_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs

   1 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
   2 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
   3 //! by hand.
   4
   5 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
   6 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
   7 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
   8 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{Decodable, Encodable};
   9 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  10 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  11
  12 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
  13 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  14 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
  15 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
  16
  17 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
  18 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
  19 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
  20 use util::byte_utils;
  21
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
  24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  25
  26 use std::{cmp, mem};
  27
  28 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
  29
  30 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
  31 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
  32
  33 #[derive(PartialEq)]
  34 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
  35         AcceptedHTLC,
  36         OfferedHTLC
  37 }
  38
  39 impl HTLCType {
  40         /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
  41         pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) ->  Option<HTLCType> {
  42                 if witness_script_len == 133 {
  43                         Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
  44                 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
  45                         Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
  46                 } else {
  47                         None
  48                 }
  49         }
  50 }
  51
  52 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
  53 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
  54
  55 pub(super) fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
  56         let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
  57         for i in 0..48 {
  58                 let bitpos = 47 - i;
  59                 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
  60                         res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
  61                         res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
  62                 }
  63         }
  64         res
  65 }
  66
  67 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
  68 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
  69 ///
  70 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
  71 /// or so.
  72 #[derive(Clone)]
  73 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  74         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
  75 }
  76
  77 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  78         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
  79                 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
  80                         if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
  81                                 return false
  82                         }
  83                 }
  84                 true
  85         }
  86 }
  87
  88 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  89         pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
  90                 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
  91         }
  92
  93         #[inline]
  94         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
  95                 for i in 0..48 {
  96                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
  97                                 return i
  98                         }
  99                 }
 100                 48
 101         }
 102
 103         pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 104                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 105                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 106                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 107                         if idx < min {
 108                                 min = idx;
 109                         }
 110                 }
 111                 min
 112         }
 113
 114         #[inline]
 115         pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 116                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 117                 for i in 0..bits {
 118                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 119                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 120                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 121                                 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
 122                         }
 123                 }
 124                 res
 125         }
 126
 127         pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
 128                 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
 129                 for i in 0..pos {
 130                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 131                         if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 132                                 return Err(());
 133                         }
 134                 }
 135                 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
 136                         return Ok(());
 137                 }
 138                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 139                 Ok(())
 140         }
 141
 142         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 143         pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
 144                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 145                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 146                                 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 147                         }
 148                 }
 149                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 150                 None
 151         }
 152 }
 153
 154 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 155         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 156                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 157                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
 158                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
 159                 }
 160                 Ok(())
 161         }
 162 }
 163 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 164         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 165                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
 166                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
 167                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
 168                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
 169                 }
 170
 171                 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
 172         }
 173 }
 174
 175 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
 176 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
 177 ///
 178 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 179 /// generated (ie our own).
 180 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 181         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 182         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 183         sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
 184         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 185
 186         let mut key = base_secret.clone();
 187         key.add_assign(&res)?;
 188         Ok(key)
 189 }
 190
 191 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
 192 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
 193 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
 194 ///
 195 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 196 /// generated (ie our own).
 197 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 198         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 199         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 200         sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
 201         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 202
 203         let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
 204         base_point.combine(&hashkey)
 205 }
 206
 207 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
 208 ///
 209 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 210 /// generated (ie our own).
 211 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 212         let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
 213         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
 214
 215         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 216                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 217                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 218                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 219
 220                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 221         };
 222         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 223                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 224                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 225                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 226
 227                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 228         };
 229
 230         let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
 231         part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 232         let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
 233         part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 234         part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
 235         Ok(part_a)
 236 }
 237
 238 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
 239 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
 240 /// public key instead of private keys.
 241 ///
 242 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 243 /// generated (ie our own).
 244 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 245         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 246                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 247                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 248                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 249
 250                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 251         };
 252         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 253                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 254                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 255                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 256
 257                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 258         };
 259
 260         let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
 261         part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 262         let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
 263         part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 264         part_a.combine(&part_b)
 265 }
 266
 267 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
 268 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
 269 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
 270 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
 271         /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
 272         pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 273         /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
 274         /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
 275         pub(crate) revocation_key: PublicKey,
 276         /// A's HTLC Key
 277         pub(crate) a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 278         /// B's HTLC Key
 279         pub(crate) b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 280         /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
 281         pub(crate) a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 282 }
 283 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
 284         { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key });
 285
 286 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
 287 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 288 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
 289         /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
 290         /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
 291         pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
 292         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
 293         /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
 294         /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
 295         /// states.
