point.
368 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
369 pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
371 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
372 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
373 broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
374 countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
375 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
379 /// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys.
380 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
381 pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
382 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(
384 &per_commitment_point,
385 &broadcaster_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
386 &broadcaster_keys.htlc_basepoint,
387 &countersignatory_keys.revocation_basepoint,
388 &countersignatory_keys.htlc_basepoint,
393 /// The maximum length of a script returned by get_revokeable_redeemscript.
394 // Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 2 bytes for contest_delay, and two public
395 // keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push).
396 pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 3 + 34*2;
398 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
399 /// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
400 /// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
401 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
402 let res = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
403 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
404 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
405 .push_int(contest_delay as i64)
406 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
407 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
408 .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
409 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
410 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
412 debug_assert!(res.len() <= REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH);
416 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
417 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
418 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
419 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
420 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
421 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
422 /// the counterparty or our own.
424 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
425 /// this divided by 1000.
426 pub amount_msat: u64,
427 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
428 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
429 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
430 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
431 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
432 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
433 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
434 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
437 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, {
443 (8, transaction_output_index)
447 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
448 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
450 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
451 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
452 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
453 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
454 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
455 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
456 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
457 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
458 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
459 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
461 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
462 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
463 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
465 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
466 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
468 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
469 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
470 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
471 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
472 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
473 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
474 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
475 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
478 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
479 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
480 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
481 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
482 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
483 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
484 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
485 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
486 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
487 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
489 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
490 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
491 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
492 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
493 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
495 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
496 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
498 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
499 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
500 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
501 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
502 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
503 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
504 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
505 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
506 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
511 /// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
512 /// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
514 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
515 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
518 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
519 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
520 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script {
521 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
522 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
524 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
525 if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
526 builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
527 .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
529 builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
530 .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
531 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
534 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
535 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
536 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
538 previous_output: OutPoint {
539 txid: prev_hash.clone(),
540 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
542 script_sig: Script::new(),
547 let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
548 feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
550 feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
553 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
555 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
556 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
561 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
567 /// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction).
568 /// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty.
570 /// Normally, this is converted to the broadcaster/countersignatory-organized DirectedChannelTransactionParameters
571 /// before use, via the as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
573 pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters {
574 /// Holder public keys
575 pub holder_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
576 /// The contest delay selected by the holder, which applies to counterparty-broadcast transactions
577 pub holder_selected_contest_delay: u16,
578 /// Whether the holder is the initiator of this channel.
579 /// This is an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
580 pub is_outbound_from_holder: bool,
581 /// The late-bound counterparty channel transaction parameters.
582 /// These parameters are populated at the point in the protocol where the counterparty provides them.
583 pub counterparty_parameters: Option<CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters>,
584 /// The late-bound funding outpoint
585 pub funding_outpoint: Option<chain::transaction::OutPoint>,
588 /// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
590 pub struct CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
591 /// Counter-party public keys
592 pub pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
593 /// The contest delay selected by the counterparty, which applies to holder-broadcast transactions
594 pub selected_contest_delay: u16,
597 impl ChannelTransactionParameters {
598 /// Whether the late bound parameters are populated.
599 pub fn is_populated(&self) -> bool {
600 self.counterparty_parameters.is_some() && self.funding_outpoint.is_some()
603 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
604 /// given that the holder is the broadcaster.
606 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
607 pub fn as_holder_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
608 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_holder_broadcastable");
609 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
611 holder_is_broadcaster: true
615 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
616 /// given that the counterparty is the broadcaster.
618 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
619 pub fn as_counterparty_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
620 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_counterparty_broadcastable");
621 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
623 holder_is_broadcaster: false
628 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, {
630 (2, selected_contest_delay),
633 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelTransactionParameters, {
635 (2, holder_selected_contest_delay),
636 (4, is_outbound_from_holder),
638 (6, counterparty_parameters),
639 (8, funding_outpoint),
642 /// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by
643 /// broadcaster/countersignatory.
645 /// This is derived from the holder/counterparty-organized ChannelTransactionParameters via the
646 /// as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
647 pub struct DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
648 /// The holder's channel static parameters
649 inner: &'a ChannelTransactionParameters,
650 /// Whether the holder is the broadcaster
651 holder_is_broadcaster: bool,
654 impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
655 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the broadcaster
656 pub fn broadcaster_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
657 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
658 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
660 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
664 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the countersignatory
665 pub fn countersignatory_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
666 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
667 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
669 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
673 /// Get the contest delay applicable to the transactions.
