1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
11 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::Sign message signing by hand.
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
16 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
23 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
24 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
25 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
26 use util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Message};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
38 use util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
39 use ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI};
43 pub(crate) const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
45 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction.
47 pub fn htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
48 const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
49 const HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 706;
50 if opt_anchors { HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT }
53 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
55 pub fn htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
56 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
57 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 666;
58 if opt_anchors { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT }
62 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
68 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
69 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
70 if witness_script_len == 133 {
71 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
72 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
73 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
80 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
81 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
83 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
84 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
85 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
88 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
89 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
90 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
96 /// Build a closing transaction
97 pub fn build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat: u64, to_counterparty_value_sat: u64, to_holder_script: Script, to_counterparty_script: Script, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Transaction {
99 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
101 previous_output: funding_outpoint,
102 script_sig: Script::new(),
103 sequence: 0xffffffff,
109 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
111 if to_counterparty_value_sat > 0 {
113 script_pubkey: to_counterparty_script,
114 value: to_counterparty_value_sat
118 if to_holder_value_sat > 0 {
120 script_pubkey: to_holder_script,
121 value: to_holder_value_sat
125 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
127 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
128 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
140 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
141 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
143 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of our counterparty in just 50*32 bytes
146 pub struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
147 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
150 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
151 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
152 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
153 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
161 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
162 /// Creates a new empty `CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets` structure.
163 pub fn new() -> Self {
164 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
168 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
170 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
177 /// Returns the minimum index of all stored secrets. Note that indexes start
178 /// at 1 << 48 and get decremented by one for each new secret.
179 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
180 //TODO This can be optimized?
181 let mut min = 1 << 48;
182 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
191 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
192 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
194 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
195 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
196 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
197 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
203 /// Inserts the `secret` at `idx`. Returns `Ok(())` if the secret
204 /// was generated in accordance with BOLT 3 and is consistent with previous secrets.
205 pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
206 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
208 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
209 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
213 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
216 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
220 /// Returns the secret at `idx`.
221 /// Returns `None` if `idx` is < [`CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::get_min_seen_secret`].
222 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
223 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
224 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
225 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
228 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
233 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
234 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
235 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
236 writer.write_all(secret)?;
237 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
239 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
243 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
244 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
245 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
246 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
247 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
248 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
250 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
251 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
255 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
256 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
258 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
259 /// generated (ie our own).
260 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
261 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
262 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
263 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
264 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
266 let mut key = base_secret.clone();
267 key.add_assign(&res)?;
271 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
272 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
273 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
275 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
276 /// generated (ie our own).
277 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
278 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
279 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
280 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
281 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
283 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
284 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
287 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
289 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
290 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
291 /// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
292 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
294 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
295 /// generated (ie our own).
296 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
297 let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
298 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
300 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
301 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
302 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
303 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
305 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
307 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
308 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
309 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
310 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
312 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
315 let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone();
316 countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
317 let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone();
318 broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
319 countersignatory_contrib.add_assign(&broadcaster_contrib[..])?;
320 Ok(countersignatory_contrib)
323 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
324 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
325 /// public key instead of private keys.
327 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
328 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
329 /// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
330 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
332 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
333 /// generated (ie our own).
334 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
335 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
336 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
337 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
338 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
340 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
342 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
343 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
344 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
345 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
347 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
350 let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone();
351 countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
352 let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone();
353 broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
354 countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
357 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
358 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
360 /// A broadcaster key is provided from potential broadcaster of the computed transaction.
361 /// A countersignatory key is coming from a protocol participant unable to broadcast the
364 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
365 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
366 /// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the
367 /// pre-calculated keys.
368 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
369 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
370 /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
371 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
372 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
373 /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
375 pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
376 /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
377 pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey,
378 /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
379 pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
380 /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
381 pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
384 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(TxCreationKeys, {
385 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
386 (2, revocation_key, required),
387 (4, broadcaster_htlc_key, required),
388 (6, countersignatory_htlc_key, required),
389 (8, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, required),
392 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
393 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
394 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
395 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
396 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
397 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
398 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
399 /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
400 /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
402 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
403 /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
404 /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
405 /// static across every commitment transaction.
