_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
  11 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
  12 //! by hand.
  13
  14 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  15 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
  17 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{Decodable, Encodable};
  18 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  19 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  20
  21 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
  22 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  23 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
  24 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
  25
  26 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
  27 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
  28 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
  29 use util::byte_utils;
  30
  31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
  32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
  33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
  34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  35
  36 use std::{cmp, mem};
  37
  38 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
  39
  40 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
  41 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
  42
  43 #[derive(PartialEq)]
  44 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
  45         AcceptedHTLC,
  46         OfferedHTLC
  47 }
  48
  49 impl HTLCType {
  50         /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
  51         pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) ->  Option<HTLCType> {
  52                 if witness_script_len == 133 {
  53                         Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
  54                 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
  55                         Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
  56                 } else {
  57                         None
  58                 }
  59         }
  60 }
  61
  62 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
  63 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
  64
  65 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
  66 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
  67         let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
  68         for i in 0..48 {
  69                 let bitpos = 47 - i;
  70                 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
  71                         res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
  72                         res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
  73                 }
  74         }
  75         res
  76 }
  77
  78 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
  79 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
  80 ///
  81 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
  82 /// or so.
  83 #[derive(Clone)]
  84 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  85         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
  86 }
  87
  88 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  89         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
  90                 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
  91                         if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
  92                                 return false
  93                         }
  94                 }
  95                 true
  96         }
  97 }
  98
  99 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 100         pub(crate) fn new() -> Self {
 101                 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
 102         }
 103
 104         #[inline]
 105         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 106                 for i in 0..48 {
 107                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 108                                 return i
 109                         }
 110                 }
 111                 48
 112         }
 113
 114         pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 115                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 116                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 117                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 118                         if idx < min {
 119                                 min = idx;
 120                         }
 121                 }
 122                 min
 123         }
 124
 125         #[inline]
 126         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 127                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 128                 for i in 0..bits {
 129                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 130                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 131                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 132                                 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
 133                         }
 134                 }
 135                 res
 136         }
 137
 138         pub(crate) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
 139                 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
 140                 for i in 0..pos {
 141                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 142                         if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 143                                 return Err(());
 144                         }
 145                 }
 146                 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
 147                         return Ok(());
 148                 }
 149                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 150                 Ok(())
 151         }
 152
 153         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 154         pub(crate) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
 155                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 156                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 157                                 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 158                         }
 159                 }
 160                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 161                 None
 162         }
 163 }
 164
 165 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 166         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 167                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 168                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
 169                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
 170                 }
 171                 Ok(())
 172         }
 173 }
 174 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 175         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 176                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
 177                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
 178                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
 179                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
 180                 }
 181
 182                 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
 183         }
 184 }
 185
 186 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
 187 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
 188 ///
 189 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 190 /// generated (ie our own).
 191 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
 192         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 193         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 194         sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
 195         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 196
 197         let mut key = base_secret.clone();
 198         key.add_assign(&res)?;
 199         Ok(key)
 200 }
 201
 202 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
 203 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
 204 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
 205 ///
 206 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 207 /// generated (ie our own).
 208 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
 209         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 210         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 211         sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
 212         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 213
 214         let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
 215         base_point.combine(&hashkey)
 216 }
 217
 218 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
 219 ///
 220 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
 221 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
 222 /// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
 223 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
 224 ///
 225 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 226 /// generated (ie our own).
 227 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
 228         let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
 229         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
 230
 231         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 232                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 233                 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
 234                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 235
 236                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 237         };
 238         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 239                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 240                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 241                 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
 242
 243                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 244         };
 245
 246         let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone();
 247         countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 248         let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone();
 249         broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 250         countersignatory_contrib.add_assign(&broadcaster_contrib[..])?;
 251         Ok(countersignatory_contrib)
 252 }
 253
 254 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
 255 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
 256 /// public key instead of private keys.
 257 ///
 258 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
 259 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
 260 /// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
 261 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
 262 ///
 263 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 264 /// generated (ie our own).
