1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
11 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
17 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{Decodable, Encodable};
18 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
19 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
21 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
22 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
23 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
24 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
26 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
27 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
28 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
38 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
40 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
41 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
44 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
50 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
51 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
52 if witness_script_len == 133 {
53 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
54 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
55 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
62 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
63 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
65 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
66 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
67 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
70 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
71 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
72 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
78 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
79 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
81 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
84 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
85 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
88 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
89 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
90 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
91 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
99 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
100 pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
101 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
105 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
107 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
114 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
115 //TODO This can be optimized?
116 let mut min = 1 << 48;
117 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
126 pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
127 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
129 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
130 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
131 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
132 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
138 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
139 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
141 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
142 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
146 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
149 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
153 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
154 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
155 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
156 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
157 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
160 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
165 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
166 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
167 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
168 writer.write_all(secret)?;
169 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
174 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
175 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
176 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
177 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
178 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
179 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
182 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
186 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
187 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
189 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
190 /// generated (ie our own).
191 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
192 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
193 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
194 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
195 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
197 let mut key = base_secret.clone();
198 key.add_assign(&res)?;
202 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
203 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
204 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
206 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
207 /// generated (ie our own).
208 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
209 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
210 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
211 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
212 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
214 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
215 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
218 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
220 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
221 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
222 /// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
223 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
225 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
226 /// generated (ie our own).
227 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
228 let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
229 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
231 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
232 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
233 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
234 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
236 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
238 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
239 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
240 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
241 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
243 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
246 let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone();
247 countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
248 let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone();
249 broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
250 countersignatory_contrib.add_assign(&broadcaster_contrib[..])?;
251 Ok(countersignatory_contrib)
254 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
255 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
256 /// public key instead of private keys.
258 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
259 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
260 /// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
261 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
263 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
264 /// generated (ie our own).
265 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
266 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
267 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
268 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
269 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
271 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
273 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
274 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
275 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
276 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
278 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
281 let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone();
282 countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
283 let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone();
284 broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
285 countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
288 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
289 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
291 /// A broadcaster key is provided from potential broadcaster of the computed transaction.
292 /// A countersignatory key is coming from a protocol participant unable to broadcast the
295 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
296 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
297 /// PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys.trust_key_derivation because we trusted the source of the
298 /// pre-calculated keys.
299 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
300 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
301 /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
302 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
303 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
304 /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
306 pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
307 /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
308 pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey,
309 /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
310 pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
311 /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
312 pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
314 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
315 { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, broadcaster_htlc_key, countersignatory_htlc_key, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key });
317 /// The per-commitment point and a set of pre-calculated public keys used for transaction creation
319 /// The pre-calculated keys are an optimization, because ChannelKeys has enough
320 /// information to re-derive them.
321 pub struct PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(TxCreationKeys);
323 impl PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys {
324 /// Create a new PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys from TxCreationKeys
325 pub fn new(keys: TxCreationKeys) -> Self {
326 PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(keys)
329 /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
330 /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
331 pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
335 /// The transaction per-commitment point
336 pub fn per_commitment_point(&self) -> &PublicKey {
337 &self.0.per_commitment_point
341 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
342 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
343 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
344 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
345 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
346 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
347 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
348 /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
349 /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
351 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
352 /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
353 /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
354 /// static across every commitment transaction.
355 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
356 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
357 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
358 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
359 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
360 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
361 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
362 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
365 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
367 revocation_basepoint,
369 delayed_payment_basepoint,
374 impl TxCreationKeys {
375 /// Create a new TxCreationKeys from channel base points and the per-commitment point
376 pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
378 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
379 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
380 broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
381 countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
382 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
387 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
388 /// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
389 /// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
390 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
391 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
392 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
393 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
394 .push_int(contest_delay as i64)
395 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
396 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
397 .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
398 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
399 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
403 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
404 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
405 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
406 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
407 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
408 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
409 /// the counterparty or our own.