406 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
407 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
408 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
409 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
410 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
411 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
412 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
413 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
416 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelPublicKeys, {
417 (0, funding_pubkey, required),
418 (2, revocation_basepoint, required),
419 (4, payment_point, required),
420 (6, delayed_payment_basepoint, required),
421 (8, htlc_basepoint, required),
424 impl TxCreationKeys {
425 /// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point.
426 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
427 pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
429 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
430 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
431 broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
432 countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
433 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
437 /// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys.
438 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
439 pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
440 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(
442 &per_commitment_point,
443 &broadcaster_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
444 &broadcaster_keys.htlc_basepoint,
445 &countersignatory_keys.revocation_basepoint,
446 &countersignatory_keys.htlc_basepoint,
451 /// The maximum length of a script returned by get_revokeable_redeemscript.
452 // Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 2 bytes for contest_delay, and two public
453 // keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push).
454 pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 3 + 34*2;
456 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
457 /// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
458 /// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
459 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
460 let res = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
461 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
462 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
463 .push_int(contest_delay as i64)
464 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
465 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
466 .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
467 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
468 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
470 debug_assert!(res.len() <= REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH);
474 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
475 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
476 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
477 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
478 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
479 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
480 /// the counterparty or our own.
482 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
483 /// this divided by 1000.
484 pub amount_msat: u64,
485 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
486 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
487 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
488 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
489 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
490 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
491 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
492 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
495 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, {
496 (0, offered, required),
497 (2, amount_msat, required),
498 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
499 (6, payment_hash, required),
500 (8, transaction_output_index, option),
504 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
505 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
507 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
508 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
509 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
510 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
511 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
512 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
513 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
514 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
515 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
516 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
518 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
519 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
520 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
522 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
523 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
525 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
526 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
527 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
528 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
529 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
530 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
531 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
533 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
534 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
535 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
537 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
540 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
541 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
542 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
543 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
544 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
545 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
546 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
547 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
548 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
549 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
551 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
552 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
553 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
554 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
555 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
557 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
558 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
560 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
561 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
562 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
563 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
564 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
565 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
566 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
567 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
569 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
570 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
571 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
573 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
578 /// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
579 /// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
581 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
582 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
585 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
586 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
587 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script {
588 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
589 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
591 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
592 if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
593 builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
594 .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
596 builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
597 .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
598 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
601 /// Builds an unsigned HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction from the given channel and HTLC
602 /// parameters. This is used by [`TrustedCommitmentTransaction::get_htlc_sigs`] to fetch the
603 /// transaction which needs signing, and can be used to construct an HTLC transaction which is
604 /// broadcastable given a counterparty HTLC signature.
606 /// Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
607 /// commitment transaction).
608 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
609 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
611 previous_output: OutPoint {
612 txid: commitment_txid.clone(),
613 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
615 script_sig: Script::new(),
616 sequence: if opt_anchors { 1 } else { 0 },
620 let weight = if htlc.offered {
621 htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
623 htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
625 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * weight / 1000;
627 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
629 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
630 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
635 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
641 /// Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled.
643 pub(crate) fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> Script {
645 .push_slice(&payment_point.serialize()[..])
646 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY)
648 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
652 /// Gets the witnessScript for an anchor output from the funding public key.
653 /// The witness in the spending input must be:
654 /// <BIP 143 funding_signature>
655 /// After 16 blocks of confirmation, an alternative satisfying witness could be:
657 /// (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule)
659 pub fn get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Script {
660 Builder::new().push_slice(&funding_pubkey.serialize()[..])
661 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
662 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IFDUP)
663 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
665 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
666 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
670 /// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction).
671 /// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty.
673 /// Normally, this is converted to the broadcaster/countersignatory-organized DirectedChannelTransactionParameters
674 /// before use, via the as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
676 pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters {
677 /// Holder public keys
678 pub holder_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
679 /// The contest delay selected by the holder, which applies to counterparty-broadcast transactions
680 pub holder_selected_contest_delay: u16,
681 /// Whether the holder is the initiator of this channel.