 265 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
 266         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 267                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 268                 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
 269                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 270
 271                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 272         };
 273         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 274                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 275                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 276                 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
 277
 278                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 279         };
 280
 281         let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone();
 282         countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 283         let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone();
 284         broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 285         countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
 286 }
 287
 288 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
 289 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
 290 ///
 291 /// A broadcaster key is provided from potential broadcaster of the computed transaction.
 292 /// A countersignatory key is coming from a protocol participant unable to broadcast the
 293 /// transaction.
 294 ///
 295 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
 296 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
 297 /// PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys.trust_key_derivation because we trusted the source of the
 298 /// pre-calculated keys.
 299 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
 300 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
 301         /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
 302         pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 303         /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
 304         /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
 305         /// an old state.
 306         pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
 307         /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
 308         pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 309         /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
 310         pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 311         /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
 312         pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 313 }
 314 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
 315         { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, broadcaster_htlc_key, countersignatory_htlc_key, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key });
 316
 317 /// The per-commitment point and a set of pre-calculated public keys used for transaction creation
 318 /// in the signer.
 319 /// The pre-calculated keys are an optimization, because ChannelKeys has enough
 320 /// information to re-derive them.
 321 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
 322 pub struct PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(TxCreationKeys);
 323
 324 impl PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys {
 325         /// Create a new PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys from TxCreationKeys
 326         pub fn new(keys: TxCreationKeys) -> Self {
 327                 PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(keys)
 328         }
 329
 330         /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
 331         /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
 332         pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
 333                 &self.0
 334         }
 335
 336         /// The transaction per-commitment point
 337         pub fn per_commitment_point(&self) -> &PublicKey {
 338                 &self.0.per_commitment_point
 339         }
 340 }
 341
 342 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
 343 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 344 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
 345         /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
 346         /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
 347         pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
 348         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
 349         /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
 350         /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
 351         /// states.
 352         pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
 353         /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
 354         /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
 355         /// static across every commitment transaction.
 356         pub payment_point: PublicKey,
 357         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
 358         /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
 359         /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
 360         pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
 361         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
 362         /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
 363         pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
 364 }
 365
 366 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
 367         funding_pubkey,
 368         revocation_basepoint,
 369         payment_point,
 370         delayed_payment_basepoint,
 371         htlc_basepoint
 372 });
 373
 374
 375 impl TxCreationKeys {
 376         /// Create a new TxCreationKeys from channel base points and the per-commitment point
 377         pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
 378                 Ok(TxCreationKeys {
 379                         per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
 380                         revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
 381                         broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
 382                         countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
 383                         broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
 384                 })
 385         }
 386 }
 387
 388 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
 389 /// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
 390 /// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
 391 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 392         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 393                       .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
 394                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 395                       .push_int(contest_delay as i64)
 396                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
 397                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 398                       .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
 399                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 400                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 401                       .into_script()
 402 }
 403
 404 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 405 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
 406 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 407         /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
 408         /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
 409         /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
 410         /// the counterparty or our own.
 411         pub offered: bool,
 412         /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
 413         /// this divided by 1000.