411 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
412 /// this divided by 1000.
413 pub amount_msat: u64,
414 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
415 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
416 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
417 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
418 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
419 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
420 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
421 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
424 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
429 transaction_output_index
433 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
434 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
436 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
437 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
438 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
439 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
440 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
441 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
442 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
443 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
444 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
445 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
447 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
448 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
449 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
451 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
452 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
454 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
455 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
456 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
457 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
458 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
459 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
460 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
461 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
464 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
465 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
466 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
467 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
468 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
469 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
470 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
471 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
472 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
473 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
475 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
476 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
477 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
478 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
479 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
481 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
482 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
484 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
485 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
486 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
487 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
488 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
489 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
490 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
491 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
492 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
497 /// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
498 /// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
500 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
501 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
504 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
505 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
506 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script {
507 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
508 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
510 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
511 if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
512 builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
513 .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
515 builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
516 .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
517 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
520 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
521 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
522 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
524 previous_output: OutPoint {
525 txid: prev_hash.clone(),
526 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
528 script_sig: Script::new(),
533 let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
534 feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
536 feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
539 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
541 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
542 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
547 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
554 /// We use this to track holder commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
555 /// to broadcast. This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature
556 /// given the relevant secret key.
557 pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
558 // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
559 // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
560 // so we're probably most of the way there.
561 /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
562 pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
563 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
564 pub counterparty_sig: Signature,
565 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
566 // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
567 holder_sig_first: bool,
568 pub(crate) keys: TxCreationKeys,
569 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
570 /// controlled by the channel initiator.
571 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
572 /// The HTLCs and counterparty htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
574 /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
575 /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
576 /// fees and not included in the to_holder or to_counterparty outputs.
578 /// The counterparty HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
579 /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
580 pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
582 impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
584 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
585 let dummy_input = TxIn {
586 previous_output: OutPoint {
587 txid: Default::default(),
590 script_sig: Default::default(),
594 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
595 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
597 unsigned_tx: Transaction {
599 input: vec![dummy_input],
603 counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
604 holder_sig_first: false,
605 keys: TxCreationKeys {
606 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
607 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
608 broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
609 countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
610 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
617 /// Generate a new HolderCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
618 /// counterparty signature and both parties keys.
620 /// The unsigned transaction outputs must be consistent with htlc_data. This function
621 /// only checks that the shape and amounts are consistent, but does not check the scriptPubkey.
622 pub fn new_missing_holder_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, counterparty_sig: Signature, holder_funding_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_funding_key: &PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> HolderCommitmentTransaction {
623 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
624 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
626 for htlc in &htlc_data {
627 if let Some(index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
628 let out = &unsigned_tx.output[index as usize];
629 if out.value != htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000 {
630 panic!("HTLC at index {} has incorrect amount", index);
632 if !out.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
633 panic!("HTLC at index {} doesn't have p2wsh scriptPubkey", index);
641 holder_sig_first: holder_funding_key.serialize()[..] < counterparty_funding_key.serialize()[..],
648 /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
649 /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
650 pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
654 /// Get the txid of the holder commitment transaction contained in this
655 /// HolderCommitmentTransaction
656 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
657 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
660 /// Gets holder signature for the contained commitment transaction given holder funding private key.
662 /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
663 /// by your ChannelKeys.
664 /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
665 /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
666 /// ChannelKeys::sign_holder_commitment() calls directly.
667 /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
668 pub fn get_holder_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
669 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
670 .signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
671 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
674 pub(crate) fn add_holder_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, holder_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
675 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
676 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
677 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
679 if self.holder_sig_first {
680 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
681 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
683 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
684 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
686 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
687 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
689 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
693 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
694 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
696 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
697 /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
699 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
700 let txid = self.txid();
701 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
702 let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
704 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
705 if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
706 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_selected_contest_delay, &this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
708 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &self.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
710 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
711 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &holder_htlc_key)));
719 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature.