682 /// This is an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
683 pub is_outbound_from_holder: bool,
684 /// The late-bound counterparty channel transaction parameters.
685 /// These parameters are populated at the point in the protocol where the counterparty provides them.
686 pub counterparty_parameters: Option<CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters>,
687 /// The late-bound funding outpoint
688 pub funding_outpoint: Option<chain::transaction::OutPoint>,
689 /// Are anchors used for this channel. Boolean is serialization backwards-compatible
690 pub opt_anchors: Option<()>
693 /// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
695 pub struct CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
696 /// Counter-party public keys
697 pub pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
698 /// The contest delay selected by the counterparty, which applies to holder-broadcast transactions
699 pub selected_contest_delay: u16,
702 impl ChannelTransactionParameters {
703 /// Whether the late bound parameters are populated.
704 pub fn is_populated(&self) -> bool {
705 self.counterparty_parameters.is_some() && self.funding_outpoint.is_some()
708 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
709 /// given that the holder is the broadcaster.
711 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
712 pub fn as_holder_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
713 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_holder_broadcastable");
714 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
716 holder_is_broadcaster: true
720 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
721 /// given that the counterparty is the broadcaster.
723 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
724 pub fn as_counterparty_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
725 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_counterparty_broadcastable");
726 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
728 holder_is_broadcaster: false
733 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, {
734 (0, pubkeys, required),
735 (2, selected_contest_delay, required),
738 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelTransactionParameters, {
739 (0, holder_pubkeys, required),
740 (2, holder_selected_contest_delay, required),
741 (4, is_outbound_from_holder, required),
742 (6, counterparty_parameters, option),
743 (8, funding_outpoint, option),
744 (10, opt_anchors, option),
747 /// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by
748 /// broadcaster/countersignatory.
750 /// This is derived from the holder/counterparty-organized ChannelTransactionParameters via the
751 /// as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
752 pub struct DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
753 /// The holder's channel static parameters
754 inner: &'a ChannelTransactionParameters,
755 /// Whether the holder is the broadcaster
756 holder_is_broadcaster: bool,
759 impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
760 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the broadcaster
761 pub fn broadcaster_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
762 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
763 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
765 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
769 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the countersignatory
770 pub fn countersignatory_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
771 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
772 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
774 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
778 /// Get the contest delay applicable to the transactions.
779 /// Note that the contest delay was selected by the countersignatory.
780 pub fn contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
781 let counterparty_parameters = self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
782 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { counterparty_parameters.selected_contest_delay } else { self.inner.holder_selected_contest_delay }
785 /// Whether the channel is outbound from the broadcaster.
787 /// The boolean representing the side that initiated the channel is
788 /// an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
789 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
790 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder } else { !self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder }
793 /// The funding outpoint
794 pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
795 self.inner.funding_outpoint.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint()
798 /// Whether to use anchors for this channel
799 pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
800 self.inner.opt_anchors.is_some()
804 /// Information needed to build and sign a holder's commitment transaction.
806 /// The transaction is only signed once we are ready to broadcast.
808 pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
809 inner: CommitmentTransaction,
810 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction
811 pub counterparty_sig: Signature,
812 /// All non-dust counterparty HTLC signatures, in the order they appear in the transaction
813 pub counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>,
814 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
815 // The user should be able to reconstruct this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
816 holder_sig_first: bool,
819 impl Deref for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
820 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
822 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.inner }
825 impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
826 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
827 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
828 self.inner == o.inner
832 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderCommitmentTransaction, {
833 (0, inner, required),
834 (2, counterparty_sig, required),
835 (4, holder_sig_first, required),
836 (6, counterparty_htlc_sigs, vec_type),
839 impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
841 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
842 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
843 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
844 let dummy_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
846 let keys = TxCreationKeys {
847 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
848 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
849 broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
850 countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
851 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
853 let channel_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
854 funding_pubkey: dummy_key.clone(),
855 revocation_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
856 payment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
857 delayed_payment_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
858 htlc_basepoint: dummy_key.clone()
860 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
861 holder_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(),
862 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
863 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
864 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
865 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: 0 }),
868 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
869 let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, false, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
870 HolderCommitmentTransaction {
872 counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
873 counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec::new(),
874 holder_sig_first: false
878 /// Create a new holder transaction with the given counterparty signatures.