674 /// Note that the contest delay was selected by the countersignatory.
675 pub fn contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
676 let counterparty_parameters = self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
677 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { counterparty_parameters.selected_contest_delay } else { self.inner.holder_selected_contest_delay }
680 /// Whether the channel is outbound from the broadcaster.
682 /// The boolean representing the side that initiated the channel is
683 /// an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
684 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
685 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder } else { !self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder }
688 /// The funding outpoint
689 pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
690 self.inner.funding_outpoint.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint()
694 /// Information needed to build and sign a holder's commitment transaction.
696 /// The transaction is only signed once we are ready to broadcast.
698 pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
699 inner: CommitmentTransaction,
700 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction
701 pub counterparty_sig: Signature,
702 /// All non-dust counterparty HTLC signatures, in the order they appear in the transaction
703 pub counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>,
704 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
705 // The user should be able to reconstruct this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
706 holder_sig_first: bool,
709 impl Deref for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
710 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
712 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.inner }
715 impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
716 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
717 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
718 self.inner == o.inner
722 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderCommitmentTransaction, {
724 (2, counterparty_sig),
725 (4, holder_sig_first),
727 (6, counterparty_htlc_sigs),
730 impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
732 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
733 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
734 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
735 let dummy_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
737 let keys = TxCreationKeys {
738 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
739 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
740 broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
741 countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
742 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
744 let channel_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
745 funding_pubkey: dummy_key.clone(),
746 revocation_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
747 payment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
748 delayed_payment_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
749 htlc_basepoint: dummy_key.clone()
751 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
752 holder_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(),
753 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
754 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
755 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
756 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: 0 })
758 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
759 let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, keys, 0, &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
760 HolderCommitmentTransaction {
762 counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
763 counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec::new(),
764 holder_sig_first: false
768 /// Create a new holder transaction with the given counterparty signatures.
769 /// The funding keys are used to figure out which signature should go first when building the transaction for broadcast.
770 pub fn new(commitment_tx: CommitmentTransaction, counterparty_sig: Signature, counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>, holder_funding_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Self {
772 inner: commitment_tx,
774 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
775 holder_sig_first: holder_funding_key.serialize()[..] < counterparty_funding_key.serialize()[..],
779 pub(crate) fn add_holder_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, holder_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
780 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
781 let mut tx = self.inner.built.transaction.clone();
782 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
784 if self.holder_sig_first {
785 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
786 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
788 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
789 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
791 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
792 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
794 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
799 /// A pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction and its txid.
801 pub struct BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
802 /// The commitment transaction
803 pub transaction: Transaction,
804 /// The txid for the commitment transaction.
806 /// This is provided as a performance optimization, instead of calling transaction.txid()
811 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BuiltCommitmentTransaction, {
816 impl BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
817 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
819 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
820 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
821 let sighash = &bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.transaction).signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..];
822 hash_to_message!(sighash)
825 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
826 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
827 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
828 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
829 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
833 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a commitment transaction and to
834 /// actually build it and sign. It is used for holder transactions that we sign only when needed
835 /// and for transactions we sign for the counterparty.
837 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
840 pub struct CommitmentTransaction {
841 commitment_number: u64,
842 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64,
843 to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64,
845 htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
846 // A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust()
847 keys: TxCreationKeys,
848 // For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust()
849 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction,
852 impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction {
853 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
854 let eq = self.commitment_number == o.commitment_number &&
855 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat == o.to_broadcaster_value_sat &&
856 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat == o.to_countersignatory_value_sat &&
857 self.feerate_per_kw == o.feerate_per_kw &&
858 self.htlcs == o.htlcs &&
861 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.transaction, o.built.transaction);
862 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.txid, o.built.txid);
868 /// (C-not exported) as users never need to call this directly
869 impl Writeable for Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
871 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
872 (self.len() as u16).write(w)?;
873 for e in self.iter() {
880 /// (C-not exported) as users never need to call this directly
881 impl Readable for Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
883 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
884 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
885 let byte_size = (len as usize)
886 .checked_mul(HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE)
887 .ok_or(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor)?;
888 if byte_size > MAX_BUF_SIZE {
889 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
891 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(len as usize);
892 for _ in 0..len { ret.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment::read(r)?); }
897 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CommitmentTransaction, {
898 (0, commitment_number),
899 (2, to_broadcaster_value_sat),
900 (4, to_countersignatory_value_sat),
907 impl CommitmentTransaction {
908 /// Construct an object of the class while assigning transaction output indices to HTLCs.
