1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
11 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::Sign message signing by hand.
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
16 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
23 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
24 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
25 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
26 use util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Message};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
38 use util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
39 use ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI};
43 pub(crate) const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
45 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction.
47 pub fn htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
48 const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
49 const HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 706;
50 if opt_anchors { HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT }
53 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
55 pub fn htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
56 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
57 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 666;
58 if opt_anchors { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT }
62 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
68 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
69 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
70 if witness_script_len == 133 {
71 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
72 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
73 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
80 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
81 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
83 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
84 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
85 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
88 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
89 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
90 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
96 /// Build a closing transaction
97 pub fn build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat: u64, to_counterparty_value_sat: u64, to_holder_script: Script, to_counterparty_script: Script, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Transaction {
99 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
101 previous_output: funding_outpoint,
102 script_sig: Script::new(),
103 sequence: 0xffffffff,
109 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
111 if to_counterparty_value_sat > 0 {
113 script_pubkey: to_counterparty_script,
114 value: to_counterparty_value_sat
118 if to_holder_value_sat > 0 {
120 script_pubkey: to_holder_script,
121 value: to_holder_value_sat
125 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
127 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
128 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
140 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
141 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
143 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
146 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
147 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
150 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
151 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
152 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
153 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
161 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
162 pub(crate) fn new() -> Self {
163 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
167 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
169 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
176 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
177 //TODO This can be optimized?
178 let mut min = 1 << 48;
179 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
188 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
189 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
191 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
192 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
193 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
194 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
200 pub(crate) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
201 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
203 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
204 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
208 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
211 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
215 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
216 pub(crate) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
217 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
218 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
219 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
222 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
227 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
228 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
230 writer.write_all(secret)?;
231 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
233 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
237 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
238 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
239 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
240 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
241 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
242 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
244 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
245 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
249 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
250 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
252 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
253 /// generated (ie our own).
254 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
255 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
256 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
257 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
258 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
260 let mut key = base_secret.clone();
261 key.add_assign(&res)?;
265 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
266 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
267 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
269 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
270 /// generated (ie our own).
271 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
272 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
273 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
274 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
275 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
277 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
278 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
281 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
283 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
284 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
285 /// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
286 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
288 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
289 /// generated (ie our own).
290 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
291 let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
292 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
294 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
295 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
296 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
297 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
299 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
301 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
302 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
303 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
304 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
306 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
309 let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone();
310 countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
311 let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone();
312 broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
313 countersignatory_contrib.add_assign(&broadcaster_contrib[..])?;
314 Ok(countersignatory_contrib)
317 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
318 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
319 /// public key instead of private keys.
321 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
322 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
323 /// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
324 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
326 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
327 /// generated (ie our own).
328 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
329 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
330 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
331 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
332 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
334 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
336 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
337 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
338 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
339 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
341 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
344 let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone();
345 countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
346 let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone();
347 broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
348 countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
351 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
352 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
354 /// A broadcaster key is provided from potential broadcaster of the computed transaction.
355 /// A countersignatory key is coming from a protocol participant unable to broadcast the
358 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
359 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
360 /// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the
361 /// pre-calculated keys.
362 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
363 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
364 /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
365 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
366 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
367 /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
369 pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
370 /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
371 pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey,
372 /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
373 pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
374 /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
375 pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
378 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(TxCreationKeys, {
379 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
380 (2, revocation_key, required),
381 (4, broadcaster_htlc_key, required),
382 (6, countersignatory_htlc_key, required),
383 (8, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, required),
386 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
387 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
388 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
389 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
390 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
391 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
392 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
393 /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
394 /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
396 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
397 /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
398 /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
399 /// static across every commitment transaction.
400 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
401 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
402 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
403 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
404 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
405 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
406 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
407 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
410 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelPublicKeys, {
411 (0, funding_pubkey, required),
412 (2, revocation_basepoint, required),
413 (4, payment_point, required),
414 (6, delayed_payment_basepoint, required),
415 (8, htlc_basepoint, required),
418 impl TxCreationKeys {
419 /// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point.