 414         pub amount_msat: u64,
 415         /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
 416         pub cltv_expiry: u32,
 417         /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
 418         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 419         /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
 420         /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
 421         /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
 422         pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
 423 }
 424
 425 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
 426         offered,
 427         amount_msat,
 428         cltv_expiry,
 429         payment_hash,
 430         transaction_output_index
 431 });
 432
 433 #[inline]
 434 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 435         let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
 436         if htlc.offered {
 437                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 438                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 439                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 440                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 441                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 442                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 443                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 444                               .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 445                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 446                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 447                               .push_int(32)
 448                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 449                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
 450                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 451                               .push_int(2)
 452                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 453                               .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 454                               .push_int(2)
 455                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 456                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 457                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 458                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 459                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 460                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 461                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 462                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 463                               .into_script()
 464         } else {
 465                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 466                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 467                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 468                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 469                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 470                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 471                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 472                               .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 473                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 474                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 475                               .push_int(32)
 476                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 477                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 478                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 479                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 480                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 481                               .push_int(2)
 482                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 483                               .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 484                               .push_int(2)
 485                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 486                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 487                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 488                               .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
 489                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
 490                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 491                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 492                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 493                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 494                               .into_script()
 495         }
 496 }
 497
 498 /// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
 499 /// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
 500 #[inline]
 501 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
 502         get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
 503 }
 504
 505 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
 506 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
 507 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 508         let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
 509         let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
 510
 511         let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
 512         if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
 513                 builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
 514                         .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
 515         } else {
 516                 builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
 517                         .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
 518         }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
 519 }
 520
 521 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
 522 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
 523         let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 524         txins.push(TxIn {
 525                 previous_output: OutPoint {
 526                         txid: prev_hash.clone(),
 527                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
 528                 },
 529                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 530                 sequence: 0,
 531                 witness: Vec::new(),
 532         });
 533
 534         let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
 535                         feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 536                 } else {
 537                         feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 538                 };
 539
 540         let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
 541         txouts.push(TxOut {
 542                 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
 543                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
 544         });
 545
 546         Transaction {
 547                 version: 2,
 548                 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
 549                 input: txins,
 550                 output: txouts,
 551         }
 552 }
 553
 554 #[derive(Clone)]
 555 /// We use this to track holder commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
 556 /// to broadcast. This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature
 557 /// given the relevant secret key.
 558 pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
 559         // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
 560         // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
 561         // so we're probably most of the way there.
 562         /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
 563         pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
 564         /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
 565         pub counterparty_sig: Signature,
 566         // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
 567         // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
 568         holder_sig_first: bool,
 569         pub(crate) keys: TxCreationKeys,
 570         /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
 571         /// controlled by the channel initiator.
 572         pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
 573         /// The HTLCs and counterparty htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
 574         ///
 575         /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
 576         /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
 577         /// fees and not included in the to_holder or to_counterparty outputs.
 578         ///
 579         /// The counterparty HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
 580         /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
 581         pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
 582 }
 583 impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
 584         #[cfg(test)]
 585         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 586                 let dummy_input = TxIn {
 587                         previous_output: OutPoint {
 588                                 txid: Default::default(),
 589                                 vout: 0,
 590                         },
 591                         script_sig: Default::default(),
 592                         sequence: 0,
 593                         witness: vec![]
 594                 };
 595                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 596                 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 597                 Self {
 598                         unsigned_tx: Transaction {
 599                                 version: 2,
 600                                 input: vec![dummy_input],
 601                                 output: Vec::new(),
 602                                 lock_time: 0,
 603                         },
 604                         counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
 605                         holder_sig_first: false,
 606                         keys: TxCreationKeys {
 607                                         per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
 608                                         revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 609                                         broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 610                                         countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 611                                         broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 612                                 },
 613                         feerate_per_kw: 0,
 614                         per_htlc: Vec::new()
 615                 }
 616         }
 617
 618         /// Generate a new HolderCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
 619         /// counterparty signature and both parties keys.
 620         ///
 621         /// The unsigned transaction outputs must be consistent with htlc_data.  This function
 622         /// only checks that the shape and amounts are consistent, but does not check the scriptPubkey.
 623         pub fn new_missing_holder_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, counterparty_sig: Signature, holder_funding_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_funding_key: &PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> HolderCommitmentTransaction {
 624                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
 625                 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
 626
 627                 for htlc in &htlc_data {
 628                         if let Some(index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 629                                 let out = &unsigned_tx.output[index as usize];
 630                                 if out.value != htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000 {
 631                                         panic!("HTLC at index {} has incorrect amount", index);
 632                                 }
 633                                 if !out.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 634                                         panic!("HTLC at index {} doesn't have p2wsh scriptPubkey", index);
 635                                 }
 636                         }
 637                 }
 638
 639                 Self {
 640                         unsigned_tx,
 641                         counterparty_sig,
 642                         holder_sig_first: holder_funding_key.serialize()[..] < counterparty_funding_key.serialize()[..],
 643                         keys,
 644                         feerate_per_kw,
 645                         per_htlc: htlc_data,
 646                 }
 647         }
 648
 649         /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
 650         /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
 651         pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
 652                 &self.keys
 653         }
 654
 655         /// Get the txid of the holder commitment transaction contained in this
 656         /// HolderCommitmentTransaction
 657         pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
 658                 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
 659         }
 660
 661         /// Gets holder signature for the contained commitment transaction given holder funding private key.