910 /// Populates HTLCOutputInCommitment.transaction_output_index in htlcs_with_aux.
912 /// The generic T allows the caller to match the HTLC output index with auxiliary data.
913 /// This auxiliary data is not stored in this object.
915 /// Only include HTLCs that are above the dust limit for the channel.
917 /// (C-not exported) due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
918 pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
919 // Sort outputs and populate output indices while keeping track of the auxiliary data
920 let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters).unwrap();
922 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(commitment_number, channel_parameters);
923 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
924 let txid = transaction.txid();
925 CommitmentTransaction {
927 to_broadcaster_value_sat,
928 to_countersignatory_value_sat,
932 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
939 fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> Result<BuiltCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
940 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters);
942 let mut htlcs_with_aux = self.htlcs.iter().map(|h| (h.clone(), ())).collect();
943 let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters)?;
945 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
946 let txid = transaction.txid();
947 let built_transaction = BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
951 Ok(built_transaction)
954 fn make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number: u64, txins: Vec<TxIn>, outputs: Vec<TxOut>) -> Transaction {
957 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
963 // This is used in two cases:
964 // - initial sorting of outputs / HTLCs in the constructor, in which case T is auxiliary data the
965 // caller needs to have sorted together with the HTLCs so it can keep track of the output index
966 // - building of a bitcoin transaction during a verify() call, in which case T is just ()
967 fn internal_build_outputs<T>(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> Result<(Vec<TxOut>, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), ()> {
968 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
969 let contest_delay = channel_parameters.contest_delay();
971 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<&mut HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::new();
973 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 {
974 let script = script_for_p2wpkh(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point);
977 script_pubkey: script.clone(),
978 value: to_countersignatory_value_sat,
984 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 {
985 let redeem_script = get_revokeable_redeemscript(
986 &keys.revocation_key,
988 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
992 script_pubkey: redeem_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
993 value: to_broadcaster_value_sat,
999 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_with_aux.len());
1000 for (htlc, _) in htlcs_with_aux {
1001 let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
1003 script_pubkey: script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1004 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1006 txouts.push((txout, Some(htlc)));
1009 // Sort output in BIP-69 order (amount, scriptPubkey). Tie-breaks based on HTLC
1010 // CLTV expiration height.
1011 sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
1012 if let &Some(ref a_htlcout) = a {
1013 if let &Some(ref b_htlcout) = b {
1014 a_htlcout.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlcout.cltv_expiry)
1015 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
1016 // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
1018 .then(a_htlcout.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlcout.payment_hash.0))
1019 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1020 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1021 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1022 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1025 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1026 for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1027 if let Some(htlc) = out.1 {
1028 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1029 htlcs.push(htlc.clone());
1031 outputs.push(out.0);
1033 Ok((outputs, htlcs))
1036 fn internal_build_inputs(commitment_number: u64, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> (u64, Vec<TxIn>) {
1037 let broadcaster_pubkeys = channel_parameters.broadcaster_pubkeys();
1038 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1039 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1040 &broadcaster_pubkeys.payment_point,
1041 &countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point,
1042 channel_parameters.is_outbound(),
1045 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number =
1046 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
1049 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1051 previous_output: channel_parameters.funding_outpoint(),
1052 script_sig: Script::new(),
1053 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
1054 | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32),
1055 witness: Vec::new(),
1059 (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins)
1062 /// The backwards-counting commitment number
1063 pub fn commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1064 self.commitment_number
1067 /// The value to be sent to the broadcaster
1068 pub fn to_broadcaster_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1069 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat
1072 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty
1073 pub fn to_countersignatory_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1074 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat
1077 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction.
1078 pub fn feerate_per_kw(&self) -> u32 {
1082 /// The non-dust HTLCs (direction, amt, height expiration, hash, transaction output index)
1083 /// which were included in this commitment transaction in output order.
1084 /// The transaction index is always populated.
1086 /// (C-not exported) as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should
1087 /// expose a less effecient version which creates a Vec of references in the future.
1088 pub fn htlcs(&self) -> &Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1092 /// Trust our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1094 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1096 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
1097 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
1098 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction {
1099 TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self }
1102 /// Verify our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1104 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1106 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
1107 /// or using the built transaction.