420 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
421 pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
423 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
424 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
425 broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
426 countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
427 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
431 /// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys.
432 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
433 pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
434 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(
436 &per_commitment_point,
437 &broadcaster_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
438 &broadcaster_keys.htlc_basepoint,
439 &countersignatory_keys.revocation_basepoint,
440 &countersignatory_keys.htlc_basepoint,
445 /// The maximum length of a script returned by get_revokeable_redeemscript.
446 // Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 2 bytes for contest_delay, and two public
447 // keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push).
448 pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 3 + 34*2;
450 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
451 /// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
452 /// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
453 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
454 let res = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
455 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
456 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
457 .push_int(contest_delay as i64)
458 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
459 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
460 .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
461 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
462 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
464 debug_assert!(res.len() <= REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH);
468 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
469 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
470 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
471 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
472 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
473 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
474 /// the counterparty or our own.
476 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
477 /// this divided by 1000.
478 pub amount_msat: u64,
479 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
480 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
481 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
482 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
483 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
484 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
485 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
486 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
489 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, {
490 (0, offered, required),
491 (2, amount_msat, required),
492 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
493 (6, payment_hash, required),
494 (8, transaction_output_index, option),
498 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
499 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
501 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
502 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
503 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
504 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
505 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
506 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
507 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
508 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
509 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
510 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
512 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
513 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
514 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
516 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
517 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
519 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
520 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
521 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
522 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
523 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
524 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
525 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
527 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
528 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
529 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
531 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
534 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
535 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
536 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
537 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
538 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
539 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
540 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
541 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
542 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
543 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
545 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
546 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
547 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
548 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
549 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
551 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
552 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
554 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
555 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
556 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
557 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
558 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
559 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
560 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
561 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
563 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
564 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
565 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
567 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
572 /// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
573 /// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
575 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
576 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
579 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
580 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
581 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script {
582 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
583 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
585 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
586 if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
587 builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
588 .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
590 builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
591 .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
592 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
595 /// Builds an unsigned HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction from the given channel and HTLC
596 /// parameters. This is used by [`TrustedCommitmentTransaction::get_htlc_sigs`] to fetch the
597 /// transaction which needs signing, and can be used to construct an HTLC transaction which is
598 /// broadcastable given a counterparty HTLC signature.
600 /// Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
601 /// commitment transaction).
602 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
603 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
605 previous_output: OutPoint {
606 txid: commitment_txid.clone(),
607 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
609 script_sig: Script::new(),
610 sequence: if opt_anchors { 1 } else { 0 },
614 let weight = if htlc.offered {
615 htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
617 htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
619 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * weight / 1000;
621 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
623 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
624 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
629 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
635 /// Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled.
637 pub(crate) fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> Script {
639 .push_slice(&payment_point.serialize()[..])
640 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY)
642 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
646 /// Gets the witnessScript for an anchor output from the funding public key.
647 /// The witness in the spending input must be:
648 /// <BIP 143 funding_signature>
649 /// After 16 blocks of confirmation, an alternative satisfying witness could be:
651 /// (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule)
653 pub fn get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Script {
654 Builder::new().push_slice(&funding_pubkey.serialize()[..])
655 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
656 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IFDUP)
657 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
659 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
660 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
664 /// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction).
665 /// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty.
667 /// Normally, this is converted to the broadcaster/countersignatory-organized DirectedChannelTransactionParameters
668 /// before use, via the as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
670 pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters {
671 /// Holder public keys
672 pub holder_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
673 /// The contest delay selected by the holder, which applies to counterparty-broadcast transactions
674 pub holder_selected_contest_delay: u16,
675 /// Whether the holder is the initiator of this channel.
676 /// This is an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
677 pub is_outbound_from_holder: bool,
678 /// The late-bound counterparty channel transaction parameters.
679 /// These parameters are populated at the point in the protocol where the counterparty provides them.
