1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
11 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
17 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{Decodable, Encodable};
18 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
19 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
21 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
22 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
23 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
24 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
26 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
27 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
28 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
39 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
40 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
43 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
49 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
50 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
51 if witness_script_len == 133 {
52 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
53 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
54 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
61 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
62 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
64 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
65 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
66 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
69 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
70 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
71 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
77 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
78 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
80 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
83 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
84 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
87 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
88 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
89 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
90 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
98 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
99 pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
100 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
104 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
106 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
113 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
114 //TODO This can be optimized?
115 let mut min = 1 << 48;
116 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
125 pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
126 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
128 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
129 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
130 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
131 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
137 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
138 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
140 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
141 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
145 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
148 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
152 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
153 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
154 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
155 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
156 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
159 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
164 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
165 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
166 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
167 writer.write_all(secret)?;
168 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
173 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
174 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
175 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
176 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
177 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
178 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
181 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
185 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
186 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
188 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
189 /// generated (ie our own).
190 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
191 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
192 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
193 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
194 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
196 let mut key = base_secret.clone();
197 key.add_assign(&res)?;
201 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
202 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
203 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
205 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
206 /// generated (ie our own).
207 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
208 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
209 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
210 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
211 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
213 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
214 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
217 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
219 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
220 /// generated (ie our own).
221 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
222 let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
223 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
225 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
226 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
227 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
228 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
230 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
232 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
233 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
234 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
235 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
237 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
240 let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
241 part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
242 let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
243 part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
244 part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
248 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
249 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
250 /// public key instead of private keys.
252 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
253 /// generated (ie our own).
254 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
255 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
256 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
257 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
258 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
260 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
262 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
263 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
264 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
265 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
267 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
270 let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
271 part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
272 let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
273 part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
274 part_a.combine(&part_b)
277 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
278 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
280 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
281 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
282 /// PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys.trust_key_derivation because we trusted the source of the
283 /// pre-calculated keys.
284 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
285 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
286 /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
287 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
288 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
289 /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
290 pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
292 pub a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
294 pub b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
295 /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
296 pub a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
298 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
299 { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key });
301 /// The per-commitment point and a set of pre-calculated public keys used for transaction creation
303 /// The pre-calculated keys are an optimization, because ChannelKeys has enough
304 /// information to re-derive them.
305 pub struct PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(TxCreationKeys);
307 impl PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys {
308 /// Create a new PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys from TxCreationKeys
309 pub fn new(keys: TxCreationKeys) -> Self {
310 PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(keys)
313 /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
314 /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
315 pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
319 /// The transaction per-commitment point
320 pub fn per_comitment_point(&self) -> &PublicKey {
321 &self.0.per_commitment_point
325 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
326 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
327 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
328 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
329 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
330 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
331 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
332 /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
333 /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
335 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
336 /// The public key which receives our immediately spendable primary channel balance in
337 /// remote-broadcasted commitment transactions. This key is static across every commitment
339 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
340 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
341 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
342 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
343 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
344 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
345 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
346 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
349 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
351 revocation_basepoint,
353 delayed_payment_basepoint,
358 impl TxCreationKeys {
359 /// Create a new TxCreationKeys from channel base points and the per-commitment point
360 pub fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
362 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
363 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
364 a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
365 b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
366 a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
371 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
372 /// key or the delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
373 /// Encumbering a `to_local` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
374 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
375 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
376 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
377 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
378 .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
379 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
380 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
381 .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
382 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
383 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
387 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
388 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
389 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
390 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
391 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
392 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
393 /// the remote party or our own.
395 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
396 /// this divided by 1000.
397 pub amount_msat: u64,
398 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
399 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
400 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
401 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
402 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
403 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
404 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
405 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
408 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
413 transaction_output_index
417 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
418 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
420 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
421 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
422 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
423 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
424 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
425 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
426 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
427 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
428 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
429 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
431 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
432 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
433 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
435 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
436 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
438 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
439 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
440 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
441 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
442 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
443 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
444 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
445 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
448 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
449 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
450 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
451 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
452 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
453 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
454 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
455 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
456 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
457 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
459 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
460 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
461 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
462 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
463 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
465 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
466 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
468 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
469 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
470 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
471 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
472 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
473 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
474 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
475 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
476 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
481 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
482 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
484 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
485 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
488 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
489 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
490 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
491 let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
492 let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
494 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
495 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
496 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
497 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
499 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
500 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
501 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
504 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
505 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
506 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
508 previous_output: OutPoint {
509 txid: prev_hash.clone(),
510 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
512 script_sig: Script::new(),
517 let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
518 feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
520 feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
523 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
525 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
526 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
531 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
538 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
539 /// to broadcast. This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature
540 /// given the relevant secret key.
541 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
542 // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
543 // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
544 // so we're probably most of the way there.
545 /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
546 pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
547 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
548 pub their_sig: Signature,
549 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
550 // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
552 pub(crate) local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
553 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
554 /// controlled by the channel initiator.