879 /// The funding keys are used to figure out which signature should go first when building the transaction for broadcast.
880 pub fn new(commitment_tx: CommitmentTransaction, counterparty_sig: Signature, counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>, holder_funding_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Self {
882 inner: commitment_tx,
884 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
885 holder_sig_first: holder_funding_key.serialize()[..] < counterparty_funding_key.serialize()[..],
889 pub(crate) fn add_holder_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, holder_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
890 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
891 let mut tx = self.inner.built.transaction.clone();
892 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
894 if self.holder_sig_first {
895 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
896 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
898 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
899 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
901 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
902 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
904 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
909 /// A pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction and its txid.
911 pub struct BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
912 /// The commitment transaction
913 pub transaction: Transaction,
914 /// The txid for the commitment transaction.
916 /// This is provided as a performance optimization, instead of calling transaction.txid()
921 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BuiltCommitmentTransaction, {
922 (0, transaction, required),
926 impl BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
927 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
929 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
930 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
931 let sighash = &bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.transaction).signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..];
932 hash_to_message!(sighash)
935 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
936 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
937 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
938 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
939 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
943 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a closing transaction and will
944 /// actually build it and sign.
946 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
948 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq)]
949 pub struct ClosingTransaction {
950 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
951 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
952 to_holder_script: Script,
953 to_counterparty_script: Script,
957 impl ClosingTransaction {
958 /// Construct an object of the class
960 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
961 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
962 to_holder_script: Script,
963 to_counterparty_script: Script,
964 funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
966 let built = build_closing_transaction(
967 to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat,
968 to_holder_script.clone(), to_counterparty_script.clone(),
973 to_counterparty_value_sat,
975 to_counterparty_script,
980 /// Trust our pre-built transaction.
982 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
984 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
985 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
986 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedClosingTransaction {
987 TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self }
990 /// Verify our pre-built transaction.
992 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
994 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
995 /// or using the built transaction.
996 pub fn verify(&self, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Result<TrustedClosingTransaction, ()> {
997 let built = build_closing_transaction(
998 self.to_holder_value_sat, self.to_counterparty_value_sat,
999 self.to_holder_script.clone(), self.to_counterparty_script.clone(),
1002 if self.built != built {
1005 Ok(TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self })
1008 /// The value to be sent to the holder, or zero if the output will be omitted
1009 pub fn to_holder_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1010 self.to_holder_value_sat
1013 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty, or zero if the output will be omitted
1014 pub fn to_counterparty_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1015 self.to_counterparty_value_sat
1018 /// The destination of the holder's output
1019 pub fn to_holder_script(&self) -> &Script {
1020 &self.to_holder_script
1023 /// The destination of the counterparty's output
1024 pub fn to_counterparty_script(&self) -> &Script {
1025 &self.to_counterparty_script
1029 /// A wrapper on ClosingTransaction indicating that the built bitcoin
1030 /// transaction is trusted.
1032 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1034 /// This structure implements Deref.
1035 pub struct TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1036 inner: &'a ClosingTransaction,
1039 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1040 type Target = ClosingTransaction;
1042 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1045 impl<'a> TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1046 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1047 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &Transaction {
1051 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
1053 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
1054 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
1055 let sighash = &bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.inner.built).signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..];
1056 hash_to_message!(sighash)
1059 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
1060 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
1061 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
1062 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
1063 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
1067 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a commitment transaction and will
1068 /// actually build it and sign. It is used for holder transactions that we sign only when needed
1069 /// and for transactions we sign for the counterparty.