680 pub counterparty_parameters: Option<CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters>,
681 /// The late-bound funding outpoint
682 pub funding_outpoint: Option<chain::transaction::OutPoint>,
683 /// Are anchors used for this channel. Boolean is serialization backwards-compatible
684 pub opt_anchors: Option<()>
687 /// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
689 pub struct CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
690 /// Counter-party public keys
691 pub pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
692 /// The contest delay selected by the counterparty, which applies to holder-broadcast transactions
693 pub selected_contest_delay: u16,
696 impl ChannelTransactionParameters {
697 /// Whether the late bound parameters are populated.
698 pub fn is_populated(&self) -> bool {
699 self.counterparty_parameters.is_some() && self.funding_outpoint.is_some()
702 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
703 /// given that the holder is the broadcaster.
705 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
706 pub fn as_holder_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
707 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_holder_broadcastable");
708 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
710 holder_is_broadcaster: true
714 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
715 /// given that the counterparty is the broadcaster.
717 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
718 pub fn as_counterparty_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
719 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_counterparty_broadcastable");
720 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
722 holder_is_broadcaster: false
727 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, {
728 (0, pubkeys, required),
729 (2, selected_contest_delay, required),
732 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelTransactionParameters, {
733 (0, holder_pubkeys, required),
734 (2, holder_selected_contest_delay, required),
735 (4, is_outbound_from_holder, required),
736 (6, counterparty_parameters, option),
737 (8, funding_outpoint, option),
738 (10, opt_anchors, option),
741 /// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by
742 /// broadcaster/countersignatory.
744 /// This is derived from the holder/counterparty-organized ChannelTransactionParameters via the
745 /// as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
746 pub struct DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
747 /// The holder's channel static parameters
748 inner: &'a ChannelTransactionParameters,
749 /// Whether the holder is the broadcaster
750 holder_is_broadcaster: bool,
753 impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
754 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the broadcaster
755 pub fn broadcaster_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
756 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
757 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
759 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
763 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the countersignatory
764 pub fn countersignatory_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
765 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
766 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
768 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
772 /// Get the contest delay applicable to the transactions.
773 /// Note that the contest delay was selected by the countersignatory.
774 pub fn contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
775 let counterparty_parameters = self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
776 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { counterparty_parameters.selected_contest_delay } else { self.inner.holder_selected_contest_delay }
779 /// Whether the channel is outbound from the broadcaster.
781 /// The boolean representing the side that initiated the channel is
782 /// an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
783 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
784 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder } else { !self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder }
787 /// The funding outpoint
788 pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
789 self.inner.funding_outpoint.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint()
792 /// Whether to use anchors for this channel
793 pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
794 self.inner.opt_anchors.is_some()
798 /// Information needed to build and sign a holder's commitment transaction.
800 /// The transaction is only signed once we are ready to broadcast.
802 pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
803 inner: CommitmentTransaction,
804 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction
805 pub counterparty_sig: Signature,
806 /// All non-dust counterparty HTLC signatures, in the order they appear in the transaction
807 pub counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>,
808 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
809 // The user should be able to reconstruct this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
810 holder_sig_first: bool,
813 impl Deref for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
814 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
816 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.inner }
819 impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
820 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
821 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
822 self.inner == o.inner
826 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderCommitmentTransaction, {
827 (0, inner, required),
828 (2, counterparty_sig, required),
829 (4, holder_sig_first, required),
830 (6, counterparty_htlc_sigs, vec_type),
833 impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
835 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
836 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
837 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
838 let dummy_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
840 let keys = TxCreationKeys {
841 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
842 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
843 broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
844 countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
845 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
847 let channel_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
848 funding_pubkey: dummy_key.clone(),
849 revocation_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
850 payment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
851 delayed_payment_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
852 htlc_basepoint: dummy_key.clone()
854 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
855 holder_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(),
856 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
857 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
858 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
859 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: 0 }),
862 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
863 let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, false, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
864 HolderCommitmentTransaction {
866 counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
867 counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec::new(),
868 holder_sig_first: false
872 /// Create a new holder transaction with the given counterparty signatures.
873 /// The funding keys are used to figure out which signature should go first when building the transaction for broadcast.