 296         pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
 297         /// The public key which receives our immediately spendable primary channel balance in
 298         /// remote-broadcasted commitment transactions. This key is static across every commitment
 299         /// transaction.
 300         pub payment_point: PublicKey,
 301         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
 302         /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
 303         /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
 304         pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
 305         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
 306         /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
 307         pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
 308 }
 309
 310 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
 311         funding_pubkey,
 312         revocation_basepoint,
 313         payment_point,
 314         delayed_payment_basepoint,
 315         htlc_basepoint
 316 });
 317
 318
 319 impl TxCreationKeys {
 320         pub(crate) fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
 321                 Ok(TxCreationKeys {
 322                         per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
 323                         revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
 324                         a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
 325                         b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
 326                         a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
 327                 })
 328         }
 329 }
 330
 331 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
 332 /// key or the delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
 333 /// Encumbering a `to_local` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
 334 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 335         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 336                       .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
 337                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 338                       .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
 339                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
 340                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 341                       .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
 342                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 343                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 344                       .into_script()
 345 }
 346
 347 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 348 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
 349 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 350         /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
 351         /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
 352         /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
 353         /// the remote party or our own.
 354         pub offered: bool,
 355         /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
 356         /// this divided by 1000.
 357         pub amount_msat: u64,
 358         /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
 359         pub cltv_expiry: u32,
 360         /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
 361         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 362         /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
 363         /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
 364         /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
 365         pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
 366 }
 367
 368 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
 369         offered,
 370         amount_msat,
 371         cltv_expiry,
 372         payment_hash,
 373         transaction_output_index
 374 });
 375
 376 #[inline]
 377 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 378         let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
 379         if htlc.offered {
 380                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 381                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 382                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 383                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 384                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 385                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 386                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 387                               .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 388                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 389                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 390                               .push_int(32)
 391                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 392                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
 393                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 394                               .push_int(2)
 395                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 396                               .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 397                               .push_int(2)
 398                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 399                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 400                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 401                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 402                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 403                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 404                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 405                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 406                               .into_script()
 407         } else {
 408                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 409                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 410                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 411                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 412                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 413                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 414                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 415                               .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 416                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 417                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 418                               .push_int(32)
 419                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 420                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 421                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 422                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 423                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 424                               .push_int(2)
 425                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 426                               .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 427                               .push_int(2)
 428                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 429                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 430                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 431                               .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
 432                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
 433                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 434                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 435                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 436                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 437                               .into_script()
 438         }
 439 }
 440
 441 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
 442 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
 443 #[inline]
 444 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
 445         get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
 446 }
 447
 448 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
 449 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
 450 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 451         let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
 452         let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
 453
 454         let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
 455         if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
 456                 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 457                         .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
 458         } else {
 459                 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
 460                         .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 461         }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
 462 }
 463
 464 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
 465 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u64, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
 466         let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 467         txins.push(TxIn {
 468                 previous_output: OutPoint {
 469                         txid: prev_hash.clone(),
 470                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
 471                 },
 472                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 473                 sequence: 0,
 474                 witness: Vec::new(),
 475         });
 476
 477         let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
 478                         feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 479                 } else {
 480                         feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 481                 };
 482
 483         let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
 484         txouts.push(TxOut {
 485                 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
 486                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
 487         });
 488
 489         Transaction {
 490                 version: 2,
 491                 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
 492                 input: txins,
 493                 output: txouts,
 494         }
 495 }
 496
 497 #[derive(Clone)]
 498 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
 499 /// to broadcast. Eventually this will require a signer which is possibly external, but for now we
 500 /// just pass in the SecretKeys required.
 501 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 502         // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
 503         // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
 504         // so we're probably most of the way there.
 505         /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
 506         pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
 507         /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
 508         pub their_sig: Signature,
 509         // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
 510         // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
 511         our_sig_first: bool,
 512         /// The key derivation parameters for this commitment transaction
 513         pub local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
 514         /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
 515         /// controlled by the channel initiator.