1071 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
1074 pub struct CommitmentTransaction {
1075 commitment_number: u64,
1076 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64,
1077 to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64,
1078 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1079 htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
1080 // A boolean that is serialization backwards-compatible
1081 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
1082 // A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust()
1083 keys: TxCreationKeys,
1084 // For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust()
1085 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction,
1088 impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction {
1089 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
1090 let eq = self.commitment_number == o.commitment_number &&
1091 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat == o.to_broadcaster_value_sat &&
1092 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat == o.to_countersignatory_value_sat &&
1093 self.feerate_per_kw == o.feerate_per_kw &&
1094 self.htlcs == o.htlcs &&
1095 self.opt_anchors == o.opt_anchors &&
1096 self.keys == o.keys;
1098 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.transaction, o.built.transaction);
1099 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.txid, o.built.txid);
1105 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CommitmentTransaction, {
1106 (0, commitment_number, required),
1107 (2, to_broadcaster_value_sat, required),
1108 (4, to_countersignatory_value_sat, required),
1109 (6, feerate_per_kw, required),
1110 (8, keys, required),
1111 (10, built, required),
1112 (12, htlcs, vec_type),
1113 (14, opt_anchors, option),
1116 impl CommitmentTransaction {
1117 /// Construct an object of the class while assigning transaction output indices to HTLCs.
1119 /// Populates HTLCOutputInCommitment.transaction_output_index in htlcs_with_aux.
1121 /// The generic T allows the caller to match the HTLC output index with auxiliary data.
1122 /// This auxiliary data is not stored in this object.
1124 /// Only include HTLCs that are above the dust limit for the channel.
1126 /// (C-not exported) due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
1127 pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
1128 // Sort outputs and populate output indices while keeping track of the auxiliary data
1129 let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, opt_anchors, &broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key).unwrap();
1131 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1132 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1133 let txid = transaction.txid();
1134 CommitmentTransaction {
1136 to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1137 to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1140 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1142 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1149 fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<BuiltCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1150 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1152 let mut htlcs_with_aux = self.htlcs.iter().map(|h| (h.clone(), ())).collect();
1153 let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, self.opt_anchors.is_some(), broadcaster_funding_key, countersignatory_funding_key)?;
1155 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1156 let txid = transaction.txid();
1157 let built_transaction = BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1161 Ok(built_transaction)
1164 fn make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number: u64, txins: Vec<TxIn>, outputs: Vec<TxOut>) -> Transaction {
1167 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
1173 // This is used in two cases:
1174 // - initial sorting of outputs / HTLCs in the constructor, in which case T is auxiliary data the
1175 // caller needs to have sorted together with the HTLCs so it can keep track of the output index
1176 // - building of a bitcoin transaction during a verify() call, in which case T is just ()
1177 fn internal_build_outputs<T>(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<(Vec<TxOut>, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), ()> {
1178 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1179 let contest_delay = channel_parameters.contest_delay();
1181 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<&mut HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::new();
1183 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 {
1184 let script = if opt_anchors {
1185 get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh()
1187 get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)
1191 script_pubkey: script.clone(),
1192 value: to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1198 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 {
1199 let redeem_script = get_revokeable_redeemscript(
1200 &keys.revocation_key,
1202 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1206 script_pubkey: redeem_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1207 value: to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1214 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1215 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(broadcaster_funding_key);
1218 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1219 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1225 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1226 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(countersignatory_funding_key);
1229 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1230 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1237 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_with_aux.len());
1238 for (htlc, _) in htlcs_with_aux {
1239 let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, opt_anchors, &keys);
1241 script_pubkey: script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1242 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1244 txouts.push((txout, Some(htlc)));
1247 // Sort output in BIP-69 order (amount, scriptPubkey). Tie-breaks based on HTLC
1248 // CLTV expiration height.
1249 sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
1250 if let &Some(ref a_htlcout) = a {
1251 if let &Some(ref b_htlcout) = b {
1252 a_htlcout.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlcout.cltv_expiry)
1253 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
1254 // here for fuzzing mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
1256 .then(a_htlcout.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlcout.payment_hash.0))
1257 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1258 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1259 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1260 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1263 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1264 for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1265 if let Some(htlc) = out.1 {
1266 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1267 htlcs.push(htlc.clone());
1269 outputs.push(out.0);
1271 Ok((outputs, htlcs))
1274 fn internal_build_inputs(commitment_number: u64, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> (u64, Vec<TxIn>) {
1275 let broadcaster_pubkeys = channel_parameters.broadcaster_pubkeys();
1276 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1277 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1278 &broadcaster_pubkeys.payment_point,
1279 &countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point,
1280 channel_parameters.is_outbound(),
1283 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number =
1284 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
1287 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1289 previous_output: channel_parameters.funding_outpoint(),
1290 script_sig: Script::new(),
1291 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
1292 | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32),
1293 witness: Vec::new(),
1297 (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins)
1300 /// The backwards-counting commitment number
1301 pub fn commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1302 self.commitment_number
1305 /// The value to be sent to the broadcaster
1306 pub fn to_broadcaster_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1307 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat
1310 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty
1311 pub fn to_countersignatory_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1312 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat
1315 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction.