874 pub fn new(commitment_tx: CommitmentTransaction, counterparty_sig: Signature, counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>, holder_funding_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Self {
876 inner: commitment_tx,
878 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
879 holder_sig_first: holder_funding_key.serialize()[..] < counterparty_funding_key.serialize()[..],
883 pub(crate) fn add_holder_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, holder_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
884 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
885 let mut tx = self.inner.built.transaction.clone();
886 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
888 if self.holder_sig_first {
889 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
890 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
892 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
893 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
895 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
896 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
898 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
903 /// A pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction and its txid.
905 pub struct BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
906 /// The commitment transaction
907 pub transaction: Transaction,
908 /// The txid for the commitment transaction.
910 /// This is provided as a performance optimization, instead of calling transaction.txid()
915 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BuiltCommitmentTransaction, {
916 (0, transaction, required),
920 impl BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
921 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
923 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
924 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
925 let sighash = &bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.transaction).signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..];
926 hash_to_message!(sighash)
929 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
930 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
931 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
932 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
933 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
937 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a closing transaction and will
938 /// actually build it and sign.
940 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
942 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq)]
943 pub struct ClosingTransaction {
944 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
945 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
946 to_holder_script: Script,
947 to_counterparty_script: Script,
951 impl ClosingTransaction {
952 /// Construct an object of the class
954 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
955 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
956 to_holder_script: Script,
957 to_counterparty_script: Script,
958 funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
960 let built = build_closing_transaction(
961 to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat,
962 to_holder_script.clone(), to_counterparty_script.clone(),
967 to_counterparty_value_sat,
969 to_counterparty_script,
974 /// Trust our pre-built transaction.
976 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
978 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
979 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
980 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedClosingTransaction {
981 TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self }
984 /// Verify our pre-built transaction.
986 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
988 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
989 /// or using the built transaction.
990 pub fn verify(&self, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Result<TrustedClosingTransaction, ()> {
991 let built = build_closing_transaction(
992 self.to_holder_value_sat, self.to_counterparty_value_sat,
993 self.to_holder_script.clone(), self.to_counterparty_script.clone(),
996 if self.built != built {
999 Ok(TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self })
1002 /// The value to be sent to the holder, or zero if the output will be omitted
1003 pub fn to_holder_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1004 self.to_holder_value_sat
1007 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty, or zero if the output will be omitted
1008 pub fn to_counterparty_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1009 self.to_counterparty_value_sat
1012 /// The destination of the holder's output
1013 pub fn to_holder_script(&self) -> &Script {
1014 &self.to_holder_script
1017 /// The destination of the counterparty's output
1018 pub fn to_counterparty_script(&self) -> &Script {
1019 &self.to_counterparty_script
1023 /// A wrapper on ClosingTransaction indicating that the built bitcoin
1024 /// transaction is trusted.
1026 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1028 /// This structure implements Deref.
1029 pub struct TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1030 inner: &'a ClosingTransaction,
1033 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1034 type Target = ClosingTransaction;
1036 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1039 impl<'a> TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1040 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1041 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &Transaction {
1045 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
1047 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
1048 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
1049 let sighash = &bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.inner.built).signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..];
1050 hash_to_message!(sighash)
1053 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
1054 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
1055 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
1056 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
1057 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
1061 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a commitment transaction and will
1062 /// actually build it and sign. It is used for holder transactions that we sign only when needed
1063 /// and for transactions we sign for the counterparty.
