1 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
2 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
5 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
6 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
8 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{Decodable, Encodable};
9 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
10 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
12 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
13 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
14 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
15 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
17 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
18 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
19 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
28 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
30 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
31 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
34 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
40 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
41 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
42 if witness_script_len == 133 {
43 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
44 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
45 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
52 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
53 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
55 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
56 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
57 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
60 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
61 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
62 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
68 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
69 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
71 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
74 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
75 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
78 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
79 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
80 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
81 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
89 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
90 pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
91 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
95 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
97 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
104 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
105 //TODO This can be optimized?
106 let mut min = 1 << 48;
107 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
116 pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
117 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
119 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
120 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
121 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
122 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
128 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
129 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
131 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
132 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
136 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
139 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
143 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
144 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
145 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
146 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
147 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
150 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
155 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
156 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
157 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
158 writer.write_all(secret)?;
159 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
164 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
165 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
166 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
167 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
168 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
169 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
172 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
176 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
177 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
179 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
180 /// generated (ie our own).
181 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
182 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
183 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
184 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
185 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
187 let mut key = base_secret.clone();
188 key.add_assign(&res)?;
192 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
193 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
194 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
196 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
197 /// generated (ie our own).
198 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
199 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
200 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
201 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
202 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
204 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
205 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
208 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
210 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
211 /// generated (ie our own).
212 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
213 let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
214 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
216 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
217 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
218 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
219 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
221 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
223 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
224 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
225 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
226 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
228 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
231 let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
232 part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
233 let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
234 part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
235 part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
239 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
240 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
241 /// public key instead of private keys.
243 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
244 /// generated (ie our own).
245 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
246 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
247 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
248 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
249 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
251 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
253 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
254 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
255 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
256 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
258 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
261 let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
262 part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
263 let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
264 part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
265 part_a.combine(&part_b)
268 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
269 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
270 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
271 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
272 /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
273 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
274 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
275 /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
276 pub(crate) revocation_key: PublicKey,
278 pub(crate) a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
280 pub(crate) b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
281 /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
282 pub(crate) a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
284 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
285 { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key });
287 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
288 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
289 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
290 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
291 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
292 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
293 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
294 /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
295 /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
297 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
298 /// The public key which receives our immediately spendable primary channel balance in
299 /// remote-broadcasted commitment transactions. This key is static across every commitment
301 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
302 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
303 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
304 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
305 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
306 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
307 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
308 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
311 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
313 revocation_basepoint,
315 delayed_payment_basepoint,
320 impl TxCreationKeys {
321 pub(crate) fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
323 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
324 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
325 a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
326 b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
327 a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
332 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
333 /// key or the delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
334 /// Encumbering a `to_local` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
335 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
336 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
337 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
338 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
339 .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
340 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
341 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
342 .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
343 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
344 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
348 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
349 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
350 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
351 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
352 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
353 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
354 /// the remote party or our own.
356 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
357 /// this divided by 1000.
358 pub amount_msat: u64,
359 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
360 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
361 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
362 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
363 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
364 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
365 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
366 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
369 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
374 transaction_output_index
378 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
379 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
381 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
382 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
383 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
384 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
385 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
386 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
387 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
388 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
389 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
390 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
392 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
393 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
394 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
396 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
397 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
399 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
400 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
401 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
402 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
403 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
404 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
405 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
406 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
409 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
410 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
411 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
412 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
413 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
414 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
415 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
416 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
417 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
418 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
420 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
421 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
422 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
423 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
424 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
426 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
427 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
429 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
430 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
431 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
432 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
433 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
434 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
435 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
436 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
437 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
442 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
443 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
445 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
446 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
449 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
450 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
451 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
452 let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
453 let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
455 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
456 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
457 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
458 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
460 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
461 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
462 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
465 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
466 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
467 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
469 previous_output: OutPoint {
470 txid: prev_hash.clone(),
471 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
473 script_sig: Script::new(),
478 let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
479 feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
481 feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
484 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
486 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
487 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
492 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
499 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
500 /// to broadcast. This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature
501 /// given the relevant secret key.
502 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
503 // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
504 // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
505 // so we're probably most of the way there.
506 /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
507 pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
508 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
509 pub their_sig: Signature,
510 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
511 // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
513 /// The key derivation parameters for this commitment transaction
514 pub local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
515 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
516 /// controlled by the channel initiator.