720 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16) -> Transaction {
721 let txid = self.txid();
722 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
723 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
724 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
725 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
726 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
727 if this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
729 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_selected_contest_delay, &this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
730 // Channel should have checked that we have a counterparty signature for this HTLC at
731 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
732 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
734 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &self.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &self.keys.revocation_key);
736 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
737 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
739 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
740 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
741 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
742 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
744 if this_htlc.0.offered {
745 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
746 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
748 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
751 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
755 impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
756 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
757 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
758 self.txid() == o.txid()
761 impl Writeable for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
762 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
763 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
765 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
766 _ => panic!("holder tx must have been well-formed!"),
769 self.counterparty_sig.write(writer)?;
770 self.holder_sig_first.write(writer)?;
771 self.keys.write(writer)?;
772 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
773 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
774 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
781 impl Readable for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
782 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
783 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
786 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
787 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
790 let counterparty_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
791 let holder_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
792 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
793 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
794 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
795 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
796 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
797 let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
798 let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
799 per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
802 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
803 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
804 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
819 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
823 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
824 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
825 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
828 macro_rules! test_secrets {
830 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
831 for secret in secrets.iter() {
832 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
835 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
836 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
841 // insert_secret correct sequence
842 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
845 secrets.push([0; 32]);
846 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
847 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
850 secrets.push([0; 32]);
851 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
852 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
855 secrets.push([0; 32]);
856 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
857 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
860 secrets.push([0; 32]);
861 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
862 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
865 secrets.push([0; 32]);
866 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
867 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
870 secrets.push([0; 32]);
871 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
872 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
875 secrets.push([0; 32]);
876 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
877 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
880 secrets.push([0; 32]);
881 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
882 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
887 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
888 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
891 secrets.push([0; 32]);
892 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
893 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
896 secrets.push([0; 32]);
897 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
898 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
902 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
903 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
906 secrets.push([0; 32]);
907 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
908 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
911 secrets.push([0; 32]);
912 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
913 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
916 secrets.push([0; 32]);
917 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
918 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
921 secrets.push([0; 32]);
922 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
923 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
927 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
928 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
931 secrets.push([0; 32]);
932 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
933 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
936 secrets.push([0; 32]);
937 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
938 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
941 secrets.push([0; 32]);
942 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
943 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
946 secrets.push([0; 32]);
947 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
948 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
952 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
953 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
956 secrets.push([0; 32]);
957 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
958 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
961 secrets.push([0; 32]);
962 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
963 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
966 secrets.push([0; 32]);
967 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
968 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
971 secrets.push([0; 32]);
972 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
973 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
976 secrets.push([0; 32]);
977 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
978 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
981 secrets.push([0; 32]);
982 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
983 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
986 secrets.push([0; 32]);
987 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
988 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
991 secrets.push([0; 32]);
992 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
993 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
997 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
998 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1001 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1002 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1003 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1006 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1007 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1008 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1011 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1012 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1013 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1016 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1017 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1018 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1021 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1022 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1023 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1026 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1027 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1028 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1032 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1033 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1036 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1037 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1038 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1041 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1042 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1043 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1046 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1047 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1048 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1051 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1052 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1053 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1056 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1057 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1058 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1061 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1062 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1063 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1066 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1067 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1068 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1071 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1072 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1073 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1077 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1078 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1081 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1082 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1083 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1086 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1087 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1088 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1091 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1092 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1093 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1096 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1097 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1098 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1101 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1102 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1103 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1106 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1107 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1108 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1111 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1112 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1113 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1116 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1117 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1118 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1122 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1123 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1126 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1127 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1128 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1131 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1132 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1133 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1136 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1137 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1138 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1141 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1142 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1143 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1146 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1147 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1148 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1151 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1152 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1153 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1156 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1157 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1158 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1161 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1162 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1163 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());