1065 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
1068 pub struct CommitmentTransaction {
1069 commitment_number: u64,
1070 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64,
1071 to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64,
1072 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1073 htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
1074 // A boolean that is serialization backwards-compatible
1075 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
1076 // A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust()
1077 keys: TxCreationKeys,
1078 // For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust()
1079 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction,
1082 impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction {
1083 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
1084 let eq = self.commitment_number == o.commitment_number &&
1085 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat == o.to_broadcaster_value_sat &&
1086 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat == o.to_countersignatory_value_sat &&
1087 self.feerate_per_kw == o.feerate_per_kw &&
1088 self.htlcs == o.htlcs &&
1089 self.opt_anchors == o.opt_anchors &&
1090 self.keys == o.keys;
1092 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.transaction, o.built.transaction);
1093 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.txid, o.built.txid);
1099 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CommitmentTransaction, {
1100 (0, commitment_number, required),
1101 (2, to_broadcaster_value_sat, required),
1102 (4, to_countersignatory_value_sat, required),
1103 (6, feerate_per_kw, required),
1104 (8, keys, required),
1105 (10, built, required),
1106 (12, htlcs, vec_type),
1107 (14, opt_anchors, option),
1110 impl CommitmentTransaction {
1111 /// Construct an object of the class while assigning transaction output indices to HTLCs.
1113 /// Populates HTLCOutputInCommitment.transaction_output_index in htlcs_with_aux.
1115 /// The generic T allows the caller to match the HTLC output index with auxiliary data.
1116 /// This auxiliary data is not stored in this object.
1118 /// Only include HTLCs that are above the dust limit for the channel.
1120 /// (C-not exported) due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
1121 pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
1122 // Sort outputs and populate output indices while keeping track of the auxiliary data
1123 let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, opt_anchors, &broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key).unwrap();
1125 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1126 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1127 let txid = transaction.txid();
1128 CommitmentTransaction {
1130 to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1131 to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1134 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1136 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1143 fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<BuiltCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1144 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1146 let mut htlcs_with_aux = self.htlcs.iter().map(|h| (h.clone(), ())).collect();
1147 let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, self.opt_anchors.is_some(), broadcaster_funding_key, countersignatory_funding_key)?;
1149 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1150 let txid = transaction.txid();
1151 let built_transaction = BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1155 Ok(built_transaction)
1158 fn make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number: u64, txins: Vec<TxIn>, outputs: Vec<TxOut>) -> Transaction {
1161 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
1167 // This is used in two cases:
1168 // - initial sorting of outputs / HTLCs in the constructor, in which case T is auxiliary data the
1169 // caller needs to have sorted together with the HTLCs so it can keep track of the output index
1170 // - building of a bitcoin transaction during a verify() call, in which case T is just ()
1171 fn internal_build_outputs<T>(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<(Vec<TxOut>, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), ()> {
1172 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1173 let contest_delay = channel_parameters.contest_delay();
1175 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<&mut HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::new();
1177 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 {
1178 let script = if opt_anchors {
1179 get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh()
1181 get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)
1185 script_pubkey: script.clone(),
1186 value: to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1192 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 {
1193 let redeem_script = get_revokeable_redeemscript(
1194 &keys.revocation_key,
1196 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1200 script_pubkey: redeem_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1201 value: to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1208 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1209 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(broadcaster_funding_key);
1212 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1213 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1219 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1220 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(countersignatory_funding_key);
1223 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1224 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1231 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_with_aux.len());
1232 for (htlc, _) in htlcs_with_aux {
1233 let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, opt_anchors, &keys);
1235 script_pubkey: script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1236 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1238 txouts.push((txout, Some(htlc)));
1241 // Sort output in BIP-69 order (amount, scriptPubkey). Tie-breaks based on HTLC
1242 // CLTV expiration height.
1243 sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
1244 if let &Some(ref a_htlcout) = a {
1245 if let &Some(ref b_htlcout) = b {
1246 a_htlcout.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlcout.cltv_expiry)
1247 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
1248 // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
1250 .then(a_htlcout.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlcout.payment_hash.0))
1251 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1252 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1253 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1254 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1257 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1258 for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1259 if let Some(htlc) = out.1 {
1260 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1261 htlcs.push(htlc.clone());
1263 outputs.push(out.0);
1265 Ok((outputs, htlcs))
1268 fn internal_build_inputs(commitment_number: u64, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> (u64, Vec<TxIn>) {
1269 let broadcaster_pubkeys = channel_parameters.broadcaster_pubkeys();
1270 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1271 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1272 &broadcaster_pubkeys.payment_point,
1273 &countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point,
1274 channel_parameters.is_outbound(),
1277 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number =
1278 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
1281 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1283 previous_output: channel_parameters.funding_outpoint(),
1284 script_sig: Script::new(),
1285 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
1286 | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32),
1287 witness: Vec::new(),
1291 (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins)
1294 /// The backwards-counting commitment number
1295 pub fn commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1296 self.commitment_number
1299 /// The value to be sent to the broadcaster
1300 pub fn to_broadcaster_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1301 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat
1304 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty
1305 pub fn to_countersignatory_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1306 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat
1309 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction.