1108 pub fn verify<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1109 // This is the only field of the key cache that we trust
1110 let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point;
1111 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx).unwrap();
1112 if keys != self.keys {
1115 let tx = self.internal_rebuild_transaction(&keys, channel_parameters)?;
1116 if self.built.transaction != tx.transaction || self.built.txid != tx.txid {
1119 Ok(TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self })
1123 /// A wrapper on CommitmentTransaction indicating that the derived fields (the built bitcoin
1124 /// transaction and the transaction creation keys) are trusted.
1126 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1128 /// This structure implements Deref.
1129 pub struct TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1130 inner: &'a CommitmentTransaction,
1133 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1134 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
1136 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1139 impl<'a> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1140 /// The transaction ID of the built Bitcoin transaction
1141 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
1142 self.inner.built.txid
1145 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1146 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1150 /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
1151 pub fn keys(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
1155 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
1156 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
1158 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order.
1159 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
1160 let inner = self.inner;
1161 let keys = &inner.keys;
1162 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1163 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(inner.htlcs.len());
1164 let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
1166 for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() {
1167 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1168 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1170 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1172 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
1173 ret.push(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
1178 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature.
1179 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_index: usize, counterparty_signature: &Signature, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Transaction {
1180 let inner = self.inner;
1181 let keys = &inner.keys;
1182 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1183 let this_htlc = &inner.htlcs[htlc_index];
1184 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1185 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
1186 if !this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
1187 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
1188 if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
1190 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1192 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1194 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
1195 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1197 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
1198 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
1199 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1200 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1202 if this_htlc.offered {
1203 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
1204 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1206 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
1209 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
1214 /// Get the transaction number obscure factor
1215 pub fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1216 broadcaster_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1217 countersignatory_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1218 outbound_from_broadcaster: bool,
1220 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1222 if outbound_from_broadcaster {
1223 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1224 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1226 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1227 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1229 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
1231 ((res[26] as u64) << 5 * 8)
1232 | ((res[27] as u64) << 4 * 8)
1233 | ((res[28] as u64) << 3 * 8)
1234 | ((res[29] as u64) << 2 * 8)
1235 | ((res[30] as u64) << 1 * 8)
1236 | ((res[31] as u64) << 0 * 8)
1239 fn script_for_p2wpkh(key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
1240 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1241 .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&key.serialize())[..])
1247 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
1251 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1252 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1253 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1256 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1258 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1259 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1260 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1263 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1264 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
1269 // insert_secret correct sequence
1270 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1273 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1274 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1275 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1278 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1279 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1280 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1283 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1284 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1285 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1288 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1289 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1290 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1293 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1294 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1295 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1298 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1299 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1300 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1303 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1304 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1305 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1308 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1309 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1310 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1315 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1316 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1319 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1320 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1321 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1324 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1325 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1326 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1330 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1331 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1334 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1335 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1336 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1339 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1340 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1341 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1344 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1345 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1346 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1349 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1350 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1351 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1355 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1356 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1359 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1360 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1361 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1364 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1365 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1366 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1369 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1370 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1371 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1374 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1375 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1376 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1380 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1381 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1384 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1385 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1386 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1389 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1390 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1391 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1394 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1395 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1396 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1399 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1400 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1401 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1404 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1405 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1406 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1409 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1410 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1411 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1414 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1415 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1416 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1419 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1420 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1421 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1425 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1426 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1429 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1430 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1431 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1434 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1435 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1436 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1439 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1440 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1441 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1444 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1445 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1446 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1449 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1450 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1451 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1454 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1455 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1456 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1460 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1461 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1464 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1465 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1466 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1469 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1470 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1471 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1474 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1475 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1476 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1479 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1480 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1481 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1484 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1485 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1486 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1489 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1490 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1491 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1494 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1495 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1496 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1499 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1500 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1501 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1505 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1506 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1509 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1510 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1511 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1514 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1515 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1516 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1519 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1520 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1521 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1524 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1525 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1526 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1529 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1530 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1531 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1534 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1535 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1536 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1539 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1540 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1541 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1544 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1545 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1546 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1550 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1551 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1554 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1555 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1556 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1559 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1560 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1561 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1564 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1565 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1566 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1569 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1570 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1571 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1574 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1575 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1576 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1579 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1580 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1581 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1584 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1585 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1586 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1589 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1590 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1591 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());