 662         ///
 663         /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
 664         /// by your ChannelKeys.
 665         /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
 666         /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
 667         /// ChannelKeys::sign_holder_commitment() calls directly.
 668         /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
 669         pub fn get_holder_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
 670                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
 671                         .signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
 672                 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
 673         }
 674
 675         pub(crate) fn add_holder_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, holder_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
 676                 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
 677                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 678                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 679
 680                 if self.holder_sig_first {
 681                         tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 682                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 683                 } else {
 684                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 685                         tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 686                 }
 687                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 688                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 689
 690                 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 691                 tx
 692         }
 693
 694         /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
 695         /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
 696         ///
 697         /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
 698         /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
 699         /// included.
 700         pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
 701                 let txid = self.txid();
 702                 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
 703                 let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
 704
 705                 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 706                         if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
 707                                 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_selected_contest_delay, &this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
 708
 709                                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &self.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
 710
 711                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
 712                                 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &holder_htlc_key)));
 713                         } else {
 714                                 ret.push(None);
 715                         }
 716                 }
 717                 Ok(ret)
 718         }
 719
 720         /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature.
 721         pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16) -> Transaction {
 722                 let txid = self.txid();
 723                 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
 724                 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
 725                 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
 726                 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
 727                 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
 728                 if  this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
 729
 730                 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_selected_contest_delay, &this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
 731                 // Channel should have checked that we have a counterparty signature for this HTLC at
 732                 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
 733                 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
 734
 735                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &self.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
 736
 737                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 738                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 739
 740                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
 741                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
 742                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 743                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 744
 745                 if this_htlc.0.offered {
 746                         // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
 747                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 748                 } else {
 749                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
 750                 }
 751
 752                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 753                 htlc_tx
 754         }
 755 }
 756 impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
 757         // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
 758         fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
 759                 self.txid() == o.txid()
 760         }
 761 }
 762 impl Writeable for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
 763         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 764                 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
 765                         match e {
 766                                 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
 767                                 _ => panic!("holder tx must have been well-formed!"),
 768                         }
 769                 }
 770                 self.counterparty_sig.write(writer)?;
 771                 self.holder_sig_first.write(writer)?;
 772                 self.keys.write(writer)?;
 773                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
 774                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
 775                 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 776                         htlc.write(writer)?;
 777                         sig.write(writer)?;
 778                 }
 779                 Ok(())
 780         }
 781 }
 782 impl Readable for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
 783         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 784                 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
 785                         Ok(tx) => tx,
 786                         Err(e) => match e {
 787                                 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
 788                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 789                         },
 790                 };
 791                 let counterparty_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
 792                 let holder_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
 793                 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
 794                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
 795                 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 796                 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
 797                 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
 798                         let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
 799                         let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
 800                         per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
 801                 }
 802
 803                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
 804                         // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
 805                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 806                 }
 807                 Ok(Self {
 808                         unsigned_tx,
 809                         counterparty_sig,
 810                         holder_sig_first,
 811                         keys,
 812                         feerate_per_kw,
 813                         per_htlc,
 814                 })
 815         }
 816 }
 817
 818 #[cfg(test)]
 819 mod tests {
 820         use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
 821         use hex;
 822
 823         #[test]
 824         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
 825                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
 826                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
 827                 let mut monitor;
 828
 829                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
 830                         () => {
 831                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
 832                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
 833                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
 834                                         idx -= 1;
 835                                 }
 836                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
 837                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
 838                         };
 839                 }
 840
 841                 {
 842                         // insert_secret correct sequence
 843                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 844                         secrets.clear();
 845
 846                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 847                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 848                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 849                         test_secrets!();
 850
 851                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 852                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 853                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 854                         test_secrets!();
 855
 856                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 857                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 858                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 859                         test_secrets!();
 860
 861                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 862                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 863                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 864                         test_secrets!();
 865
 866                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 867                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 868                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 869                         test_secrets!();
 870
 871                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 872                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 873                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 874                         test_secrets!();
 875
 876                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 877                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 878                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 879                         test_secrets!();
 880
 881                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 882                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 883                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 884                         test_secrets!();
 885                 }
 886
 887                 {
 888                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
 889                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 890                         secrets.clear();
 891
 892                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 893                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 894                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 895                         test_secrets!();
 896
 897                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 898                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 899                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 900                 }
 901
 902                 {
 903                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
 904                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 905                         secrets.clear();
 906
 907                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 908                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 909                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 910                         test_secrets!();