1310 pub fn feerate_per_kw(&self) -> u32 {
1314 /// The non-dust HTLCs (direction, amt, height expiration, hash, transaction output index)
1315 /// which were included in this commitment transaction in output order.
1316 /// The transaction index is always populated.
1318 /// (C-not exported) as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should
1319 /// expose a less effecient version which creates a Vec of references in the future.
1320 pub fn htlcs(&self) -> &Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1324 /// Trust our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1326 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1328 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
1329 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
1330 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction {
1331 TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self }
1334 /// Verify our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1336 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1338 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
1339 /// or using the built transaction.
1340 pub fn verify<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1341 // This is the only field of the key cache that we trust
1342 let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point;
1343 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx).unwrap();
1344 if keys != self.keys {
1347 let tx = self.internal_rebuild_transaction(&keys, channel_parameters, &broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey, &countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey)?;
1348 if self.built.transaction != tx.transaction || self.built.txid != tx.txid {
1351 Ok(TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self })
1355 /// A wrapper on CommitmentTransaction indicating that the derived fields (the built bitcoin
1356 /// transaction and the transaction creation keys) are trusted.
1358 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1360 /// This structure implements Deref.
1361 pub struct TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1362 inner: &'a CommitmentTransaction,
1365 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1366 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
1368 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1371 impl<'a> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1372 /// The transaction ID of the built Bitcoin transaction
1373 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
1374 self.inner.built.txid
1377 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1378 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1382 /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
1383 pub fn keys(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
1387 /// Should anchors be used.
1388 pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
1389 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
1392 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
1393 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
1395 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order.
1397 /// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses SigHashType::All.
1398 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
1399 let inner = self.inner;
1400 let keys = &inner.keys;
1401 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1402 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(inner.htlcs.len());
1403 let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
1405 for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() {
1406 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1407 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1409 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1411 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
1412 ret.push(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
1417 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature.
1418 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_index: usize, counterparty_signature: &Signature, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Transaction {
1419 let inner = self.inner;
1420 let keys = &inner.keys;
1421 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1422 let this_htlc = &inner.htlcs[htlc_index];
1423 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1424 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
1425 if !this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
1426 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
1427 if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
1429 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1431 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1433 let sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { SigHashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { SigHashType::All };
1435 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
1436 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1438 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
1439 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
1440 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(sighashtype as u8);
1441 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1443 if this_htlc.offered {
1444 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
1445 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1447 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
1450 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
1455 /// Commitment transaction numbers which appear in the transactions themselves are XOR'd with a
1456 /// shared secret first. This prevents on-chain observers from discovering how many commitment
1457 /// transactions occurred in a channel before it was closed.
1459 /// This function gets the shared secret from relevant channel public keys and can be used to
1460 /// "decrypt" the commitment transaction number given a commitment transaction on-chain.
1461 pub fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1462 broadcaster_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1463 countersignatory_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1464 outbound_from_broadcaster: bool,
1466 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1468 if outbound_from_broadcaster {
1469 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1470 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1472 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1473 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1475 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
1477 ((res[26] as u64) << 5 * 8)
1478 | ((res[27] as u64) << 4 * 8)
1479 | ((res[28] as u64) << 3 * 8)
1480 | ((res[29] as u64) << 2 * 8)
1481 | ((res[30] as u64) << 1 * 8)
1482 | ((res[31] as u64) << 0 * 8)
1485 fn get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
1486 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1487 .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&key.serialize())[..])