 516         pub feerate_per_kw: u64,
 517         /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
 518         ///
 519         /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
 520         /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
 521         /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
 522         ///
 523         /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
 524         /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
 525         pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
 526 }
 527 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 528         #[cfg(test)]
 529         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 530                 let dummy_input = TxIn {
 531                         previous_output: OutPoint {
 532                                 txid: Default::default(),
 533                                 vout: 0,
 534                         },
 535                         script_sig: Default::default(),
 536                         sequence: 0,
 537                         witness: vec![]
 538                 };
 539                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 540                 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 541                 Self {
 542                         unsigned_tx: Transaction {
 543                                 version: 2,
 544                                 input: vec![dummy_input],
 545                                 output: Vec::new(),
 546                                 lock_time: 0,
 547                         },
 548                         their_sig: dummy_sig,
 549                         our_sig_first: false,
 550                         local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
 551                                         per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
 552                                         revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 553                                         a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 554                                         b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 555                                         a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 556                                 },
 557                         feerate_per_kw: 0,
 558                         per_htlc: Vec::new()
 559                 }
 560         }
 561
 562         /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
 563         /// remote signature and both parties keys
 564         pub(crate) fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 565                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
 566                 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
 567
 568                 Self {
 569                         unsigned_tx,
 570                         their_sig,
 571                         our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
 572                         local_keys,
 573                         feerate_per_kw,
 574                         per_htlc: htlc_data,
 575                 }
 576         }
 577
 578         /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
 579         /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
 580         pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
 581                 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
 582         }
 583
 584         /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
 585         ///
 586         /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
 587         /// by your ChannelKeys.
 588         /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
 589         /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
 590         /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
 591         /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
 592         pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
 593                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
 594                         .sighash_all(&self.unsigned_tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
 595                 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
 596         }
 597
 598         pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
 599                 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
 600                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 601                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 602
 603                 if self.our_sig_first {
 604                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 605                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 606                 } else {
 607                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 608                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 609                 }
 610                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 611                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 612
 613                 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 614                 tx
 615         }
 616
 617         /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
 618         /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
 619         ///
 620         /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
 621         /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
 622         /// included.
 623         pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
 624                 let txid = self.txid();
 625                 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
 626                 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
 627
 628                 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 629                         if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
 630                                 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 631
 632                                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 633
 634                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
 635                                 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
 636                         } else {
 637                                 ret.push(None);
 638                         }
 639                 }
 640                 Ok(ret)
 641         }
 642
 643         /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
 644         pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
 645                 let txid = self.txid();
 646                 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
 647                 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
 648                 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
 649                 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
 650                 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
 651                 if  this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
 652
 653                 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 654                 // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
 655                 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
 656                 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
 657
 658                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 659
 660                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 661                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 662
 663                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
 664                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
 665                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 666                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 667
 668                 if this_htlc.0.offered {
 669                         // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
 670                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 671                 } else {
 672                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
 673                 }
 674
 675                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 676                 htlc_tx
 677         }
 678 }
 679 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 680         // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
 681         fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
 682                 self.txid() == o.txid()
 683         }
 684 }
 685 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 686         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 687                 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
 688                         match e {
 689                                 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
 690                                 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
 691                         }
 692                 }
 693                 self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
 694                 self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
 695                 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
 696                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
 697                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
 698                 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 699                         htlc.write(writer)?;
 700                         sig.write(writer)?;
 701                 }
 702                 Ok(())
 703         }
 704 }
 705 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 706         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 707                 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
 708                         Ok(tx) => tx,
 709                         Err(e) => match e {
 710                                 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
 711                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 712                         },
 713                 };
 714                 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
 715                 let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
 716                 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
 717                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
 718                 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 719                 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
 720                 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
 721                         let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
 722                         let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
 723                         per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
 724                 }
 725
 726                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
 727                         // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
 728                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 729                 }
 730                 Ok(Self {
 731                         unsigned_tx,
 732                         their_sig,
 733                         our_sig_first,
 734                         local_keys,
 735                         feerate_per_kw,
 736                         per_htlc,
 737                 })
 738         }
 739 }
 740
 741 #[cfg(test)]
 742 mod tests {
 743         use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
 744         use hex;
 745
 746         #[test]
 747         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
 748                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
 749                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
 750                 let mut monitor;
 751
 752                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
 753                         () => {
 754                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
 755                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
 756                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
 757                                         idx -= 1;
 758                                 }
 759                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
 760                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
 761                         };
 762                 }
 763
 764                 {
 765                         // insert_secret correct sequence
 766                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 767                         secrets.clear();
 768
 769                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 770                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 771                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 772                         test_secrets!();
 773
 774                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 775                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 776                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 777                         test_secrets!();
 778
 779                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 780                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 781                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 782                         test_secrets!();
 783
 784                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 785                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 786                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 787                         test_secrets!();
 788
 789                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 790                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 791                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 792                         test_secrets!();
 793
 794                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 795                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 796                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 797                         test_secrets!();
 798
 799                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 800                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 801                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 802                         test_secrets!();