1316 pub fn feerate_per_kw(&self) -> u32 {
1320 /// The non-dust HTLCs (direction, amt, height expiration, hash, transaction output index)
1321 /// which were included in this commitment transaction in output order.
1322 /// The transaction index is always populated.
1324 /// (C-not exported) as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should
1325 /// expose a less effecient version which creates a Vec of references in the future.
1326 pub fn htlcs(&self) -> &Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1330 /// Trust our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1332 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1334 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
1335 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
1336 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction {
1337 TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self }
1340 /// Verify our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1342 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1344 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
1345 /// or using the built transaction.
1346 pub fn verify<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1347 // This is the only field of the key cache that we trust
1348 let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point;
1349 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx).unwrap();
1350 if keys != self.keys {
1353 let tx = self.internal_rebuild_transaction(&keys, channel_parameters, &broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey, &countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey)?;
1354 if self.built.transaction != tx.transaction || self.built.txid != tx.txid {
1357 Ok(TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self })
1361 /// A wrapper on CommitmentTransaction indicating that the derived fields (the built bitcoin
1362 /// transaction and the transaction creation keys) are trusted.
1364 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1366 /// This structure implements Deref.
1367 pub struct TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1368 inner: &'a CommitmentTransaction,
1371 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1372 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
1374 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1377 impl<'a> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1378 /// The transaction ID of the built Bitcoin transaction
1379 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
1380 self.inner.built.txid
1383 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1384 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1388 /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
1389 pub fn keys(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
1393 /// Should anchors be used.
1394 pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
1395 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
1398 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
1399 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
1401 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order.
1403 /// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses SigHashType::All.
1404 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
1405 let inner = self.inner;
1406 let keys = &inner.keys;
1407 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1408 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(inner.htlcs.len());
1409 let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
1411 for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() {
1412 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1413 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1415 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1417 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
1418 ret.push(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
1423 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature.
1424 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_index: usize, counterparty_signature: &Signature, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Transaction {
1425 let inner = self.inner;
1426 let keys = &inner.keys;
1427 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1428 let this_htlc = &inner.htlcs[htlc_index];
1429 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1430 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
1431 if !this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
1432 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
1433 if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
1435 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1437 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1439 let sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { SigHashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { SigHashType::All };
1441 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
1442 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1444 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
1445 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
1446 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(sighashtype as u8);
1447 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1449 if this_htlc.offered {
1450 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
1451 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1453 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
1456 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
1461 /// Commitment transaction numbers which appear in the transactions themselves are XOR'd with a
1462 /// shared secret first. This prevents on-chain observers from discovering how many commitment
1463 /// transactions occurred in a channel before it was closed.
1465 /// This function gets the shared secret from relevant channel public keys and can be used to
1466 /// "decrypt" the commitment transaction number given a commitment transaction on-chain.
1467 pub fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1468 broadcaster_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1469 countersignatory_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1470 outbound_from_broadcaster: bool,
1472 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1474 if outbound_from_broadcaster {
1475 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1476 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1478 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1479 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1481 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
1483 ((res[26] as u64) << 5 * 8)
1484 | ((res[27] as u64) << 4 * 8)
1485 | ((res[28] as u64) << 3 * 8)
1486 | ((res[29] as u64) << 2 * 8)
1487 | ((res[30] as u64) << 1 * 8)
1488 | ((res[31] as u64) << 0 * 8)
1491 fn get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
1492 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1493 .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&key.serialize())[..])