517 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
518 /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
520 /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
521 /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
522 /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
524 /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
525 /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
526 pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
528 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
530 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
531 let dummy_input = TxIn {
532 previous_output: OutPoint {
533 txid: Default::default(),
536 script_sig: Default::default(),
540 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
541 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
543 unsigned_tx: Transaction {
545 input: vec![dummy_input],
549 their_sig: dummy_sig,
550 our_sig_first: false,
551 local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
552 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
553 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
554 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
555 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
556 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
563 /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
564 /// remote signature and both parties keys
565 pub(crate) fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
566 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
567 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
572 our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
579 /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
580 /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
581 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
582 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
585 /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
587 /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
588 /// by your ChannelKeys.
589 /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
590 /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
591 /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
592 /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
593 pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
594 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
595 .sighash_all(&self.unsigned_tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
596 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
599 pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
600 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
601 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
602 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
604 if self.our_sig_first {
605 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
606 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
608 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
609 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
611 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
612 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
614 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
618 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
619 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
621 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
622 /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
624 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
625 let txid = self.txid();
626 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
627 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
629 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
630 if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
631 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
633 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
635 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
636 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
644 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
645 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
646 let txid = self.txid();
647 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
648 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
649 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
650 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
651 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
652 if this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
654 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
655 // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
656 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
657 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
659 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
661 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
662 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
664 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
665 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
666 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
667 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
669 if this_htlc.0.offered {
670 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
671 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
673 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
676 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
680 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
681 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
682 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
683 self.txid() == o.txid()
686 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
687 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
688 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
690 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
691 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
694 self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
695 self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
696 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
697 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
698 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
699 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
706 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
707 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
708 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
711 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
712 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
715 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
716 let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
717 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
718 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
719 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
720 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
721 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
722 let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
723 let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
724 per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
727 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
728 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
729 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
744 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
748 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
749 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
750 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
753 macro_rules! test_secrets {
755 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
756 for secret in secrets.iter() {
757 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
760 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
761 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
766 // insert_secret correct sequence
767 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
770 secrets.push([0; 32]);
771 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
772 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
775 secrets.push([0; 32]);
776 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
777 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
780 secrets.push([0; 32]);
781 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
782 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
785 secrets.push([0; 32]);
786 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
787 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
790 secrets.push([0; 32]);
791 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
792 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
795 secrets.push([0; 32]);
796 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
797 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
800 secrets.push([0; 32]);
801 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
802 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
805 secrets.push([0; 32]);
806 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
807 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
812 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
813 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
816 secrets.push([0; 32]);
817 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
818 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
821 secrets.push([0; 32]);
822 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
823 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
827 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
828 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
831 secrets.push([0; 32]);
832 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
833 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
836 secrets.push([0; 32]);
837 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
838 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
841 secrets.push([0; 32]);
842 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
843 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
846 secrets.push([0; 32]);
847 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
848 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
852 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
853 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
856 secrets.push([0; 32]);
857 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
858 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
861 secrets.push([0; 32]);
862 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
863 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
866 secrets.push([0; 32]);
867 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
868 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
871 secrets.push([0; 32]);
872 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
873 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
877 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
878 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
881 secrets.push([0; 32]);
882 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
883 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
886 secrets.push([0; 32]);
887 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
888 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
891 secrets.push([0; 32]);
892 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
893 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
896 secrets.push([0; 32]);
897 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
898 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
901 secrets.push([0; 32]);
902 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
903 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
906 secrets.push([0; 32]);
907 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
908 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
911 secrets.push([0; 32]);
912 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
913 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
916 secrets.push([0; 32]);
917 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
918 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
922 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
923 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
926 secrets.push([0; 32]);
927 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
928 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
931 secrets.push([0; 32]);
932 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
933 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
936 secrets.push([0; 32]);
937 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
938 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
941 secrets.push([0; 32]);
942 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
943 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
946 secrets.push([0; 32]);
947 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
948 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
951 secrets.push([0; 32]);
952 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
953 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
957 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
958 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
961 secrets.push([0; 32]);
962 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
963 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
966 secrets.push([0; 32]);
967 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
968 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
971 secrets.push([0; 32]);
972 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
973 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
976 secrets.push([0; 32]);
977 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
978 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
981 secrets.push([0; 32]);
982 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
983 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
986 secrets.push([0; 32]);
987 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
988 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
991 secrets.push([0; 32]);
992 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
993 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
996 secrets.push([0; 32]);
997 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
998 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1002 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1003 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1006 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1007 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1008 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1011 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1012 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1013 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1016 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1017 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1018 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1021 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1022 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1023 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1026 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1027 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1028 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1031 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1032 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1033 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1036 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1037 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1038 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1041 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1042 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1043 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1047 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1048 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1051 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1052 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1053 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1056 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1057 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1058 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1061 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1062 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1063 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1066 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1067 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1068 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1071 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1072 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1073 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1076 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1077 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1078 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1081 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1082 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1083 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1086 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1087 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1088 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());