 803
 804                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 805                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 806                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 807                         test_secrets!();
 808                 }
 809
 810                 {
 811                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
 812                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 813                         secrets.clear();
 814
 815                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 816                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 817                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 818                         test_secrets!();
 819
 820                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 821                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 822                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 823                 }
 824
 825                 {
 826                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
 827                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 828                         secrets.clear();
 829
 830                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 831                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 832                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 833                         test_secrets!();
 834
 835                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 836                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 837                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 838                         test_secrets!();
 839
 840                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 841                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 842                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 843                         test_secrets!();
 844
 845                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 846                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 847                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 848                 }
 849
 850                 {
 851                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
 852                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 853                         secrets.clear();
 854
 855                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 856                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 857                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 858                         test_secrets!();
 859
 860                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 861                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 862                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 863                         test_secrets!();
 864
 865                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 866                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 867                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 868                         test_secrets!();
 869
 870                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 871                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 872                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 873                 }
 874
 875                 {
 876                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
 877                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 878                         secrets.clear();
 879
 880                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 881                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 882                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 883                         test_secrets!();
 884
 885                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 886                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 887                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 888                         test_secrets!();
 889
 890                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 891                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 892                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 893                         test_secrets!();
 894
 895                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 896                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
 897                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 898                         test_secrets!();
 899
 900                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 901                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 902                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 903                         test_secrets!();
 904
 905                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 906                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 907                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 908                         test_secrets!();
 909
 910                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 911                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 912                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 913                         test_secrets!();
 914
 915                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 916                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 917                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 918                 }
 919
 920                 {
 921                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
 922                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 923                         secrets.clear();
 924
 925                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 926                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 927                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 928                         test_secrets!();
 929
 930                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 931                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 932                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 933                         test_secrets!();
 934
 935                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 936                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 937                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 938                         test_secrets!();
 939
 940                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 941                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 942                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 943                         test_secrets!();
 944
 945                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 946                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
 947                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 948                         test_secrets!();
 949
 950                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 951                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 952                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 953                 }
 954
 955                 {
 956                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
 957                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 958                         secrets.clear();
 959
 960                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 961                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 962                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 963                         test_secrets!();
 964
 965                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 966                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 967                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 968                         test_secrets!();
 969
 970                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 971                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 972                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 973                         test_secrets!();
 974
 975                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 976                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 977                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 978                         test_secrets!();
 979
 980                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 981                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
 982                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 983                         test_secrets!();
 984
 985                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 986                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
 987                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 988                         test_secrets!();
 989
 990                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 991                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 992                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 993                         test_secrets!();
 994
 995                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 996                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 997                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 998                 }
 999
1000                 {
1001                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1002                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1003                         secrets.clear();
1004
1005                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1006                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1007                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1008                         test_secrets!();
1009
1010                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1011                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1012                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1013                         test_secrets!();
1014
1015                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1016                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1017                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1018                         test_secrets!();
1019
1020                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1021                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1022                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1023                         test_secrets!();
1024
1025                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1026                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1027                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1028                         test_secrets!();
1029
1030                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1031                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1032                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1033                         test_secrets!();
1034
1035                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1036                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1037                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1038                         test_secrets!();
1039
1040                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1041                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1042                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1043                 }
1044
1045                 {
1046                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1047                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1048                         secrets.clear();
1049
1050                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1051                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1052                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1053                         test_secrets!();
1054
1055                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1056                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1057                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1058                         test_secrets!();
1059
1060                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1061                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1062                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1063                         test_secrets!();
1064
1065                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1066                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1067                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1068                         test_secrets!();
1069
1070                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1071                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1072                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1073                         test_secrets!();
1074
1075                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1076                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1077                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1078                         test_secrets!();
1079
1080                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1081                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1082                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1083                         test_secrets!();
1084
1085                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1086                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1087                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1088                 }
1089         }
1090 }