1499 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
1502 use ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
1503 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Secp256k1};
1504 use util::test_utils;
1505 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, BaseSign};
1506 use bitcoin::Network;
1507 use ln::PaymentHash;
1508 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
1512 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1514 let seed = [42; 32];
1515 let network = Network::Testnet;
1516 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
1517 let signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
1518 let counterparty_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
1519 let delayed_payment_base = &signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1520 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1521 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
1522 let htlc_basepoint = &signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1523 let holder_pubkeys = signer.pubkeys();
1524 let counterparty_pubkeys = counterparty_signer.pubkeys();
1525 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1526 let mut channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
1527 holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.clone(),
1528 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
1529 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1530 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
1531 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: 0 }),
1535 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
1537 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs
1538 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1541 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1542 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1544 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1546 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1547 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point));
1549 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs as well as two anchors
1550 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1553 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1554 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1556 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1558 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 4);
1559 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh());
1561 // Generate broadcaster output and anchor
1562 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1565 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1566 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1568 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1570 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1572 // Generate counterparty output and anchor
1573 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1576 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1577 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1579 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1581 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1583 let received_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1585 amount_msat: 400000,
1587 payment_hash: PaymentHash([42; 32]),
1588 transaction_output_index: None,
1591 let offered_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1593 amount_msat: 600000,
1595 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
1596 transaction_output_index: None,
1599 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, w/o anchors
1600 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1603 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1604 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1606 &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
1607 &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1609 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 3);
1610 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[0].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1611 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1612 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1613 "002085cf52e41ba7c099a39df504e7b61f6de122971ceb53b06731876eaeb85e8dc5");
1614 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1615 "002049f0736bb335c61a04d2623a24df878a7592a3c51fa7258d41b2c85318265e73");
1617 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, with anchors
1618 channel_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
1619 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1622 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1623 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1625 &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
1626 &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1628 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 5);
1629 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[2].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1630 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1631 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1632 "002067114123af3f95405bae4fd930fc95de03e3c86baaee8b2dd29b43dd26cf613c");
1633 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1634 "0020a06e3b0d4fcf704f2b9c41e16a70099e39989466c3142b8573a1154542f28f57");
1638 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1639 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1640 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1643 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1645 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1646 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1647 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1650 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1651 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
1656 // insert_secret correct sequence
1657 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1660 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1661 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1662 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1665 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1666 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1667 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1670 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1671 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1672 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1675 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1676 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1677 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1680 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1681 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1682 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1685 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1686 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1687 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1690 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1691 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1692 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1695 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1696 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1697 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1702 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1703 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1706 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1707 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1708 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1711 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1712 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1713 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1717 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1718 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1721 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1722 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1723 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1726 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1727 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1728 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1731 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1732 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1733 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1736 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1737 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1738 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1742 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1743 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1746 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1747 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1748 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1751 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1752 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1753 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1756 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1757 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1758 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1761 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1762 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1763 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1767 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1768 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1771 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1772 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1773 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1776 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1777 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1778 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1781 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1782 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1783 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1786 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1787 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1788 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1791 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1792 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1793 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1796 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1797 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1798 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1801 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1802 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1803 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1806 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1807 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1808 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1812 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1813 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1816 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1817 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1818 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1821 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1822 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1823 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1826 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1827 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1828 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1831 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1832 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1833 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1836 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1837 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1838 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1841 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1842 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1843 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1847 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1848 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1851 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1852 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1853 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1856 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1857 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1858 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1861 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1862 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1863 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1866 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1867 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1868 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1871 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1872 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1873 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1876 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1877 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1878 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1881 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1882 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1883 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1886 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1887 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1888 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1892 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1893 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1896 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1897 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1898 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1901 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1902 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1903 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1906 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1907 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1908 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1911 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1912 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1913 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1916 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1917 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1918 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1921 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1922 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1923 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1926 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1927 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1928 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1931 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1932 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1933 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1937 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1938 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1941 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1942 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1943 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1946 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1947 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1948 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1951 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1952 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1953 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1956 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1957 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1958 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1961 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1962 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1963 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1966 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1967 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1968 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1971 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1972 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1973 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1976 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1977 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1978 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());