555 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
556 /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
558 /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
559 /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
560 /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
562 /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
563 /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
564 pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
566 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
568 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
569 let dummy_input = TxIn {
570 previous_output: OutPoint {
571 txid: Default::default(),
574 script_sig: Default::default(),
578 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
579 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
581 unsigned_tx: Transaction {
583 input: vec![dummy_input],
587 their_sig: dummy_sig,
588 our_sig_first: false,
589 local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
590 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
591 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
592 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
593 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
594 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
601 /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
602 /// remote signature and both parties keys.
604 /// The unsigned transaction outputs must be consistent with htlc_data. This function
605 /// only checks that the shape and amounts are consistent, but does not check the scriptPubkey.
606 pub fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
607 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
608 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
610 for htlc in &htlc_data {
611 if let Some(index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
612 let out = &unsigned_tx.output[index as usize];
613 if out.value != htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000 {
614 panic!("HTLC at index {} has incorrect amount", index);
616 if !out.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
617 panic!("HTLC at index {} doesn't have p2wsh scriptPubkey", index);
625 our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
632 /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
633 /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
634 pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
638 /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
639 /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
640 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
641 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
644 /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
646 /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
647 /// by your ChannelKeys.
648 /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
649 /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
650 /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
651 /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
652 pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
653 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
654 .sighash_all(&self.unsigned_tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
655 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
658 pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
659 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
660 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
661 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
663 if self.our_sig_first {
664 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
665 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
667 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
668 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
670 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
671 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
673 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
677 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
678 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
680 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
681 /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
683 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
684 let txid = self.txid();
685 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
686 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
688 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
689 if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
690 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
692 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
694 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
695 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
703 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
704 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
705 let txid = self.txid();
706 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
707 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
708 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
709 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
710 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
711 if this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
713 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
714 // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
715 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
716 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
718 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
720 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
721 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
723 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
724 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
725 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
726 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
728 if this_htlc.0.offered {
729 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
730 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
732 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
735 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
739 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
740 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
741 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
742 self.txid() == o.txid()
745 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
746 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
747 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
749 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
750 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
753 self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
754 self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
755 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
756 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
757 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
758 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
765 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
766 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
767 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
770 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
771 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
774 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
775 let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
776 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
777 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
778 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
779 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
780 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
781 let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
782 let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
783 per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
786 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
787 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
788 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
803 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
807 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
808 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
809 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
812 macro_rules! test_secrets {
814 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
815 for secret in secrets.iter() {
816 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
819 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
820 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
825 // insert_secret correct sequence
826 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
829 secrets.push([0; 32]);
830 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
831 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
834 secrets.push([0; 32]);
835 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
836 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
839 secrets.push([0; 32]);
840 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
841 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
844 secrets.push([0; 32]);
845 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
846 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
849 secrets.push([0; 32]);
850 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
851 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
854 secrets.push([0; 32]);
855 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
856 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
859 secrets.push([0; 32]);
860 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
861 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
864 secrets.push([0; 32]);
865 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
866 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
871 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
872 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
875 secrets.push([0; 32]);
876 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
877 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
880 secrets.push([0; 32]);
881 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
882 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
886 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
887 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
890 secrets.push([0; 32]);
891 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
892 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
895 secrets.push([0; 32]);
896 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
897 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
900 secrets.push([0; 32]);
901 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
902 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
905 secrets.push([0; 32]);
906 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
907 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
911 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
912 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
915 secrets.push([0; 32]);
916 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
917 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
920 secrets.push([0; 32]);
921 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
922 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
925 secrets.push([0; 32]);
926 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
927 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
930 secrets.push([0; 32]);
931 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
932 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
936 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
937 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
940 secrets.push([0; 32]);
941 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
942 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
945 secrets.push([0; 32]);
946 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
947 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
950 secrets.push([0; 32]);
951 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
952 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
955 secrets.push([0; 32]);
956 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
957 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
960 secrets.push([0; 32]);
961 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
962 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
965 secrets.push([0; 32]);
966 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
967 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
970 secrets.push([0; 32]);
971 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
972 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
975 secrets.push([0; 32]);
976 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
977 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
981 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
982 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
985 secrets.push([0; 32]);
986 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
987 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
990 secrets.push([0; 32]);
991 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
992 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
995 secrets.push([0; 32]);
996 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
997 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1000 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1001 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1002 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1005 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1006 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1007 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1010 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1011 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1012 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1016 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1017 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1020 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1021 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1022 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1025 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1026 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1027 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1030 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1031 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1032 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1035 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1036 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1037 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1040 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1041 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1042 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1045 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1046 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1047 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1050 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1051 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1052 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1055 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1056 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1057 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1061 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1062 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1065 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1066 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1067 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1070 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1071 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1072 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1075 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1076 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1077 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1080 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1081 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1082 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1085 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1086 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1087 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1090 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1091 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1092 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1095 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1096 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1097 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1100 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1101 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1102 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1106 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1107 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1110 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1111 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1112 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1115 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1116 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1117 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1120 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1121 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1122 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1125 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1126 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1127 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1130 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1131 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1132 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1135 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1136 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1137 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1140 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1141 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1142 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1145 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1146 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1147 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());