1493 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
1496 use ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
1497 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Secp256k1};
1498 use util::test_utils;
1499 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, BaseSign};
1500 use bitcoin::Network;
1501 use ln::PaymentHash;
1502 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
1506 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1508 let seed = [42; 32];
1509 let network = Network::Testnet;
1510 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
1511 let signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
1512 let counterparty_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
1513 let delayed_payment_base = &signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1514 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1515 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
1516 let htlc_basepoint = &signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1517 let holder_pubkeys = signer.pubkeys();
1518 let counterparty_pubkeys = counterparty_signer.pubkeys();
1519 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1520 let mut channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
1521 holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.clone(),
1522 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
1523 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1524 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
1525 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: 0 }),
1529 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
1531 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs
1532 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1535 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1536 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1538 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1540 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1541 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point));
1543 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs as well as two anchors
1544 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1547 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1548 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1550 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1552 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 4);
1553 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh());
1555 // Generate broadcaster output and anchor
1556 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1559 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1560 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1562 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1564 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1566 // Generate counterparty output and anchor
1567 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1570 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1571 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1573 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1575 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1577 let received_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1579 amount_msat: 400000,
1581 payment_hash: PaymentHash([42; 32]),
1582 transaction_output_index: None,
1585 let offered_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1587 amount_msat: 600000,
1589 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
1590 transaction_output_index: None,
1593 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, w/o anchors
1594 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1597 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1598 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1600 &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
1601 &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1603 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 3);
1604 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[0].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1605 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1606 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1607 "002085cf52e41ba7c099a39df504e7b61f6de122971ceb53b06731876eaeb85e8dc5");
1608 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1609 "002049f0736bb335c61a04d2623a24df878a7592a3c51fa7258d41b2c85318265e73");
1611 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, with anchors
1612 channel_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
1613 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1616 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1617 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1619 &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
1620 &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1622 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 5);
1623 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[2].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1624 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1625 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1626 "002067114123af3f95405bae4fd930fc95de03e3c86baaee8b2dd29b43dd26cf613c");
1627 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1628 "0020a06e3b0d4fcf704f2b9c41e16a70099e39989466c3142b8573a1154542f28f57");
1632 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1633 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1634 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1637 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1639 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1640 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1641 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1644 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1645 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
1650 // insert_secret correct sequence
1651 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1654 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1655 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1656 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1659 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1660 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1661 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1664 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1665 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1666 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1669 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1670 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1671 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1674 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1675 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1676 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1679 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1680 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1681 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1684 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1685 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1686 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1689 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1690 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1691 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1696 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1697 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1700 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1701 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1702 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1705 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1706 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1707 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1711 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1712 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1715 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1716 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1717 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1720 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1721 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1722 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1725 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1726 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1727 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1730 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1731 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1732 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1736 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1737 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1740 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1741 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1742 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1745 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1746 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1747 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1750 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1751 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1752 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1755 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1756 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1757 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1761 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1762 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1765 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1766 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1767 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1770 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1771 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1772 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1775 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1776 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1777 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1780 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1781 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1782 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1785 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1786 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1787 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1790 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1791 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1792 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1795 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1796 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1797 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1800 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1801 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1802 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1806 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1807 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1810 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1811 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1812 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1815 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1816 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1817 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1820 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1821 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1822 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1825 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1826 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1827 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1830 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1831 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1832 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1835 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1836 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1837 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1841 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1842 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1845 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1846 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1847 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1850 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1851 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1852 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1855 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1856 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1857 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1860 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1861 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1862 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1865 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1866 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1867 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1870 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1871 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1872 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1875 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1876 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1877 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1880 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1881 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1882 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1886 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1887 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1890 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1891 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1892 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1895 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1896 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1897 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1900 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1901 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1902 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1905 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1906 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1907 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1910 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1911 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1912 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1915 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1916 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1917 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1920 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1921 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1922 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1925 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1926 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1927 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1931 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1932 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1935 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1936 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1937 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1940 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1941 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1942 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1945 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1946 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1947 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1950 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1951 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1952 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1955 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1956 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1957 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1960 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1961 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1962 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1965 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1966 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1967 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1970 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1971 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1972 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());