 911
 912                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 913                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 914                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 915                         test_secrets!();
 916
 917                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 918                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 919                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 920                         test_secrets!();
 921
 922                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 923                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 924                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 925                 }
 926
 927                 {
 928                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
 929                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 930                         secrets.clear();
 931
 932                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 933                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 934                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 935                         test_secrets!();
 936
 937                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 938                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 939                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 940                         test_secrets!();
 941
 942                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 943                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 944                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 945                         test_secrets!();
 946
 947                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 948                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 949                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 950                 }
 951
 952                 {
 953                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
 954                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 955                         secrets.clear();
 956
 957                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 958                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 959                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 960                         test_secrets!();
 961
 962                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 963                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 964                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 965                         test_secrets!();
 966
 967                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 968                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 969                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 970                         test_secrets!();
 971
 972                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 973                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
 974                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 975                         test_secrets!();
 976
 977                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 978                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 979                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 980                         test_secrets!();
 981
 982                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 983                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 984                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 985                         test_secrets!();
 986
 987                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 988                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 989                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 990                         test_secrets!();
 991
 992                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 993                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 994                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 995                 }
 996
 997                 {
 998                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
 999                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1000                         secrets.clear();
1001
1002                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1003                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1004                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1005                         test_secrets!();
1006
1007                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1008                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1009                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1010                         test_secrets!();
1011
1012                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1013                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1014                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1015                         test_secrets!();
1016
1017                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1018                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1019                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1020                         test_secrets!();
1021
1022                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1023                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1024                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1025                         test_secrets!();
1026
1027                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1028                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1029                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1030                 }
1031
1032                 {
1033                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1034                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1035                         secrets.clear();
1036
1037                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1038                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1039                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1040                         test_secrets!();
1041
1042                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1043                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1044                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1045                         test_secrets!();
1046
1047                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1048                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1049                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1050                         test_secrets!();
1051
1052                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1053                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1054                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1055                         test_secrets!();
1056
1057                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1058                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1059                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1060                         test_secrets!();
1061
1062                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1063                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1064                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1065                         test_secrets!();
1066
1067                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1068                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1069                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1070                         test_secrets!();
1071
1072                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1073                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1074                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1075                 }
1076
1077                 {
1078                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1079                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1080                         secrets.clear();
1081
1082                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1083                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1084                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1085                         test_secrets!();
1086
1087                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1088                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1089                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1090                         test_secrets!();
1091
1092                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1093                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1094                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1095                         test_secrets!();
1096
1097                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1098                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1099                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1100                         test_secrets!();
1101
1102                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1103                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1104                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1105                         test_secrets!();
1106
1107                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1108                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1109                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1110                         test_secrets!();
1111
1112                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1113                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1114                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1115                         test_secrets!();
1116
1117                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1118                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1119                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1120                 }
1121
1122                 {
1123                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1124                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1125                         secrets.clear();
1126
1127                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1128                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1129                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1130                         test_secrets!();
1131
1132                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1133                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1134                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1135                         test_secrets!();
1136
1137                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1138                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1139                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1140                         test_secrets!();
1141
1142                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1143                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1144                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1145                         test_secrets!();
1146
1147                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1148                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1149                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1150                         test_secrets!();
1151
1152                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1153                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1154                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1155                         test_secrets!();
1156
1157                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1158                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1159                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1160                         test_secrets!();
1161
1162                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1163                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1164                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1165                 }
1166         }
1167 }